For some time now, there has been debate in academic circles about just how much civilian politicians in Latin America need to know, and do, to control their militaries. David Pion-Berlin, a highly regarded scholar on Latin American civil-military relations, has argued that “civilians do not have to worry about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training.”¹ Pion-Berlin bases his argument on deductive logic and history, but we believe the situation has changed significantly in the region. Therefore, we respectfully disagree. In our opinion, civilians must know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they are required to do, not only in terms of submitting to civilian control, but also in successfully fulfilling the current very wide spectrum of roles and missions assigned to security forces in Latin America. Unlike Pion-Berlin, we believe that the security threats facing Latin America are now so broad and so critical that civilians have little choice but to engage with them and invest political capital in responding to them.

We must first recognize that in agreement with Pion-Berlin there is, in fact, an important disincentive for civilians to become expert on military issues.² In Aesop’s fable about the hedgehog and the fox, “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. This suggests that the fox, for all of his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog’s defense.”³ Like foxes, democratically elected politicians must know many things, while the armed forces, like the hedgehog, only have to know one big thing: national security—even though the definition of this concept is in transition. Military officers spend their careers studying and training in it; they belong to institutions that focus on it; and they ascend through the ranks depending on their knowledge of it. It is impossible for civilians, lacking this background, to develop anything like the national security expertise of military officers. We have seen senior military leaders use a hedgehog strategy to challenge civilian control of the military precisely because of the dearth of civilian knowledge about national security issues.

We believe that civilians do not need to be experts on national security to exercise control over the military and determine its roles and missions. However, they clearly must know something, and just as important, they must be aware of what they don’t know. In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, security is being reformed to mean much more than “national” security: it is widely understood to include “public” and “citizen”


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³ Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau and Dr. Richard B. Goetz Jr., Major General, U.S. Air Force (Retired)
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security as well. While civilians might not need to know everything about national security, they must know about public and citizen security, and they must be ready to act in response to the demands of society regarding both. National security has meant defending the continuity and sovereignty of a state. This is the traditional role of national defense forces. Public security refers to the state’s ability to maintain public order so that basic sectors such as transport, communications, and commerce can function. Citizen security addresses the exercise of human, political, and social rights by individuals and groups in a democracy.

The combination of threats in contemporary Central America is so serious that it challenges all three levels of security. Civilian elites currently employ the armed forces, among other instruments, to respond to these challenges. Public opinion surveys reveal that insecurity is the first concern of citizens in Central America. Our interviews indicate that political campaigns hinge on it, and that politicians expect to be held accountable for it. Even the academic literature is catching up to this fact of life.  

A Spectrum of Missions

Before turning to these threats, it might be useful to examine a national security mission that some countries view as an opportunity: peacekeeping and peacemaking, collectively termed Peace Support Operations (PSO). These operations are integral to the region’s armed forces. In response to Argentine President Menem’s strategy to change the international image of his nation, the military began by participating in PSO. More recently, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala sent troops to Haiti for United Nations Chapter 7 peacemaking operations. Chile, like Argentina, has established a PSO training center, and El Salvador and Guatemala are doing so as well. El Salvador also sent troops to support the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

All scholars who write on PSO emphasize the critical civil-military component of these operations, not only at policymaking levels, where the ministries of foreign affairs and finance work closely with the ministries of defense, but also locally, where troops interact with governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). There is, in short, a new element to civil-military relations in Latin America. Increasing numbers of countries are involved in what unfortunately promises to be the growth industry of PSO. There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that civilian policymakers are sending troops to Haiti. In Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, civilians were actively engaged in all phases of the decisions to send troops to Haiti and to keep them there.  

Organized crime is another threat keeping the region’s militaries employed. Many Latin and Central American countries face extremely serious crime problems that threaten the quality of life of millions of people and potentially even the survival of democracies. Organized crime threatens public and citizen security and, in some cases, national security as well. Organized crime and money-laundering in the Tri-Border Region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), drug-lord control of Rio de Janeiro favelas, organized crime and narcoterrorism in Colombia, and drug shipments throughout the region have been enormously corrosive. There is also the newer phenomenon of the maras, or gangs, in Central America and Mexico. Conservative estimates by El Salvador’s National Police have put the mara membership in Central America at approximately 70,000, with 36,000 in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, 11,000 in El Salvador, 4,500 in Nicaragua, 2,700 in Costa Rica, 1,400 in Panama, and 100 in Belize. The maras are not only a Central American regional phenomenon; in fact, they are transnational. The MS-13 gang, for example, reportedly has 8,000 to 10,000 members in the United States, 4,000 members in Canada, and a presence in 25 states in Mexico.

The maras’ defining characteristic is their exceptionally violent behavior. Initiation into the gangs,
discipline, and ascension into leadership positions are based on violence. In MS-13, four members beat each prospective gang member for 13 seconds while he puts up no resistance, protecting only his face and genitals. Later, mara members have to kill a person for no other reason than to show they can. The maras are believed to be responsible for 60 percent of the 2,576 murders committed in El Salvador in 2004, and the percentage is increasing. Countries with maras have overtaken even Colombia, with its active insurgency, in homicides. In 2005, the number of homicides per 100,000 people was 54.71 (3,761 homicides) in El Salvador, 40.66 (2,836) in Honduras, 37.53 (5,500) in Guatemala, and 33.76 (14,503) in Colombia.  

Besides fighting criminal gangs, Latin and Central American countries are also becoming increasingly involved in counterterrorism. None of the region’s countries except Colombia was concerned with terrorist threats before 11 September 2001, but since then Washington has made eliminating these threats priority number one in international relations. As General Bantz Craddock states in “SOUTHCOM Priorities and Investment Guidance: War on Terrorism,” “The number one priority for this command is to prevent terrorist groups from using the SOUTHCOM AOR as a staging ground to conduct terrorist operations against the United States or our vital interests in the Western Hemisphere, including partner nations throughout the region.” Those partner nations have been urged to strengthen their counterterrorist capabilities and to cooperate and coordinate with each other and the United States. These are civil-military issues because top civilian and military leaders decide when to use intelligence and special operations forces against terrorists.

Appreciation of the terrorist threat and action taken against it varies by countries in the region. We find that the governments of some countries that did not take the threat seriously, such as Brazil and Uruguay, are now developing strategies and committing resources to fight terrorism. El Salvador has received threats because of its role in Iraq and has responded to the threats.

It should be obvious from this short summary that civilians must be knowledgeable and engaged in order to manage the scarce funds, personnel, and equipment available to handle PSOs, maras, and terrorism effectively. They really have no choice. They must become involved in PSOs if they want other nations to take them seriously; they must fight the maras if they do not want criminals to take over their cities; and they must develop effective intelligence if they want to prevent terrorists from using their countries to stage attacks on the United States. They have to act. How well they act, and how well informed they must be, is now the real issue.

Nobody can expect civilian foxes to become hedgehogs and know everything about the “one big thing” that military officers spend their careers studying. However, civilian awareness and engagement must extend beyond the ministries of defense and the armed forces to include intelligence agencies and ministries of gobierno, where the police are normally located.
Controlling the Military

According to Pion-Berlin, “Latin America is not a region where politicians have ever had or will ever have the incentive to get up to speed on defense issues” in terms either of resources or employment. These civilians lack incentive because Latin America, historically, has been free of the kinds of wars that might require civilians to know about those issues. Even today’s “internal threats (narcotraffickers, terrorists, guerrillas) do not pose challenges that warrant great military preparedness and sophistication.” Pion-Berlin goes on to highlight the contrast in competence between civilians and military officers by pointing out that “with defense perceived to be off limits, civilians have never been able to prove their worth. Instead, they have developed a kind of inferiority complex that just reinforces their dependency on the military.”

The lack of civilian expertise isn’t such a big problem, however, because “during the past two decades, while the balance of competence still tilts heavily in favor of the military, the balance of power has moved in favor of civilians.” Civilians must manage the military because it is both the coercive arm of the state and a self-interested institution whose needs must be addressed. They have done so “largely through a form of political civilian control, which is a low cost means of achieving a relative calm in civil-military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, legislative oversight, and large budgets.” And finally, “while civilians interface, they do not intervene. The government stays out of the military’s defense sphere of influence principally because of its lack of knowledge and staff.”

Latin America might be a “zone of peace” with regard to external conflict, but it is not peaceful internally, as the maras, drug traffickers, organized crime, and insurgencies (in Colombia) illustrate. Currently, civilian policymakers in Mexico and Central America have put the armed forces either on the frontline against criminal gangs or in support of anti-crime efforts. Civilian leaders also have directed the military to fulfill international responsibilities short of war, as the PSO support of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other Latin American countries shows. Although such missions are not directly related to national defense, they employ the armed forces (and to a lesser degree police forces) in support of perceived national interests. For example, Brazilian generals head up the UN Mission in Haiti, and a Brazilian brigade of 967 soldiers is deployed there.

Civilian policymakers not only manage the armed forces, but also decide upon its roles and missions, whether they want to or not, and whether they are well informed or not. These are empirical facts: presidents and their appointees decide on a daily basis about the use of security forces, including the armed forces. Analysts can agree or disagree with the wisdom of the decision, but in 2004, Guatemalan President Oscar Berger decided to reduce military manpower and budget by 50 percent. He accomplished that in about 90 days. Civilian policymakers don’t need to know the “one big thing,” but it seems to us that they do need to establish institutions to embody and perpetuate the knowledge and expertise needed to deal with military missions as they arise. Only in this way can democratic governments routinely deal with problems and crises in an internationally acceptable manner.

The Trinity

Based on our work for over a decade in more than 100 countries in all parts of the world, and drawing from the literature on security and civil-military relations, we see civil-military relations as a trinity. The first part of the trinity is “democratic civilian control of the armed forces.” This is a fairly simple concept, concerns power, and must be implemented through institutions such as ministries of defense, oversight committees in the congress, civilian control of officer promotions and military education, and the like. The other two elements of the trinity are “effectiveness” and “efficiency.” By effectiveness, we mean that the armed services and other security forces successfully implement the roles and missions assigned to them by democratically elected civilians. Efficiency means that they accomplish their missions at the least possible cost
in lives and resources. Because there are no simple mathematical formulae that define least possible costs, countries must have civilian institutions in place to determine priorities for assigning resources. Civilian policymakers—the foxes—need to think beyond problems of control and consider whether their forces can achieve their assigned roles and missions, and if so, at what cost and at what level of risk. Control does not imply effectiveness and efficiency. Indeed, the simplest way to control the armed forces would be to eliminate them, as in Costa Rica and Panama, or to severely constrain their budgets, as in Ecuador. Neither leads to effectiveness or efficiency.¹⁸

**Institutions**

If we analyze how different countries deal with elements of the trinity, we can identify four sets of structures and processes that we call “institutions” to emphasize their empirical nature.¹⁹ Table 1 illustrates how these four institutions support the trinity of civil-military relations.

**Ministries of defense (MOD).** MODs can support all three elements of the trinity.²⁰ Civilian policymakers can control the armed forces through a MOD. The MOD also typically evaluates the effectiveness of military roles and missions while cadres of civilian and military lawyers, economists, and accountants within the MOD measure how efficiently resources are used.

**Legislatures.** These institutions support all three elements of the trinity. They ensure democratic civilian control by maintaining the separation of powers, controlling the budget, and exercising oversight. Diversity of political representation (through elections) and the development of expertise among members and particularly their staffs allow legislatures to improve the effectiveness of military roles and missions. Furthermore, legislatures ensure efficiency by routinely exercising an oversight function through hearings, auditing units, and inspectors general. In most of the older democracies, legislatures enhance efficiency more than effectiveness.²¹

**Interagency communication and cooperation mechanism.** Whether it occurs via a national security council or another executive-level organization such as Brazil’s Institutional Security Cabinet, the government must have a way to effect interagency communication and cooperation—such a mechanism is critical for effectiveness. The interagency process is an element of democratic civilian control, but it depends on institutions such as an MOD to influence effectiveness. With an interagency process, civilian leaders can determine roles and missions in a rational manner. Moreover, because security today spans a wide spectrum of possibilities, this interagency process or mechanism must be robust.

**Intelligence system.** This system supports the first two elements of the trinity. Contemporary democracies maintain elaborate military and civilian intelligence systems and even more elaborate mechanisms to control them. There is also much emphasis today on effective intelligence. However, although executive and legislative institutions scrutinize intelligence systems, there is often no real effort to monitor their efficiency. The emphasis on secrecy in intelligence collection, analysis, and budgeting militates against true efficiency.²²

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**Table 1. Institutional bases for trinity of democratic civil-military relations.**

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**Table 2. Institutional bases for trinity in two countries.**

**Status: El Salvador and Guatemala**

Having laid out the four “institutions” used to support the trinity of civil-military relations, we
think it would be informative to see just how effective two of the region’s countries, El Salvador and Guatemala, have been at implementing civilian control of the military.

**El Salvador.** As table 2 indicates, El Salvador has made tremendous progress in recent years. Although an active-duty general still heads the MOD and few high-level civilians work in the ministry, there have been major reforms in other areas. About ten members of the 84-member congress are knowledgeable about security issues and have informed, competent staffs. A national security council has been active since the mid-1990s, and a secretariat with six permanent, full-time members has provided continuity and support to the council since 2005. El Salvador’s intelligence system is robust and highly professional. It includes a presidential intelligence agency, military intelligence, and a police intelligence component.

**Guatemala.** In Guatemala, everything is “on the verge” of happening—but it has been that way for many years. The Guatemalan constitution requires the minister of defense to be an active-duty general officer. In the last few years, the minister has assumed a bigger role and more power than the chief of the general staff of the armed forces (as one might expect given the fact that the last three ministers had previously served as chief). The ministry has a half-dozen qualified civilian members, mainly in the areas of defense policy and legal affairs, and plans to have a civilian vice minister of defense if the constitution cannot be changed to allow a civilian to run the MOD. The Guatemalan congress requires annual turnover of the heads of committees; consequently, nobody develops any expertise, a drawback that is aggravated when the committee staffs change as well. While Guatemala’s president does have periodic cabinet meetings with the ministers of defense, gobernacion, and foreign affairs, there is no permanent or technical staff to support those meetings and effect any resolutions issuing from them (although there is a written plan for a national security system that is “on the verge” of implementation). Guatemalans and their foreign allies have focused much attention on intelligence since at least 1997, but there is only nominal oversight of it from the executive branch and none from the congress.

**Explaining the variations.** To account for the differences between El Salvador and Guatemala in civil-military relations, we must look first at the terms and conditions of each country’s post-civil war transition to democracy and the prerogatives accruing to each country’s armed forces.

First, we note that in 1992 El Salvador’s military developed “Plan Arce 2000,” which they have been implementing ever since. Now “Plan Arce 2005,” it reformed the armed forces and provided a new, democratic approach to civil-military relations. In Guatemala, the military initiated the transition from a military to a civilian regime, and it continued to support that change along with the peace process; however, to the best of our knowledge, that was the end of their plan, and the end of their influence.

Second, international involvement and influence has been extremely important in El Salvador, but much less so in Guatemala, where foreign engagement in the peace process was less central. Of course, foreign influence can work only if there is some way for outsiders to engage with domestic constituencies. Unfortunately, the region has no organization, like NATO or the European Union, that can set forth detailed rules for, among other things, democratic civil-military relations as prerequisites for membership. The United States has at least partially filled that vacuum, but while it has been willing to continue a high level of security assistance for El Salvador because of its continued participation in Iraq, it has not done so for Guatemala because of the latter’s record of human rights abuses and its difficulty in working with other governments. Guatemala’s transition has also been impeded by (in our view) the overly influential role single-issue NGOs have played in determining U.S. policy toward the country.

Third, at least in countries that were formerly under military control, the government can only...
address issues in civil-military relations when it is stable and coherent enough to govern. The “deal” in El Salvador held, and yielded a relatively stable political system that included the rebel Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. The deal in Guatemala failed on the civilian side. President Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabrera, who had come to power promising to fight corruption and defend Guatemala’s poor and indigenous majority, had to flee to Mexico in 2004 to avoid corruption charges.

The fourth and final point concerns political learning. Scholars know that political and organizational learning is important. It is, however, a very difficult indicator to assess. At a minimum, we envision leaders learning about civil-military relations in MODs, educational institutions, and think tanks. In El Salvador, the Plan Arce 2000 created the Command for Doctrine and Military Education, which institutionalized learning for all branches of the armed forces in 18 educational institutions, including the College for Higher Strategic Studies, a school with an impressive 15-year record of educating civilians and officers to work together in the executive and legislative branches of government. In short, there are multiple areas for political learning in El Salvador, including a myriad of foreign-funded NGOs and think tanks that provide funding for academics and activists.

In Guatemala, reality has finally intervened, and much is changing. In our interviews there last March, including a meeting with President Berger and his security cabinet, we learned that he and his government perceive serious security threats at all levels—national, public, and citizen—and are planning on implementing changes that will institutionalize the interagency process and the intelligence system.

There are at least three reasons for these potential changes: the U.S., British, and Colombian Governments are encouraging and supporting change; under Berger, the government is stable; and NGOs and a defense community founded in 2001 have accumulated a critical mass of knowledge and access. If these trends continue, Guatemala might catch up to El Salvador in civil-military relations and the institutions necessary to institutionalize them. If it does, it should begin to respond more effectively to the multiple security challenges facing the country and the region.

Salvadoran President Elias Antonio Saca, center, and Defense Minister Otto Romero, left, review troops of the Artillery Brigade in San Juan Opico, El Salvador, 11 August 2006 during the farewell ceremony for the VII Cuscatlán Battalion before their deployment to Iraq as part of a multinational force working in humanitarian operations.
4. In a Pew study conducted in Guatemala in 2002, 93 percent of respondents thought that crime was a very big problem and another 5 percent thought it was a moderately big problem. See What the World Thinks in 2002, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, we don’t have a more recent Pew study. However, according to 2005 LatinoBarómetro (vol. 20, no. 7), 39 percent of Guatemalan respondents considered crime their biggest problem. It outdistanced all other issues in Guatemala, and the 39 percent concern level was the highest of any country in Latin America regarding crime. In “The Age of Insecurity: Violence and Social Disorder in the New Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, 41, 1 (2006): 178, Diane E. Davis notes: “Sad as it is to say, violence could arguably be considered the central—if not defining—problem in contemporary Latin America as it faces the new millennium.”
6. For an excellent comparative analysis of the reasons the ABC countries have for sending troops to Haiti, see Elsa Liendzerrozas, “Argentina, Brasil y Chile en la reconstrucción de Haití: intereses y motivaciones en la participación conjunta,” paper prepared for Latin American Studies Association conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 15 March 2006.
7. The Intelligence and Legal Affairs Division of the National Civilian Police in El Salvador provided extensive data on the maras from their own work and from recent international conferences. The figures and the general information provided in the text come from these data.
8. These figures are widely cited. See <http://luterano.blogspot.com/2006/01/el-salvador-pain-murder-rate-highest.html>.
11. Ibid., 19.
12. ibid., 22.
15. Ibid., 29.
17. Besides those from Brazil, military personnel from other Latin American countries in the Haiti mission include Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. As of 30 April 2005, there were 7,495 uniformed participants from the region (6,207 troops and 1,622 civilian police).
19. For this approach, see the introduction in Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tolleson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Modern Civil-Military Relations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000).
20. The literature on this topic is minimal. See the chapter on ministries of defense, by Richard Goetze and Bruneau, in Bruneau and Tolleson, ibid. The Red de Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina is now beginning to produce work on this topic. See the Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en America Latina Ser en el 2000 (Buenos Aires, 2005), 67-73.
21. See the two chapters on global comparisons of legislators by Jeanne Giraldo in Bruneau and Tolleson.
22. For more on our approach to the analysis of intelligence agencies, see Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Reforming Intelligence,” Journal of Democracy (July 2006), 28-42.
23. Bruneau has done work in El Salvador since 1997, and both Bruneau and Goetze had meetings and interviews with policymakers in the National Security Council and leaders of the National Police during the weeks of 19 March and 3 April 2006.
24. Bruneau has done work in Guatemala since 1997. Goetze did a major research project on the armed forces for President Oscar Berger in early 2004, and both Bruneau and Goetze met with President Berger, his security cabinet, and other high-level officials during the week of 26 March 2006.
25. Many scholars writing in the field, including most of those writing on transition-consolidation, agree that “terms and understanding of the transition to democracy” and “prerogatives accruing to the armed forces” are essential to explaining variations in the region’s civil-military relations. See, for example, Felipe Aguero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-authoritarian Regimes,” in David Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). While Aguero suggests other factors that might account for variations, he really looks only at transition-consolidation in his later work.
26. For an insider’s analysis of the whole process, see Gramajo Morales, Hector Alejandro, De la Guerra . . . a la Guerra: La Dificil Transicion Politica en Guatemala (Guatemala: Fondo de Cultura Editorial, 1995).
27. In our view, the major defect of the peace and democratization process in Guatemala was indeed the lack of “ownership” of the process by broad sectors of Guatemalan society. This key point is identified by Theresa Whitfield in “The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Preliminary Comparison,” in Cynthia Arnson, ed., Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 1999), 233.
28. The figures for U.S. military assistance to Guatemala and El Salvador contrast dramatically. For example, between fiscal years 2002 and 2006, Guatemala received a total of $2,044,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. El Salvador, on the other hand, received $7,035,000 in IMET during the same period and another $8.9 million in foreign military sales and $19.66 million in foreign military financing. Data are from <www.cipoline.org/facts/fms.htm>.
29. For a useful source, see Jennifer L. McCoy, ed., Political Learning and Postauthoritarian Transition in Latin America: Do Politicians Learn from Political Crises? (Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 2000).
30. By mid-2006, the College for Higher Strategic Studies had educated 409 civilians and 138 military and police officers.
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