Occasional Paper #2

Civil-Military Relations
Program in Mozambique:
Lessons Learned And Future Challenges

Thomas C. Bruneau
July 1999
| **1. REPORT DATE** | **JUL 1999** |
| **2. REPORT TYPE** | |
| **3. DATES COVERED** | **00-00-1999 to 00-00-1999** |
| **4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE** | **Civil-Military Relations Program in Mozambique: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges** |
| **5a. CONTRACT NUMBER** | |
| **5b. GRANT NUMBER** | |
| **5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER** | |
| **5d. PROJECT NUMBER** | |
| **5e. TASK NUMBER** | |
| **5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER** | |
| **6. AUTHOR(S)** | |
| **7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)** | **Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, CA, 93943** |
| **8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER** | |
| **9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)** | |
| **10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)** | |
| **11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)** | |
| **12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT** | **Approved for public release; distribution unlimited** |
| **13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES** | |
| **14. ABSTRACT** | |
| **15. SUBJECT TERMS** | |
| **16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:** | **a. REPORT unclassified** | **b. ABSTRACT unclassified** | **c. THIS PAGE unclassified** |
| **17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** | **Same as Report (SAR)** |
| **18. NUMBER OF PAGES** | **24** |
| **19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON** | |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prepared by ANSI Z39-18
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored the research in this report under agreement AEP-A-00-98-00014-00, which established the Partnership for Democratic Governance and Society. The Partnership for Democratic Governance and Society (PDGS) conducts programs to strengthen the capacity of civilians to provide leadership in defense management, policymaking and analysis. The PDGS conducts its programs in cooperation with local legislatures, political parties, civic organizations, academic institutions, media and the civilian elements of the defense establishment.

The PDGS is funded principally through a cooperative agreement with the United States Agency for International Development. Its membership consists of the following five organizations from Argentina, the Philippines, and the United States. These are the National Democratic Institute (NDI); the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR); the Seguridad Estratégica Regional en el 2000 (SER en el 2000); the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS); and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT).

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense of the United States Government.
The Center for Civil-Military Relations

The Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Post-Graduate School (CCMR, Monterey, CA) is an implementing organization of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Expanded-International Military Education and Training Program and has amassed both scholarly and practical expertise educating civilian and military defense professionals from more than 40 countries. CCMR was established in 1994 and is sponsored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). CCMR conducts civil-military relations programs designed primarily for military officers, civilian officials, legislators, and non-government personnel. These programs include courses designed to be taught both in residence at NPS and in a Mobile Education Team (MET) format, depending upon requirements. Three programs offered by CCMR include the MET, the Masters Degree in International Security and Civil-Military Relations, and the Executive Program in Civil-Military Relations.
Thomas C. Bruneau

Thomas Bruneau is a Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He joined the School in 1987 after having taught in the Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada since 1969. He became Chairman of the Department in 1989, and continued in that position until late-1995. He has researched and written extensively on Latin America, especially Brazil, and Portugal. He has published more than a dozen books in English and Portuguese as well as articles in journals including Latin American Research Review, Comparative Politics, Third World Quarterly, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Journal of Latin American Studies, and Encyclopedia of Democracy.

A native of California, Professor Bruneau received his B.A. from California State University at San Jose and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. He was a Fulbright scholar to India (1962-63) and to Brazil (1985-86), and has been awarded fellowships from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (several awards), the International Development Research Centre, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Gulbenkian Foundation, and the Luso-American Development Foundation. He has traveled extensively in Latin America and Europe, with shorter trips to Africa and Asia.

In addition to his position as Professor in the National Security Affairs Department, Professor Bruneau is the Regional Director for Latin America in the Center for Civil-Military Relations.
Civil-Military Relations
Program in Mozambique:
Lessons Learned and Future Challenges

Introduction

The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) was invited by the
Minister of Defense to develop and implement programs to assist
Mozambique consolidate democratic civil-military relations. The first
program was held at the CCMR in Monterey, California, in March 1998 for
the Minister and four other top officials, and was followed by a program
in Maputo, Mozambique in March of 1999 for fifty-six officers and
civilians. The CCMR programs fit centrally into the Government of
Mozambique’s overall strategy to develop new structures and processes to
solidify domestic stability and democratic governance.

The tremendous scope of this challenge, and the central importance
of civil-military relations, can be readily appreciated by the brief review
below of Mozambique’s troubled history since the armed independence
movement emerged in 1962 and continuing since independence on 25
June 1975. During the past forty years Mozambique has been caught up in
the dramatic political changes which have swept Southern Africa which
include the tremendous changes in Rhodesia, to become Zimbabwe, and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The events include a decade of guerrilla warfare, achievement of independence, controversial initial decisions to transform the society, civil war, regional conflict, economic dislocation and widespread misery, and finally peace in 1992 followed by democratic elections two years later. The Cold War was also part of the story. Today, at the end of the Century, the prospects for peace, stability, and development are better than at any time since independence. Nevertheless, the country’s challenges are daunting. Currently Mozambique is the poorest country in Africa, if not the world, with a 1996 GDP per capita of $90. Mozambique’s strategic position as a maritime outlet on the Indian Ocean for its neighbors including South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia, its potential as a source of electrical energy, and its diplomatic influence in the Great Lakes Region and in Angola make the question of Mozambican stability and development a vital one for the entire region.

**Background**

The centrality of civil-military relations is obvious if we recall that Mozambique experienced only three years of peace between the
emergence of the armed independence movement in 1962 and the first democratic elections in 1994. War devastated the countryside, especially the Northern provinces. Independence from Portugal was hard fought, and by 1975 the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), had approximately 11,000 armed fighters within Mozambique alone as well as more in neighboring countries. Independence ultimately came with the sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime in Portugal on 25 April 1974. The withdrawal of Portuguese forces from Mozambique, combined with the policies of a Frelimo government hostile to the settler population, led to the rapid departure of 90% of the 120,000 Portuguese residing in Mozambique at that time. This was critically important, as Portugal had not prepared Mozambique (nor Angola, Guinea-Bissau, or Timor) for independence. At independence there were only 40 Mozambican university graduates and 30 trained doctors.

Frelimo was aggressive and dogmatic in establishing a one party Socialist state along Marxist-Leninist lines. Within a short time, at least in terms of formal treaties, Mozambique became the Third World state most closely linked with the Soviet bloc. Frelimo imposed extensive social and economic transformations and permitted no political opposition. These heavy-handed methods of social and economic transformation alienated
large sectors of Mozambican society, and, in the radically changing context of Southern Africa, the severely challenged white dominated regimes of Rhodesia, until it became Zimbabwe, and then South Africa, supported the founding and supplying of an armed opposition to Frelimo, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo). Renamo was founded by dissidents from Frelimo, with the initiative taken by the Rhodesian intelligence service. Between 1976 and 1992 civil war raged across most of Mozambique resulting in devastation of the country’s infrastructure, elimination of villages, widespread killing, and the uprooting of some 4 million people, with another 1.7 million fleeing to neighboring countries. The war combined with a severe drought in the early 1990’s plunged Mozambique ever deeper into chaos and disorder.

Mozambique’s cycle of misery and death was broken by the implosion of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa with its subsequent democratization. Within Mozambique both the Frelimo government and Renamo armed opposition were exhausted, and deprived by changes in the international system of outside support. Already in 1989 the government began to de-emphasize Marxism - Leninism and allow more autonomy to the society and economy. Despite the favorable external
conditions and increasing internal willingness for peace, it required very active external mediation, including the Community of San Egidio and several states to achieve a negotiated peace. Negotiations began in 1990 and resulted in a General Peace Agreement in October 1992. This agreement opened the way to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) which from 1992 until elections in 1994 supervised the cease-fire that led to the free and internationally monitored elections in October of that year. Unlike the failure in Angola, elections were held only after demobilization. ONUMOZ also assisted greatly in peace-building and in providing humanitarian assistance. ONUMOZ had 1,100 civilian police and 4,000 armed troops, and was joined by numerous NGOs. In short, the international community greatly assisted Mozambique’s transition to peace and democracy.

The internationally mediated peace and the subsequent elections opened the way for Mozambican development. The legacy of the past is, however, terrible. The country is miserably poor and the current foreign debt is double the per capita income. The country has no tradition of democratic cooperation, and the main political forces emerging from the 1994 elections, Frelimo and Renamo, remained heavily militarized organizations. Frelimo grew out of a guerrilla movement and Renamo
was nothing but an army until 1994. As part of the General Peace Agreement of October 1992, the armed forces of both groups were to be demobilized. The demobilized included 58,000 from Frelimo and 20,000 from Renamo. The initial plan was to have a combined armed forces, the Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique (FADM), of 30,000 men equally divided between Frelimo and Renamo. However, with the option to demobilize only 12,000 opted to join the FADM as the conditions of the soldiers had been terrible and the demobilization package looked attractive in comparison. This is a serious problem due to the disequilibrium in the forces (8,000 from Frelimo and 4,000 from Renamo). In addition, these forces are too small for the legitimate needs of Mozambique’s national security. The now combined forces had known only war against each other and now they are together in the FADM. While continually engaged in conflict, these were not very professional forces but rather generally poorly trained and proficient at only a low level of warfare. Also, while many of the government officers had received training abroad, very few of the Renamo forces had received any foreign training at all. As summarized by an expert in 1996 after a long list of problems, “What matters now is to acknowledge such deficiencies and undertake the necessary additional training and orientation in order
to raise the general level of technical expertise and promote an organizational culture in line with the new political system.1

Mozambique’s political leaders are making a valiant attempt to learn from their past mistakes as well as from the mistakes of others to ensure lasting peace and democracy. This desire for a new political situation was already apparent in 1990 when the constitution was revised to replace the old Marxism-Leninist philosophy with a Western conception of democracy. With the peace process and the elections, this process of political innovation has been extended to the area of civil-military relations. Between 1995 and 1998 the government, with the approval of the multi-party Assembly of the Republic, passed three fundamental laws to build the institutional basis for democratic civilian-control and professional armed forces. These are the National Defense Bill, the Military Code of Conduct, and the Military Service Law. These three laws involved extensive debate in the Assembly between especially Frelimo and Renamo and in Mozambique society at large. The debate on the Military Service Law, which implements conscription, was especially heated. Frelimo favors conscription both to build up the force and to use the FADM in building a national awareness. Building on this legal

1 Joao Bernardo Honwana, *The United Nations and Mozambique A Sustainable Peace*?
foundation, the year 1998 was to begin the basic redefinition and revamping of the armed forces. The CCMR programs are designed to encourage and inform this process.

**Origins of the CCMR Program in Mozambique**

The link between the perceived needs of Mozambique in redefining and revamping the armed forces and the CCMR occurred in August 1997 when the Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command, with responsibility for Africa, General James Jamerson, visited Maputo and met with Minister of Defense, Aguiar Mazula. Minister Mazula is the first civilian Minister of Defense in Mozambique, had previously been the Minister of Labor, and comes from a family of highly educated Mozambicans. His brother, Brazao Mazula, was head of the National Electoral Commission, which interpreted the laws governing the 1994 elections and is at present the rector of Eduardo Mondlane University. Aguiar Mazula as Minister of Defense clearly sees it as his mission to establish democratic civil-military relations.

Minister Mazula and General Jamerson discussed how the U.S. could be helpful in redefining and revamping the armed forces and civil-

---

(Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, 1996), p. 32.
military relations in general. The immediate result was an invitation to
Minister Mazula for a Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT) to
the United States in March of 1998. The program was funded from the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
administered by the Defense Attaché in Maputo. While there were several
important protocol events and meetings in Washington, D.C. and
subsequent community involvement opportunities, the main purpose of
the DVOT was to acquaint the Mozambicans with the programs offered
by CCMR in Monterey during the week of 16-21 March. Accompanying
Minister Mazula were two members of the Assembly and the Chief of
Staff of the Navy and Vice Chief of the Army. Two were from Frelimo
and two from Renamo. During the week the CCMR put on a full program
of seminars involving fifteen faculty members to include retired high-
ranking officers and a retired member of Congress as well as a prominent
member of Congressional staff. In addition, Mr. Sam Farr, the member of
Congress from Monterey, spoke to the visiting delegation on the role of
congress in controlling the armed forces in democracies. The
Mozambicans also visited classes and met with students from Africa as
well as U.S. officers studying to become regional experts on Africa.
Minister Mazula and the CCMR agreed on the topics that would be covered in a program to be held in Mozambique by early the next year.

The Program in Maputo

The seminar was held in Maputo, Mozambique, the week of 15-19 March 1999. It was also funded from IMET administered by the Defense Attaché in Maputo. Given the priorities of the Minister, the participants in this first program on civil-military relations in Mozambique were heavily FADM officers (41), including several general officers, and 15 civilians including members of the Assembly from Frelimo and Renamo (the two parties holding all but 9 seats in the 250 member Assembly), governors, officials in the Ministry of Defense, and academics. The group included most of “those who matter” in defense policy in Mozambique. It became obvious very quickly that the participants, and particularly the officers, have very diverse educational and training background. Some had extensive training abroad, in a variety of countries (USSR, China, Cuba, Germany, South Africa, Portugal) while others apparently had none. Consequently, one of the main purposes of the seminar was to facilitate and focus a discussion among officers and between them and civilians on
key issues in civil-military relations. In short, the seminar’s purpose was to initiate a dialogue on a common set of themes.

The team of CCMR instructors selected especially for the program in Mozambique consisted of four senior instructors: an academic who specializes in comparative civil-military relations, researches on Portugal and its ex-colonies, and speaks Portuguese; a retired four star admiral with extensive experience in political/military affairs at the Pentagon and in Europe; an Austrian Army colonel with a doctoral degree in philosophy who specializes in armed forces and society; and another academic who specializes in military history, has written on colonialism in Africa, and has published eight major books on civil-military relations including one on the Portuguese revolution. The credentials of the team were not lost on the participants who made clear their interest in learning the maximum from the team’s academic and practical knowledge. The experience in Mozambique supports what CCMR has found again and again; the team of instructors must be of a sufficiently high level in academic and practical experience to command initial credibility with the participants. Once this is achieved, their attention is focused, they become engaged, and there is dialogue and debate.
The team was selected for their seniority and to match expertise with the topics requested by Minister Mazula during the DVOT. There were twelve major topics, each one beginning with a 45-minute presentation and finishing with a one-hour discussion period. The emphasis was on issues such as the armed forces, society, and politics; the military as a profession; the officer promotion process; roles and missions of the armed forces during peacetime; the responsibilities of officers and civilians in formulating strategy; the military and the media; conscription vs. the all volunteer force; and the process of resource allocation. Not surprisingly, most of the discussion by the participants focused on those issues closest to their corporate interests such as conscription (which has been implemented in Mozambique), roles and missions in peacetime, the officer promotion process, the media, and resource allocation.

The challenge for the instructors in Mozambique as elsewhere is to make their presentations general enough to be relevant to many cases, which are all to some degree unique, and illustrate with real life examples. These examples should be drawn from the experiences of several countries so that the participants are not left with the impression that the U.S. offers the best, or only, model to follow. It is thus extremely important to work out in advance the “logic” of the overall program, the
integration of the dozen issues into the program, as well as the contents of the specific topics, illustrated with relevant examples. The presentations, informed by research on the country and knowledge of the issues, take on a life of their own as the participants seek to make them as relevant as possible to their real concerns. For this reason the instructors must be actual subject matter experts, with practical and hopefully theoretical knowledge, to be able to respond and assist in making the subject matter fully useful. The team must be familiar with the issues of concern to the civilians and officers through background research and ongoing conversations with the participants.

In its programs CCMR uses simulations which are tailored to the specific context of the country. Thus while the case study is of an imaginary country - in this case Demosland - the participants can turn it into their country since the description of the civil-military problems and development challenges are similar. In Maputo, the simulation was spread over three afternoons and included the nature of the military as profession, threats to the country and requirements for strategy to respond to these threats, and the assigning of budgetary priorities to security and other government functions. The group was divided into four smaller groups combining military, from the different services, with
civilians to work on the problem. At the end of each afternoon, the
spokesman, which rotated daily, presented the group’s findings to the
others and responded to questions. The simulation worked extremely
well, with lively and dynamic debate and readily comprehensible and
logical conclusions.

In the discussion and debate on most of the topics, and certainly in
the simulation, the major concerns of the armed forces were obvious. The
officers are apprehensive regarding the future. After all, the country has
been at war during most of its recent history, and thus the military,
professional or otherwise, has been central to society and politics. With
peace, the officers question their futures and the FADM. What will be the
FADM’s roles and missions in peacetime? With demobilization, the forces
did not incorporate the agreed upon and anticipated 30,000 personnel, but
something closer to 12,000 troops which are clearly insufficient for internal
and external roles in a country the size of Mozambique. Largely for this
reason they resorted to conscription. The country has now had
democratic elections, and will have elections again in October of 1999, and
for the first time has a civilian minister of defense. Peace was initiated
through international mediation and ONUMOZ played a central role in its
consolidation. But the country is heavily indebted with much influence of
external donors including states and international organizations. Foreign involvement and links have been extremely important in Mozambique’s recent history, but are not viewed in one prism. Rather, there is a tremendous concern for “globalization” which seems to connote external control over Mozambique. This theme came up again and again; how Mozambique is powerless over its destiny. While this theme related mainly to economics and technology, it also emerged in defense. After all, Southern Africa has for a long while been a “dangerous neighborhood”, and with small and poorly equipped forces Mozambique feels somewhat vulnerable. The instructors gave some insights into how other countries have dealt with their weaknesses in the international system; internal unity and a plan is crucial, combined with external supporters. What the CCMR team provides are concepts, examples, and insights whereby the Mozambicans can better deal with the challenges that confront them and see how others have dealt with similar challenges. The participants seemed to welcome and appreciate this form of foreign involvement.

Measures of Success

From all indications the seminar was a success. How can one know and how can success be defined? These considerations are especially
important as the CCMR programs are education, and thus by nature long-term. Also, they are but one small part of the overall structure and processes; they hopefully support a positive direction in these other elements. The CCMR routinely administers an anonymous end-of-course questionnaire including ten items to solicit the comments and criticisms of the participants. What is striking about the results from Mozambique is how comprehensive and thoughtful, as well as positive, the comments are. The evaluation of the team is very high - 9.5 on a 10 point scale, they think the themes covered are all directly relevant to Mozambique, the simulation is very highly rated, and they make suggestions for other topics to be covered in a future seminar. Several of the questionnaires highlighted the dynamic in which the instructors debate among themselves and engage the participants for their experiences and insights. This type of interaction, which is sought in all CCMR programs, is often a unique experience for the participants. For CCMR the goal is to serve as a catalyst for civil-military interaction, stimulate thought on key issues, and promote a dialogue. Thus these anonymous written records are one indicator of success.

The CCMR also seeks to gauge the receptivity of the program and the topics as the program progresses and at the conclusion in
conversations at the coffee breaks, lunch, and other social opportunities. While only one of the instructors spoke Portuguese, several of the participants spoke some English, French, or German and could thus communicate with the instructors without requiring the interpreters, who were available in any case. In this way team members adjust the content and “pitch” as the program progresses for maximum effect. By the end the participants were stating to the team members that the seminar was a “watershed” and they were already using some of the concepts and insights in their work in the Assembly, FADM, and the police. Several officers stated that they had never thought about civilian control in positive terms, and even more noted that this was the first time that officers and civilians had discussed the crucial and often difficult issues. In sum, the informal feedback was very positive.

The coverage in the media was good throughout the week. Several of the print media covered the seminar frequently and radio and television media visited at the beginning, middle, and end. The team leader was interviewed in Portuguese, and summaries of several of the lectures were published in the newspapers. The value of the coverage was to disseminate some of the topics, and the general idea of democratic civil-military relations, more widely in society.
Future Plans

There are two follow-on actions being discussed with the Minister of Defense and the FADM. One is to send a civilian from the Ministry of Defense or a junior officer to the masters degree program in International Security and Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School. Several possible candidates were interviewed and it is up to the Ministry, in cooperation with the U.S. embassy, to nominate the student. The graduate would return both to teach others - military and civilians - about civil-military relations and work in defense policy formulation. The other action is to hold a second seminar in Mozambique, probably outside of Maputo, possibly in Beira. This time there will be more civilians, including politicians and journalists. The themes will again be adjusted to the composition of the participants using the suggestions from the current end-of-course questionnaires.

Lessons Learned

The single most important element making for the success of the program is the active and enthusiastic support of the Government of Mozambique represented by Minister of Defense Mazula. The CCMR program fits into the overall strategy of the government to consolidate
peace and the multi-party democracy in which a crucial element is civil-military relations. The Minister and the team leader spoke by phone prior to the Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour (DVOT) to define the priorities and topics to be covered in Monterey. During the DVOT the topics for the future program in Maputo were defined and agreed upon. The Minister gave sufficient importance to the program in Maputo to ensure very high level representation by officers and civilians. He, and the American ambassador, both opened and closed the program, and the Minister was present and very actively participating during at least part of three days. In sum, he clearly demonstrated his interest and enthusiasm for the program, and by example and words encouraged others. With regard to the team of instructors, the main lesson learned, and relearned, is to build the most highly qualified team possible who can respond accurately to questions on almost any defense or political topic from almost any angle. And, they should include both civilians and active duty or retired military for initial credibility with the participants. Then, the tailored program must attempt to convey general concepts or insights, but be richly illustrated with examples to bring the points home. The dynamic of the program, in the debate, discussion, and simulation is also designed to involve the participants and keep them actively engaged in
issues that could be abstract or alien. In this way the participants can expand their knowledge and develop insights to be more effective in dealing with their challenges in democratic civil-military relations.

---