Can S/CRS Solve the United States Government’s Interagency Coordination Challenges?

A Monograph
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See Abstract
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Abstract

CAN S/CRS SOLVE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CHALLENGES? by LTC Robert J. Bennett, USA, 47 pages.

Since 1993, the United States has conducted numerous reconstruction and stabilization operations including Operation Joint Endeavor, 1995 to 1996, and the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 to 2004. Reconstruction and stability operations require a comprehensive strategy that integrates political and diplomatic maneuvers, economic measures, military operations and other actions to solve these complex challenges. In December 2005, President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (NSPD-44). That directive modified the national security policy formulation process. The goal of the amended process was to integrate the efforts of all elements of the United States’ government more efficiently through a new office located inside the State Department and to mitigate the weaknesses demonstrated during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This monograph analyses the structure of the new office, The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) through the lens of two organizational theories: Axelrod and Cohen’s complexity theory, and Walton and Dutton’s Bureaucratic Conflict Resolution theory. The study assesses whether the new office is organized, staffed and empowered in a manner that will allow it to coordinate the interagency actors successfully in a crisis. An examination of recent reconstruction and stability operations determines which is more influential on the policy development process: the people involved or the processes used to develop policies. By determining which is more influential, people or process, the study determines if the modifications to the national security policy formulation process that NSPD-44 stipulates improve the federal government’s ability to integrate interagency efforts in support of reconstruction and stability operations.

The provisions of NSPD 44 and the capacity of S/CRS have not been tested in actual intergovernmental planning; therefore, it is not possible to assess the merits of the organization directly. However, it is possible to compare the extant organization theory with the organization and process associated with NSPD-44. Analysis of the data provided through interviews with S/CRS staff members, State Department and Department of Defense officials indicates that S/CRS staff members lack the experience of their peers throughout the interagency community and are therefore not able to coordinate the policy formulation effectively. Furthermore, the placement of S/CRS within the Department of State limits the ability of S/CRS officials to conduct their duties among their bureaucratic competitors in the interagency community. The assessment of the organization revealed that the S/CRS has been placed in a position to coordinate policy but has not been granted sufficient authority. The office is subordinate both F and the regional directorates and neither is willing to empower the S/CRS. The data indicate that S/CRS and the amended policy formulation process may develop efficient tactics, techniques and procedures that will improve interagency coordination in future administrations, but that S/CRS will ultimately fail to achieve its objectives. The data also indicate that empowered decision makers dominate bureaucratic processes and wield significantly greater influence on the policies developed than the processes that the leaders employ.
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Since 1993, American diplomats, aid workers and soldiers around the world have conducted reconstruction and stability operations continuously. From Somalia to Bosnia and from Haiti to Afghanistan and Iraq, these operations have challenged United States Government leaders to integrate all of the government’s resources. Although the physical, cultural and strategic environments varied greatly, they shared the requirement to integrate political, economic and military activities in pursuit of regional stability. Planners in all these operations had to synchronize these diverse activities at the tactical and operational level with policy makers to achieve the President’s strategic security objectives. During the policy deliberations that led to the deployment of forces to Bosnia in 1995, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake developed the policies and coordinated the federal government’s interagency community through the strength of his personality rather than through the established policy formulation process. In 2002 prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush and his administration used a top-down process to coordinate the interagency community, but planners failed to effectively use many of the products developed by many of the agencies that would later play a significant role in operations in Iraq. In December 2005, in response to ineffective interagency coordination during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, President George W. Bush implemented a new interagency coordination process. He published National Security Presidential Directive 44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (NSPD-44). The new process established the Office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction, a single entity through which members of the interagency community could share their expertise and analysis prior to the initiation of future reconstruction and stability operations. Upon the initiation of a reconstruction or stability operation, the new entity was designed to serve as the coordination center for the interagency community.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is part of the Department of State. The organization’s mission is to lead the federal government’s policy coordination effort for reconstruction and stability operations. NSPD-44 modified the NSC
policy process that President Bush established immediately after assuming office in January 2001 by establishing a pool of experienced leaders who could focus exclusively on stability and reconstruction operations. The composition of the staff and the staff’s ability to use interdepartmental funds ostensibly enabled S/CRS to respond to crises around the world without the delays imposed by the bureaucratic interactions that had slowed earlier stability and reconstruction efforts. Although S/CRS was assigned a clear mission and was staffed by experts from throughout the interagency community, the policy formulation process as modified by NSPD-44 will probably fail to establish an effective interagency coordination process. The process will fail because S/CRS is not organized to solve complex problems nor is it empowered to resolve bureaucratic disputes. The S/CRS’ competence to address complex problems can be assessed by applying well-established organizational theories to evaluate the organizational structure of S/CRS. Additionally, investigation into recent stability and reconstruction operations in Bosnia and Iraq reveals that historically individual policymakers influence the policy overcomes far more than any process dictated by a President. The policy development process, may, however, be relevant, and the process warrants analysis. The process defines what individuals are participants and their relative authority in particular situations. Consequently, analysis of NSPD-44 and the policy formulation process it has spawned may identify some essential requirements for effective national security policy development.

**The Policy Formulation Process Since NSPD-44**

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council. The NSC was created “to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”¹ Every President since President Harry S. Truman has used the council to develop an integrated national

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security policy, but each President organized the council in a manner that reflected his assessment of the national security issues challenging his administration. President Bush felt that economic policies and domestic political issues played as significant a role in national security just as much as military, diplomatic and intelligence policies. Consequently, President Bush tasked the NSC to “advise and assist [him] in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics.” The council was unable to accomplish this task in the post-conflict environment after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The President subsequently modified the policy process for complex contingencies by publishing NSPD-44.

NSPD-44 directs the Department of State, through the newly created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), “to coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. NSPD-44 further stipulated that, “the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.” Secretary of State Colin Powell selected Ambassador Carlos Pascual to lead the President’s new policy coordination office and Ambassador Pascual assumed his duties in June 2004. The office was initially located in the basement of the State Department’s main complex in Washington and included only six other staff members. In September that year, the office expanded to about 30 people and moved across the street into a State Department

Among Ambassador Pascual’s first actions was to analyze the NSPD and formulate the mission and structure for S/CRS.

Shortly after assuming his duties at S/CRS, Ambassador Pascual addressed a forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He began his briefing by articulating S/CRS’ mission: “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”

He identified five core functions for the new office:

- Monitor potential crises in the world and develop interagency contingency plans
- Mobilize civilian resources and, in conjunction with international partners, deploy them into regions where they are needed
- Develop a deployable interagency capability that can respond within a timeframe traditionally demonstrated by rapidly deploying military forces
- Incorporate and institutionalize lessons learned into an accepted interagency doctrine
- Coordinate reconstruction and stability planning and operations with international and multilateral organizations, individual states and NGOs

These core functions directly reflected the overarching tone and task delineation that President Bush articulated in NSPD-44, but a close examination of them illustrated less of a need for S/CRS and a greater need for reform in other agencies of the government. Prior to the establishment of S/CRS, the State Department regional bureaus were already responsible for monitoring potential world crises. USAID was already responsible for mobilizing civilian aid agencies and deploying their expertise concurrently with military operations. The NSC was tasked to coordinate interagency planning in 1947, and President Bush did not relieve the council of that task in NSPD-1. The core function that NSPD-44 stipulated and Ambassador Pascual omitted was the policy coordination role that S/CRS would play prior to American action around

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the world or in response to a crisis that generated national security concerns. This role led S/CRS to participate in an amended policy development process as a facilitator for other federal agencies.

The amended policy development process established by NSPD-44 is complex. The following illustration, while somewhat simplified, demonstrates the relationships in the national security policy development process as prescribed in NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security System, and amended by NSPD-44. Figure One illustrates that S/CRS lacks the authority or power to execute its tasks because its bureaucratic position is significantly junior to the other agents who affect the national security policy formulation process.

Figure 1: The national security formulation process as amended by NSPD-44

5 Ibid., slide 6.
The solid lines in Figure One illustrate hierarchical relationships. The senior entity along a solid line can compel the subordinate office to act. The dotted lines represent informal or formalized coordination among entities; these relationships often depend on the personal relationships between the entities because neither entity possesses the authority to compel the other to act. The relationships between the President and his Secretaries and Assistant for National Security Affairs remained constant during the transition from the NSPD-1 system to the NSPD-44 system. NSPD-44 amended the process by inserting S/CRS underneath the State Department and empowered S/CRS to coordinate interagency reconstruction and stability operations. The administrative means that empowered S/CRS to accomplish this task was the creation of a functional Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to address support for reconstruction and stability operations. The coordinator for S/CRS chairs this PCC.

Theoretically, this PCC provides the President and NSC Principals direct access to coordinated analysis of developing crises and potential interagency responses to reconstruction and stability challenges. Despite the bureaucratic inferiority of his position within the policy development hierarchy, the S/CRS coordinator’s leadership of the reconstruction and stability PCC was designed to ensure that his office could accomplish its core coordination task and oversee the core tasks of other national security policy actors.

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6 Most of the national security policy formulation process remained constant during the transition from NSPD-1 to NSPD-44. The President appoints the departmental secretaries with the consent of the Senate, and they are the agents responsible for the actions of their entities. The President’s principal foreign policy advisors include the Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The NSC Principals Committee consists of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair), Chief of Staff to the President, Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and, when required, The Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The principals are the “senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security;” when disputes develop, the President decides the issue. The deputies committee of the NSC consists of the principals’ deputies. The deputies committee reviews decisions before they are presented to the principals for decision and often resolve less complicated issues. In the current administration, there were originally 17 Policy Coordination Committees subordinate to the deputies committee. Six of these committees were regionally focused and chaired by a State Department representative and the reminder were functionally oriented. Under
After President Bush signed NSPD-44 in December 2005, S/CRS was unable to fulfill its role in the national security policy development system as designed. Both intra-agency politics at the State Department and the existing interagency coordination norms limited S/CRS’ ability to fulfill its core tasks. Since the coordinator’s rank is equal to that of an under secretary, he is required to report to an assistant secretary despite the NSPD-44 stipulation that the coordinator reports directly to the Secretary of State. To meet the NSPD-44 requirements, the secretary currently meets with the S/CRS coordinator alone one or two times per month to discuss the ongoing operations of S/CRS and to provide guidance for future planning. The Secretary of State has delegated day-to-day supervision of S/CRS’ activities to the Foreign Assistance Director, Ms. Henrietta H. Fore. Ms. Fore supervises the daily activities of S/CRS because F oversees the distribution of all foreign aid. The relationship between F and S/CRS is further complicated because Ms. Fore also serves as the administrator of USAID. USAID often competes with S/CRS for both resources and the authority to lead reconstruction operations around the world. Ms. Fore’s ability to resolve disputes within her bureau in favor of USAID limits S/CRS’ ability to accomplish either its core coordination or oversight functions.

In an attempt to delineate clearly the role of S/CRS in crisis response or contingency planning, the S/CRS staff identified two triggers that would initiate S/CRS-led planning and interagency coordination through the Reconstruction and Stability PCC. These two triggers were initiation of a crisis with national security implications by an external actor or identification of a likely crisis by analysts working for or with S/CRS. The NSC Deputies Committee did not

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7 State Department officials’ opinions regarding F’s oversight of S/CRS vary significantly. Most individuals associated with F believe that since S/CRS temporarily ostensibly oversees operations in failed or failing states, S/CRS should serve as a functional branch underneath F. S/CRS leaders believe that their role as an interagency coordinator requires that their organization should have the same rank as F.

accept these triggers. Neither did the Deputies Committee accept the S/CRS’ self-identified role in the process, and the NSC Principals have not superseded the Deputies Committee to identify situations in which S/CRS would initiate interagency planning or direct interagency coordination. Since there is no specific trigger to initiate S/CRS activity in response to any situation, the NSC Deputies Committee tasks S/CRS to lead or coordinate planning for reconstruction and stability operations using the same methodology that they task any of the other regional or functional PCCs. One consequence of the deputies’ methodology was the deployment of S/CRS personnel to augment embassy operations and staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. The S/CRS personnel deployed in support of these operations fill vacant positions that the State Department, USAID or other interagency actors are unable to staff. The S/CRS personnel do not focus on the core tasks for which their organization was formed. Absent accepted triggers for S/CRS action and NSC support for S/CRS primacy in leading reconstruction and stability operations limits S/CRS’ ability to accomplish its tasks and leads S/CRS to employ its personnel in a manner inconsistent with the organization’s mission.

Similarly, the State Department and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) do not cede responsibility for planning reconstruction or stability operations to S/CRS. Both the State Department regional bureaus and GCCs have established processes that sustain situational awareness of events in the regions for which they are responsible and both the State Department and the regional commanders maintain planning staffs that anticipate potential crises. Instead of relying on S/CRS to lead planning efforts that would be executed by foreign service officers or military units, the State Department and GCCs are more likely to accept augmentation of their staffs to meet the increased demands of a crisis in their areas of responsibility. S/CRS provides this type of support for reconstruction and stability operations by deploying Strategic Planning Teams. S/CRS’ deployment of Strategic Planning Teams enables S/CRS to participate in national security policy execution, thereby providing S/CRS relevance in the policy process. The deployment of these teams does not, however, support the overarching objective of empowering
S/CRS to shape and coordinate policy because the teams augment staffs that overcome the challenges that the interagency team faces in an active crisis. S/CRS contribution is simply to form a functionally focused Strategic Planning Team and make the interagency coordination process more efficient. Some officials at S/CRS believe that the contribution of Strategic Planning Teams will establish S/CRS’ corporate reputation for problem solving among interagency leaders and establish the foundation upon which S/CRS can one day fulfill all the missions assigned the organization in NSPD-44.

After approval of a strategic concept by the NSC Principals, Strategic Planning Teams form at S/CRS and deploy to a GCC headquarters, embassy or Joint Task Force to support operational planning. The team members are drawn from entities within the interagency community that can provide relevant resources or expertise. They function like military liaison officers by providing a link between the deployed location and the Washington, D.C. headquarters of the agency that each team member represents. Unlike the standing Joint Interagency Coordination Group that exists at each GCC, members of the strategic planning team are able to provide GCC or embassy staffs an accurate assessment of what the interagency community can currently provide in support of reconstruction and stability operations. To prove the viability of the concept of Strategic Planning Team employment, S/CRS-led teams participated in a series of US Southern Command exercises in 2005 and 2006. Based on the feedback from exercise participants, the teams made interagency coordination more efficient and increased the ability of the SOUTHCOM commander to conduct effective reconstruction and stability operations. While the deployment of Strategic Planning Teams worked well in these exercises, no teams have been deployed in support of a real crisis. The State Department and GCCs’ failure to employ S/CRS Strategic Planning Teams operationally in the manner envisioned by S/CRS leaders indicates that operational level actors do not believe that S/CRS can enhance reconstruction and stability operations. This lack of confidence mirrors the attitude demonstrated
by the NSC deputies and principals toward S/CRS’ leadership in contingency planning and
interagency coordination.

Despite the S/CRS failure to accomplish its core tasks to date, the organization has
successfully lobbied Congress and developed a process that enabled the State Department and
USAID to employ Department of Defense funds in support of reconstruction and stability
operations. The first challenge that Ambassador Pascual encountered as the S/CRS coordinator
was the lack of an approved budget for his organization. To mitigate that shortcoming,
Ambassador Pascual convinced the Department of Defense to transfer funds from DoD’s budget
to S/CRS to support reconstruction and stability operations. In both the State Department and
DoD, these funds are now referred to as “1207 funds.” 1207 funds support reconstruction and
stability operations around the world, and they provide both the State Department and USAID
with access to funds that were previously unavailable. However, the S/CRS must negotiate a
convoluted process to gain control of those funds. Fulfilling the requirements of the process
requires significant effort and occupies the time of several S/CRS staff members. First, S/CRS
identifies a funding requirement through one of its internal action officers or the office receives a
request from a State Department, USAID or other entity involved in a reconstruction or stability
operations. After identifying the requirement, S/CRS requests the funds from DoD and
coordinates the request internally through F. Simultaneously, S/CRS coordinates the request
externally through the six committees in Congress who deal with the Armed Services,
International Relations and Appropriations. After approval by these seven actors, S/CRS works
with the DoD and Office of Management of Budget to transfer the funds to the State Department.

language of the authorization enabled DoD to transfer up to $100 Million worth of goods and/or services to
the Department of State, which would in turn transfer the funds to S/CRS. Because S/CRS has failed to
provide direct leadership in reconstruction and stability operations to date, the funds are usually transferred
directly to USAID or embassies where they could be used by organizations with personnel or other
resources located in closer proximity to crises.
Once the funds are transferred to the State Department, S/CRS coordinates with the State Department comptroller to transfer the funds to the office that will conduct the reconstruction or stability operation. 1207 funds were not utilized in FY 06 because the processes to secure them were still being developed. In FY 07, S/CRS secured over $90 Million to support twelve projects around the world in failed or failing states. The approval of a process to transfer funds among interagency actors was S/CRS’ greatest achievement during the organization’s first two years. By providing DoD funds to other entities involved in reconstruction and stability operations, the S/CRS 1207 funds reallocation process enhanced the ability of the government as a whole to participate in coordinated operations. The complicated process and small size of the S/CRS office limits the ability of S/CRS to accomplish both 1207 funds coordination and planning and the coordination requirements associated S/CRS core tasks. S/CRS’ failure to establish credibility among its bureaucratic competitors and to accomplish its core tasks requires observers to examine the organization of the office through the lens of organizational theories to determine if S/CRS is organized in a manner that facilitates its success.

Is S/CRS Organized Correctly?

Organizational theory establishes three schools of thought that explain how organizations develop, function and adapt over time: Resource constrained theories, population ecology theories and institutional theories. Resource constrained theories are most effectively applied to organizations that deal with simple problems and limited resources. Most often, these organizations have simple goals and deal with simple problems. Population ecology theories apply Darwin’s concept of the “survival of the fittest” to organizations. These theories apply most effectively in the marketplace or similarly competitive environments where resources may

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10 In eleven of these cases, the funds supported ongoing USAID or foreign assistance projects. In Haiti, S/CRS conducted a pilot project that enhanced the security of a ghetto in Port au Prince that included a small interagency planning cell, USAID aid workers and Department of Justice advisors.
be readily available, but organizations compete with each other for success that is easily defined. Institutional theories apply when regulation by a government or an organizational body define the environment in which the organization under study operates. Theorists assume that success is difficult to define in cases where the institutional theories apply. The institutional framework best describes the organization of S/CRS because of the high degree of oversight for all actors involved in policy formulation and the high degree of technological innovation resident throughout the community.

One institutional framework that applies to the S/CRS case is the theory articulated in Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen’s *Harnessing Complexity*. Axelrod and Cohen’s framework applies exclusively to organizations that function in complex environments. The number of actors involved in the national security policy development process eliminates the possibility that the S/CRS organizational challenges can be examined as a simple problem. Many factors combine to define the problem that S/CRS faces as a complex problem instead of a complicated problem. The factors include the relationships among the members of the interagency community, the number of individuals within the system who play multiple roles in the process, and the number of entities involved in funding reconstruction and stability operations. Additionally, the S/CRS’ mission statement requires the office to synchronize the many disparate actors involved in the policy development process. Hence, the S/CRS is an organization clearly in competition with a variety of bureaucratic competitors that have their own organizational strategies as well as separate approaches to the stability and reconstruction problem at hand.

Axelrod and Cohen define twelve conceptual guidelines for the creation and management of organizations that are prepared to deal with complex problems. These guidelines fall into three

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general categories: people, process and power. Five of the twelve guidelines are directly related to the skill sets, experience and background of the personnel who work in an organization that is prepared to deal with complex problems. Axelrod and Cohen believe that an organization must attract and retain an employee population that has diverse experiences and expertise to establish the organization’s ability to understand a complex environment and develop solutions that the organization encounters. Seven of the conceptual guidelines relate directly to the processes the organization uses to understand and solve complex problems. Axelrod and Cohen define process guidelines as the procedures that an organization uses to accomplish its mission. In order to be successful, these processes must clearly define the problem and synchronize many actors’ efforts to solve the problem. Three of the conceptual guidelines reflect the relative power within the system that enables an organization to authoritatively state its analysis and implement its solutions. Axelrod and Cohen define power as the ability of an organization to implement its vision of a solution in a competitive bureaucratic environment in opposition to the solutions proposed by other actors. Appendix One defines each of Axelrod and Cohen’s guidelines that enable an organization to deal with complex problem and then examines how S/CRS organization follows or fails to follow each guideline. The data indicate that despite the initial collection of a well-educated and diverse team, S/CRS lacks experienced and powerful leaders who can implement the tenants established in NSPD-44. Furthermore, the data demonstrate that the process defined by NSPD-44 limits the ability to S/CRS to accomplish its tasks because S/CRS is placed in a bureaucratically inferior position when compared to its competitors. Table One illustrates how S/CRS fails to follow five of Axelrod and Cohen’s guidelines. Two of the organizational guidelines that S/CRS fails to implement effectively deal with personnel issues, and an examination of the composition and experience level of the staff follows the table. S/CRS also fails to adhere to Axelrod and Cohen’s process and power focused guidelines. A detailed examination of the implementation of the modified policy formulation system follows the analysis of S/CRS’ personnel system. The power relationships between S/CRS and the other
actors in the national security policy formulation process includes anecdotal analysis and an examination of S/CRS’ ability to resolve inter-agency organizational conflicts through the lens of Walton and Dutton’s bureaucratic conflict resolution theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Axelrod and Cohen Guideline</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>S/CRS Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (Personnel)</td>
<td>A collection of agents, or, in some situations, collections of strategies</td>
<td>The S/CRS staff is drawn from the State Department, USAID and DoD. These subject matter experts come from diverse backgrounds and understand national security issues, but they are often less experienced by their colleagues at the NSC or in the entities from which they came.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent (Personnel and Process)</td>
<td>A collection of properties, strategies and capabilities for interacting with artifacts and other agents</td>
<td>The relative experience of the S/CRS staff compared to the NSC staff and other interagency leaders places the S/CRS staff at a disadvantage when negotiating with their peers. The bureaucratic inertia associated with the policy development process as stipulated in NSPD-1 limits S/CRS ability to dictate policy recommendations on behalf of the interagency as a whole. The NSC Deputies’ failure to embrace the S/CRS-developed triggers limits the application of NSPD-44 requirements to the Reconstruction and Stability PCC. S/CRS’ ability to facilitate reallocation of funds by use of 1207 funds facilitates improved whole-of-government support for reconstruction and stability operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Pattern (Process)</td>
<td>The recurring regularities of contact among types within a system</td>
<td>Because S/CRS is small, intra-office interaction is effective. Externally, S/CRS relies on meetings of the Reconstruction and Stability PCC to shape the content and tone of interagency coordination. The NSC Deputies and F both limit S/CRS’ effectiveness in accomplishing their core tasks by establishing the agenda at PCC meetings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy (Process and Power)</td>
<td>A conditional action pattern that indicates what to do in which circumstances</td>
<td>The draft S/CRS triggers for action establish C/CRS’ preferred operating environment, but they have not been adopted throughout the interagency. The State Department interpretation of NSPD-44 led the department to place coordination obstacles between C/CRS and the remainder of the interagency community. DoD established its preferred interagency coordination standards in DoD Memo 3000.05, which was accepted throughout DoD and is supported by the significantly greater resources available to DoD as compared to the remaining members of the interagency community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System (Process and Power)</td>
<td>A larger collection, including one or more populations of agents and possibly also artifacts</td>
<td>S/CRS occupies a bureaucratic space in the national security policy formulation system junior to the State Dept, DoD and NSC. Interagency principal leaders (other than DoD, State Dept and USAID), US Ambassadors, Geographic Combatant Commanders all share equivalent rank with the S/CRS coordinator; consequently, he is only able to direct action as part of the Reconstruction and Stability PCC.</td>
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Table 1: Axelrod and Cohen’s concepts as applied to S/CRS

Seventy-seven people now staff S/CRS. Ambassador John Herbst leads the organization. He is a career diplomat who has served as the US Ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan. He also served in the embassies in Israel, Moscow and worked in the Near East Bureau at the State Department. His experience in developing countries exposed him to many of the challenges in failed or failing states, and his exposure to the corporate culture inside the State Department’s headquarters in Washington prepared him to deal with the political challenges associated with establishing a new office in that department. The next level of S/CRS leaders all have extensive experience and diverse backgrounds. The Principal Deputy, Mr. Mark L. Asquino, shares Ambassador Herbst’s background as a Foreign Service Officer. Mr. Asquino also brings experience from international coordination of stability operations based on his service in the embassy in Uzbekistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. The Deputy Coordinator, Mr. Larry Sampler, came to S/CRS from USAID, where he served as a senior advisor to the USAID Administrator. Among his career achievements are successful deployments with USAID to Iraq and Afghanistan. Colonel William “Fitz” Lee serves as the senior military advisor to Ambassador Herbst. Colonel Lee is a career Army officer who served as an infantryman and a psychological operations officer and participated in Operation Desert Shield / Storm. These organizational leaders bring the right skill sets and experiences to meet the complex challenges associated with stability and reconstruction operations. However, ability of these leaders to influence their peers throughout the interagency is limited by the fact that, with the possible exception of Mr. Sampler, none of them is likely to advance further in their careers.

The other seventy-three people assigned to S/CRS bring the variety of skills needed to accomplish their missions. They are representatives from the European Union, USAID, DoD and several bureaus within the Department of State. While this group has a diverse background, most of them are inexperienced. Since the S/CRS staff coordinates with staff from throughout the interagency community, the relative youth and inexperience sometimes limits their effectiveness.
at meetings and negotiations. Because the Axelrod and Cohen’s conceptual construction of
agents includes both the capabilities of the people involved and the processes, the relative
inexperience of the majority of the S/CRS staff diminishes the office’s ability to accomplish its
mission from both the people and the process perspective.

The complexity of the foreign policy development process as illustrated in Figure One
limits S/CRS’ ability to successfully play the role assigned to it in NSPD-44. In addition to
establishing S/CRS’ credentials as an agent that can reconcile interagency disputes, S/CRS has to
acquire sufficient organizational authority in the policy formulation process within the State
Department to assume the role assigned to it in NSPD-44 successfully. The conceptual space
occupied by S/CRS is inferior to its State Department competitors. The State Department’s F
Bureau is the bureau most likely to lose organizational power in favor of S/CRS in the new
system, but since F oversees the daily activities of S/CRS, F is in a position to ensure S/CRS
remains ineffective. The tactic most commonly employed by leaders in F is to consider any
transfer of aid to a foreign country as its responsibility regardless of the circumstances that led to
the requirement for that aid. This tactic equates natural disasters with the aftermath of inter-
ethnic violence and subsequent interagency stability operations. Similarly, the regional bureaus
perceive S/CRS’ involvement in their region as a sign of diplomatic failure. Consequently, they
do not share with S/CRS information that a crisis may be brewing in their region. Just as the F
Bureau considers all funds transfers its exclusive purview, the regional bureaus consider events in
their regions the exclusive purview of the diplomats with regional experience and expertise. The
compartmentalized and competitive nature of the State Department bureaus complicates the
foreign policy development process and supports the established bureaucratic power arrangement,
thereby hampering S/CRS’ attempts to fulfill its assigned mission.

USAID is a peer competitor with S/CRS and is the second agent in the policy
development process that is likely to lose bureaucratic power because of the changes to the
process defined by NSPD-44. USAID leaders believe that their organization’s planning
methodology and relationships with all the agents in the interagency and NGO community enable it to coordinate stability and reconstruction operations best. Since Ms. Fore serves as both the director of the F Bureau and the USAID administrator, she controls significant bureaucratic power, and Ms. Fore’s opposition to S/CRS significantly diminishes S/CRS’ ability to accomplish its mission. USAID’s overarching bureaucratic power goal is to supplant S/CRS in the coordinating role and assume responsibility for larger operational missions and the associated budgets.

The Department of Defense is the S/CRS’ third major competitor in the policy development process. DoD is the least likely of the major competitors to exclude S/CRS from all aspects of planning and conducting stability and reconstruction operations. Nevertheless, many DoD planners exclude the new office during the initial stages of an operation in order to plan more efficiently. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld established the timeliness as a caveat in the process defined by NSPD-44 by publishing Department of Defense Memorandum 3000.05 (DoD 3000.05). DoD 3000.05 defined Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) as “activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.” The directive tasked all military personnel to focus as much energy on stability operations as combat operations. It further required that future plans integrate the capabilities of non DoD government agencies, NGOs and indigenous governments. The definition of the term and tasks identified in the document affirmed the policy decision that the President made in May, but the implementing instructions to employees and uniformed members of the Department of Defense established DoD offices as natural competitor to the new office. By requiring military planners to integrate SSTR into their products, the directive allowed the DoD to ignore
organizations that did not support the DoD analysis of a situation because reconciling the organizational differences would stall planning. Additionally, the directive specifically notes that, “US military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish and maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” By including the “be prepared to” task, the directive provided commanders the ability to take action unilaterally based on their assessment of situation. This phrase embraced the lessons learned by Col. Gregory Fontenot, MG David Petraeus and countless other operational leaders in Bosnia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq and hundreds of other crisis locations on the globe. Additionally, it defined SSTR as a military task, thereby rendering portions of the President’s new policy moot. Colonel Gregory Cantwell, an Army Strategic Plans and Policy Officer, asserted that, despite the explicit guidance issued by the President, the “responsibility for coordination does not mean the Department of State necessarily has all the capabilities required to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations.” The inclusion of a “be prepared to…” task carries the DoD organizational presumption that the civilian entities and non-military organizations would fail in future endeavors. Cantwell’s widely accepted conclusion that “the Department of Defense is the best agency to lead the coordination of the elements of national power for stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations” is evidence of DoD’s cultural inability to work effectively in an interagency environment. In some ways, the DoD 3000.05 reflected the “deep-seated and long-standing military distrust of civilians’ judgments on military issues” that historian Russell F. Weigley observed in 1999.

14 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 67.
Can S/CRS Resolve Bureaucratic Conflicts?

The national security policy development process attempts to synchronize the efforts of many actors whose goals often conflict. This conflict results from different organizational goals and functions. The differing corporate cultures in the Department of Defense, Department of State, NSC, Office of the President and Vice President, Department of the Treasury, USAID, and S/CRS reflect the functions the organizations were created to perform. Those core functions establish organizational perspectives that guarantee differences in opinion about foreign policy matters. The policy development system established in NSPD-1 and modified by NSPD-44 does little to resolve the conflicts between departments, agencies and bureaus. It merely establishes the conceptual space where these conflicts will take place: the meeting rooms of the PCCs, the NSC Deputies Committee and NSC Principals Committee. Walton and Dutton’s seminal 1969 study of inter-department conflict provides a theoretical framework that can predict if this system will be able to resolve these inevitable policy disagreements.

Walton and Dutton found that, “horizontal interactions are seldom shown on the organizational chart, but transactions along this dimension are often at least as important as vertical interactions.” They identified nine major sources of tension among bureaucratic organizations. They are “mutual dependence, asymmetries, rewards, organizational differentiation, role dissatisfaction, ambiguities, common obstacles and personal traits.” The first two sources of tension are obvious in the Bosnian and Iraqi case studies. At the policy level, the diplomatic and military policy advisors to the President did not agree on a definition of


19 Ibid.
success and were, therefore, not mutually dependent.\textsuperscript{20} The absence of a mutual dependency caused significant tension between the departments of State and Defense that was exacerbated by the significant differences in size and composition. Due to the difference in size and budget between the departments, the State Department often lacks the capabilities to act and defers to Defense Department leaders. Walton and Dutton observed this in corporate America and remarked that, “the adverse effects of asymmetrical conditions are sometimes related to the fact that one unit has little incentive to coordinate.”\textsuperscript{21} The modification of the system established by NSPD-44 has failed to change this dynamic. Patrick and Brown found that, “the S/CRS experience reaffirms a Washington truism: it is difficult to coordinate the entire US government from any one department, even with a staff drawn from multiple agencies. This is doubly true when the office in question has not been given resources adequate to command broad respect as a serious player capable of getting things done.”\textsuperscript{22} Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates verified Patrick and Browns’ conclusions in his 2007 Alf Landon Address at Kansas State University. He said that, “if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.”\textsuperscript{23} From both the theoretical and practical perspectives, the policy formulation modifications articulated in NSPD-44 do not sufficiently empower S/CRS to resolve interagency conflicts.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. Walton and Dutton refer to mutual dependence as “the key variable in the relevance of the inter-unit conflict model.”

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 74.


The cultural differences between the actors involved in the policy process also contribute to the intensity of the bureaucratic infighting. Walton and Dutton contend that since organizations deal with different aspects of problems, bureaucratic infighting is not always dysfunctional. However, when one organization’s members observe a significant discrepancy in the prestige, budget or staffing they receive for what is perceived as equally important work, it can cause staff members to “withdraw from contacts which were painful reminders of the lack of status.”

Walton and Dutton define this perception of inequality among bureaucratic competitors as role dissatisfaction. Currently, many participants in the foreign policy development process demonstrate role dissatisfaction in many foreign policy forums. The initial exclusion of aid workers from the Future of Iraq Project led USAID to develop an entirely independent working group during the initial stages of the civilian planning effort in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Michele A. Flournoy, Clark A. Murdock and Shawn W. Brimley based their study of the impact of NSPD-44 on the policy development process exclusively from a Department of Defense perspective because “it is a simple fact that today, U.S. operational capability rests almost entirely in the Department of Defense. Enhanced coordination, planning and outreach among non-DoD agencies are of little use until they can be translated into operations.”

In May 2007, Government Accountability Office investigators observed a similar cultural dynamic in their first analysis of the effectiveness of the interagency policy development process. They found that truly effective coordination between the Departments of State and Defense “will require cultural changes throughout government that will take years or perhaps decades to

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achieve.” The cultural differences between the Departments of State and Defense exacerbate the process-driven hurdles to integrated reconstruction and stability operations planning by denigrating the value of information that each agent provides the other.

Situational ambiguities, which are numerous in reconstruction and stability operations, cause organizations with an inherently different viewpoint to disagree over proper courses of action and evaluations of prior actions. In their analysis, Walton and Dutton find that “difficulty in assigning credit or blame between two departments increases the likelihood of conflict.”

Since the national security policy formulation process includes no less than fifteen agents in its most simple form, the situational ambiguities cause a great deal of bureaucratic conflict. Stewart and Brown ultimately conclude that, “the fragmentation of the current US approach to fragile states reflects a lack of clear leadership and direction from the White House and particularly the National Security Council. The NSC has failed to bring together the different departments in an effort to harmonize efforts and bridge differences."

The final causes of inter-unit conflict in the Walton and Dutton model are competition for scarce resources, budget and personnel, and the interpersonal skills of organizational leaders. There are compelling illustrations of these sources of conflict in the Bosnian and Iraqi studies and in the current environment. Anthony Lake used his personal relationship with the President to shape the policy discussions that led to the deployment of American forces in Bosnia. President Bush’s executive leadership style contributed to the amount, quality and sources of data he used to make decisions. Ambassador Herbst’s inability to compel other agents to accept a significant


S/CRS role in the process through personality or bureaucratic power also supports Walton and Dutton’s model. In an essay in *Foreign Affairs*, former Assistant Secretary of State James Dobbins found that the power of personality was so prevalent in the development of interagency policies that an executive order or NSPD would not change the dynamic in Washington. Dobbins asserted that “the national security establishment thus needs a legislated reorganization so that it can better conduct postwar stabilization and reconstruction missions, just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act over 20 years ago reorganized the military establishment to more effectively wage war.”[^29] The updated policy formulation process defined by NSPD-44 fails to obviate the inter-organization tension predicted by Walton and Dutton and demonstrated by the process’ participants.

When viewed through the lens of two organizational theories, Axelrod and Cohen’s guidelines for forming an organization adept at solving complex problems and Walton and Dutton’s model for bureaucratic competition, S/CRS demonstrates characteristics that predict its ultimate failure to accomplish the tasks for which it was designed. Despite these indicators, the Congress continues to fund S/CRS, and S/CRS’ leaders retain faith that their organization will succeed. A prevalent belief among S/CRS staff members is that the current national security policy formulation structure is simply part of an ever evolving process that will never reach an optimal level of efficiency because of inter-unit bureaucratic conflict as described by Walton and Dutton. A close examination of two recent stability operations, Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, support the belief that the current system is part of a larger procedural evolution by highlighting the critical role that empowered decision-makers play in the process regardless of the political orientation of the administration facing a reconstruction and stability challenge. In both these cases, leaders and senior staff members used their

bureaucratic influence to create policy; the policy development processes in place in both administrations failed to play a significant role in shaping the policies implemented.

**Operation Joint Endeavor**

The deployment of American military and diplomatic forces to Bosnia in 1995 demonstrated that individuals in the United States Government, not complex processes, play the decisive role in developing integrated policies. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake overcame an inefficient policy development process and significant bureaucratic conflict to shape the policy that President Clinton implemented. The Bosnian 1992–1995 Civil War caused over 200,000 deaths among the three major ethnic peoples in the country and demonstrated the first post-Cold War challenge to European peace and stability. Both the United States and its European allies were in the process of shrinking their armed forces as part of the “peace dividend” that accompanied the end of the Cold War. The massive human toll in Bosnia reminded Europe of the Holocaust and caused many policy makers to recommend armed intervention to stop the suffering. International cries for action became louder when over 500,000 Rwandans died in that country’s civil war without any significant efforts to either stop the fighting or ease the suffering of the survivors. In the United States, these cries fell upon the ears of President William J. Clinton Administration’s foreign policy team. That team was led by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake.

Clinton’s foreign policy development process reflected his leadership style. President Clinton sought many opinions and hoped to reach a consensus solution after a great deal of debate.30 The first articulation of this style from a policy perspective was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) Number Two, in which President Clinton wrote, “the NSC shall advise and

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assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States --
domestic, foreign, military, intelligence and economic (in conjunction with the National
Economic Council). Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC shall be my principal means
for coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of
national security policy. 31 President Clinton further directed the creation of a series of working
groups that were charged with the mission of analyzing issues regionally or functionally before
bringing them to the attention of the President, his principal advisors or their deputies. While this
system generally resembled the national security apparatus utilized by the first Bush
administration, the degree of inclusiveness was significantly greater. Consequently, the process
generated a great deal of uncoordinated bureaucratic activity prior to the request for a decision by
senior policy makers or, in the case of significant issues, the President himself. Oftentimes,
because the President refused to make a decision in a timely manner and issue instructions to his
staff, this convoluted process contributed to the crises by delaying a clear articulation of the
American position. 32 Vicki Rast’s analysis of interagency operations during Operation Desert
Storm and Operation Joint Endeavor found that, “once the President establishes the tone for
interagency relations, the department principals’ personalities define each agency’s internal and
external operational boundaries.” 33 As the principals debated the American policy toward Bosnia
during the summer of 1995, the personality of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake proved to
be a decisive factor in the development of U.S. policy and subsequent initiation of Operation
Joint Endeavor.

32 Bert A. Rockman, “Leadership Style and the Clinton Presidency,” in The Clinton Presidency:
33 Vicki Rast, Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia, (Maxwell
In July and August 1995, President Clinton decided that American policy toward Bosnia required adjustment. He tasked four of his advisors to develop independent solutions to the situation in Bosnia. The Bosnian War had been recently highlighted by the Serb offensives against Srebrenica and Zepa, attacks near Tuzla and Gorazde and the Croat offensives in the Krajina province. Neither Secretary of Defense Perry nor Secretary of State Christopher felt that the Civil War in Bosnia was a crisis worthy of American military intervention. While both condemned the suffering inflicted on the people living in the region and felt that the ethnic cleansing operations perpetrated by all of the participants constituted war crimes, neither Secretary judged the situation a violation of a critical national security concern for the United States requiring direct military intervention. Secretary Perry argued that the potential for a long, difficult and ill defined military operation placed more risk to American forces than was justified by the nature of the crisis. His thinking was shaped by the 1993 loss of nineteen American Soldiers during peacekeeping operations in Somalia and reflected the thinking of many senior military leaders who espoused “The Powell Doctrine,” a tenant of which required a clearly defined end state. Perry supported policies that included air strikes in support of an international effort to drive all the warring parties to the negotiation table. A key feature of Perry’s recommended policy was his endorsement of a breakup of Bosnia into two states. 34 Secretary Christopher eschewed any use of force, but proposed a multi-lateral conference including all European powers, the warring parties and the UN that would develop a negotiated settlement. The primary incentive for Serb participation in the Christopher plan was the proposal to lift the economic sanctions against the Serbs and the Government of Yugoslavia then in effect in the United States. 35

35 Ibid., 104-105.
Since the solution to the Bosnian problem involved many United Nations entities, President Clinton included UN Ambassador Madeline Albright as one of the four principals on whose counsel he would rely to develop a new policy. Albright articulated three major points, all of which refuted the arguments of her colleagues at DoD and State. First, she highlighted how force was the only consistently useful tool available to the President when working with the Serbs. In Albright’s estimation, America’s ability to influence the region correlated directly with the amount of force that the United States was willing to commit to the region. In her second point, she indicated that the UN military forces currently in Bosnia, while ineffective at the time, could play a role in an environment in which the rules did not restrict their operations. Finally, she opined that the American electorate would equate a successful conclusion to the current Bosnian crisis with a successful Clinton foreign policy process and strategy. Since President Clinton was due to run for re-election within 16 months, this point was most interesting to the President.  

The NSC strategy, which was written by Lake, blended aspects of Albright’s and Christopher’s recommendations. The NSC approach focused on ending the fighting through diplomatic means, military deterrence or the use of force against the Serbs, development of a multi-lateral military force to supervise the peace agreement, and an American commitment to training and equipping Bosnian forces.

President Clinton reviewed the four proposals for solving the Bosnian crisis at a meeting in the Oval Office on August 7, 1995. Clinton, “used to a seminar-type style of decision-making, wanted to hear what everyone else had to say. Each principal in turn elaborated on his or her perspective, stressing the points he or she most thought Clinton should hear. After they finished, the president indicated support for Albright’s argument.”

36 Ibid., 102-103
37 Ibid., 103-104
38 Ibid., 108.
advisors to develop his Bosnia policy, President Clinton directly contradicted his own processes as articulated in PDD 2. Through his use of an ad hoc decision-making process, President Clinton increased conflict among his foreign policy team instead of developing the coherent solution he sought. Vickie Rast observed in her assessment of Bosnia policy that “this approach disenfranchises people from both policy development and its subsequent implementation while perpetuating the conditions for continued conflict during future interagency engagements.”

After the August 7th meeting, President Clinton empowered both NSC Advisor Lake and the President’s envoy for Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke, to develop a solution within his guidelines. While Lake coordinated the developing policy among the interagency entities in Washington, Holbrooke dealt directly with the European states and leaders of the warring parties. Holbrooke’s team included LTG Wesley Clark. General Clark provided the diplomat military advice and was responsible for developing the military annex to any agreement that was reached. Clark recalled that “it was an interagency team, bringing together a wide perspective on the issues. It was a close team, as well.” In addition to serving as an important member of the team, Clark had another role; “he really went as Shali’s [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN John Shalikashvili] eyes and ears, to make sure Holbrooke didn’t make too many promises on behalf of the Pentagon.”

From August to November 1995, Holbrooke and his team negotiated with all of the relevant parties and developed a product that could be finalized at the peace conference that Secretary of State Christopher had originally envisioned in August at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. Simultaneously, Lake worked through the NSC apparatus to gain the support of the interagency in three areas: the military force’s mission, the exit strategy tied to a

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one-year deadline and the organization of the civilian implementation effort. Holbrooke’s efforts proved more successful initially than did Lake’s. The day after the representatives of the three Bosnian ethnic groups signed the Dayton accords, President Clinton chided Gen. Shalikashvili into generating support throughout the defense establishment. Holbrooke remembered the confrontation in his memoir, “he [Clinton] looked directly at Shalikashvili. ‘I know there has been ambivalence among some of your people – not you, Shali, but some of your people – about Bosnia,’” he said, ‘but that is all in the past. I want everyone here to get behind the agreement.’ The armed forces did get behind the agreement, and the first soldiers from the Implementation Force (IFOR) entered Bosnia on 22 December 1995.

Upon arrival in Bosnia, the Soldiers assigned to IFOR found a devastated countryside, mass graves, internal refugees, destroyed infrastructure, a non-functioning economy and three well-organized armed forces. The agreement empowered IFOR to separate the combatants and establish the conditions for states, international agencies, non-governmental organizations, and others to conduct activities simultaneously that would establish a lasting peace in the region within one year, when the military force would be withdrawn. The baseline document included twelve appendices, of which nine were focused on implementation requirements by civilian authorities and three were focused on military forces under IFOR control. Over the course of the next twelve months, many thousands of soldiers, diplomats, aid workers, election monitors and other concerned individuals entered Bosnia and attempted to implement the myriad of missions articulated in the peace agreement. Holbrooke, who had moved onto an advisory position in the State Department, observed that, “while the military, sixty-thousand strong, met

every early deadline, the civilian side, functioning out of Carl Bildt’s cellular telephone, met almost none, and fell steadily behind schedule.”45 Col. Gregory Fontenot commanded the northernmost brigade assigned to IFOR during the initial deployment. Like Holbrooke, he observed that, “the international community built its teams on the fly. Consequently, the heart of the effort to execute the Accords’ intent lagged behind the military effort by months.”46

As the months passed, the military continued to complete the tasks assigned to it by the General Framework Agreement, and IFOR leaders began to take on some of the roles and responsibilities that were assigned to civilian leaders because the civilian agencies lacked the capability, budget, access, or sometimes all three commodities to accomplish their tasks. In Fontenot’s area of responsibility, he directed that all his subordinates down to the company level to work closely with the military, civilian and local government officials in order to synchronize their efforts. In July 1996, Fontenot’s brigade formalized the process by forming the Posavina Working Group, which coordinated all of the agencies working in his area of responsibility.47 In an interview immediately prior to his redeployment from Bosnia back to Germany, Col. Fontenot addressed the purpose of the working group; he said,

I don’t want to take on the role of some warlord of the Posavina who tells people what must be done, but rather I want to facilitate and work myself out of a job, give the civilian folks an opportunity to synchronize the effort themselves. We’re not going to impose a military chain of command on civilians, it’s just not going to work, they would have joined the military if they liked that kind of thing. What we can do, however, is suggest and let them develop their strategy

47 Ibid., 52-53. The Posavina Working Group initially included the International Police Task Force, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, USAID, the EU Customs Monitors, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank and the Office of the High Representative. Eventually, the group also included the factional leaders from the region. The group met at the Arizona Market, which was south of the Zone of Separation between the factions and directly west of the brigade’s headquarters, Camp Kime.
and their campaign for making it happen in which they can accept responsibility.\textsuperscript{48}

Ten months after the first tanks crossed the Sava River, Secretary of State Christopher, in an address to cadets at the US Military Academy, reflected that, “Only IFOR could create the secure environment in which a lasting peace can be built. But only civilians can rebuild a civil society in Bosnia.”\textsuperscript{49}

By the time Fontenot redeployed, the military tasks articulated in Annex 1A of the Dayton Accords had been accomplished, but the civilian entities were far behind schedule and required additional time. Consequently, the twelve-month military mission was extended an additional eighteen months to provide those civilian entities a secure environment in which to work. In December 1997, President Clinton once again extended the deadline, this time indefinitely, to enable civilian entities under the leadership of the Office of the High Representative to continue their efforts. Holbrooke believed that the second, indefinite, extension, proved effective because it clarified for all the participants that the United States was committed to the process, not a timeline.\textsuperscript{50} This approach eventually led to the transition of the mission in 2004 to a European task force that continued to work for the High Representative. This organization is currently scheduled to dissolve in 2008 and return full sovereignty to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The efforts begun at Dayton, carried out by Fontenot and many thousands of others, eventually succeeded, but not in the manner or the timeframe envisioned. In addition to bringing peace to the region, American leaders in both military and civilian agencies also learned many lessons that could inform future operations.


\textsuperscript{49} Warren Christopher, “Force, Diplomacy and the Resources We Need for American Leadership,” (Address, US Military Academy, West Point, NY, October 25, 1996).

\textsuperscript{50} Richard C. Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War} (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 356-357.
The Bosnian operations illustrate that effective interagency policy development relies on the efforts of an aggressive leader within the federal government who is not associated with an executive department. In his analysis of the Bosnian policy development process, Daalder finds that Lake “abandoned his role as the honest broker and opted to become the policy entrepreneur. Lake not only developed his own policy, but also structured the decision making process in such a way as to enhance the likelihood of his position on Bosnia becoming U.S. policy.”

Operation Joint Endeavor also illustrates that plans involving reconstruction and stability operations must include detailed analysis of the requirements to accomplish the mission and a concept of operations for bringing all of the resources of the United States Government to bear against the problem. Daalder’s analysis of the negotiations at Dayton and the resulting document concludes that, “with the sole and important exception of IFOR’s mission and mandate, little thought was given to the difficult task of implementing the highly ambitious provisions of the Accords.”

Over the course of the next six years, American policy makers would apply these lessons in Kosovo, but many of the lessons failed to make the transition to the new set of policy makers when President George W. Bush succeeded President Clinton on January 20, 2001. However, many of the junior leaders in the military and civil service who experienced and articulated the lessons of Operation Joint Endeavor would lead larger formations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Well before he became President of the United States, George W. Bush judged Saddam Hussein to be a threat to the United States and the world, and the events of September 11, 2001 caused Bush to consider an immediate attack on Iraq concurrently with Operation Enduring

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52 Ibid., 175.
President Bush initiated the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom at the conclusion of a National Security Council meeting in the White House on November 21, 2001. His initial action was to direct Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review and update standing war plans for operations against Iraq. The President later acknowledged to journalist Bob Woodward that “setting Rumsfeld in motion on Iraq war plans might be the first step in taking the nation to a war with Saddam Hussein.”

Over the course of the next sixteen months, the President, Vice President, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice developed the policies that led to the initiation of hostilities in March 2003. The interactions of these senior leaders and the analysis provided by their staffs shaped the discussions that influenced the President’s decision either to attack or to pursue a diplomatic solution with Iraq. Immediately after being tasked to analyze the situation in Iraq, both Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld initiated planning within their respective departments.

President Bush publicly articulated his belief that Iraq threatened the United States in his 2002 State of the Union address by including Iraq as a member of the “axis of evil.” On 7 February 2002 at an NSC meeting, General Tommy Franks reviewed his war plan prepared in accordance with Bush’s November 21, 2001 guidance for the principals. Gen. Franks’ review concluded that a war against Iraq would require approximately 300,000 Soldiers (six divisions organized in three corps) and 225 days to defeat Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. Franks also highlighted the need for significant interagency planning that would support the stability operations phase immediately after major combat operations. Franks concluded the briefing by advising the President and the principals that, “we’ve been giving you concepts.

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55 Ibid., 29-94.
We’ve got to be able to put some time and effort into creating something that is better.”56 Secretary Rumsfeld departed the briefing with the understanding that the entire concept could be refined, especially those portions regarding the size of the force and the amount of time required to conclude operations. Secretary Powell understood that the operational concept was too immature to implement and that diplomatic efforts would remain paramount in US-Iraqi relations for the foreseeable future. Vice President Cheney, like Rumsfeld, believed that the briefing indicated that the military was prepared to change the plan, and he believed that the time required to implement the plan gave the enemy too much time to both prepare for and react to the initial operations. The President accepted the briefing. He seemed to accept the assessment that military operations would require a force larger than that deployed in Afghanistan, and offered no additional guidance.57 After the meeting, all of the principals instructed their staffs to develop plans based on their interpretation of the February 7th meeting results.

In March 2002, the Department of State and Department of Defense began exploring the ramifications associated with forcing a regime change in Iraq. The State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project” sought to probe the experiences of Iraqi exiles and to determine the most effective means to assist a nascent post-Saddam government. The project based its planning on the assumption that a new regime ruled Iraq, but allowed for a range of causes for the regime change from an internal coup to the assassination of Saddam by government rivals to a forcible removal by a US-led coalition. The project supported seventeen working groups, each of which examined specific post-war issues that would best be implemented in a new Iraq including policies such as the creation of economic policy boards, de-Baathification policies and energy policies. The project’s work did not draw intense scrutiny by many Americans in the public sector, but legislators endorsed the project’s work by funding it in May 2002. The overarching objectives

56 Ibid., 103.
57 Ibid., 103-104.
for the project included “practical planning – what can be done prior to regime change, and in the aftermath of transition [and] integration into USG planning for future of Iraq: ideas and people that can play a role in post-Saddam Iraq.” Other government agencies also developed assessments of the Iraqi situation throughout the spring and early summer of 2002. The CIA conducted a series of war games in May and June that indicated that, “rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow, that a similarly quick transfer of sovereignty [compared with the operations in Afghanistan] would only invite chaos.” Planners at US Central Command focused their energies on amending the war plan that Gen. Franks submitted to the NSC during this period, and they prepared their commander to brief the President and his advisors again in early August.

Gen. Franks briefed the amended plans to the principals on August 5, 2002 at the White House. The President received the “Hybrid” proposal most enthusiastically. That course of Action envisioned 32 days to deploy a 265,000-person force to Iraq and 125 days of combat before the collapse of the Saddam regime and initiation of stability operations. The amended plan satisfied both the Vice President and Secretary of Defense, but it led Secretary of State Powell to conclude that the President had already determined to go to war and to forego a diplomatic solution. In a one-on-one meeting with the President the following day, Secretary Powell described the strategic challenges, civilian requirements and complexity associated with the stability operations to the President. Powell urged the President to consider the totality of the tasks associated with the post-war environment in Iraq and to integrate coalition and United Nations assets into the plan in order to conduct the stability operations more effectively after

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Saddam fell.\textsuperscript{60} At the conclusion of this meeting, Powell felt he had convinced the President to consider seriously courses of action other than war. Gen. Franks directed his staff to conduct additional analyses of the Hybrid course of action and to develop a plan based on it. For the next several months, the number of entities and agencies preparing for war with Iraq and its aftermath grew.

Based on Secretary Powell’s read of the August 5 briefing, the Future of Iraq Project continued its meetings without a clearly defined timetable. By mid September, several of the working groups completed their initial meetings and presented their findings to the State Department. The working groups failed to achieve consensus on many issues. Three of the working groups never met, and the Education working group only managed to produce six pages of recommendations that were agreeable to all its members.\textsuperscript{61} Despite the lack of results, the working groups determined some common themes including the probability of significant looting and identified the importance of civil works projects to the Iraqi people.\textsuperscript{62} The findings of the project reinforced Secretary Powell’s preconceived notions. Consequently, the specific findings were not shared extensively outside the State Department.

While the State Department focused on the Future of Iraq Project, the US Agency for International Development began extensive planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. Beginning in September, USAID hosted weekly meetings that included about twelve aid agencies. Initially, the group included the situation in Iraq as one agenda item among many subjects. In early October, after both the Senate and House of Representatives approved Public Law 107-243: Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, the group focused exclusively on Iraq and adopted the moniker “USAID Iraq Working Group.” The group identified the

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potential for a collapse in the social system and the likelihood of mass looting based. USAID
used the information for its contingency planning, but many of the NGOs, which expected both
feedback from USAID and information that would guide their planning, received nothing. Joel
Charny, Vice President for Policy of Refugees International, participated in the meetings and
found that “the dialogue was one way. We would tell them stuff, and they would nod and say,
‘Everything’s under control.’”63 From an information gathering perspective, USAID believed
that everything was under control, but from a synchronized planning perspective, the government
was still struggling.

After the Congress passed the Authorization for use of Force, the Defense Department
began more detailed post-war planning. The Department of Defense tasked the Army War
College to research the environment after the conclusion of major hostilities and to recommend
post war courses of action. The Defense Department work relied less on Iraqi expatriate
influences and focused more on historical operations in the region and recent American military
reconstruction and stability operations. Among the report’s conclusions was an observation that,
“an occupation such as that contemplated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailed
interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military commitment, and a national commitment
to nation-building.”64

While Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Franks debated the details of the war plan, Secretary
Powell continued to pursue a diplomatic end to the US / Iraqi confrontation. On October 10,
based on the joint resolution authorizing force and public statements by American leaders, it was
apparent that the United States was preparing for conflict. On November 8, Secretary Powell

62 Ibid.
63 James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004,
64 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and
Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle, PA: The US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003), 1.
proposed, and the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed, Resolution 1441, which stated that Iraq had one “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” Powell believed that the diplomatic victory in the UN would lead to Saddam’s peaceful abdication and a resolution to the crisis between the United States and Iraq. At the very least, Powell believed the resolution would delay the war. Simultaneously, Gen. Franks and Secretary Rumsfeld completed the list of forces that would deploy during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom and were working through the process of notifying units for deployment. As the Secretary Rumsfeld issued deployment orders, his staff began to plan in detail for the stability operations it assumed would follow the major combat operations.

The period between the passage of Resolution 1441 and middle January highlighted the differing foci, culture and planning processes of the Department of State and Department of Defense. At State, Secretary Powell with his team in foreign capitals around the world and in the UN focused on building international support for the United States’ position against Iraq, gaining commitment for forces in the event of war between the belligerents and advancing diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis through the UN. The planning staffs at the State Department developed contingency plans for international relations in a post-Saddam Middle East and attempted to identify potential flash points. The Future of Iraq Project proved to be the most significant product developed during the planning, but it consisted of a list of informed assumptions and ideals with very few actionable processes against which resources could be allocated. USAID continued to work with aid agencies and other non-government organizations during this period and to develop an assessment of humanitarian needs at the conclusion of the war they assumed would occur. The aid agencies requested to meet with Secretary Rumsfeld or

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. However, the Defense Department refused to meet with them.\textsuperscript{67}

At Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld analyzed every request for forces developed by US Central Command Planners and directed many adjustments. Throughout his second tenure as Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld strove to improve the bureaucratic processes inside the Pentagon and to make them more efficient. With regard to developing war plans and deploying forces to conduct them, Rumsfeld found the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) process to be both inefficient and outdated. Rumsfeld decided to “fix” this process while simultaneously using it in order to transform the Department of Defense. He also believed that deploying the forces in small pieces over a long time would enhance Secretary Powell’s diplomatic efforts. Consequently, he frequently adjusted CENTCOM’s requested force flow to meet the department’s objectives. This generated a great deal of angst and frustration among the military personnel responsible for developing the war plans.\textsuperscript{68} The disagreements between Rumsfeld and the uniformed leaders around him further strained the already difficult relationships between civilian and military leaders in both the department and CENTCOM. Rumsfeld reacted by becoming more involved in the process and he micro-managed the deployment sequencing and planning for the stability operations portion of the upcoming operation.

By January 2003, President Bush had decided that the United States would implement a military solution to the Iraqi crisis. He told this to his political advisor, Karl Rove, first during a meeting at the President’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. Rove wanted to discuss the timing of the President’s official filing for re-election and fund raising schedule, but the President told him to forget about politics for a while because, “‘we got a war coming,’ and you’re just going to have to


wait.”69 The President informed Secretary Powell of his assessment in an Oval Office meeting on Jan. 13, 2003. Powell reiterated the point he made in August, the United States would bear the weight of the rebuilding of Iraq. The secretary then articulated some of the challenges his staff identified during the Future of Iraq Project, and the President reaffirmed his judgment. Powell departed the twelve minute meeting with President Bush knowing that his diplomatic efforts from that point forward would essentially comprise a deception operation.70 Future policy discussions among the principals would not revolve around methods of resolving the crisis with Iraq; instead, they would focus on methods of ending the war quickly and winning the peace.

Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith completed the initial work to synchronize the government during the stability operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Feith knew about the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project, but he was reticent to transfer control of the operations in Iraq to another department after the hostilities concluded. Instead, he believed that the Defense Department could leverage its proximity to the problem with Gen. Franks’ staff and most efficiently transfer control of Iraq to a nascent government under the leadership of an Iraqi successor to Saddam Hussein. Secretary Rumsfeld concurred with Feith’s proposal, and the issue was debated at an NSC principals meeting in early January. Secretary Powell did not fight the DoD proposal because he believed that: the proposal mimicked successful operations during the Second World War in Japan and Germany and he understood that he would be able to provide staff for the oversight agency. The President accepted his principals’ recommendation and published on January 20, 2003 National Security Presidential Directive 24 which established the DoD office, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).

Rumsfeld and Feith asked Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner to lead ORHA and tasked him to synchronize the efforts of the remainder of the US government and coalition

70 Ibid., 268-273.
partners. Doctors Crane and Terrill wrote the base document for Garner’s work at the Army War College and listed 135 specific tasks that would lead to successful transfer of authority in Iraq from the conquering forces to a new regime. Many of these tasks were familiar to Garner. He had been the commander of Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991. Garner was also aware of the Future of Iraq project and asked for its leader, Thomas Warrick, and one of the authors, Meghan O’Sullivan, to be appointed to his team. Powell tasked both Warrick and O’Sullivan to report to Garner, but within a few hours of their arrival at the Pentagon, Warrick and O’Sullivan were asked to leave and were told they would not be needed. Powell was agitated because he felt that DoD was not developing an interagency approach to post-war Iraq. DoD was simply reapplying the operational concepts from Bosnia and Kosovo. Powell engaged Rumsfeld about the appointments and learned that an authority senior to the secretaries did not want Warrick on the reconstruction team and his exclusion was final, but O’Sullivan was added to the team. Bob Woodward believes that the structure and organization of ORHA became a focus of the President or Vice President because “Cheney thought there were too many in the State Department, the secretary included, who were neither sympathetic nor supportive of the President’s goal of democracy in Iraq and trying to transform the region.”\textsuperscript{71}

Garner continued to plan as he built his team. By February, over seventy people from throughout government worked for ORHA; the vast majority of the people came from DoD or academia. Many of the seventy-five experts that Powell offered to ORHA were not selected, and the Future of Iraq Project was not used to help inform the planning process. Garner decided against using the project because it was not considered a valid planning document by the Department of Defense, the National Security Council or senior members of the executive

Garner and his team conducted a rock drill at the National Defense University on
February 21st and 22nd that included “our whole team, all the plans, and then the assistant or
deputy secretary of the agency that was responsible [for] that plan, who was not on the team, but
was responsible for supporting the team or developing that plan…. We had all the interagency, all
those guys’ bosses, us and the military.”73 The plan Garner adopted prior to his deployment to
Kuwait and subsequently to Iraq used the Iraqi Army as the agency through which the nascent
Iraqi government completed reconstruction projects and delivered goods and services until the
civil administration was running effectively. When Garner presented the plan to President Bush
in early March, the President did not comment on the plan, but he did ask several questions about
Garner’s background and his confidence in his organization.74

Secretary Powell presented the American case for war with Iraq to the United Nations on
Feb. 5, 2003. The 76-minute presentation attempted to demonstrate continuous Iraqi
intransigence with regard to weapons of mass destruction research and non-compliance with the
UN Security Council conditions that were adopted after the 1991 Gulf War. The presentation did
not change the opinions of UN member states who opposed the United States’ position, but it did
convince a majority of the American electorate that war with Iraq was justifiable. Powell even
convinced liberal columnist Mary McGrory, who wrote in a Feb. 6 editorial that, “Colin Powell
has convinced me that it might be the only way to stop a fiend, and that if we do go, there is
reason.”75 Forty-two days later, F-117s dropped two bunker-buster bombs on a suspected
command and control bunker in Baghdad and initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom.

72 Jay M. Garner, interview by Martin Smith for the PBS Frontline Special “Truth, War and
Consequences” on July 17, 2003.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
As American forces fought through Iraqi Army units and Saddam Fedayeen forces in late March and early April 2003, Jay Garner and his team in Kuwait completed their preparations to assume control of the country. By the time that Baghdad fell on April 9th, ORHA had teams in place in Basra and Irbil. Garner and his team arrived in Baghdad on April 18th. The ORHA teams arrived in Iraq with a concept of operations. They understood their goals, but they lacked the ability to secure themselves and they had no Iraqi source of manpower with which to conduct operations. Garner recalled that using the Iraqi Army enabled ORHA to get things done because “they know how to fix roads, they know how to fix bridges…. They’re all trained to a certain degree…. The problem with that concept is that the Iraqi Army evaporated. A lot of people said the Iraqi army would collapse, and when they said ‘collapse,’ they meant ‘surrender,’ so, therefore, it would be available. No, it didn’t surrender. It just evaporated.”

The civil servants who administered the Iraqi governments also evaporated. Consequently, there was no nascent government with whom ORHA could work and subsequently to whom ORHA could transfer authority.

On May 12th, Garner welcomed L. Paul Bremer to Baghdad and prepared to dissolve ORHA and transfer his mission to Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority. Bremer’s mission was articulated directly by the President: “use your best judgment as to how things should transpire in terms of the economic, the political, and the security situation, and give me your best judgment. We expected to have an interim government…in place by the middle of July.”

Because Bremer’s mission to form a government differed dramatically from Garner’s mission to transition to a nascent government, the concepts and standing plans that ORHA developed were scrapped. Bremer’s Coalition Provision Authority began functioning with an objective, but no


77 L. Paul Bremer, interview by Martin Smith for the PBS Frontline Special “Truth, War and Consequences” on August 1, 2003
plan for achieving it. The military units in Iraq, unsure about the command and control relationships with the CPA and lacking explicit guidance with regard to their objectives, began establishing order using many of the same techniques that the Army developed in the Balkans in the 1990s.

Maj. Gen. David Petraeus actively engaged in numerous nation-building activities. Immediately upon his arrival in Mosul in late April 2003, Petraeus’ soldiers “did all that [they] could with the resources available early on to help the people, to repair the damage done by military operations and looting, to rebuild infrastructure, and to restore basic services as quickly as possible.” 78 Over the course of the next several months, Petraeus expanded this effort by linking soldiers in his formation with similar Iraqi government bureaucracies. Military police units worked with local police, signal units worked with the Ministry of Telecommunications, and the division surgeon worked with the Ministry of Health. Petraeus applied this concept to each of the Iraqi ministries in his area in an effort to build an indigenous capability rapidly. Petraeus’ operations mirrored what Bremer was attempting to do at the national level with the CPA, but the 101st Airborne Division was more effective. Michael Gordon of the New York Times reported that, “[the] American military, not the civilian-led occupation authority based in Baghdad, is the driving forces in the region’s political and economic reconstruction.” 79 Just as Col. Fontenot had taken action in Bosnia in 1996 to implement the civilian policies that helped move his area of operations from war to peace, Gen. Petraeus took action in Mosul in the absence of interagency subject matter experts.

The development of the American policies that led to Operation Iraqi Freedom shared many similarities with the development of the policies that led to Operation Joint Endeavor. Both


operations illustrate that effective interagency policy development relies on the efforts of a super-empowered policy maker. In the 2003 case, the policy originated with either President Bush or Vice President Cheney. The President relied on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to develop the details of the policy because the President believed that Rumsfeld shared the President’s vision of the end state and shared his business-style decision-making techniques. Because President Bush relied heavily on Rumsfeld, the President often failed to include the advice presented to him by Secretary Powell, USAID administrator Andrew Natsios, and dissenting voices in the Department of Defense. In James Fallows opinion, Rumsfeld “was not careful about remembering his practical obligations. Precisely because he could not foresee all hazards, he should have been more zealous about avoiding the ones that were evident – the big and obvious ones the rest of the government tried to point out to him.”

While the role of a super-empowered leader during the policy development process prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom mirrored the same process prior to Operation Joint Endeavor, the planning procedures in the two operations differed significantly. Unlike the 1995 case, the National Security Council and government departments conducted extensive reconstruction and stability operations planning. Both DoD and the State Department developed detailed analyses of the requirements to accomplish the mission and concepts of operations for bringing all of the resources of the United States Government to bear against the problem. These resources were all available to decision makers before the first American forces entered Iraq, but they were never fully synchronized. When asked about ORHA’s failure to incorporate the Future of Iraq Project in their planning, Jay Garner said, “I think that it was a mistake that we didn’t use that. It was my intent to use that, but we didn’t.” The failure to fully integrate the disparate entities available to

the government did not go unnoticed, and, in a NSC Principals meeting in April 2004, the President directed the NSC to develop a solution to the problem.

**People, not Process**

During the past fifteen years, the United States has encountered many complex crises that required reconstruction and stability operations. The deployment of forces in both Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate the powerful role that individuals play in developing foreign policy. In 1995, NSC Advisor Anthony Lake convinced President Clinton to adopt his views related to the severity of the situation in Bosnia and the range of policy alternatives. Because President Clinton developed policy through an open, inclusive process, he adopted Lake’s policy recommendations and empowered Lake to coordinate the activities of the rest of the government. In 2002, President Bush and his most senior advisors directed the NSC and the federal departments to plan for military operations in Iraq long before the crisis that would initiate hostilities matured. As the crisis evolved and Bush’s senior advisors debated the merits of the argument to go to war, the President continued to push the planning process forward. To meet the President’s time demands, military planners responsible for developing the plan for the operation failed to integrate the detailed analysis of the post-conflict environment that planners in the interagency community developed. These case studies, while differing in the political orientation of the leaders and cause of conflict, demonstrated the significant role that individuals play in developing policy.

The role that empowered leaders played in these crises highlights the first weakness of the process that President Bush implemented when he signed NSPD-44. President Bush, National Security Advisor Rice, and Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell designed the process to focus on organizational interaction. But the individuals that Secretary Powell chose to lead S/CRS initially lacked the bureaucratic strength to shape policy. They lacked the personality and the personal relationships with senior leaders or their hierarchical position. An examination of
S/CRS’ organization through the lens of Axelrod and Cohen’s guidelines for designing an organization adept at solving complex problems illustrates that S/CRS’ staff lacks the experience or procedural tools to accomplish its assigned tasks. S/CRS is unable to compel other actors who participate in the national security policy formulation process to act. Other actors including the F Directorate, senior State Department leaders, USAID leaders and Geographic Combatant Commanders frequently exclude S/CRS from planning activities by manipulating the triggers that mandate the inclusion of S/CRS in the process. When S/CRS does engage in inter-unit conflict as defined by Walton and Dutton to resolve interagency disputes, it lacks the tools to compel others and accomplish its mission. It is unlikely that S/CRS or the policy development system as amended by NSPD-44 will be effective, but the concepts expressed in the NSPD may serve as a bridge to a more efficient and inclusive process in a future administration.
Appendix One:

Organizational Characteristics of S/CRS According to Axelrod and Cohen

Personnel Guidelines: Axelrod and Cohen believe that the composition and skill sets of the personnel assigned to an organization establish the organization’s ability to understand a complex environment and develop solutions that the organization encounters.

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<tr>
<th>Axelrod and Cohen Guideline</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>S/CRS Characteristic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>A collection of agents, or, in some situations, collections of strategies</td>
<td>The S/CRS staff is drawn from the State Department, USAID and DoD. These subject matter experts come from diverse backgrounds and understand national security issues, but they are often less experienced by their colleagues at the NSC or in the entities from which they came.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>All the agents (or strategies) in a population that have some characteristic in common</td>
<td>Stability and reconstruction operations require political, military, aid and economic experts. S/CRS staff members are experts in at least one of these areas; senior S/CRS leaders have extensive experience in all these areas. Senior leaders also have some experience operating in the interagency environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Variety</td>
<td>The diversity of types within a population or system</td>
<td>The S/CRS staff includes individuals with expertise in political, military, aid and economic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space (physical)</td>
<td>The location in geographical space and time of agents and artifacts</td>
<td>The S/CRS staff works in the State Department’s annex in Washington, D.C. within walking distance to the department’s headquarters. Consequently, it has access to departmental leaders and is able to coordinate with other leaders in the interagency community.</td>
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Personnel and Process Guidelines: Axelrod and Cohen believe that the composition and skill sets of the personnel assigned to an organization establish the organization’s ability to understand a complex environment and develop solutions that the organization encounters. Process guidelines address the procedures that an organization uses to accomplish its mission. In the personnel and process guidelines, both the personnel and process guidelines impact an aspect of an organization’s ability to deal with complex problems equally.

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<td>Agent</td>
<td>A collection of properties, strategies and capabilities for interacting with artifacts and other agents</td>
<td>The relative experience of the S/CRS staff compared to the NSC staff and other interagency leaders places the S/CRS staff at a disadvantage when negotiating with their peers. The bureaucratic inertia associated with the policy development process as stipulated in NSPD-1 limits S/CRS ability to dictate policy recommendations on behalf of the interagency as</td>
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a whole. The NSC Deputies’ failure to embrace the S/CRS-developed triggers limits the application of NSPD-44 requirements to the Reconstruction and Stability PCC. S/CRS’ ability to facilitate reallocation of funds by use of 1207 funds facilitates improved whole-of-government support for reconstruction and stability operations.

Process Guidelines: Axelrod and Cohen define process guidelines as the procedures that an organization uses to accomplish its mission. In order to be successful, the processes implemented by the organization must clearly define the problem and synchronize many actors’ efforts to solve the problem.

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<td>Artifact</td>
<td>A material resource that has definite location and can respond to the actions of agents</td>
<td>The NSC national security policy coordination process as defined by NSPD-1 and amended by NSPD-44 establishes the process that all members of the interagency community must use to develop solutions to reconstruction and stability problems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction Pattern</td>
<td>The recurring regularities of contact among types within a system</td>
<td>Because S/CRS is small, intra-office interaction is effective. Externally, S/CRS relies on meetings of the Reconstruction and Stability PCC to shape the content and tone of interagency coordination. The NSC Deputies and F both limit S/CRS’ effectiveness in accomplishing their core tasks by establishing the agenda at PCC meetings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>Processes that lead to an increase or decrease in the frequency of various types of agents or strategies</td>
<td>The S/CRS draft planning process and articulation of triggers that initiate S/CRS action have not yet been implemented by the NSC at either the Deputies or Principals level. Deployments of S/CRS Strategic Planning Teams have been limited to an exercise environment by the State Department and GCCs. The 1207 funds coordination process is difficult to complete and requires a great deal of effort by S/CRS personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success criterion</td>
<td>A “score” used by an agent or designer in attributing credit in the selection of relatively successful (or unsuccessful) strategies or agents</td>
<td>Since S/CRS has not been afforded the opportunity to conduct operations in the manner that NSPD-44 defines or that the organization envisions for itself, S/CRS has been unable to describe its activities as either successful or unsuccessful.</td>
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Process and Power: Axelrod and Cohen define process guidelines as the procedures that an organization uses to accomplish its mission. In order to be successful, the processes implemented by the organization must clearly define the problem and synchronize many actors’ efforts to solve the problem. Axelrod and Cohen define power as the ability of an organization to implement its vision of a solution in a competitive bureaucratic environment in opposition to the solutions proposed by other actors.

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<td>Strategy</td>
<td>A conditional action pattern that indicates what to do in which circumstances</td>
<td>The draft S/CRS triggers for action establish C/CRS’ preferred operating environment, but they</td>
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have not been adopted throughout the interagency. The State Department interpretation of NSPD-44 led the department to place coordination obstacles between C/CRS and the remainder of the interagency community. DoD established its preferred interagency coordination standards in DoD Memo 3000.05, which was accepted throughout DoD and is supported by the significantly greater resources available to DoD as compared to the remaining members of the interagency community.

| System | A larger collection, including one or more populations of agents and possibly also artifacts | S/CRS occupies a bureaucratic space in the national security policy formulation system junior to the State Dept, DoD and NSC. Interagency principal leaders (other than DoD, State Dept and USAID), US Ambassadors, Geographic Combatant Commanders all share equivalent rank with the S/CRS coordinator; consequently, he is only able to direct action as part of the Reconstruction and Stability PCC. |

**Power:** Axelrod and Cohen define power as the ability of an organization to implement its vision of a solution in a competitive bureaucratic environment in opposition to the solutions proposed by other actors.

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<td>Space (conceptual)</td>
<td>The “location” in a set of categories structured so that “nearby” agents will tend to interact</td>
<td>S/CRS is tasked by NSPD-44 to coordinate whole of government solutions to stability and reconstruction operations, but the State Department interpreted this mission as a subset of Foreign Aid and subordinated S/CRS to its F Bureau. The subordination of the Reconstruction and Stability PCC to the NSC Deputies limit S/CRS’ ability to direct whole-of-government actions in support of reconstruction and stability operations.</td>
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