Institutionalizing Security Force Assistance

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See Abstract

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Abstract


This monograph examines the role that Security Force Assistance plays in the development and execution of US foreign policy. It looks at the manner in which security assistance guidance is developed and executed. An examination of national level policy and the guidance from senior military and civilian leaders highlights the important role of Security Force Assistance. Further inquiry into the execution of Security Force Assistance reveals a discrepancy between what is necessary and what is available. With 243,000 Soldiers deployed or forward stationed in 76 countries worldwide a way to reduce the gap is to build capabilities and capacities of allies and partners.

The uniqueness of the United States and the topic hindered the use of actual case studies in this monograph, however where suitable, references and linkages to other examples of Security Force Assistance are provided.

The expected generational length of the Long War, the transformation of the US Army into a future force and the desire to empower allies, partners and friends necessitate a change in the way the US Army conducts Security Force Assistance. The US Army requires an institutionalized capability to conduct Security Force Assistance beyond Special Forces and Transition Teams (TTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1
- NATIONAL LEVEL DOCUMENTS/JUSTIFICATION ............................................................... 8
- WHAT SENIOR LEADERS ARE SAYING ................................................................................ 14
- MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND HOW IT WORKS ................................................................. 21
  - THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE ................................... 25
  - MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING ................................................................. 29
  - CURRENT MiTT TRAINING .............................................................................................. 30
- US CONDUCT OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND THE PROBLEM WITH
  SPECIAL FORCES ............................................................................................................... 36
  - ONE EXAMPLE OF SFA ........................................................................................................ 41
- CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 41
- RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 44
- BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 49
INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the United States (US) is built on democracy and engagement.¹ The policy itself shifts based on the variables and dynamics which make up the international political environment. However, long term goals and guiding principles are established in order to align US policymakers and agencies as well as inform the world at large of the intentions of the US. This is done primarily through the publication of national level documents such as The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), “…which explains the strategic underpinning of his [the President’s] foreign policy” in addition to the words and actions of political and military leaders.²

The NSS is created with the input of many governmental organizations and ideally in conjunction with other world leaders and organizations. Its creation, at the highest levels of government, allows subordinate organizations to use it as their framework to develop subsidiary policies and programs that are nested with the overall goals of the US. It “is based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.”³ As policy flows down from the President to the individual it passes through many layers of both people and organizational bureaucracy. It is important to remember that as the world situation evolves and political leadership changes, so to may the direction of US foreign policy. This is a natural occurrence in the political cycle and allows subordinates to utilize these documents in the development and execution of secondary plans and policy.

The US shifted its foreign policy in keeping with the evolving nature of national and international threats and allies. The most notable change was from containment during the cold war to engagement in the current era of globalization.\(^4\) As the world continues to become more interconnected and interdependent, there will continue to be new and emerging threats that impact the members of the world as well as US policy. While some consider the US to have a “preemptive national security policy for the 21\(^{st}\) century,” the fact remains that turning back time to the way things were is not an option.\(^5\) Former Secretary of State Colin Powell illustrated the massive impact and spanning reach of the US when he said, “there is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have become the motive force for freedom and democracy in the world. And there is no country in the world that does not touch us.”\(^6\) Balancing between protection and engagement is analogous to the carrot and the stick and US policymakers must know when different forms of national power are required to influence both long term strategy and immediate desired outcomes.

If one believes, as Clausewitz said, that “when whole communities go to war…the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political objective. War, therefore, is an act of policy,” then the military can conceivably be considered one of the many policy tools available to the nation.\(^7\) The military along with the diplomatic, informational and economic elements comprise the four elements of national power or DIME; but should the military be used as a policy tool to prevent war before it occurs? If one accepts that all the instruments of national power must be understood, applied and leveraged for the US to


accomplish it’s near and far term foreign policy goals, then the military may not only be relevant but a necessary and integral component of US foreign policy.

Despite a general preponderance of policy, doctrine and ideas, the US Army lacks clear practical guidance and the structure for implementation of Security Force Assistance (SFA). The better part of a decade was spent fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), now the third longest war for the US since the Revolutionary War, and the US has failed to posture itself for efficient security assistance into the future.8

Securing borders and ports will not be enough to isolate or insulate the US from the looming threats posed by those throughout the world who wish the US and others harm. Future conflict is inevitable and with the emergence of both rogue states and non-state actors the nature of future conflict, including its location, scope and duration will not be for the US or its allies to determine. Conflict will continue for the foreseeable future and terrorism is a threat that will not be limited by geographic boundaries.9

Some, both in and out of uniform, believe that because the US has the best trained, best equipped and most technologically advanced military in the world, victory clearly belongs to them.10,11 However, looking back on the lessons from the last seven years of combat shows this prediction has not always materialized. If anything is certain, it’s that the US should be humble

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and thorough in its approach to predicting the future of military conflict. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that four times in the last century the nation forgot the lessons of the war and while conventional challenges of US military capabilities seems unlikely in the near future, the priorities need to change.\(^\text{12}\) If the US has the market cornered on the conventional battle, then how does it seek to gain the advantage in the other spectrums of conflict, advance it and its allies’ foreign policy goals and help deter or prevent future conflict? The US will need to be able to do more than defeat nation states, it must build allies, close seams and gaps between stable and unstable states and regions, and advance a world built on freedom, not terror.

The US Army has a capability gap that will likely grow, given the expanding commitment of US resources. Presently, 243,000 Soldiers (over 40% of those on active duty) are deployed or forward stationing in 76 countries around the world.\(^\text{13}\) A way to reduce the size of the gap is to build the capabilities and capacities of allies and partners. The US Army can look to both existing allies as well as new partners to help fill their capability gaps and build lasting partnerships. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) GEN Peter Pace stated, “building partnership capacity leverages the local language, knowledge, and culture of indigenous forces, which reduces requirements for our own forces.”\(^\text{14}\)

Given the change in world events, emphasis on security throughout the world and the suggested duration of the GWOT, what current CJCS ADM Mike Mullen calls the Long War, the

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\(^\text{12}\) Robert M. Gates, (Remarks delivered during the Landon Lecture Series, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007).


US Army requires a capability to conduct foreign Security Force Assistance.\textsuperscript{15} Despite the previous reliance on US Army Special Forces (SF) and the current use of Transition Teams (TTs), the Army requires something different, perhaps revolutionary, to meet this need. Commitments in the Middle East and throughout the world will continue to tax the military. Even with a planned growth in SF, they will continue to be constrained by the demand for them as resources and by their own doctrine.\textsuperscript{16} As the Army plans to grow the active force by 65,000 it must critically look to the future of conflict to determine the best capabilities and skill sets for the successful employment of forces and fulfillment of their role as part of the military element of national power. This leads to the hypothesis of this paper: does the US Army require a different capability to conduct foreign Security Force Assistance?

The criteria used to evaluate this hypothesis will include both qualitative and quantitative data, with more emphasis on the qualitative. It will include the use of both primary and secondary sources of data. It will review national level documents to highlight the US strategy and policy specific to engagement with other nations and security assistance. It will review what senior civilian and military leaders are proposing with regard to foreign nations and whether it is in concert with US strategy and policy. It will explain and analyze the current manner in which military assistance is conducted and attempt to determine if it is still relevant. Finally, it will provide recommendations and suggestions for both improvement and future research.

The methodology used to answer the research question and evaluate the hypothesis will be done by linking together the common themes in the relevant documents, publications and information to determine if there is a requirement for the Army to institutionalize a capability to conduct Security Force Assistance.

\textsuperscript{15} Mike Mullen, (Question and Answer, following remarks delivered at the Center for New American Security (CNAS), Washington, DC, October 25, 2007), \url{http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/071025_Q_A_at_CNAS.html} (accessed February 2, 2008).

\textsuperscript{16} “JCISFA White Paper SFA Proponency” (draft working paper, Winter 2008), 1.
The limitations of this research include the newness of the topic, lack of comparable case studies and tendency to compare Security Force Assistance (SFA) exclusively to Afghanistan and Iraq. While it can be argued the United States conducted some form of SFA since the inception of the nation, only recently has it moved into the discourse of military and academic professionals. While many forms of research benefit from some form of case study comparison, given the uniqueness of the US in terms of geographic location, political interconnectedness and economic position, it is difficult to compare it to other nations or even to examples from its own history as relevant case study comparisons. Finally, there is a tendency throughout the military and likely the world at large, to want to compare things to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq and while they provide us with some recent scenarios they are not all inclusive examples.

There are some key recurring definitions that are important to understand early is the paper. The first, which relates directly to the title of the paper is Security Force Assistance. It is defined in emerging doctrine as the unified action of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) community to generate, employ, sustain, and assist host nation and regional security forces in support of legitimate authority.17 Additionally, this paper will also discuss capability and capacity as they relate to a militaries ability to execute missions. Using the definitions from RAND, capability refers to the ability to perform a function and capacity refers to the extent of a capability present.18 Understanding the definitions at the beginning of the paper should help to alleviate confusion throughout the remainder of the paper.

The conclusions reached in this paper indicate that there is a requirement to expand the current capacity to conduct security force assistance. National level documents, senior military and civilian leaders echo a need to expand the capability and capacity of our allies, partners and

18 RAND Corporation, Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007).
friends. The plan to expand the Special Forces will not solve this problem. The current advisory effort is a good start but falls short in many ways. The United States will have a requirement to conduct SFA beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, but these operations help reinforce the necessity.
NATIONAL LEVEL DOCUMENTS/JUSTIFICATION

The change of direction in US foreign policy since the end of the cold war is aptly reflected in the US National Security Strategy (NSS). Considered by Condoleezza Rice to offer “…a bold vision for protecting our nation that captures today’s new realities and new opportunities.”19 As the US shifts from a policy of isolation and containment to embrace and engagement, all of the instruments of national power must be synchronized in order to accomplish established strategic goals. This section will illustrate how these national level documents convey common themes of multilateral versus unilateral, engagement versus isolation and empowerment versus domination when dealing with other nations and states.

Since the birth of the nation the US has established relationships and alliances with other nations.20 The nature and duration of such arrangements changed over time, but were often focused, both offensively and defensively, on protecting US interests. The protection of US interests has not changed with time, rather it expanded in scope. Such changes in policy or direction are often captured in US national level policy.21

The NSS “provides top-level strategic guidance to [Department of Defense] DoD and other departments and a framework for inter-agency strategic planning.”22 According to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, it “…explains the strategic underpinnings of his [the President’s] foreign policy [and] … lays out the President’s vision of how to achieve this


goal…” President George H.W. Bush’s Introduction Letter to the NSS of 2002 says the war on terrorism is global in reach and enterprise and of uncertain duration and that “America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror.” The document further states that in addition to our allies, “cooperative security agreements are a key element to confronting these emerging transnational threats.” Expanding the capabilities of the military and providing the national command authority with more options is the essence of transformation. The US military will attempt to maintain itself as the unequalled best in the world, but the nation and world will continue to demand the increased use of non-military and softer-military options than those previously relied upon.

The 2006 NSS echoes the same message of unequalled military strength and democracy set forth in its predecessor, but expands the scope of US commitment. In addition to generic partnership and strengthening of our allies, it states the US efforts will include, “tailoring assistance and training of [foreign] military forces to support civilian control of the [foreign] military and [foreign] military respect for human rights in a democratic society.” Some of the main points are strengthening our allies, working with others to diffuse regional conflicts, preventing our enemies from threatening us and our allies, and transforming America’s national

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security for the 21st century.28 Both documents exemplify the importance the President places on foreign engagement and the support for bolstering and bettering foreign militaries in the effort to meet and defeat new and emerging threats.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2005 reiterates the new challenges faced by the US but also highlights the opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners overseas to help bring stability to the world. Two of its four strategic objectives are achieved through efforts and actions with other nations. It specifically says the US will “help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.”29 It acknowledges the potentially undetermined duration and scope of future operations, stating that defeating irregular forces and terrorists “may require operations over long periods, and using many elements of national power, such operations may require changes to the way we train, equip, and employ our forces…”30 Under the transformation initiatives of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld it stressed that we must question and challenge the way we think about problems, opportunities, and goals and that we must “adapt the Defense Department [DoD] to that new perspective and refocus capabilities to meet future demands, not those we are already most prepared to meet.”31 The document goes so far as to say that we need to increase other nation’s capabilities and that security cooperation is “one of the principal vehicles for strengthening alliances and partnerships.”32

The National Military Strategy (NMS) is created by the CJCS to inform the military of its strategic direction, in order to support the goals and objectives outlined in the NSS and NDS. It lays out the military objectives of the nation as well as the way ahead for the prioritization of capabilities and effort. Noting the guidance from the NSS to build and maintain relations with allies and partners, the NMS emphasizes the need not just for kinetic strike options but also to “create conditions inhospitable to terrorism and rogue regimes.” The 2001 – 2005 CJCS GEN Richard Myers emphasized that transformation was more than just a buzzword and required “…intellect and cultural adjustments – adjustments that reward innovations and creativity” and is further demonstrated by the NMS predicing success on “…a capabilities-based approach to force design and planning…”

Working off the NDS strategic objectives, the NMS outlines three supporting military objectives: “to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.” Partnership and alliance are mentioned in all three objectives, but strongly emphasized under the second objective, prevent conflict and surprise attacks. Highlighting that by bolstering our partners’ desire and ability to help in regional security, reinforces US strategic goals and benefits overseas security. Further, the NMS directs the military to enable “multi-national partners through security cooperation and other engagement

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activities” with some of the most important outcomes of such activities being “the integration of military operations with allies, contribution to regional stability, reduce underlying conditions that foment extremism and set the conditions for future success.”39 Further noting the reasons for this include, “establishing important military interactions, building trust and confidence between the United States and its multinational partners. These relatively small investments often produce results that far exceed their cost.”40

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislative requirement that is intended to balance strategy with resources, develop strategic guidance for the DoD, lay out the agenda for the development of needed capability for the future forces and perhaps, most importantly, it is supposed to be a twenty year outlook for the entire Defense Department.41 Additionally, it “reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense,” yet highlights the disconnect between the policy of engagement and the DoD restructuring of forces.42 The 2006 document highlights “tailored deterrence,” focuses on “non-state enemies [and] rogue powers” on preventative shaping of the future, and on “building partner capabilities.”43

The QDR reiterates that the current struggle will “last for some years to come” and conveniently refers to it as “the long war.”44 It postulates that organizations and missions such as

Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) are a model for empowering others and “critical to winning the long war.” While the QDR emphasizes the priorities to build and expand the capabilities of partners and grow them to do for themselves, it seeks to provide balance by attempting to “minimize its [the US] own costs in terms of lives and treasure.”

According to the 2006 QDR the joint ground force vision is that, “they will understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the ability to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.” The QDR emphasizes that enabling others to do a task is better than the US doing it for themselves.

The QDR Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity, 22 May 2006 was intended to help implement the QDR, noting that the US can not accomplish its strategic goals and fulfill its national security interests without the help of allies and partners. Specifying that, “the United States must work with new international partners in less familiar areas of the world to reduce the drivers of instability, prevent terrorist attacks … and ultimately defeat them.” It advocates for the DoD to “grow a new team of leaders and operators … comfortable working in remote regions of the world” who are able to achieve US aims through “personal engagement, persuasion and quite influence – rather than military force alone.” Perhaps most startling, in order

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to achieve these results acknowledges, “… new approaches to education assignments and career incentives, as well as new authorities are needed.”

While it is sometimes easier to do things alone rather than in collaboration, these national level policy documents show the US reaffirmed its commitment to helping others help themselves. In doing so it helps ensure the security of those receiving help, increases regional stability, and in turn fosters security throughout the world. These documents explain the desire and willingness of senior level officials to use the military to help further the goals of US foreign policy through the national and international security process. Throughout the NSS, NDS and QDR senior military and civilian officials acknowledge the struggle against extremists and terrorism will last not for years, but for generations. Further, those changes are necessary in the way the military trains, equips and executes the missions of the United States.

WHAT SENIOR LEADERS ARE SAYING

Some outside the military such as Thomas Barnett, Dr. Klare, and Dr. Don Snider have argued for years that a change in approach following the end of the cold war was necessary and immediate. Dr. Barnett is a New York Times best selling author and a nationally-known public speaker who was featured in numerous national publications. He is in high demand within government circles as a forecaster of global conflict and expert on military transformation.

Citing the impact of previous conflicts, they warned that the US should not forget the hard learned and hard fought lessons of the past. The common critique was that we should not train to fight the last war and many felt Counterinsurgency (COIN) was too difficult, but if history has taught us anything, it’s that we must learn from the past.


Those such as Dr. Michael Klare, the Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies has written widely on defense policy, security, the arms trade, and advocated a change in the post-Cold War mentality.\textsuperscript{52} Like other scholars who pondered the cause, scope and location of the next conflict, he asked if “traditional assumptions” were still valid and if the fault lines had shifted away from traditional conflict between states. Further noting the tendency and desire to use such “traditional assumptions” but elaborating that “… it is not at all apparent that such assessments will prove reliable.”\textsuperscript{53} His observation is particularly valuable because it was published over a decade ago, long before current conflicts developed.

An Australian Armoured [sic] Corps Officer with experience in both the Solomon Islands and Iraq noted, “training for high [intensity conflict] and adapting to low [intensity conflict] is a cliché that Western militaries need to challenge…”\textsuperscript{54} This military professional reminds us that every mission requirement is unique and that preparation and execution require more than just “dialing down” the intensity to meet the current threat.

Senior leaders throughout the DoD acknowledge the necessity for something different than the status quo and the way things were regarding Security Force Assistance. Both the former and current Secretaries of Defense as well the current Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen’s have reiterated these views in multiple forums. Their words and deeds show they understand the increasing scope and complexity of the situation in the world and that global security is more than just a “military issue” or a “political issue.” There will likely always be debate over the military’s role in the

\textsuperscript{52} The Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies is a joint appointment at Amherst College, Hampshire College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith College, and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.


development and execution of national or foreign policy and as this section will illustrate more and more leaders are echoing the need for global engagement and Security Force Assistance.

Their views and ideas are important because these leaders are the ones who give life to and execute the strategic visions and policies of their predecessors. They take words and concepts and put them into action implementing change along the way and they have the ability to depart from or reinforce previously published guidance. The senior leaders below demonstrate through their comments that they are ready and willing to support the path of change.

The current CJCS ADM Mike Mullen’s, confirmed that senior leaders understand that our military and the world is in a time of change that will continue to speed up and provide ever increasing challenges beyond just Iraq and Afghanistan.55 During his visit to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas he cited the impact and value of working with foreign militaries and when asked about the future of MiTTs (Military Transition Teams) and whose responsibility it would be he said, “I don’t think the MiTT thing is a fad… I don’t think it’s going to be a fad at all, I think we’re going to have to be doing it.”56 Having recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan, he spoke from first-hand accounts of the impact such organizations were having on the development and security of the country.

In January 2008, ADM Mullen through Video TeleConferencing (VTC) addressed a group assembled for a SFA symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, further reinforcing the weight of the issue and solidifying his support for the process of change. ADM Mullen’s comments are extremely relevant given that he recently began his term in October 2007, after serving as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). As a career naval officer, he is in the position to provide an objective view from a service not primarily engaged with the mission of SFA. His

55 Mike Mullen, (Remarks delivered to the Command and General Staff College Audience, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 23, 2007).
56 Mike Mullen, (Remarks delivered to the Command and General Staff College Audience, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 23, 2007).
enthusiasm and support for Transition Teams (TTs) illustrates his acknowledgement of the current and future requirement for such a capability of an extended duration beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. Such support from “the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces” and “the principle military advisor to the President” lends weight to the necessity, longevity and further development of SFA.\(^{57}\) His support of the MiTT concept shows he is focused on how best to provide assistance to our allies so that the US will not have to do it alone.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld showed he understood the need for Security Force Assistance and the design of a common doctrinal language by creating the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). On 4 April 2006 he published a memorandum directing the establishment of JCISFA with the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent and the organization reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS.\(^{58}\) The memorandum specifically stated that “the ability to train host nation forces to assume security missions rapidly from U.S. forces is critical to our national strategy.”\(^{59}\) It further elaborated that the organization would “institutionalize lessons and best practices from Security Force Assistance operations to better prepare U.S. and Partner nation forces…”\(^{60}\) Despite the existence of organizations such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) or the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) he deemed it necessary to create an organization focused


specifically on Security Force Assistance and by using that term he established a base from which to expand the doctrine for working with foreign security forces. 61

The current Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke at both the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and at Kansas State University and emphasized many similar themes. Clearly an advocate for shared responsibility and increasing the capabilities of the non-military elements of national power, he addressed the future threat and roles for the military. Noting perhaps the lessons learned from both Iraq and Afghanistan was that “…military success is not sufficient to win…” and things such as “…institution-building…[and] training and equipping indigenous military and police forces…” are essential. 62 He elaborated that enabling and empowering partners to defend themselves is key to the war and “the standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole.” The evidence of his commitment was demonstrated when he said, “…as I’ve said before, the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities…” 63

At the 2007 AUSA Annual Meeting he said,

… arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking. 64

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63 Robert M. Gates, (Remarks delivered during Landon Lecture Series, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007).
This is largely important because while the Army provides the majority of the forces that fill TTs and conduct advisory missions, it the recognition by the Secretary of Defense, that will help facilitate the institutionalization of such capabilities beyond the Army and across all the services.

Even the Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, appears to be synchronized with this shared vision, noting the integral role of the military and SFA. At the AUSA Eisenhower luncheon he said, “…the Army will remain central to any national strategy to ensure our security and that we need versatile and agile forces that can rapidly adapt to unexpected circumstances.”

After a visit to Fort Riley, Kansas to observe MiTT training, he noted, “we will not succeed in our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the Iraqi and Afghan security forces being able to secure themselves. So these missions for the transition teams are absolutely essential for our long-term success.”

The Honorable Pete Geren, then acting Secretary of the Army, when addressing the future of the Army, said that questions and answers about the size, organization, equipment and missions of the Army for the next two decades should “drive everything we do as your Army’s leadership.” He further stated “that an assumption, a foundational principle for your Army leadership: the years ahead will be years of Persistent Conflict. We must organize our programs and policies to reflect that reality.” He specifically highlighted the priority of security

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cooperation, with a multi-lateral approach to the future by “...invest[ing] in our allies and build[ing] partnership capacity.”  

LTC John Nagl who commands 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, the unit that trains Transition Teams at Fort Riley, Kansas, may be the most resounding advocate for such a change in the institutional thinking and proposed changes for such an organization. Moving beyond concept and vision, his article *Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps* outlines specific recommendations for changes to the Army force. He doesn’t shy away from some of the challenges the current Transition Teams face, yet highlights their value and importance. He says, “… it is past time for the Army to institutionalize and professionalize the Manning and training of combat advisors in permanent Army force structure.” It appears his greatest concerns are advising foreign forces is an enduring mission, the demand for trainers currently exceeding the supply and a way for the military (beyond Fort Riley) to institutionalize the capability being lost as TT members return home and are demobilized after their deployments.

The sentiment from Fort Riley illustrates the urgent need for the development of a near term change in the way SFA at the tactical level is executed and resourced. Information from a Department of the Army Working Group indicates that the DoD anticipates Train, Advise and Assist (TAA) missions will be enduring, their current ad hoc nature should be more efficient and effective and perhaps there are institutional adjustments that will enhance TAA.

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68 LTC John Nagl is a West Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar, who after earning a doctorate from Oxford University taught at West Point and was the Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is often credited as one of the driving forces behind the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual in addition to his own book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.*
The collective comments of senior military and civilian leaders across the operational levels, from strategic to tactical, indicate a commonly shared idea that the nature of both the current and future conflict has changed and the military must attempt to anticipate and accurately prepare for such changes. From those at the Pentagon to those training troops on a daily basis, there is a resounding cord that Security Force Assistance is necessary and must evolve to meet the growing demands the US places on its military in the execution of national policy.

**MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND HOW IT WORKS**

Prior to the early 19th century foreign military assistance usually came in the form of “mercenaries, slaves and former enemy troops pressed into service” and the countries sending such advisors “usually have [had] policy goals beyond what the receiving nation is told or expects.” An example is in the mid 1920s, the Finns employed a British military mission, not to gain military advice, rather to bolster their political ties with London. Dr. Donald Stoker of the US Naval War College states that advising foreign militaries is now often “driven by a desire to cultivate political and economic influence” with military advice falling into one of six categories including: modernization, nation building, an ideological tool, a counterinsurgency tool, for fun and profit or for economic purposes or penetration. He believes “nations will continue to want

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foreign military advice to modernize their own military forces, or combat an enemy … [and others will] offer such advice to further their own political and economic objectives.”  

US foreign policy is developed at the national level and generally includes foreign assistance as one of its many components. The US, through both formal and informal relationships conducted some form of security assistance since the inception of the nation and continues to do so now. In order to better understand the direction of this monograph, a primer in security assistance might prove worthwhile. The five major categories of foreign assistance are bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting US political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid. One of the many ways the US attempts to help and influence other nations is through foreign military aid; specifically in the form of security (force) assistance. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 military aid was $5.011 billion or 23.6% of the total aid program composition according to the Congressional Research Service.

Military assistance can be categorized as one component under the broad umbrella of Security Cooperation. The Department of Defense broadly defines Security Cooperation (SC) as those activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to: build relationships that promote specified US interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access. Of critical

importance is that Security Cooperation happens only in peacetime and is solely limited to the DoD.\textsuperscript{77}

Security Assistance is a sub-set of Security Cooperation and includes a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended and other related statutes. They allow the transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and friendly foreign governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens and help foster regional stability.\textsuperscript{78} Security Assistance includes such diverse efforts as the delivery of weapon systems and equipment to foreign governments, training international students through US military schools, internal defense advice to foreign governments from US personnel, and even guidance and advice regarding infrastructures and economic bases to help foster regional stability.

Security assistance programs support US national security and foreign policy objectives by assisting other nations in meeting their defense requirements, facilitate the sharing of defense, and foster regional stability all while contributing to US security.\textsuperscript{79} Security assistance can be interpreted as an element of security cooperation, which is larger in scope but more limited in application, meaning it may impact a large number of nations, but only in a very specific way. Interestingly or ironically, SA is funded and authorized by the Department of State but administered by the DoD, sometimes with commercial contractors. Yet it must still be coordinated through the State Department and “by law the training and advising under SA cannot


Most military assistance is administered by the Department of Defense (DoD) in conjunction with the Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the primary DoD body responsible for foreign military financing and training programs.

The most familiar types of military assistance within SA are broken down further into additional sub-components. The three main programs are Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and peacekeeping funds. Foreign Military Financing is a grant program that provides funds for foreign militaries to obtain excess military equipment through the US or through authorized commercial channels and amounted to $4.75 billion in 2005. The IMET program provides grants for foreign military training and was $89 million in 2005. The peacekeeping funds are for voluntary, non-UN operations and were $178 in 2004. Since 1990 the percentage of US foreign aid that was allocated to military aid ebbed and flowed based on administrations, political developments, world events and other factors. It has continued to decline since its peak of 42% (of US foreign aid) in FY1984 to 23.6% (of US foreign aid) in FY2005.

SFA as earlier defined uses the same security forces to deal with an internal or external threat and can be conducted in or out of combat. It often includes SA, because equipment is important to Host Nation (HN) forces.

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SFA does not yet exist in doctrine and while there are elements of it that exist scattered through the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) world, it lacks dedicated forces or a clear vision. The US currently conducts SFA throughout the world but most visibly in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet the burden rests largely on TTs rather than Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from the general purpose force (GPF). If SFA is no longer exclusive to Special Forces (SF) and is a responsibility for the GPFs of the conventional Army, than should BCTs train for it or should some other sub-set of the larger Army be responsible for it? To advance the foreign policy goals of the nation, the United States Government (USG) may have to move beyond arming and educating in order to facilitate the type of world and partners its leaders envision.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE

Security assistance is very complex, derived from many different inputs and executed through many different outputs. The President of the United States, through the National Security Council (NSC), produce the National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the major areas of concern and very broad ideas to address the issues and convey additional national level guidance through such documents as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The resources used to execute these goals are predicated on the amount of funding expected from the Congress. These documents are used in the development of other policy guidance such as the National Defense Strategy which in turn provides guidance for the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism and the National Military Strategy. Even though the Department of States is responsible for direct foreign military aid, the Department of Defense is essentially sub-contracted to provide security assistance. For example, in FY 2005, the DoD managed
approximately $4.7 billion of total foreign aid spending.84 This necessitates the Secretary of
Defense also publish Security Cooperation Guidance to provide guidance to the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and combatant commanders, while the Department of State is
responsible for publishing its Strategic Plan. While not directly stated in the DoS Strategic Plan,
they allude to the large role the DoD plays in the execution of SA, stating,

Defense coordinates closely on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics programs,
and provides the military-to-military contacts, assistance, and training that
strengthen military and alliance relationships, play an important role in the
management of arms transfers and the Excess Defense Articles program, and
support the evacuation of non-combatants from crisis or disaster sites…. 85

Each Combatant Commander (CC) is responsible for developing their individual Theater
Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) as part of their larger theater strategy. It incorporates the
national, defense and military strategies customized for the specific geographic combatant
commanders’ area and is therefore ideally nested with higher guidance and regionally focused.86
The combatant commander’s theater strategy should be developed in conjunction with the
Department of State (DoS) country team but because of different geographical boundaries, the
DoS country teams representatives being military members and the combatant commander having
great authority, the strategy is not always properly nested.87 Each US Embassy, under the
Security Assistance Officer (SAO) soon to be Security Cooperation Officer (SCO), is supposed to

84 Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress 98-916, Foreign Aid: An
19, 2005), 24.


1-3.

4.
develop a two year training plan for the country that is also nested with the CC. While it is the DoS that possess the authority for international engagement, it is the DoD that has the resources and as a result the DoD tends to have a larger voice than the DoS in execution. Each CC must submit their TSCP to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for annual review, but there is no national level process that ensures all the CCs TSCPs are nested or unified across the JIIM. A recent report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted that aid programs run by both the DoS and DoD, “..are in need of strong guidance from the embassies if they are to be coordinated with other programs the U.S. Government is supporting and are to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy priorities.”

Security cooperation strategies are required for each geographic combatant command (GCC), functional combatant command (FCC), and each Service. The GCCs signed draft is due to the Joint Staff/J-5 Strategic Policy annually for review on 15 April, which is then sent to the FCCs and services “to ensure alignment of supporting strategies.”

The Army as a service then publishes the Army International Activities Plan (AIAP) that implements the Security Cooperation Guidance from the DoD for the Army. It supports the NSS, NDS, regional strategies and the TSCP by “providing Army goals and objectives for Army security cooperation activities.”


91 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Responsibilities for the Coordination and Review of Security Cooperation Strategies, CJCSI 3113.01A,” (October 2006), Enclosure C-1.

Military aid with its policies and process becomes a hugely complex and convoluted process that seems to be explained and depicted differently depending on with whom you are speaking or what organizational literature you read. According to the Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People Around the Globe (HELP) Commission’s Report on Foreign Aid, “20 largely uncoordinated departments, agencies, initiatives and programs manage U.S. assistance.”93 A current example is in Iraq, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) lacks 17% of the TTs required. This is largely because the International Police Advisors (IPA) are civilian contractors who are hired through a DoD funded, State Department managed contract.94 Depicted below is an attempt to provide an accurate illustration reflecting the major parts involved in the SA process.

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Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress has authorized additional programs to train and equip other foreign militaries. The FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163) authorizes up to $200 million annually to build the capacity of foreign militaries to conduct counterterrorist operations, or to participate in or support military operations in which the United States is a participant. The same Act allows the DoD, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to reimburse any key cooperating nation for logistical and military support provided in connection with US military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the global war on terrorism. The FY2006 Defense Appropriation Act (P.L. 109-148) provided $805 million for such reimbursements. The FY2006 authorization act also authorized up to $100 million annually for services, defense articles, and funds to the Secretary of State to facilitate reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.96

To provide a brief historical context, one must understand the role of the military in Security Force Assistance to this point. Prior to the start of the Long War, the Vietnam War was the last time the United States Army utilized military advisors to train indigenous forces on a scale comparable to the current advisory effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. It involved over 8,000 US advisors at its peak in 1968, not including those to the South Vietnamese Regular Army.97 During The Vietnam War the United States Army, under the direction of President John F. Kennedy, highlighted the unique capabilities of the US Army Special Forces. He saw the value of


FID and made it one of SFs core missions, which they executed throughout South Vietnam. 98 In 1967 the US military began large scale advisory efforts in Vietnam and later created an advisor corps to train and liaison with South Vietnamese military forces. 99 It was known as MACV and was responsible for training the Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). After the creation of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV), SF concentrated on working with strike troops and the training responsibility fell on conventional or general purpose forces.

The Vietnam War carried with it many military, social and political ramifications that focused the US military efforts away from Counterinsurgency (COIN) and towards the large conventional battles that would be the focus of the military throughout the cold war. 100 In the interim period between Vietnam and the end of the cold war, smaller scale advisor missions were conducted, most notable in El Salvador.

**CURRENT MiTT TRAINING**

While planning for possible rapid capitulation and regime change in Iraq the scope of post-invasion options quickly became a daunting task for the United States Government (USG). Attempting to reconstitute the Iraqi military after it was disbanded was a difficult task that the US was not trained, manned or equipped to conduct on such a large scale. 101 While the initial use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to train Iraqi troops was a good start, the military struggled in their attempts to train the Iraqi military on a large scale. Despite standing up a command in Iraq

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and attempting to use US Drill Sergeants, those in charge failed to understand the differences between training US and foreign forces and initial obstacles were constantly renegotiated. In the wake of a full-blown Iraq insurgency, the military realized the need to train, advise and assist Iraq security forces on a much larger scale.

In 2006 Transition Team training was consolidated at Fort Riley, Kansas, initially with trainers from an Army Reserve training support units and then consolidated under 1st Infantry Division. While the training evolved over the past few years, it is still very much a tactically oriented program that lacks advisor specific training and focus.

The Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM) conducts three of the five phases of TT training, Phase I – Inprocessing, Phase II – Individual Training, and Phase III – Collective Training. Phases IV and V are conducted in theater with Phase IV–Kuwait Training (Iraq TTs only) and Phase V – The Phoenix Academy, Taji Iraq or The COIN Academy, Kabul, Afghanistan.

Once selected for a Transition Team, members are offered a “Recommended Reading” list that includes some 28 different books and manuals ranging from the relevant FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency to the not so useful, including State of Denial by Bob Woodward and Not a Good Day to Die by Sean Naylor. The Army considers learning to be a lifelong process, but

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102 Steven E. Clay, Iroquois Warriors in Iraq, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), 57-60.


the demands of a current unit, limited family time and relevant reading requirements stand to
challenge the impetus for recommended study before the start of the program. 106

1st BDE, 1 ID is the unit responsible for training members of future TTs to deploy to Iraq
and Afghanistan. They complete 60 days of training that “transforms individuals into capable
units.” 107 Training models prior to October 2007 appeared more like a basic training schedule
than training for foreign military advisors. Routine activities such as Combat Life Saver (CLS),
drivers training, land navigation, weapons qualification and infantry battle drills dominated the
schedule. 108 The December 2007, updated training model makes more efficient use of the limited
time available for TT training, yet still appears to fall woefully short in actually training someone
to be an advisor. There remains a heavy preponderance of training dedicated to basic and
collective level tasks that members assigned to Army FORSCOM units are expected and required
to have and maintain.

The 1st BDE, 1 ID Standard Training Model is updated and refined to better prepare
service member for the challenges they will face during their deployment. Yet, even the current
model dedicates only three days to theater specific “cultural (associated) training,” three hours to
counterinsurgency fundamentals and the three day COIN Application is only required for two
members of a team to attend. 109

106 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 6-22: Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile,


109 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas, “Standard Training Model and Notes,” under
Transition Teams are supposed to consist of 10 to 15 members depending on location, unit size, unit type, coverage area, etc, yet leave, injuries and extended operations cause teams to be short staffed and potentially impede their effectiveness. The location, physical set-up and nature of some units and missions require the temporary or even permanent augmenting of TTs with coalition forces from the unit whose area [in theater] the TT operates within.

Leaders and doctrine espouse the importance of the TT mission and continue to reiterate that only the best and most qualified personnel are assigned to fill its ranks. The US Army and Marine Corps COIN Manual says, “commanders must assign the best qualified Soldiers and Marines to training and advisory missions…All land forces assigned to this high-priority mission need thorough training, both before deploying and in theater.”

When LTG James Lovelace, then Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, US Army testified before the House Armed Services Committee he stated that “teams are usually comprised of 11-15 highly qualified senior officers and noncommissioned officers … and [they] usually have significant combat experience.” He contradicted himself during the same testimony when he said “of the enlisted Soldiers already in TTs or on orders to team assignments, roughly half have prior deployment experience.” While his testimony did not mention officer deployment experience, he did note that sending 18% or 30 officers of an Intermediate Level Education (ILE) class directly to TT assignments was an indication that the Army was selecting and assigning the right people


to the job.\textsuperscript{113} The lack of prior combat experience by advisors was also highlighted by the Army Times in a January 2007 article noting, “more than half the service members trained for the mission so far have not served a tour in either country.”\textsuperscript{114}

A counterpoint to the high standards of TT members is noted by Army MAJ David Voorhies, a former Iraq MiTT Team Chief. He said many MiTTs are “thrown together from across the Army, many transition teams contained men who lacked the training, aptitude, and discipline to serve in these autonomous roles.”\textsuperscript{115} A CALL Report on Transition Team Training further reinforces the importance of selecting the right people for the job. Noting, “far and away, the issue that every team saw as most critical is selection of the Team Leader and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). No other issue came close.”\textsuperscript{116} They said that TT members should be screened not only for the right skills and experiences, but also mutual compatibility.\textsuperscript{117} They go on to say the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) selected for TTs have a critical mission and require special selection and “TT leaders should be branch qualified or have enough experience in their field to be an advisor. The learning curve is too steep, and the members of the Iraqi Army due (sic) not respect in-experienced advisors.”\textsuperscript{118}


\textsuperscript{116} Center for Army Lessons Learned, Transitions Team (TT) Training Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) Initial Impressions Report (IIR), (Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006), 3.

\textsuperscript{117} Center for Army Lessons Learned, Transitions Team (TT) Training Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) Initial Impressions Report (IIR), (Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006), 37.

\textsuperscript{118} Center for Army Lessons Learned, Transitions Team (TT) Training Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) Initial Impressions Report (IIR), (Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2006), 40.
A member of the brigade of trainers echoed similar concerns, LTC Curt Hudson the deputy commander of 1st BDE, 1st ID reinforced concerns, specifically about the number of qualified trainers within the organization. He stated, “We don’t have a lot of advisor veterans within the brigade.”119

Despite repeated requests over a period of several months to the US Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC) for demographic data about the composition of TT members, none was provided. It is unknown whether this was a conscious decision to withhold information or just a repeated and glaring oversight by the US Army to represent their side of the story. However, in addition to the common perception and anecdotal references that the best and brightest are not selected for TTs, the Army Times offered some more insight into the process. They noted that “many were selected for the assignment, though some were volunteers” and that HRC is required to find Soldiers with more than 12 months of dwell time in specialties with the highest demand.120 The former commander of the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG), BG Dana Pittard told the Army Times although many advisors were good, “the Army needed to do a better job of selecting and training candidates to ensure that all were up to the mission.”121

This is the way the US Army selects, trains and conducts the advisory program for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With limited personnel, time and resources they brought the program from its infancy to the successful organization that exists today. Yet, more could be done. Not by the great people at Fort Riley, KS but by the Army and the DoD.


The US conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with a predominately Special Operations Forces (SOF) mentality. Joint publications emphasize that United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is “the only combatant command with a legislatively-mandated FID core task” and provide little more than one sentence about the use of conventional forces in FID missions. Within the US Army the FID role is left largely up to the Special Forces. The inherent problem with this revolves around two simple facts, the first is that the scope of the SFA mission has expanded beyond the capacity of SF and second that even if there were enough SF Soldiers to conduct the SFA mission, they are limited in execution by their own doctrine. These two problems will be explained in greater detail throughout the remainder of this section.

US Army Special Forces are part of the US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) and reports to the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as the major command for Army SOF. The Special Forces Command provides command and control for five active component groups and training oversight for the two Army National Guard (ANG) groups. Each group is regionally focused, with the five active groups covering PACOM, CENTCOM/EUCOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM and EUCOM and the ANG groups covering PACOM/CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM.

Special Forces are inherently designed around the Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) also known as an ODA or A Team yet they possess a hierarchy similar to many other military organizations. Each SF Group is composed of one HHC, one SPT Co and three SF BNs, with each SF BN further broken down into one HQ Det, one SPT Co and three SF COs. The bedrock of the SF CO are the six ODAs or A Teams, which provide 18 A Teams per BN for a total of 54 A Teams per SF Group.

Special Forces train for five doctrinal missions, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA) and Counterterrorism (CT), yet there is an increasing focus on UW and coalition warfare and support.\textsuperscript{126}

FID is commonly defined in both Army and Joint doctrine as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”\textsuperscript{127} FID is considered a joint, multinational and interagency effort. FID is a legislatively directed though not SOF exclusive mission, to which they are well suited given their “unique functional skills and unique cultural and language training.”\textsuperscript{128} Unlike other forms of SC, FID is solely focused on a HN country’s internal defense and development (IDAD) and not focused on external actors or threats.\textsuperscript{129}


According to FM 3-05.202, “the primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise, assist, and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of the [Host Nation] HN forces.”  

With the difference between them and general purpose forces resting in their advisor ability/capacity, directly linked to their “advanced skill and capabilities (such as language)” separating them from their conventional counterparts who, “lack the capability to conduct effective advisory operations.” The same manual says that SF FID missions may vary in size and scope from a single SFODA to an entire SF GRP outlines some examples of command and control (C2) relationships between US SF and HN organizations, yet never addresses any in-country SF unit above the company level to advise a HN Brigade (BDE).

In addition to SF moving away from FID missions, their own organization and doctrine limit their ability to conduct it effectively above the tactical level. The SF Group and BN possess no capability to conduct FID above the SF CO level. The SF CO has the capability to “develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces of up to regimental size in special operations.” The SFODA has a similar capability, but only up to a battalion. Their capability is limited to the maximum size force they can partner with and train as well as the nature of the training SF can provide.

Unfortunately, not all militaries need or want special operations capabilities or training. While infantry type training is its bedrock, SF does not have the capability or mission requirement to conduct any other type of training for foreign forces. This presents a potentially huge void in the training of other nation’s militaries in non-special operations roles and missions. Additionally, the capability to train up to a regimental size organization presents a serious


drawback in any training plan. SF rests a great amount of its hope for success solely at the tactical level, while ignoring the operational and strategic levels of security and defense.\textsuperscript{133}

As a result, the training of host nation forces above the regimental requires the creation of an ad-hoc organization to deploy each time such a mission dictates. This naturally causes a lack of continuity in the planning and execution of such training, despite the regional focus of the SF Groups.

The primary method that SF uses to train host nation forces is the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), which is “a program conducted overseas to fulfill US forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between US forces and host nation counterparts. Training activities are designed to improve US and host nation capabilities.”\textsuperscript{134}

However the relevance and effectiveness of JCETs has long been debated. One SF officer wrote in a published academic paper that, “even in the SOF community, FID is most often associated with the overt Joint Combined Exercises for Training, (JCET) that have a reputation for being SOF boondoggles.”\textsuperscript{135}

The 2004 Unified Command Plan designated US SOCOM to “serving as the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed executing global operations against terrorist networks…”\textsuperscript{136} The effort against terrorism is intended to be world wide in

\textsuperscript{133} “JCISFA White Paper SFA Proponency” (draft working paper, Winter 2008), 1.


scope, yet the CENTCOM area presently consumes eighty-five percent of all SOF, leaving very little resources for other requirements.\textsuperscript{137}

According to the 2006 QDR SOF will increase by 15\% and the number of SF BNs will increase by one-third.\textsuperscript{138} Despite the plan to grow SF units the commitments to the GWOT will likely consume those forces and only provide rotational relief to tactical unit deployments and not likely contribute to any strategic mission. After the US invasion of Iraq, the pace of deployments has kept two SF Groups dedicated to Iraq (5\textsuperscript{th} SF GRP and 10\textsuperscript{th} SF GRP) and two groups dedicated to Afghanistan (3\textsuperscript{rd} SF GRP and 7\textsuperscript{th} SF GRP). The only other active duty SF Group, 1\textsuperscript{st} SF GRP provides one battalion to support OEF-Philippines. In addition, both 1\textsuperscript{st} SF GRP and 10\textsuperscript{th} SF GRP have one forward deployed battalion that have not been deployed for OEF/OIF.\textsuperscript{139}

While much in the world has changed since Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address pledging to “…pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty,” there must be an understanding among policy makers, political captains and military leaders about the impacts and limitations of the US instruments of national power.\textsuperscript{140}

Despite the historical lineage of Special Forces in the conduct of FID missions, the paradigm and nature of conflict has shifted. The demand exceeds the capacity of SF and their doctrine limits them beyond the tactical level. SF will continue to be relevant and necessary especially in the training of Counter Terrorism (CT) and work with the militaries of advanced


\textsuperscript{139} Eric J. Peltzer, “Using Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare to Conduct Global Counterinsurgency,” (master’s monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2007), 25.

nations. Clearly stated in the Army and Marine Corps FM 3-24, “while SOF personnel may be ideal for some training and advisory roles, their limited numbers restrict their ability to carry out large-scale missions to develop HN security forces.” Which further elaborates that, “while FID has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all Services.”

**ONE EXAMPLE OF SFA**

The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was announced in April 2002 and lasted for almost two years, followed by a second train and equip program (TEP) approximately one year later. Led by US Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) four infantry battalions and a mechanized armor team were trained and equipped to perform tasks related to domestic security, namely managing the (suspected terrorist) violence in the Pankisi Gorge region. In total 2,600 soldiers received training at a cost of $64 million. The second TEP addressed identified shortcoming in higher level knowledge and because of Georgia’s interest in participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to a RAND study of the program, the GTEP achieved their primary objective in that, “…GTEP achieved its goal of providing troops to the Pankisi Gorge, and SSOP-trained forces contributed to OIF.” Georgia now contributes a Brigade-size force to the efforts in Iraq – a capability they would not have, had the US not invested the time, money and resources to develop their military capability.

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CONCLUSION

The change in global events since the end of the Cold War has forced the United States to reexamine the complex role it plays as one of the world’s leading nations. The military is not immune from this change in perspective and approach. It all too quickly learned the world and the enemies of the US are not the same as they were even a decade ago.

National level policy and strategic guidance developed at the top levels of government in the US clearly indicate the shift in approach from the Cold War era of containment to the present day engagement in an interconnected world. The President and his senior staffs realize the old way is not longer a feasible approach to the future and have attempted to respond accordingly. Documents including the NSS, NDS and State Department Strategic Plan reflect the emphasis on engagement as well as strengthening and building US allies and partners.

Senior military and civilian leaders of the US continue to echo the sentiments of the President and the national level policy. Despite some turnover and changes among the senior military and civilian leadership, the underlying tone has not changed. The US will continue to be engaged in persistent conflict for some time to come, our commitments will continue to increase, not lessen, and strengthening our partners and allies helps to maintain stability and security in troubled areas throughout the world.

Foreign assistance, particularly military assistance, resembles a big bureaucratic mess. While there is an emphasis on military assistance, it lacks the mechanisms for oversight and nesting to ensure the execution of actions reflects national strategic policy nested across the DIME. Foreign assistance has evolved since the inception of the nation and continues today in unit exchanges, foreign military schooling and advisory efforts throughout the world.

The current advisory effort spearheaded at Fort Riley, Kansas is a good start that is headed in the right direction. Unfortunately, some senior leader rhetoric and visions seem to lack a solid grounding in reality. The manner in which advisors are selected and trained is reflected in
what they are able to accomplish in their short-term roles. The emphasis on tactical combat skills helps ensure they are as well trained as other units deploying overseas, unfortunately their training as advisors falls short.

While it is easy to understand the tendency to pass off anything related to foreign militaries to the Special Forces, it is shortsighted at best. Special Forces excel at the training of indigenous forces in counterinsurgency up to the Brigade level. The reality is that the demand for advisors now and in the future exceeds the capacity of the Special Forces. Further, they are doctrinally and organizationally constrained by an inability to institutionally partner with organizations above the Brigade.

The US Army does not have enough Special Forces Soldiers to meet the future demands of SFA missions. The current method of training people for Transition Teams (TT) is as ad hoc as the organizations they fill. If the US Army is willing to accept the reality that generation persistent conflict will generate higher demand for SFA requirements and that it lacks the current capacity and capability to meet that demand, then they must institutionalize the capability to conduct Security Force Assistance.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The creation of an organization to conduct Security Force Assistance, whether newly formed or as a modification from an existing organization, will be a fundamental shift. A shift not away from but rather in line with the US approach to foreign policy and engagement. While such an organization will strive to clarify the manner, efficiency and effectiveness of Security Force Assistance, it can not go it alone. The creation and use of such a capability must be closely linked to US policy and the changing world situation. The use and effects of all of the elements of national power should not be used linearly or in isolation from one another. Their impact and effects are interconnected and have cascading impacts on each other.

While the requirement for TTs may be a current theater specific requirement for Iraq and Afghanistan, the requirement to work with other nations to build capacity and capability will not diminish when our heavy troop presence in these two countries is reduced. Even if military forces remain engaged in the Middle East for the foreseeable future, the requirement to conduct SFA missions will not go away. It is the responsibility of the US to increase the quality of its SFA programs to ensure they are delivering the best possible assets for the stated mission and desired outcome.

If SF doctrinally conducts FID, and TTs are currently conducting FID in Iraq and Afghanistan, then their training should be commensurate to the value and importance of the required mission. The conclusion established in this monograph is the justification for the recommendations listed below.

Critics argue the military should have more combat capability and not a MiTT Brigade or Division sitting around waiting for the next Iraq and that FID should be left to the growing SOF component. However, SOF and particularly SF are not much different than any other high caliber military professional that is taught a new skill set built upon previous knowledge and experience while providing new opportunities for employment of what they have learned. Prior to the
creation of SF, many high level military officials felt there was no need for such a group, yet
many would agree that creating them was the correct decision and they have paid large dividends
for the US. So too will the creation of elements outside of SF that conduct SFA. Unlike the Army
of WWII, where the best and brightest were siphoned off away from the “grunt work,” today’s all
volunteer military has enough smart and dedicated professionals to go around.

Simply growing SF increases an already existing capability for the unknown future.

While excellent, SF soldiers stay within their own community for their careers, seldom, if ever
moving back to the ranks of GPFs. This keeps their knowledge, skills and experience sheltered
within their own organization with no opportunity for cross-fertilization throughout the GPF. The
creation of an SFA capability would not only tailor a capability to meet the emerging threats
throughout the globe, but ultimately return these members back to the GPFs and ultimately
enhance the Army as a learning organization through the sharing of information and experience.
Similar to the concept of Ranger School, where most of the graduates do not go to Ranger units,
but rather out to the GPF of the military, creating a distinct SFA capability provides SFA back to
GPF. Isolating the FID skills in SF hinders the Army’s overall SFA efficiency and effectiveness
both now and in the future.

On 19 December 2007, the US Army announced its plans to grow its total force by
75,000 in support of the military growth plan approved by President George W. Bush. By 2010
the Army plans to grow its active duty force by 65,000, the National Guard by 8,000 and the
Reserves by 1,000. The active growth is focused around the creation of six new BCTs and eight
support brigades. One of the justifications given by US Army Vice Chief of Staff GEN Richard
Cody for the creation of two new BCTs in Germany was security cooperation. He said, “there
will be a relocation of a brigade combat team in Germany, based upon the retention for theater security cooperation.”

The 2004 NMS devotes an entire section to force design and size, emphasizing the NDS requirement to have a “1-4-2-1 force” in order to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two overlapping swift defeat campaigns and “determining the size of the force requires assessing the adequacy of the force to meet current and future challenges” yet “force sizing and design must look beyond current operations.”

The past US support of some less than democratic regimes might cause some to question the validity of even suggesting such an institutionalized capability within the US Army. This history is exactly why the use of foreign aid, specifically the employment of forces for Security Force Assistance, must be integrated and nested with US foreign policy. The institutionalization of such a capability may help to foster similar reform within the federal government. Security assistance must be planned in conjunction with the realization of national security goals, not in isolation.

There must be a proponent for SFA, ideally the Army or Marine Corps. The Army may be the logical choice, given the larger size of the force, the depth of its National Guard and Reserves as well as the fact the Marine Corps is still working through its own emergence into its SOF role. USASOC should be tasked with leading this transformation until the SFA organization is up and running, similar to the way AFRICOM operated under EUCOM as a sub-unified command until it was able to function independently. The Army’s lead as the proponent for SFA should prompt and encourage the other services to work together in the development of a more


integrated approach to SFA. Even if the Army does it alone, it will still expand the capabilities of
the force to help meet future demand.

The question of structure is one that deserves further consideration as to what size is
appropriate. The leader of such an organization must have sufficient rank to interact with
combatant commanders, defense ministers and other high ranking foreign military officials. The
organization must have sufficient depth to conduct SFA throughout the world and must have a
plan for surge operations in the event of a large scale contingency operation or war.

Not everyone will be right for or want to conduct SFA. However, the Army will need to
do more than create the organization to attract quality individuals to its ranks. Officers and NCOs
must be screened for traits and characteristics that make them compatible with the missions of
SFA. They must be offered advanced education and skills that are relevant to their missions and
benefit their personal and professional development. Language proficiency and education in
international relations and specific regions of the world are just examples of some of the skills the
members of this new organization will need and desire.

Maintaining SFA members on airborne status provides a number of benefits. It aids in
recruitment, retention and foreign interaction. The ability to attend airborne school and be on
airborne status will attract a wider range of individuals than simply asking for volunteers. The
additional Hazardous Duty Pay will serve as an extra benefit for the job and the maroon beret will
further distinguish this new SFA organization. Countries’ around the world have airborne troops
and even those that do not likely recognize the prestige and honor of the airborne community.
Even if SFA missions are not conducted with other countries’ airborne units, they will still
recognize the unit they are working with as an elite US organization.

While a special tab or badge is unnecessary, the creation of an additional skill identifier
ASI) may serve as an incentive to Soldiers, but more importantly would allow the tracking of
Soldiers with SFA education, training and experience. This would allow the Army to better
understand the capability is has within its ranks and help in the event of a planned surge.
The career path of Soldiers who are part of this organization must be established and managed in order to both continue the future development and career progression of those who served the SFA organization as well as to recruit new members. A three or four year assignment to a SFA organization is about the correct length of time. It would allow approximately one year for education and training, another two years for operational use and deployments and a final year to serve as a cadre member, staff position or a third year of operational use. After the completion of their SFA assignment the Soldier moves to a new unit with a host of new skills and experiences and is able to benefit their new organization in ways never before possible.

If the Army does not create an organization dedicated to conducting SFA it must make changes to the TT program. Officers and NCOs selected for the mission must not be screened on the basis of who has the most dwell time or who has not yet deployed. While tour equity should be enforced, potential advisors must be screened based on their background, education and experience. If the TT program is relocated from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Fort Polk, Louisiana, in September 2009 as planned, it will only serve to reduce interest in the program based largely on the remoteness and isolated location of Fort Polk. The TT program must be expanded to include a renewed emphasis on advisor skills. The current focus on combat skills is notable, but advisor success will be gauged more by their interactions than their reaction to contact. Finally, an expanded advisor capability will produce more advisors who can then become trainers and in turn produce better advisors.

Faced with persistent conflict for the coming decades and the exact shape and nature of the conflict somewhat unknown, the US Army must meet demands that exceed its resources. The recommendations of national and DoD strategic guidance, views from senior military and civilian leaders all reiterate that change is necessary and bolstering the capacity and capabilities of our allies and partners will help not only to fill the demand, but increase their self-sufficiency and ultimately foster regional stability.
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