Working Together during Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

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WORKING TOGETHER DURING  
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Although the Department of State is the Lead Federal Agency for conducting noncombatant evacuation operations they can, and often do, request assistance from the Department of Defense. Traditionally there has been little cooperation between the two departments except during large-scale evacuations. Newly released guidance encourages improved cooperation among all NEO participants. The timing could not be better. The United States Government and the Military are in the midst of transforming not only the size of their branches but the way they currently operate. Additionally, Globalization is forcing both departments to explore and develop new partnerships, whether they are with nongovernmental agencies (NGO) or multinational forces (MNF). This paper evaluates the new doctrine released in the Department of State emergency planning handbook (EPH) and the Department of Defense Joint Publication JP 3-68. It addresses the need to cooperate with: (1) other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, (2) nongovernmental organizations (NGO), (3) host nations (HN), and (4) coalition partners (CP) and multinational forces (MNF) during NEOs. In reviewing NEOs conducted since 1988, it concludes that cooperation is adequate but that it needs to get stronger. It recommends that the Department of State and the Department of Defense continue to seek opportunities to train and work together in order to evaluate the new doctrine and explore developing civil – military partnerships.
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WHY NEOs ARE IMPORTANT

According to Joint Publication 3-68 (JP 3-68) “noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating U.S. citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and designated host nation (HN) and Third Country Nationals (TCN) whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven.”\(^1\) The publication continues to state that “the decision to evacuate a U.S. embassy and the order to evacuate is political.”\(^2\) Therefore, from the Department of Defense perspective, NEOs are by definition joint operations. For either the Department of State or the Department of Defense to think of noncombatant evacuations as unilateral actions is a mistake. They require coordination and interaction at every level, from pre-mission planning to after action reports.

Reinforcing the perception that NEOs are unilateral actions is the fact that until recently, Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) developed evacuation specific contingency plans (CONPLAN) exclusively as military operations. Despite the Department of Defense’s linear approach to NEOs, JP 3-68 and newer evacuation CONPLANs do address, even if in generic terms, the need to coordinate and cooperate with others in four specific areas: other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), host nations (HN), and coalitions partners (CP) and multinational forces (MNF).

The United States Government is in the midst of a transformation. Internally, 2008 is an election year, the Department of Defense is right-sizing, the Department of State is expanding, and the economy is struggling. Externally, globalization is forcing us to change the way we view and do business with the rest of the world. The same, if not similar,
problems are affecting our coalition partners. Now is the time to embrace the changes. The Department of Defense has an opportunity to capitalize on new doctrine and new partnerships. If we do not start working together now, it is not going to get any easier.

**BACKGROUND: NEO 101**

The need for the Department of State and the Department of Defense to take NEOs seriously is validated by the fact that they occur with surprising regularity. Confirmation of this claim is evident in the following information obtained from a 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report. According to State Officials:

…since 1988, State has ordered more than 270 evacuations from overseas posts...1 in 5 overseas posts reported they had experienced some type of evacuation of post staff and dependants in the past five years.3

…of the 89 evacuations over the past five years, almost half were clustered in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan. Twenty-three of these evacuations were due to the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003; the remaining evacuations in the Middle East, Turkey, and Pakistan were due primarily to terrorist threats or attacks.

Ten other evacuations in Southeast Asia resulted from the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the spring of 2003, and nine in the Caribbean were due to hurricanes. During 2006 and 2007, State evacuated eleven posts for various reasons, including civil unrest, elections that could lead to civil unrest, a coup attempt, a U.S. embassy bombing, a hurricane, and war.4

Approximately 20 percent of posts reported that they had experienced an authorized departure within the last five years, and about 10 percent reported experiencing an ordered departure within this period.5

Despite the constant occurrence of NEOs, their importance is often overlooked in that most are small and their conditions vary widely. Additionally, they are seen as isolated
incidents initiated only during crisis situations. Although no two NEOs are alike, they do share common attributes and can be compared in four generic areas.

According to the Department of State the primary reasons for initiating a NEO are: (1) civil strife, (2) terrorist incidents, (3) natural disaster, (4) conventional war threats, and (5) the outbreak of disease. The Department of State further organizes evacuations into three groups: (1) authorized departure of post staff and dependants, (2) ordered departure of post staff and dependents, or (3) the assisted departure of American citizens (AMCITS).

The Department of Defense adds that, “NEO environments can be defined as: (1) permissive, (2) uncertain, or (3) hostile.” The final characteristic determining the nature of a NEO is scale: (1) large, involving American citizens or (2) small, limited to U.S. embassy staff and dependants.

INTERAGENCY SUPPORT

Each United States Government (USG) department or agency has publications that provide guidance for noncombatant evacuation operations. In recent years efforts have been made to update the publications to ensure accuracy and that doctrine matches current operating procedures. The Department of State’s Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH), their source for emergency policies, procedures, and crisis management tools, was reviewed and updated in November 2005. Within the Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-68 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (JP 3-68), dated 22 January 2007, replaces Joint Publication 3-07.5 (JP 3-07.5), its 30 September 1997 predecessor.

Despite the efforts to ensure the new procedures are applicable in today’s environment, a difficult task in and of itself, some of the important changes have been
isolated and contained within each department. The result is that information is not consistent across department and agency boundaries. For example, within the Department of Defense, Commander United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is assigned responsibility for the coordination, assessment, acquisition, and management of strategic mobility requirements during NEOs.\(^\text{10}\) Within the Department of State, the Bureau of Administration is responsible for coordinating transportation needs.\(^\text{11}\) Although this is addressed in each department’s individual publication, the information is not reciprocated in the other’s publication. This could contribute to duplicate efforts in procuring transportation assets. The inconsistencies, though not necessarily harmful to operations, are disruptive to the mission once noncombatant evacuations are authorized.

The emergency planning handbook (EPH) hints at a need for increased interagency coordination. “Several State bureaus are also involved in preparations for possible evacuations and implementing evacuations. These include the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which generates emergency guidance and oversees planning for crises; the Bureau of Human Resources, which includes a Family Liaison Affairs Bureau, which responds to the needs of American citizens abroad; and the Bureau of Administration, which is responsible for chartering flights or other transportation out of the country, if needed.”\(^\text{12}\)

Joint Publication 3-68 addresses the Department of Defense’s interaction and coordination with other agencies with a slightly different emphasis. It states that “during NEOs, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will probably be required to coordinate with agencies outside the Department of State (DOS). Other agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs include the following:” U.S. Agency For International Development (USAID), the lead federal agency (LFA) for U.S. foreign disaster assistance;
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States; and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), responsible for adjudicating visa, naturalization, asylum, and refugee applications should the United States be designated a safe haven during NEOs.\textsuperscript{13}

Regional contingency plans (CONPLAN) also discuss the possibility of cooperation with other government agencies. A United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) CONPLAN concerning NEOs specifically mentions that the “Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Commerce (DOC), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will be called upon to provide support as required.”\textsuperscript{14}

The current Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Department of State and Department of Defense on the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and other designated persons, which dates from 1997-1998, is designed to improve interaction between the two departments. It defines the roles and responsibilities of each agency during noncombatant evacuation operations.\textsuperscript{15} The “goal is to expedite practical communication and coordination between the two departments before and during large scale evacuations...”\textsuperscript{16}

The MOA is not intended to inflate, diminish, or even alter DOD’s ability to conduct military missions within the range of military operations (ROMO).\textsuperscript{17} Despite the existence of the MOA, Combatant Commanders (CCDR) do not have authority to task other United States Government departments or agencies. Their needs are translated as requests and recommendations rather than requirements. Unity of effort is left to the responsibility of the individuals involved.
In 2007, the lack of consistency between departmental publications potentially created an unknown internal conflict of interest in Lebanon. Misunderstandings in the differences between Department of State and Department of Defense contracting procedures led to delays by both departments in chartering ships and planes for use during the evacuation. “The Department of State and the Department of Defense were competing for some of the same commercial planes, thereby creating duplicated requests that gave the perception of fewer available planes for contract.”

According to JP 3-68 situational awareness (SA) and a solid understanding of the area of responsibility (AOR) are two of the key factors in successful NEOs. Therefore Geographic Combatant Commanders have a responsibility to vet all U.S. embassy emergency action plans (EAP). This requirement is designed to verify the feasibility of the plans and determine the degree of coordination expected and/or required. Furthermore, they ensure the emergency action plans are current, on file, and executable. In return, U.S. embassies have a responsibility to ensure their emergency actions plans are up to date. This is not always the case. “While all posts are required to review and update their EAPs once a year, we [State] found almost 40 percent of posts surveyed had not updated their EAP in 18 months or longer.” These two requirements are designed to help improve everyone’s situation awareness and deconflict potential sources of tension in advance of actual operations.

Operation Eastern Exit in Somalia in 1991 provides an excellent example of why current information is required. “Marine amphibious forces in control of rescue helicopters had only a 1969 map of the city. Fortunately, the lead CH-53E pilots were able to spot the embassy compound from the air after flying around town for 15 minutes.” The outdated
information degraded the pilots situational awareness and is considered a potential contributing factor to why two marines were almost left behind that day.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO) SUPPORT}

Although JP 3-68 dedicates less than half a page to discussions on coordination with nongovernmental (NGO) and intergovernmental (IGO) organizations, their value should not be underestimated. NGOs can be a great source of local information, even before evacuations have begun. Noncombatant evacuation operations are often accompanied by dynamic and constantly changing conditions. The military has always placed a high value on current and correct intelligence, especially in uncertain or hostile environments. Since NEOs occur primarily in volatile areas of the world (prime operating territory for NGOs), NGOs are more than likely already operating in country. They tend to have established relationships, allowing them access to much needed information and supplies. U.S. embassy and Department of Defense personnel might encounter difficulty establishing similar relationships during the short time frames that traditionally accompany NEOs.

NGO personnel are heavily connected to the local community and may know the identities and whereabouts of U.S. and third country citizens. Recognizing this, U.S. embassies worldwide employ in country NGOs members in their warden systems to spread important information during evacuations. Without introducing an added layer of command, NGO personnel are utilized as liaisons between the host nation, U.S. embassy and Department of Defense personnel.
HOST NATION (HN) SUPPORT

Host Nation support during NEOs can be categorized in one of two ways; involved or ignored, with little room in between. Their support is entirely dependent on the functionality of their government at the time the crisis occurs. Their capacity to help is directly related to their own internal stability and the condition of local services. Both the Department of State and the Department of Defense provide guidance on working with a host nation during a time of crisis. A specific change to JP 3-68 “adds discussion of the role of the host nation.”

A secondary source of information is Annex P: Host Nation Support of contingency plans (CONPLAN).

The main areas of interaction between either U.S. embassy or Department of Defense personnel and the host nation are security, intelligence, communication, and transportation (representing four Operations Functions). Security is an integral part of any evacuation operation. Security needs are determined by pre-existing arrangements, forces available, and the operating environment (permissive, uncertain, or hostile). They often involve complex relationships among participants. Each U.S. embassy has a Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSG) that works with the regional security officer (RSO) to meet the U.S. embassy’s specific security needs. Depending on current conditions in a country, a U.S. embassy may employ contract security guards or host nation military personnel in addition to the Marine Security Guards. At the request of the regional security officer, additional security can be provided by Combatant or Joint Force Commanders (JFC) during evacuation operations. Host nation restrictions and established rules of engagement (ROE) might limit the size of a security force permitted during evacuations. It is important to note that if additional security forces are utilized the Marine Security Guards works directly for the
regional security officer while the additional security forces work directly for the Combatant or Joint Force Commander. This unusual arrangement requires close coordination by all security forces to ensure unity of effort.

Depending on the nature of the evacuation, host nation personnel can be a good source of current intelligence. In a permissive environment they are the local experts, with unrestricted access to multiple sources. In uncertain or hostile environments, additional intelligence resources will have to be explored as the host nation is no longer exercising direct control over their intelligence assets. Access to both communication and transportation networks depends on the nature of the evacuation and the degree of control effected by the host nation. Both parties, the United States and host nation, need to consider the political ramifications of their actions. Host nations can, and often do, impose restraints on evacuating forces.

Experiences in Lebanon illustrate the value of a high degree of cooperation between a host nation and Department of Defense personnel assigned to conduct evacuations. “The permissive environment combined with the professional embassy security force – and the cooperation of the Lebanese police – enabled the MEU Commander to comply with the embassy’s request to reduce the military’s footprint in the area.”

MULTINATIONAL FORCES (NMF) SUPPORT

Although the United States is a global superpower, it rarely acts alone. This is recognized in guidance from the Department of State that “encourages posts to plan and coordinate with other foreign missions during crises, such as evacuations. However, almost sixty percent of posts reported that they do not have standing arrangements with foreign
missions on evacuation planning and coordination.”\textsuperscript{25} This highlights the fact that NEOs tend to be isolated U.S. efforts, even if they are a coordinated effort within the U.S. Government (USG). The concern with this fact is that NEOs often occur in geographically remote areas and almost always require temporary safe havens (Lebanon 2007, West Africa 2003 and 2007). American citizens are evacuated alongside citizens from other countries; often times to the same safe haven. This can lead to competition for the same resources, a problem the United States is already facing internally. If the United States is not closely coordinating with other nations, its citizens can experience delays in evacuation procedures. Italy, one of the first nations to evacuate its citizens from Lebanon in 2007, initiated operations three days ahead of the United States.\textsuperscript{26}

Competing for the lead in developing new partnerships among nations, the Department of Defense is embracing its place among multinational forces. Just as JP 3-68 “adds discussions on the role of host nations” it “expands the discussion of multinational NEOs.”\textsuperscript{27} Among the key lessons and observations from the Lebanon NEO by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) was that “U.S. Military forces should seek to improve cooperation and synergy with other nations that are evacuating their own citizens.”\textsuperscript{28} Specifically “… [Coordinate] with other countries for evacuee boat spaces”\textsuperscript{29} and “contract mobility (buses) immediately – other evacuating countries are.”\textsuperscript{30}

The United States is not alone in looking to fellow coalition partners for assistance. Australia learned a similar lesson when it found itself in a difficult position with 300 Australians stranded in southern Lebanon. They lacked the resources to ensure their safe passage before the expiration of Israel’s 24 hour deadline for evacuation from the region.\textsuperscript{31}
“Consular officials were making ‘every effort’ to organize the safe departure of the Australians, including placing them in evacuation efforts by other countries.”

The Canadian Government, with the largest number of citizens to evacuate from Lebanon, founds itself struggling with dual-citizens or ‘Canadians of Convenience.’ “The official policy of the government of Canada is that a dual-citizen is the responsibility of the foreign government when living in the foreign country; however, in practice Canada does not distinguish between dual-citizen and single-citizen Canadians.” The mere number of citizens to evacuate taxed Canada’s ability to move people in a timely and orderly manner. Their solution was found in combining evacuation efforts with coalition partners.

As the United States continues to pursue bilateral, multinational, and international defense agreements, new factors will develop that affect NEO. In January 2007, the United States Military transferred the USS Trenton to India through the foreign military sales program (FMS). The renamed INS Jalashva will diversify India’s fleet and improve their capabilities within the range of military operations (ROMO). The Jalashva’s primary role is amphibious operations but secondary missions include humanitarian aid, disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation operations. The two nations have pledged bilateral military support should the need for an evacuation arise.

In November 2006, NATO declared that its NATO Response Force (NRF) was fully operational. The NRF is NATO’s answer to military transformation and highlights their need for improved interoperability among member nations. As a truly combined organization with a rotating command structure, the NRF is responsible for conducting NEOs. As one of the largest suppliers of forces to NATO, the United States could find itself participating in a multinational NEO before long.
Closer to home, the United States held the fifth Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Conference in Pearl Harbor, HI in October 2006. According to Dr. Jens Jensen, the host of the conference, “For coalition forces and civilian agencies to continue working well together during NEOs…the NEO planners must exchange information, identify mutual issues they can preplan before a NEO event occurs, and continue the development of common techniques and procedures.”

**SAY IT IS NOT SO**

The counter to the requirement for improved cooperation among NEO participants is that the need simply is not there. Within the United States Government, the Department of State is, always has been, and will continue to be the lead agency responsible for NEOs. Requests for assistance from the Department of Defense are rare. In the past twenty years the Department of State has handled more than 270 evacuations successfully. The Department of Defense has provided assistance during evacuations operations on only four occasions in the past five years. Assistance when requested has occurred during large-scale operations or from hostile operating environments.

Historically, most evacuations are small. A “relatively small-scale evacuation from Conakry, Guinea, in February 2007, during a period of civil strife…involved flying a few dozen people (dependants of embassy staff, State employees temporarily deployed to the embassy, and private American citizens) to a nearby city in another West African Country, where U.S. embassy personnel assisted the evacuees in obtaining commercial flights back to the United States or an alternate approved safe haven.”
The fact remains that within the Department of Defense noncombatant evacuation operations are still planned as unilateral operations. When called upon, the “JFC’s primary duties include maintaining order at the evacuation site and supporting the ambassador’s efforts to care for noncombatant evacuees.” The military fulfils these duties in a supporting role and augments, but does not always assume, the embassy’s mission. Requesting Department of Defense assistance during large-scale evacuations is not a last ditch effort by a U.S. embassy, but rather an opportunity for one department to capitalize on their expertise of another.

Although a potential source of support and information during evacuations, complete reliance on NGOs should be avoided. Their charter or bylaws may legally limit their involvement. Additionally, their causes might be divergent from the interests of the United States Government. In hostile environments their organizations might be forced to evacuate with everyone else, as was the case in Iraq in 2003.

Host nation support, although important, can be unreliable under certain circumstances. Internal instability, disrupted capacity, chaos, divided priorities, and political concerns all influence a host nation’s involvement during evacuations. Chances are that if the United States is conducting a NEO, it is because the capacity of the host nation to provide for the safety and well being of U.S. embassy staff and citizens has been exceeded.

An underlying reason for bilateral or multinational defense agreements is to pool resources and improve unity of effort. Relying on our partners is expected but still involves risk. Within NATO, the only country besides the United States capable of strategic lift is the United Kingdom. Therefore, chances are that if NATO becomes involved in a multinational NEO, the United States will not only be expected but is required to provide a preponderance
of the lift assets. Additionally, if our coalition partners are engaged in conflicts elsewhere, who will establish the priority if a crisis requiring an evacuation develops.

THE FUTURE OF NEOs

Despite twenty years of successful NEOs conducted by the State Department and Department of Defense’s limited involvement in evacuations, both departments need to ensure that enough emphasis is placed on understanding the factors that will affect NEOs in the future. A quick look at Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index shows how volatile the world is.43

“Almost 45 percent of posts reported that State has issued a travel warning for their country within the past five years.”44 “Almost three-quarters of posts reported issuing a threat or security warning within the past five years.”45 NEOs are not a thing of the past. They are a very real and present challenge that faces U.S. embassies on a daily basis.

The Department of State and the Department of Defense are both embroiled in a radical transformation process. As the military is in the process of right-sizing to meet the demands of the Department of Defense, the Department of State is similarly in the process of adjusting its ranks. The challenges associated with the Department of State’s rapid growth and expansion in size can be felt by those in uniform. “According to State officials, the number of positions at unaccompanied posts is at its highest in history. Less experienced staff can be stationed at unaccompanied posts for several reasons; they have less seniority in State’s posting process…or they may seek out placements at unaccompanied posts because such postings enhance their career development. For example state recently made service in a hardship post a prerequisite for promotion to the senior Foreign Service. This may result a
trend toward less experienced personnel serving terms at unaccompanied posts that could be vulnerable to future crises and potential evacuations.” These same challenges are already faced by our men and women in uniform.

The development of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) provides the Department of Defense (and State) with an opportunity to refine the guidance and training required between all NEO participants. AFRICOM’s unique command structure should facilitate improved interoperability. One word of caution: what works well for AFRICOM might not work well for other Geographic Combatant Commanders due to the unique civil-military organizational structure.

A recent review of a United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) CONPLAN reiterated the need for continued cooperation among partners. “While it is stated that a U.S. NEO would be unilateral, it is recommended that a sample/possible coalition command structure be provided.” After all, the United States is not alone in transformation. Even our friends the French have spent the last decade transforming their conscript army to a lighter more expeditionary force that includes new roles during noncombatant evacuation operations.

The impacts of globalization are currently being felt around the world; a world that is virtually accessible to everyone. American citizens, in tandem with the rest of the world’s citizens, are traveling at unprecedented rates. Boarders are being blurred with the expansion of multicultural societies and the blending of families. Cooperating with our partners is not new. Connectivity is only getting better. The reality is that the United States has already relied exclusively on our coalition partners during recent NEOs. “…A State official reported that during an evacuation of about 400 American citizens from West Africa in 2004, the post
extensively coordinated and communicated with foreign missions because all American citizens were evacuated on foreign government-arranged aircraft."

The foundation for easing cooperation among U.S. Government departments and agencies has been laid. New guidance has been put out through the Department of State’s emergency planning handbook (EPH) and the Department of Defense’s JP 3-68. It is the responsibility of everyone to act on it. The Department of State and Department of Defense need to capitalize on opportunities to train to the new doctrine. Preparation now will help when it comes time to execute NEOs together later. With these changes comes the need to work together with our coalition partners.

The bottom line is that things are working well. We need to keep doing what we are doing, looking forward and not backward. Institutional ‘cultures’ are starting to change. The Department of Defense has emphasized that the military needs to pay “more attention than normal [to NEOs] due to the non-DOD departments and agencies involved in this plan (Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Defense, etc…).” They have recognized the desire to fix the disconnects between doctrine and current operations. The Department of State has pledged to expand its ranks and incorporate more traditional and non-traditional partners into their organization.

When push comes to shove, the United States Government will step in to assist its citizens anywhere in the world at any and all costs. If this were not true, the Government would not have decided to rescind the requirement for promissory notes in Lebanon or authorized the seventh evacuation from Liberia in twenty years. We can no longer expect to conduct NEOs alone. It is time we improve our plan on working together from the beginning.
1 United States Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP 3-68 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), ix.
2 JP 3-68, ix.
4 Ibid., 7-8.
5 Ibid., 10.
6 Ibid., 4.
7 Ibid., 9.
8 United States Central Command, USCENTCOM CONPLAN 1100 Plan Summary (U), (MacDill AFB, FL: Headquarters, United States Central Command, August 2007), 2.
12 Ibid., 11.
14 United States Central Command, USCENTCOM CONPLAN 1100 Plan Summary (U), (MacDill AFB, FL: Headquarters, United States Central Command, August 2007), 7
17 The terms defining the full spectrum of military operations are still evolving. They include the range of military operations (ROMO) and military operations other than war (MOOTW).
19 JP 3-68, x. “The three key factors in noncombatant evacuation planning are: situational awareness; a correct appraisal and understanding of the changing diplomatic, political, and military environment in which the evacuation force will operate; and preparation of the evacuation force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile.”
22 Ibid., 246.
23 JP 3-68, iii.
27 JP 3-68, iii.
29 Ibid., 2.
33 Worthington, Peter, “Convenient Canadians,” *Toronto Sun*, 21 July 2006, http://www.torontosun.ca/ (accessed 31 March 2008). A term made prominent during the Lebanon evacuations with comments by Peter Worthington of the Toronto Sun and refers to Canadians with dual citizenship who have moved back to their original home country but continues to hold onto their Canadian citizenship.
39 Ibid., 10.
40 DOD provided assistance during evacuations from Lebanon in 2006, a large scale operation, and during Operation Shining Express in Liberia in 2003, conducted in a hostile environment due to internal civil unrest.
42 JP 3-68, xiv.
46 Ibid., 26.
52 Director, Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC), “USCENTCOM CONPLAN 1100-07 (DRAFT) NOPC Review,” (Research Paper, Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 2007), 10. “NOPC discovered that DOS Operations Center (Executive Secretary) convenes the Washington Liaison Group (WLG), but was unaware of the utilization of Regional Liaison Groups (RLG). The RLG is defined and addressed as part of the interagency planning process for NEO in the DOD/DOS MOA and JP 3-68, but is not a functional part of how DOS operates.”
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