The Deployable Operations Group:
A Model for A National Unified Interagency Rapid Response Command

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14. ABSTRACT
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created after the attacks on September 11, 2001 to consolidate all the domestic agencies responsible for protecting America’s borders and national infrastructure under a single department. Since the attacks, nationwide preparedness efforts have established numerous federal rapid response teams, which are coordinated during a federal interagency response under the National Incident Management System. This hastily formed interagency command can become clumsy, because normally each of these rapid response teams is managed and functions under their independent agency. The U.S. government has unparalleled capability and capacity to respond to crisis events, but this arrangement lacks unity of command which hinders coordination and unity of effort. The newly updated National Response Framework (NRF) and recently developed Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) process provide a strategic and upper operational skeleton for interagency coordination, but do not provide the degree of unity of effort needed to avoid duplication and inefficiency in a time critical response. If each of the highly capable and independent rapid response teams scattered throughout the federal government were managed under a single body, instead of through their parent agencies, the national response effort could have increased interoperability and harmonization. This paper describes how incorporating multi-agency rapid response forces under a single unified command could better coordinate the domestic All-Hazards federal rapid response.
THE DEPLOYABLE OPERATIONS GROUP: A MODEL FOR A NATIONAL UNIFIED INTERAGENCY RAPID RESPONSE COMMAND

By

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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created after the attacks on September 11, 2001 to consolidate all the domestic agencies responsible for protecting America’s borders and national infrastructure under a single department. Since the attacks, nationwide preparedness efforts have established numerous federal rapid response teams, which are coordinated during a federal interagency response under the National Incident Management System. This hastily formed interagency command can become clumsy, because normally each of these rapid response teams is managed and functions under their independent agency. The U.S. government has unparalleled capability and capacity to respond to crisis events, but this arrangement lacks unity of command which hinders coordination and unity of effort. The newly updated National Response Framework (NRF) and recently developed Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) process provide a strategic and upper operational skeleton for interagency coordination, but do not provide the degree of unity of effort needed to avoid duplication and inefficiency in a time critical response. If each of the highly capable and independent rapid response teams scattered throughout the federal government were managed under a single body, instead of through their parent agencies, the national response effort could have increased interoperability and harmonization. This paper describes how incorporating multi-agency rapid response forces under a single unified command could better coordinate the domestic All-Hazards federal rapid response.
INTRODUCTION

In the 1980’s, we had the best Army, the best Navy, the best Air Force, and the best Marine Corps in the world, but they did not work jointly. Arguably today, we have a great State Department, a great Department of Defense, and a great Department of Treasury that are not working jointly.¹

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created after the attacks on September 11, 2001 to consolidate all the domestic agencies responsible for protecting America’s borders and national infrastructure under a single department.² To fulfill its role, DHS has embraced an All-Hazards mentality in its preparedness to thwart future attacks and minimize the consequences of disasters. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 created the nucleus about which DHS agencies, and other federal executive departments, formed to increase U.S. capability to respond to domestic crises. Nationwide preparedness efforts have established numerous rapid response teams,* which have vastly increased the federal capacity to react to a national calamity. In a national response effort, United States policy promulgates that agencies responding to a domestic crisis coordinate under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) through the formation of an ad-hoc interagency command.³ Unfortunately, this can be a clumsy arrangement because in day-to-day activities, each of these rapid response teams is managed and functions under their independent agency. Subsequently, this hastily formed interagency command often becomes a stove-piped organization because of the differences in procedures and policies between the responding agencies. The sub-optimal operating environment surrounding a disaster area further exacerbates on-scene tactical

* Nearly every agency in the federal government has created an internal organization that is responsible for rapid response to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, environmental disasters or other urgent crises. These organizations range from the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team to FEMA’s Disaster Medical Assistance Team to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) to the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Team and National Strike Force and many, many others.
coordination challenges. In a domestic homeland security crisis situation, particularly one involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the associated inefficiencies with this arrangement can lead to disastrous consequences. The U.S. government has unparalleled capability and capacity to respond to crisis events, but the federal rapid response structure is currently unorganized because it lacks unity of command which hinders coordination and unity of effort.

A coordinated and swift federal domestic response is critical to minimize loss of life during terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The federal government has not improved interagency coordination among the abundant federal rapid response teams to a level that is sufficient to achieve these ends. The newly updated National Response Framework (NRF) and recently developed Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) process provide a strategic and upper operational skeleton for interagency coordination, but do not provide the degree of unity of effort needed to avoid duplication and inefficiency in a time critical response. If each of the highly capable and independent rapid response teams scattered throughout the federal government were managed under a single body, instead of through their parent agencies, the national response effort could have increased interoperability and harmonization. This paper will investigate the domestic All Hazards federal rapid response structure and examine the possibility of increased coordination by incorporating multi-agency rapid response forces under a single unified command.
ANALYSIS

During an interagency operation, there is little unity of command because federal rapid response teams are currently compartmentalized and controlled by their respective agencies. Interagency coordination is hindered by functionally separate command and control structures that result in operating procedures, tactics and techniques, rules of engagement, authorities and jurisdiction that are not aligned at the operational or tactical level. Hence, a federal domestic crisis response is also often compartmentalized and unconnected (i.e. one agency handles a specific geographic area or function of a response event with minimal coordination with other groups). The lack of unity of command makes unity of effort and interagency coordination extremely difficult, particularly in a time-sensitive or hostile situation. In addition, each agency’s authorities are restricted by differing legal requirements, such as Posse Comitatus limits on the Department of Defense. The existing organizational federal rapid response structure makes it problematic to achieve the degree of synchronization and non-redundancy that is required in a federal crisis response. The development of a single command and control structure for all federal rapid response organizations could address these challenges and enhance federal rapid responder training, standardization and interoperability.

Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Coast Guard faced similar internal coordination challenges due to the organization’s functional structure. Although already recognized as an extremely flexible organization, in response to 9/11 and the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the U.S. Coast Guard reorganized to “become less reactive, and more proactive and anticipatory in its actions.” One facet of this reorganization was the development of the Deployable Operations Group (DOG) as part of the Coast Guard trident
force structure (in addition to shore-based geographically fixed forces and maritime patrol and interdiction Deepwater forces). The purpose of the DOG is to “oversee, coordinate, and integrate deployable force packages from all Coast Guard specialized teams [and] provide the Coast Guard with better surge capability and flexibility in emergencies.” A unified interagency rapid response command, with a framework similar to the DOG but expanded to incorporate multiple agencies inside and outside the Department of Homeland Security, could maximize operational readiness by aligning “all deployable, specialized DHS [and other governmental] forces under a single, unified command in adaptive, tailored force packages for rapid response to national threats.”

**Lessons Learned from September 11, 2001**

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 were, in large part, successful because the United States had not fully envisioned and was not prepared for a scenario involving the use of commercial airlines as weapons of mass destruction. The initial responding agencies, in particular the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and DOD’s North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), were challenged by sub-optimal interoperability and communication protocols. Awakened by the inadequate interaction between the two agencies responsible for United States airspace control and defense, federal officials realized that it was essential to change the interagency emergency response capabilities. While the formation of the Department of Homeland Security provided a strategic framework to enhance national protection, DHS agency operational and tactical capabilities remain stove-piped. When examining future areas for improvement, the 9/11 Commission stated interagency coordination “means going well beyond the preexisting jobs of the agencies that have been brought together inside the department.”
Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina

Insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination are not problems that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well.  

The interagency response to Hurricane Katrina highlights that there is room for improvement in coordination, communication, cooperation, and command and control across federal organizations. In the initial days of the response, there was no central coordinating authority in New Orleans or cohesive plan to maximize the efforts of rapid response teams. Search and rescue teams were not coordinated, which meant that many areas received redundant efforts, while others received no help at all. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned report states “there is a compelling need to strengthen operational capabilities across the federal government. Those departments and agencies that have a responsibility to participate in catastrophic response must build up their crisis deployable capabilities.” United States Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen reinforced the need for mandated interagency coordination when, after serving as the Principal Federal Official during the Hurricane Katrina response, he compared the interagency efforts to Operation Eagle Claw (the failed operation to rescue Iranian hostages that led to the development of United States Special Operations Command and was a catalyst for the Goldwater-Nichols Act). The driving factor behind the uncoordinated efforts was that there was no unity of command during the initial federal response.

Overlapping Responsibilities

The challenges of interagency coordination have always been a source of friction, but recent events have thrust the issue into the national spotlight. The National Strategy for
Homeland Security describes that agencies responding to national emergencies could take orders from a variety of sources, including:

- state, local, and tribal emergency operations centers;
- fusion centers;
- the National Operations Center;
- the National Infrastructure Coordination Center;
- the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Response Coordination Center (DHS);
- the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operations Center (DOJ);
- and the National Counterterrorism Center (DNI)

The document further describes that the United States has to strengthen interagency command and control systems and improve communication of critical information to ensure federal response efforts are better coordinated.\(^22\)

Current U.S. policy guidelines lack specificity on who has responsibility for any particular incident. There are significant overlaps, which can lead to confusion and sub-optimal response efforts, as demonstrated during 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. In any domestic homeland security incident, multiple agencies may have responsibility and no single agency has control over other agency’s resources. This arrangement results in resources and capabilities that may be employed improperly or not at all\(^23\). If a homeland security incident occurs in a maritime region near an international border, the following current federal policies list the following responsibilities:

- The Department of Justice (through the Federal Bureau of Investigation) has **lead responsibility** for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats.”\(^24\)
- United States Coast Guard has “**primary responsibility** for maritime homeland security.”\(^25\)
• Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator is **responsible for**
  “preparation for, protection against, response to, and recovery from all-hazards incidents.”

• The Department of Defense (DOD) “is responsible for the Homeland Defense (HD) mission, and therefore **leads the HD response**, with other departments and agencies in support of DOD efforts. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.”

• “Customs and Border Protection is “the **single federal agency principally responsible for** managing and securing our nation’s borders both at and between the ports of entry.”

• The “Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the **lead agency** for the design and implementation of the operational security plan when an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a National Special Security Event.”

• The Department of State is “the **lead federal agency** for terrorism response outside the United States.”

The redundancy in Homeland Security responsibilities was reported to Congress in a 2004 GAO testimony and identified “six departments—the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and State—as having … lead agency roles in implementing the Homeland Security strategy.”

With all of these agencies assigned overlapping lead roles, it is not surprising that there have been disagreements on which agency actually has the lead and which assets should be employed for a particular incident. The 2005 Top Officials Exercise (TOPOFF 3)
(a biannual national terrorism preparedness exercise that involves top officials from all levels of government) highlighted the confusion caused by this redundant authority. An after action report stated that “the FBI never fully integrated into and accepted the unified command called for under NIMS (National Incident Management System) [and] concurrent management of both the investigation and all other response functions would have increased the effectiveness and efficiency of the response effort. The report also recommended the continuation of multi-agency training and exercises to test interagency coordination efforts.”

The Federal Bureau of Investigation agreed and in a report stated, “Unless incident command and other coordination issues are resolved in advance and response scenarios are exercised, the overlapping nature of the FBI's and the Coast Guard's responsibilities in the maritime domain may result in confusion and interagency conflict with the FBI in the event of a maritime incident.”

Despite enormous pressure to address these problems very little was accomplished towards interagency coordination in the two years between exercises. Among several preliminary observations, the 2007 TOPOFF 4 After Action Quick Look Report stated that “problems were observed that affected coordination within Unified Commands” and that further analysis was necessary to “identify ways to address coordination issues.”

**Improved Interagency Coordination**

When a domestic crisis quickly unfolds, the tactical response must be coordinated to minimize loss of life and protect the nation, regardless of overlapping responsibilities and authorities. Recognizing the existing gap in interagency coordination, the Department of Homeland Security developed the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) (which is part of the National Strategy for Maritime Security) in 2005 and updated the National
Response Framework (NRF) in 2007 to improve coordination among federal agencies. The MOTR process aims for a “coordinated government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities that enable the government to respond quickly and decisively.”\textsuperscript{35} The NRF is structured around federal support to incidents that overwhelm the initial local and state response efforts. Both the NRF (previously called the National Response Plan) and MOTR process have demonstrated successful interagency coordination in numerous exercises and actual events\textsuperscript{36}, but a 2007 GAO report expressed concern that DHS initiatives have not “been tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions and demands they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster.”\textsuperscript{37}

**National Response Framework**

The National Response Framework (NRF) presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies – from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The Framework defines the key principles, roles, and structures that organize the way we respond as a Nation.\textsuperscript{38}

The National Response Framework (NRF) is a Department of Homeland Security document that outlines how agencies will organize for a variety of national response situations. It defines the coordinating and primary agencies for a particular type of response and “provides the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support.”\textsuperscript{39} The NRF is designed for a progressive response effort that relies heavily on federal agencies supporting an initial local response. The NRF does not direct which agencies will provide forces and the responsibilities for each of those response forces, but it does provide the framework for coordination between the responding agencies. The NRF does not provide for rapid response
team coordination prior to an actual event, because it does not describe those necessary lines of authority.

Maritime Operational Threat Response

MOTR execution commences upon identification of a maritime threat against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain and concludes upon completion of response activities. These activities include maritime security response and counterterrorism operations; maritime interception operations; the boarding of vessels for law enforcement purpose; prevention and detection of, and response to, mining of U.S. ports; detection, interdiction and disposition of targeted cargo, people, and vessels; and countering attacks on vessels with U.S. citizens aboard; or any other maritime activities that affects U.S. interests anywhere in the world. The MOTR plan is intended to develop “protocols [to] promote better understanding of the threat and identification of the full range of U.S. government response options [and] to allow appropriate actions to attain the desired outcome.” The MOTR protocols enhance the NRF process by “directing a unified and coordinated Federal response to threats in the maritime domain.” The MOTR protocols describe how agencies will respond, which agency has lead authority and directs agencies to “initiate coordination activities pursuant to this plan at the earliest possible opportunity.” The MOTR process does not solve fundamental problems with stove-piped interagency command and control structures and many would argue that once a domestic crisis has occurred, it is too late to “initiate coordination.”
RECOMMENDATIONS

The complexity, scope, and potential consequences of a terrorist threat or incident require that there be a rapid and decisive capability to resolve the situation. The resolution to an act of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination of law enforcement, criminal investigation, protective activities, emergency management functions, and technical expertise across all levels of government. The incident may affect a single location or multiple locations, each of which may be an incident scene, a hazardous scene, and/or a crime scene simultaneously.\textsuperscript{34}

While it is a generally recognized that a rapid and effective federal response requires interagency coordination and there has been significant movement towards strategic and upper operational level coordination (through the MOTR and NRF), there is a tremendous gap in the lower operational and tactical synchronization of interagency rapid response teams. There remain significant challenges with doctrine, organization, training, material and leadership at the operational and tactical levels in domestic crisis response, because each agency independently organizes, maintains, trains and equips its rapid response teams. This decentralized structure enhances agency-specific specialized capabilities, but significantly detracts from interagency cooperation and results in duplication of effort. Furthermore, this arrangement can lead to segregation and confusion on-scene because rapid response teams operating in the same area with the same mission (and sometimes equivalent capabilities) are from different agencies and use different equipment, communication systems, tactics and even chain of command. An efficient and successfully coordinated response is hindered by separate command structures, which breeds deficiencies in teamwork, collaboration and joint training.\textsuperscript{45}

There has been considerable discussion of the development of an interagency command (much of it revolving around a structure similar to that of the Joint Interagency Task Forces fighting the War on Drugs) and interagency operations centers to consolidate
information flow, but today’s interagency federal response effort still revolves around interpersonal relationships, command center teleconferences and ad-hoc structures. A permanent unified interagency rapid response command would inherently maximize coordination and flexibility, while simultaneously improving reaction and efficiency through adaptive force packaging.

The key to any efficient and successful operation is unity of effort. The NRF and MOTR processes rely on cooperation among several disparate entities to achieve unity of effort. History has shown that it is normally “much better to achieve unity of effort through unity of command [rather] than through cooperation.” Consequently, it is extremely important that a permanent unified interagency rapid response command be not only unified, but also have unity of command. Unity of command can only exist when there is a clear and singular line from the President to the on-scene federal responders. “Unified command is the medium through which a multi-agency team manages an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies without loss or abdication of agency or organizational authority, responsibility, or accountability.”

Unified command remains a critical component because it is the driving factor that ensures all agencies have ownership, accountability, influence and responsibility in the rapid response process. A standing unified command would ensure that the federal response has maximum unity of effort by having an established chain of command prior to an actual incident.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), which is required for all federal agencies by Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, provides the medium for both unified command and unity of command. NIMS is an extremely flexible structure that is normally only employed on a temporary basis.
during a disaster response, but can be adapted as the basis for a permanent organization. A unified interagency command should be built around the NIMS foundation for four reasons: (1) it is documented and readily understood by all federal agencies; (2) its flexibility allows for the federal response to be injected at any time during a crisis; (3) it allows for the federal rapid response to lead, if necessary; and (4) it allows for the federal response to expand and adapt as the situation develops.

A unified interagency rapid response command could be outfitted with a deployable element that provides an immediate ICS command structure, which includes pre-designated Principal Federal Officials (PFO)† and incident management teams. This is not a new concept for the federal government, as DHS has already designated hurricane incident management teams consisting of PFOs, Defense Coordinating Officers and Federal Coordinating Officers for hurricane response. Along with being trained to respond under NIMS, the command deployable staff could also be trained in DOD’s Joint Planning and Execution System (JOPES) in order to initiate or support command and control under the National Command Authority when required.

† FEMA defines the Principal Federal Official as the Federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities under HSPD-5. In certain scenarios, a PFO may be pre-designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal domestic incident planning and coordination at the local level outside the context of a specific threat or incident. A PFO also may be designated in a pre-incident mode for a specific geographic area based on threat and other considerations.
Figure 1 demonstrates a potential command structure for a unified interagency rapid response command. The example command organization is based on an ICS structure, and because of HSPD-5 requirements, it is ‘plug and play’ with all federal agencies. In addition to the standard ICS sections and command staff elements (highlighted in gray on Figure 1), the example command organization includes a standardization element (responsible for standardizing equipment, procedures and policies) and a training element (responsible for exercises, coordinated tactics and techniques and integrated training). These elements incorporate organizational components that are not typically included in traditional ICS structures due to their temporary nature. These non-traditional elements incorporate
requirements similar to those considered when the DOD establishes a new capability under the DOTMLPF\(^\dagger\) process.

As with all consortia, the determination of the primary leader is a contentious issue. The head of a unified interagency rapid response command would likely be the agency that has the broadest authority. FEMA has traditionally coordinated federal response efforts during general domestic emergencies and has been designated as responsible for “preparation for, protection against, response to, and recovery from all-hazards incidents.”\(^{51}\) The Coast Guard’s widespread authority and jurisdiction through both Title 10 and Title 14 responsibilities would facilitate a global and domestic response. Therefore, it would be a logical choice to designate a FEMA director with a deputy United States Coast Guard Admiral to carry the required authorities, and lead a unified interagency rapid response command.

The parent command for a unified interagency operational level commander already exists within the DHS Office of Operations Coordination,\(^{52}\) whose “primary role is to coordinate national/strategic level interagency planning for the Secretary to effectively and efficiently coordinate federal government operations when necessary.”\(^{53}\) In addition, the DHS Office of Operations Coordination owns the Interagency Incident Management Planning Team that provides “national-level contingency and crisis-action incident management planning through a collaborative, interagency process.”\(^{54}\) The development of a unified interagency rapid response command would fill that gap between the strategic and tactical levels. The only change for existing federal rapid response teams would be their

\(^\dagger\) DOTMLPF stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities. A DOTMLPF study is required by the DOD when establishing new capabilities. (Joint Publication 1-02)
consolidation under a single, unified force provider. Subordinate elements (building blocks for a unified interagency rapid response command), such as the U.S. National Response Team, already exist throughout the federal government.

The development of a standing unified interagency rapid response command would synthesize the MOTR and NRF processes by consolidating operational level authorities with a standing command structure, so that rapid response teams could be deployed more quickly and efficiently. Under a standing operational commander, rapid response teams will likely have trained together and standardized processes and equipment in the unified environment. The unified interagency rapid response command model gives the interagency teams a better chance to integrate operations prior to an actual event.

CONCLUSION

General Peter Pace, USMC, as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that there was no one underneath the President who could follow through on decisions and order different agencies to accomplish what must be accomplished.\footnote{55}

It is often said that the United States is preparing for when, not if, another major terrorist attack occurs. The National Intelligence Council reported that “the probability of a hostile state using a WMD is expected to increase during the next decade.”\footnote{56} It is just as inevitable that a major natural disaster will occur in the United States. The challenge is to determine how and where the event will occur and what resources the United States needs to have readily available to minimize loss of life.

A 2006 GAO report stated that “fundamental to effective preparation and response are (a) clearly defined, clearly communicated and clearly understood legal authorities, 

\footnote{55} USNRT consists of 16 Federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents.
responsibilities, and roles at the federal, state, and local level, and (b) identification and development of the capabilities needed to mount a well-coordinated, effective response to reduce the loss of life and property and set the stage for recovery. Providing these fundamentals requires effective planning and coordination, including detailed operational plans, and robust training and exercises in which needed capabilities are realistically tested, assessed and problems identified and addressed.” 57 A standing unified interagency rapid response command will facilitate achieving these fundamentals.

The development of a unified interagency rapid response command is necessary to maximize coordination and minimize redundancy across federal first responders. This is not an easy task. The 9/11 Commission Report states “government agencies also sometimes display a tendency to match capabilities to mission by defining away the hardest part of their job. They are too often passive, accepting what are viewed as givens, including that efforts to identify and fix glaring vulnerabilities to dangerous threats would be too costly, too controversial, or too disruptive.” 58 After the shortfalls during the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina response, United States citizens expect and deserve a more coordinated federal government response. U.S. government agencies need to set aside the bureaucratic obstacles to interagency coordination and work towards creating a truly unified rapid response command that is flexible, adaptable and interoperable in an All-Hazards environment.
NOTES

1 Garamone, Jim “Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act.” American Forces Press Service (September 7, 2004)
5 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, (Washington, DC: February 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (accessed April 2, 2008): 43 “Equipment interoperability problems hindered an integrated response. Similar issues of bifurcated operations and interoperability challenges were also present between the military and civilian leadership…The lack of interoperable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment.”
6 ibid: 43 “Once forces arrived in the Joint Operations Area, they fell under separate command structures, rather than one single command. The separate commands divided the area of operations geographically and supported response efforts separately, with the exception of the evacuations of the Superdome and the Convention Center in New Orleans.”
9 ibid: 45
11 The 9/11 Commission Report: 14-18
12 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned: 12 “After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Federal government realized that additional measures were needed to ensure effective coordination with State and local governments and took steps to alter how it responds to emergencies.”
13 ibid: 73
14 The 9/11 Commission Report: 428
15 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned: 50
16 ibid: 42
17 ibid: 57 “This meant that multiple rescue teams were sent to the same areas, while leaving others uncovered. When successful rescues were made, there was no formal direction on where to take those rescued. Too often rescuers had to leave victims at drop-off points and landing zones that had insufficient logistics, medical, and communications resources.”
18 Ibid: 72
19 Conversation with Admiral Thad Allen. March 14, 2008

21 *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*: 38 “Some teams displayed their own initiative to fill the gap in unified command, determining their own rescue priorities, areas to be searched, and locations to drop off the people they rescued.”


23 *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*: 45 “In the aftermath of the hurricane, DOI delivered a comprehensive list of its deployable assets that were immediately available for humanitarian and emergency assistance, including such items as 300 dump trucks and other vehicles, 119 pieces of heavy equipment, 300 boats, eleven aircraft, fifty to seventy-five maintenance crews. Although DOI repeatedly attempted to provide these assets through the process established by the NRP, there was no effective mechanism for efficiently integrating and deploying these resources. DOI offered 500 rooms and other sites for shelters or housing. The Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Agriculture (USDA) also offered thousands of housing units nationwide to FEMA for temporary assignment to evacuees. Most of the thousands of housing units made available by other Federal agencies were not offered to evacuees and were never used.”


35 *National Strategy for Maritime Security*: 27


39 *National Response Framework*: ESF-i


41 ibid: 9-10

42 ibid: 2

43 ibid: 3


45 *The 9/11 Commission Report*: 396


Vego: VIII-13

ibid: APP-97


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“Office of Operations Coordination,” March 27, 2008

www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0797.shtm (accessed March 25, 2008) “The Office of Operations Coordination is responsible for: Conducting joint operations across all organizational elements; Coordinating activities related to incident management; Employing all department resources to translate intelligence and policy into action; Overseeing the National Operations Fusion Center (NOFC) which collects and fuses information from more than 35 Federal, State, territorial, tribal, local and private sector agencies.”


ibid: 2 “IMPT’s focus is at the strategic level and comprises two components: (1) a core group of 15 full-time planning representatives from key DHS elements (e.g., FEMA, TSA, CBP, Coast Guard, I&A) as well as other key interagency members (e.g., DOD, DOJ/FBI, HHS, DOE, EPA, DOT and the American Red Cross); and (2), an “on-call” staff of 38 planners that includes other members from both DHS and the interagency community.”


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