Achieving Operational Unity of Effort in SSTR

The challenges of recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq combined with an increasingly unstable security environment highlight the need for the U.S. Government to effectively conduct Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Future security challenges nearly guarantee that SSTR operations will play a far greater role in the success or failure of U.S. forces. The U.S. military must accept the fact that SSTR needs to happen, regardless of the presence or capabilities of elements of the interagency. Overcoming shortcomings in members of the interagency is far less of a challenge when the JTF headquarters is properly structured to manage the complexities of SSTR. Creating a permanent leadership position at the operational level is the first step achieving unity of effort in SSTR operations.
Achieving Operational Unity of Effort in SSTR

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________________

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Abstract

The challenges of recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq combined with an increasingly unstable security environment highlight the need for the U.S. Government to effectively conduct Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Future security challenges nearly guarantee that SSTR operations will play a far greater role in the success or failure of U.S. forces. The U.S. military must accept the fact that SSTR needs to happen, and is likely to lead many SSTR efforts, regardless of the presence or capabilities of elements of the interagency. Overcoming shortcomings in members of the interagency is far less of a challenge when the JTF headquarters is properly structured to manage the complexities of SSTR. Creating a permanent leadership position at the operational level is the first step in achieving unity of effort in SSTR operations.
Introduction

The challenges of recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq combined with an increasingly unstable security environment highlight the increased need for organizations to effectively conduct Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. As the primary agency for national security, the Department of Defense (DoD) must develop and implement structural command and control changes that take into account the critical nature of SSTR operations current in future conflict. U.S. Government leadership and interagency members have acknowledged the importance of SSTR operations, and that acknowledgement is codified in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44.

The recently published Military SSTR Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) outlines key trends in today’s strategic environment that will undoubtedly impact the frequency and character of future conflict. These trends nearly guarantee that SSTR operations will play a far greater role in the success or failure of U.S. forces in future conflicts.\(^1\) The security trends outlined in the SSTR JOC include a continued presence of failed or failing states, a rise in ethnic and religious rivalries, vast and rapid urbanization, globally networked media, and rapid technology diffusion. These trends demand that the whole of the USG continue to address the need for greater interagency unity of effort across the spectrum of conflict.\(^2\) The attempts of NSPD-44 to increase unity of effort at the strategic level have met with some success, but have uncovered more challenges. These challenges materialize more prominently at the Operational level of war. Operational Joint Task Force commanders take strategic directives and translate them into operational

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\(^2\) Irregular Warfare (IW), Major Combat Operations (MCO) and Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR).
guidance for tactical implementation. Critical to the improvement of SSTR operations is providing unity of effort at the JTF level through the creation of a permanent senior leadership position, such as Deputy Commander for SSTR. The creation of such a position would help balance the competing demands of SSTR and combat operations, ensuring greater success in future conflicts.

Current Policy

NSPD 44 was published in an effort to better coordinate the elements of national power by establishing the Department of State as the lead agency for reconstruction and stability operations. NSPD 44 provided direct guidance to the Departments of State and Defense and indirect guidance to all other departments and agencies within the U.S. Government with regard to the conduct of stabilizing and reconstructing failed states. Additionally, NSPD 44 established a Policy Coordination Committee for reconstruction and stability operations to provide the President and National Security Council with a single point of contact for SSTR operations. Although NSPD 44 made an attempt to better coordinate the efforts of the U.S. Government through defining “what” each element of the Interagency would do, it failed to address the more important question of “how.” Making the assumption that elements of the interagency will be incapable in the near term to achieve unity of command, how will they make decisions and create strategies? How will interagency members come to consensus on difficult issues of national security? How will the interagency achieve unity of effort? Without the “how,” it is unlikely that members of the interagency will achieve unity of effort at the strategic level because they will be unable to attain the necessary level of coordination to succeed in a contingency operation. Additionally, without the clearly defined “how” it is unlikely that interagency members will
be able to sustain a stable organizational construct because leaders, agendas, and policies change every four years in our form of government. To provide a more steady and durable system of supporting SSTR operations, the DoD must bridge the gap.

In an effort to answer the requirements outlined in NSPD 44, the DoD published DoD Directive 3000.05 to provide guidance to the department as a whole, Combatant Commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Services concerning the conduct of stability and reconstruction operations. The most important aspect of DoD Directive 3000.05 was its elevation of SSTR to a core competency and on the same level as offensive and defensive operations.

“Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”

The response to DoD Directive 3000.05 within the DoD was to adopt organizational changes that designate lead offices within each service, designate lead personnel within each Combatant Command, establish Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in several Combatant Commands, increase billets for personnel with SSTR related skills, adjust training curriculums, and revise doctrine. All of these adjustments are outlined in the April 1st, 2007 Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05 by the Secretary of Defense.

The specifics within the Secretary of Defense’s report describe how the DoD is increasing the focus on SSTR operations from the top-down through the development of

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coordination groups, interagency coordination, and by adjusting Joint doctrine. While these ideas are at the strategic level, the report also addresses the high operational level of war and the importance of creating Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at the Combatant Commands. The report also addresses how the DoD is increasing SSTR capability from the bottom-up through interagency education and cross-training, increased manning, and better equipping; better linking operational objectives to tactical capabilities. DoD Directive 3000.05 addresses the top and the bottom well, but lacks specificity in how the DoD plans to implement change at the operational level. Combatant Commanders are directed to designate a person as the responsible agent for SSTR, but this person still operates at the Theater Strategic level. Either the directive must go further and direct that all JTFs will have responsible agents for the conduct of SSTR or the military must act on its own. Without a dedicated agent for SSTR at the operational level, guidance produced at the strategic level will fail to reach the target audience at the tactical level.

Although DoD Directive 3000.05 provided limited vision with regard to operational level changes to improve SSTR, some Combatant Commanders have recognized a greater need and have taken action. The Commander of SOUTHCOM created a J9 to be the responsible agent for interagency planning. Although the SOUTHCOM J9 was not built specifically for SSTR, it in effect increases SOUTHCOM’s ability to conduct SSTR related operations. Furthermore, AFRICOM is building a staff framework from the ground up to better deal with the stability and reconstruction needs within its area of responsibility. The changes within SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM may over time create changes in JTF C2 structures. But with the majority of current operations residing in the CENTCOM AOR, it is unlikely that current JTF Headquarter constructs will change due to the natural organizational
aversion to change and the constant pressures of ongoing operations. Change in both
operational doctrine and operational command structure are the factors needed to affect
change.

Recent Doctrinal Changes

The first tangible effort by the military to provide focus and guidance at the
operational level through doctrinal change was the recently published Army manual FM 3-0
Operations. FM 3-0 now “equally weights tasks dealing with the population – stability and
civil support – with those related to offensive and defensive operations.” \(^4\) This is the first
essential step in changing operational doctrine, thereby raising the level of importance of
SSTR operations. FM 3-0 directs the Army to treat SSTR operations with the same
importance as other core capabilities and that they play a part of phase of a
conflict. By raising the level of importance in doctrine, the Army created stability tasks that must be
resourced and trained to, ultimately providing a necessary capability to
address future threat environments. Figure 3-5 from Operations portrays stability tasks in
each phase of conflict.

As was earlier stated, both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have already begun
reorganizing their respective headquarters to conform to the guidance outlined in DoD
Directive 3000.05, but more importantly have begun to adjust their structures to better

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address the future threat environment. These steps are both prudent and necessary, but they address the issue of SSTR at the theater strategic and high operational levels. Similar changes must occur at the JTF level to ensure proper integration and synchronization of the capabilities resident in the interagency, intergovernmental agencies (IGOs), and nongovernmental agencies (NGOs).

Current Challenges Demand Operational Change

The need for change is evidenced by the current operational challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq where SSTR operations are characterized by “ad hoc” command relationships and unsynchronized execution. James McNaught, a DoS employee, stated that the “ad hoc response continues to hallmark civil-military integration at the tactical level, while civilian agencies entirely lack theater-operational presence.”⁵ He went on to say that recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are “highlighted [by] the continuing lack of operational synergy between military and civilian efforts.”⁶ James McNaught’s statements highlight the tactical struggles of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and the embedded PRTs (ePRTs) in Iraq that operate under and within ambiguous and confusing command relationships. In Afghanistan, PRTs are military led and fall under the operational control of ISAF. There are five regional commands, with each regional command headed by a different nation. This approach is subject to the shifting agendas of the sponsor nations, leading to varying levels of support, and often leading to unsynchronized execution and missed opportunities. In Iraq, the ePRTs are generally civilian led with a chain of command terminating with the U.S. Ambassador. The ePRTs are tactically embedded in the staffs of Brigade Combat Teams, facilitating close cooperation and better


⁶ Ibid.
synchronization, thus producing greater unity of effort. This unity of effort serves to move information more quickly from the PRT and BCT staffs to higher levels of command, both military and civilian. Unity of effort has proven even more critical as members of the military and their civilian counterparts from the interagency work together to overcome gaps in knowledge and experience created by service culture and training. PRTs and ePRTs achieve outstanding results in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but that success has more to do with personal relationships and personalities than it does with organizational structure. The concern is that when success of the mission depends almost entirely on personal relationships, there is an unacceptable risk of mission failure directly attributable to personnel rotation in and out of country. To improve performance in SSTR operations, the military must make organizational structure changes at the operational level to address security and SSTR simultaneously.

In fairness to the commands executing SSTR, the challenges are many and are compounded by difficult security environments. Although security challenges make SSTR difficult, the greatest challenges of SSTR spring from the broad range of activities necessary to stabilize a nation – most of which have little to do with security. The range of operations encompassed within SSTR operations are outlined in FM 3-0 as the Army’s Stability Tasks or logical lines of operation (LLOs) for SSTR: Civil Security, Civil Control, Restore Essential Services, Support Governance, Support to Infrastructure and Infrastructure Development. These LLOs roughly parallel the Department of State sectors of Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, Governance and

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7 Initial Impressions Report (IIR), Provincial Reconstruction Teams Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2007, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Participation, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. FM 3-0 does a good job of aligning DoD tasks and DoS sectors in theory, a critical first step. The need for effective execution is far more important, and in many ways more difficult. The military has two distinct challenges it must overcome to convert “ad hoc” SSTR operations into operations that have unity of effort as a cornerstone and are effective in delivering results.

The first challenge the military must address to increase the effectiveness of SSTR operations is to address the critical shortage of necessary personnel capabilities in every area other than civil security. The military has an unmatched ability to plan and organize militarily oriented tasks but lacks the requisite knowledge to rebuild and administer governments, restore large scale essential services, and rebuild critical infrastructure. The DoD addresses these capability areas in great detail in the Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoDD 3000.05. These capability areas are necessary to increase stability operations to a core competency, but without organizational changes at the JTF level, individual training and small unit capabilities will continue to be mismanaged and underutilized.

The second challenge and the more direct path to improvement is for the military to address command structure. The military must create an operational command structure capable of simultaneously addressing SSTR and Major Combat Operations. The military’s ability to plan and organize operations is unmatched, but this is only the case when the military’s command structure is properly task-organized for the problem it is facing. The military’s ability to plan operations is further challenged when it is unable to determine the true nature of the conflict due to a lack of personnel trained in civil-military operations and

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9 Ibid.
SSTR related tasks. Overcoming the shortage of properly trained personnel is a strategic concern to be resolved through increased cross-training of personnel from every department and directorate of the government. Overcoming the military’s current command structures can and must occur in the near term if we are to improve our performance in ongoing SSTR operations.

To properly adjust any command structure the military must first correctly identify the factors affecting the environment within which it operates. Major combat operations demand very little in the form of dialogue and two way communication; there is an enemy who is non-compliant and the military is tasked to impose the will of the United States upon the enemy. The conduct of SSTR operations require that the DoD address the problem in a different fashion with a greater emphasis on consensus building and through processes that focus more on shared goals, negotiated visions, and agreed upon solutions. These processes are rarely tied to military style objectives or timelines. Accomplishing these types of operations requires a command or organizational structure that places SSTR operations on an equal footing with Operations and Support. This can be done by appointing a Deputy Commander for SSTR similar to the Deputy for Operations and Deputy for Support in JTF staffs. In order to ensure equal importance in planning and execution, the Deputy for SSTR must be of equal rank (military or civilian) as the other Deputies and have similar tasking and execution authorities. But it is not enough to have only a Deputy for SSTR. The Deputy must also have the necessary staff to perform the coordination and planning required in SSTR related operations and then be able to properly synchronize those operations across the full spectrum of operations.
Historical Precedent for having a Deputy for SSTR

The U.S. military is not new to the concept of a Deputy for SSTR type operations. As early as 1942 General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson were confident that the United States would win the war against Japan and Germany and began planning for the inevitable occupations that would follow. General Lucius Clay was appointed by President Roosevelt to be General Eisenhower’s deputy and Military Governor of Germany. General Clay was responsible for planning the follow-on to Operation Overlord, known as Operation Eclipse. Operation Eclipse was planned prior to and during the execution of Overlord. Within months of the Allies defeating Germany, General Eisenhower returned to the United States and General Clay assumed command of the Allied Occupation Forces in Germany.  

The Pacific theater approached SSTR in much the same manner. During the planning for Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, Admiral Nimitz determined the need for a transitional authority within the chain of command. The 10th Army represented the expeditionary force under LTG Buckner, and consisted of an amphibious corps, an Army corps, a tactical air force, and an “Island Command” under MG Wallace. The purpose of MG Wallace’s command was to plan for the post-invasion governance and necessary SSTR related tasks.  

Fifty years ago the United States faced similar political-military challenges in the Vietnam War as it does today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our success in today’s conflicts depends directly upon our ability to build stable and legitimate governments capable of  

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10 George Oliver, unpublished manuscript, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 17-19.  
11 G.K. Cunningham, Professor of Joint Land Operations, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Public Power Point Presentation, 1 April, 2008.
administering to their peoples. In Vietnam the United States addressed this very problem through the implementation of a counter-insurgency, or “pacification” program known as Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).\textsuperscript{12} Realizing that strategic actions alone had not ensured the success of previous counter-insurgency programs, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Ambassador Robert Komer as his Special Assistant for Non-Military Programs. Komer received the four star equivalent rank of Ambassador, and worked directly for General Westmoreland as his deputy. He had operational authority over all pacification programs, but needed a great deal of support from the military. In short, Ambassador Komer exercised command responsibility over 6500 personnel spread over 44 provinces and 234 districts.\textsuperscript{13} Ambassador Komer exercised leadership of a CORDS cadre comprised of approximately 20% civilians holding the predominance of higher level leadership positions and approximately 80% military, concentrated at the tactical level in the provincial and village teams.\textsuperscript{14} Ambassador Komer oversaw the largest contingent of USAID personnel ever fielded who sponsored programs to build roads and develop the rural economy through land reform, as well as working with the CIA to induce defectors.\textsuperscript{15}

“It is significant that not until an organization was created to focus specifically on pacification as its primary mission and to integrate all relevant military and civilian agency efforts did a major and sustained pacification effort begin to take shape.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} James A. McNaught, Getting it Right: Operationalizing Civilian Capacity for SSTR. (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 4-5.
Ambassador Komer’s description of CORDS was “Clear, Hold, and Rebuild.”

CORDS, according to many who analyzed Vietnam, could have been successful in slowing or stopping the Vietnamese insurgency, had it been applied earlier.

A more recent and more successful application of operational leadership in SSTR occurred in Kosovo under the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK). Although Kosovo ultimately benefited from better civil-military coordination than Vietnam, the entire operation was dependent on interpersonal relationships, consensus building, and consensus decision making. Christopher Holshek succinctly outlines that operational level civil-military operations are critical to present and future peace operations because they link the strategy to the tactical actions. Holshek’s view is that the operational level of command is the most critical to the success of civil-military operations because it must effectively manage the greatest amount of information, coordinate disparate supporting agencies, and synchronize the entire effort. It is arguable that creating SSTR strategy or executing tactical SSTR operations are easy tasks, far from it. But it is far more difficult to develop operational concepts that successfully interpret strategic guidance into operational and tactical objectives that when achieved, produce measurable, and more importantly visible strategic results for civilian policy makers.

Kosovo clearly brought to light the differing modus operandi of civilian and military organizations. The military, designed to reach clearly defined objectives in a linear fashion under a unified command and control structure. And the civilian led organization which was

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more concerned with a process of dialogue, bargaining, and risk-taking to fulfill shifting political interests.\textsuperscript{20}

UNMIK addressed this challenge by defining four pillars (or Lines of Operation) to guide CMO activities. More importantly UNMIK’s chain of command contained a Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs (DCOM-CA),\textsuperscript{21} placing CMO and all other combat operations on equal footing. The establishment of a Deputy for CA did not by itself ensure success, but it did establish a single point of responsibility to ensure that unity of effort occurred through the constant flow of information between military and civilian agencies. Of note, UNMIK’s position of DCOM-CA did have an impact on the organizational structure of US forces in Kosovo (KFOR). Task Force Falcon had a Deputy for Civil Military Operations in 2002.\textsuperscript{22}

In every example there is evidence of conscious effort to overcome the challenges posed by SSTR operations. The examples of Kosovo and Vietnam highlight the need for unity of effort at the operational level to ensure the best opportunities for success. CORDS was an example of a solution being forced on the military by the President, and Ambassador Komer successfully executing the role of Deputy for SSTR with heavy military support. Kosovo represented the ability of the military to recognize the need for a Deputy Commander for SSTR to oversee the myriad of complex and time consuming tasks associated with consensus building and SSTR. The need for a Deputy for SSTR was repeated during \textit{Operation Provide Comfort} in 1991 in Iraq, but was not implemented due to the high level of cooperation between interested parties, military and civilian alike.\textsuperscript{23} The \textit{ad hoc} approach to unity of effort in \textit{Operation Provide Comfort} also worked in some degree because it was

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 271.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 283.
\item \textsuperscript{22} George Oliver, TF Falcon PowerPoint slideshow, Jan 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 1996, 22.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
predominantly a humanitarian assistance with no need for stability, transition, or reconstruction operations. The troubling issue is that in each case the U.S. military reinvented the wheel with respect to operational level command and control of SSTR operations. Each historical case and our current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are rife with *ad hoc* C2 relationships for long periods of time before a coherent SSTR C2 structure and strategy surface.

As was stated earlier, the military is applying lessons learned at the Combatant Command level by adjusting command structures to respond to the demand for SSTR capabilities in the current and future threat environments. But making strategic level adjustments is not addressing the greater operational challenges, which Christopher Holshek determined to be the most critical when facing SSTR related operations.

*Recommendations for Operational Change*

The U.S. military has executed successful SSTR operations in past conflicts, but the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to display an inability to effectively apply those lessons at the operational level. The U.S. military has made marked progress in the Combatant Commands with adjusted staff structures and the formation of JIACGs. There have also been great improvements in capability at the tactical level, but those gains have come at an unnecessary cost; many of the lessons learned on the streets of Iraq and Afghanistan could have been more easily learned in training, without the sacrifice in blood and treasure. The challenge that the military must overcome is an inability to achieve unity of effort for SSTR at the operational level. A JIACG can produce the best theater strategic guidance for SSTR, but if the JTF cannot effectively interpret that guidance and create unity of effort, the tactical actions or units, IGOs, and NGOs will remain subject to their own
individual limitations. The most rapid and effective means of improving performance at the operational level is to appoint a Deputy for SSTR related operations.

Appointing a Deputy for SSTR prior to the commencement of Phase IV operations addresses numerous command and control issues. The Deputy becomes the single point of contact for all things SSTR related, and more importantly becomes the leader of a military leadership framework that can later transform into a civilian led organization.

Working along FM 3-0’s SSTR lines of operation (Figure 3-3), it is obvious that some tasks naturally lend themselves to military solutions while others do not normally reside within the military’s comfort zone. At the JTF level, the Deputy responsible for Operations would have responsibility for Civil Security and Civil Control throughout Phase III and much of Phase IV. But that individual and the majority of the JTF staff would be consumed by the requirements of executing Phase III operations, unable to dedicate the requisite time and resources to the other lines of operation. This is where the position of Deputy for SSTR is crucial to the success of future SSTR operations.

By adopting C2 constructs previously used in Germany following World War II, it is possible to simultaneously execute Phase III and plan for Phase IV operations. The Deputy for SSTR would spend the predominance of his time planning for the restoration of essential services, supporting governance, and supporting infrastructure and the economy. Additionally, as the security situation permitted, the Deputy would also assume responsibility
of civil control as a justice system asserted itself in the host nation. These lines of operation represent areas where the military is far less capable than elements of the interagency. In these areas the interagency has the preponderance of skills and experience necessary to achieve success in SSTR operations. But to harness that expertise, the JTF Commander must have a Deputy dedicated to the process of developing a plan and seeing it through to execution. As was stated earlier, this process is full of dialogue and consensus building, neither of which incorporate well into the military planning processes.

The current C2 construct places the burden of SSTR on the Deputy for Operations or directly on the Commander. The operational environment then poses difficult challenges to operational leaders and planners. Priorities are often ambiguous and competing, and existing cultural bias, whether right or wrong, often dictates that combat operations take precedence over SSTR related tasks. Without a Deputy for SSTR, the Deputy for Operations must assume the task of planning and synchronizing both combat operations and SSTR, or the Commander must take a greater role himself. The Deputy for SSTR would provide the Commander the person and the mechanisms to plan Phase IV operations during Phase III, and either transition those plans, or assume the main effort during Phase IV.

By creating a Deputy for SSTR, the JTF Commander effectively creates the nucleus of the JIACG within his headquarters, facilitating communication with the Combatant Command’s JIACG. The Deputy and his staff become the point of integration for every agency and department within the U.S. Government, as well as IGOs, NGOs, International Corporations, and even Coalition Partners who may not desire to assist with Phase III operations but do desire to assist with SSTR. The Deputy for SSTR becomes the
clearinghouse for everything SSTR related, is responsible for synchronizing effort, and in the end provides the unity of effort necessary to ensure success during Phase IV.

The Deputy for SSTR is crucial in providing unity of effort in planning for SSTR (Phase II and III) and during the execution of SSTR (Phase IV). But the Deputy’s most important function may well be as a transitional figure as operations move into Phase V and responsibility transitions to the purview of civilian leadership. After planning and executing a successful Phase IV, it only makes sense to maintain a considerable portion of the Deputy’s staff as the nucleus for Phase V to prevent unnecessary losses in institutional knowledge, cultural awareness, and problem understanding. If the military conducts regressive planning from a desired Phase V endstate, it would make sense to incorporate civilians into the SSTR staff along the way, laying the groundwork for transition to civilian control.

During Phase III operations the Deputy for Operations would receive primacy of effort while the Deputy for SSTR would remain largely in a planning and synchronization role. As operations progressed to Phase IV, civilians would begin taking a greater role in both leadership and operations, and the Deputy for SSTR would take more of a leading role.
The ultimate endstate for the military is a successful transition to Phase V where the civilian agencies achieve primacy and the military reverts to a supporting role and eventually redeploy; the Deputy for SSTR smooths the transitions and facilitates a more rapid shift to Phase V.

**Conclusion**

The concept of a Deputy Commander for SSTR is not new to the military and existed as far back as World War II under varying names. The challenges of multiple contingency operations, to include the current contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, display that the U.S. military continues to struggle with the command and control issues posed by SSTR operations. Unless the military addresses the need for organizational change at the JTF level, disjointed and *ad hoc* SSTR efforts will continue.

In order to avoid repeating history, the military must create a permanent position at the JTF level, such as the Deputy Commander for SSTR, to provide unity of effort in SSTR operations and effectively raise SSTR to the core competency that DoD Directive 3000.05 directs. The Deputy for SSTR represents the person and his staff the mechanism, to enable the JTF headquarters to conduct both combat and SSTR in a near simultaneous fashion. Some would argue that conducting Phases III and IV in parallel is unlikely, but what are the costs if the military is incapable of executing when required? In the future threat environment, it is possible that Phase III will happen much faster than anticipated, and the lack of a Phase IV plan will not preclude the enemy from exploiting the seam and gaining the initiative. Furthermore, future operations may be far more focused on Phase 0 and IV, with little need for Phase III operations. This is not to say that the military should dilute its Phase III capabilities for the sake of Phase IV capacity. Rather, the military must accept the fact
that SSTR must occur whether or not civilian agencies are present. Appointing a Deputy for
SSTR at the JTF level is the single most important step in creating unity of effort for SSTR
operations and smoothing to transition to Phase V.
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