NATO: AGENDA FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

SUPPORTED BY A GRANT FROM THE FORD FOUNDATION

A SERIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

JANUARY 1982
### NATO: Agenda for the Next Four Years

**1. REPORT DATE**  
JAN 1982

**2. REPORT TYPE**

**3. DATES COVERED**  
00-00-1982 to 00-00-1982

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**

**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**

**5b. GRANT NUMBER**

**5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**

**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**

**5e. TASK NUMBER**

**5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER**

**6. AUTHOR(S)**

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

Rand Corporation, 1776 Main Street, PO Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA, 90407-2138

**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

**9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**

**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

Same as Report (SAR)

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**

175

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prepared by ANSI Std Z39-18
This publication was supported by Grant No. 790-0061 from The Ford Foundation.

The Rand Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation
NATO: AGENDA FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

James A. Thomson, Chairman of the Workshop
Rose E. Gottemoeller, Rapporteur

SUPPORTED BY A GRANT FROM THE FORD FOUNDATION

A SERIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

JANUARY 1982

Rand SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406
PREFACE

In late 1978, The Ford Foundation provided grants to The Rand Corporation and several university centers for research and training in international security and arms control. At Rand, the grant is supporting a diverse program. In the Rand Graduate Institute, which offers a doctorate in policy analysis, the grant is contributing to student fellowships for dissertation preparation, curriculum development, workshops and tutorials, and a series of visiting lecturers. In Rand's National Security Research Division, the Ford-sponsored projects are designed to extend beyond the immediate needs of government sponsors of research by investigating long-term or emerging problems and by developing and assessing new research methodologies. The grant also is being used to fund the publication of relevant sponsored research that would otherwise not be disseminated to the general public.

All research products are being made available to as wide an audience as possible through publication as unclassified Rand Reports or Notes or in journals. The Rand documents may be obtained directly or may be found in the more than 300 libraries in the United States and 30 other countries that maintain collections of Rand publications.

This report documents the proceedings of the Ford-sponsored workshop on NATO held in Rand's Washington office, June 10-11, 1981. The workshop brought together a small cross-section of the official and nonofficial strategic community on the two sides of the Atlantic for a candid exchange of views on the problems likely to face the alliance during the coming four years.

Although the participants reflected a wide range of views, with divergences within and among individual nationalities, they agreed more than they disagreed. With but few exceptions, Europeans and Americans alike advocated incremental policies to deal with the alliance's continuing basic problems of security, deterrence, and detente. Although the outcome may have been foreordained by the composition of the group, no one saw the need for or advocated a drastic change in the fundamentals of postwar Western security arrangements.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION I. NATO AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Paper by William G. Hyland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussant's Remarks</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION II. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR ALLIED COOPERATION</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session Chairman's Introductory Remarks</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Paper by Robert W. Komer</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussant's Remarks</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION III. NATO STRATEGY: CHALLENGES OF THE NEXT FOUR YEARS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Paper by James A. Thomson</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussant's Remarks</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRAP-UP OF THE FIRST DAY'S DISCUSSION</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Remarks by William E. Hoehn, Jr.</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION IV. SALT AND NATO: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEXT FOUR YEARS</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session Chairman's Introductory Remarks</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Paper by René Herrmann</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussant's Remarks</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION V. DEFENSE BUDGETS: DETERMINING THE BURDENS</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the DoD Report on Allied Defense Budgets</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION VI. THE MANAGEMENT OF INTRA-NATO RELATIONS</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Paper by Simon Lunn</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session Chairman's Remarks</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussant's Comments</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART TWO. THE DISCUSSION PAPERS

NATO AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, William G. Hyland ................................. 87

PROSPECTS FOR ALLIED COOPERATION OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA,
Robert W. Komer ................................................................. 99

NATO STRATEGY: THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEXT FOUR YEARS,
James A. Thomson ............................................................... 108

SALT AND NATO: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEXT FOUR YEARS,
René Herrmann ................................................................. 129

THE MANAGEMENT OF INTRA-NATO RELATIONS, Simon Lunn ................. 144

PARTICIPANTS IN THE RAND WORKSHOP ON NATO ............................. 163
GLOSSARY

ABM     antiballistic missile
ALOC   air lines of communication
ASAT   antisatellite system
AWACS  airborne warning and control system
CDE    conference on disarmament in Europe
CENTO  Central Treaty Organization
CTB    comprehensive test ban
COCOM  NATO coordinating committee responsible for compiling lists of strategic goods that the Western powers want to deny the communist countries
CSCE   Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPC    Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
EC     European community; European Communities
ERW    enhanced radiation warhead
FBS    forward-based systems
FRG    Federal Republic of Germany
GDP    gross domestic product
GDR    German Democratic Republic
GLCM   ground-launched cruise missile
GNP    gross national product
HLG    High Level Group (NATO)
IISS   International Institute for Strategic Studies
LRTNF  long-range theater nuclear force(s)
LTDP   long-term defense program (NATO)
MBFR   mutual and balanced force reduction
MR/IRBM medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC    nuclear-biological-chemical
NPG    NATO Planning Group
PG/IO  Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean
SALT   strategic arms limitation talks
SCC    Standing Consultative Commission (NATO)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>sea lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td><em>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</em> (Social Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNF</td>
<td>theater nuclear force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Rand NATO workshop brought together a small group of Americans and Europeans for a candid exchange on the problems likely to face the Atlantic alliance between 1981 and 1985. The participants represented a cross section of the official and unofficial strategic community on the two sides of the Atlantic. Europe was represented by participants from Britain, Belgium, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. A list of participants appears at the end of the report.

The workshop was held in Washington, June 10-11, 1981, shortly after NATO's foreign ministers had met in Rome. As a consequence, the workshop discussion was heavily laden with references to the principal issue on the agenda of that meeting: the implementation of NATO's "two-track" decision on modernization and the control of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). This is hardly surprising, for by the time of the workshop, the LRTNF question had assumed a political importance far transcending its original focus on defense and arms control, and everybody was talking about the growing pacifist and neutralist movements in Europe and Soviet attempts to derail the modernization program. In the view of workshop participants, these challenges only heightened the need to carry through with the modernization program. No one advocated abandoning LRTNF. On this and other issues, the workshop discussions mirrored the problem facing NATO decisionmakers, who agree broadly on overall goals but disagree, often fundamentally, on how to achieve them, in particular on how to manage the increasingly vocal opposition to their policies among elements of their respective publics.

In the interest of fostering a candid exchange, the workshop discussions were held off the record. For this reason, the report identifies only the authors of invited papers and two other participants in connection with what they said. Because the discussions clearly illustrated the differences between the American and European views, however, speakers are identified as either American or European—even at the risk of oversimplifying their differences. In fact, Americans and Europeans reflected a wide spectrum of opinion, with divergences within and among
individual nationalities; yet, despite the differences, the participants agreed more than they disagreed.

In the words of one participant, the principal underlying difference running through the discussion was the American stress on the "politics of power" and the European emphasis on the "power of politics." Europeans tended to see U.S. policy as drifting toward overemphasis on the military dimensions of security and the policy of confrontation with the USSR--nuclear war-fighting strategy, increased demands for European defense efforts both inside and outside Europe, and a U.S. military buildup--a policy that the Europeans see as having been adopted without adequate attention to the political dimension of security. Americans argued that increased attention to military security was necessary as a direct consequence of the inattention to it over the previous decade, when detente, arms control, and other politically oriented policies were stressed.

This sort of difference echoed in other areas. Europeans, especially West Germans, valued the benefits of the East-West detente process as an important factor in their security policy; in contrast, at least one American asserted that the assumptions on which the detente track rests are fallacious. Europeans stressed that the principal goal of the alliance was peacetime deterrence, that the alliance's ability to achieve that goal depended on the solidarity of the alliance, and that this solidarity could be undermined should the United States focus on planning and building forces for wartime operations. Europeans pleaded again and again for increased U.S. understanding of and sensitivity to their domestic political problems and for a balanced, two-track policy to manage these problems--a defense track and a second track of detente, arms control, and political sensitivity.

In the course of the workshop, many participants recalled the admonition of an American early in the discussion: that the two sides of the Atlantic seemed to be talking past one another and that if this continued, the alliance might collapse. The Europeans would then say that the Americans, rather than the Soviets, were the principal threat to peace and that U.S. militarist policies were destroying the essence
of the European way of life. The Americans would say that the Europeans were going neutralist and that they wanted the United States to carry the entire defense burden while they enjoyed the benefits.

With but few exceptions, workshop participants advocated incremental policies to deal with these problems. Though the outcome may have been foreordained by the makeup of the group, no one foresaw a need for or advocated a drastic change in the fundamentals of the postwar Western security arrangements.
PART ONE. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS

SESSION I. NATO AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

SUMMARY OF THE PAPER BY WILLIAM G. HYLAND¹

Not since the death of Stalin has the future of East-West relations seemed more uncertain. Contributing to the uncertainty are the Reagan administration's lack of a clear Soviet policy, the approaching leadership succession and growing internal problems facing the USSR, and the serious conflicts within NATO over how to deal with the formidable and dangerous military power of the Eastern bloc. To deal with these uncertainties, the NATO alliance must address four major issues:

- How to cope with "selective detente."
- How to deal with the military threat to Western Europe.
- How to allocate the burden of extra-European crises.
- How to respond to the Polish crisis.

Selective Detente. The key to the flowering of European detente in the early 1970s was Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, aided by the Sino-Soviet split, U.S.-Chinese rapprochement, the Soviet Union's problems in Eastern Europe, and the development of U.S.-Soviet detente. Many observers, especially in Europe, thought that the burgeoning East-West cooperative economic relationships would induce a relaxation of tensions. In the United States, however, this view clashed with the goals of those who insisted on making economic cooperation dependent on Soviet emigration policy. Thus began the split between the U.S. and the Western European approaches to detente. The Soviets skillfully applied a "divisible detente" by holding out the prospect of stable and expanding relationships in Europe, while U.S.-Soviet detente deteriorated. Obviously, the Western alliance must sort out its basic attitude toward economic links with the East:

¹ General Brent Scowcroft presented the paper in Mr. Hyland's absence. The complete text may be found on pp. 87-98.
Are there definable limits to the Western expansion of trade?

Can Western economies sustain economic sanctions against the USSR? the entire Warsaw Pact?

What would be the effect of a broad Warsaw Pact repudiation of indebtedness?

Does the West have economic leverage and can it relate to political-military objectives?

**Detente Without Security.** The Soviets have tried to maintain detente in Europe while building up the military strength of Warsaw Pact forces. They have enjoyed mixed success: Their deployment of the SS-20 led to the NATO two-track decision on theater nuclear force (TNF). However, although the European balance has been endangered, the Soviet strategy has had its effect. Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have qualified their commitment and have emphasized East-West negotiations. Thus, the chance of a negotiated compromise shaded in favor of the USSR becomes increasingly likely—and raises some critical questions:

- Can NATO live with an imbalance in both conventional and nuclear forces?
- What will be the effect of continuing imbalances on NATO doctrine and strategy?
- Does arms control offer any realistic hope of redressing military balances?
- Can NATO rebuild its military position and at the same time pursue detente?

**Crisis Outside Europe.** Differences in the European and American response to the crises in Iran and Afghanistan severely threatened the cohesion of the Western alliance. In Europe, Afghanistan was written off as a preventive measure; in the United States it was seen as the

---

2 General Scowcroft said that during his recent visit to China, the Chinese had voiced the hope that NATO was consulting about what to do in a Polish crisis, so that there would be no repetition of the disarray that followed the invasion of Afghanistan.
opening of a dangerous new era of confrontation. The threat of advancing Soviet power in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, however, is as critical to Europe as to the United States, and Europe must share the security burden in that area with the United States.

○ What will be the consequences for Europe of assuming more of its own direct defense in the face of increased Soviet power?

○ What will be the consequences of Europe's new vulnerability to Soviet pressures in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area, as well as in Central Europe?

○ Will European opinion support significantly increased defense levels?

**Implications of the Polish Crisis.** The Polish crisis appears to be more significant than those in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956). Previous Eastern European crises arose within the framework of the communist parties; in Poland the threat to communist domination comes from outside the party. The situation in Poland points up the dilemma for Soviet policy in Europe: how to intervene in Poland without risking detente with Western Europe for a long time. For the alliance, the dilemma is

○ How far will the West go in retaliation against Soviet intervention?

○ Can the West tip the balance against intervention?

**The Outlook.** Although the major power centers—the United States, Europe, Japan, and China—are in some degree hostile to it, the USSR nevertheless enjoys military advantages. It may therefore try to reduce the number and power of its opponents, possibly through confrontation. It will periodically probe for accommodation with the Chinese. It may also seek to entice the Japanese into its sphere. Most likely, however, the Soviets will pursue their strategy of divisible detente, encouraging a special relationship with Western Europe so that Western
Europe and the United States gradually drift apart in their major concerns.

DISCUSSANT'S REMARKS

Mr. Hyland was canny—the discussant, an American, said—in setting out questions but offering no answers. The conference could fruitfully spend the entire two days searching for answers. At the same time, many of the issues have come up before in similar situations, although now they may have new qualitative aspects.

Some commonalities exist, for example, between the problems that the Polish crisis poses to NATO and those posed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia 13 years earlier. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviets had been playing on European desires for greater independence from the United States and on DeGaulle's anti-Americanism. Such examples suggest that the Soviets had already found a good formula for weakening NATO unity and undermining U.S. influence in Europe. In fact, although at that time both alliances were sometimes termed "relics of a fading confrontation," NATO seemed to be coming apart somewhat faster than the Warsaw Pact. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, talk of defections from NATO ceased.

The Soviet invasion of Poland would probably be good for NATO in much the same way that the invasion of Czechoslovakia benefited the Western alliance. An invasion would help NATO to avoid succumbing to selective detente and the other problems eroding and dividing it. The Soviets are unlikely, however, to provide this solution to NATO's problems, knowing, as they do, that the disciplinary means that they would have to use in Eastern Europe would have the effect of again putting NATO on guard. If the Soviets have cause to doubt this outcome, NATO is in serious trouble. The Soviets would invade Poland, however, if they became convinced that the communist party had lost control there—even if they knew that they were certain to lose the benefits of selective and divisible detente.
DISCUSSION

A European addressed the problem of different trends in U.S. and European public opinion. Western Europeans have consistently been anxious to emphasize the continuity of alliance policy. It is presently the two-track policy of TNF modernization and arms control, but it has its roots in the Harmel report of 1967. The link between the two-track policy and the Harmel policy of defense and detente is what the Europeans mean when they talk about continuity; this continuity is important for European public opinion.

The American public, however, the European added, has been increasingly disappointed by the detente part of the two-track policy and is looking for new directions. This rethinking has, in turn, affected European public opinion, leading various leftist—Americans would call them pacifist—circles in Europe to criticize trends in the United States. Europeans are beginning to doubt that the United States intends to continue the detente part of the Harmel concept. This public opinion problem should, in fact, be the first to be addressed by the workshop. The potential effect of misunderstanding involving public opinion is tremendous, and the failure to prevent such misunderstandings could have serious consequences for the domestic policies of Western European governments.

European governments, according to the same speaker, are firm in the conviction that policy continuity must be maintained, no matter which parties—right or left—are in power. Governments in Western Europe change constantly, but each new leadership tries to coordinate its views with those of the outgoing government, declare common positions, and harmonize policies. Consequently, Europeans were pleased when Reagan announced his basic policy of no surprises, i.e., full consultation with the NATO allies. His apparent support of continuity in NATO's position was welcomed by Western Europeans. However, Reagan, like his predecessors, has reserved the right to challenge the Soviet Union, whatever the impact on alliance policy.

The European commentator pointed out that Western Europe's concerns differ from those of the United States. The Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), for example, is tied to its East German neighbor by a web of agreements that are not just general statements of cooperative policy. They are real treaties governing aspects of daily life—Berlin, access routes, and family reunification—and the FRG has a strong commitment to uphold them. West Germans feel that détente is not an abstract policy of peace with the Soviet Union, but a concrete policy enshrined in the treaty objectives.

At the same time, the European said, West Germans recognize that following the signing of the Helsinki accords, the Soviets embarked on an enormous rearmament program, became much more active in the third world, and are now possibly preparing to invade Poland. On the basis of such behavior, Americans are prepared to say that détente is dead. Europeans, however, prefer to say that while NATO has continued to follow détente policies, the Warsaw Pact—particularly the Soviet Union—has not.

American and European approaches differ in this regard. Americans say that the Soviets have violated basic guiding principles and should be punished. Europeans feel that it is better to continue to pursue détente while trying to get the Soviets back on a cooperative course. The European commentator remarked that such an approach was more likely to gain the cooperation of the European left, which does not generally believe that punishment is the best way to handle the Soviets.

The double-track TNF concept, according to the speaker, represents the European orientation exactly and provides a framework for the public discussion. Europeans understand that they must do what is necessary to maintain the military balance, but at the same time, they want to be ready to negotiate. European policymakers run into problems when their constituencies perceive the discussions in the United States as leading to the support of only the first track—arms buildup—while rejecting the second track—arms control.

The European also addressed himself to specific U.S. complaints about Soviet behavior in the third world. Europeans understand that the Soviets have violated the basic understandings of the 1972 declaration of basic principles governing U.S.-USSR relations. The differing
attitudes of the NATO nations toward these violations came out clearly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Americans felt that, because NATO influence was weak in southwest Asia, the alliance should increase the tension in Europe to counter the Soviet threat. The Europeans, on the contrary, felt that increasing the tension in Europe would not get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. They proposed instead that NATO seek leverage by helping to stabilize other countries in the region, including Turkey and the Persian Gulf states. Europeans are limited in the military aid that they can extend, but they are willing to help in whatever way possible in the economic sphere.

Europeans also believe that NATO should endorse the concept of nonalignment. Nonalignment can exist only when it cannot be challenged, and Europeans want Western Europe and the United States to work with the nonaligned countries, instead of continuing to bipolarize the world.

The European concluded his remarks with a discussion of Poland. European opinion holds that NATO contingency planning for a Polish crisis is being overemphasized. Instead, the alliance should concentrate on obstacles and incentives to prevent a Soviet invasion. NATO should, in effect, demand that the signatories of the Helsinki accords abide by the nonintervention clause of those accords. Brezhnev has been deeply committed to Helsinki; NATO should therefore stress the restrictions imposed by the accords, as well as the positive aspects of the evolution in Poland. NATO should provide the back-up arguments for those in the Kremlin who want to continue cooperation with the West.

Finally, the commentator reiterated his basic response to Mr. Hyland's paper, namely, that trends in public opinion in the United States and Europe may split the alliance and that such trends should never be underestimated.

In a major rejoinder to this European point of view, an American said that it was worth reviewing the 1967 Harnel report, because comparison with that time permits one to ask the most necessary and fundamental questions about the nature of the Soviet partner and opponent. The alliance has not done well, he said, in pursuing either track—
military strength or detente—of the Harel report. The events of the
past five to ten years have demonstrated that the assumptions on which
the detente track rests are fallacious. As a result, the policy out-
lined in the Harel report, to which NATO has tried with difficulty to
adhere, has failed. Of course, the policy led to some achievements,
notably in establishing stability in the relationship between East and
West Germany. Since the failure to maintain military strength is appar-
ent, the failure of detente should be discussed also.

The political psychology of detente, according to the American,
goes back to the mid- and even early 1960s, when the NATO allies be-
lieved either that the United States was endowed with a virtually
permanent strategic superiority that made up for regional imbalances in
Europe, or that the replacement of superiority by strategic parity
would provide stability. Yet another view common at that time held
that if NATO should find itself a little short of parity at some point,
the lag would not matter, because margins of strategic advantage and
disadvantage were of little consequence. These assumptions of the mid-
1960s, which provided the basis for the strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT), among other things, have since been proved highly dubious, if
not obviously wrong, and been repudiated by some of the people who held
them.

The American speaker noted that many Westerners believed in those
years that the continuing evolution of the Soviet Union was ameliorat-
ing, if not eliminating, the harshest features of its internal rule.
This belief was important to American and Europeans alike, both because
of their concern for the human condition of citizens in Eastern Europe
and because of their awareness that the nature of the Soviet system as
a ruling system has a lot to do with the nature of the Soviet system as
an international actor. The compulsion to achieve internal hegemony
does not differ essentially from the compulsion to control and dominate
international relationships. Having witnessed the quasi-liberalization
of the Khrushchev era, we failed to note the re-Stalinization going on
under the gray bureaucracy of the Brezhnev politburo, and the image of
an evolving Soviet system prevailed into the late 1960s, to some extent
coloring the assumptions of detente.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the belief existed in the West that the Soviet Union was evolving into a "status" power. It was an aspirant superpower, to be sure. But it could become a stabilizing factor in the international order as its ideological preoccupation faded and its consciousness of the benefits of participation in the international order and the risks of being an outlaw state increased.

The assumption regarding the evolution of the USSR prevailed well into the 1970s, the American continued, but the historical record of recent years has demonstrated convincingly that it is wrong. The strategic military conditions on which we based our offer of cooperation in the mid-1960s do not exist. The Soviet Union is not becoming a civilized participant in the international order. It is a revolutionary state—a revolutionary international actor in all senses of that word. It is working relentlessly with discipline, persistence, patience, and a great deal of strength to overturn and remake the international order. Its legitimacy as a ruling apparatus is tied to its rejection of Western political values and social structures.

Events, the American commentator said, have thus repudiated the bases for the second, political, track of the Harmel report. The strain between the United States and its Western European allies today arises from the deep consciousness of the American body politic and its elected leaders that the allies have not done well by track one and have found the intellectual presuppositions underlying track two overturned by events. Unless these issues are reexamined, the alliance cannot be held together except as a day-to-day political expediency.

New policies will emerge from events, from argument, from the vitality of politics itself, the American concluded. However, neither the United States nor any other nation can sustain a foreign policy solely because challenging it would cause problems with public opinion. Americans are as ready as the next society to shirk their responsibilities if they are offered a convenient rationalization for doing so. But for the moment at least, Americans seem determined to resist those rationalizations.

These remarks by the European advocate of detente and the American skeptic set the tone for the remainder of the discussion. A second
American offered the view that detente policy was not the problem—in deed it is essential to the alliance in the short run—but rather that the failure to strengthen NATO's collective defense strength had to be rectified. Another European pointed out that NATO has survived many crises and conflicts. NATO members, despite pacifist views among their populations, have accepted prepositioning of nuclear weapons on their territories. Ties among NATO nations, in other words, are concrete, a fact that should be remembered.

A third European agreed that the Soviets pursue a selective detente, cajoling Europe while accusing the United States. They can do this, he said, because they have access to our media. Rightly or wrongly, Europeans perceive that, as far as the United States is concerned, detente is dead. Regardless of why the detente concept has fallen into disrepute, Europeans believe that the dialogue must go on. This is a minimal definition of detente, and is, in fact, what the dual-track decision on TNF is all about.

The larger questions of detente raised by the earlier American speaker were relevant, the third European said, but not so important as this continuing dialogue. Detente has not failed; indeed, in a number of fields—intra-German relations have been mentioned—it has worked quite well. In addition, detente has made life more difficult for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. For Hungarians, Poles, Czechoslovaks, and other Eastern Europeans, detente has constituted a limited, perhaps too limited, liberalization process. Eastern Europeans would stand to lose if the links were severed and the dialogue ended.

But, said the European, there can be no detente and no viable dialogue with the USSR without the United States and the security that the United States provides to Europe. Europeans also have a role here. It can be argued that they should share more of the burden of their own defense, but this may be difficult to achieve considering the financial constraints under which they operate. TNF modernization will go through, however, as long as NATO sticks to the dual-track policy of the Harmel report.

The commentator identified three types of pacifism and neutralism in Europe: the short-sighted "better-red-than-dead" variety espoused
by Bertrand Russell; the kind found among those who are convinced that Europe cannot win an open-ended arms race (in this view, a U.S. race for superiority will end in stalemate or confrontation with the USSR); and the sort typical of the smaller NATO nations, whose people feel that the problem is vast, but that their country is so small as to be irrelevant.

The European concluded with the point that, in terms of consensus, the alliance was in worse shape from 1965 to 1967 than it is today. Europeans were saying then that the vast military superiority of the United States made the alliance unnecessary. Today, Europeans do not question the existence of a threat; furthermore, nine out of ten Europeans, even socialists and moderates, feel that the alliance is the proper means of addressing the threat. A serious rift between the United States and Europe will not develop as long as both continue to pursue the dual-track approach.

A fourth European argued that detente had undermined the Eastern European social environment in which communist parties thrive. The effects of detente may be seen in the recent events in Poland and in the eroding cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. Even if the alliance were to scratch the word detente, it would still have to deal with the Soviet Union, particularly in those areas involving human relations. The problem of the two Germanies is an example of this continuing need.

An American noted that detente plays a role in the long-term struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies for the soul of both Western and Eastern Europe. Thus, detente is a policy instrument for both sides. The Soviets use detente to influence Western European public opinion. They threaten to cut off certain benefits that everyone fears losing, especially in Germany, and thus influence Western policy. As a result, detente has had a negative impact on the Western alliance. The situation in Poland illustrates at least one consequence of the Western use of detente as an instrument of policy. Another use has to do with influencing Western European public opinion, as exemplified by the issue of TNF modernization. TNF is no
longer strictly a military issue. It now concerns the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies to keep the Soviets out of NATO defense decisionmaking. Western leaders must be concerned that neither Eastern bloc leaders nor Western European publics be given the impression that the USSR is able to influence critical NATO defense decisions.

The American summed up his reasons for not repudiating detente and arms negotiations: First, NATO cannot give up its influence over Eastern Europe. Second, NATO needs detente to manage Western European public opinion on defense and other security decisions. The repudiation of detente would not be in the best long-run interest of the United States, for such moves would eventually set off forces in Western Europe that would be out of U.S. control.

Directly responding to the earlier American argument, a European pointed out that the Vietnam experience had led Americans to forget their scruples and open a dialogue with the Soviets. There had been too much optimism at the genesis of detente. The alliance needed more leverage and skill to pressure the Soviets to behave acceptably than it had at the time—the United States sought to acquire these commodities only in the 1970s. On the European side, West Germany had to be dragged into detente. Eventually, the West Germans were relieved to have been so compelled, because they successfully negotiated the treaties on intra-German relations.

According to the European speaker, Europeans began to feel that the detente policy could be used to resolve a number of outstanding issues. They came to believe in a long-range detente policy, while Americans came to doubt it. A more serious difference arose from the U.S. accusation that, to maintain detente, Western Europe was unwilling to muster the defense efforts necessary to counter the Soviets. Those who accuse Western Europe of being deaf to the voices of disaster, however, are precisely those who persist in thinking of NATO as a wartime alliance. In fact, there is no war. Consensus must therefore be reached on the basis of divergent national interests, among them interests involving the Soviet Union. The functioning of the alliance
depends on the fact that NATO is not now and has never been a wartime alliance. It is a political alliance that must be able to sustain differences among its members without basic questions about its moral, political, psychological, or societal fiber.

The American commentator whose earlier points had generated the detente discussion replied to subsequent arguments. While agreeing that the Vietnam experience had influenced the U.S. move to detente, he pointed out that the American origin of illusions about the efficacy of detente does not make them any less dangerous or less valid as targets of criticism. Second, he stressed that the fundamental point is not whether the detente track or the two-track policy obtained something of value. The point is, has the manner in which the NATO allies conducted the dialogue served the peace or not? The basic criticism of the policies that NATO has pursued is that, either in spite of them or because of them, the worldwide danger has increased. There is a greater risk of war today than there was in 1968 for reasons that our policies either failed to address or themselves stimulated. These reasons have to do with structural disorders and turbulence in the international system. They have to do with the shift from highly polarized conditions of the first 20 postwar years. Most of all, they have to do with a historically unprecedented shift in the balance of power between the United States and the USSR. This shift has taken place in an environment in which the avarice and paranoia that have characterized the Soviet and Russian approach to world affairs throughout history have combined with the messianic qualities of the Marxist-Leninist approach to world affairs.

In short, the American said, we, the NATO allies, have fundamentally and dangerously mismanaged our affairs with the East. The world has gotten more rather than less dangerous. The policies under the heading of detente have contributed to dangers for NATO because they cultivated delusions. They distracted the alliance from the necessary business of deterrence, defense, and security building. Furthermore,
they fed rationalizations that legitimized certain dangerous behavior. In that sense, detente policies have contributed to instability.

The European who had spoken at the outset of the discussion contested the position of the American who had just spoken. He agreed that there have been a growing number of instabilities in the world, but did not think that they could be blamed on detente. Detente is a stabilizing policy. It led to the Helsinki accords and financial agreements with Eastern Europe. It was an important factor in unifying European public opinion behind defense efforts. If the detente policy is weakened, a tremendous peace movement will erupt in Western Europe. Established European political parties will try to capture peace movement support rather than allow the political fringe groups to reap its benefits. Thus, without detente the European political base for the two-track policy could readily disappear. A consensus cannot be achieved in Europe on the basis of the defense track alone.

Western European arbiters of public opinion, including the Catholic church and important academic circles, have become increasingly interested in decisions about the security of the NATO alliance. Their concern became evident after the NATO two-track decision was made in December 1979, because their governments did not publicly explain the motivation behind it. The groups are now calling for open discussion of the decision, but their attitude is not irresponsible or negligent. It is the natural result of the excessive discretion of Western European governments. Because there was no open discussion before the decision was made, the two-track policy is now undergoing public examination.

The European pointed out that even before the Helsinki accords were signed in 1975, European leaders saw the danger of detente euphoria. They outlined plans to combine defense with detente policies and initiated important weapon programs and force improvements even during the high tide of detente. In short, European leaders never questioned the need to prepare for defense and to strengthen the alliance.

The European commentator emphasized that it would be wrong to reject detente, because it is an element of international stability. Economic problems and tensions between developed countries and the third
world are not the results of detente policies, but they are issues that NATO must tackle. It will not be able to do so if it repudiates such an important stabilizing factor in the East-West relationship as detente.

The American discussant of Mr. Hyland's paper concluded the discussion. The impact of detente, he said, is part of the problem that the Soviet Union is facing in maintaining stability within its own alliance. However, the Soviet Union to some extent may be structurally immune to the kind of change that detente, in order to be ultimately successful, must encourage. Recent Soviet behavior can be seen as a demonstration of the Soviet system's inability to make the accommodations to the detente relationship that are necessary if detente is going to be a long-term, viable policy. If detente has the effect of stimulating the Soviet Union to enforce the integrity of its dominion through force of arms, then the NATO alliance should perhaps ask itself whether a detente policy that brings out the very worst in the Soviet system should be pursued.

General Scowcroft closed the session. The discussion, he said, illustrated the nature of the problem that NATO faces. One element of the problem that has only been raised indirectly is the U.S. leadership and its inability to decide what to do about detente and the Soviets: embrace detente or repudiate detente, accommodate the Soviets or repudiate the accommodation? The fundamental problem is a psychological one concerning the nature of the Soviet threat and therefore how to address it. Europeans and Americans seem to be talking past each other on these basic issues. The two sides disagree on the elements of detente, the nature of the threat, and what constitutes security in the face of the threat.

If these divergent attitudes persist, General Scowcroft concluded, the NATO alliance will reach a point where the Europeans will say that the Americans, rather than the Soviets, are the basis of the threat and that the Americans are destroying the essence of the European way of life with crazy militarist policies. The Americans, from their standpoint, will say that the Europeans are decadent neutralist pacifists who want the United States to carry the whole defense burden while Western Europe
enjoys its benefits. The danger of such widely diverging perceptions is the nature of the problem that the alliance faces.
SESSION II. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR ALLIED COOPERATION OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA

SESSION CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The session chairman, an American official, prefaced his introduction of the speaker with the following remarks on the Reagan administration's approach to allied cooperation outside NATO.

The United States needs additional security aid in the Persian Gulf area from the NATO allies. Although the European countries can contribute to European security by filling in for U.S. assets that may have to be used in a crisis in southwest Asia, it would be a mistake to carry this specialization too far. For the allies to concentrate solely on the central region, while the United States alone was responsible for southwest Asia, would be politically unacceptable in the United States, and possibly in Europe as well.

Given the magnitude and nature of the task in the Persian Gulf, it makes strategic, economic, and political sense for those who can to do more in both Europe and southwest Asia. Possibilities for cooperation exist in many areas, including peacetime presence, rapid deployment forces, access to facilities en route to and in the Persian Gulf region, and economic and security assistance.

Peacetime presence should be undertaken mainly by Britain, France, and the United States, which now have forces in the region. But there may also be some merit in encouraging Australia, New Zealand, and Italy, for example, to deploy forces to the region temporarily and to participate in periodic combined exercises there. Furthermore, any allied contributions to Turkish defenses would improve the NATO presence on the periphery of the Persian Gulf.

Americans recognize that the United States will probably have to bear the brunt of rapid deployment. The British and French, however, have improved their own intervention capabilities, and the United States might consider moving in British and French forces in a limited contingency. Such forces could prove more acceptable locally, for example, in Oman.
With regard to the use of facilities in the Persian Gulf region, the U.S.-UK cooperation in Diego Garcia is going well. Additional access arrangements for en route facilities are being considered for Portugal, Italy, and Turkey.

Finally, allies that face real restrictions on military participation in the region could make a meaningful contribution in the form of economic and security assistance. West Germany, for example, has assisted Turkey. In addition to increasing the levels of assistance, however, the allies must coordinate their efforts. The formation of consortia to aid Egypt and Pakistan—in addition to that assisting Turkey—and the closer coordination of arms sales in the region would also contribute.

**SUMMARY OF THE PAPER BY ROBERT W. KOMER**

Ambassador Komer noted first that the chairman's description of the Reagan administration's approach suggests that the approach does not differ essentially from that of the previous administration.

The military balance of power has changed radically over the past 15 years. As a result, the danger of conflict is greater in the 1980s than it was in the 1970s, and the alliance faces a more turbulent decade even than the last one. The increased threat does not, however, result from mistaken policy, as was the dominant American view in the earlier discussion, but from other fact-of-life situations that have emerged. The first is the loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, on which NATO strategy basically depends. If NATO can no longer rely on the American nuclear umbrella, then the allies must rethink the problem.

A second major factor in the loss of U.S. military superiority was the expense of the Vietnam war, the incremental cost of which, in today's dollars, has been estimated at about $400 billion. This includes $300 billion for the war itself and about $100 billion for the reduction in U.S. defense efforts as a direct result of the aftermath. This translates into the loss of almost a decade of U.S. force modernization. People wonder where the new missiles went, or the new bombers,

---

1The complete text of Ambassador Komer's paper appears on pp. 99-107.
or the tactical fighters, or the ships that the Navy wanted, or the equipment that the Army wanted: They all went down the drain in Vietnam.

After Vietnam came the energy squeeze and the consequent economic difficulties, including inflation and declining economic growth. Inflation and declining economic growth have, in turn, seriously undermined allied efforts to build up both NATO's conventional and nuclear forces over the past four or five years. The 3 percent formula is failing to achieve an impact, and NATO is not carrying out the long-term defense program (LTDP) on which the allies agreed. These failures are not occurring, however, because the Germans or anyone else have gone into a funk. They are not occurring because of the great contest between detente and security. They are occurring for economic reasons.

The issue is not that the Europeans are less faithful to NATO; after all, what viable alternative have they? It is rather that the credibility of NATO's deterrent shield has greatly diminished. This is the context in which the workshop must approach the issue of NATO cooperation outside the NATO area. If Europe cannot make its agreed contribution to European deterrence and defense, what is the point in asking it to defend the Middle East? Moreover, Europe lacks the force projection capabilities to do so. Only the United States can afford to project forces 9500 miles. The Europeans could not project forces 3000 miles without calling on U.S. airlift. The United States could provide airlift for its allies, as the preceding speaker noted. To do so, however, would diminish the U.S. ability to deliver its own forces.

Europe can, nevertheless, help the United States. The four ways offered earlier are fine, as long as those espousing them do not ask the Europeans to do what they are simply not able to do. Any political effort to extend the NATO umbrella over the Persian Gulf area would just not work. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's suggestion that there ought to be a more rational division of labor makes good strategic sense. From the viewpoint of the last Defense Department, it is much more cost-effective for the Europeans to use whatever additional defense resources they are willing to contribute to strengthen NATO capabilities in Europe, rather than to buy—in addition to these capabilities—very expensive force projection assets, such as super-large
aircraft or fast-deployment ships. For military as well as political reasons, the United States should not ask its European allies to do much more than strengthen European deterrence and defense.

Some degree of allied participation in Persian Gulf deterrence and defense is, however, politically imperative. Militarily, European forces are less useful, but they can perform roles that complement those of the United States in important ways. For example, with the Soviets sitting at Aden or across the Red Sea at Dahlak Island, the Suez Canal route and Red Sea exits to the Persian Gulf are threatened. Thus, it would make a great deal of sense for the European NATO countries to join the United States in preparing for contingencies involving Aden, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

The best way to accomplish these limited objectives is through bilateral negotiations. Only France, Great Britain, and West Germany can contribute anything in the way of forces and force projection capabilities. A few other allies can be extremely helpful in the essential matter of en route basing and transit rights.

While the United States and its European allies share a common perception that NATO Europe and the Persian Gulf are strategically linked, and while both sides want to develop policies that are more than unilateral U.S. policies, in the last analysis the United States will have to carry most of the load by itself. Participation by the European allies will be limited, at best. The question therefore becomes, How can the United States and its allies manage Schmidt's division of labor so that the allies do more in Europe, because American strength has had to be diverted to the Persian Gulf? There will inevitably be a cost to defending Persian Gulf oil. In other words, given the current force structure, some U.S. assets that would otherwise be programmed for Europe in an emergency will have to be diverted. The United States needs allied help, but bilateralism is the only realistic route by which to achieve it.

DISCUSSANT'S REMARKS

The discussant, a European, noted that Ambassador Komor quite rightly emphasized the fallacy of Kissinger's prediction that Western
Europe would partake exclusively of detente, leaving defense to the United States. Actually, most Europeans agree that the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf are relevant to West European security. This consensus is a great improvement over past disagreements on the relevancy of third world tensions to NATO security. The Suez crisis, for example, was an early case of the United States and Soviet Union lining up against the European allies on a third world issue. The French and American problems with Vietnam are two more cases in which the alliance could not agree to become involved.

However, the alliance has not yet discussed how to create a political framework within which to seek cooperation with third world governments. At present, the degree of overt cooperation that a country is willing to give is often directly linked to U.S. policy toward Israel. In fact, what is needed is a policy that helps local moderates to espouse cooperation with the West. NATO cannot have a policy that isolates local moderates from their publics, for the Soviets are very clever at exploiting such situations.

**DISCUSSION**

One key area, an American participant said, cannot be emphasized enough: Turkey. Turkey can provide the linchpin of NATO's deterrent and defensive structure in the region. For the foreseeable future, if there is to be a NATO defensive response to the canonical Soviet military threat to the Persian Gulf, it will clearly have to involve interdictive air power, at least initially. The most logical and effective place out of which to operate is Turkey. If the Soviets were convinced that NATO air power would in fact interdict a Soviet thrust against the Gulf, this conviction would afford the best deterrent to both military and political adventurism.

The conclusion that NATO air power could interdict a Soviet advance into the Persian Gulf area suggests the following measures: First, bases and support facilities in Turkey should be improved so that the alliance can ready a tactical air capability to deter a Soviet attack through Iran. A developed basing structure would also allow American
and allied forces to be in place and ready to conduct operations. Second, because that basing structure must be defended and because its use might invite attack on Turkey itself, Turkey's armed forces must be extensively and rapidly modernized.

The improvement of NATO bases in Turkey and the modernization of the Turkish armed forces, ideally accompanied by a formal declaration of NATO's intentions, should convince the Soviets that an attack through Iran to the Gulf would inevitably confront U.S., Turkish, and other allied air power operating out of Turkey. If that psychological reality is created, then the allies will have taken an enormous step toward creating a ring of deterrence around a region that is intrinsically difficult to defend. They would be substituting, at least temporarily, an element of will and resolve for a perilous and probably long-lasting shortage of affordable military capability. Making Turkey the bridge between the Persian Gulf and Frankfurt, London, Paris, New York, and Washington is the most important single burden that the alliance can share, at least in regard to the Persian Gulf region.

Another American warned that although the division of labor makes military and strategic sense, it is nonetheless a politically risky policy for the United States and thus for Western Europe as well. It is difficult to explain to Americans that, despite Europe's greater dependence on Persian Gulf oil, the United States will alone provide military security for the Gulf region. However, good arguments exist for Europeans' concentrating their resource expenditures in Western Europe. But American policymakers must be able to point to concrete European actions to show their constituents that, indeed, the Europeans are sharing the Gulf burden. Signals from Europe have not been encouraging. Evidence of further European efforts to take up the burden has yet to appear.

The type of threat, an American said, provides another area for division of labor. The United States is no doubt the only power capable of deterring Soviet aggression. However, the Europeans are often
better able to deal with local instabilities and conflicts. Western European countries have historic ties with the Persian Gulf region, and large numbers of their citizens live and work there. Furthermore, whereas one superpower intervention legitimizes another, thus raising a local conflict to the level of global confrontation, European intervention need not.

Returning to the subject of Turkey, a European speaker agreed that Turkey is indeed a key factor, but a difficult one to exploit. First, there is a national trend toward Islam. Second, the United States has alienated Turkey with its weapons embargo in recent years, and those wounds will not soon heal. Third, the European community (EC) cannot embrace Turkey politically or economically—politically because Greece is already a member, economically because it cannot afford to support the lagging Turkish economy.

A second European questioned the American recommendations, on the grounds that Washington sees things in a global connotation, but neglects regional problems. Specifically, have the Turks been asked how they feel about making Turkey a bridge? The Turks, who have for years been calling attention to their own strategic significance, resent the United States and its European allies for their continued neglect. Now that the allies have belatedly discovered the Persian Gulf region, they should not expect the Turks to rush to accommodate the revised NATO strategy. Furthermore, the United States and its European allies should not assume that the Turks perceive the threat in the same way. They do not, because of both the revival of Islamic fundamentalism and their links to the Arab world.

On the subject of burden-sharing, the European said that the NATO allies have created an enormous public relations problem, particularly in the United States. The U.S. government cannot easily convince the American people that the Europeans are doing more. A NATO commitment to protect the Gulf implies the commitment of additional resources, yet the European members cannot provide additional resources. Therefore,
how can NATO provide the additional capabilities implied by the division of labor? The policy suggestions emerging under this grandiose division of labor seem to be purely a formula to reconcile divergent opinions. They are not concrete options whose implementation would be clearly visible to the U.S. public. Some visible military deployment to the region is the only action that would really satisfy U.S. public opinion. But that is not politically possible. The European concluded that Americans may well become fed up with not seeing a legitimate European contribution to the Gulf commitment.

Another European noted that European countries are generally constrained from deploying armed forces outside the NATO area. They cannot draw down forces, including reserves, in the NATO central region. Some of them are also constrained constitutionally from sending combat forces abroad. Because of these constraints, European activities outside the region must be mostly confined to political and economic contributions.

Military measures, the European continued, should have at least the passive support of countries in the region. Military programs that foster rejectionist attitudes are useless. Third world countries must be encouraged to see their own interests in such programs. In this regard, the NATO allies should ask themselves how they can help the countries that were severely shocked by the events in Afghanistan to organize their defensive capabilities.

Saudi Arabian leaders, for example, comprehend the growing regional security problems. They feel threatened by Soviet footholds in the region, especially in Yemen, by the Soviet options arising from the Arab-Israeli and the Iran-Iraq conflicts, and by the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran. To cope with these threats, the Saudis have indicated varying degrees of interest in a Western-European as well as American--military presence. They remain wary, however, about allowing military bases.

The European speaker cautioned against NATO's underestimating the growing interest of the Persian Gulf states in the stability of the region. These countries have invested their wealth in the developed
Western economies; their leaders realize that their futures depend on the stability of the Western alliance, which in turn depends on Persian Gulf oil. At the same time, the Gulf states want to remain members of the nonaligned movement. In dealing with the Gulf states, therefore, the NATO allies should respect their choice to remain nonaligned and emphasize NATO's aim of preserving the monarchies so as to discourage the Soviet Union from attacking or playing power politics in the region. The alliance should help Persian Gulf powers to establish regional defense plans and purchase weapons, but should not limit aid to these two areas. Leaders of the region have been asking for Western European cooperation across the board. Furthermore, they do not oppose Western politico-strategic concepts, as long as such concepts are not loudly advertised.

Calling Turkey the hinge of NATO's relationship with the Persian Gulf region and a bridge of influence to Islam, the European pointed out, however, that Western European governments face growing public opposition to cooperation with Turkey, because of Turkey's poor human rights record. At the same time, the NATO allies realize that Turkey offers the key to regional stabilization, and so a close relationship must be maintained with the Turkish government. NATO should thus devise a means for Turkey to play an important role in the alliance and to form a strong association with the European community. It need not be a full member of the community, but could be a privileged associate.

An American summarized the views expressed in the preceding discussions and offered some conclusions. Many of the speakers, he said, suggested that neither bilateralism nor a division of labor would work, and gave the following reasons. First, Europeans must agree with the strategic concept underlying NATO operations in the Persian Gulf, even if the United States is the only actor. If they do not, spending increases intended for Western European defense will not be approved. Second, if NATO countries independently take bilateral action, they may pursue different policy aims. As a result, two NATO countries may even find themselves competing for the favors of an oil producer. Third, incoherent policy may lead to a backlash in the United States against its European allies.
On the basis of Ambassador Komer's proposal, the speaker continued, the United States would impart a strategic concept to its European allies through bilateral channels, and would then manage the whole array. That system may be strained if Europeans do not accept the U.S. managerial role. Thus, the NATO mechanism is needed to define strategic concepts and coordinate European and American activities. Although Ambassador Komer advanced many good reasons why it would not be effective, NATO may simply be the only instrument available.

The European discussant of Ambassador Komer's paper agreed that the NATO bureaucracy would be unable to solve the problem of allied cooperation outside Europe. However, he said, if bilateralism is to provide the solution, then five issues must be addressed: (1) internal instability in the Middle East, where oil money and the Arab-Israeli conflict tend to destabilize the environment; (2) Persian Gulf regional solidarity, which causes individual states to refuse to accept foreign bases; (3) Islamic religious fanaticism; (4) NATO's lack of a political framework that would give third world moderate leaders a basis for cooperation with the allies; (5) NATO's indecision about the type of military action that it should be prepared to conduct in the Persian Gulf.

Ambassador Komer said that as so often happens at conferences and indeed in official discussions, the participants have developed a full understanding of how complicated and difficult the problem is at the expense of any consensus on even high-risk solutions to it. So, he continued, I would like to sum up a few basic facts. Someone has to fill the power vacuum that developed in the Persian Gulf when Britain withdrew from east of Suez, where it had previously maintained the peace. The United States tried, on the basis of institutional solutions, notably the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), to fill this strategic vacuum, but the fall of the shah robbed CENTO of its one remaining pillar. In any case, the United States probably could not reconstitute CENTO, or form anything like a Middle Eastern NATO.

Realities of life in the Persian Gulf area, Komer continued, almost dictate a flexible, reasonably adroit policy of making arrangements
with those who are willing, however reluctantly, to make them. It would be great if the Americans could organize a NATO role in the Persian Gulf, but it is just not going to happen. The very factors that would lead the Americans to try to convince the Europeans to share the burden would tend to drive the Europeans away from the United States. The Americans and whichever developed allies can be convinced to join them will have to carry the main share of the load.

As a result of these conditions, Komer said, a de facto division of labor is already emerging. It is reflected in current U.S. programs, planning, and diplomacy. The Americans are simply not going to be able to devote as large a share of their military assets as in the past to the defense of Western Europe, whether central region or the flanks. In light of the Iranian revolution and the fall of Afghanistan, the United States must give higher priority to filling the strategic vacuum in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, even if the Reagan budget calls for defense spending to reach 7 percent of the gross national product (GNP), the United States will not be able to contribute unlimited amounts to NATO defense at the same time that it is acquiring major new commitments in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The question is whether the European allies are going to fill, at least in some measure, the gap that will be left by a reduction in available U.S. resources.

Turkey, Ambassador Komer continued, is a key, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to credible deterrence and defense in the Persian Gulf region. The allies must understand, however, that the Turks are going to be extremely careful not to overcommit themselves again, as they did in the 1950s and 1960s. In any case, the limits of Turkish policy do not mean that greater assistance to Turkey is not useful or that such assistance, military as well as economic, would not have a deterrent impact on Soviet thinking. Anything that the allies put in Turkey, whether or not it convinces the Soviet planners that it would be used in the event of a Persian Gulf clash, will at least worry them to the extent that the possibility exists.

Ambassador Komer found the dearth of references to Pakistan interesting, because one of the currently fashionable myths is that Pakistan
is the key to the defense of Persian Gulf oil. The strategic importance of Pakistan does not compare to that of Turkey, however, for the road through the Khyber Pass leads to the Indian subcontinent, and not to the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, Pakistan is on NATO's other flank. It also exports excellently trained manpower, both military and technical.

Australia is another country, according to Komer, that might be able to make a concrete contribution. Australia had been accustomed in the old days to pulling Britain's chestnuts out of the fire in the Middle East and could resume that role for NATO. The Australians have a rapid intervention force, which the current government intends to increase from one battalion to two. Even a two-battalion brigade group would be quite useful to NATO in the Persian Gulf. The Australians also own an island group, the Cocos Islands, one of which has a larger area, better harbor, and more facilities than Diego Garcia. So many facilities are being built on Diego Garcia that it may soon sink into the sea.

The Saudis and others, Komer said, want a Western deterrent and defense umbrella, but they want it to stay over the horizon. The allies have tried to approach this ambivalence by inventing a new category of bases called facilities, which are bases that are not garrisoned. In any case, the alliance will have to live with the ambivalence of local leaders in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the NATO allies should try to educate those leaders to the value of a Western presence there. Some Saudis, for example, apparently believe that Saudi money buying F-15s, AWACS, French ships, and other things will suffice to deal with the Soviet threat to Persian Gulf oil. The chief value of those "goodies," however, is that they may cool the Russians slightly. They will certainly reassure the locals that NATO cares. Furthermore, they comprise a reservoir of prepositioned equipment in the area, and that equipment is compatible with American force requirements.

Ambassador Komer noted, finally, that a credible political framework, a credible deterrent strategy, and above all military capability sufficient to put teeth into that strategy will be much more difficult to develop for the Persian Gulf than it has been for Europe, or even
for northeastern Asia. Bilateralism will have to be the order of the
day, although NATO will remain a splendid forum for consultation. How-
ever, when resources must be allocated, commitments made, or forces
actually deployed, the decisions will probably be made by the small
group of powers willing to do so.

An American participant asked Ambassador Komor to comment on the
nightmare scenario in which a regime friendly to NATO, such as Saudi
Arabia, collapses, perhaps within the next four years.

First of all, Komor replied, glib analogies should not be drawn be-
tween Iran and Saudi Arabia, for they are not alike as far as political
stability is concerned. Saudi Arabia is an oligarchy, an extended fam-
ily with more than 4000 princes, all of whom have retinues, all of them
on the public payroll. Second, the Iranian revolution was primarily an
urban revolution; the Saudi population is still mainly rural. The Saudi
leadership keeps close tabs on the urban proletariat, which is made up
largely of Palestinians, Pakistanis, and other non-Saudis.

Even if changes should occur in some of these countries, it is not
inevitable that the new regimes would be anti-Western and pro-Soviet.
The odds are greater that military coups rather than Moslem takeovers
will occur in many of these countries. After all, that pattern has
been standard during the modernization process in the developing world.
If military factions take over, their members might be more alert to
security concerns, and also more of a modernizing force than the tradi-
tional aristocracy.

These reassurances aside, Ambassador Komor concluded, the NATO al-
lies face a serious problem. They must be prepared to do many things
to insure that the Soviets do not opportunistically meddle in a civil
emergency in a Persian Gulf state. NATO deterrent capabilities should
be sufficient to enforce a policy of "We won't intervene if you don't,"
or "We may intervene overtly because the oil is valuable to us, but you
don't have the same excuse for doing so." Thus, a security umbrella
for the Persian Gulf region serves the useful purpose of limiting larger
consequences of local changes in regime. It is not, however, the com-
plete answer.
SESSION III. NATO STRATEGY: CHALLENGES OF THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

The session chairman, an American official, noted in introducing the speaker that the arms control process provides an opportunity for one government to interfere in the internal political affairs of another. That opportunity produces a form of coupling of arms programs, strategy, and political relationships--one that would not exist in the absence of arms control--and Mr. Thomson quite rightly highlights this coupling in his paper.

SUMMARY OF THE PAPER BY JAMES A. THOMSON

NATO faces a long agenda of objective needs, both in strategy and force posture. However, political realities govern how far and how fast the allies can go in seeking solutions. The current challenge for the alliance is to develop a political strategy that establishes priorities--what problems are most important and what problems can be set aside for later.

The agenda arises out of changes in the underpinnings of NATO military strategy. In 1967, the allies reached consensus on the key role of escalation. Escalation linkage, the allies agreed, would ensure that the U.S. strategic deterrent would continue to contribute to European defense. Escalation control would provide opportunities to terminate the conflict at less than catastrophe. For the strategy to work, however, Soviet leaders, contemplating conflict in Europe, would have to perceive that it could escalate to a level at which they would find themselves at a net disadvantage. Escalation dominance was thus a prerequisite for NATO strategy.

This perception was plausible in 1967. Although the Soviet Union held conventional superiority, the United States was generally perceived to have superior battlefield nuclear weapons and superior strategic nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, changes in the Soviet force posture since then have essentially neutralized NATO's ability to dominate escalation at certain levels. As a result, the Soviets can now cope with
NATO strategy at all levels—conventional, battlefield nuclear, medium- and long-range theater nuclear, and strategic intercontinental.

Soviet strategy, as the allies have come to realize, is unlike NATO's. Whereas the NATO allies view the escalation strategy merely as a way to send political signals, the Soviets have integrated their strategy for nuclear strikes directly into their planning for conventional military operations. These operations are aimed at traditional military objectives, i.e., seizing the strategic initiative, breaking up enemy forces, and causing the total breakdown of enemy political and military systems. The strategy seems to involve the use of nuclear strikes, whether small- or large-scale, along with conventional and chemical weapons. The Soviets may not believe that the strategy will work, but they are preparing forces on the basis of it.

The NATO alliance is not ready to cope with this Soviet strategy: It has not trained troops for such a conflict, it has not planned to fight a war on those terms, and it has not acquired equipment to protect troops and materiel from radiation and chemicals. Thus, a basic asymmetry has developed between the Soviet Union and NATO. The Soviets can cope with NATO strategy, but the allies cannot cope with Soviet strategy.

The current long-term agenda of the alliance stems from this asymmetry. The allies should be planning, first, to reestablish the credibility of the escalation strategy and, second, to cope with Soviet nuclear war-fighting capabilities. The LRTNF decision—which grew out of concerns that the gap between NATO and Soviet long-range theater forces was becoming the dominant feature of the escalation spectrum—takes one step toward reestablishing escalation credibility. The second goal involves denying the Soviets the chance to achieve traditional military objectives during nuclear war.

Both goals contribute to deterrence, for they are aimed at convincing the Soviets that launching an attack on the West would be pointless. Their homeland could be destroyed, and they would not be able to achieve their military goals. However, in political terms the escalation task has always been easier to explain than the denial task.
Europeans link escalation with deterrence, but they do not link denial with deterrence. Denying the Soviets their military objectives is characterized as war-fighting, and in alliance political discussions war-fighting has become a code word for bad.

The allies are, furthermore, committed only sporadically to planning for the decisions that they might have to make during nuclear conflict. The alliance would probably come apart over questions of initial—or if not initial, then subsequent—nuclear employment. NATO needs plans for nuclear weapon employment that go well beyond the broad generalities of MC 14/3. Such plans should both address Soviet war-fighting capabilities and preserve the essence of the escalation strategy. These planning requirements make up the first half of the NATO agenda.

The second half of the agenda consists of the many force improvements that NATO needs to perform the tasks laid out in these plans. Most of all, the alliance needs conventional strength, for in an era of nuclear parity, conventional forces should be the preeminent deterrent against nonnuclear attack. In addition, conventional strength will continue to be important if NATO ever has to fight a nuclear war. Long-range theater nuclear forces are second in priority, because the alliance must reestablish the credibility of the escalation spectrum. Third, the alliance must improve the survivability of troops, weapons, and equipment in the face of possible nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. Survivable command and control systems, the fourth priority, would allow NATO to carry out a strategy of either escalation control or nuclear war-fighting. Offensive chemical weapons are fifth on the list of needed force improvements, and new nuclear systems are last. The nuclear force must, of course, be modernized beyond LRTNF, but NATO's problems lie more with planning and protection than with force structure.

Because this list of necessary force improvements is extensive, a demand that everything be done at once would spark uncontrollable political controversy among the allies. Such a demand could also easily undermine the remaining political foundations for the LRTNF decision. That decision has already become the focal point in a struggle between
East and West over European defense and security. If the Soviets succeed in undoing the decision and the weapons are not deployed, the political consequences for the alliance will be profound.

Thus, the most important question for the NATO alliance in the next four years is, How far should these issues be pushed? Two schools of thought have already offered answers. One insists that the allies should first try to accomplish what has already been set in motion, and only then move on to new improvements. This group feels that the alliance cannot now bear new demands. The second group insists that, because the problems are so serious, the allies must push ahead on a longer list of improvements without delay. According to this school of thought, political problems can either be managed, or they do not matter. The broad differences between the two schools of thought define an important dilemma for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

DISCUSSANT'S REMARKS

The discussant—an American official—agreed with Thomson's list of needed force improvements. The Reagan administration apparently also agrees with these objectives. The administration's assessment reflects the view that deterrence must be based on force effectiveness, which, in turn, is defined as the ability to deny the Soviets military objectives. The Soviets have finally built a force structure that begins to match their doctrine, while the West no longer enjoys such a match. Steps must be taken to correct this situation.

The Reagan administration is continuing a number of Carter administration policies. Reagan has reaffirmed, for example, the TNF decision, the NATO long-term defense program, the 3 percent formula, and PD-59. The administrations differ significantly, however, in their commitment to force improvements, such as those listed in Thomson's paper. Although many of the improvements were highly controversial among Carter's advisers, Reagan's advisers have reached a broad consensus on them. The fact of this solid U.S. consensus will make it easier for the Reagan administration to gain support in Europe for its security agenda.
The heart of the dilemma that Thomson presents involves the need to develop nuclear employment plans. The Reagan administration has asked NATO's High Level Group to prepare two studies, one reexamining the threat and the other defining functional requirements to meet it. These studies will help to build consensus on the function of NATO's TNF systems.

The Reagan administration, like Thomson, gives a fairly low priority to new nuclear systems. Those working on the issue generally feel that force mix and force structure are not the biggest problems. As Thomson has suggested, the biggest problems involve planning, force improvements, and force protection.

Although the tasks outlined here are difficult, the Reagan administration is convinced of its objectives and committed at the same time to improving consultation within the alliance. Reagan's advisers hope to secure agreement among the allies at a level above the lowest common denominator. In answer to Thomson's concluding question, the Reagan administration will push ahead on both force improvements and planning efforts. However, it will do so in a sensitive way that it hopes will produce greater success than many might have expected.

DISCUSSION

An American participant said that the goal of reachieving escalation dominance represented an inordinately ambitious task. For the foreseeable future, both sides will probably be able to deny each other dominance, but not gain control. Furthermore, lauding TNF's military effectiveness is a little surprising, because in terms of numbers and survivability, the systems are unimpressive. Thus, TNF modernization could be considered only a marginal first step toward the goal of escalation dominance.

Thomson replied that he was not suggesting that NATO could reestablish escalation dominance, a next-to-impossible task. Instead, NATO should try to reestablish the credibility of the escalation spectrum, a concept linked to parity. Parity in this sense does not mean matching
weapons at any conceivable boundary of escalation. It means that, when NATO systems are measured against Soviet systems, there should be no big holes.

For example, NATO's long-range theater nuclear force modernization is not an attempt to match Soviet long-range theater nuclear capability. That large Soviet force includes a whole family of medium bombers, as well as SS-20s, -4s, and -5s. The Soviets have over 2000 long-range theater nuclear weapons. NATO is not trying to match that capability, for the allies consciously do not want to appear to be creating an independent nuclear strike force on the European continent. However, they would like to fill some obviously big holes in NATO's roster of theater weapon systems.

A European praised Thomson for focusing on the need to reconcile deterrence and defense. In the minds of many Europeans, deterrence and defense are not two sides of the same coin. The basic question in Thomson's paper is, How can the NATO allies escalate, since circumstances have changed and the Soviets are now in a position to escalate any conflict themselves? The allies can no longer assume that they would be the first to go nuclear; the Soviets may be the first to do so. Thus, the most important problem is clearly regaining some degree of escalation control, to which TNF modernization is a partial solution.

Improvements to conventional forces are also needed, the European continued, and that issue is even more controversial in Europe than TNF. Europeans fear that the United States wants to establish a conventional balance, i.e., parity at the level of conventional forces. However, the alliance would have to go a long way to match Soviet conventional capabilities, and Europeans question NATO's ability and need to do so. They appreciate the need for a continuum from conventional through strategic nuclear forces but feel that overemphasis on one component of that continuum will undo the strategy underlying it.

On the question of how to proceed with force improvements, the allies should indeed be careful not to overload the circuits. By 1983, all European NATO countries will have to decide whether to make a firm
commitment to TNF modernization. That decision will constitute an im-
portant first step toward comprehensive force improvements, and the
allies should not try to force the other issues until it is made.
Thomson's list of force improvements will have to be addressed, but 1983
will not be too late.

A second European agreed that the alliance must carefully consider
what the traffic will bear in Europe. It is a tragic factor of current
European political life, he said, that TNF symbolizes a battle between
East and West for the soul of Europe. European leaders may think that
the TNF systems planned for deployment in Europe are of marginal mili-
tary value, but they must grapple with them as an important political
issue. TNF is in fact receiving the full attention of European politi-
cal leaders, and they would probably agree that, realistically, it is
not possible to seek further force improvements now.

The war-fighting concept is very unpopular in Europe, and any calls
for force improvements that suggest matching the Soviets at every level
will be equally unpopular. European governments have yet to find a way
to present modernization needs, including TNF, in such a way that they
make sense to European citizens. Most Europeans, not comprehending the
other levels of the escalation ladder, continue to have blind faith in
the capabilities of U.S. central strategic systems. Thus, the European
concluded, on the political side the alliance is in big trouble.

A third European noted that, above all, Europeans need a sense of
confidence in and consistency from the United States. These qualities
enable them to persuade their own publics that NATO should have a more
convincing strategic posture. The allies will not be able to argue for
more force improvements until they can point to a coherent strategy for
managing East-West relations, especially a policy for negotiating con-
trol of central strategic systems. The entire list of improvements
called for in Thomson's paper may not be achievable, the European con-
cluded, but European leaders would like to have a crack at it. For any
degree of success, they must be able to show European parliaments and publics that the strategic arms control process continues.

An American suggested that the reason that the allies had decided on a modest number of long-range theater nuclear weapons was only partly, as Thomson said, because they did not want to destroy the credibility of the U.S. central strategic systems. The decision was also based on simple political realism. In fact, the planners of all of the NATO initiatives that the United States launched during the last four years have tried to be extremely sensitive to what Europeans would accept. They tried to devise programs that were politically possible and would move the alliance in the right direction—even if they did not solve the entire problem.

The key to reaching consensus in the alliance, the American pointed out, is to move at a pace that is politically feasible. Often debate can proceed on two levels simultaneously. Long before policymakers address an issue with any seriousness, professionals can discuss it at conferences like this one. The LRTNF decision represented about ten years of discussion, but it emerged in earnest as part of American proposals for the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP). In 1977, Americans proposed an LTDP task force to deal with nuclear modernization. The High Level Group, established in fall 1977, took on that task, and by December 1979—barely two years later—the alliance took a collective decision to proceed with LRTNF modernization. In NATO terms, that is moving fast.

Another American agreed that the allies should not fool themselves about the current effectiveness of NATO doctrine. Not only have the Soviets robbed the alliance of escalation dominance in the theater, he said, they may also have done so at the strategic intercontinental level. One can confidently conclude that the odds for victory in a contained European war—conventional or nuclear—lie with the Soviet side. The odds for a Soviet victory in a strategic intercontinental conflict must be predicted with less confidence. However, the counterforce and
war-fighting capabilities of the Soviet strategic strike force, Soviet civil defense and survival assets, and the implications to the U.S. of attacks on its warning and command and control systems all point to a plausibly negative outcome for NATO in a strategic intercontinental exchange.

The Soviets think in terms of general war, not in terms of separate steps in an escalation ladder. The most important aim of Soviet war strategy is national survival, which involves the capability to retain viable military reserve forces so that the Soviet Union will remain the most effective military entity in Eurasia after the conflict. The Soviets' ability to achieve that aim is believable, if by no means certain, for they have modernized their forces with it in mind.

The comprehensive problem that at least we in the United States must worry about, the American continued, is conducting a comparable renovation of both strategic intercontinental and theater forces. Because the assured destruction strategy is no longer either relevant or assured, we must plan for national survival, addressing such issues as civil defense, command and control, and continuity of government. We need reserve military forces and projection capabilities for a nuclear environment where a critical mission for Soviet strategic offensive weapons will be to cut the United States off from Eurasia.

The complexity, costliness, and political difficulties of force modernization in NATO Europe, the American concluded, implies an even heavier burden on the United States. A strategy of forward defense in Europe is not enough, because any credible ratio of forces in central Europe would leave too much uncertainty about war outcomes. NATO Europe will always have to depend on U.S. strategic strike assets and power projection capabilities. Therefore, the U.S. and NATO must face the expensive and politically taxing burden of planning for general war.

For the concepts put forward in Thomson's paper to have an impact in Europe, a European stated, they must be put in a larger context. Europeans demand balanced concepts, as well as balanced forces, and that is why both deterrence/defense and arms control must remain integral parts of alliance security policy.
The first problem for NATO, therefore, is finding a means to continue defense policies on a base of popular support. The offensive character of arms control policy should be emphasized. Arms control can be used to expose and criticize the USSR in European parliaments and other power centers. Quickly organizing and starting up a new negotiating process would do much to stabilize European public opinion.

The second problem for NATO, the Europeans said, concerns finding a means to finance all the force improvements needed, especially highly sophisticated weapon systems, at a time of large budget deficits and cutback social programs. As is the case with strategic policy, financing force improvements may upset social and political stability.

A second European argued that lack of public discussion is the essence of NATO's current problems. Most people agree, he said, that the High Level Group's work on LRNF was one of the most successful examples of NATO consultation on a very sensitive issue. At the same time, there was a large gap between what NATO officials were deciding and what was politically acceptable. The political breaking point came with President Carter's decision on the neutron warhead. Europeans were incensed to the point that European governments were unable to cope with public opinion. European antinuclear opposition has since deepened and widened to include church movements as well as left-wing groups.

Many NATO decisionmakers did not expect this reaction, because for a long time they had been able to discuss nuclear weapons in the relative calm of official circles. Thanks to the momentum behind the antinuclear movement, however, that luxury no longer exists. Now alliance leaders must convince their publics early on of why an agenda of force improvements is needed. Notions such as flexible response, escalation governance, and war-fighting scare the public, because they imply a nuclear war on European territory. Thus, convincing public opinion about the relationship between NATO nuclear doctrine and deterrence will be an uphill struggle.

European antinuclear sentiment has also increased substantially in the last months, thanks to statements by the Reagan administration.
Calls for nuclear superiority and refusals to negotiate with the Russians make Europeans uneasy. Antinuclear sentiment will subside only when people feel more confident about how East-West relations are being handled. For that reason, SALT is extremely important at a symbolic level. If the U.S. demonstrates that it is serious about the SALT process, Europeans will feel much easier about the TNF decision.

Finally, the European concluded, in emphasizing NATO deficiencies, the allies have themselves been guilty of undermining flexible response. They have exaggerated those deficiencies for the obvious reasons of keeping resources flowing and people motivated. But how do the allies know what a Soviet military or political leader calculates when he measures the NATO alliance? He may not believe that the USSR could escape without unacceptable losses in a conflict with NATO.

A third European agreed that the trouble with public opinion in Europe began with the neutron bomb issue. That issue revived the controversy surrounding nuclear war-fighting, and the Russians quickly began to manipulate the controversy. Soon, a wide circle of Europeans was convinced that theater nuclear force modernization is equal to European nuclear war, although for 20 years they had believed that deterrence was not war. The Soviets are exploiting this perception cleverly, he concluded, but it is only a perception and it can be turned around.

It is simply too ambitious, an American opined, to seek credible escalation control. Both sides would lose escalation control if they ever crossed the nuclear threshold. Therefore, neither side will let itself fall so far behind in nuclear capabilities that nuclear employment will become a sensible option in wartime. Because of this nuclear impasse, conventional forces have, in a sense, become more important than nuclear forces. Rectifying conventional imbalances, however, costs far more than rectifying nuclear imbalances, for nuclear weapons are basically cheap. The real question that the allies must grapple with is, How do we generate the resources?
The allies should realize, of course, that they already enjoy special advantages in generating resources. For example, the members of NATO are blessed with rich allies, while the Soviets have only poor ones. If NATO assets are counted in aggregate, the alliance has more men under arms, greater naval and ground strength, and larger defense expenditures than the Soviets. If the allies want to rectify conventional force imbalances at a cost acceptable to free societies, the American concluded, then they must decide how to manage the enormous resources that they are already putting into the military competition. More effective resource management is the key to a credible conventional defense.

In his final comments, the American discussant of Thomson's paper said that he was struck by the consensus among workshop participants that the allies should not overload the transatlantic circuit, although now we seem to be doing so. The key to correcting the overload is balance. The Carter administration, with its excessive enthusiasm for arms control, actually set the process back a decade. Likewise, excessive enthusiasm for defense improvements can damage our chances of achieving those objectives.

At the same time, the allies should not judge prematurely how much the traffic will bear. American policymakers run the risk of making what Henry Kissinger called preemptive concessions, i.e., assuming that the Europeans will not accept a position before presenting it to them. The Europeans, in turn, should make explicit what they think will be palatable to European publics.

Finally, the American said, everyone assumes that the TNF issue will dominate the NATO security agenda—and conferences like this one—for years to come. The allies should remember that these issues can be ephemeral. For example, a few years ago every NATO conference focused on Eurocommunism, at least until the Angolan civil war, when the Soviets were discovered to have a new third world power projection capability.

Mr. Thomson concluded the session by summarizing and commenting on the discussion. NATO must have an active arms control policy to ensure
support for TNF and other defense matters. That fact is apparently now recognized in Washington. Furthermore, whether or not the alliance has an arms control policy, the Soviets will have one, and they will come out with proposal after proposal. The allies must be prepared to show the fallacies of those proposals. In other words, the alliance needs not only an active, but an offensive arms control policy.

Intercontinental forces must play a role in both planning and improving capabilities for a general war. If they do not, U.S. strategy and commitments to NATO will be inconsistent. The general trend in American strategic thought is to think more about the relationship between theater war and intercontinental forces. However, although NATO professionals can think about and discuss problems, these problems must at some time become part of alliance public debate. The High Level Group was so successful in one respect because European senior political leaders were informed about what was happening there. Certain political leaders preferred not to come to grips with the issues, continuing to treat them as matters for experts. Others became much more sensitive and were able to provide an essential link between expert discussions and public debate on TNF.
WRAP-UP OF THE FIRST DAY'S DISCUSSION

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY WILLIAM E. HOEHN, JR.

The issues raised during the first three sessions of the workshop seem to indicate that NATO's needs are outpacing available resources. NATO is facing demands growing out of imbalances in strategic forces, theater nuclear weapons, major conventional capabilities, and power projection potential. Because the demands are great and the resources limited, the allies need a framework for assigning priorities.

According to Soviet military doctrine, the Soviets want to be able to defeat militarily whatever coalition of forces is raised against them, at whatever level the conflict has to be fought. In defeating their enemies, the Soviets want their leadership to survive and continue its role in the postwar environment as the true interpreter of Marxism-Leninism.

In terms of NATO priorities, the allies should perhaps focus on how a Soviet planner might think about his ability to satisfy such criteria as the survival of the Soviet state as an economic entity, survival of military power and resources, and survival of the Soviet leadership itself. When the complexity of the Soviet planner's task is considered, neither NATO's central strategic forces nor theater nuclear forces look as inadequate as they have seemed in recent years. The existence of these forces makes it fairly difficult for Soviet planners to feel confident that their country can meet Soviet criteria for bringing a war to a successful end. NATO nuclear forces at every level compound their planning problem.

Whether a nuclear conflict were to originate in the NATO theater, or as a large-scale operation involving both theater and intercontinental strikes, the Soviets have no illusions about how destructive the results would be. Because they do not take the subject of destruction lightly, one can feel a little easier about the imbalances that exist in central and theater nuclear systems, especially since the allies are taking steps to redress the imbalances. NATO's imbalance at the conventional level causes greater worry, because NATO needs a strong
conventional defense to discourage Soviet temptations to challenge the alliance.

Several workshop participants have argued that the level of resources destined for NATO conventional modernization approximates the amount that the Soviets have been spending for the same purpose. Somehow, NATO's production function for conventional forces seems to be a major problem. The allies should therefore seriously consider management initiatives that would extract a larger output from the substantial input that they are already contributing.

NATO power projection capabilities also leave a great deal to be desired in terms of mobility, firepower, and general configuration. Of all NATO's collection of crying needs and limited resources, its power projection weaknesses are perhaps the most serious. While the allies cannot be entirely comfortable with the strategic nuclear balance, the theater nuclear balance, and the major conventional balance, they should be even less satisfied with their ability to bring power to bear at remote distances, where the Soviet leadership has lately tended to be adventurous. Thus, the alliance should assign priority to improving its power projection forces.

DISCUSSION

A European said that the Soviets have an integrated war plan that does not distinguish between different levels of conflict. The Soviets also have a hierarchy of aims to be achieved in a future war, among them salvaging their political system, economy, and position as a world power. Furthermore, they have experience in picking up the pieces after disastrous conflicts. Although one should not assume that the Soviets plan for aggression, they have, nevertheless, a much more realistic view of nuclear war than do the NATO allies.

NATO should not try to copy the USSR, however, because the alliance is not designed for war; it is a peacetime coalition whose ability to maintain peace is closely intertwined with its own internal stability. Domestic political pressures in Europe mean that while the USSR can plan for war in a cold, realistic sense, NATO cannot. In other words,
NATO is precluded from drastically improving its defense posture. It must improve its posture on an incremental basis.

Perhaps the major deterrent value of NATO, the European concluded, is its ability to maintain cohesion. When considered in that light, a policy of continuous incrementalism is worthwhile. Thus, adding 3 percent of GNP annually to the conventional and theater nuclear defense effort makes eminent sense, even if by Soviet-style reckoning it makes no sense at all. Basically, it is meaningless to compare Soviet attitudes and needs with those of NATO. NATO's politics differs fundamentally from that of the Warsaw Pact, and the allies should not try to sovietize NATO.

The allies must maintain economic well-being and political stability within their own countries, the European concluded. Of course, they recognize at the same time that the USSR has grown powerful enough militarily to circumscribe the West's freedom to pursue its economic and political interests. Western European countries cannot, however, operate on the assumption that they must plan for a major East-West war. European publics expect peace and stability, and that expectation is the foundation of the alliance. If the basic assumption that peace can be maintained falls apart, NATO in its present form will not survive.

Since 1945, an American said, significant shifts in the balance of power have occurred between the United States and the USSR. A more significant shift, however, has occurred between North and South. Nowadays, developing countries are not only capable of resisting America's will, they can also threaten American vital interests, as they have done in the Persian Gulf.

Confidence in U.S. military power has been degraded over the past 30 years, although not because it has failed to deter the Soviet Union. In fact, by and large it has succeeded in deterring the Soviets whenever the U.S. leadership really wanted to deter them. On the other hand, U.S. military power has failed or only minimally met its objectives in conflicts with third world powers. These failures, not the failure to deter the Soviets, have called into question the efficacy of that power.
Thus, agreeing with Dr. Hoehn, the American concluded that although deterring the Soviets must remain the main U.S. objective, America and its European allies should be devoting resources to meeting objectives that they have failed to meet since World War II.

We, the allies, a second American stated, cannot define our priorities strictly in terms of hardware and systems. Political resources are often more important than budgetary resources. For example, effective power projection requires en route access. In addition to providing funds for improving facilities, the allies must reach agreements with countries whose leaders are willing to take risks and live with ambiguities about the purposes for which their facilities may be used.

The same types of need are reflected in other areas. Hence, the key resources needed for theater nuclear force deployment are not money, but the steadiness of American policy, fortitude of allied governments, and ability of allied leaders to convince their publics and parliaments to proceed. The key resources needed for strategic forces are American ingenuity, ability to obtain agreement to missile sites in the United States, and credibility of U.S. decisionmaking both in Soviet and alliance eyes. Even in the case of conventional forces, where modernization depends more directly on the funds available, political resources may be just as important. In fact, alliance ability to produce defense funds may relate directly to the state of alliance resolve and cooperation.

Thus, the American concluded, the context in which we identify priorities should be broadened. In establishing priorities between, for example, theater nuclear forces and force projection, we should remember that, although both require monetary resources, they relate to different foreign policy problems.

An American noted that a false dichotomy between power projection and other alliance functions was drifting into the discussion. Soviet actions and reactions are clearly fundamental to all NATO calculations, including calculations of power projection. NATO and the Warsaw Pact deter each other in third world crises and conflicts as they do in
Europe. In regard to NATO and the Middle East, the Western European allies may be entering a period in which their vital interests will be tested by events that have little to do with direct Soviet or European involvement, but that could ultimately lead to clashes between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Europeans may no longer be able to assume that they can go through certain rituals to prepare a defense and never expect to see it tested.

Many Europeans, according to a European speaker, are already disturbed over the Reagan administration's apparent militarization of international relations. If the NATO allies are to handle their domestic oppositions, then this perception must be counteracted. Most important, the allies should not be creating the impression that NATO favors militarization and expansion, while the Soviet Union appears to want peace. The allies should not be talking about projecting Western power into the third world. They should talk instead of supporting the independence, integrity, and nonalignment of third world countries. In Poland, they should clearly state that NATO respects Polish autonomy and demand that the Soviet Union respect it too. In short, policies must be described in such a way that they will sell to European publics.

A second European agreed with Hoehn's analysis of military needs but said that NATO policymakers find it extremely difficult to impose armaments on Europe just for the sake of armaments. Most Europeans do not think that the Soviet Union can be defeated through an arms race, nor do they think of superiority as a viable concept. Arms are only useful when they convince the Soviets to behave more rationally. For that reason, the allies must resolve to maintain a military balance. Through that resolve, the Soviets will also come to believe that superiority is not a viable concept.

The Europeans, an American participant pointed out, have been stressing the idea that the alliance should focus on political and psychological, rather than military, dimensions in formulating policy. However, it is precisely the military dimension that the alliance,
with the United States in the forefront, has been collectively neglecting over the past 20 years. Meanwhile, the USSR has built up its military power to frightening proportions, especially in relation to NATO's simultaneous depletion. The alliance is becoming less and less credible because its strategy and posture can no longer satisfy the demands posed by this shifting balance.

The allies essentially agree on objectives for alliance policy. They disagree, however, on the means and pace needed to fulfill those objectives. If they proceed as they have over the past decade, NATO will no longer be capable of carrying out policy. For the remainder of the workshop, the American concluded, the participants should talk more about how to confront NATO's problems, and less about why they developed.
SESSION IV. SALT AND NATO: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

SESSION CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Before introducing Mr. Herrmann, the session chairman, a European, asked the participants to consider two questions in the morning's discussion:

- Could military security arguments and political–strategic arguments (such as allied solidarity) both point in the same direction, i.e., toward the resumption of the SALT process?
- If not, are there contravening arguments to persuade the alliance that the SALT process is invalid, no matter what the political penalties?

SUMMARY OF THE PAPER BY RENE HERRMANN

European negotiators are often at a disadvantage in discussing arms control with their U.S. counterparts, because the two sides hold such different views of the process. Europeans are incredulous when U.S. SALT negotiators are accused by their own countrymen of incompetence, of not holding their own against the Soviets. Many Europeans assume that the technical criticisms of SALT in the United States actually mask more important political arguments. The European concern with SALT is political: Europeans consider arms control negotiations to be political exercises, the technical details of which fall into place as discussions proceed. In other words, they believe that once the subject matter of negotiations is staked out, the less important technical details fall into place. Furthermore, Europeans consider the verification of arms control agreements a secondary issue, while Americans consider it an essential condition. In general, Europeans and Americans differ in the details of their approach to the subject matter of negotiations.

1 The complete text of Mr. Herrmann's paper may be found on pp. 129-143.
Europeans are perplexed by the Reagan administration's approach to strategic arms limitation, because it seems to disrupt completely the two-track long-range theater nuclear force decision, mutual and balanced force reductions, and other arms control negotiations. European decisionmakers are eager for the United States to pursue arms control policy vigorously. They would prefer not to be faced with the necessity of looking to the USSR for impetus on SALT. In fact, they think it incumbent on the U.S. leadership to deny the Soviets that kind of leverage by developing a credible arms control policy.

Americans are currently debating how to withdraw the West Europeans from their dependence on arms control: "cold turkey" or with "methadone." Cold turkey--complete withdrawal from negotiations--by denying Europeans the reassurance of sharing with the United States a common purpose and strategy for dealing with the Soviets, would cause a deep rift in the Atlantic alliance. Methadone--substituting an artificial process for true arms control--would also have grievous consequences, because allied cohesion demands that the United States show its good faith in developing negotiating strategies. Allied cohesion has come to depend on a common positive arms control strategy, because domestic attitudes toward NATO are much less benign than they were in the 1960s.

**DISCUSSANT'S REMARKS**

The discussant of Mr. Herrmann's paper, an American, agreed that the addiction metaphor suited NATO's dependence on the arms control process well. Arms control policies are changing in the face of the profound uncertainties surrounding arms control, but Europeans dislike these changes. Why? The SALT debate, which has been going on for a long time in this country, has been transparent to public view. It has not been based on the merits or demerits of any particular agreement, but on political, historical, and strategic trends.

Overall, the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union has steadily worsened, although SALT was supposed to be a stabilizing factor. The world has become more, not less, dangerous in
recent years, and SALT must share the blame. During the SALT negotiations, those who supported SALT voted for military budgets and made program decisions that have proved inadequate to maintain the military balance.

We know a lot more about Soviet strategic doctrine now than we did in 1969. Little in Soviet doctrine agrees with the premises upon which the United States entered the negotiations: a belief in the search for stability. That kind of thinking is demonstrably absent from the Soviet approach to the strategic business. Furthermore, in the world at large, Soviet motives and outlook are fundamentally incompatible with the political-strategic consensus—presupposed to exist without negotiations—that underlies the U.S. approach to the SALT process. At what point will Americans decide that the process simply cannot work?

The bitterest critics of SALT regard the process as more injurious than the result. They have decided that the political, psychological, and ideological ramifications of the process themselves have a perverse effect. For example, in the 1970s successive U.S. administrations became ever more vigorously involved in the SALT process, even as detente deteriorated. Thus, SALT became the central feature of the East-West relationship.

What of SALT's future? In principle, there are three possibilities:

- We can return to the old pieties in new garb. The most explicit theme in the argument to return to SALT is that we must use SALT to create a better strategic environment. But it is not possible to have an agreement that will change strategic conditions, because the basis for it does not exist.
- We can resume the process because it is politically expedient. René Herrmann argues that European politics demands that Reagan continue the SALT process. Reagan is inching toward this position because of European public opinion, although there is no groundswell of support for either SALT or TNF negotiations in the United States. In an atmosphere of political expediency, we cannot simply put forward positions that we consider good
and desirable—they must also be negotiable. However, requiring the good and desirable to also be negotiable is probably asking too much of a politically expedient process.

Returning to the addiction analogy, we can withdraw cold turkey—suspend or delay indefinitely the SALT and TNF negotiating process. What if we had three to five years' delay in these negotiations? A stable environment for negotiations is long gone, and we have yet to decide what kinds of arms control we ought to pursue. Doctrine, force posture, and the role of arms control are now being debated in the United States. For example, we do not know whether we hurt or help the coupling of European nuclear systems to U.S. central systems by what we are doing in the TNF arms control arena—yet Europeans press us to carry on anyway.

To engage in the rituals of a pietistic SALT process means that the Western arms control bureaucracies would be acting without conviction. The knowledge that negotiations are bound to fail has a pernicious effect on democratic governments. SALT is part of a problem, not its solution. We in the United States should not shackle Western governments, including that of the United States, with an arms control process in an environment that we do not understand.

DISCUSSION

Europeans feel much better about the security situation, an American commented, when there is a rational framework within which to debate arms control. They are confused by America's changing policy on strategic arms, and they lack confidence in overall U.S. strategy. Given the tremendous debate in the United States during the past five to seven years, that confusion and lack of confidence is probably justified.

Today there is a strong American consensus for national defense, including strategic modernization, but neither the Reagan administration nor anyone else has decided what weapon system should be selected.
Likewise, Americans and Europeans have moved into an uncertain position on arms control. On the one hand, the Reagan administration says and believes that the United States should not return to the SALT negotiations until this country has improved its strategic posture. On the other, because of strong and understandable feelings in Europe, the United States is about to enter into theater nuclear negotiations. Paradoxically, the United States is at a greater disadvantage in theater nuclear forces than in central systems, even given a worst case strategic scenario. Thus, the United States and its allies are entering into negotiations in which they have less leverage and refraining from entering into negotiations in which they would have more leverage. That strange paradox stems from the current relationship between the United States and Europe.

The allies, the American continued, should incorporate theater negotiations into strategic negotiations, or at least conduct them in parallel. Drawing a line between the two is impossible with today's weaponry. Furthermore, it is too narrow an approach politically. One can easily foresee the Soviets two or three years from now, as NATO prepares to deploy theater nuclear weapons (assuming an agreement to limit them has not been reached), threatening to pull out of the separate TNF negotiations if a single Pershing II or cruise missile is deployed. If, on the other hand, those negotiations were joined with larger negotiations on SALT, the Soviets would be much less likely to use that kind of leverage.

The United States must consider the strong feelings on arms control in Europe. Both the United States and Europe need to recognize, however, that they are being pushed into a posture for negotiating with the USSR that is not only difficult, but almost certain to fail. It creates the kind of leverage for the Soviets in theater nuclear force negotiations that the Americans have tried to avoid granting them in the strategic arena. The interaction of the United States and NATO Europe has yielded poor results during the past two years in this arms control case.

I agree with the discussant's assessment, another American said, with one key exception: It is not realistic. Objectively, it assesses
the situation logically, but it does not address the problem that we have been discussing here, i.e., the real relationship between European politics and the negotiating process.

That negotiating process should be important to Europeans and Americans alike, because it is part of the Soviet strategy for dealing with Western Europe. It provides the Soviets a stage from which to project their peace initiatives to the European public. Since there will be negotiations and Soviet posturing, there is a political need to meet the Soviets on those terms. As several have already said, the alliance must have an offensive position for dealing with the Soviets directly and exposing their arms control initiatives for what they are. But there are limits to this offensive position.

Western arms control proposals ought to have some real effect on military posture. The multiplication of vacuous proposals will simply lead to dangerous illusions in the United States and Europe. Unfortunately, a network of arms control negotiations already exists, some of which do not meet that standard of meaningfulness. At the same time, the repudiation of these proposals would have negative political consequences. The SALT negotiations could be made to meet the standard. Over the long run, one could conceivably design a negotiating posture that would materially affect the strategic situation. For example, the two sides might be able to address the vulnerability of land-based forces or the problem of preemption in the SALT context.

But what is going to happen to SALT now? Actually, the American continued, one could ask a series of questions about SALT's future. The first concerns the possibility that the United States or USSR will break out of the SALT II framework by deploying new weapons. The Soviets, although they are already straining at the SALT II limits, will probably choose not to do so, because they recognize the political effect of such an action on Western Europe. They are no doubt hoping that the United States will do them the favor of threatening the original framework before the two sides reach the next level of agreement.

The second question relates directly to SALT's future. New U.S. strategic weapons programs could substantially affect not only SALT,
but the whole concept of strategic arms control as it has been enunciated so far. Given the vulnerability of even the MX program to an increasing threat, the United States is probably going to have to consider such options as smaller mobile systems, involving thousands of missiles, to fulfill the land-based ICBM mission. The SALT process is not currently constructed to deal with that number of missiles, and an approach focusing on warheads would probably be needed. The United States may also choose the option of actively defending the land-based missile force with an ABM system. If so, the ABM treaty will have to be reopened, with unknown political and strategic consequences. Will the United States or Soviet Union be seen in Europe as the villain of that piece? What will happen to British, French, and Chinese strategic capabilities if the Soviets proliferate ABMs?

The third question, America's poor leverage in TNF negotiations, has already been raised. The most sensible way to remedy the situation would be to link long-range theater and strategic forces. In that way, the allies can try to apply against theater imbalances the leverage embodied in U.S. central systems. Such leverage will have to be created by robust central modernization programs. This remedy makes sense also from a doctrinal standpoint. Americans continually emphasize that their central systems are linked to Europe for deterrence. The logical consequence of the deterrent link is that central forces must be linked to European forces in arms control.

Finally, there is the question of arms control and the strategic situation in central Europe. The Soviets have significant advantage in conventional forces and a recently improved TNF posture, both of which contribute to instability on the European continent. The MBFR negotiations have tried unsuccessfully to address that instability. Participants in the process have decided that a new forum is needed to seek a regime that will both restrain Soviet military actions in a crisis and provide early warning of impending conflict. The regime, to be negotiated at the conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE), would be composed of confidence-building measures. Unfortunately, the regime under discussion, already limited in scope, will doubtless emerge
from a 35-nation negotiating process watered down even further. The regime will likely be incapable of detecting a full range of Soviet preparations for war, yet it will be advertised as bringing to NATO a new sense of security. Such a process does not meet the criterion of military meaningfulness.

A negotiating approach linking SALT and TNF has, in fact, long been a subject of discussion, a European stated, because of Soviet efforts to bring forward-based systems (FBS) into the SALT process. Incongruities arise when efforts are made to decide where weapon systems belong—-in TNF or SALT. Many, such as F-4 aircraft, British strategic weapons, and submarines based in Europe, can serve double purposes. Perhaps the allies should opt for a unified equation that would address TNF within the SALT context. Such a unified framework would do away once and for all with the idea that allied territory can be split and that either the United States or Western Europe can be a sanctuary preserved from attack. Furthermore, NATO needs an offensive, active concept of arms control. The Soviets have been swarming all over Western Europe, charging that the West does not want to negotiate, that the United States is dragging its feet, and that the preparations are just a facade. The allies must debate these allegations.

The European concluded with a word about the CDE proposal, which he described as an integrated arms control package and a great achievement. It has improved European self-confidence and cohesion. Moreover, if negotiations advance on the basis of this proposal, it will help to gain European parliamentary support for stronger defense programs. Vigorous arms control negotiations do not mean fewer defense efforts in Europe.

A second European agreed with the Americans who argued that SALT has perniciously affected both strategic debate and force posture in the West. He disagreed, however, with the conclusion that the allies should accept that argument as a reason for ending SALT, for the argument assumes that the allies could go back to the beginning and
develop new strategic concepts for arms control. The leisure for developing new strategic concepts, which existed prior to SALT, has gone, and the alliance cannot, in any event, pay the political price of reversing the SALT process. Thus, although the allies are faced with a dilemma, it is a political not strategic dilemma.

An American pointed out that an invasion of Poland would end SALT negotiations for many years to come. Furthermore, the indefinite continuation of political tension between Moscow and Warsaw would also interfere with negotiations. The future of arms control will be somewhat brighter if the Soviets do not invade—and also if they refrain from intimidation tactics. If they are willing to accept a de facto democratization of Poland, the possibilities for negotiations cannot even be imagined. In that case, the Soviet Union would obviously be a changed opponent.

Arguments over ICBM basing illustrate the difficulty of conducting the SALT negotiations. How can the United States design a credible and negotiable SALT strategy around any particular basing system when so many alternatives are being considered? As for suspending SALT, the Reagan administration does not propose to impose its will on the alliance. Any modification in the long-standing SALT process will require a lengthy political dialogue with the Europeans. That dialogue has already begun, and the allies have agreed on at least one point, i.e., that they must get rid of the territorial compartmentalization that has burdened both arms control and strategy. SALT and TNF are certainly two parts of a whole. The only reason that the Carter administration separated them was to keep the messy and fruitless TNF negotiations from impeding the healthy and promising SALT negotiations. Once the alliance agrees to such separations, where do they stop? Battlefield nuclear forces? Nonnuclear forces? Conceptually and strategically, the time has come for the alliance to integrate its deliberations.

Finally, the American returned to the fundamental question of whether political requirements justified the continuation of the arms control process. Soon Americans will be putting forward proposals that
the Soviets will not accept, and the Europeans will be asking us to modify the proposals. Before we know it, our arms control bureaucracy will again be negotiating with itself. It is not cold turkey withdrawal of arms control that will break the alliance. Rather it is the fact that NATO's principal member—the one with the greatest responsibility for alliance security—is obliged, because of the internal political requirements of the lesser members, to engage in a diplomacy that it regards as illusory.

A second American chided the conference participants for heaping too much responsibility on SALT: Some were suggesting that the alliance would rise or fall with SALT, while others were blaming it for the current state of NATO defenses. The deficiencies in U.S. foreign, defense, and economic policy actually result from far more fundamental causes. Vietnam and Watergate reduced the American executive to its weakest state in the 20th century. During the past 15 years, one president left office, choosing not to run again because of an unpopular war, his successor resigned under threat of impeachment, and the next two presidents were not reelected. The economy, defense establishment, and SALT have all suffered as a result of indecision and policy reversals during these many changes.

SALT is not a bad agreement, but a good agreement concluded three years too late. Had the treaty been signed and ratified in 1975, it would have contributed to resolving some difficulties in the U.S. defense establishment and increasing alliance security. A second treaty in the late 1970s, accompanied by a defense program designed to resolve the emerging problem of ICBM vulnerability, would have helped even more. We should be less worried about the future of SALT than we are about the state of the American executive. If it has overcome its weakness, then the United States may be prepared to resolve, through force planning and weapon programs, the weakness in its strategic arguments. If force planning decisions can be made to stick, then Americans can design a SALT proposal and negotiate an agreement that both contributes to alliance security and supports the force programs. SALT will remain a
victim, however, if no one in the United States today has the authority to make and enforce decisions.

A European said that not all Europeans were addicted to arms control regardless of outcome. Most Europeans take a more rational view, but still favor arms control. Geographic asymmetry shapes this attitude. Europeans, feeling themselves vulnerable, have concluded that, although Soviet and U.S. central systems are par, parity has limited meaning for Europe. In their view, the larger the Soviet arsenal becomes, the less credible the U.S. arsenal becomes in relation to Europe. The marginal utility of one more Soviet weapon, in other words, is greater than that of one more U.S. weapon. Europeans fear that, even in an era of parity, the Soviet Union is on the verge of achieving some sort of marginal advantage over Europe. This translates into European insistence on the value of arms control. Although Europeans are generally not complacent about what the process can accomplish, they feel that they have little choice. Somehow, the Soviet arms buildup must be capped. The only other rational approach, the Europeans say, is to use a NATO arms buildup as a threat to make the Soviets more tractable.

Because the Soviet Union is a revolutionary state, the European continued, proving genuine Soviet interest in arms control is no simple task. However, the allies should remember that talking around a table is better than making war. By not talking, the allies free the Soviets to do whatever they like—and perhaps they will. My final word will be on the merits of arms control as I see them. Most important, SALT has produced an agreed data base that will lead to better understanding. Negotiations with the Soviets achieved a major breakthrough in enabling each side to know routinely what the other is talking about. SALT has also produced the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), a forum in which the United States can discuss issues with the USSR in a business-like fashion. Mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) has contributed to maintaining European defense efforts that otherwise would have been reduced. It has also helped to explain to European publics the difficulty of negotiating with the Soviets. After seven years of talks,
the Soviets still refuse to provide the basic data to begin the negotiations in earnest. That fact makes it easier to explain to Europeans that the Soviets are not cooperative.

According to a second European, Europeans perceive the existence of an arms control process--TNF--which the Americans are not at liberty to quit and which they, the Europeans, want to join. Europeans believe that it is not they who should be cured of an addiction to arms control, but rather the Americans, who should be cured of their addiction to SALT. If the SALT process is dragging, then the alliance should continue with lesser negotiations. Arms control existed before SALT, and Europeans want to maintain a framework of some type of arms control, even without SALT.

Negotiations to control chemical weapons, for example, may be an easy place to begin. Controversy over the deployment of binary weapons would be strong in Europe, given its history, but public opinion would be quieted by an early investment of political capital in negotiations. CDE is another possibility, although one must be skeptical about the value of a 35-nation disarmament forum. But by pursuing negotiations on confidence-building measures in CDE, the allies will be acquiring means to increase warning time prior to attack. They will also be acquiring a means to restrict Soviet use of military force in political crises, in Poland and elsewhere. If the Soviets are faced with a request to inspect every time they move troops near the Polish border, their urge to take military action may be constrained.

An American stated that he would like to stimulate Europeans to raise issues about integrating theater and strategic doctrine. We spoke yesterday not about acquiring perfect balance at every level in the theater, but about filling gaps in capabilities. Yet allied TNF arms control discussions continue to focus on acquiring balance in LRNF. If the allies pursue that path, they will be forced by the relentless logic of arms control to acquire 2000 to 3000 long-range theater warheads to balance Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces. But how will
the allies buy so many warheads, and where will they put them in Europe? These difficult problems are reasons for getting out of an arms control logic that forces, in a sense, a separate European strategic balance. Instead, the allies should be seeking ways to integrate long-range theater with strategic doctrine and force structures.

The outcome of the Polish crisis will indeed have a decisive effect on the course of East-West relations, a European said. The West has at its disposal a number of political measures that will help to control that outcome: It can (1) insist that all signatories of the CSCE final act abide by its nonintervention clause; (2) if Poland wishes, extend financial and economic aid; and (3) maintain an international political framework within which the Poles can manage the crisis themselves.

A Soviet invasion of Poland might help the alliance to sort out its problems, a second European noted, but in the long run it might produce the reverse effect. If there is no framework within which the allies can reach consensus on a response to the invasion, they may become more, rather than less, divided. The allies must agree to be consistent—they must not suspend arms control negotiations while continuing to sell grain—and they must decide on their objectives in responding to an invasion.

René Herrmann closed the session, saying that SALT must go forward, if only for alliance reasons. Several participants mentioned the need for a global approach to arms control. Joining SALT to TNF makes good sense in terms of reformulating American strategic policy, and perhaps even strategic thoughts in NATO Europe. The SALT/arms control debate looks different from European and American perspectives. According to the European view, bridging gaps in perception is an important purpose of the arms control process. Also in their view, negotiations should be an extended diplomatic effort, rather than a day-to-day affair. Hence, they are interested in CDE, confidence-building measures, and other forms of communication through negotiation. They accept the fact that
NATO faces basic doctrinal questions, but feel that common alliance negotiating positions can still be shaped. Europeans do not accept whether or not to negotiate as the most important issue. They are more concerned about the change in outlook that has occurred in the United States, and the resulting new American approach to strategic concepts.
SESSION V. DEFENSE BUDGETS: DETERMINING THE BURDENS

An American official summarized the unclassified version of the Report on Allied Commitments to Defense Spending, which the U.S. Department of Defense sent to the Congress in March 1981.

SUMMARY OF THE DOD REPORT ON ALLIED DEFENSE BUDGETS

The issue of defense burden-sharing should be examined and discussed with the following purposes in mind:

- To determine whether the burden of defense spending is being shared equally by the members of the alliance. NATO provides military benefits that are shared equally by all of its members; therefore, the burden of defense spending should also be shared equally, with the caveat that the distribution of the burden should be consistent with each member's ability to pay.

- To determine what further resources each member can contribute to increasing NATO's overall military effort to meet its defense needs.

- To educate the publics and legislatures of the member nations so as to obtain their support in strengthening NATO. The allies, especially the United States, must publicize the contribution of each member nation to the common defense. Many Americans, for example, do not know what the European countries are doing to help meet NATO's needs.

The commonly used measure of burden-sharing is the percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to defense. This indicator, like other economic and budgetary indicators, has the major shortcoming of failing to consider the heavy socialization of the European (and Japanese) economies, the uneven effect of inflation, and currency fluctuations. It also fails to take into account the ability of a country
to pay—a prime concern when the objective is the equitable distribution of the burden. Furthermore, being an input measure, this indicator neglects efficiencies. Since the allies can always throw more money at the defense problem without solving it, they should not rely solely on an input measure. Nevertheless, the GDP measure represents one of the few common ways to portray overall aggregate performance.

The ranking of ten NATO countries and Japan in terms of both the percentage of the GDP spent on defense and the per capita GDP in 1979, shown in Table 1, suggests some broad conclusions: For example, the United States and Great Britain, and to a lesser extent, France and Italy, are being somewhat exploited. One may conclude also that Denmark, West Germany, and Belgium are doing less than they are able to do and that Canada and Japan are undercontributing in terms of both their ability to pay (measured by per capita GDP) and the actual fraction of the GDP going into defense.

Table 1

BASIC BURDEN-SHARING DATA
(1979 programs in 1979 prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of GDP on Defense</th>
<th>Per Capita GDP ($U.S.)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>10,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>12,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The methodology used here to calculate ability to pay is based on two assumptions. First, defense spending should be directly proportional to some measure of relative affluence. Second, U.S. performance may be
taken as a standard. Thus, if the per capita GDP of a country—say, Belgium—is higher than that of the United States, the fraction of that country's GDP going to defense should be greater than the U.S. fraction.

One method of calculating what the Belgian defense allocation should be relative to that of the United States is to multiply the ratio of Belgian to U.S. per capita GDP by the percentage of the U.S. GDP allocated to defense; thus, based on Table 1,

\[ \frac{11,300}{10,700} \times 5.2 = 5.5 \]

Belgium should, then, according to this measure, be spending 5.5 percent of its GDP on defense. With that number as a goal, dividing the percentage of actual Belgian spending in 1979 by the percentage that it should be spending will yield the Belgian spending level relative to that of the United States, that is, the Belgian performance normalized to the U.S. level:

\[ \frac{3.2}{5.5} = .58 \]

Actually, four GDP input methods—with several variations—have been used to compare defense burdens. The first, most prevalent method divides the fraction of a country's GDP going to defense by the U.S. fraction. The second is illustrated above; a variation squares per capita GDP to account for the general proposition that rich nations should spend proportionally more for defense than poorer nations. The third method, by taking into account the national security value of fulfilling basic domestic needs for food, clothing, and shelter, thus arbitrarily excludes either $2000 or $4000 from per capita GDP. The fourth method, based on a progressive taxation theory, would have each country pay for defense according to a progressive schedule—1 percent of the first $1000 of per capita GDP, 2 percent of the second, and so on up to 10 percent of $10,000.

Table 2 compares national defense burdens calculated according to these methods. All four methods yield similar calculations for countries,
Table 2
COMPARISON OF DEFENSE BURDENS CALCULATED BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS
(Allied performance normalized to U.S. level; 1979 data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Method 1</th>
<th>Method 2</th>
<th>Method 3</th>
<th>Method 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% GDP</td>
<td>Var. A</td>
<td>Var. B</td>
<td>$2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

such as France and the Netherlands, whose per capita GDPs approximate that of the United States. The calculations for Italy and Britain, on the other hand, vary considerably, because these countries have low GDPs; furthermore, Britain allocates a large share of its GDP to defense. In general, by any of these methods, the heavily industrialized NATO allies of central and northern Europe and Canada do not compare well with the United States in terms of contributions to defense.

Manpower, another factor to be considered in calculating the defense burden of each country, presents a particularly difficult costing problem. The European members of NATO pay their manpower considerably less than the United States does, because they generally rely on conscription. To get a more accurate picture of defense spending, manpower should perhaps be removed from each budget and weighed separately. Alternatively, European manpower might be costed at U.S. rates, a method that would raise most of the contribution amounts. Dutch conscripts, however, are paid more than American volunteers.

Other factors that might be considered include military land use, military infrastructure, mobilized manpower (including host-nation...
support and reserve replacements), and economic aid. In some countries, for example, the opportunity costs of using land for military installations rather than economic purposes—such as manufacturing plants—are high. In addition, the costs of European host-nation support, expressed in U.S. manpower equivalents and cost avoidance by the United States, might also be calculated. The European allies could be given credit for special military infrastructure costs, such as those incurred by overbuilding roads, bridges, and airfields to accommodate military traffic. Finally, economic aid could be costed as an item closely related to the security, as well as to the political and economic, interests of the alliance. However, percentage rates of increase in defense spending, used sometimes as an indicator to back up arguments about burden-sharing, is, in many respects, a false measure, primarily because it ignores the base from which each country starts.

Because input measures viewed in isolation may reveal apparent burden-sharing inequities, the allies should perhaps focus more on outputs, e.g., force levels, divisions, tactical aircraft, ships, modernization rates, and composite items, such as ground forces firepower. People have difficulty, however, accepting output measures. Until recently, for example, the British military establishment would have resisted a measure that forced them to concentrate more on the British Army of the Rhine and less on the Royal Navy. Furthermore, output measures may be overemphasized at the expense of less visible items. For example, if congressmen are measuring weapon system production, at budget time they may lose sight of the fact that support systems are also needed. The professional military establishment must argue for both.

When the U.S. contribution is compared with the contributions of the other NATO countries, as shown in Table 3, the United States is probably not far from where it ought to be. Considering both ability to contribute and output measures, the United States may even be a little ahead of where it ought to be in terms of defense spending share and active defense manpower share. To a lesser extent, the same is true in terms of tactical aircraft and naval combatants, although the European allies are ahead in overall ground forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to Contribute Based On</th>
<th>Contribution, Based On</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>Defense Spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Active Defense Manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TacAir Combat Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S. NATO</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-U.S. NATO and Japan</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NATO</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NATO and Japan</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Army division equivalents.

<sup>b</sup>Less than 0.05%.  

Table 3

SELECTED INDICATORS OF ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE AND CONTRIBUTION (In Percentages)
These general conclusions about the United States and its NATO allies also hold true if Japan is included in the calculations. However, the calculations also conceal major differences between the countries. The current analysis emphasizes simply that some allies are doing better than others.

**DISCUSSION**

Detente, a European said, has not really had such ill effects on European defense efforts. Even though alliance members signed the Helsinki accords in 1975, France, Britain, West Germany, and even Belgium have increased their defense spending in real terms during the past ten years. By any standard, of course, some allies have not done well. Canada can be singled out as a poor contributor. The others, however, are making an effort that is far from insignificant.

The question of burden-sharing is obviously complex. The Carter administration concentrated too much on monitoring burden-sharing measures. It reminded one of burden-sharing at the time of the Mansfield amendment, which called on the Europeans to pay the United States for maintaining its military presence in Europe. The real question is not about money, but about each ally's ability to share the risk and pull its load. Thus, the supplementary measures that were suggested—reserve cadres, land use, host-nation supports—are important, if difficult to quantify. For example, if a country has maintained its forces in readiness for 30 years, that readiness indicates not only a monetary contribution, but also a willingness to be in the front lines.

Much symbolism has been attached to the 3 percent formula for defense spending. It was the cause of serious frustration in the Carter administration, because the European allies had subscribed to a commitment that some of them were not able to fulfill. Now they have reaffirmed their commitment, somewhat surprisingly. Although 3 percent is an easy indicator and one that reflects more spending in real terms, it is not adequate to measure operational readiness and other factors that show the actual contribution of each NATO country to the overall defense effort.
Burden-sharing as seen from the United States is one thing, but from Europe it is another. Each European country is concerned about whether it is doing enough. However, contributions vary considerably from one country to another, depending on size, background, history, and attitude. The American public forgets that Europe is not a homogeneous entity. The countries range from underdeveloped to highly developed, from large to small. The larger countries, wanting to project a powerful image "over the horizon," may see fit to spend more on defense. A smaller country may be much less willing to take global responsibilities upon itself. The United States is a superpower and is willing to bear the cost of being a superpower. A small European country is not a superpower and could not be one even if it wanted to. Therefore, if a European country does half of what the United States does, on an individual basis that is not a bad contribution.

European countries are finding it difficult to divert resources from social programs to defense. Since they are hard put to spend more on the military side, they should concentrate on doing what they can more efficiently. The Carter administration, to aid in that process, recommended specialization, rationalization, and standardization. The allies should be wary, however, of carrying any of these too far. For example, a Dutch decision to specialize in conventional forces while doing away with nuclear missions might be contagious. A number of countries would simply drop the missions that were not palatable to their citizens. Solidarity is an essential component of NATO's defense posture, and each member should contribute, according to its ability, to a broad spectrum of alliance activities.

The only way that European countries will be brought to spend more is within the framework of a European grand design. Such a design would not emphasize European defense to the detriment of NATO defense, but it would lead to a better understanding of what Europe, as an entity, wants to do. European unity is presently lagging, and without a grand design Europeans will find it difficult to build a rationale for sharing with the United States more responsibility both inside and outside Europe.

Three considerations, a second European said, will shape the way that Europe responds to new demands for defense spending increases.
First, Europeans are watching closely to see how effective the increased U.S. defense spending is. There is a lot of skepticism about America's capacity to sustain the projected levels of defense hardware investment. Furthermore, many Europeans perceive the United States merely to be throwing money at NATO's problems. A U.S. decision to resume the draft will indicate to the Europeans that the United States means business. Second, Europeans are intent on remedying the U.S. perception that their burden-sharing performance has somehow been lacking. They are convinced that for ten years they have been performing adequately and want to explain this. Finally, Europeans are interested in what the Soviet Union can afford. Having perceived the inefficiency of the Soviet economy, they believe that perhaps NATO will, in the long run, outspend the Soviet Union.

An American explained the point of view of the U.S. Congress on the burden-sharing issue. Congressmen have seen many changes in the past few years. The Soviet military buildup has given the USSR nuclear parity, increased military capability in Europe, and greater power projection potential. The flow of oil to Europe and the United States has become more vulnerable, whether to direct Soviet military intervention or to instability in the Middle East itself. Finally, American allies in Europe and Japan are doing much better economically than they used to.

Given these changes, the Japanese and European allies must not allow the U.S. Congress and public to believe that they are going it alone. America and its allies need to develop some form of coherent strategy, for if burden-sharing is not the right symbol, they need some other set of symbols. Burden-sharing happens to be the current focus because congressmen say that they cannot cut social programs to build up defense while everyone else in the world is conducting business as usual.

The basic problem, an American said, is that NATO is short of forces and of structure to support those forces. The alliance lacks enough operational reserves to carry out its forward defense concept. An action plan for creating those reserves would be preferable to the present focus
on burden-sharing. Europeans have reserve manpower that should be formed into reserve combat brigades. The United States army will have to be expanded, because it is not now large enough both to face a crisis in southwest Asia and to reinforce central Europe. Those who argue about whether the U.S. all-volunteer force is working or not are missing the point; they should be focusing on maintaining the current level of U.S. active military manpower. The United States force structure needs exceed the roughly 2.1 million men in the U.S. armed forces. Once those needs hit 2.3 or 2.4 million, the all-volunteer force will simply be inadequate. As the Europeans have said a number of times, the United States will have to return to conscription. For Europeans and Americans to share the societal cost of conscription and raise new units would constitute a simple action plan for burden-sharing.

Americans have repeatedly pointed out, according to a European, that at many levels NATO outspends and outmans the Warsaw Pact. If that is the case at least to some degree, then the allies should think again about what they are doing wrong, either in computing the difference or in rectifying the structural problems. Certain structural problems, such as shortages in European active divisions, cannot be rectified. At the present level of service time, the manpower pool in West European countries is exhausted. West Germany, for example, with the present 15 months of service time, could not raise four additional brigades.

The American official who had opened the discussion with a summary of the DoD report on allied defense spending predicted that the burden-sharing argument would unravel the alliance in the near future unless something were done about it. The United States will tend to move in an isolationist direction, perhaps concentrating on developing naval forces to use outside NATO, while allowing support for traditional theaters--northeast Asia and Europe--to slow or decline. That danger is one that the Japanese and Europeans should be eager to avoid.
SESSION VI. THE MANAGEMENT OF INTRA-NATO RELATIONS

SUMMARY OF THE PAPER BY SIMON LUNN

Europeans and Americans hold very different views of security, and especially of the scale and nature of the threat. Americans believe that the credibility of NATO's shield has diminished, but Europeans do not necessarily agree. The NATO doctrine of flexible response is a theory of deliberate insufficiency. Escalation and linkage demand a deliberate insufficiency of forces in some respects. The alliance never set out to match the Warsaw Pact. The allies currently must decide what degree of insufficiency they are willing to live with.

At the moment, Europeans tolerate a greater degree of insufficiency than Americans do. This difference translates directly into the issue of resource allocations, and what the Europeans are prepared to spend on defense becomes the crux of the problem. Americans and Europeans also differ, as has been evident throughout the workshop, over the appropriate policy toward the Soviet threat and threats outside the NATO area. Differences over the latter have been effectively papered over by the division-of-labor concept, a typical NATO formula for concealing conflict within the alliance.

The allies have, of course, always differed, and one wonders whether the present rift is not being overdramatized. In my view, the situation is more serious now than it has been in the past. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, continued Soviet militarization programs, and the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf area make the issues seem more dramatic. More important, the political climate has changed on both sides of the Atlantic. The current mood in the United States of overwhelming support for defense spending and confrontation of the Soviet Union has no counterpart in Europe. In fact, Europeans believe the reverse.

The rise of antinuclear sentiment in Europe represents opposition neither to NATO nor to defense. It concerns, rather, the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance. Many groups that now actively oppose

---

The complete text of Dr. Lunn's paper appears on pp. 144-161.
nuclear weapons include people who would support their country's continued membership in NATO and even significant levels of defense spending. Opposition to NATO and defense is generally found only on the fringes, although the British Labour Party's strong anti-NATO stand may be seen as a significant exception. Anti-NATO and anti-American sentiment arises when these groups see NATO and the United States as responsible for unacceptable policies.

In taking up nuclear issues, antinuclear groups have also become increasingly interested in defense in general. Heretofore, defense has not been widely discussed in most European countries. Parliaments, for example, have had little influence on either the formulation or discussion of defense policy. The little discussion that took place usually concerned decisions that had already been made. Now, however, especially in the smaller NATO countries, antinuclear movements have awakened interest in what the government is doing about defense. Small countries governed by coalitions are particularly vulnerable to public opinion. The public and parliament of such a country, under the influence of strong antinuclear opposition, may restrict the ability of the government to deal with defense as it has in the past.

Such is not the case in the United States. The role of the Congress in defense policy has always exceeded that of any European legislature. The Congress's interest in what the allies are doing about NATO has recently increased. In some ways, it is more hawkish than the Reagan administration on burden-sharing, and it may be able to force the administration's hand on certain sensitive issues.

NATO was built on a spirit of compromise. It has worked because countries have been able to adjust and adapt their positions. They have always had a margin of maneuver so that mutually acceptable compromises could be reached. Now, however, the margin of maneuver has narrowed, and some governments will be prevented from taking the pragmatic steps needed for compromise. Thus, NATO may face a situation in which some countries opt out of sensitive decisions and thus become less than full members of the alliance. Such sensitive decisions may involve not only LRNF, but also chemical weapons, the enhanced radiation warhead (neutron bomb), and defense spending.
NATO itself will probably be unable to provide the means to resolve security issues. The alliance has served as an excellent mechanism for coordinating, consulting, and communicating information on broad issues, such as East-West trade. It has been less useful, however, in terms of actually getting things done. Even in the past, security issues have often been handled bilaterally.

The establishment of the High Level Group was a genuine effort to involve the European allies in the formulation of nuclear policy from the beginning. The older Nuclear Planning Group had allowed participation, but not on basic requirement and deployment decisions. The High Level Group, representing a new and innovative idea, emerged with the realization that LRTNF was a sensitive issue. The allies decided that, on an issue of such sensitivity, European leaders should be involved directly, rather than through the standard NATO bureaucracy. Although the High Level Group ensured the preparation of member-government officials, the December 1979 LRTNF decision has nevertheless run into trouble in Europe, because the member governments failed to prepare their publics. Some of the smaller European countries deliberately kept the LRTNF issue out of the public arena until the very last minute. This inaction was fatal; unable to overcome public, party, and legislative opposition, some governments were forced in the end to back away from the decision.

The presentation of the nuclear issue to the public is an important problem that European governments must face in the next few years. In that regard, one has the feeling that the Reagan administration harbors certain reservations concerning the responsibilities that were surrendered to the Europeans when the High Level Group was formed. Including the Europeans in nuclear decisionmaking has resulted in the linkage of security issues and arms control, a linkage that many believe to be a mistake. The Reagan administration may now revert to the position that the United States should make the hard decisions and then consult with the allies on implementation, but not allow them to participate from the beginning. Such a reaction would have important implications for NATO's handling of the nuclear issue over the next two to three years.
European publics are building up tremendous expectations about what arms control can accomplish, but they have not yet realized that arms control and increased defense efforts actually go hand in hand. Arms control does not obviate the need for deployment, a fact that will disillusion European publics when they understand it. Americans also have to realize that LRTNF cannot be expected to go very far outside a strategic arms limitation context.

What will happen if a country, such as the Netherlands, decides to refuse LRTNF deployments? Few believe that any Dutch government could decide to deploy today. In that event, the Netherlands would join the ranks of Denmark and Norway, which have had a "no-nuclear" policy inherent in their NATO membership almost from the beginning. The Netherlands, however, would be different, for it would actually be abandoning the nuclear role. The allies should consider the potential implications of such decisions, particularly in regard to a country's membership in the alliance.

On the issue of burden-sharing, each NATO country has traditionally used a different set of criteria to justify how much it should contribute to the alliance. The 3 percent decision in a sense provided a standard measure for comparing national defense contributions, thereby opening up lagging countries to criticism and pressure.

Despite the Reagan administration's indication that it will move away from the 3 percent increase, the issue has begun to surface again. The most ominous sign is the fact that Congress has discovered the 3 percent commitment. Congressmen are not really interested in the complexities of burden-sharing. To them, European countries should be contributing visible, symbolic things, such as ships in the Indian Ocean. Europeans, on the other hand, believe that sensible, quiet things—with no visibility—are more effective contributions to alliance security. For that reason, Europeans' credibility with Congress on the burden-sharing issue is rather low. In general, Americans think of 3 percent as the minimum that should be contributed; Europeans think of it as a ceiling to be attained if possible.

Western Europe and the United States might make several trade-offs to bring their viewpoints closer together. For example, if Europeans
were willing to accept the need to donate more resources and to commit
themselves somehow in the Persian Gulf, Americans should be prepared
to give way to European sentiments on SALT and to begin a new round of
talks. Europeans should realize, however, that if they want to partic-
ipate in NATO decisionmaking, they must be prepared to compromise on
the issues. The United States has already made some important compro-
mises, including agreeing to the conference on disarmament in Europe;
the U.S. concessions should encourage the European countries to move
more readily in America's direction.

Although European leaders no longer have the freedom to maneuver
that they once had, they should think seriously and independently about
what they ought to be doing within the structure of the alliance. Euro-
pean publics will be convinced of security requirements only if their
leaders are convinced and able to communicate their convictions. In the
past, leaders have been unwilling to think issues through on their own.
Now, however, U.S. pressure is no longer enough to ensure that decisions
made in Washington will be implemented in Europe in the face of adverse
public opinion.

SESSION CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

To me--the session chairman, a U.S. official, said before present-
ing the discussant--the most important thesis of Dr. Lunn's paper is
that the NATO allies are less capable than ever of coping with divergent
views in their efforts to develop and pursue common policies. The al-
lies diverge at two levels. In the first place, the Americans and Euro-
peans view the threat in different terms. Second, and perhaps more
fundamental, the allies on the two sides of the Atlantic are politically
out of phase. The second divergence hinders the allies in overcoming
the first.

The differences in outlook of the allies raises several questions.
Are the allies experiencing an uncommon degree of societal and political
divergence? If so, what can be done about it? Are the allies experi-
cencing an uncommon degree of divergence with regard to the meaning of
the threat? Do the current European attitudes originate in fears about
nuclear war, or do they originate in different experiences with regard
to detente? Can stronger and more reliable U.S. leadership and reinvigorated U.S. power overcome these differences? Finally, what are the consequences of the sharp disappointment in the United States over European failure to increase defense efforts? The United States probably will not isolate itself, but it may become less ready to allow allied views to affect the way it behaves in the world.

DISCUSSANT'S COMMENTS

Three factors—economic recovery, Soviet actions, and consistent U.S. leadership—may affect the differences between Europe and the United States, the discussant, an American official, said. In particular, Europeans have been quite rightfully bemused by the last 17 years of American history. They have been unhappy with the international implications of American disarray during a period of particular turbulence in the world. If the Reagan administration is able to show consistency and coherence over time, the Europeans may be more willing to cooperate in the alliance.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused European and American attitudes to clash for two reasons. First, the challenge was new and the event itself open to different interpretations—for example, that the invasion was only defensive in nature, or that the United States caused it by not ratifying SALT. Second, consultation between the United States and its allies was inadequate at a time when their interests were far apart, given greater European investments in detente. Europeans were basically concerned that the immediate American response to Afghanistan was too military in character.

Since then, European and American views on Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region have drawn noticeably closer together. Even the Reagan administration recognizes that the Palestinian problem is important and that the failure to make progress on it will cause serious problems. Europeans, in turn, are ready to admit that the Soviets present a threat, as long as the answer to that threat is not single-mindedly military.

In other words, positions are evolving as usual in the alliance. The allies, confronted with a new problem, have been arguing back and
forth across the Atlantic and are finally approaching a consensus acceptable to most of the partners. They have been discussing Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf area for a relatively short time, however, and they should not expect too much too soon. The gap is narrower than it was a year ago, thanks simply to the traditional NATO process of consensus-building.

DISCUSSION

A European pointed out that because the second track of the LRTNF decision has lost SALT, one of its important facets, finding a means to get theater systems deployed has become a significant issue for intra-NATO relations. Basically, the problem involves finding a way to make believe that the SALT process is continuing, even if it is no longer part of the West's arms control framework. Defense is not only hardware; it is also policy. The allies, therefore, must invent another political framework to substitute for the discredited codewords arms control and détente.

One can imagine several outcomes for the intra-NATO controversy. The first possibility is that the Soviets will solve the problem by misbehaving either in Poland or the Middle East, although it is unlikely that they will be so stupid as to oblige the alliance in Poland. The second option is a two-tiered alliance, i.e., a group of strong, defense-oriented states linked to states less committed to defense. This arrangement would damage the alliance and would be possible only on a temporary basis. The third option would involve the equalization of demands. The Americans would for a time lower their demands, which the Europeans consider a hardware binge. The Europeans, on their part, would manage to squeeze a little more juice from the already squeezed lemon to provide some of the defense outlays for NATO that have already been promised. Of the three possibilities, the third is the most probable, and it would lead to more manageable relations.

A second European agreed with Lunn's assessment of the divergent views of the United States and its European allies. The disagreements
between the two sides of the Atlantic are mostly in the realm of perception and mood. For example, American emphasis on the doubling and tripling of West European trade with the East has created the perception in the United States that Europeans really do not share. Europeans feel that it is more important to focus on order of magnitude than on absolute increase. After all, West Germany's trade with the Soviet Union represents only 2.1 to 2.2 percent of its total export trade. Europeans should stand up to the generalization that Western Europe's trade with the East gives strong evidence of divergence in the views of the United States and its NATO allies. That argument is creating the wrong impression among Americans. Europeans should try to correct the view by placing it in its proper perspective.

People in Western Europe are also growing impatient over the perception that their governments' efforts to increase defense spending are not being taken into account in the United States, or are even being presented inaccurately.

Europeans have generally agreed that strong armed forces provide a deterrent, which in turn prevents war. The argument that the allies are pursuing a war-prevention policy, however, has almost disappeared from public discussion. Commentators focus on new nuclear programs, rather than on their deterrent qualities. The allies would not weaken their defense efforts by giving more weight to the war-prevention argument.

Rightly or wrongly, the impression has gained ground in Europe that the United States is preparing a nuclear war-fighting capability. Americans too have not placed enough emphasis on the war-preventing nature of their present actions. Furthermore, as long as the East-West dialogue continued, the European public was reassured that, although nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe, the superpowers were at least talking.

The psychological reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has also influenced the mood on the two sides of the Atlantic. Americans felt deceived by the invasion. Western Europeans, on the other hand, deplored the invasion, but recognized all along that the Soviets were capable of such actions. The European attitude toward detente, in short, was more realistic than the American.
The vast majority in Europe would probably reject the idea of neutrality as far-fetched. Many Europeans, and especially West Germans, are staunchly anticomunist and fear the USSR. They would not want to be neutralists separated from the NATO defense effort.

It is true that the alliance has a perception problem, a third European said. Some people in the United States have taken strong ideological positions, so for the first time, Europeans appear to be the pragmatists and Americans the ideologues. As pragmatists, Europeans insist on the strong coupling of armament and disarmament and on the eventual achievement of alliance consensus on Afghanistan. The allies can reconcile their views as long as the United States remains their leader and they remain committed to alliance-wide compromise, such as the dual-track approach.

Even if worse comes to worst and the allies are unable to reconcile their views, the United States would probably not return to isolationism. As a superpower, it could not isolate itself. On the other hand, it might deal increasingly unilaterally with friends and foes alike. I use this argument to scare people back home. Europeans must decide whether they want the United States to defend Europe in cooperation with Europe, or irrespective of Europe's wishes. Do they want to be objects or participants in their own defense? To be a full participant, each nation in the alliance ought to pull its full load.

The session chairman noted that one could distill from the discussion a prescription for improving intra-NATO relations. First, to give both the Americans and Europeans more room to maneuver, issues should be presented less unequivocally. At the same time, the allies should work on raising Europe's consciousness. Second, the allies are now muddling fairly successfully toward developing a policy for Afghanistan and southwest Asia. That muddling through may prove to be a model for handling other issues, although issues like LRTNF are already very abrasive. Third, the allies should benefit from Soviet good behavior or misbehavior, taking credit for the first and using the second to
form public perceptions. Fourth, U.S. leadership and foreign policy successes should breed confidence in the United States as a country that knows what it wants to do and can do it. Finally, the sense of sides should be strengthened in Europe. Europeans tend to think in terms of superpower confrontation, with Europe in the middle. That attitude does not help Europeans to develop a sense of what side they are on. A sense of sides is crucial if the allies are to cope.

Dr. Lunn closed the session by noting that NATO officials, if left to their own devices, could resolve all of NATO's problems. Popular pressures, however, would not allow alliance policymaking to proceed as usual, and popular participation in government decisions is increasing. Whereas American society is unprepared to accept the idea that the alliance is vulnerable, European society is accustomed to vulnerability. European publics, therefore, search eagerly for mechanisms with which to address that vulnerability. At the same time, faltering European economies bring unemployment, and unemployment makes people ready to march, whatever the issue. This purely social dimension of intra-alliance relations should not be ignored.
PART TWO. THE DISCUSSION PAPERS

NATO AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

William G. Hyland

Not since the death of Stalin has the future of East-West relations seemed more uncertain. The new American administration insists that it is adopting a new strategy toward the USSR, though it has yet to flesh out a clear policy. The Soviet Union, in a presuccession period, faces growing internal problems and an unprecedented challenge in its Eastern European empire. Yet, the USSR remains a formidable and dangerous military power, and the Western alliance cannot agree on how to deal with it. Despite the amelioration of Atlantic relations, some fundamental policy differences have yet to be resolved. Indeed, the differences may have been aggravated by such recent events as the election of a new French government and the weakening of the governing coalition in West Germany.

If the alliance is to develop a broad and effective strategy, it must address four major issues:

- How to cope with the Soviet strategy of "selective detente," in which Europe seems to benefit from a relaxation of tensions in its dealings with the USSR while American-Soviet relations deteriorate.
- How to reply to the growing military threat to Western Europe in both conventional and nuclear forces.
- How to allocate the burden of the extra-European crisis, namely, that in the Persian Gulf.
- How to deal with the implications for the alliance of the Polish crisis.

SELECTIVE DETENTE

For Europe and the Soviet Union, detente was ushered in by the German treaty of 1970, which reflected the changes in the German
attitude toward the USSR and East Germany and, above all, the willingness to accept the existence of two German states.

The initiatives of Chancellor Brandt were decisive, but three other factors contributed to the evolution of what amounted to a general European peace settlement: The first was the growing Soviet apprehension over China, an apprehension greatly intensified by the border clashes of 1969 and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971. The second was the impact on Moscow of the threat of further post-Czechoslovak troubles in Eastern Europe as manifested in the Polish riots of December 1970 and the consequent removal of Gomulka. These internal Polish tensions erupted despite Gomulka's successful negotiations of a treaty with West Germany. The third factor, of course, was the detente with the United States, which was formally inaugurated at the May 1972 summit and which was made possible by the Berlin agreement of September 1971. And the Berlin agreement in turn opened the door to the broader European conference at Helsinki that was intended to crown Brezhnev's "peace program" announced at the 25th Party Congress in March 1971.

At the Helsinki conference in July 1975, Brezhnev achieved what had been denied to Stalin and Khrushchev: a pan-European acceptance of the territorial status quo in Europe. This achievement was possible in part because the West had long since given up the idea of territorial revision. On the other hand, Western—rather than Soviet—influence predominated at Helsinki. Whatever the military balance, the psychological balance favored the West, and this advantage has continued to be evident in the defensive Soviet performance at the subsequent meetings.

The new climate, nevertheless, held out certain advantages for Moscow. First and foremost, it provided opportunities to draw Western Europe toward the Soviet economic sphere as a hedge against the deterioration of relations either outside Europe or between the superpowers. Trade, credits, and the whole web of economic interrelationships between East and West had long been thought by many observers, especially in Europe, to be a major Western instrument for influencing the course of internal Soviet-Eastern European developments, as well as Soviet foreign policy. Trade was considered to be an opening wedge in promoting a relaxation of tensions. In the United States, however, this view clashed
with the goals of the faction that insisted on using trade concessions to achieve such political concession from Moscow as free emigration. Soviet overtures for a new economic relationship found fertile soil in Europe, however, and a policy gap was thereby opened between the United States and its NATO allies.

With its five-year plan of 1971-1976, Moscow began to build into its economic expectations a higher level of trade with the West, including increased imports of high technology—to be financed largely on Western credits. Soviet desires in this regard were never concealed; in fact, one of the leading edges in the Soviet peace offensive of the 1970s was the economic offer.

The Soviets have succeeded. In 1973, communist trade with European NATO countries totaled about $19 billion; by 1976, it had grown to over $32 billion and by 1979, to over $50 billion. European exports to Warsaw Pact countries more than doubled from $10 billion in 1973 to over $25 billion in 1979. The USSR was the dominant partner, of course. Interestingly, Soviet trade with West Germany exceeded internal East-West German trade in 1973, when the Federal Republic's exports to the Soviet Union surpassed its exports to the GDR, and this ranking has continued. Soviet exports, of course, came to include considerable energy resources—natural gas and some oil. During 1980—the period of the U.S. grain embargo—European trade increased in any case. West German exports increased 20 percent.

The expansion of trade has been financed from Western resources, since the USSR has historically had a chronic shortage of hard currency. In effect, the Soviets have been able to borrow heavily: In 1971, the Soviet hard currency debt to the West was only about $1.8 billion; by 1979, it had grown to over $17 billion, the greatest leap taking place in 1974-1975, i.e., coinciding with the energy crisis and Helsinki conference. The statistics for the Eastern bloc as a whole are even more dramatic: Hard currency indebtedness grew from $8.5 billion in 1971 to over $77 billion in 1979. It is also important to note that this debt is not all from governmental sources, but includes a large share from commercial lending in the private sectors, thus drawing in
a particularly important segment of the political elite in Western countries.

Trade and credit thus provide the material underpinning for the political relationship that has come to be known as "divisible" detente. The Soviet tactic has been to differentiate between principal Western European countries and the United States. The Soviets have correctly calculated that the internal political dynamics of Western Europe--especially the existence of communist parties and strong left-wing factions of noncommunist coalitions--meant that the governing parties would have to be more sensitive to the domestic implications of international tension. Moreover, the Soviets also calculated that Europe would be open to opportunities to assert its independence from the United States, e.g., in the Middle East, where European and Soviet viewpoints have coincided in supporting the recognition of the PLO and urging a settlement through the enlarged negotiations at Geneva. In short, the overall Soviet aim has been to create a political conviction in Europe that detente is a permanent feature of relations and one that can be relied on, or as Helmut Schmidt put it, "a policy of calculability on both sides."

The impact of detente has also been psychological. In this sense, it evolved to the point that before the invasion of Afghanistan the Western Europeans could say, quoting Helmut Schmidt: "We are living in more secure circumstances than in the first 25 years after the war."1

Whereas the American commitment to detente was tentative and subject to reversal, particularly after the Angolan conflict of 1975, the European commitment has continued to grow. The differences between the United States and Europe may go even deeper. In Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark, a strong current of pacifism has taken the political form of an insistence on detente and arms control negotiations and a strong campaign against nuclear weapons. These are not merely the views of fringe groups; they are reflected to some degree in the attitudes of the major parties, including the left-wing faction of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD).

The divergence in economic policies poses a major operational problem for the Western alliance. Current negotiations over the Yamburg natural gas pipeline will tie Western Europe even closer to the Soviet economy and give the Soviets new long-term leverage. At the same time, the NATO countries are trying to arrange a contingency plan that would respond to Soviet action in Poland with broad economic sanctions. Obviously, the Western alliance needs to sort out its basic attitude toward economic links with the East:

- Are there definable limits to the Western expansion of trade, including qualitative limits on technology transfer?
- Are Western economies capable of sustaining economic sanctions against the USSR? against all of the Warsaw Pact?
- What would be the impact of a broad Warsaw Pact repudiation of indebtedness?
- What leverage does the West have on its economic relations with the USSR and, separately, with Eastern Europe? Can this leverage relate to political-military objectives?

**Detente Without Security**

The relaxation of the political relationship in Europe has not been accompanied by a parallel military relaxation. The Soviets face a major dilemma in this regard. On the one hand, ending the German menace has meant giving up the cohesion inherent in the invocation of a constant external threat to Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Soviets risk their own predominance if, at a time of shoring up the territorial-political status quo, they begin to undo it through the destabilizing process of a major disengagement of Soviet troops from the central region of the Warsaw Pact.

Soviet policy has thus been a blend of propaganda and tactical dexterity. First, they have insisted that the proper outcome of any negotiations over military relations must reflect the existing balance,
though perhaps at a lower level. This concept alone guarantees protracted negotiation, whether in conventional forces (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction—MBFR) or in theater nuclear forces (TNF).

Tactically, the Soviets have indicated that they might be interested in a token or symbolic agreement in MBFR or "substantial reductions" in TNF. But in general they insist on "equal security"; that is, they treat the negotiations as an exercise in ratifying the existing relationship of forces in the European area.

By 1977–1978, however, it had become increasingly evident that the Soviets were determined to change the balance in Europe. They deployed a new, mobile, intermediate-range missile with a multiple warhead, the SS-20, as a replacement for the older SS-4 and SS-5. It had also become evident that the "Euro-strategic balance" had been neglected in the Western negotiating positions: The SS-20 had been excluded from both MBFR and SALT II. Leading European statesmen finally began to express their concern that the European balance was endangered and to call for some adjustment—by new Western deployments, new negotiations, or a combination of both. This was the thrust of Helmut Schmidt's Alastair Buchan memorial lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 1977.²

The subsequent campaign by the Soviet Union to head off a NATO decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II in Europe illustrates both the limits and strengths of Soviet policy: On the one hand, the Soviets are unable to elaborate a line of genuine detente in central Europe without offering some significant military concessions; on the other hand, the Western Europeans are clearly reluctant to confront the Soviet Union with the consequences of its military buildup.

Thus, NATO could not be deflected from its determination to redress the military balance, with or without negotiation, since the Soviets refused to make a genuine offer to halt their buildup. The NATO decision of December 1979 was a sharp setback to the Soviet strategy of achieving detente without offering security.

Soviet diplomacy had its effect, however: Germany and the Benelux countries have qualified their commitment and have emphasized East-West negotiations and, in so doing, have made the NATO position extremely vulnerable to Soviet tactical exploitation. Indeed, the Soviets gradually came to appreciate this vulnerability. They abandoned the harsh threats and, through contacts with Chancellor Schmidt, opened the way to preliminary negotiations, which began October 13, 1980, but ended without progress.

In any case, the Soviets still have a tactical advantage. Even if negotiations are protracted, as long as they appear to offer some slight hope, it is unlikely that the American cruise missile deployments will proceed in either Belgium or Holland. In this case, it may become politically impossible for the Germans to proceed, and thus the chance of a negotiated compromise shaded in favor of the USSR becomes increasingly likely. This situation raises some critical questions.

- Can NATO live with an imbalance in both conventional and nuclear forces?
- What will be the impact of continuing imbalances on NATO doctrine and strategy, especially forward defense and possible first use of nuclear weapons?
- Does arms control offer any realistic hope of redressing military balances?
- Can NATO rebuild its military position and pursue a relationship of detente?

NEW AREAS OF CHALLENGE

During 1980, the twin crises in Iran and in Afghanistan severely threatened the cohesion of the Western alliance. The European and American responses revealed the deep fissures between them. These have been partially closed, but an array of new defense and burden-sharing issues remain.

The net effect of Soviet moves in 1980 bode ill for the Atlantic alliance. The intervention in Afghanistan was a deliberately calculated
decision by a leadership that had usually been thought of as quite prudent and inclined to low-risk options. But in Afghanistan the Soviets had acted, perhaps because they had run out of viable political options, but also because they no longer considered direct intervention there a risky and dangerous policy. Indeed, what the Soviets saw was new regional instabilities on their southern frontier—but set against a new global balance that gave them a new freedom of action. Not only did they see the highly tempting opportunities that were opening in the third world, but they also saw increasingly ineffective Western reaction. And finally the Soviets concluded that the "relations of international forces and especially of international military power," had changed drastically in their favor.³

In Europe, Afghanistan was written off as a "preventive measure"; in the United States, it was seen as a watershed, opening a dangerous new era of confrontation. The Europeans offered formulas for negotiations in Afghanistan, certainly without any genuine hope of success, while the Americans concentrated on punitive measures, also without much hope of forcing a Soviet withdrawal.

The threat of advancing Soviet power in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, however, is as critical to Europe as to the United States and forces a redistribution of defense burdens. The pressures of extra-European crises on U.S. forces and resources are growing with each new crisis. The strong implication is that the Europeans will have to share more of the security burden, in some undefined ways, but almost certainly by increasing their force readiness, their stocks, and perhaps even their force levels in central Europe. Some naval and air requirements currently met by U.S. forces will have to be shared, say, in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the North Atlantic. In any case, it is evident that the United States cannot maintain a one and one-half war strategy without political and material assistance. For their part, Europeans cannot risk leaving decisions on extra-European commitments to the United States alone.

What, then, is the consequence for Europe of assuming more of its own direct defense in the face of a new balance of power in which Soviet domination looms more and more ominous?

What are the consequences of Europe's new vulnerability to Soviet pressures, not only the traditional pressures in central Europe, but those in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, areas of obvious importance to Europe's economic well-being?

Will European opinion support significantly increased defense levels?

**THE IMPLICATIONS OF POLAND**

The foregoing issues fall within what might be considered the normal range of East-West issues. And for over a decade the alliance was able to ignore Eastern Europe, or deal with it largely in conferences such as that on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or in terms of trade. At this writing, the Polish crisis is far from over, but it already appears to be far more significant than the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 or the Hungarian revolt in 1956. Previous Eastern European crises have arisen within the framework of the ruling party, whereas in Poland the threat to Leninist predominance comes from outside the party and its apparatus. Moreover, there has been a unique alliance between intellectuals and workers. Although Solidarity's tactics have been shrewd and carefully calibrated to fall short of confrontational demands, the threat to party domination and to Soviet influence constitutes a clear and present danger for the USSR. Independent institutions are a threat to the Leninist order, and the Soviets cannot tolerate their existence. Thus, with each success the new Polish revolution ironically moves closer to a showdown with the Soviet Union.

Whatever the immediate outcome, the Polish crisis once again points up the dilemma for Soviet policy in Europe. Its first priority is to protect the homeland and this means securing a firm grip on Eastern Europe. The second priority is to extend its influence over Western
Europe; currently this means a relaxation of tensions, linked to a continuing military advantage. If the Soviets are required to intervene in Poland or elsewhere to retain their base, then the prospects for using detente as a means of increasing their influence over Western Europe would almost certainly evaporate for a considerable time.

- How far will the West go in a punitive policy in retaliation against Soviet intervention?
- Can the West adopt measures that might tip the balance against intervention?

THE OUTLOOK

The next several years will be critical for NATO's relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet strategy will be shaped by the fact that all of the major power centers—the United States, Europe, Japan, and China are in some degree hostile to the Soviet Union. The USSR is confronted by the threats of encirclement, which impose a heavy military load on an increasingly burdened Soviet economic base. On the other hand, the United States, Europe, and Japan will remain vulnerable to the interruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, and for the next several years the Soviet Union will continue to enjoy major military advantages in this area, as well as in strategic and conventional forces.

The foregoing suggests that in the near term the Soviet Union will have to try to reduce the number and power of its opponents, and it may seek to do so through a policy of confrontation. The possibility of a broad negotiated settlement with the United States seems to have passed, at least for the foreseeable future. Any U.S. administration is likely to be wary of the risks of a new era of detente. Although the current situation does not preclude contacts, negotiations, and even some agreements, it seems to rule out a broadly based accommodation. At the same time, the Soviets can expect to have more leverage over the course of Chinese and European NATO policy.

The Soviets obviously intend periodically to probe for an accommodation with the Chinese and to support their political overtures with some degree of pressure and threat. The Sino-Soviet negotiations
produced by the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979 may reflect a pattern: cautious explorations by both sides interrupted by clashes over fundamental issues.

Alternatively, the USSR may try to entice the Japanese into the Soviet sphere at the expense of China and the United States. But the Soviets probably consider this a hopeless strategy and have little faith that it would succeed. The minimum precondition for rapprochement with Japan would be the settlement of the Kurile problem, which has remained deadlocked for decades. However, the prospect of gradual Japanese rearmament could change the Soviet view, and the Kuriles may constitute the ultimate bargaining chip to block Japanese rearmament.

The relationship with Western Europe presents a more fruitful field for maneuver. The USSR has made some progress in creating a special relationship with the European members of NATO. The Soviets have conceded the legitimacy of German armament and British and French nuclear forces. They have long since accepted the independence of the European Economic Community (EEC), and they have also almost abandoned any hope for the prospects of Eurocommunism. Finally, they have acquiesced in an increased level of exchanges between Eastern and Western Europe. In short, the Soviets have achieved a fairly stable relationship with Western Europe, and the price for Moscow has been irritating but tolerable: the acceptance of a certain amount of agitation over human rights in the Helsinki framework, occasional European outbursts about aggressive Soviet activities outside Europe, and a further distancing of the Western communist parties from the USSR.

Soviet strategy is likely to intensify its most recent course of exploiting divisible detente so that the interests of the United States and Western Europe gradually drift apart in the major areas, including trade relations, East-West exchanges, political dialogues and summits, the general climate of relations, the assessment of the requirements for European security, and the role of negotiated arms control. The Soviets are highly unlikely to demand, or even propose, the formal retraction of U.S. power in Europe. Much more likely is a strategy of paring down American influence with its allies; forcing the United States to accept Soviet-inspired regional arms control agreements or
arrangements in the name of Atlantic solidarity; playing on the genuine
divergencies of Europe and the United States in the third world and
thus eventually making U.S. policy a liability to Europe and an ob-
stacle to security guarantees from the USSR.

What the Soviet Union hopes to accomplish and what it will actu-
ally realize are, of course, quite different. Soviet leaders from
Stalin through Khrushchev have launched ambitious schemes to dominate
Europe, only to fail dramatically in Berlin and, ultimately, in Cuba.
The chief difference now lies in the changing balance of power and the
Soviet determination to take advantage of it. In some respects, the
Soviets are embarking on a subtle version of Khrushchev's Sputnik cam-
paign; the threat of military superiority is a common theme, but the
offers and demands will be much more skillfully attuned to European and
even American opinion. The process is more protracted and more intri-
cate, and no highly focused confrontation is intended (though it might
develop). It is, however, fundamentally a test of will and tenacity,
just as the Sputnik offensive was a test of nerves.
THE RECOGNIZED STRATEGIC LINKAGE

This paper deals mostly with the prospects for allied cooperation in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean (PG/IO) area as the most active and likely case in which such cooperation seems desirable over the next several years. The United States and its NATO allies show a common perception that the NATO area and the PG/IO are strategically closely linked, primarily because of allied economic dependence on Persian Gulf oil—a dependence that is even greater on the part of most European allies (except Britain and Norway) than it is on the part of the United States and Canada.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan reinforced the already widespread perception that the USSR, by moving into the power vacuum created by Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez, the demise of CENTO, and the fall of the shah, could control allied access to vital oil supplies. This threat is perceived as being less one of premeditated Soviet attack than of opportunistic Soviet exploitation of any number of local political upheavals (e.g., the Iranian revolution, the Mecca incident, the Iran-Iraq war) endemic to this volatile and unstable region. While allied force projection may not be the preferred instrument for influencing the outcome of local political upheavals, it emphatically serves the corollary objective of deterring or, if necessary, combating Soviet (or surrogate) exploitation of such upheavals.

Besides the instability of the oil-rich PG/IO region, two other factors dictate giving it a much higher strategic priority than it has received since World War II. One is the great vulnerability of the oil and oil access to political, economic, and military disruption—ample evident in recent years. Allied deterrent capabilities (except at sea) are far feebler than those in Western Europe or even northeastern Asia. Second is the obvious prize that domination of Middle East oil would confer on the USSR, enabling it to control in large measure the flow
of economic lifeblood to free world economies and hold them to ransom. The economic consequences could be catastrophic if even part of this flow were cut off or the prices jacked up.

Hence the United States has already given high priority to the forced draft strengthening of its deterrence and defense capabilities in the PG/IO. Other interested allies, such as the UK and France, are following suit on a much more limited scale.

As the Hyland paper says, this will inevitably entail a significant diversion of resources from what would otherwise be available for defense of the NATO area. The rapid deployment joint task force is composed of forces and logistic support drawn from what was otherwise earmarked for NATO or other contingencies, and this will remain the case even if the U.S. force structure is expanded. Currently the diversion is most marked in the case of naval forces, but a PG/IO contingency would occasion major diversions of ground and air forces as well. Even in a NATO/WP war, precautionary deployments to the PG/IO would probably be prudent. A sizable fraction of our FY81 and 82 defense budgets is programmed for PG/IO needs, and this diversion will doubtless continue indefinitely (though many of the assets created will be fungible). In effect, because NATO and the PG/IO are strategically linked, the U.S. views this diversion as essential to NATO's own defense.

THE CASE FOR RATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Given their shared perception of the NATO-PG/IO strategic linkage and the greater risks of conflict in that volatile area, one might expect similar diversions of European military resources. For several reasons, however, this has not been the case—and is unlikely to become so.

Our allies are severely inhibited politically from assuming out-of-area strategic obligations by their own domestic preoccupations, their consciousness of their own limited capabilities, their fear of the USSR, their concern over irritating Persian Gulf states on whom they depend for oil, etc. These reasons vary from country to country, but only France and perhaps Britain contemplate even limited military commitments to PG/IO deterrence and defense. Insofar as security is
concerned, Europe's overall outlook has become increasingly regional and less global.

In so thinking, the Europeans are in large measure simply reflecting a strategic fact of life. Only the United States has the conventional or nuclear global force projection capabilities, real or potential, to meet the need. It is our strategic nuclear umbrella, reinforced by flexible theater nuclear assets (carriers, long-range bombers, and naval cruise missiles), which extends over the area. Only the United States, with its strategic mobility forces, can hope to project multidivision and multiking forces to such remote areas. Even in such modest contingencies as Shaba and Zimbabwe, the British and French had to rely on U.S. airlift. Allied forces simply lack the major long-range force projection and logistic support capability that the United States demonstrated in Korea and Vietnam. This is true even of their naval forces. Nor, with the modest exception of France, do they have the facilities structure which the United States is painfully building in the area.

Of course, our allies could seek to develop these expensive capabilities. But this would be at the expense, at least in part, of their ability to fill many of the glaring gaps in NATO's own European defenses. It would be much more cost-effective for them to build up NATO's home defenses than to acquire costly force projection assets. Even Japan is in the same boat.

Moreover, strengthening NATO defenses would increase Western global deterrence capabilities, an important factor given the escalatory potential inherent in Soviet pressure on vital Western oil access. Further, the more Europe does to strengthen its own defenses, the more the United States may be able to divert forces to the Persian Gulf without excessive risk to NATO. For all these reasons, it is hard to see how dragging our allies into Persian Gulf defense on a large scale would produce strategic gains commensurate with the costs and risks (discussed below).

Military sense dictates instead a more rational division of labor of the sort Helmut Schmidt proposed in early 1980: The United States should assume the chief burden of PG/IO defense on the common behalf
(on top of our nuclear umbrella and command of the seas), while Europe does more to plug the many holes in NATO's own defensive shield. This is the broad policy that the U.S. proposed officially to its allies in 1980 and NATO adopted with a sense of relief. Regrettably, however, these allies have not yet seen fit to carry out many of the more expensive Phase I and Phase II objectives, much less the long-term defense program and long-term TNF measures and the 3 percent real growth goal adopted earlier. Allied defense spending in 1978-1980, and even more in 1981, has fallen far short of that pledge. Nonetheless, the more constrained the availability of allied resources, the more logical a division of labor becomes.

In a contingency, however, U.S. forces would need European allied assistance in the form of *en route bases and transit rights*. By far the shortest and best-endowed air and sea lines of communication (ALOC and SLOC) available are from the east coast of the United States via Egyptian air bases or the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf. The distance involves some 7,000 miles, rather than the 10,000 miles around the Cape of Good Hope or 15,000 miles from west coast U.S. ports. Since current U.S. plans regard rapid precautionary deployment as the key to deterrence, the advantages of having such bases are obvious.

The United States has officially informed its NATO allies that en route access is essential in the common cause and is bilaterally discussing specific requirements with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal. Other nations will also be approached. Fortunately, numerous alternative complementary routes are available to the current U.S.-Azores-Spain-Greece-Egypt ALOC. Portugal and Morocco could readily be used as alternatives to Spain, as could England, France, Germany, and Italy. Other combinations are possible.

---

1 One is always impressed with the clarity of the chancellor's strategic thinking—and equally depressed by his difficulty in getting a reluctant SPD to come up with the consequent resources.

2 It is possible to refuel in the air en route to, say, Egypt, without using European bases or air space. Suffice it to say that this raises costs inordinately. As for the SLOC, the Suez Canal is vulnerable to blockage, but Egypt could still be used as a transshipment point.
Unsurprisingly, no NATO ally seems prepared to give the United States automatic unrestricted use of its facilities whenever the United States decides there is an emergency need. Consultation will be required. But all allies approached realize the potential need for quick overflight or base access and seem prepared to provide this in principle, should a major Soviet threat to Western oil access emerge. They may be less prepared to do so in other contingencies not involving the USSR (at least initially).

THE POLITICAL LIMITS ON EXPANDING NATO'S ROLE

Even so, some advance a political argument for extending the NATO area to guarantee the defense of threatened Persian Gulf states—and thus presumably enhance their willingness to provide sufficient oil at reasonable prices. In theory, this would help deter Soviet intervention by injecting an element of automaticity into NATO's response. After all, any major Soviet intervention in the Persian Gulf would inevitably raise the risk of escalation into NATO/WP or even global war. Indeed, some argue that U.S. defense capabilities in the remote Persian Gulf are so limited that only the prospect of such escalation (hitting the USSR elsewhere) provides an effective deterrent. Moreover, in the event the Soviets moved into the Persian Gulf region, it would be logical for Moscow to use threats aimed at NATO (even including partial mobilization) to pin down NATO—and U.S.—forces in Europe. Why not use the same logic in reverse?

Aside from the many other flaws in this strategy (where else could we credibly threaten the USSR?), it is not a feasible NATO option. As a free association of sovereign allies, NATO functions by consensus, and informed political observers agree that there would be virtually no hope of achieving such consensus. The smaller northern members in particular (Norway, Denmark, Benelux, and Iceland) would adamantly oppose the strategy. In my own view, France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey would also be dubious—and probably maneuver to prevent the issue from ever coming to a head.

Indeed they have viewed NATO from the outset as a strictly regional alliance—in essence an institutional means of securing a U.S.
commitment to the defense of Europe, not a means of extending European guarantees to other regions. Even defense of remaining European colonies was excluded (French North Africa was a special case). Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952 only after the Scandinavians and Benelux critics questioned why they should be expected to go to war if such far-away nations were attacked. The NATO Council has always resisted pleas from the NATO naval authorities to expand NATO's naval mandate formally to the South Atlantic (mainly to defend the oil routes). While Spain will probably be admitted if it asks, it is clearly a part of Europe and not under immediate threat. Moreover, Spain too would probably oppose the extension of the treaty area.

France is a special case. Though a NATO ally--and the one most willing and capable of helping in PG/IO defense--it has made clear that this must be the subject of discreet bilateral concert with the United States. France does not participate even in NATO's military structure (and it is questionable whether this policy will change under Mitterand). Since France alone can contribute more than most other NATO allies collectively, it makes sense to take her views fully into account.

Turkey is another special case. Though the present Turkish government has indicated that it would participate in Persian Gulf defense provided NATO itself formally took such action, this is less an indication of Turkish eagerness than a posing of conditions which the government of Turkey is shrewdly aware are highly unlikely to be met. Given its own internal troubles, and current military as well as economic weakness, it is realistically unwilling to risk exposing itself to a Soviet riposte by intervening outside the NATO area.

Under these circumstances, any U.S. pressure for NATO to assume a corporate role in Persian Gulf deterrence and defense is likely not only to fail, but also to touch off extended and enormously divisive debate within the alliance, at a time when NATO already faces too many other divisive issues (see Hyland and Thomson). Even if the United States could dragoon NATO into a positive consensus, many allies would doubtless attach stiff reservations amounting to nonparticipation. In short, expanding NATO's perimeter to encompass the Persian Gulf is not politically feasible, and even the attempt itself would create serious divisions (as I advised the enthusiasts in the Carter administration).
Bilateral negotiations with nations able and willing to contribute is a far more sensible course.

Indeed, a case can be made that a NATO corporate role in PG/10 defense would have positive disadvantages, since the inevitable corollary requirement for prior consultation could limit U.S. freedom of action in a crisis. At the least, serious delays could result.

Lastly, it is not inconceivable that any move by NATO to extend its institutional umbrella over another region would lead to troublesome countermoves by the USSR. It would hardly be in our interest, for example, to see Syria join the Warsaw Pact, particularly since most other area states would be quite unlikely to join NATO. This leads to the question of their attitudes, which are quite relevant to the issue.

LIKELY ATTITUDES OF OTHER STATES

Given their current jealous nationalism, and the added complication of the Arab-Israeli conflict, most regional states would feel compelled to reject any invitation to join NATO or even a unilateral extension of NATO's umbrella to cover them. At present they even reject bilateral ties with the United States. Although a few are willing to grant the United States the use of their facilities, this is as far as they are likely to go. Even Sadat had been quite explicit on this score. Our past CENTO experience is a case in point. Only Iraq among the oil producers joined, and this helped spawn a nationalist Ba'athist revolution that for two decades made Iraq a client of the USSR. Revolutionary Iran's current hostility toward the West is another case in point.

Any NATO attempt to involve itself in the Persian Gulf would not only divide NATO and thus diminish the credibility of any NATO guarantees, but would also create a political furor in the area, a furor that the USSR could exploit. These obvious prospects would lead the European allies to be doubly wary of any NATO initiative. Other key countries—Japan, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand—which are also important players in this game would also oppose NATO involvement in the Persian Gulf area. One must also take into account the almost certainly hostile reaction of the "nonaligned" states, led by India and Yugoslavia, to such an attempt to further divide the world into opposed blocs. In
effect, a broader range of political risks and potential costs has to be factored into any proposed NATO involvement in PG/IO defense. The complications arising from unilateral U.S. initiatives are already bad enough.

WHAT WE CAN EXPECT OF OUR ALLIES

Despite its theoretical strategic merits, an attempt to extend NATO’s commitments beyond its current boundaries would probably be politically infeasible, present no clear military advantages to the United States, and entail potential costs and risks that would outweigh any likely gains.

Militarily, a rational division of labor whereby Europe would do more for its own defense, while the United States assumed the main PG/IO burden, would be more cost-effective and more congenial to our allies. Most of what could be achieved militarily through a NATO role in the PG/IO could probably be achieved as well, and certainly more easily, through bilateral U.S. initiatives.

Politically, strong allied reluctance to expand NATO’s boundaries would create sharp divisions within the alliance over any such U.S. request. At a time of continuing (perhaps even growing) interallied differences over detente, strategy, arms control, trade, TNR modernization, and defense spending (as described by Hyland and Thomson), should an additional source of friction be created? Such an initiative would also open a Pandora’s box of political repercussions in the PG/IO states and other interested countries.

True, at least a limited allied role in PG/IO deterrence and defense is essential for political even more than for military reasons. Allied en route bases and transit access are crucial to rapid U.S. deployment. Beyond this, the United States would insist on some limited allied participation (showing the flag) in any actual PG/IO deployment to indicate allied solidarity, as it did in Korea and Vietnam. The U.S. public would deeply resent allied failure to even show the flag on a token basis, with divisive alliance consequences. But most of this could be achieved more readily through bilateral arrangements.

A formal NATO endorsement of the U.S. role in the PG/IO as being on the common behalf is doubtless achievable. Moreover, the United
States should be able to get many of its allies to contribute military and economic aid to shore up the stability and local defense capabilities of various PG/IO states. But this too is best done bilaterally. Europe and Canada can also serve the common strategic interest effectively by adopting additional conservation, alternative energy-use, and energy-saving measures to limit allied strategic dependence on Persian Gulf oil. In fact, the United States could use the leverage of otherwise asking for a formal NATO role east of Suez to encourage its allies to take these lesser measures.

CONCLUSION

While even greater allied than U.S. dependence on vital Persian Gulf oil access (the parametric case) makes NATO cooperation in securing it strategically logical, in fact only limited allied cooperation is militarily feasible or politically possible. Despite the likelihood that Europe could be most readily brought to its knees economically by cutting off its lifeblood—oil—our European allies will remain preoccupied with such other pressing problems as detente, arms control, and TF modernization, while tacitly leaving the main burden of Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean deterrence and defense to the only ally with the power projection capabilities needed to this end.

No NATO consensus to extend the NATO deterrent umbrella formally over the PG/IO is politically achievable. Even a U.S. proposal to do so would be enormously divisive and would further fracture an alliance solidarity, which is today fragile at best. Such a U.S. attempt would also be opposed by most Persian Gulf states and the nonaligned movement, and the USSR would readily exploit the political repercussions.

Nonetheless, limited allied participation in PG/IO deterrence and defense is essential. Militarily, en route base access and transit rights must be made available promptly to enable rapid deployment. Politically, at least a modest show of allied participation is needed to demonstrate allied solidarity. But most of this can be more readily achieved by bilateral negotiations with individual allies that, like France, can contribute most. Indeed, bilateralism is the only realistic route, and the United States can achieve most of what it wants by taking this route.
INTRODUCTION

Many assumptions behind the adoption, in 1967, of the NATO strategy of flexible response, embodied in the document MC 14/3, have been overtaken by changes in the Soviet force posture and in our understanding of Soviet military doctrine. Yet, the NATO MC 14/3 strategy cannot and, indeed, should not be changed. The compromises of differing national views underlying that agreement are the basis for continued political and military cooperation between the United States and Western Europe. To trifle with these compromises would threaten the solidarity of the alliance—one of the key factors in its ability to counter Soviet political and military power in Europe.

Although it would be foolhardy to reopen issues resolved in the basic strategy document of NATO, the military strategy of the alliance needs further development. The lack of mutual understanding on the two sides of the Atlantic over the role of military power, particularly nuclear weapons, in deterrence and defense raises questions about the ability of the alliance to continue to deter Soviet military actions, to hold together in a crisis, and to prosecute a war, should one break out.

In the area of military strategy and force posture, the challenge that NATO faces in the next four years differs little from what it faced in 1967—to develop strategy beyond the broad generality of flexible response, as defined in MC 14/3, and to build a force structure to support that strategy. The need for such development is now more acute than it was in 1967, and, at the same time, the political obstacles to such development have grown substantially. There is a real danger that posing new issues of strategy and force posture now could overload the political system in Europe, leading to the complete unraveling of the

---

1 This paper deals solely with the question of strategy for force employment in Europe.
NATO long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF)\(^2\) decision, with devastating consequences for the perception in the United States, Europe, and the USSR of the utility of NATO as a security instrument. Many would argue, therefore, that the NATO agenda for the next four years specifies only the deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), a process that will have only just begun in 1985, and the follow-through on the conventional improvements of the long-term defense program (LTDP). Others would ask whether we can afford to continue to neglect the underlying issues of strategy and related force posture improvements.

The purpose of this paper is to spell out some of these underlying issues, discuss the related political problems, and leave it to the workshop participants to discuss the agenda for the next four years.

**BACKGROUND**

In 1967, after almost a decade of debate, NATO formally abandoned the strategy of massive retaliation and adopted flexible response (MC 14/3). To summarize the debate briefly, the American\(^3\) side was dealing with the reality that it could not significantly limit damage to itself in a strategic nuclear exchange. It thus pushed for the adoption of a NATO strategy that would provide more credible conventional and nuclear defense options, and thus strengthen deterrence and hold out the hope of controlling escalation should war break out. The European side was concerned that "more credible defense options" meant extended war on European territory, and clung to the belief that a threat of early massive strategic nuclear strikes on the USSR would preserve deterrence.\(^4\)

\(^2\)Forces capable of striking the USSR from Western Europe and vice versa.

\(^3\)By American side and European side, I mean the influential elites --political leaders, officials, diplomats, academics, researchers, journalists, and others--concerned with defense and foreign policy matters. Even with this restrictive definition, a broad spectrum of opinion obviously exists on both sides of the Atlantic. I want to suggest only that the centers of these spectra reflect somewhat different views.

\(^4\)Henry Kissinger referred to this position as the "secret dream of every European...to have it [nuclear war] conducted over their heads by
The result of this debate was a predictably vague set of strategic guidelines, based on the overall war aim of maintaining or restoring the territorial integrity of NATO. Nevertheless, some important features stand out:5

- An initial conventional defense (or should the enemy employ nuclear weapons, a combined conventional and nuclear defense) designed to blunt the enemy's attack directly and maintain the territorial integrity of NATO.
- If this should fail (or perhaps threaten to fail), deliberate escalation with nuclear weapons, designed to send a political message to Soviet leadership that the costs and risks of its aggression would be high, and thus induce a decision to cease hostilities and withdraw.
- If this escalation chain should fail to achieve the political decision to withdraw, an all-out nuclear attack on the enemy's homeland, carried out by theater and central nuclear assets, to make good the earlier escalation threat.

This strategic concept neatly papered over divergent alliance views of the role of conventional forces and nuclear weapons in NATO military strategy. It did not attempt to deal with such questions as the conditions that would trigger initial nuclear use by NATO, the length of time that conventional defense should be asked to hold, the division of resource effort between conventional and nuclear defense preparations, the stages of nuclear escalation that must be passed through before an all-out nuclear attack would be ordered, and the swift intelligence, command/control capabilities, and consultation mechanisms needed to make an escalation strategy work. Most important, it barely touched on the

---

question of what would happen if the Soviet Union employed nuclear weapons. To a large extent, the strategy assumed that NATO will be able to control the initiation and scale of nuclear employment.

In the years following the adoption of MC 14/3, the alliance, particularly through the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), attempted to elaborate the doctrine further. These efforts have essentially come to naught. The NPG communiques of the 1970s offer little further elaboration of TNF employment doctrine and no sign that NATO's political authorities have provided detailed guidance to the military on planning for the employment of nuclear weapons. One can only conclude that most political leaders of the alliance have not confronted the nature of the decisions that they would have to face in deep crisis. This lack of understanding of nuclear employment options could cause confusion and delay, should a crisis come. At the worst, it could cause the alliance to come apart.

Although there has apparently been little formal development of the military strategy that the political leadership of the alliance would have to rely on in crisis, there has nonetheless been some convergence in U.S. and European views about nuclear strategy since the adoption of MC 14/3. In particular, both Europeans and Americans have come to accept deliberate escalation as the linchpin of NATO strategy. Europeans have increasingly seen that only through an unbroken chain of escalation capabilities can the coupling of U.S. central nuclear forces to Europe be maintained. Americans have increasingly seen the value of such coupling, not only because the firm linkage of U.S. strategic power to Europe helps to insure deterrence, but also because European confidence in the American strategic commitment is essential for both maintaining American political power in Europe and countering Soviet political power there.

---

6For a review of NPG efforts to elaborate political guidelines for NATO nuclear employment, see Uwe Nerlich in Kenneth Myers (ed.), NATO, the Next Thirty Years, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1980, p. 65.

What does it matter, then, that a NATO strategy for nuclear employment under the umbrella of MC 14/3 has not been elaborated? One answer has already been suggested: It matters because, in a crisis, NATO faces the danger of delays, confusion, or even total collapse of the alliance over nuclear employment questions. Another possible answer—not developed further here—is that it matters because future TNF arms control discussions cannot go forward if the two sides of the Atlantic do not agree on the basic purposes of nuclear weapons. But the most important answers to the question lie in the implications for deterrence of the changes since the adoption of MC 14/3.

CHANGES SINCE THE ADOPTION OF MC 14/3

When the strategy of flexible response was adopted in 1967, NATO had a position that could be characterized as escalation dominance over the USSR. Dominance—or, at a minimum, parity—was required if the combination of NATO force structure and the strategy of flexible response was to deter Soviet military action. This means that the Soviet leadership, looking up the ladder of escalation, could see that a conflict could escalate to some level at which they would be at a net disadvantage vis-à-vis NATO; thus, they would be deterred from initiating hostilities. Or, if hostilities had started, actions that demonstrated NATO's willingness to escalate the conflict would cause the Soviets to cease hostilities and settle the conflict on NATO's terms, namely, the restoration of territorial integrity.

In the late 1960s, NATO was seen to have this capability. At the highest level of escalation—central nuclear forces—the United States was seen to have superiority over the USSR. While many in the United States were concerned that this was irrevocably slipping away (and thus were motivated to adopt flexible response), many Europeans had a blind faith in U.S. central capabilities. At the lower (theater) levels of nuclear conflict, the United States was also perceived to have superiority. The Soviet theater nuclear stockpile was believed to be smaller than NATO's and to consist of crude weapons, suitable for massive attacks on Western Europe, but incapable of the discriminate strikes called for by a strategy of either controlled nuclear escalation or
nuclear war-fighting. NATO, by contrast, seemed to be almost overburdened with TNFs: It had a substantial superiority at the level of battlefield nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and short-range missiles), as well as dual-capable aircraft and missiles (such as Pershing I) with the potential to strike deep into Eastern Europe.

Until the mid-1970s, the main worry in the United States about NATO's capability to carry out a flexible response strategy was the deficiency in NATO's conventional forces—a deficiency that raised questions about the credibility of NATO's deterrent at the lowest level of escalation. By comparison, theater nuclear forces—especially battlefield nuclear forces—were seen as fat, and thus as a source of additional resources for beefing up conventional defenses. Indeed, the large number of U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe, coupled with concerns about the survivability (and thus crisis instability) of the forces, led to numerous proposals to reduce the NATO TNF stockpile from about 7000 to as low as 1000 nuclear warheads. 8

The Soviet force posture has changed markedly and continues to change. Our assumptions about Soviet strategy for employing nuclear weapons have also changed. While concern about the need to strengthen NATO's conventional capabilities has not abated, the TNF issue has moved back to the top of the NATO agenda, alongside conventional improvements.

The comprehensive Soviet military buildup, which began in the mid-1960s, has touched all aspects of Soviet military power—conventional, theater nuclear, 9 and central strategic forces:

- Conventional improvements in the European theater include new tanks, self-propelled artillery, new armored fighting vehicles incorporating antitank guided missiles, armed helicopters, and a new generation of tactical aircraft.

---


The Soviets are in the process of transforming their battlefield theater nuclear forces into a force capable of discrete nuclear strikes in support of ground force operations. The improvements include the addition of nuclear artillery, as well as a new generation of missiles (SS-21, -22, and -23) to replace the obsolete Frog and Scud rockets. These changes move toward eliminating NATO's earlier advantages in battlefield nuclear weapons.

The conversion of the Soviet tactical air force, with the deployment of such aircraft as the Flogger, Fitter, and Fencer, from one oriented primarily toward air defense to one capable of long-range theater air strikes has added substantially to Soviet theater nuclear capability, as well as conventional capability.

With their large SS-4 and -5 medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile (MR/IRBM) force and medium bombers, the Soviets have long had an advantage in long-range TNE. The addition of the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber to this force reflected the pattern of modernization described above—the transformation of the Soviet nuclear force from a blunt instrument into one capable of more precise and controlled use. The SS-20, for example, has lower yield warheads and greater accuracy and survivability than the older MR/IRBM force.

Finally, the buildup of Soviet central forces has brought the Soviets to a position of undisputed strategic parity.

These Soviet military improvements took place during a period in which NATO's conventional, theater nuclear, and central strategic capabilities remained roughly constant. The resulting shift in the balance has raised questions about the validity of the basic assumption behind the flexible response strategy—that NATO could dominate the escalation process. By the late 1970s, Soviet leaders, looking up the escalation ladder, no longer could see a level of escalation at which they would
be at a net disadvantage. Indeed, the Soviets have numerical superiority in conventional forces and a significant advantage in long-range TNF on the European continent. The latter advantage has now become important because strategic nuclear parity, coupled with improvements in Soviet battlefield and medium-range TNFs, have moved toward neutralizing NATO's earlier advantages. Thus, the gap in LRTNF now dominates the nuclear escalation spectrum.

NATO military planners recognize these factors and have made them the basis of the two major defense initiatives of the last four years—the long-term defense program, aimed at strengthening NATO's conventional forces, and the LRTNF decision of December 12, 1979, to fill the gap in long-range theater nuclear forces.

Closely related to changes in Soviet force structure since 1967 is the increased Western understanding of Soviet military strategy and doctrine. The last decade has seen a wealth of research into the writings of the Soviet military.10 This research indicates a Soviet military doctrine starkly different from the NATO emphasis on escalation control and controlled nuclear strikes for political (war-termination) objectives.

The Soviet military doctrine appears to be what has been loosely called nuclear war-fighting—the integration of nuclear weapons with other weapons in offensive operations aimed at achieving traditional military objectives—the defeat and destruction of the enemy's forces, especially nuclear forces, the disintegration of the enemy's political structure, the seizure of key strategic areas, and finally, the occupation and control of enemy territory. The Soviets stress the importance of surprise and preemption in carrying out these operations, as well as protective measures, such as civil defense, against NATO responses. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Soviets eschew deterrence and seek war. Rather, they believe that by preparing for war and

10 See, for example, Benjamin Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy, The Rand Corporation, R-2034-DDRE, December 1976.
being able to achieve military objectives should war break out, they strengthen deterrence. 11

Many questions about Soviet doctrine remain unanswered. Not the least of these concerns the relationship, in Soviet eyes, between the value of these military objectives and the costs of achieving them. NATO strategy is predicated on the assumption that it can make those costs disproportionate to the value of the objectives by threatening to escalate to massive nuclear attacks on the Soviet homeland. Viewed from a Western perspective, these potential costs ought to stimulate Soviet interest in escalation control. Fritz Ermarth has pointed out, however, that the Soviet view of nuclear conflict limitations is "obscure"12; Douglass and Hoeber,13 on the other hand, suggest that the Soviets have entertained notions of a war limited to the European theater and of a conventional phase to war. But the main thrust of Soviet thinking is to see nuclear operations in Europe as part of a general war against the West in which the USSR will use whatever weapons are needed to prevail.

NATO is not prepared for this war. The current peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery means, dependent on a small number of fixed installations, is vulnerable to Soviet preemption. NATO's military forces have only a limited capacity to operate in a nuclear (or chemical) environment. Most important, troops and commanders are unprepared to cope with the devastating effects of nuclear conflict. While it is arguable whether any military force could cope with a nuclear battlefield, the Soviets have clearly taken the problem more seriously in their doctrine, training, and equipment.

Thus, changes in the Soviet force posture, and in our understanding of Soviet military doctrine, have raised questions about the

effectiveness of NATO's military strategy in the current context, and thus about the contribution that NATO's military posture makes to deterring Soviet military action. Alterations in Soviet force posture have undermined NATO's earlier position of escalation dominance and given the Soviets less reason to be concerned about NATO's escalation threats than in the past. But Soviet doctrine raises questions about how much the Soviets would be concerned about escalation threats, since they seem to be preparing for a rather widespread nuclear conflict in any case—a conflict that NATO is unprepared to engage in. A basic asymmetry emerges:

- The USSR can now cope with NATO's strategy on its own terms, and perhaps dominate a conflict based on it.
- NATO cannot cope with Soviet strategy on its own terms; the Soviets would dominate a conflict based on it.

The agenda for the development of NATO strategy—and related force posture improvements—over the long term involves both elements of the asymmetry: (1) reestablishing the validity of an escalation strategy, because this is the essence of the transatlantic compromise on strategy; (2) denying the Soviets the ability to carry out their strategy. Such an agenda will force both sides of the Atlantic to face more explicitly issues regarding the use of nuclear weapons—issues that can undermine the political foundations of the alliance if not approached with great care.

**NATO'S LONG-TERM AGENDA**

Reestablishing the credibility of NATO's escalation threats and coping with Soviet war-fighting are two sides of the same deterrence coin, affecting the Soviet calculus of both the potential risks of aggression and the potential gains. An unbreakable chain of escalation that could end in all-out intercontinental nuclear war makes the risks to the Soviets high. The ability to deny them the achievement of their military objectives in a conflict makes the potential gains to the Soviets low.
In short, deterrence requires that NATO have "forces, and plans for their use, such that the Soviet Union, applying its own standards and models, would recognize that no plausible outcome of aggression would represent victory on any plausible definition of victory."\textsuperscript{14} Acquiring these forces and plans broadly defines the long-term military agenda of NATO.

The Plans Agenda

Despite the fact that nuclear weapons decisions have proved historically difficult in NATO, acquiring the plans may be by far the toughest problem on the agenda, both politically and conceptually. Such planning amounts to the elaboration of NATO strategy, a task that has been difficult to accomplish in the past. Alliance political leaders (and the general public) think only reluctantly about how NATO's nuclear weapons might actually be used. These political difficulties will be compounded by the introduction of denial (of Soviet military objectives) as an explicit objective of NATO nuclear weapons employment strategy, which could easily be given, in Europe, the politically unpalatable label of war-fighting.

But the conceptual difficulties of devising nuclear employment plans that marry both escalation and denial objectives may be even greater. And, in devising the plans, U.S. central systems must play a role, else the planning will violate a key precept of NATO strategy—that U.S. central systems should be coupled to the defense of Europe. The essence of the conceptual problem is, How can NATO, on the one hand, plan to fight combined conventional and nuclear battles with theater and intercontinental forces to deny the Soviets their military objectives and, on the other hand, plan to control escalation?

The answer requires analysis well beyond the scope of this paper; the necessary planning might, however, include the following elements:

\textsuperscript{14} The quote is from Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," \textit{International Security}, Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring 1981. Slocombe, however, referred only to U.S. requirements.
A delineation of (1) the sorts of military objectives that NATO forces might seek and (2) the operations that they might thus have to carry out while executing the forward defense concept.

An examination of the contributions that nuclear weapons might make to these operations, with an assessment of the impact that Soviet nuclear employment would have on the operations.

On this basis, a selection of possible employment options that would seem advantageous to NATO. The number of such options should be quite large so as to cover a spectrum of possible military and political objectives for the attacks, including different target types and geographical areas; they should also provide for a range of both theater and central force employment possibilities. Since it will not be possible always to predict in advance the specific targets, provision must be made for a generalized target selection, with specifics to be decided at the time.

A planning system that (1) permits political and military authorities rapidly to construct nuclear attack operations suitable to the situation at hand and (2) to take into account both the need for controlled escalation and the possibility of widespread nuclear war.

Central to this planning process is the issue of political control. As long as NATO deliberately seeks to control escalation, each decision to employ nuclear weapons must be reserved for the highest political authorities. Consequently, they need to be aware of and to guide the planning process. Military plans that are outside the realm of political reality are wasteful, and shielding political leaders from the nature of decisions that they may ultimately have to take in deep crises is dangerous.

The feasibility of executing the strategy and plans outlined above is another central issue. They would almost certainly not be feasible now; analysis may show that with force improvements, some may
be feasible; others may be impossible. This brings us to the question of needed force improvements.

The Force Agenda

The need for the following NATO force improvements stems from both the escalation and denial deterrent requirements. They are, nevertheless, largely familiar and would probably not be as strenuously opposed by those concerned about war-fighting strategies as the above planning agenda would be. This stems from the fact that many improvements aimed at reestablishing the credibility of the escalation ladder also improve denial capabilities. It is also related to a basic understanding on both sides of the Atlantic that, whatever the arcane deterrent theory, the alliance might someday have to defend itself and it had better get ready to do so.

This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to raise the most important issues on the agenda:

Conventional Strength. The most needed step in reestablishing a credible spectrum of escalation options is a substantial strengthening of NATO's conventional force capabilities. The greatest gap in NATO's escalation ladder is at the conventional level, where the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are superior. As NATO's earlier theater and central nuclear advantages have been eroded and the credibility of their employment in first use consequently reduced, the nonnuclear forces have assumed a greater burden in the deterrent of nonnuclear attack. Conventional strength is needed also for the nuclear aspects of deterrence, because conventional forces must be able to survive and to fight on a nuclear battlefield, if NATO is to be able to cope with a Soviet combined nuclear and conventional offensive and thereby to deny the Soviets their military objectives. One of the great fallacies of past discussions of NATO strategy has been an implicit separation of nonnuclear and nuclear defenses--an assumption that when the latter began, the former would cease. This separation has led many, especially in Europe, to oppose improved conventional capabilities on the grounds
that strengthened conventional forces would signal a reduced NATO willingness to employ nuclear forces, hence lowering the credibility of escalation threats.

An agenda of conventional improvements is already at hand in the form of the NATO long-term defense program and related force improvement proposals. These aim principally at improving NATO forces qualitatively. But quantity is also needed. Especially high on the future agenda should be steps to increase the divisions, brigades, and battalions available to NATO commanders. With the current forward defense concept, most of NATO's available formations are committed forward. Little is left therefore to be held as a strategic reserve; such a reserve is needed to deal with the enemy penetrations that must inevitably occur, even if the forward defense is giving a good account of itself. French forces and the U.S. reinforcements, which will be made available more rapidly if the LTDP is carried through, would help to provide a strategic reserve. But the former are not committed to NATO, and the latter may be diverted to conflicts outside NATO (e.g., in southwestern Asia). Thus, the key need for the future is the formation of additional European units to bolster the strategic reserves of NATO. These units might be cadres in peacetime and rapidly fleshed out in wartime with reserve personnel.

Long-Range TNF. Beyond conventional improvements, the most important step in reestablishing the credibility of the escalation spectrum will be the deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, as called for by the NATO decision of December 12, 1979. As discussed above, these deployments will help fill the gap in NATO's escalation ladder—a gap caused by the USSR's rise to strategic parity and the historical shortage in NATO's land-based capability to strike Soviet territory, and widened by the recent across-the-board Soviet military buildup. These forces will also contribute substantially to NATO's denial capability by providing the power to strike forces moving forward to battle, lines of communication, command and control facilities, as well as air and nuclear assets.

Survivability of Nuclear Forces. Soviet doctrine emphasizes pre-emption, especially through attacks on nuclear assets, and NATO's
theater nuclear forces are vulnerable to such attacks. They are vulnerable because they depend on a few fixed bases and because they are concentrated forward, near areas of potential land engagements. The Soviets thus could potentially erase large portions of NATO's TNF at the outset of hostilities, undermining NATO's escalation threats and sharply curtailing denial capabilities. If carried through, the LRTNF program, which emphasizes force mobility and dispersion of forces over five countries, is a step in the right direction. But a good deal more will be needed in the future to improve survivability, both for existing and new forces. The dimensions of these improvements will have to be defined by analysis of current and projected vulnerabilities, but they could include such factors as hardness, mobility, dispersal over wide areas and numerous countries, and perhaps active defenses.

It is tempting to argue that the survivability problem could be solved by removing nuclear assets from the European continent and increasing the capabilities of U.S. intercontinental and other offshore forces (e.g., sea-launched cruise missiles) to contribute to NATO's defenses in the European theater. Such increased capabilities may indeed be important. However, since the maintenance of an unbroken ladder of escalation from conventional to intercontinental forces requires nuclear forces on the continent, the land-based survivability problem cannot be wished away entirely. The issue for the future is the mix of land-based and offshore forces, not whether there should be land-based capabilities.

**Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) Protection.** A consequence of the growing realization in the West that the Soviets take nuclear warfighting seriously--they have revised their training and equipment in recognition of the need to fight in a nuclear (and chemical) environment--has been the emphasis in the United States on preparing to survive and to fight on an integrated battlefield--i.e., a battlefield where nuclear or chemical weapons could be employed at any time. Thus, survivability needs encompass the entire force structure, not just the nuclear forces. The improvements that NATO needs to deal with an integrated battlefield will involve military doctrine, training,
leadership, and protection for the individual soldier and pilot and for his equipment and support structure. Whether such improvements will mean that the integrated battlefield will be anything other than total chaos is an open question. But NATO must seek to answer this question, since the Soviets are preparing to fight on it, and since chaos and the resulting disintegration of NATO's political and military structure is one of the objectives of Soviet doctrine.

**Survivable C^{3}I.** To carry out successfully a strategy of controlled escalation, NATO political and military authorities need a clear and common understanding of the factors bearing on their decisions to employ conventional and nuclear force (intelligence), a system that permits rapid execution of those decisions (command, control, and communications), and a means for swiftly determining their impact (intelligence again). The needs, especially intelligence, would be greatest during politically difficult transitions from peace to war and from conventional to nuclear conflict; however, for NATO to control war and successfully terminate it on NATO's terms, the C^{3}I needs would continue. Thus, the C^{3}I capabilities must be able to survive and endure. Survivable C^{3}I is also an essential element of coping with the Soviet war style and denying the Soviets their aim of disrupting NATO and bringing about its disintegration, since disruption of C^{3}I is an effective way to achieve these aims.

**Offensive Chemical Capabilities.** Up to now, this paper has dealt with the chemical issue only in passing. As NATO has slowly permitted its limited offensive chemical weapon inventory to lapse into obsolescence, it has done so on the unstated assumption that Soviet employment of chemical weapons would be deterred by the threat of NATO nuclear escalation. This assumption should be examined carefully in view of the differences in destructive potential between chemical and nuclear weapons--differences that might cause the Soviets to calculate that their employment of chemical weapons would not necessarily lead NATO to respond with nuclear weapons. The operational consequences of the asymmetry between NATO and Warsaw Pact offensive chemical capabilities should also be examined: The threat of Soviet chemical use may force NATO to adopt protective measures that degrade the effectiveness of NATO's forces, while
the Soviets need not fear NATO offensive use. The result of such examination is likely to be a recommendation that NATO modernize its offensive chemical inventory, taking advantage of the improved safety features of binary chemical munitions.

**New Nuclear Systems.** This item has been deliberately left to the bottom of the agenda. This brief review of the deterrent requirements stemming from the objectives of reestablishing a credible escalation ladder and of preventing the Soviets from executing their strategy has pointed to crying needs in the areas of planning for nuclear employment, conventional strength, survivability of nuclear and conventional forces, and $C^3I$. Only the new LRNTN have been mentioned as a priority new weapons need. Nevertheless, as existing systems (such as nuclear artillery) face obsolescence, new systems will be needed. Or, survivability analysis may indicate that a new type of system can provide important new advantages over the old. The point of leaving new weapon systems until last is not to suggest that they will not be needed. Rather, the purpose is to highlight the fact that the traditional issue of the past—the size and weapons makeup of NATO's TNF stockpile—is only one element of a broad program of refurbishing NATO's deterrent.

**POLITICAL REALITY AND THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS**

Even setting aside the question of new nuclear systems, the above agenda contains ample seeds of serious political controversy, controversy that could threaten the political unity of the alliance itself and thus pose far more serious issues for the long term than those discussed above. Nuclear matters especially can take on political meaning beyond their intrinsic military value. They can become an element in the long-term struggle between the United States and USSR for the soul of Western Europe—a struggle about which, according to Uwe Nerlich, the American body politic seems scarcely aware. Consequently, the choice of the agenda for the next four years must be informed by an understanding of the political dangers, joined with a strategy of political action designed to minimize them.

The current controversy over LRTNF provides a case study of the way in which NATO military issues take on an importance that far transcends their military value. The December 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM was a demonstration of allied unity. It showed that despite serious problems with nuclear issues in the past (e.g., the multilateral force and the enhanced radiation warhead), and despite a number of other transatlantic differences, the United States and Western Europe could act in concert on matters vital to their security. It showed this to the publics on both sides of the Atlantic, which were increasingly questioning the effectiveness of NATO as an instrument of their security. It showed this most importantly to the USSR, which strongly opposed the decision.

The LRTNF debate is not over, of course, and as it continues, its political importance grows. Recognizing the potential gains and risks for them, the Soviets have redoubled their efforts to stop the LRTNF deployments. They have employed a combination of threats and blandishments, both aimed at the same audience—the Western European public and parties that can affect the political foundations of leaders, such as Chancellor Schmidt, who are LRTNF supporters. Soviet threats are aimed at Western European interest in the continuation of detente and concern about future Soviet military buildups. Blandishments include a series of superficially appealing arms control offers that would have little impact on the Soviet military forces that led NATO to decide that it needed LRTNF.

Hence, the question of whether the LRTNF are ever deployed is a test of whether the USSR can—by manipulating Western public opinion—successfully exert control over security decisions in the West. For this reason, many would argue that the LRTNF question should be almost the sole item on the NATO military strategy agenda (perhaps in combination with the LTDF and 3 percent real growth) until the new weapons are deployed in the mid-1980s. In short, they would say that now is not the time for a more robust agenda, even though perhaps not quarreling with the substance of such an agenda.

Those who argue for a more robust agenda, such as that outlined above, must also come forward with a plan for dealing with the series
of underlying political problems, any or all of which could ignite a major controversy. The Soviets have proved adept at recognizing these problems and have attempted to manipulate them. The problems include:

**European Concern with War-Fighting.** More than Americans, Europeans have professed to see a difference between strategies and forces for deterrence and strategies and forces for war-fighting. Many people see these as opposites—i.e., any strategy or force posture that is associated with war-fighting will harm deterrence and make nuclear war more likely. The fact that this is a more prevalent attitude in Europe than in the United States is understandable, since the theater nuclear war would be fought on European territory. Because of this distinction, strategies and forces built around the denial objectives discussed above could provoke emotional debate in Europe, including charges of American attempts to plan for extended nuclear war confined to Europe.

**European–American Differences over Detente.** Over the last few years, the goal of good relations with the USSR has largely disappeared as an American national security objective. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States has generally considered the USSR an adversary to be directly countered around the globe—including Europe—on the basis of U.S. military power. In Europe, however, a substantial consensus continues to support the policy of detente, and many political parties are firmly committed to this policy. Europeans value the benefits of the policy (trade, relations with Eastern Europe, and a sense of reduced vulnerability), and the policy is believed to provide a means of affecting the long-term orientation of the USSR. This transatlantic difference provides significant opportunities for the Soviets to influence NATO defense issues by threatening to withhold the benefits of detente and by playing to popular perceptions in Europe of a Soviet Union more benevolent than it is seen to be in the United States.

**Arms Control.** Americans now see arms control as no more than an adjunct to defense preparations in ensuring security. The remaining supporters of arms control see it as having limited objectives—a means by which to make the future defense environment more stable and predictable. Few would argue that arms control agreements can substitute
for defense efforts. Not so in Europe, where a large popular movement supports arms control and does so because it believes that defense preparations could be avoided through arms control. This difference also provides opportunities for the USSR to affect defense decisions and leads European leaders to stress the need for arms control adjuncts to defense decisions, as with maintaining the second (arms control) track of the December 1979 decision.

These are but a few of the underlying political problems that could provoke controversy over NATO nuclear decisions. Any nuclear issue is an emotional one that requires careful public handling. When serious transatlantic differences, such as those described above, are added, the need for caution is multiplied. The key question is how to balance the objective defense needs of making rapid progress on the long-term agenda described above with the need to maintain the solidarity of the alliance—the popular consensus on both sides of the Atlantic supporting NATO as the instrument of Western security.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to spell out the agenda of strategy and related force posture issues facing the NATO alliance over the long term. It has argued that the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent is being undermined by an emerging asymmetry:

- The Soviets have developed a force posture able to cope with NATO's escalation strategy.
- NATO is unable to cope with the Soviet strategy of nuclear war-fighting.

This argument leads to an agenda of potential actions to improve NATO's deterrent by reestablishing the credibility of NATO's escalation ladder and the capability to deny the Soviets their military objectives. These goals are two sides of the same deterrent coin.

The paper has suggested that the choice of the specific agenda for the next four years will be heavily influenced—as always—by political
considerations and that the stakes in this choice are high because of the importance of successful implementation of the LRTNF decision. It has posited two schools of thought on the choice of the agenda:

- One arguing for concentration solely on LRTNF—and perhaps on conventional force improvements, such as the LTDP.
- Another pushing for a more robust agenda, encompassing the majority of the agenda items described in this paper.

A more robust agenda must be accompanied by a political strategy aimed at minimizing the potentially severe political problems that could be raised by such an agenda.
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. failure to ratify the SALT II treaty will continue to trouble the Atlantic alliance over the next few years. The Reagan administration came into office skeptical of the utility of the SALT process, while the European allies continued to view SALT as the cornerstone of Western arms control policies. This divergence may lead to disruptive policy conflicts between the United States and its European allies and ultimately threaten the political viability of the alliance. The potential for conflict has already manifest itself in the opposition to the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces, in the clash of strategic interests, and in the apparent U.S. willingness to consider NATO a contingent arrangement.

The prospects for implementing the December 1979 decision on long-range theater nuclear forces are heavily burdened by the rejection of SALT II. The deployment aspect of that decision has come under pressure from the peace movement, which gained momentum largely because of the failure of SALT II. The negotiating aspect was shaped in anticipation of the successful conclusion of SALT II. Thus, although the United States will represent an agreed Western position in LRNF negotiations with the USSR, the allied attitude toward LRNF deployments will also be shaped by the prospects of SALT.

The conflicts of interest that NATO's strategic doctrine (MC 14/3) bridged are reasserting themselves politically because of the uncertainty surrounding SALT. Arms control negotiations had the effect of politically "desensitizing" these conflicts, thanks to the increasingly successful development of a coherent NATO stance on SALT, MBFR, CSCE, and the LRNF decision. This buffer between conflicting U.S. and European strategic interests now threatens to break down.

To the European allies, the failure of SALT II seemed also to go hand in hand with a basic shift in U.S. attitudes toward the Atlantic
alliance—an apparently growing American willingness to consider NATO a contingent arrangement subject to a short-term and limited cost-benefit calculus for U.S. policies.

The ultimate relevance of these effects clearly depends on the course of U.S.-Soviet relations—and SALT—over the next few years, on American success in managing the intra-alliance aspect of its policies toward the USSR, and on the U.S. appreciation of the sources of allied concerns over SALT. A consideration of some of the problems that will determine the success or failure of managing SALT within the Atlantic alliance follows.

**ALLIED SUPPORT OF SALT II**

European support for the SALT II treaty was a central issue in the American debate on whether or not to ratify SALT II.¹ Successive U.S. administrations had consulted with the NATO allies to allay European concerns and to secure European support for the U.S. position on strategic arms limitation. And although U.S. officials may have considered the need for consultation a burden on the SALT process, these consultations largely assuaged European fears. The combination of general European support for arms control and the European practice of leaving strategic judgments and decisions largely to the United States forestalled any basic challenge within the alliance to the SALT process or to the general outline of SALT I and II agreements. When U.S. domestic opposition to the proposed SALT II agreement began to threaten the near certainty of ratification, however, the question of NATO cohesion and

Western European interest in SALT ratification came to the fore of the American debate. In fact, the Carter administration's success in demonstrating strong allied support for SALT II became one of its most telling arguments for ratification.

The opponents of SALT II used four broad sets of arguments to defuse the Carter administration's predictions about the likelihood of a profound crisis in NATO were SALT II not ratified: (1) allied support for the treaty need not be taken at face value, since it was stimulated by Washington; (2) the support was less an expression of approval of the treaty than one of fear about the consequences for East-West relations should the United States fail to ratify the treaty; (3) insofar as allied support for SALT II was genuine, it stemmed from Europeans' customary attention to the political-symbolic details of their security rather than to the military; and (4) since the Western European support for SALT II did not absolve the United States of the responsibility for Western security, SALT II should be decided on its merits and not on the basis of allied support.

The first opposition argument referred to the Western Europeans' obligation as allies to support U.S. policy. This obligation stems from the fundamental fact of Atlantic alliance relations: The United States is indispensable to European security, but not vice versa. Thus, for the European allies not to support the U.S. government's SALT policies would not only undermine NATO's future negotiating position with the Warsaw Pact but would also endanger the basis of the U.S. commitment to European defense.

The second argument of the SALT II opponents addressed the Europeans' identification of the SALT process as the most important element in the continuity of the European detente process. Thus, in the European view, any technical demerits of the SALT treaty for Western security were overshadowed by the requirement for continuity in East-West relations. In European eyes, the failure to ratify the treaty could lead to further deterioration of the U.S. government's ability to manage East-West affairs and possibly also to the total breakdown of the SALT process and, with it, the detente process.
The third argument interpreted the European support for SALT II as a consequence of the European political-strategic outlook: The European allies combined skepticism about the importance of the strategic arguments put forward by SALT opponents—with regard both to the terms of the treaty and to the requirements of Western defense—with their customary acceptance of U.S. strategic judgments. The fourth argument simply reflected the view of some Americans that the burden of leadership and strategic responsibility bestows the right to make strategic decisions, allied worries notwithstanding.

The SALT opponents' explanations of allied motives for supporting SALT II were, in a sense, a hard-line review of the nature of intra-NATO relations. One should add, however, that behind these views were more critical (or even hostile) views of NATO and the European failure to support even the modest efforts of the Carter administration to counter Soviet expansionism. Added to the above assessments of Western European motives in supporting SALT II was the implication that European attitudes could signify the end of NATO's usefulness as the framework for safeguarding the security of the Atlantic nations.

In defusing the Carter administration's European argument, the opposition's analysis of European motives permitted the conclusion that, in fact, the consequences of nonratification for the Atlantic alliance could be managed. The approach to coping with the consequences of the failure to ratify SALT II could be summarized as follows:

- The consequences of the failure to ratify SALT II would be mitigated by the election of a new president, who could sweep the board clean, and—with his popular mandate—have the political freedom to effect the necessary changes in U.S. and NATO defense and arms control policies, thus creating an entirely new framework for intra-alliance relations.
- Shelving SALT II would not mean shelving the SALT process. Rather, a coherent and strong Western security policy would increase the chances for getting more meaningful arms control agreements.
In this context, specific issues of European concern, such as the SALT II Protocol and the Backfire understanding, which were indicative of the flawed approach to SALT of previous administrations, could be rectified in a more coherent concept of Western security.

The SALT opponents' assessment of the U.S. ability to manage the failure of SALT II may also have been influenced by the perception that America's NATO allies ultimately had no real alternative but to accept the rejection of SALT II. In other words, the same political-strategic realities that motivated the Western European support for SALT II would also serve to reconcile the allies to its failure.

The election of President Reagan resolved the SALT II debate: The new administration decided against resubmitting the treaty to the Senate for ratification. The correctness of the treaty opponents' assessment of the validity and force of earlier European concerns about the failure to ratify SALT II will largely determine how successful this administration will be in managing its SALT policies vis-à-vis its allies.

ALLIED STAKES IN THE CONTINUITY OF SALT

Although the Western European attitude toward SALT has changed substantially over the past 14 years, it may have always had—in American eyes—a faintly paradoxical quality. At the beginning of the SALT process, Western Europeans frequently expressed fears of an emerging "superpower condominium"—fears that the new era in U.S.-Soviet relations would override alliance loyalties and, in fact, restore superpower hegemony over the European members of NATO. These concerns became linked to more permanent concerns about the willingness of the United States to maintain its nuclear commitment to Europe, and the issue of forward-based systems (FBS) developed into substantial European misgivings about the American SALT stance. Later, the related concern about the suspected willingness of the United States to trade away NATO defense options in SALT gave the cruise missile issue importance far beyond its strategic relevance. The last issue, however, drew its contentiousness
not simply from worries about U.S.-USSR bilateralism, but also from an allied perception that these systems could well enhance the credibility of the U.S. commitment to NATO.

Although the SALT information and consultation efforts could never completely alleviate allied worries about the strength of the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO, they succeeded in other ways. In addition to securing European support for SALT, the strategic "education" provided by the United States to its allies fed back into the work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). As a consequence, European understanding of the relationship between central forces and European defense under conditions of strategic parity became more sophisticated. While this led to rather positive allied responses to the American efforts to improve the flexibility of central forces (in NSDM 242 and SIOP 5), European concerns about the relationship between the central balance and the balance of theater nuclear forces increased.

The NATO decision on LRTNF modernization in December 1979, then, was very much a child of the SALT process. Americans and Europeans recognized that strategic parity must not be permitted to erode the U.S. nuclear commitment. Soviet efforts to increase existing disparities in the theater nuclear balance thus had to be countered either by a negotiated theater balance or by restoring the balance through matching arms efforts. This double-track approach, which was agreed to in December 1979, was in keeping with both the American approach to SALT and the traditional predominance in European strategic thought of political considerations over more narrow military considerations.²

In sum, the SALT process provided a mechanism for reducing the distance between U.S. strategic planning, arms control negotiating strategies, and allied strategic concerns. In addition, the Europeans saw arms control as linked not only to strategic planning but to overall

²The frequently quoted speech by Helmut Schmidt in 1977 before the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) must be looked at in the context of closing the politically deleterious negotiating gap between SALT and MBFR so as to pressure the Soviets into TNF negotiations with the threat of matching NATO efforts. It was well understood at that time that TNF negotiations would provide for an even closer connection between SALT and allied concerns about the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO.
security strategy. In particular, the pursuit of arms control was embedded in detente policies designed to reduce further the possibility of a military conflict in Europe without permanently freezing the European status quo. SALT thus provided well for the European allies' NATO interests, and, at least in the West German case, it also contributed to making a continuous real increase in defense outlays relatively non-controversial within the country.

For these reasons, the Western European allies were reluctant to accept the domestic American political criticism of detente and the strategic and political criticism of SALT, because such criticism ostensibly delegitimized both SALT and detente and thus threatened the whole web of Western policies.

Most Western European policymakers interpreted the mainstream strategic arguments against SALT II as arguments against the Carter administration and those opposed to the B-1, MX, and other defense efforts. Thus, Western Europeans did not (and, to a degree, still do not) understand that many of the strategic arguments against SALT II derived from the opponents' views of SALT's original flaw—that of having been conceived without a strategy, or with the misdirected strategic concept of assured destruction. It is especially hard for them to recognize the latter as a flaw, since it represents their fundamental assumption about what makes deterrence work. They find it equally difficult to understand the argument that the American negotiating team could not protect U.S. security interests successfully. Therefore, the detailed criticism of SALT II in the United States was frequently taken as a smokescreen for political arguments.

For this reason, allied governments probably considered the Reagan administration's position on SALT—and on arms control in general—more flexible and more amenable to allied concerns than if they had taken the strategic arguments at face value. Thus, Western European leaders tempered their apprehensions about the future of SALT and U.S.-Soviet relations with the notion that the U.S. commitment to negotiate with the Soviets stemmed from the belief that, now that the SALT politics of a weak administration is over, the SALT process and other negotiations can be made to work again to the U.S. advantage.
The allies' mixture of concern and faith continues to express itself in the hope that U.S. policies will settle down to a tough-minded, pragmatic realism. Then, the failure of the Vienna agreement could be regarded as an unfortunate legacy of the prior administration's weakness (for which some Western European governments must accept some of the blame), and the SALT process could be saved by the enhanced credibility and resolve of the Reagan presidency. Others, however, who look with apprehension on the Reagan administration's foreign and strategic policies blame the failure of SALT II on the U.S. rejection of both the SALT process and the political changes that the alliance underwent during the 1970s. In this perspective, the restoration of domestic legitimacy to the SALT process is considered rather improbable in the short term. In addition, some members of allied governments worry that while they are looking for indicators of which way SALT is going, which channels of negotiation and conflict management with the USSR are still open, and which options for resuming SALT still exist, the United States may already be considering a moratorium on arms control negotiations—the high probability of LRNF negotiations notwithstanding.

Quite obviously, these two views are closely linked with expectations about the future of the Atlantic alliance. In fact, under current political conditions, the willingness of the United States again to enter into SALT negotiations with the Soviets may be contingent on allied willingness to follow the U.S. leadership in dealing politically, militarily, and economically with the USSR. This presents a painful dilemma to the allies: On the one hand, while following U.S. leadership in the hope that the resulting demonstration of Western resolve and unity may obviate the need for the United States to freeze arms control negotiations in response to Soviet misbehavior, it may also lead to the further deterioration of East-West relations and thus destroy the minimum conditions for viable arms control negotiations. On the other hand, European efforts to maintain some pluralism in Western policies toward the USSR may impel the United States to adopt a much more confrontational stance in dealing with the Soviets, to freeze arms control, and to approach East-West relations unilaterally.
This dilemma connects intra-alliance and East-West relations so closely that the question of the continuity of SALT nearly translates into the question of how much diversity the United States can still tolerate within the Atlantic alliance and how much confidence in its policies it can inspire.

THE EUROPEAN FLANK OF U.S. SALT POLICIES

The unprecedented scrutiny and second-guessing to which the European allies are subjecting U.S. arms control policies have created a serious problem for intra-alliance relationships. The problem concerns the usefulness of American assurances that the United States will pursue forthright arms control negotiations with the USSR. European pressure on the United States has been self-defeating in the sense that the assurances were too obviously a response to allied concerns. Therefore, the Europeans tend to find the reassurances inadequate, and they are looking for more tangible evidence of U.S. intentions in the form of a stable negotiating process, concrete proposals, and, ultimately, a new SALT treaty. Because time has not yet permitted such evidence to develop, Europeans give more weight to circumstantial evidence of American intentions (leaks, for example) than to the assurances of U.S. officials. Until SALT, LRTNF, and other arms control negotiations provide concrete evidence of U.S. intentions, Europeans will be watching U.S. behavior with respect to the existing SALT treaties—the ABM treaty, the SALT I interim agreement, and the unratified SALT II treaty. They will also be watching the Soviets.

The potential for a second problem for intra-alliance relationships stems from Western European ambivalence regarding Soviet arms control observance. A U.S. breakout from any of the arms control agreements would elicit strongly adverse political reactions in Europe. Yet any change in the Soviet position on these agreements, especially on the unratified SALT II treaty, would be interpreted less harshly. Especially because SALT II places the most immediately effective and most visible constraints on the Soviets, some Europeans would probably see

For example, the provisions about testing and deploying no more than one new, light, single-warhead ICBM, the nonmodification provisions,
a Soviet breakout as evidence that the Soviets either considered the resumption of SALT unlikely or expected an American public relations effort rather than forthright arms control negotiations.

Nevertheless, the Soviets must take into account the possibility that should they be the ones to break out, they would have to bear the responsibility for ending the SALT process. To avoid permanent political losses in Europe, they would therefore seek to strengthen the perception that the responsibility for their breakout rested mainly with the United States. On the other hand, if the Soviets in fact expect a SALT-less strategic competition with the United States, they may --European reactions notwithstanding--decide to translate their present advantage of having a broad weapon-production program into a clear-cut strategic advantage over the United States (and NATO).

Soviet behavior with regard to the Vienna treaty may be considered a substantial, albeit ambiguous, indicator. If the Soviets are willing to risk the political costs of breaking out of SALT II, they may indeed consider the chances of resuming SALT in the next four years, as well as a return to businesslike U.S.-Soviet relations, to be highly improbable. In short, 1982 may see, on the one hand, intricate Soviet maneuvering to test American intentions and to exploit European worries and, on the other, American efforts to keep the Soviets limited to two basic options:

- Observing SALT II--an option that offers the USSR the prospect of U.S. proposals to renegotiate or abrogate the ABM treaty and to deeply cut offensive weapons.
- Not observing SALT II--an option that may not improve the Soviet negotiating position, will further reduce the chances of resuming SALT, and, at the same time, might curtail Soviet political opportunities in Europe.

Thus, Soviet and American tactics must both be geared to using the other side's Western European flank to constrain the other side's

the verification provisions, the provision banning mobile ICBMs, the Backfire arrangement, and the fractionation limits.
options. This connection puts a high premium on the ability of the United States to reassert its leadership in Europe and on the ability of the Soviet Union to persuade the Western Europeans that detente still holds substantial benefits for them. Seen in this light, the problem of alliance cohesion may in fact be the most vulnerable side of the Reagan administration's SALT policy. A sullen resignation on the part of Western Europeans to "weathering the next four years" may --as much as irritation with the previous administration's unpredictability--undermine allied cohesion and effective U.S. leadership and, thus, the American bargaining position with the Soviets.

Conversely, a strong U.S. administration's disenchantment with its NATO allies might have substantially greater consequences, especially if it puts greater pressure on the Europeans with regard to defense budgets and foreign policies than the last administration and demonstrates even greater willingness (and ability) to carry through political-strategic threats against its allies (e.g., by encouraging a conservative version of the Mansfield amendments)--and to accept the consequences. The management of a policy of linking SALT to Soviet international behavior and arms control negotiations to allied cooperation thus requires extraordinary diplomatic adroitness if the United States considers the alliance costs to its security policies relevant. Simplicity and straightforwardness will certainly not characterize intra-alliance relations.  

To make its strategy work, the United States must convince the Soviets that it approaches SALT on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. At the same time, to keep allied dissent within manageable bounds, it must convince the Western Europeans that this approach gives SALT an honest second chance. Western European apprehensions about the future of SALT, the U.S. policy of linkage, and the likely nonnegotiability of a deep-cut SALT proposal will strain the credibility of the U.S. position--especially if the U.S. decides to abrogate or to renegotiate the ABM treaty.

---

4The situation in Poland does not rescue the United States from this diplomatic balancing act: It may yet force the United States to stand by its commitment to link SALT to the Soviets' international behavior and thus to delay or scuttle SALT. But the allied perceptions of the confrontational nature of the Reagan administration's policies
PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

If SALT negotiations resume, the alliance will have to face the problem of SALT-LRTNF linkage. The implementation of NATO's LRTNF decision will become a practical problem in 1983-1984. By then, the fate of SALT will be more readily apparent. Politics will tie the successful implementation of the LRTNF decision to the U.S. stance on both SALT and the LRTNF negotiations. This means that the link between SALT and LRTNF, envisioned in 1979 and broken by the failure of SALT II, will have to be reforged, further complicating U.S. SALT problems.

This SALT-LRTNF connection also poses a strategic problem. Because the decision of December 12, 1979, had a persuasive political rationale and only a rather amorphous strategic one, LRTNF negotiations, or the LRTNF aspect of SALT negotiations, may fall far short of strategic coherence. Rectifying this defect would require defining a strategic rationale for sizing the LRTNF force, clarifying the role of LRTNF within NATO's strategic concept (a concept that should guide the whole of NATO's TNF posture), and conceptualizing the relationship between the NATO TNF and LRTNF posture and the U.S. central strategic posture. These tasks are daunting under the best of circumstances, and even then, at least five years would be needed to achieve preliminary results.

The present schedule for negotiating with the Soviets and the initial deployment of GLCM and Pershing II does not allow even for getting a serious start on resolving these problems. These sensitive issues will be posed by the negotiations, even if there is no serious plan to study them in NATO.

The required coordination of the LRTNF and SALT (or START—strategic arms reduction talks) negotiating positions raises another, closely related set of strategic issues—issues that the United States must address in the light of internal criticism of the SALT II Protocol and the Backfire understanding. To mention only the most obvious issues: In which forum, and how, should Backfire, SS-N-6, and the part of the SS-11 forces targeted on Europe, as well as Scud and Scaleboard (and their

before the fact remain a crucial problem for the alliance management of the consequences.
successors), be addressed? How will the schedule of LRNTF and SALT (START) negotiations be coordinated? Should Europeans regain the role they had in consulting with the United States about its SALT (START) negotiating strategy?

The United States thus is boxed in by conflicting pressures: domestic demands for a strong and coherent military posture, domestic suspicions of arms control, the need to assuage allied fears about the future of arms control, and the demands of relieving the domestic pressure on allied governments (especially the beleaguered West German one). Therefore, if the Soviets cannot be pressured into making substantial concessions on the LRNTF issue, or if international events do not rescue the United States from arms control negotiations with the Soviets, serious LRNTF negotiations will probably either alienate this administration's constituencies or lead to open conflicts of interest between the allies (and again, especially West Germany).

In sum, the ability of the United States to pursue a defense policy that neither endangers the political alignments in Western Europe, the stability of West Germany, and the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance, nor subverts its original promise of a coherent defense and arms control strategy, seems to depend on its ability to force the Soviets into substantial concessions. As pointed out above, according to U.S. reasoning, it can obtain these concessions only if it can credibly threaten to outarm and to outspend the Soviets. This requires not only willingness on the part of NATO Europe to increase its defense efforts, but also substantial European increases to equalize the economic disadvantages of larger American defense burdens.\(^5\)

In this analysis, the critics' three conditions\(^6\) for successfully managing the rejection of SALT II cannot be met. Because the United

\(^5\)This point is germane, because the success of the Reagan administration's economic program could be threatened further by a substantial deterioration in the international economic position of the United States, thus endangering the stability of the U.S. defense budget. Equally important, such a situation tends to reinforce the strains on the Western economic system and the attendant political repercussions.

\(^6\)See above, pp. 132-133.
States has considerable control over the foreign policy consensus in such countries as Germany and Italy, it may be able to reassert its leadership of the alliance. But it is far from clear that the resulting kind of leadership could then be used to strengthen Western security, because the domestic consensus in Western Europe on security and foreign policies—a consensus that has prevailed for at least two decades—may give way to a lasting polarization over the issue of national and European security.

This is a deeply unsatisfactory conclusion, but it is not inescapable. Time could make a difference if the politics of the intervening period are carefully managed and if the Europeans can be brought to believe that the new rules of the game have a reasonable chance of being accepted—or at least of not being flagrantly violated—by the Soviets. The time needed to demonstrate that the United States is indeed committed to a vigorous defense program and to countering Soviet opportunist expansionism may not be long enough to cause the consequences that the Europeans fear. This is particularly true if the Soviets become convinced that without some restraint on their part, the Western Europeans will be forced to fall into line behind the United States, Soviet propaganda and disruptive diplomacy notwithstanding.

Europeans may consider this solution of the European dilemma—American strength regained, European detente and arms control maintained—a high-risk gamble. It requires their acceptance of the underlying American aims as achievable and reasonable: achievable, because failure would lead to an indefinite freeze in East-West relations; reasonable, because of the simmering suspicion in Europe that the normalization of East-West relations may be held hostage to the situation in Poland and to the success of American policies in Latin America (e.g., El Salvador or Guatemala), Africa (e.g., South Africa, Namibia, or Ethiopia), the Middle East, or Asia.

Turning the gamble into political strategy sensitive to the concerns of the European allies requires a large measure of U.S. diplomatic agility and firmness of purpose. It also requires confidence in U.S. ability to restrain its strategic goals—i.e., that restoration of
coherence, reliability, focus, and moderation to American foreign
policy means no more than reestablishing equality in arms control
negotiations at all levels and curbing Soviet opportunities for ex-
ploiting regional instabilities. If the United States can convince
its Western European allies that this is the case, then the Europeans
may be able to bear the uncertainties attendant upon such a course
with less gloomy expectations.
THE MANAGEMENT OF INTRA-NATO RELATIONS

Simon Lunn

INTRODUCTION

Recent events suggest that the management of intra-NATO relations and the preservation of the current framework of the alliance as the basis for Western security will severely challenge Western policymakers in the 1980s. Disagreements exist between the United States and its European allies over a broad range of topics. At issue is the prevailing view in the United States that the Soviet threat, having reached global proportions, requires a global response from the Western alliance. The European allies, for the most part, have been reluctant to accept the analysis that underlies this view or the policy prescriptions that flow from it. A lack of strategic consensus exists on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the nature and scale of the threat and the appropriate policies and resources needed to counter it.

Differences concern both the nature of the threat and the capacity and appropriateness of the alliance as currently structured to deal with it. Should NATO confine itself to dealing with military security issues, narrowly defined, or do the complexities of the international arena demand a much broader definition of security, including the close coordination of all aspects of the East-West relationship? Are new institutional mechanisms and new procedures needed to cope with the new challenges? Would such developments serve only to enlarge the area of potential alliance friction and distract attention from the already troubled agenda facing NATO in its area of primary responsibility: the defense of the Atlantic area? Would such innovations mean the eventual fragmentation of the alliance?

None of these problems, neither those of substance nor those of structure, is new. As seasoned NATO officials and observers frequently remind us, alliance history is littered with crises and disagreements reminiscent to those of today, and NATO has survived. So why should we believe that current problems are worse than previous ones?
Three factors make the issues facing the alliance today more serious than those of the past. First, while changes in the security environment—for example, Soviet force modernization and Persian Gulf area instability—are highly visible, interpretations of the implications of these changes vary considerably. Second, the differences spread across a wider range of topics. Third, the political environment on both sides of the Atlantic has changed.

Public attitudes in Europe and the United States have moved apart. The current support in the United States for a stronger military posture and increased defense spending has no counterpart in Europe. In contrast to the Reagan administration, European governments are insisting that defense must take its share in the general reduction in public spending. The substantial growth of antinuclear sentiment in several European countries and a greater awareness of hitherto neglected defense issues reflect a further change in the political climate of Europe. At the same time, some member governments have experienced swings in public and parliamentary opinion. The cumulative effect of these developments has been to constrain the freedom of action of some allied governments in taking sensitive defense decisions.

The greater public interest in defense on both sides of the Atlantic will tend to hinder alliance decisionmaking and reduce the freedom to maneuver and the willingness to compromise that are essential to the achievement of consensus. The mutual understanding and tolerance that have been indispensable to the effective functioning of the alliance will inevitably diminish. Current transatlantic differences reflect not only arguments about capabilities and means, but also much deeper societal trends which, if they continue, may seriously affect the Atlantic relationship. Under these conditions, the traditional assumption that the common values and mutual interests underlying the alliance will always overcome differences will become increasingly questionable.

The problems of managing intra-NATO affairs in the 1980s will involve two separate but related issues: the resolution of differences concerning the immediate security requirements of the alliance and the adjustments or changes to be made in the alliance structure to enable it to cope with the changing environment of the 1980s. This paper
concentrates on the immediate security issues facing the alliance, namely, the role of nuclear weapons, defense spending, and out-of-area threats, and their implications for intra-NATO relations. These issues, reflecting the principles of equity and burden-sharing on which NATO is based, represent the alliance's reason for being. The paper will also examine the problems of coordinating alliance policies in broader areas and the more theoretical issue of alternative mechanisms.

CURRENT TENSIONS

Current differences between the United States and Europe range across a broad spectrum of issues. These differences are well known, and a brief summary of the main points of contention will suffice. The fundamental divergence concerns interpretations of the threat and the policies to counter it. The United States sees the growth of Soviet power and influence as a challenge that must be met by concerted military, political, and economic action. The Reagan administration has proposed policies that set the tone for this reassertion of Western influence. The new approach will be based on greater military power, entailing substantial increases in defense spending and a shift in the allocation of domestic resources from social programs to defense, a more rigorous approach to East-West relations based on the principles of reciprocity and linkage, and a lower priority for the role of arms control negotiations.

The popular support in the United States for these policies originated in the general feeling of frustration concerning the apparent decline of U.S. power. Several developments created a feeling of vulnerability to which American society was unaccustomed: the effects of the oil crisis, the spread of Soviet influence and growth of Soviet military power, the development of Soviet strategic forces, and the related issue of vulnerability of American land-based missiles. The decline of U.S. power was finally demonstrated by the seizure of American hostages by the Iranians. In contrast, the rise of Soviet power was demonstrated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The support for a reversal of this situation has provided a clear mandate for officials in the Reagan
administration who have long argued for policies designed to counter the Soviet menace.

Although many issues that produced the demand in the United States for a restoration of American power were of equal relevance to Europe, European reactions have been quite different. Europeans have been reluctant to accept the stark, seemingly confrontational approach of the Reagan administration to East-West relations. They are reluctant to move away from the principles of defense and detente, which have guided NATO policy for the past decade. Europeans accept the need to improve NATO's defenses in the face of Soviet modernization, but how much, and the degree to which defense should be given priority over social needs, is a matter of contention. Furthermore, in contrast to the current mood in the United States, the Europeans retain a strong commitment to arms control as an essential component of European security—hence, the emphasis on the duality of the NATO LRTNF decision and the pressure on the United States to begin negotiations. Western dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf states has increased Western interest in the stability of the region, but Americans and Europeans differ as to which policies will help to maintain this stability. Europeans, less convinced than Americans of the potential role for military force, place more emphasis on political and economic measures.

The significant rise of antinuclear sentiment in a number of European countries stems from the general condition of international instability, the current tension between East and West, the lack of success of arms control negotiations in moderating the technological developments of either superpower, the perceived move toward viable nuclear options symbolized by FD 59, the somewhat dramatic debate over the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW), and the subsequent debate over NATO's decision to modernize its LRTNF. These developments led to a feeling of helplessness regarding the control of nuclear weapons and to the call for the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from European territory. Opponents of nuclear weapons do not automatically oppose NATO or defense spending. They are concerned principally about what they perceive to be NATO's excessive dependence on nuclear weapons and unnecessarily
confrontational policies. In this sense, they become anti-NATO and anti-American when NATO and the United States are seen to be responsible for such developments. However, many of the antinuclear lobby continue to support both NATO and current levels of defense spending.

A variety of reasons have been advanced to explain the antinuclear trend in Europe and the refusal of European governments to contribute the resources considered necessary to meet the new challenges: Europeans have been seduced by the rewards of detente; they want the benefits of cooperation without the costs of competition; they have become overly dependent and overly committed to their welfare societies; they have been intimidated by Soviet military power; and having lost faith in American power and purpose, they have opted for the middle ground of accommodation. These statements probably contain an element of truth, but the underlying premise that Europeans are opting out of the defense business and approaching a state of self-neutralization is fundamentally wrong. Such assertions ignore past and current levels of European defense spending and existing and planned capabilities. They also ignore the fact that in most European countries conscription fosters the concept of national defense rooted in society.

Although most Europeans accept the obligation of military service and the need to maintain defense capabilities, however, the precise details of a government's defense policy generally attracts little public interest. Parliaments, for the most part, play a relatively minor role in the formulation of defense policy. While their powers of scrutiny vary from country to country, nowhere do they match those of the United States Congress. The growth of public concern over the role of nuclear weapons in Europe has changed this situation. In a number of countries, interest in nuclear issues has meant a greater awareness of defense issues generally. Current economic conditions and the need for governments to reduce public spending has also served to focus attention on the claim of defense to scarce national resources. This increased and potentially critical interest in defense has come at a time when several governments are increasingly vulnerable to swings in public and parliamentary opinion. As a result, these governments will be less
free to adjust their positions in intra-alliance bargaining, particularly over such sensitive issues as nuclear weapons.

Thus, current attitudes to defense and nuclear weapons, combined with the vulnerability of several governments to parliamentary and party political pressures, will be an important factor in intra-NATO relations. The ability to compromise so as to achieve mutually acceptable solutions will diminish. This is true for the United States, where the Congress will want to see visible signs of European acceptance of the new challenges. The Congress will be increasingly unwilling to accept ambiguous formulas, such as the division of labor concept, without more tangible proof in the way of additional resources and commitments. The ability of European governments to simultaneously accommodate American pressures and satisfy their own domestic critics will be similarly constrained. If current trends continue, the ability of the smaller countries to participate in certain defense functions may be diminished and, as a consequence, the cohesion of the alliance may be weakened.

ALLIANCE COORDINATION

Much of the current friction in the alliance arises from disagreements over what NATO can do and what it ought to do. These disagreements stem from differing concepts of the original institution. Is it simply a defense mechanism concerned with the coordination of a common defense policy for the alliance area, or is it a community of like-minded nations linked by a common purpose and an identity of interests that should permit close cooperation across a broad range of activities? In practice, it has fluctuated uneasily between the two extremes, achieving relatively close coordination in military planning but rarely succeeding in reconciling divergent interests on issues less directly related to the single common denominator, the security of Western Europe. Similarly, the allies have disagreed over the definition of security, whether Western security can be confined to military developments in the Atlantic area, or whether it inevitably involves events outside NATO's boundaries and economic and political factors that influence defense capabilities. NATO has been relatively successful in accepting the first definition, less successful with the second.
Demands that NATO should adopt broader responsibilities than the coordination of military requirements go back to the original charter. However, the alliance's ability to do so has always been constrained by its institutional characteristics and by the diversity of its membership. NATO constitutes an excellent mechanism for the exchange of information and for regular consultation and coordination. It suffers, however, from the inevitable handicap that agreements are not binding and are continually subject to the pressures of domestic politics. Thus, while circumstances frequently point to the need for a broader mandate, the nature of the institution and its membership suggests that the degree of involvement should be limited.

The adoption of the Harmel report and of the dual principles of defense and detente gave NATO a secure stake in the coordination of the political and economic aspects of East-West relations. However, its role was essentially that of a coordinating mechanism, as most of the work was done in bilateral and multilateral negotiation. The most crucial area of nonmilitary coordination has concerned East-West trade. However, differences between the United States and Europe and even among the Europeans themselves in the extent of trade with the East have made agreement difficult. The lack of agreement was demonstrated by the attempt to coordinate sanctions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when there was considerable dispute over the relevance and effectiveness of such measures.

The allied response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated the long-enduring problem of consultation. The United States, as a global superpower, has primary interest in this issue. Almost every American administration has taken office promising that its relationship with its allies will be based on timely and adequate consultation; however, what constitutes timely and adequate is a subjective judgment. In respect to Soviet actions in Afghanistan, not only did the Europeans disagree with the U.S. strategic analysis, but they were unhappy with the procedure by which they were informed of American policies.

With regard to Poland, however, the alliance has demonstrated the ability to consult and coordinate policy in a timely fashion. Members
have agreed that Soviet intervention would have grave consequences for Eastern relations and has conveyed that opinion in the hope of affecting Soviet behavior. But despite their determination to make clear to the Soviet Union the full consequences of its actions, members of the alliance show distinct unease at the implications of such a policy. As with deterrence, there is a reluctance to think beyond the threat.

The instability of the developing world, the increased dependence of the West on external sources for its raw materials and energy, and the expansion of Soviet influence mean that the coordination of Western policies over a broader range of issues will remain a key issue of the 1980s. The present structure of the alliance will not suffice, however, because the interests of the fifteen are too diverse and because NATO must focus its attention on solving the most pressing problems of its immediate security. Consequently, it will be necessary to look for new mechanisms and structures.

As befitting an alliance whose primary function is defense, NATO has achieved a considerable degree of coordination in collective defense planning. A well-practiced mechanism of coordination and consultation exists for reaching agreement on the capabilities needed for defense. Even in this area, however, NATO's scope is limited by national sovereignty. NATO force planning provides member nations with priorities and objectives that are guidelines rather than binding commitments. The force goals themselves already represent a compromise between what international military commanders would like and what national plans will allow. Nevertheless, the force goals remain a useful benchmark against which to judge a country's performance.

Efforts to achieve closer cooperation in national defense planning continue, and in this respect, the LTDP initiative of the Carter administration represented one of the most ambitious attempts to coordinate alliance actions. Although the LTDP has had considerable political significance, however, its military impact has been reduced by the inability or unwillingness of nations to alter their already established domestic planning cycles.

Inherent in the concept of alliance membership is the principle that each country contributes equitably to the common defense.
Variations in economic conditions and domestic pressures have always presupposed a degree of tolerance and mutual understanding concerning individual contributions at any given time. There are always disagreements concerning what is needed and how much can be afforded. Force levels and contributions evolve through bargaining and inevitably involve compromises on all sides. Multilateral consultation frequently influences member countries to adjust their position, and collective NATO pressure has on occasion reversed national decisions (as in the case of the United Kingdom and Denmark in the mid-1970s).

The system, although flawed, functions because the members can reconcile differences through consultation and compromise. Recent events, however, indicate that this procedure will be severely tested in the coming years. Three issues, each of which has both a material and symbolic importance, will be crucial:

- The role of nuclear weapons in Europe, symbolizing the willingness of the European allies to share the nuclear risk
- Defense spending, affecting the fundamental principle of equity in alliance burden-sharing
- The alliance response to out-of-area threats, demonstrating the capacity of the alliance to adapt to the changing security environment, and of the Europeans to share the new responsibilities of Western security.

Because each of these issues affects NATO's primary function, the future defense of the alliance, they have already inspired considerable debate and discussion, much of it acrimonious. The alliance has managed in its usual fashion to achieve consensus on each issue, but as in each case this consensus accommodates rather than reconciles the divergent views, it will prove difficult to sustain in the current political climate. For contrasting reasons, it will satisfy neither American nor European expectations.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The role of nuclear weapons in Europe will doubtless continue to be a significant and highly divisive issue in intra-NATO relations. Recent political developments, the continued uncertainty over the NATO decision of December 12 to modernize its LRNF, and the inevitable need for the alliance to consider further modernization and adjustments to the other elements of the TNF posture in Europe will continue to attract public interest to the role of nuclear weapons. The political capital invested in the NATO decision means that any falling away from the December 12 consensus will have unfortunate repercussions. The inability of certain member countries to participate in nuclear risk-sharing will mar relations between the United States and Europe, and among the European members. Much will depend on the procedures and tactics now adopted, particularly arms control negotiations.

The United States has traditionally dominated allied nuclear planning. While the formation of the NPR gave the Europeans a degree of participation in nuclear planning, the United States took the lead in initiating changes in doctrine and capabilities. Events in the mid-1970s led to a deviation from this procedure. European suspicions that the United States was ignoring European security concerns in the SALT negotiations was coupled with a growing concern at the modernization of Soviet medium-range nuclear forces. The establishment of the High Level Group (HLG) to deal with these concerns represented an effort on the part of the alliance to reach a genuine consensus on NATO TNF requirements. The allies were in effect asked to participate in the formulation of alliance nuclear policy. Furthermore, the participation of officials from national capitals reflected the recognition of the issue's importance and the need to ensure attention at the highest level. It was also an indirect criticism of the workings of the NATO bureaucracy and the NPR in the sense that a number of officials believed that nuclear issues were not receiving the political attention they merited.

The ERW episode provided an important lesson for alliance policymakers. Most significantly, it demonstrated the need for thorough preparation and consultation in any future nuclear decision. Officials were
determined to avoid a repetition of the situation in which the defense minister of a major ally complained that he had not been informed of the development of the ERW. The unfortunate ERW outcome also led U.S. officials, once a consensus on LRNTNF requirements had been reached, to reassert American leadership so as to ensure a successful LRNTNF outcome. The failure of the alliance to deal with the ERW also heightened the significance of the LRNTNF process as a demonstration of NATO's ability to take difficult and sensitive defense decisions.

Most participants agree that the HLG was a model of alliance planning and consultation. After initial exchanges in which most national representatives contributed, a consensus was rapidly achieved on the need to focus on long-range systems and subsequently on the need to deploy new capabilities. Once this decision had been taken, the United States provided the analysis that served as the basis of the numbers and mix of systems finally selected. Despite the thoroughness of preparation and the intensity of consultation, a number of countries expressed last-minute reservations. In fact, the consensus reflected in the final communiqué had been achieved only with considerable difficulty. Why, then, after such thorough preparation did the decision almost falter?

The principal reason for the last-minute LRNTNF problems lay with the member governments themselves. While the HLG ensured cooperation and consultation between governments at the official level, it did not—nor could it have been expected to—ensure adequate preparation within governments or between governments and their constituencies. For a variety of reasons, either through preoccupation with internal domestic problems or because of the ERW episode, a number of governments did not go public until very late, in certain instances delaying cabinet discussion until the last moment. The question of the appropriate moment for the public presentation of sensitive issues, such as nuclear decisions, represents a permanent dilemma for NATO.

The LRNTNF process offers a number of pointers for future allied nuclear planning. First, despite the general view that both the HLG and the SOC represented excellent examples of alliance coordination, some American officials are uneasy over what they regard as an excessive
abdicating by the United States of its leadership role in nuclear affairs. Allied participation in the decisionmaking process, they feel, led to the imposition of political conditions, notably the requirement for arms control, which greatly complicated the situation. They believe the precedent of linking a modernization decision to arms control negotiations to have been a mistake. Of course, this view ignores the political reality that without these conditions it is unlikely that the decision would have been achieved.

Second, the linkage of LRTNF to arms control negotiations has created false expectations. It has created false expectations among those who have not understood the complementary nature of the modernization and arms control parts of the NATO decision and believe that arms control negotiations will eliminate the need for deployment. It has also created false expectations among governments that, for domestic political reasons, are looking for visible progress in LRTNF negotiations. The complexity of these negotiations and the fact that the United States has yet to evolve a position on the SALT negotiations makes such progress highly unlikely. Linkage has also meant, as some American officials feared, continuous European pressure on the United States to begin negotiations. The administration has responded positively to this pressure, but the potential for further pressure remains.

Third, the public presentation of the LRTNF issue in Europe left much to be desired. Several countries preferred to keep the issue out of the public arena (the exceptions being the Federal Republic and the Netherlands, where public debate was intense). This lack of adequate preparation produced last-minute reservations in at least three countries. Furthermore, when governments went public, they presented the issue badly. Because it was obviously easier, they argued the necessity of LRTNF modernization in terms of the SS-20 rather than in terms of the somewhat more esoteric, but more appropriate, justification that modernization was required to fulfill the conditions of flexible response. Concentration on the SS-20 reinforced the belief that arms control could solve the problem by reducing the threat.

In terms of both the LRTNF decision and alliance nuclear decisions, the future poses uncertainties and questions:
Given the volatility of the political climate in Europe, the future of LRNF modernization remains uncertain. For better or for worse, much will depend on progress in arms control negotiations and, to a lesser extent, on U.S. decisions concerning strategic programs (MX and SLCM).

Any falling away from the NATO December 12 decision will have serious consequences for the cohesion of the alliance and U.S.-European relations.

Consideration will have to be given to the implications of a negative decision by the Netherlands (as is now likely, whereas the Belgian position remains more positive). To what extent would this affect the Dutch role in NATO nuclear decisionmaking?

Will the Reagan administration follow the precedent established by the Carter administration in the degree of consultation with its allies on nuclear questions, or will it move back to the more traditional relationship, in which the United States decided on procurement and consulted with its allies on deployment? Is it likely to show more resistance to allied pressure in its bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union? This question is also valid for other sensitive issues, notably the ERW and offensive chemical weapons. Pressure from the United States to deploy either system would create serious problems in Europe and could further undermine LRNF modernization.

The most important lesson for the future rests with the Europeans. Governments must now make every effort to explain to their publics the rationale behind current NATO nuclear doctrine and capabilities. They must also discuss the consequences of alternative policies. This will be no easy task, as time has been lost and antinuclear sentiment has gained considerable momentum. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle, however, and from now on all nuclear decisions will be subject to serious public scrutiny and debate.

\[1\] This necessity has been recognized by at least two governments. Both the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic have recently issued literature explaining the rationale behind alliance nuclear policy.
DEFENSE SPENDING AND NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

The level of defense expenditure required to ensure NATO security has also been the subject of intense discussion and disagreement within the alliance. The complexity of comparing defense expenditures and defining an equitable distribution of the defense burden has meant that divergent views have had to be reconciled. The adoption in 1977 of a 3 percent increase as a permanent benchmark of national performance and the recent surge of public support for defense spending in the United States have intensified the disagreements.

The NATO commitment to raise defense spending by 3 percent—the amount by which the Europeans had been increasing their defense budgets during the 1970s—was intended to demonstrate allied determination to match Warsaw Pact modernization. At the same time, the 3 percent commitment provided a simple and ready measure of member nations' defense contributions. With the deterioration of economic conditions, however, few European governments have been able to meet this commitment. In retrospect, the commitment is seen to have had serious drawbacks. Specifically, it ignored past performance, focused on input rather than output, and encouraged countries to demonstrate their fulfillment.

Although the present U.S. administration has announced that it will not seek fixed percentage increases, administration officials have made it clear that they consider 3 percent insufficient to meet current commitments. Whatever the measure, the United States will be looking for larger contributions from its allies. Furthermore, despite the administration's deemphasis of fixed increases, input measures will remain the simplest and most readily available indicator of defense effort, particularly as far as Congress is concerned. The persistence of the 3 percent formula was further confirmed at a recent meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in Brussels. At that meeting, ministers reaffirmed their commitment to a 3 percent increase and pledged to do their utmost to make available the resources needed to strengthen their deterrence and defense forces—language that Secretary Weinberger interpreted as an affirmation that more money will have to be spent.

Arguments on the measurement of defense efforts notwithstanding, the allies differ fundamentally on defense spending. The United States
clearly expects its allies to follow its example and to devote substantially greater resources to defense, even if doing so means changing domestic priorities. However, despite the commitments implied in the ambiguous language of the DPC commune, these extra resources seem unlikely to materialize. Rather, officials are talking again about the need to make better use of existing resources, i.e., reemphasizing the concept of rationalization. Given these conflicting attitudes, further friction would appear inevitable. Europeans will continue to resist American pressure to spend more, pointing out, as acknowledged in the DPC commune, that a variety of factors, including past and present achievements, should be taken into account in determining defense efforts. However, even if the administration accepts the European arguments, will Congress? How will Congress react when the shift of resources to the U.S. defense effort begins to affect the living standards of the American people, but there is no sign of similar sacrifices in Europe?

NATO's formal acknowledgment of the threat of events in the Persian Gulf region to alliance security has complicated the problem of burden-sharing. The major responsibility for the Gulf will be shouldered by the United States, with the help of relatively small contributions from Britain and France. The concept of the division of labor has emerged as the formula under which responsibilities for the additional commitments will be shared, but it also constitutes a mechanism for concealing differences over the most appropriate means of ensuring stability in the region. Accordingly, member countries will do everything possible to assist the United States in its contingency planning for the Gulf and will compensate for any shortfall in American capabilities as a result of Gulf commitments. The practical implications of the division of labor have yet to be clearly identified, but additional commitments would seem to imply additional resources, which as yet have not been forthcoming.

The perception of Congress again may be important. Congress has been blunt in indicating that Europe is more dependent on Gulf oil than the United States is, and therefore the Europeans must do more to protect their own oil. Their general skepticism concerning the role of
military force in the Gulf and their preference for political and economic measures notwithstanding, if the Europeans want to influence the decisionmaking process, they must demonstrate their willingness to share the responsibilities.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

In the matter of East-West trade, trade credit policy, technology transfer, and the effectiveness of economic sanctions in particular have divided the United States and Europe. American officials argue that trade should be used as an instrument of policy to influence Soviet behavior. The United States has also demonstrated particular concern over what it sees as the West's growing dependence on Soviet energy, particularly the gas that the Soviet Union has agreed to sell to some European countries. Europeans argue that trade benefits both sides, particularly in the sense that it creates interdependence. The question of potential energy dependence remains unresolved, although Europeans remain skeptical that this dependence would give the USSR effective leverage. Given the varied economic interests of the alliance and the recent experience over sanctions, it would appear that NATO's role in coordinating Western trade policy with the East will always be limited (the specific case of Poland excepted) to the area of high technology, currently handled by the Coordinating Committee (COCOM).

In the matter of arms control, the differences between the current administration and the majority of Europeans over the value of arms control, particularly SALT, are so familiar as to need no repetition here. Suffice it to say that the SALT process has assumed a substantial symbolic importance in Europe. The impression that the United States is dragging its feet on SALT will certainly undermine implementation of LRTNF and in some countries will affect public support of the alliance. The West must not allow the Soviet Union to seize the advantage on arms control initiatives.
IMPLICATIONS

Issues directly related to the military security of the alliance and the general condition of East-West relations pose the most immediate challenges for intra-NATO relations. The current differences between the United States and Europe on these issues reflect the fundamental rift in Western security policy for the 1980s. As the basic perceptions that underly these divergent views are unlikely to change, the crucial question is whether the traditional mechanism of the alliance can achieve a mutually acceptable policy. Much will depend on the procedures and tactics of negotiation and on the willingness of both sides to compromise.

In three areas of major concern—defense spending, out-of-area threats, and arms control—the reconciliation of national positions appears to be possible. To achieve a compromise,

- The European members of NATO must accept the need to contribute additional resources and to take on new commitments.
- The United States must accommodate European concerns over arms control by moving ahead with SALT.

Underlying this formula for compromise is the assumption that if the Europeans want a say in the development of policy in the Persian Gulf region, they must agree to share the responsibility.

The willingness of the allied governments to compromise and the willingness of their parliaments and publics to accept the compromises, however, remain in doubt. Europeans may draw some encouragement from recent U.S. policy developments directly related to European concerns—notably, the announcement of an LRTNF dialogue, support for the proposal for a CDE, and the deemphasis of the 3 percent commitment. The Americans, however, see no sign of the additional resources that are absolutely essential to demonstrate European willingness.

Even if national governments show a willingness to compromise, parliamentary and public opinion may prevent the traditional NATO mechanism from functioning. Domestic pressures may substantially inhibit
the freedom of action of member governments, particularly of the smaller European countries, with regard to such sensitive issues as nuclear weapons. Similarly, the absence of visible European efforts may again raise in the U.S. Congress the fundamental question of the American commitment to Europe.

To establish the conditions under which the alliance could reach agreement on the issues confronting it, the Europeans must begin to develop a consensus on the requirements of Western security and the degree of European participation. European commitments in this respect should not be seen solely as a response to U.S. prodding or the satisfaction of congressional expectations. The nuclear issue will for several reasons continue to pose a fundamental challenge to alliance cohesion. American willingness to proceed with the SALT process will significantly influence the current debate in Europe. However, the major burden of explaining and justifying to their publics the rationale underlying NATO's current nuclear doctrine and capabilities rests with the European governments.

Faced with the problems of its immediate security, narrowly defined, the alliance should not be expected to cope with the coordination of broader issues. The NATO mechanism may serve to coordinate individual members' activities regarding the Persian Gulf, but actual policy will have to be formulated bilaterally or multilaterally by those countries willing to be actively involved.
Mr. Robert Blackwill
Deputy Director, Bureau of
Poltico-Military Affairs
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Ludger Buerstedde
Counselor, Political Affairs
Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Mr. Pierre Champenois
Political Counselor
Belgian Embassy
3330 Garfield Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dr. David Chu
Director, Program Analysis
and Evaluation
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Mr. Benoit d'Abotville
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Paris, France
c/o Mr. Jean-Paul Reau
French Embassy
2535 Belmont Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dr. Fredo Dannenbring
Deputy Chief of Mission
Embassy of the Federal
Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director, Bureau of
Poltico-Military Affairs
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. James F. Dobbins
Director, Office of
Theater Military Policy
Bureau of Polito-co-
Military Affairs
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Fritz Ermarth
Northrop Corporation
Washington Analysis Center
1015 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. David Gompert
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Ms. Rose Gottmeieller
The Rand Corporation
2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Mr. René Herrmann
Visiting Scholar from
West Germany
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, Cal. 90406

Dr. William E. Hoehn, Jr.
Vice President for
Program Development
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, Cal. 90406

The Honorable Robert W. Komor
214 Franklin Avenue
Alexandria, Va. 22314

1Not all participants attended all sessions.
Mr. Michael Leonard  
Deputy Director for  
Regional Programs  
Office, Program Analysis  
and Evaluation  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dr. Simon Lunn  
Director of Committees  
and Studies  
North Atlantic Assembly  
Brussels, Belgium

Mr. Andrew W. Marshall  
Director of Net Assessment  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

The Honorable Sam Nunn  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Colonel John Pappageorge  
Policy Planning Staff  
Department of State  
2201 C Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Mr. Leon Pfeiffer  
Office, Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (International  
Security Policy)  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Professor Richard Pipes  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Mr. Jean-Paul Reau  
Counselor, French Embassy  
2535 Belmont Road, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.)  
1875 I Street, N.W., Suite 440  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. Francis J. Sullivan  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Mr. James A. Thomson  
Director, National Security  
Strategies Program,  
Project AIR FORCE  
The Rand Corporation  
1700 Main Street  
Santa Monica, Cal. 90406

Mr. Milton Tulkoff  
Office, Director of Program  
Analysis and Evaluation  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

The Honorable Gunther van Well  
Ambassador, Permanent Mission  
of the Federal Republic of  
Germany to the United Nations  
600 Third Avenue, 41st Floor  
New York, N.Y. 10016

Mr. John Weston  
Counselor, British Embassy  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dr. Milton G. Weiner  
The Rand Corporation  
1700 Main Street  
Santa Monica, Cal. 90406

Maj Gen Jasper A. Welch, Jr.  
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Research, Development  
and Acquisition)  
Hq United States Air Force  
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dr. Thomas W. Wolfe  
The Rand Corporation  
2100 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037