THE MEDIA AND INTRA-ELITE COMMUNICATION IN POLAND: ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE MEDIA

Jane Leftwich Curry

December 1980

N-1514/1
**The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Organization and Control of the Media**

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The Rand Corporation is conducting a multiyear comparative study of the role of the media in intra-elite communication in Communist countries. Western analysts of the political process in "closed" Communist systems necessarily rely heavily on the published and broadcast output of the mass and specialized media. These media are in part propaganda organs, but they also have other functions. A generation of Sovietologists (and specialists on other Communist states) has had to base much of its analysis of policies and politics on interpretations of media nuances. Yet the assumptions of Sovietologists about the relationship between the media and the political actors whose behavior or attitudes are inferred from them have received little attention.

The Rand study was initiated to fill this need. Its emphasis is not on techniques of content analysis, which have received considerable attention in the past, but rather on the process by which politically significant material appears in Communist-country media. The study tests the validity of the usual Kremilinological assumption that the media of the USSR or other Communist countries are utilized as an instrument of power struggle and policy debate by contending leaders or groups. It seeks to establish the degree to which and the circumstances under which partisan views of particular leaders, groupings, or institutions may find expression in the controlled media.

The principal data base of the study is information obtained from extended interviews with emigres formerly involved in the media process—as writers, journalists, editors, censors, and government and
Party officials. In contrast to the many studies based on content analysis alone, and in an effort to test the often unexamined assumptions of content-analysis studies, the Rand project utilizes this data base to examine the structure and process of Communist media; the study focuses on the medium in the expectation that this will enhance the analyst's ability to interpret its message.

The study has to date included investigations of Soviet and Polish media. Work on Soviet media continues, and the results will be published when available. Polish media were selected for analysis in part because they appeared to differ more than other East European media from Soviet practice and in part because better information about their operations was available. Jane Leftwich Curry, a Rand consultant, and A. Ross Johnson collaborated on this research. Extended interviews were conducted in 1978 and 1979 by the co-investigators with 44 former Polish journalists, experts, editors, censors, and Party officials. The interviews were conducted with the understanding that the interviewees would remain anonymous; this stipulation has precluded the normal referencing of source material and has necessitated omitting some of the details of specific events. Project information from emigré interviews was supplemented with other data obtained in discussions with journalists, experts, and officials during trips to Poland. The reader may wish to have more details about events and about the authority of sources, to evaluate the plausibility of the research findings. As in any sensitive elite interviewing project, however, that natural wish must be subordinated to protecting the interests of the respondents.
The results of this work on Polish media are published in Rand Report, R-2627, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Summary Report*, by Jane Leftwich Curry and A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, which provides an overview analysis and conclusions, and in a series of Rand Notes, which contain more detailed analyses and documentation of the research:

- **N-1514/1**, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Organization and Control of the Media*, by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, reviews the controls over and the internal organization and process of Polish media.

- **N-1514/2**, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: The System of Censorship*, by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, documents in detail the structure and operations of the formal censorship system.

- **N-1514/3**, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: The Role of Military Journals*, by A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, details the structure and process of military publication.

- **N-1514/4**, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: The Role of "Special Bulletins"*, by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, reviews the important role played by limited-distribution bulletins in informing the Polish leadership about domestic and foreign affairs.

- **N-1514/5**, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Case Studies of Controversy*, by Jane Leftwich Curry and A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, describes six cases that are
illustrative of discussion, debate, and controversy in Polish media.

A. Ross Johnson
Study Director
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I. INTRODUCTION

The basic editorial structure and process of Polish media have changed little since the end of World War II. The differences that have occurred among journals and over time in internal organization and editorial processes have resulted from the personalities of individual chief editors, initiatives of media staffs, or simply natural evolution. But the output of each media organ is a product not only of its internal organization but of the political and professional attitudes of its journalists and editors, their contacts and sources of information, and the leeway given them by external factors—primarily Polish Party and state authorities, but also Soviet officials and, to a much lesser degree, the audience. These external factors have changed over time, sometimes dramatically.

This Note examines the structural and organizational factors that influence the output of Polish media. Section II reviews the changing position of the media in the Polish Communist system in the postwar period and provides a basis for understanding both the important general distinctions among the Stalinist, 1956, Gomulka, and Gierek periods and related changes in the instruments of Party control. Section III examines the various instruments by which the Party exercises direct and indirect supervision over the media. (Formal censorship, one of the major instruments of that control, is important enough and so well documented that it has been analyzed in detail in a separate publication, Note N-1514/2.) Sections IV and V describe key elements of the internal organization and editorial process, respectively, that affect the output
of Polish media organs. That discussion indicates that editorial
details such as publication deadlines and the system of remunerating
journalists can affect media output as much as Central Committee direc-
tives or censorship. The Appendix describes the functioning of key
media which differ from the standard processes discussed in the body of
the Note.

In addition to Rand project materials, this Note draws extensively
on dissertation field research carried out by the author in Poland in
1976, prior to her affiliation with Rand. That field research included
a survey of 174 working journalists, some results of which are repro-
duced in the tables of this Note.
II. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE MEDIA

THE GOMULKA PERIOD

During the Gomulka period (1957 to 1970), the Polish Communist elite tended to deemphasize the role of the media as an instrument for developing Party control. The Gomulka leadership drew a clear distinc-
tion between its approach to the media and that of the Stalinist leader-
ship. [1] Instead of being a mechanism for mobilizing the population to support Party policy, the media simply were expected to satisfy the normal demands of the population for entertainment and information. One of the key factors used to judge the effectiveness of the media during the Gomulka period was their ability to keep their audience from seeking non-Polish sources of information. The leadership accepted discussion as a normal occurrence in an established socialist society. Hence the media were allowed to reflect much popular discussion. Gomulka stated this general position in 1961 in an interview with a Le Monde correspon-
dent:

Every revolution has its enemies. Because of them, the new governments must limit freedom. As the revolution goes for-
ward, the possibilities of criticism broaden. If you look at our dailies, you will find real and free criticism of the government, state institutions, and ministries. That criti-
cism is useful as it allows us to fight against our fail-
ings. [2]

[1] See Władysław Gomulka, "Przemówienie tow. Władysława Gomulki na XIV Zjazdzie Związku Literatow Polskich w Lublinie," Nowe Drogi, October 1964, pp. 3-12. In this speech, Gomulka argued against total repudiation of the literary production of the Stalinist period, while claiming that the system itself no longer existed in Poland.

Three separate factors converged in Gomulka's "media ideology": his attitude toward the media, unresolved intra-elite conflicts, and neglect of socioeconomic modernization. The appearance of media discussions that did not question the basic values and structures of the society resulted both from Gomulka's personal perception of the legitimacy of criticism and independent thinking and from his general disinterest in the media as a political force. It was also a result of elite conflict, some of which was naturally reflected in the media. A number of factions or groups existed within the Party throughout the entire Gomulka period. Some of these groups—especially the Moczarites, but also the Gierek faction and others—sought to use the media to develop support, which insured the presentation of issues from a variety of viewpoints. Finally, the separation between the Party and the media institutions reflected a policy emphasis on maintaining the status quo. Since socioeconomic modernization was not a priority, there was no need to mobilize the population.

While these three factors theoretically encouraged the development of open discussion and information in the media, official behavior did not allow real media freedom after the closing of Po Prostu (a student cultural journal) in 1957. Gomulka welcomed criticism only when it did not involve personal criticism of individuals in the Party.[3] Low-level members of the elite and other officials were further protected by the

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[3] Journalists whom we interviewed who were active in the Gomulka period consistently noted that a strong regime response occurred when journalists criticized old Party activists, even at local levels.
emphasis on the status quo. Divisions within the elite allowed individual ministries or institutions to have enough factional support to block the publication of critical information. Those divisions also made decisions on censorship unpredictable. Gomulka's evaluation of the political role of the mass media was reflected in limited investment in media development and in the low earnings of journalists. It was also reflected in the Gomulka leadership's disinterest in regulating the censorship process or involving it in questions of information access (when leadership did become involved in such questions, it was because of the personal connections of the individual seeking access, not political concerns).

Gomulka's personal relationship with the media was a complex one. He had little involvement with the normal mass media during his initial tenure as Party First Secretary, prior to 1948, and during his subsequent disgrace, he was the object of vitriolic media attack. In speeches made after he returned to power in 1956, Gomulka often cited those attacks as an argument in support of his opposition to control of culture by the Party.[4] The journalists with whom he did maintain ties prior to 1956 were principally his wartime political cadres; several of these, including Zenon Kliszko and Władysław Bienkowski, had been editors of Party journals prior to 1945.

Gomulka's return to power in 1956 was preceded by growing public criticism of the Stalinist system. By 1954, the National Congress of the Association of Polish Journalists (SDP) was publicly criticizing existing conditions, and grievances of journalists also appeared in the

media. This open criticism was legitimized by the reading of Khrushchev's secret speech by established journalists at Party meetings. Most journalists supported Gomulka as an acceptable new leader because they perceived him as a victim of Stalinist excesses and therefore a liberal. By the time Gomulka had returned to power, the censors' office had been dissolved by the censors themselves, because the directives from Party government authorities were so contradictory that they simply could not function. With the journalists thus largely unregulated, open criticism of the Soviet Union and the Communist system began to appear in some journals. As a result, Gomulka came under immediate pressure from the Soviet Union to curb the media. In October 1956, he told a delegation of journalists that the Soviets threatened to intervene if media criticism did not end. This, he said, made it necessary "for journalists to behave like realists and not romantics." He also asked the journalists to be supportive of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) until Poland's "bad economic situation" improved.[5]

During 1956-1957, while Gomulka gradually established his control, journalists and Party officials formed an ad hoc board of review that assumed responsibility for post-publication censorship. Journalists were expected to stay within the parameters of Soviet tolerance and the requirements for maintaining civil calm in a difficult economic period. But the power of the board declined as Gomulka rebuilt institutions that had collapsed during de-Stalinization and as it became clear that the advisory powers of the board were not sufficient to control such journals as Po Prostu. Gomulka's assessment of the board and of journalism

generally during this period was: "You want to have it too easily. You want clean hands and for me to do all the dirty work. That's why journalists can't govern themselves, much less a nation."[6] As Gomulka retreated from the image of liberalism, liberal advisors such as Wladyslaw Bienkowski, who had long exposure to journalism and maintained friendships among working journalists, were gradually removed. This left no one in Gomulka's immediate circle who had close, sympathetic ties with the media.

Leading journalists of this period whom we interviewed characterized Gomulka's relationship with them as contradictory. He was said to have disliked sycophants and to have liked "distant critics." He never regarded journalism as "Party work," so he neither drew journalists into the political elite nor pressured them to join the Party. He was willing to intervene to protect the professional positions of some journalists who were in tenuous positions because they had spoken out, yet he castigated and blacklisted others.[7]

Since Gomulka did not consider the media to be instruments for mobilization and socialization, he paid little attention to journalists' public positions. During this period, they were generally portrayed as being too little involved with the life of the country and too enamored with Western consumerism. The elite claimed that the media

... too rarely run stories about honest working people, their differences, troubles and the toil that they put into everyday living ... what is even worse, one encounters cases where our media prints articles which are out of touch with reality in

[7] Ibid.
this country and which propagate the Western style of living and which pander to bourgeois tastes.[8]

Journalists were blamed for reporting that hurt low-level Party and government leaders.[9] They were considered less significant than literary writers and were often presented as undereducated and unskilled.[10] Journalism could be "enlivened," Gomulka felt, by the inclusion of "creative and artistic groups" in the media.[11] Symptomatically, he appeared before the writers union but not the journalists' association.

Gomulka wanted to achieve a situation in which

... the Party, which directs the country, abstains from petty involvement and blocking of initiatives of journals [and] ... does not lead the media by the hand, [and] ... the editorial staff has broad possibilities in selecting problems and carrying out the craft of journalism in all of its forms.[12]

Government involvement in the affairs of the media was, thus, reactive rather than directive. Journalists were usually not informed as to the lines of acceptable discussion prior to writing an article. Like other institutions external to the Party, the media were critiqued but not necessarily controlled. Instead, each publishing organization was largely responsible for setting up its own parameters for acceptable discussion.

In spite of the relatively low position officially accorded them, the media were a subject of continuing elite attention. Specific journals and articles were often mentioned in major Party documents. In some cases, members of the elite used the media to extend internal Party debates, either through their own articles or through journalist supporters. Party leaders, however, did not appear to be marshalling public opinion; rather, they appeared to be extending internal discussions, demonstrating the popularity of certain views, or appealing for specialist support.[13] In other cases, members of the political elite cited specific journalists, editors, and journals as examples of unacceptable behavior. In 1963, Gomulka publicly criticized Jerzy Urban, a well-known journalist, for "demagogical and destructive criticism" of a prominent crusader against alcoholism. In the same speech, Gomulka also condemned Przegląd Kulturalny (a liberal cultural journal) for indicating in a discussion on the "generation battle" that career channels were blocked for the young.[14] Most often, though, the interest in the media came primarily from leaders other than Gomulka. He is reputed to have read little himself and to have relied on capsulized media surveys prepared by his aides—the most powerful of whom was connected to Moczar in the late 1960s. Most often, he reacted to articles only when they had been brought to his attention by someone else in the leadership. His disinterest allowed other Party leaders to manipulate the media.

[13] This became pronounced as the Moczarites gained strength after 1964, but it also occurred in regard to other issues not related to purely factional struggles. See Note N-1514/5, Section II.
Journalists, according to Gomulka, were supposed to provide information, a positive view of their nation, and "criticism of some real, essential, and visible errors in our everyday life."[15] As a propagandizer, the media was to

...present positively the problems of the development of our country, to respond to the issues concerning public opinion, and broadly to enlighten the public as to the difference between socialism and capitalism....[16]

The alliance between the media and the population was, according to Party directives, to be concentrated on the working and peasant classes. Journalists were to focus on maintaining a dialogue with these groups to block their use of Western news sources.[17] The success of Western broadcasts was constantly held up by the leadership as a sign that journalists were not performing their tasks adequately.[18]

The Gomulka leadership's attitude about the legitimacy of media criticism changed as a result of the 1968 crisis.[19] The journalism establishment did not, on the whole, support the demands for cultural freedom put forth by writers and students; but the student demonstrations themselves, the support they received among the intelligentsia, and the strength of anti-Gomulka forces in the elite convinced the Gomulka group of the need for more orchestration of the media. By 1969, the autonomy of the media was called into serious question. In a Polityka

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[19] See Note N-1514/5, Section II.
interview, Jan Szydlak, Politburo minister and representative of the Party Ideological Committee that was established after 1968, stated that

... a condition of good propaganda work is a concentration on key problems presented by the Party at a given moment. It is the task of the Party propaganda apparatus to make known among publicists the intention of the Party to win the minds and hearts of the people to the truths proclaimed by the Party.... It is also a condition of good propaganda--side-by-side with a correct understanding of the situation and of the groups at which it is aimed--to be on the offensive and to take a combative stance.... Spreading knowledge of Party policy among the public is not being done in an abstract vacuum but in combat with wrong social habits, both those left over from the old ideology and those resulting from the pressure and infiltration of imperialist propaganda, unavoidable in a divided world.... The insufficient amount of attention paid to "combat readiness" in the training of our propaganda personnel results in the fact that the "propaganda fuel"--political content and opinions--sometimes arrives too slowly.[20]

The role and limits of criticism were now redefined. As late as 1967, Gomulka had declared, "There are different political ideologies in any system of a single political focus."[21] After the events of 1968, however, the media were supposed to be directed by Party organizations.[22] Critical discussion was to be generated within the Party and then published externally.[23] The Party clearly expressed its increasing concern about the media as a tool of propaganda:

Above all, we care for the content, for the character of the arguments, and only then for better forms, and our main concern should be for the cadre of propagandists.[24]

The conflict of 1968 brought into the open efforts by Gomulka's opponents within the leadership--the Moczarites and Gierek[25]--to woo journalists. Moczar rallied many editors and journalists to his cause, either because they shared his outlook or because they felt they could make professional gains through affiliation with his group. The Moczarite platform was espoused in Prawo i Życie, Walka Młodych, and other publications. The Moczarites spoke often on media topics and in many ways reflected media professionals' concerns. They criticized the current top Party elite for

... not attaching sufficient importance to the role played by information. Our media does not print information on many political events which have direct importance for our country.... Information is one of the absolutely necessary elements of effective propaganda.[26]

In discussing faults of the media system, the Moczarites advocated the protection of journalists' right to information that was potentially damaging to individuals and specific institutions. In line with this, they suggested that the work of the censors' office, while necessary, had not been "predictable or responsible."[27]

Gierek, as discussed below, had established a separate media system in Silesia based on his direct control (as regional First Secretary) of

[25] The Moczarite offensive in the media is described in Note N-1514/5, Section II.
Trybuna Robotnicza. He courted journalists by speaking often to journalists' gatherings and by hosting journalists in Silesia.

Given Gomulka's benign neglect of the media for most of his tenure, many journalists welcomed Gierek when he assumed power in 1970. Gierek offered the promise that the media would receive much better treatment, both materially and ideologically. He offered the prospect of economic and social change, with journalists included in the policy process. In contrast to Gomulka, Gierek appeared to offer high regard for journalists, inclusion in decisionmaking, external guidance as to acceptable and nonacceptable subjects, and institutional and elite cohesion to protect the media from the vagaries of political change.

THE GIEREK PERIOD

Gierek's model for the media was well established in the isolated laboratory of Silesia before he took power, but it was never fully understood by non-Silesian journalists.[28] Imposition of the Gierek media system on a national scale marked a major departure from Polish journalism traditions and a diminution of the possibilities for wide-ranging media discussion that characterized the Gomulka period. All aspects of the media were now to be managed by the Party. Since the Party leaders now saw the media as having a major role to play in mobilizing the population to support the Party's plans for the socioeconomic development of Poland, journalists were expected to push the population closer to fulfilling the Party's goals.

Both the determining factors of the media and their resulting ideological images in the Gierek period were diametrically opposed to those

in the Gomulka period. Gierek's personal stance on the media was a reflection of his belief that social change was of paramount importance for the pursuit of economic development and for the maintenance of a socialist system. The importance of social change far outweighed the validity of demands for independent media presentation of information and discussion. The media's only role, in Gierek's view, was to direct the population to better follow Party policy. Visible and direct ties between the Party and the population were considered crucial. Other institutions in society, including the media, could neither substitute for this contact nor interfere with it.[29] This discouraged discussion in the media. The elite conflict that characterized the Gomulka era and contributed to media debate was greatly reduced by Gierek's domination of the PZPR through the promotion of his own men.

Divergences among the population were not, in the Gierek period, taken as "givens." Instead of responding to mass demands, as they were expected to do in the Gomulka period, mass media under Gierek had a different role:

... to shape the consciousness of the masses through a constant, systematic influence on the working people ... by reaching them with the Party's word, indicating the goal and the roads leading to it, through the concentration and mobilization of all of society around the Party, the nation's leading force.[30]

[29] As an example, the censorship office issued directives that no institution or journal was to issue New Year's greetings to its constituency. The issuance of such greetings was to be limited to central Party organs.
The media's relationship with the Party was thus an entirely subservient one. It was the Party organization's responsibility to mobilize journalists:

The Party organization considered it its duty to inspire our comrade journalists to criticize from a well-considered Party position, with the intention of bringing the situation into conformity with the general Party line.[31]

Journalists, rather than being autonomous professionals, were integral parts of the Party organization. Speaking of the Katowice media system, which in the 1960s had the highest percentage of Party journalists in Poland, Gierek said that

... the media, radio, and television constitute, to a great extent, the ideological front of our Party. Hence, the transformation of the role and rank of the journalist, who is promoted to the rank of political activist, who fights with his talents and abilities side-by-side with ... the whole Party for the implementation of its goals.[32]

This politicization of the journalism profession expanded the functions of the journalist to include both public manipulation of information to support the Party's policy and private activism in internal Party discussions.

Gierek had created a sophisticated media system in Katowice, the region where he had headed the Party organization almost continually since 1945. Because Katowice is the most industrially developed and the richest area in Poland, it had the leverage to maintain fairly autonomous regional policies, so much so that it came to be known as the

[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
"Polish Katanga." The Party in Katowice was involved in selecting and training journalists, planning media campaigns and discussions, and running joint Party-media festivals and programs.

While he headed the Katowice Party organization, Gierek used the media to promote his position in the national political arena. To expand his power base beyond Katowice, he courted favor with journalists nationally, thereby giving himself broad exposure. He appeared at journalists' association meetings, invited journalists to tour Silesia, and spoke publicly about how journalists should play a more important role in public life and decisionmaking, as they already did in Katowice, and how their material benefits should increase.

Once Gierek became national Party First Secretary in 1971, journalists who had supported him earlier were rapidly inducted into the Party elite. Gierek initiated press conferences and meetings with journalists to draw them into activist roles. New editors, many of whom had worked in the Silesian media, were assigned to key positions, including the editorships of most of the regional Party papers. A final element of the Gierek takeover occurred after the territorial administrative reforms of 1975. Local Party newspapers were removed from the control of individual regional Party committees and made organs of several new committees formed on the territory of the former regions. In the process, primary responsibility shifted to the Central Committee official in Warsaw assigned to oversee the regional papers.

[33] Editors of Polityka, Kultura, Literatura, and Życie Gospodarcze were elevated to political positions in Gierek's regime.
[34] Journalists were expected not only to question Gierek about issues of concern to their readers, but also to make policy suggestions.
[35] An example of this redistribution policy was the nomination of former Trybuna Robotnicza chief editor Maciej Szczepanski as head of Polish Radio and Television.
The loyalty and active commitment of journalists was a major requirement of the Gierek media system. Gierek's chief mass-media officer, Central Committee Secretary Jerzy Lukaszewicz, made a clear division between technical specialists and those on the "ideological front." The measure, "he who is not with us is against us," was adequate for the technical intelligentsia, he said, but ideological workers had to be those "who are within the Party and are involved in Communist Party affairs."[36] To be "multiskilled social activists,"[37] journalists were trained to be both journalists and agitators.[38] Such a shift to a highly politicized profession meant that individual journalists were no longer encouraged or allowed to become "stars." Analyses and propaganda pieces were no longer produced by journalists but by Party propagandists. Journalism was merely part of the ideological and propaganda activity of the Party.[39] The individual journalist was a member of an "editorial collective, shaped with the Party's help." Such collectives, termed by Gierek "the source of the best possible implementation of the Party's policy," were characterized as

... loyal and successful units in which commanders as well as individuals solidly fight effectively under the banner of our Party in the first rank on the ideological front.[40]

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Leading journalists were recruited into political circles as a matter of policy. Reports of Party activities at all levels stressed the inclusion of journalists in various Party Committees.\[41\] Journalists' earnings and other benefits were increased regularly, and budgetary allotments for the development of a media infrastructure were expanded during the first half of the 1970s.\[42\] Journalists' suggestions for the development of public policy were solicited by the Gierek regime through nonmedia channels. This attention increased the apparent significance of the profession within policymaking circles. But as the failings of the Gierek leadership became increasingly evident in the second half of the 1970s, these apparent gains did not create real support for the regime among journalists. However, strong controls over the media had weakened the journalists' ability to criticize the system.

Throughout the 1970s, the media were subordinate to the Party and were never mentioned as anything more than a transmission belt. Stress was placed on direct contact between the top elite and groups of workers. The press, radio, and television were shifted from "cultural affairs" concerns in Party ideological statements to "Party affairs."\[43\] Their role was to provide "help for the Party and government."\[44\] The main responsibility of the media was to

\[42\] After 1970, journalists had three general salary increases, the most recent in 1977. The final increase was limited to journalists and members of the police and military. Allotments for paper and machinery were also increased.
... win over public support for the policies of the Party, deepen the bond between the Party and the nation ... participate in developing the Party line, liberate social initiative, and to strengthen society's knowledge in discussions ... its basic task is to increase the effectiveness of its political and ideological influence in the direction of developing a socialist worldview, national morality, and a basic sense of responsibility for the development of the country and joint management of the national riches.[45]

To do this, the media had to be closely coordinated with the current propaganda line of the Party.[46] They were simply an instrument by which Party and government organs could "quickly inform public opinion about their actions and decisions."[47] Journalists were also expected to act as propagandists and agitators for Party policy outside the confines of traditional journalism work: They were expected to sponsor entertainment and festivals, to participate at various levels in the Party leadership, and to lead community projects.[48]

This total involvement of the media with the Party altered the position of media criticism and discussion. Criticism was now merely one method of developing a socialist outlook, a way "to present the Party's goals on a broader scale." Critical articles were judged for their "documentation, factualness, and constructive tone."[49] Criticism was to be focused on the "negative elements in society: waste, laziness, and the lack of social discipline which influence the functioning...

[48] Characteristic was Trybuna Robotnicza's co-sponsorship, with the Party, of a yearly weekend festival of entertainment and education.
of institutions." The response to criticism in the media was the responsibility of the Party organs at each level.[50]

This view of the role of the media made discussion of various alternatives to social problems impermissible. It was simply assumed that the media would present Party policies in the most positive light. Disputes and differences were to be avoided. Criticism, as a vehicle to excite reader interest, was a way to reeducate the population as to the proper mode of socialist behavior, not a way to effect policy. The journalist's policy role, based largely on his contacts with public opinion, was to be through private, Party channels. Discussion, when it appeared, was a result of either limited elite commitment to a given issue or concerns that highly placed journalists felt were not being heard by the leadership.

The differences in media output in the two eras were primarily a reflection of the differences between the approaches to media management of Gomulka and Gierek. The essential processes and concerns of the journalism profession remained the same, but Party and government institutions of control and direction differed.

III. INSTRUMENTS OF GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

The production process and organization of Polish journalism have remained remarkably autonomous throughout the postwar period. Attempts by political leaders to create new organizational structures more amenable to production of the kind of information they would like to see published have been almost totally unsuccessful since the media were restructured in the late 1940s. A Polish study commissioned by the Central Committee in the early 1970s commented that "journalists are quite willing to talk about their work but are unwilling to deal with the possibilities of organizational change."[1]

Journalists control their work environment up to the editorial level, but non-journalists determine the ties of the editor-in-chief and his staff with the external world. Generally, the low-level bureaucratic elites control the journalists' ability to make contacts and get information, while the higher-level elites determine what is to be published, through long-term publication plans, the censorship process, and sanctions against media discussions that they oppose. In addition, individuals in the elite at every level attempt to use journalists to support their positions. But the process of elite direction and control is not consistent--there is a very basic division between the Party's emphasis on direction and government institutions' emphasis on control.

The external controls on the media are imposed in a way that usually prevents journalists from being clearly aware of them as formal mechanisms. The professional journalist experiences direct obstacles in his attempts to gather information and to publish critical articles, but these problems most often appear to be caused by industrial managers, government bureaucrats, and local Party officials trying to protect themselves from public criticism. To get information, journalists typically rely on professional and personal ties as well as on the desire of higher-level Party and government officials to have the media monitor lower-level administration. Higher-level officials are involved in controlling the publication of information, but their activities are apparent only in interactions with the editor-in-chief. What occurs in these informal meetings is then translated directly or indirectly by the editor to his staff.

The outside forces with which the editor-in-chief deals are not cohesive, and their expectations vary. Party and government institutions have different basic goals for the media, and each group attempts to use the media to its own best advantage as a check on the power of the others. Journalists appeal to Party organizations to override positions held by government institutions. In turn, government institutions block journalists from access to information and, in so doing, ignore formal orders by the Party. The editor-in-chief may manipulate political figures and groups to protect the options of his journal when he feels it is politically useful. But while editors-in-chief thus retain some freedom to maneuver, they are always strongly influenced by the Party and government bodies responsible for supervising the media.
PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

The PUWP is involved in all areas of the mass media, from personnel policy to circulation controls. Usually the Party itself exercises direction rather than control. Party involvement is more intense for Party-sponsored journals than for non-Party journals, where other sponsoring organizations take on this directional role, but Party supervision is a factor for all.

Politburo and Secretariat

Party bodies at all levels take a keen interest in the work of the media. Overall goals and direction are set by the Politburo, which is involved both directly and indirectly in media control. The First Secretary and other Politburo members set the tone for the media by their pronouncements and public speeches. Journalists have always read these carefully as an essential guide for deciding what is publishable. In the Gierek era, this custom was formalized into an obligation to use Gierek speeches and Trybuna Ludu as the models for all media presentations. Other Politburo members were also reported to have had personal ties and informal contacts with individual journalists and editors. Finally, Gierek held regular media conferences and expected other officials to do likewise. During these meetings, journalists were given both quotable and "off-the-record" information, and their comments and views were solicited. Such conferences were important both as overall channels for guidance and as links between the Party leadership and editors with whom Party leaders had no informal ties. Even in the Gomulka period, when this direction was far less organized, prominent journalists had informal contacts with various Politburo members.
The top leadership has always been attentive to at least the "prestige media." This was particularly true in the Gierek period, when each top leader reportedly received Trybuna Ludu, Zycie Warszawy, Polityka, Nowe Drogi, and Zycie Gospodarcze. Top leaders and their wives have also long been regular observers of Polish Television News. In addition, summaries of Polish journals, foreign news and commentary, and censored or "background" information are printed in a series of internal bulletins that are distributed to Politburo members and other designated individuals.[2] Finally, all books published are apparently automatically distributed or made available to the top leaders, although there are few indications that they read any except the highly political ones whose publication has been a matter of concern to Politburo members.

The Politburo controls top media personnel, and it assigns one of its own members to supervise propaganda and ideology. In the 1970s, Jan Szydlak performed this function. The Politburo also appoints a Central Committee Secretary for Propaganda and Ideology (in the 1970s, Jerzy Lukasiewicz). Central Committee Press Department positions and key media posts (chief editors or directors of the Main Administration for the Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances (GUKPPiW), PAP, Trybuna Ludu, Nowe Drogi, and the major publishing houses) are Politburo nomenklatura positions.

The Politburo, normally through a designated member, also serves as the ultimate arbiter in disputes over censorship decisions. Politburo members selected to serve this function included Zenon Kliszko during

the late Gomulka period and Edward Babiuch in the Gierek period. Normally, however, disagreements over censorship are resolved at lower levels. We know of only one case, that of Mieczyslaw Moczar's book Barwy walki, in which the entire Politburo resolved a censorship issue. [3]

Central Committee Press Department

The highest-level official responsible for day-to-day supervision of the media is the Central Committee Secretary in charge of the Central Committee Press Department. He supervises all Central Committee-level decisions on nomenklatura media positions (i.e., the appointments of all chief editors and the lower-level editors of important publications). He also supervises and has direct responsibility for all Central Committee organs (Trybuna Ludu, Nowe Drogi, and Polish Television News).

As the central body for media control, the Central Committee Press Department has three basic functions:

1. To provide directives on appropriate media foci.
2. To evaluate and coordinate central and provincial journals.
3. To supervise media treatment of the PUWP and its leadership.

In the Gomulka period, supervision in these areas was often left to other bodies: the censors' office, the journalists' association (SDP), publishing houses, and media study institutes. Under Gierek, however, the Press Department increased its power both by the importance of its directors within the Party leadership and by the growth of its staff to over 50 instructors (as compared to 10 to 15 during the Gomulka era).

[3] See Note N-1514/5, Section II.
Instructions on the coverage of various substantive issues in the media and even detailed censors' regulations came from the Press Department instead of the censors' office. As a result, the Press Department acquired new organizational capability to direct and control the media. There is some evidence that the Press Department also gathered much public opinion data from Poland and abroad, and one section of the Department even apparently analyzed treatment of Poland in the foreign media.

It appears from interview data and available biographical data that at middle and low levels, there is a great deal of circulation between parts of the journalism profession and the Central Committee Press Department, with many editors being appointed from the Department and a few Party journalists spending time there. Most of the lower-level Department officials, known as "instructors," have had some contact with journalism, although it is virtually unheard of for skilled or promising journalists to go into the Press Department as instructors after they have begun their professional careers.

Press Department direction of the media is carried out through a number of channels. Its head may speak publicly on media policy at Central Committee Plenums, meetings of the journalists' association, and special meetings of editors called by the Press Department, or in special forums such as interviews published in particular journals. Press Department instructions on the presentation of various general topics frequently direct journalists to follow the model of Trybuna Ludu as it presents the stance of Polish policy, the leadership, or the Soviet
Union.[4] Trybuna Ludu was formally the established spokesman of Gierek's views, although its journalists received no more specific direction on news coverage than did those of any other major daily. There has been little need for such direction, however, as the editors of Trybuna Ludu are closely tied to the Press Department and naturally adhere to the Party line.

Press Department directives, issued to the editors of PUWP journals and to the censors' office, define the proper focus of the media in a given period and the way in which specific developments are to be treated. For instance, in 1976, the tasks of the media in popularizing the Third PUWP Central Committee Plenum were outlined as

... strengthening moral and political unity of the nation, strengthening the role of the Party, developing socialist patriotism, strengthening the state, and improving administrative ideological and educational work.[5]

As another example, in dealing with the Seventh Party Congress, journalists were told to specifically

1. Deal with developing a new model of consumption.
2. Stress the concept that foreign trade is an essential element of development by popularizing a pro-export strategy.
3. Use the concept of an "open plan" to assure people of the chance to improve themselves.

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4. Show people that they are responsible for development, i.e., that there is a close connection between the quality and quantity of work and the quality of life.[6]

For major media campaigns, more specific directions may be given. Instructions on the coverage of the American Bicentennial, for example, indicated the time when certain articles were appropriate and the extent to which certain predictable events could be discussed. (Such directives, however, have had no discernible impact on the actual coverage.) In Television News, interference by Party leaders is continuous.

Regional Control

The Central Committee Press Department (and higher officials) continually monitor the central and regional media. In the Gomulka period, local PUWP papers were also reviewed and criticized daily by the regional PUWP committees, through the chief editor's membership on the regional Party committee, personal intervention by members of the local Party committee concerning the reporting of specific issues, and general regional directives. Most provincial journalists we interviewed found local control very constraining, because local leaders were generally willing to sanction only very positive discussions of local matters. This hampered criticism of local institutions and led to a disproportionately large amount of local news.

Under Gierek, the Central Committee Press Department was more active in monitoring and criticizing regional journals. Close

management of the media was institutionalized in "lay review committees" and the assignment of an "instructor" from the Central Committee Press Department to supervise each journal (discussed below). Today, these supervising instructors typically oversee three regional Party journals. The instructor keeps abreast of the journals' performance, leads the monthly meetings of the regional lay committee, and provides specific instructions.[7] But even with increased contact and authority, the influence of Central Committee instructors remains indirect. They can critique, but they are not called in to handle daily matters. Regional journalists reported that the major advantage of this system was that they were no longer responsible to local politicians but were directed by central political authorities who encouraged them to take a critical stance toward local politics.

Central supervision of the regional media increased as a result of Gierek's 1975 territorial redivision, which fragmented the regional administrative subdivisions (wojewodztwa) into 49 small regions. Regional journals have continued to report on developments in their old wojewodztwa,[8] but each journal is no longer the organ of one regional Party committee. They all report to a number of Party committees. The decrease in Party committee authority over regional media organs and the conflict between Party committees over individual journals' coverage has increased the significance of national reporting and direction. The Central Committee Press Department instructor assigned to a journal now provides the direction that formerly came from regional Party officials.

To coordinate regional coverage, advisory councils have been established for each regional PUWP journal. These bodies, which meet monthly, are chaired by the designated Central Committee instructor and include the heads of each Party committee in the region, the representatives of various civic groups and institutions, and the editorial board of the journal.[9] The monthly meetings give local Party and community leaders an opportunity to review the coverage of the journal. They also give the Central Committee instructor, based in Warsaw, some bases for judging local coverage, and they provide the Central Committee one more forum for intervention in local affairs.

Journalists we interviewed reported that they prepared carefully for these monthly meetings and attempted to use them mainly to get information on upcoming issues and events. They also reported that this system forced them to orient their journals much more to national concerns than to local concerns.[10] The Gierek leadership encouraged the journals to increase contributions from non-journalists by developing a system of correspondents and consultants from other professions. The organization of Trybuna Robotnicza, Gierek's organ as Party leader in Silesia, was described as a model for the regional media:

... we have concentrated on the development of very close contacts with readers through the development of a broad system of contributors and surveyors for the journal. This assures us connections so that we can quickly assess public opinion on a significant event. This also results in an improvement of the paper's coverage. The Department of Ties with Readers directly handles the work of some 210 contributors and 170 surveyors who are also social activists. The department puts out, on the basis of surveys and letters, a special internal

[10] Ibid.
bulletin every two weeks whose basic conclusions are presented at a meeting of the editorial board. The department also has two nonjournalist staff members as well as a sociologist ... the editorial office includes a number of well-known specialists in various areas, ... either educators or practitioners.

... a campaign called "White Books" ... aims at strengthening work on various topics through the use of special programs for the journal's staff. Through the use of research institutes, specialized economic institutions, union leaders, and members of the staff, reports on the current situation and suggestions for the development of various areas of our life are presented (mining, steel production, housing construction, transportation, public services). These methods have proved to be extremely useful in practice.[11]

The greater control of provincial Party journals by central authorities after the 1975 territorial reorganization facilitated copying this model in other regions.

Party Membership

Most media organs have their own primary Party organization, which often contains a majority of the editorial board. However, not all of the staff or editorial board of even Party papers are required to be Party members. Even at Trybuna Ludu, there are established staff members who are not Party members. Party membership is encouraged for journalists of note but it is not required. Therefore, the primary Party organization usually plays a smaller role than other formal and informal staff contacts, dealing with procedural problems of the journal and its staff. It is yet another avenue for the exchange of unpublishable information. Primary Party organizations have used meetings of higher Party organizations to raise issues of professional journalist concern and readership interest.

Journalists who are Party members are encouraged to attend special Party ideological schools for short seminars or year-long programs, although very few are willing to take the time to do so.[12] They are also able to combine their professional skill and Party affiliation to move, temporarily or permanently, from journalism into political positions. This option is seldom taken by established journalists, however, as it means a financial sacrifice and loss of their independent power base and their direct access to policymakers.

**Impact of Party Direction**

Individual journals and other media organs have reacted differently over time to directives of the Central Committee Press Department (or lower-level Party committees). In the Gomulka era, very few Party directives were given, and those that were issued had little resonance. Party guidance was neither strong nor consistent. While disdain for Party directives was seldom exhibited openly, journalists often failed to concentrate on issues they were instructed to. Local PZPR committees' directives were dominant for provincial journals.[13] Under Gierek, guidance and control over the actual execution of Party directives became much more formalized. Following the administrative reforms of 1975, the Katowice system of "lay committee" direction was instituted for all provincial Party journals.

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The nature of informal Party elite-journalist interaction has also changed over time. There was no high-level, formal Party-journalist interaction during the Gomulka years. Gomulka never met with more than small delegations of journalists from the SDP, and even these meetings had been discontinued by the mid-1960s. However, journalists always had some non-institutionalized contact with individual leaders, and Gomulka continued to meet with (and intervene for) personal friends who were journalists. At every level, these contacts with the elite let journalists know the tenor of elite discussions and gave them "background information" to guide their selection of topics. Editors' personal contacts and formal positions on Party committees were always used to guide the media. The personalized nature of contacts encouraged the identification of journalists with factions or groups who served as patrons. In the Gomulka period, these personal contacts were the chief source of information and protection. In the Gierek era, formal national forums for contact were established. The administrative and media reforms were aimed at ending informal interaction between individuals in the media and members of the political elite and at providing more institutionalized control.

The Party has applied both direct and indirect sanctions for non-compliance with Party directives. Direct sanctions include the removal of editors and orders by the Central Committee Press Department or Party leaders for editors to remove individual journalists. Journalists may also be blacklisted, denied access to information, and denied a passport. In addition, the Party may cut back paper allocations or other resources, thereby limiting a journal's circulation and reducing
its financial base.[14] Individual journals or journalists may also be publicly criticized by either Party elites or "superior" journals, especially Trybuna Ludu.[15] Less publicly and directly, media research institute studies are often commissioned by the Central Committee to show whether the media are responding to PUWP guidance. These studies are considered significant enough by the media establishment that journals often commission their own studies to counteract criticism.[16]

MINISTRIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

Control of the media by government institutions occurs on many levels; it is usually not directive, but rather takes the form of prevention and intervention. Government and economic institutions manage the journalism process in two basic ways: They influence journalists' access to information, and they control the publication of specific information or opinion. (The process of prepublication censorship, carried out by GUKPPIW, is examined in Note N-1514/2.) Access to information is controlled on an ad hoc basis--officials often prevent journalists from obtaining information on particular issues or areas. Such actions violate the Administrative Code and periodic directives from the high officials which champion the journalists' right to information and to rapid responses from institutions that they criticize. On a practical level, however, there is little enforcement of either the Code or the directives.

[14] Each journal must largely support itself, through its circulation earnings and funds from its publishing organization.
[16] Interview data.
Officials may attempt to use their connections with higher officials to prevent the publication of information that is critical of their institutions. They may act indirectly, informally calling the journalist and his editor, or they may attempt to get a formal ruling by the censor's office that information or criticism on the topic in question may not be published. [17]

Formal channels for dispensing information, in the form of a ministry or an institutional press office, were first developed in the Gierek period. But press offices can hamper as well as assist journalists. They tend to be useful for low-level journalists who lack contacts, but they are seen as a hindrance by journalists with well-developed information networks, who try to contact directly the individuals involved in a given area or issue. Since journalists assume that bureaucrats will try to block all but positive information, they try to speak privately with workers or experts in related establishments. Many managers attempt to prevent such interviews. Access to information sources is considered by many journalists to be a major problem.

The results of a survey conducted by the author in 1976 (see Table 1) demonstrate that journalists admit having difficulties both in getting access to sources and in obtaining information from those sources. Cross-tabulations of survey responses with various professional and socioeconomic characteristics showed some relationship between a journalist's ability to get information and his own specialization, education, and links with the Party or activist segments of the population.

Table 1
EXTENT TO WHICH ACCESS TO INFORMATION IS A PROBLEM FOR JOURNALISTS

Do you have difficulties in:

(1) Access to information sources?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Absolute Number</th>
<th>Percentage (rounded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Gathering information?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Absolute Number</th>
<th>Percentage (rounded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The importance placed on these factors is further amplified by the fact that the journalists surveyed listed the "politically risky" nature of the profession as their second major problem (the first was the "fast work pace") and "difficulties in getting and using information" as the third major problem.[18]

Table 2 displays journalists' ranking of sources of information and indicates the importance of direct personal contacts.

[18] The significance of these results must be considered in light of the probable care with which journalists put this kind of identifiable information down on a survey distributed in their offices and the fact that the respondents were middle- and low-level central and provincial journalists, not high-ranking established professionals with developed contacts.
Table 2

RANKING OF INFORMATION SOURCES FOR ARTICLES
(highest to lowest)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>NA/Not Listed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAP, news agencies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other media</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private contact with officials</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP club membership</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with people</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readers' letters</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


PUBLISHING HOUSES

Publishing houses also play a significant role in the guidance of the mass media. They are organized according to topics and target audience. The largest, RSW Prasa, is the central organization for the publications of the PUWP and other allied organizations. RSW Prasa publishes 45 of the 54 journals that appear more than once a week, and it publishes 128 of the nation's 1,468 periodicals. The small number of periodicals published by RSW Prasa reflects the plethora of specialist journals published by tiny publishing houses; yet RSW Prasa journals account for 80 percent of the readership of periodicals.
RSW Prasa and the smaller publishing houses handling either technical periodicals or journals of minor parties are responsible for the administration of the Polish media complex. [19] Publishing houses make decisions about the distribution of paper to individual journals (thereby controlling the circulation and size of the journal) and about access to modern equipment. They also oversee questions of staffing, salaries, and benefits for employees. And they control the distribution of publications, a matter which is particularly significant for Catholic journals.

Applicants for journalism positions must be processed through the personnel office of a journal's publishing house; although in most cases this approval is a formality, since the chief editor hires directly, the general composition of the junior and support staffs may be colored by the personnel office. Publishers also allocate money to journals to cover foreign correspondents and travel expenses. The denial of these funds can adversely affect a journal.

Access to paper and printing facilities is determined at least formally by the publishing house. Since all journals except purely political organs must be self-supporting, readability and readership are crucial. The printing equipment assigned, the time allotted for printing a run, and the kind of paper assigned affect the technical appeal of a journal and the ability of its editors to lobby for immediate publication of censored articles or passages. Cutbacks on paper allocations force journals to cut down on the space available for their journalists.

to publish articles. This reduces the amount of income the journalists receive from the piecework component of their pay and forces them to seek at least part-time work elsewhere. Although decisions to close down journals or severely restrict their circulation and resources are made by Party bodies or in other political forums, publishing houses are the instruments that carry out these decisions and may themselves affect the media on less dramatic resource allocation issues.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE MEDIA

The organizational structure of a Polish editorial office (see Fig. 1) is a combination of strict hierarchical authority and egalitarian contacts and participation.[1] The editorial staff of a Polish journal consists of the chief editor, assistant editors, the managing editor (sekretarz redakcji), and the heads of the individual thematic departments. The chief editor determines much of the internal structure and process of individual media.

THE CHIEF EDITOR

The political direction of a journal or other media organ is ultimately the responsibility of its chief editor. He is, in turn, responsible to his sponsoring organization for political guidance. Sponsoring organizations include the PUWP, the minor parties, trade unions and professional organizations, government institutions, and publishing houses. In all cases, as noted in Section III, a newspaper or journal is also part of a publishing house that oversees administration, staffing, financial issues, and material resources. Party and "readership" newspapers (most of which address a specific audience but have no organizational sponsorship) fall under RSW Prasa, which also serves as the Party publishing house.[2]

[1] This discussion deals only with printed media, although Polish Radio and Television are organized along the same lines.
[2] Editorial appointments on journals published through RSW Prasa are a part of the Party nomenklatura system.
Fig. 1 — Newsroom structures
Not only must the chief editor satisfy the administrative and political demands of his overseers, he must also have the support and confidence of his staff. Since the chief editor is normally a political appointee, designated by his sponsoring organization, he is generally neither an established member of the staff nor a practicing journalist. He is likely to be grafted onto a staff that has been comparatively stable since the early 1960s. In contrast to the chief editor, the editorial board and assistant editors of even the most political organs tend to be upwardly mobile staff members who have moved from department head to managing editor to assistant editor. Their relationship with the staff is usually a close and egalitarian one. The chief editor is in the difficult position of being

... on the one hand, identified with the editorial staff as the representative of its interests and outlook to the political authorities. On the other hand, he is seen by the edi-

[3] In only two of 16 journals studied closely by the author had the chief editor worked on the journal before his appointment as chief editor. Even in these two cases, the chief editor had been selected by the sponsoring organization. Tadeusz Kupis (Zawod dziennikarza w Polsce Ludowej, Warsaw, Książka i Wiedza, 1966, p. 49) notes that there is frequent turnover in chief editors, making "a consolidated system of direction" impossible. Between 1949 and 1961, the average tenure for a chief editor was 1.5 years (this was a unique period, as from 1955 to 1958 there were many instances of staff revolt against the chief editor, with a new editor elected by secret ballot; most of the new editors were in turn replaced by someone selected by the publishing organization after Gomulka consolidated his control).

[4] In the course of visits to editorial offices in 1976, the author frequently found journalists talking with the assistant editor about personal as well as professional issues. Assistant editors were more often able to give personal information on individual staff members. Journalists said that they relied on this second strata of editors to relay messages to the chief editor on their treatment by the "outside world." They also turned to these editors as "experts" on journalism issues. The position of the second-level editors is strengthened by the inexperience and impermanence of the chief editors.
torial staff as being the representative of the political authorities to insure that their orders are carried out.[5]

The chief editor is normally a member of the executive body of his sponsoring organization. The chief editors of regional Party papers have, since 1971, automatically been members of their regional Party committees. The chief editor of Trybuna Ludu has automatically been a member of the national Party Central Committee, and during the 1970s his assistants were on the Warsaw regional committees. With the administrative reorganization of 1975, not only did the chief editors of regional papers belong to one regional committee, but the multiplicity of committees to which each periodical was responsible made it incumbent upon other staff members to sit on other regional committees in the region (see Table 3). In an area with a central city and satellite rural districts, the chief editor holds a position on the dominant, urban district committee, and his deputies sit on the less influential, rural committees.

Editors of ministry publications (such as journals of the Ministry of Health), unlike other editors, tend to enjoy autonomy from their sponsoring organization. As a result, these journals often publish harsher criticism of their own ministries than do the journals of professional and social organizations, which are usually aimed at intram ministry communications, i.e., drawing together various professions working for the ministry within a common area of specialization. Ministry-sponsored journals have as one of their roles self-criticism of lower levels in the ministry administration. Their chief editors are usually

outsiders to the ministry hierarchy, so their tenure and that of their staff are unrelated to the politics of the ministry.

The dual position of the chief editor means that journalists are generally insulated both from direct political control and from a clear awareness of that control. Because of his position on Party bodies, the chief editor is attuned to prevailing political concerns. Because of

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Dailies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member, vojvodship executive committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member, vojvodship committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate member, vojvodship committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member, vojvodship executive committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member, vojvodship committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate member, vojvodship committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Polish media.

Note: Editors-in-chief of weeklies and monthlies as well as of Polish Radio and Television installations were excluded from these calculations because they do not fit in either category. Eight editors of periodicals were identified in the media as belonging to local committees in 1971.
his accountability for what is published, he is the contact point for censorship and guidance. Since his status with his staff is proportional to his ability to protect the autonomy of "his" journal, the chief editor is unlikely to either present the sponsor's instructions as orders to his journalists or reveal the extent of censorship and control from outside. In the provincial media, even with the broadening of staff participation on Party committees, awareness of outside interference remains within the editorial board. The plethora of "sponsoring" committees simply diminishes the amount and authority of direction given by any one organization.

A chief editor's external and administrative functions require him to

... have significant political training, knowledge of political, economic, and social concerns, and developed contacts. The chief editor not only directs the work of the newspaper and establishes its political outlook but he also represents the journal externally.[6]

It is the chief editor who makes contact with other local elites on both formal and informal levels. He normally cultivates friendships with industrial managers, local government officials, local Party leaders, and other local "notables." He appears before citizens' groups as a representative of the local power elite and of the journal. He is frequently summoned to discuss a topic and answer questions at primary Party organization meetings. He also meets with the administrators of his publishing house on administrative matters. In the Gierek period,

chief editors were often invited to press conferences with Gierek and other high officials (or were able to honor a staff member by delegating him to attend); they were asked to attend meetings with the censor, who would notify them of new regulations and recommended lines of media coverage; and in some circumstances, they were allowed to observe Central Committee sessions. They were then expected to selectively disseminate the information they gathered to their staffs.

The chief editor, in his external functions, thus has three "pub-

1. His staff, who expect him to cultivate outside authorities to facilitate access to information and to enable journalists to publish the data they have gathered. Staff members expect him to keep them continually abreast of events in the political realm and depend on him to work with the publishing house to provide the journal with the best possible resource base, i.e., staff, equipment, and circulation.

2. His sponsoring organization, which judges him on his ability to put out a readable and popular publication that accurately presents the sponsor's political position. The sponsoring organization's ability to reward or sanction a journal is, however, dependent on its political position and that of its head.

3. His publishing house, which judges him largely on the basis of the financial solidity of his journal and its readership. This "public" encourages him to innovate, but not to the extent that the innovation becomes a burden on the resources of the publishing house. (The restrictions on innovation do not apply to
highly specialized journals and leading Party journals such as Trybuna Ludu and Nowe Drodzi.)

In addition, all chief editors are aware of the ultimate concern of central PUWP authorities with their work.

Normally, a chief editor concentrates on these political and administrative duties. In fact, only a few editors actually write for their own journals.[7] A Polish study of 29 daily papers showed that the internal responsibilities of chief editors were

- Supervision of departments of the paper (20 papers).
- Handling of material questioned by the managing editor (7 papers).
- Approving all publicystyka (analyses and propaganda work) (6 papers).
- Managing financial affairs (3 papers).
- Review of the journal's mail (2 papers).
- Staffing concerns, coordination of work of the staff, reading and evaluating material from news agencies, editing the journal, and alternating with the assistant editors in checking the actual layout (1 paper).[8]

"Supervision of departments" actually consists of controlling the journal's political direction by "direct supervision of the work of the newsroom and of the topics dealt with by the journal." Most chief editors focus on the issues of prime concern to the Party: "culture,

economics, Party affairs, local affairs, foreign affairs, agriculture, education and science, and ties with the readers," with the majority concentrating on culture, economics, and Party events. Those who supervise local, foreign, agricultural, and educational topics do so largely as a result of their journals' traditions of special concentration in these areas. The direct supervision of departments allows chief editors to gain contact and loyalty from their staff members, through

... directing new staff members, evaluating subordinates, aiding staff members with problems, and activating the staff.[9]

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

The extent to which an editor concentrates on a given role depends largely upon his own character and that of his staff, as well as the established tradition and role of the journal.[10] The chief editor is ultimately responsible for all decisions about the political line of the journal and the articles published in it. The extent of his personal involvement with the direction of his staff tends to be directly proportional to his experience in journalism and inversely proportional to the size of the staff. At the smallest journals, the entire staff meets together to plan future issues; at large dailies, this is impossible. The larger the staff, the more isolated the chief editor tends to be. Most of his contacts with the staff occur through his regular meetings with the editorial board (kolegium). Information is transmitted from and to the chief editor through this board. But even the editorial

board itself becomes a cumbersome structure on journals where many individuals have a decisive say in what is to be published. In these cases, smaller, informal editorial boards emerge whose membership has no relationship to the listing on the masthead.

In the case of Zycie Warszawy, for instance, the week's articles are planned by the editorial board on Monday. The managing editor is then responsible for executing the plan. He approves the articles as they are turned in. If there is time, the articles are also approved by the assistant editors responsible for the substantive areas being discussed. If there is no time, articles are read by the assistant editor only after they have been submitted to the censor and the printers. For unplanned articles based on local and national events (generally 20 percent of an issue),

... if the article is submitted to the managing editor by one [o'clock], it can be approved by the daily editorial board meeting. There are also times when the author takes the article directly to the managing editor or, even, late at night to the processor of wire service articles who works at night. He then tries to contact the department editor, but is not always successful.[11]

General staff meetings are infrequent. When they do occur, they tend to consist of critiques of past issues by the chief editor. The chief editor gives general directives, but he has so little contact with individual journalists that he usually cannot evaluate their work.

At both large and small journals, the editorial board meets regularly with the chief editor, linking him to the day-to-day concerns of

his staff by providing information about the work of the journal's individual units. The members of the editorial board participate with the chief editor in planning. They also filter confidential materials and information back to the staff. Board meetings are usually held daily to evaluate the previous edition of the journal and to plan the next edition.

The deputy chief editor is generally a professional journalist. The normal administrative career path appears to be from managing editor to deputy editor of the same journal. The deputy editor complements the chief editor by performing the management tasks the chief editor does not handle. While journalists do not generally perceive of such an administrative position as a professional honor, they do tend to regard deputy editors who have journalism backgrounds as comrades. Deputy editors are in fact the journalists' last level of professional control.[12] Their relations with the staff, however, are on a relatively equal, collegial level, no matter what management tasks they perform.

The day-to-day operation of a journal is normally controlled by the managing editor (sekretarz redakcji). This position is considered by journalists to be very difficult to fill: It requires extensive journalistic training and experience in addition to managerial talents that are not fundamental to journalism. The managing editor has the actual responsibility for producing a journal; he is the "gatekeeper" for the information published. His duties include

- Laying out the journal.
- Correcting and approving copy.

Selecting material to be used each day.

Coordinating with the printing house.

Managing the journal's financial affairs.[13]

Thus, he accepts or rejects the work done by journalists and thereby controls their earnings. As the "gatekeeper," he is a major contact point between the chief editor and journalists.

Through his role in the production stages of the journal, the managing editor is acutely aware of patterns of censorship, although the responsibility for arguing for the publication of articles blocked by the censor generally rests with the chief editor and his deputy, whose political ties normally give them more leverage.[14] The managing editor, however, processes all stories, and as he does this, he identifies potentially sensitive ones for referral to the chief editor for approval. Within the editorial board, he is held responsible for any articles that are allowed to slip through. He also has to fill gaps left by censored articles at the last minute, which tends to make him a fairly strict censor, particularly if his chief editor does not control articles himself or have enough authority to act against the censor. The


[14] Most chief editors interviewed in 1976 said that they felt their responsibility was to use their authority to lobby with the censors. The chief editors of some sociopolitical weeklies, however, said that they felt that it reduced the authority of their position to deal with the censors' office at the first level of appeal. They left this to their assistants. Only on issues they personally considered crucial did they involve themselves, after an initial rebuff by the censor's office.
managing editor often explains his rejection of articles to staff journalists, however, on the basis of writing quality and space. Regular journalists are thus never completely clear as to whether restrictions on their publications stem from problems in their own writing or from political pressures.

THE STAFF

The typical staff of a mass-media publication includes an average of 50 full-time journalists. General-circulation journals may have as many as 100 or more (Trybuna Ludu) or as few as 25 or less (sociopolitical weeklies).[15]

In addition to the basic full-time staff of journalists, each journal has part-time collaborators. This practice, intended to facilitate the publication of articles by non-journalists, allows editors to circumvent the blacklisting of journalists by publishing their articles under other names. It is also widely used by journalists to supplement their incomes. Normally, in fact, journalists employed on one journal write for a number of others if they have enough contacts. This is not a political act; it is an individual economic necessity. In only a few instances did journalists we interviewed report using a Polish journal other than their own for articles written under their own name for substantive reasons. And in most of these instances, either the articles involved were too specialized for the journalist's own paper or the journalist was attempting to play the factional politics of the Moczar era. There were no reported instances of articles being censored in one

journal and passed on to others. At the same time, some journalists stated that since their own journals had to print their articles, there was some limited incentive to place their better articles in other, better known journals. Such outside publication allows for a greater variety of discussion than could be provided by a limited full-time staff; but there are limits on a journal's ability to use outside collaborators, since it must pay for their articles in addition to paying the full salaries of its staff journalists.[16]

The typical staff is divided into departments based, normally, on thematic (e.g., economics, cultural, political affairs) and regional divisions (local, regional news). In addition, each journal has divisions that deal with readers' letters and news agency articles. Large journals also have a staff publicysta (news analyst). This position was added during the Gierek reforms of salary scales to provide advancement in pure journalism for skilled writers and political propagandizers.

A few Polish journals have staffs divided according to specialization in writing styles or target readership groups. The latter have been popular additions to the normal staff structures, since they focus on groups such as women and youth, that are often thought to be somewhat alienated from the Party.[17]

Most departments, with the exception of those focused on agency and local news, appear to consist of four to six journalists. This is considered by Polish researchers to be the optimal size for a group to

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lobby effectively and yet maintain a sense of group cohesiveness.[18]

Although departments are usually made up of leading specialists in their respective areas, their goal is not simply to provide information. This is done by the large staff of novice journalists in the local and regional departments:

In 50 percent of the editorial offices studied, the provision of information is an obligation for the thematic departments only when the information is "broad," illustrative of a general "problem" or "regional" (in cases where the local department handles city information and the regional departments handle powiat-level information).[19]

Dealing with current news is considered by journalists in thematic departments as "wasting a lot of time and not providing too much as well as not allowing journalists to properly use their creativity."[20]

The organization of the editorial office reflects the emphasis of Polish media on analysis and explanation, as opposed to information-gathering. For all but the "richest" journals, news-gathering is handled either by the national press agencies (which provide international and national news) or by novice journalists and nonprofessional part-time correspondents (who report on local and regional news). In a review of Polish newspapers, we did not find any instance of seasoned professionals reporting local or regional news or processing national and international news. Reporting positions draw the minimum salary on the journalism pay scale. Journalists who handle this task are often assigned to regional offices or work on different shifts from other

[20] Ibid.
journalists on the staff. This further isolates them and limits them to serving as information sources for other journalists' analyses or commentaries. Middle- and high-level journalists, freed from "reporting," can thus normally work extensively on one subject, with little concern for timeliness.

Once articles are produced, the editor of the thematic department is the first "censor":

In 70 percent of the journals, the editor in a thematic department and his immediate superior control the material as to whether it is in line with the facts, with the general line of national politics, and with the position taken in that area by the journal. In 50 percent of the journals these editors simultaneously copy-edit the material for style and language....[21]

The thematic editor is generally the leading journalist in the department.

This distribution of responsibilities and functions reinforces the tendency to present discussions rather than "news" in the media. It also ensures that all of the material that is submitted will have been carefully planned and checked. Information, international and local, is a necessary service to readers rather than a pivotal function of the media. Interpretation is the norm. Censorship at all levels must thus concern itself with nuances of interpretation as well as straight control of information.

Staff identity at small journals (whether they are major sociopolitical weeklies or small rural Party dailies) is strong and is reinforced by the likelihood of long tenure. Whether it is because

[21] Ibid., p. 34.
positions at major journals are top status positions in the profession or because journals are so isolated that staff members cannot make the contacts needed to find other jobs, a staff ethos develops. At major sociopolitical weeklies, this ethos is expanded by the long history of contact between journalists. Many who were on Po Prostu and Sztandar Młodych in 1956 have moved into positions on the leading journals, particularly Polityka, through personal contacts.[22] The staff ethos is so strong that individual journalists who have been blacklisted on a journal have sometimes been paid to publish under an assumed name until the blacklisting ended.[23]

The organization of the media production process creates a situation where journalists form close contacts and alliances with other journalists and experts in their area of interest. Since media staffs are normally divided into topical specializations and journalists remain in their specialized divisions for long periods of time, individual journalists establish contacts with relevant ministries and Party committees. These central officials frequently provide information on upcoming developments. Provincial journalists, who have little contact with these officials, tend to feel disadvantaged in this regard. Lower-level journalists frequently are in conflict with the middle-level professionals (managers and directors) about whom they report. Often, in fact, they turn to high-level officials to help them gain access to information middle-level officials are keeping from them.

[22] Fikus, p. 62, and interview data.
[23] Interview data.
Popular and elite pressures on journalists have been centered on their role as "watchdogs" or critics of government administration. Journalists must criticize the work of middle-level bureaucrats and industrial directors who are, in effect, their peers. As journalists develop expertise and produce a series of articles in a given area, they become institutionalized as the adversaries of "policy executors." At the same time, they create a following of readers who regard them as experts on a particular subject.

Specialization also creates ties between journalists on different papers who meet in SDP specialist clubs and who keep abreast of each other's articles. This often results in concentration on certain issues in the media, for media discussions or campaigns are in part a reflection of the influence journalists have on each other and the extent to which they are their own audience.

PERSONNEL POLICY

The hiring of journalists is generally a professional and personal issue, not a Party matter. In the immediate postwar period, the media system was both relatively unstructured and desperate for staff who did not have ties to the prewar regime. As a result, many of our interviewees were hired as young men and women through accidental connections and friendships. Editors were even able to hire many prewar journalists to provide professional expertise; others were hired who had neither proven expertise nor loyalty to the regime.

Even after professional journalism training programs were begun in the early 1950s, most of the hiring was rapid and highly personalized.
Journalists often established themselves and then brought friends onto their staffs. Hiring could be done rapidly because journals did not have to be self-supporting and could have bloated staffs, and the media system was expanding so fast that many new staff members were needed.

In the Gomulka years, the expansion of the media system and the high resource commitment to it ended. Few journalists were hired, even from the journalism school program, after the firings that followed the events of 1956. And since most of the "established" journalists were relatively young, few left the profession. The hiring that was done was almost totally on a personal basis. In some cases, individuals were allowed to write for journals whenever their services were needed and were paid on a piecework basis. Journalists who had been blacklisted and those who were close politically to a chief editor often worked in this way.

There have been only a very limited number of full-time, tenured journalism positions. Most journalists who have entered the field in the last 15 years have had to start with full-time but nontenured positions or, in some areas, with only part-time commitments.[24]

Three basic paths provided entry into the profession during the Gierek era. Most of the journalists who joined the staff of central journals were usually graduates of the Warsaw journalism program who were sent to the job through placement offices at publishing houses.[25] They were accepted for an apprenticeship by an editor on the basis of their record, their portfolio of work, and an interview. Many had

[24] Interview data.
worked as free-lance writers during their journalism training. Competition for positions was strong, and many journalism school graduates had to seek work outside of the profession because they could not find acceptable positions in journalism. [26] Established journalists, while they were formally channeled through the personnel offices of publishing houses, moved about in the field through personal contacts and ties. [27] Provincial journalists still tended to be recruited through old-style recruitment patterns: So few graduates of journalism school were willing to move to the provinces that prior training in journalism was not required. Young applicants simply applied to the editor for a job and were approved by the personnel office of the publishing house. [28]

Party credentials are not required for staff work on any newspaper. Successful Party journal staffers are encouraged to join the Party after two or more years of work:

In RSW Prasa, the Party publishing house, Party membership is about 51 percent, in areas with higher Party membership than Warsaw as well as in Warsaw. It should not be forgotten that RSW Prasa publishes not only dailies and periodicals of the Party and social organizations but also Świat, Sztandar Młodych, Rozrywki, Sport, CAF, and KAW. In PAP, Party membership is about 56 percent; in the Polish Committee for Radio and Television, membership is 44 percent. In the media of the ZSL, ZSL membership is 53 percent and PUWP membership, 17.5 percent. Similarly, in the Democratic Party publishing house, 45 percent are members of that party and 15 percent of the PUWP. Membership in political organizations is, of course, much higher among the editorial boards. In RSW Prasa, the editorial boards are 80 percent Party members. In radio and television, 70 percent are Party members.

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[27] Interview data, 1976.
The increase in journalism cadres from 1970 to 1977 did not show a notable increase in Party membership. Of the current 3,994 employees, 50.7 percent (2,025) are in Party organizations. In 1970, of the 2,865 journalists employed, 1,610 (56.2 percent) were in a Party organization.[29]

It is clear from these statistics and from interviews with former journalists and editors that Party membership is not a necessary qualification for entry into the profession. It is also clear that even with the increasing level of Party membership throughout society and the increase in pressure on the media in the Gierek period, the Party was unable to control the ranks of professional journalism to the extent it desired. Individuals who had been fired from their jobs for political errors were frequently rehired, often in more prestigious positions, either in another region or through the intervention of the editor.[30]

NEWS AGENCIES

For all but a few central media organs with funding for international correspondents, the news agencies are the only permanent sources of international and national news. Most journals do not even have correspondents in areas of Poland outside their own region. Within the news agencies, decisions are made about what news should be highlighted, what should be treated only tangentially, and what should be limited to background for top journalists. Daily bulletins report the news in the various categories; these bulletins include directions concerning the placement of sensitive reports and any prohibitions on their editing.

[29] Garlicki, p. 117.
[30] Interview data.
News agency reporting, with the exception of foreign correspondence, is regularized: Journalists cover stories to which they are assigned by their editors, or they rewrite stories from other sources. PAP and Interpress operate under their own specific censorship rules. [31] Once stories are written, bulletins are issued containing daily news in various categories of subject matter, target audience, and secrecy. PAP, for example, publishes the following daily bulletins for the national media: an information bulletin with reprints from the foreign media, a bulletin on other Soviet bloc countries, an economic bulletin, a foreign sports bulletin, a bulletin of caricatures and jokes, and a bulletin concerning foreign science and technology.

Other, smaller news agencies specialize in feature articles rather than straight news. Each agency also publishes a series of special service bulletins, and at least one includes a public opinion research bureau which develops "valuable material for both the media and government, economic, and social organizations." [32] Newspapers may usually select that part of the international and national news they wish to publish. [33] Infrequently, agency stories are rewritten to fit a journal's audience. News agencies also provide provincial journals with articles on technical subjects that those journals do not have the resources to pursue.

[31] Interview data, 1976, 1978. In censors' directives, limits are frequently placed on individual journals reporting anything beyond what is reported by PAP.
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS

The Polish media have more correspondents working abroad than do the media of other Communist countries. This is a result of Poland's historical tradition of international concerns and of the great interest in Poland about the West. Foreign correspondents provide analyses, human interest stories, and reports on major events to supplement press agency reports (in much the same way correspondents for American journals do). They also, both deliberately and inadvertently, provide internal information for the Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry, and Politburo members. Every foreign correspondent we interviewed said that correspondent posting was a Central Committee-level nomenklatura decision under both Gomulka and Gierk.

Customarily, the foreign correspondent is "on his own." Non-PAP correspondents get instructions from their home editors only during crisis periods or when they return for annual or biannual home leave. During home leave, journalists meet with fellow staffers, their editors, and relevant Party or Foreign Ministry officials. These home leaves are used by journalists to reacquaint themselves with Polish domestic politics and with changes in foreign policy. When they are on home leave, they are often used by Central Committee Foreign Affairs Department or Press Department officials or by Foreign Ministry officials as expert-advisors. Other than these occasional visits, though, their ties with Polish officials and even their own editors are very limited. Journalists court the local embassy staff largely to ensure their own positions, but this tends to involve relatively nonprofessional exchanges. In fact, except for the expectation that they will report on any visit-
ing Polish dignitaries or issues involving Poland, foreign correspondents exercise a great deal of initiative independent of their editors or embassy.

In the Gomulka era, before ties had been established with West Germany, foreign correspondents were stationed in Bonn. Not only did these journalists have considerable leeway in writing on subjects as they saw fit, some also served as private channels of information and advocates of a new Polish-German policy. These journalists were able to circulate widely in German society, and some prepared private policy reports for Party officials, urging a new line on the German issue. In some cases, they used interviews with German politicians as a chance to explore alternative positions.[34] This practice has occurred in other areas of the world, although the issues have been less significant and controversial than was the question of Polish-German relations in the 1960s.

Foreign correspondents transmit their articles directly back to their own media organ. They do not formally coordinate with other Polish correspondents stationed in their capital. When their writing deals with sensitive issues, their articles are often not published openly but carried in the PAP special bulletins or other limited-distribution bulletins.[35] Apparently, although correspondents are aware that their articles are not always printed, non-PAP journalists do not tailor their reports accordingly. Sometimes, however, correspondents have refused to write "required" articles that would not reflect local conditions as they saw them. In other crisis situations, correspondents have been

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[34] See Note N-1514/5, Section IV.
asked to report "what they see," and their reports have been circulated to the Politburo as an alternate source of information. PAP journalists, on the other hand, are expected to deliberately produce both regular reports for open publication and reports for internal circulation.

Foreign correspondents are sometimes commissioned to write special reports on issues of interest to leading Central Committee officials or Politburo members. These are sent directly to the interested individual. Ambassadors and high-level embassy officials may also use journalists as sources. Journalists reporting from Third World countries, with which the Foreign Ministry has little experience, are said by our respondents to have been quite influential as experts.

Positions as foreign correspondents are prized. They offer an opportunity to travel, and they are an excellent source of income. After returning to Poland, many correspondents have published compilations of their articles in books and organized national lecture tours, further increasing their earnings.

If a media organ has its own foreign correspondent, it will normally print his dispatches on major issues. Publication of a PAP dispatch instead would indicate that the correspondent's report has departed from centrally imposed directives or that presentation of that issue is otherwise under strict central control. But publication of a TASS (or other Soviet bloc) dispatch may represent an effort (either by the editorial board or at central direction) to distance subtly the journal's position from that of the USSR by refusing to adopt a "national" position.
V. THE MEDIA PROCESS

External influence and control affect the typical Polish editorial office through a variety of channels. External control occurs at three points: (1) topic selection and information-gathering; (2) pre-publication censorship; and (3) post-publication analysis. However, with the exception of personal contacts with the elite by individual journalists, most of the direct control from the outside is filtered through the editor-in-chief and his assistants. Seldom are individual journalists contacted. Awareness by editors and journalists of what is publishable comes through cumulative experiences and observations as well as through formal directives. As one leading Polish journalist stated:

Sure, we read all the papers. What happens to any one journalist is an indicator to all of us of what we can do and how far we can go. That's the way we keep track of changes in the rules of the game. We, Warsaw journalists, are much better off because we know what's happening between the lines--who did what to whom.[1]

The leadership is, however, more able to control what is published than what is actually produced. In fact, it has been accepted policy among journalists since the Stalinist period that no one should be forced to write on any given topic. Central agencies accept this principle.

Long-range plans for a given media organ are drawn up periodically and with increasing degrees of specificity. Generally, a plan of broad

themes, closely coordinated with the appropriate Party committee or institutional sponsors, is drawn up for an entire year. Broad themes are spelled out, campaigns involving readers are scheduled, and a yearly calendar is sketched out by the editorial board and the staff. More specific plans are drawn up for six- and three-month periods. In these plans, specific topics to be covered by various specialized departments are set out, allowing for some coordination between departments. Journalists make comparatively long-term commitments to handle individual topics. Leading journalists then normally can submit only one or two articles per month. They work at home, where there is more privacy, going to their editorial offices only for meetings and appointments. Because of the heavy emphasis on analysis, some journalists spend months dealing with one topic or theme in a single article or a series of articles.

In short-range planning, journalists draw much of their direction from their readership: popular responses to official announcements, letters, contacts with readers about specific problems or "on-the-street" observations, and meetings that journalists attend as guest lecturers where they are questioned by readers. Finally, immediate world and national events stimulate some reporting and analysis, but this is the least significant factor for journalists who do not specialize in international affairs.

The specific focus for an article is selected, in large part, by the individual journalist, who is responsible for keeping abreast of developments in his area. This is done through attendance at press conferences, contacts with leading individuals in a field, the use of
the press offices of ministries and other institutions, and personal observations. Journalists use specialist clubs of the SDP and elite contacts to get an impression of the general direction of policy and to obtain background information. They are also involved in continuous dialogue with their journalism colleagues about gossip and occurrences in their area of specialization. Journalists cite reader pressure and professional discussions as being much more significant than direction by members of the elite in shaping their stories. Elite contacts, except for those of top journalists in Warsaw, are much more diffuse than readership contacts. Elite views normally appear in the Polish press as articles submitted by officials or leaders, not by journalists who convey elite viewpoints. The relationship between leading Polish journalists and their patrons or elite contacts is close, but, according to journalists surveyed, it is not a domineering one (see Table 4).

Table 4
RANKING OF SOURCES OF IDEAS FOR ARTICLES
(most often used to least often used)

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<th>Source</th>
<th>Yes*</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>No*</th>
<th>n.a.</th>
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<td>Journalist's</td>
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<tr>
<td>own ideas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Readers'</td>
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<td>suggestions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Editors'</td>
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<td>suggestions</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*No ranking done; marked either yes or no.
This information is confirmed by interviewees who have been working journalists, who indicate that the normal rank-ordering of influences on a journalist's output is (1) the journalist's own ideas, (2) editors' suggestions, (3) readers' suggestions, and (4) suggestions of external authorities. It appears thus that whatever reliance journalists place on their elite patrons, the journalists are not expected to act as the mouthpiece for the patron.

Because most journalists specialize in a particular topic, they are able to develop detailed information, a sense of feasible topics to pursue, and a range of personal contacts. They are also able to deal critically with the information they are given. But access to information is a serious problem for even leading journalists.

Neither the Party nor the government apparatus can compel journalists to produce specific articles on specific topics. Even under the closely supervised media system of the Gierek era, the limited nature of directions issued by the Central Committee through the censors' office is indicated by the following examples of specific directives:

- Directions to assign a reporter to the building of Huta Katowice.
- Instructions to journalists to deal with general provisions of the documents from the Seventh PUWP Congress.
- Guidance as to what kind of information would be published in general categories and with what frequency on the American Bicentennial and the Helsinki Treaties.[2]

Even more striking is the fact that post-publication review of the coverage of these events in the Polish media showed that the Central Committee's guidelines were not followed.

The political leadership has only a limited number of sanctions or rewards that it can use to influence reporting on a given topic. Leaders or officials must rely largely on personal contacts to get journalists to publish their views, or they must use drastic measures such as the closing down of recalcitrant journals, a measure that runs the risk of serious popular reaction. For example, journalists working for provincial journals reported that in 1968, when the elite was divided, they found themselves caught between leadership demands that they write articles condemning the students who organized massive demonstrations and student demands that they publish their grievances. Most local journals were reluctant to carry out a full-scale condemnation of students in an original commentary by staff journalists. Censorship and potential sanction blocked them from publishing student demands. Instead, they published agency reports and statements by local political leaders, without commentary.[3]

This situation evidently did not change under Gierek. A Polish study in 1974 on the results of increasing the paper supply to 27 journals to stimulate their concentration on areas of special interest to the PWP concluded that (1) areas of interest to the journalists and their readers (greater use of illustrations, more analyses, more advertisements, more information on youth, more cultural and artistic presentations, and more information on sports) increased at least as much and

[3] Interview data.
usually more than the areas emphasized by Party directives,[4] and (2) the only area of PUWP interest in which there was a significant increase in coverage was that of information on other Communist countries. But this did not correct the problem that had been discussed extensively in the media and the Party: Readers were still less interested in the other East European countries than in Western Europe and the United States.[5]

The Party elite exercises negative control by blocking access to information or blocking the publication of completed articles. This control is decisive in preventing media discussions but only indirectly effective in determining coverage. It often triggers later avoidance of an issue, since journalists most often err on the side of caution and avoid potentially controversial subjects to maximize the possibility of having their articles published.

The Party and governmental bodies that exercise control over the media have been described in Section II. Within this media-control system, there are different interests that journalists can sometimes take advantage of. At the top levels, Party supervision is dominant, with the Central Committee Press Department and local Party committees providing direction as to the appropriate press topics. In specific cases, though, Party supervision and control vary in their direction, depending on the journal and its audience. Government institutions act to limit journalists' access to information to control publication of their

[4] Coverage of social topics, economic topics, the PUWP, ideologi-cal issues, and other Soviet bloc countries.
articles. Below the top level, functionaries are often in conflict over the media. Party elites encourage the press to check the behavior of the state administration, while government organs regard the press much more as an adversary. Journalists who have contacts in either hierarchy tend to use this conflict to protect their access to information and their ability to publish that information.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Party and government controls ensure that the Polish media function in conformity with PUWP policies, at least in broad outline. But direct and detailed leadership control over individual articles or other media output is the exception. Both the system of external controls and the media production process contain variations and contradictions. Party and government bodies may place contradictory demands on the media. The expectations of the top Party leadership about the mass media, and the demands levied on it, have changed over the postwar period. The organization and customs of journalism provide for autonomy. Party or government authorities may suggest articles and will in any case review them before and after publication, but media output is generally journalist-initiated.

The diversity exhibited by Polish media is increased by differences in the roles and supervision of various kinds of media. Especially in the case of the key types of media--Party organs and sociopolitical weeklies--discussed in the Appendix, the nature of editorial leadership, journalist traditions, and the staff give rise to significant variations in what is published in individual journals.
Appendix

THE ROLE OF KEY POLISH MEDIA

THE PARTY PRESS

The PUWP issues several publications that are addressed specifically to Party members: Nowe Drogi, Zycie Partii, Ideologia i Spoleczenstwo, Z Pola Walki, and Trybuna Ludu. It also takes direct responsibility for the daily evening news program on Polish Television. Each of these organs covers different subject matter, is addressed to a different audience, and has different supervision.

The highest-level journal is Nowe Drogi, the Party theoretical monthly. Although more highly respected and better staffed than other Party journals in Poland, its editorial structure and work processes follow the general patterns of other Party journals. It is addressed to the Party intelligentsia and central Party officials and activists, and it is under the direct control of a designated Politburo member.

Zycie Partii is addressed to regional and low-level Party activists. It is an organ of (and produced by) the Central Committee Organizational Department. Typically, in the 1960s, the assistant head of the Organization Department was also the chief editor of Zycie Partii.

Ideologia i Spoleczenstwo is addressed to the lowest-level Party agitators. No specific information is available on the supervision of this journal, but there are indications that it is under the Party Secretary responsible for propaganda.
Z Pola Walki is a scholarly journal produced by the Central Committee Party History Institute for a limited scholarly audience. This journal is published by its institute sponsor much like any other academic journal. Most articles are first "supervised" when they are discussed at specially organized sessions of specialists at the Institute. In the 1960s, the Politburo member responsible for the Institute (Jan Szydlak) was always invited to attend, but Party officials generally play a very small role at these meetings and are not interested in the articles that result. After the Institute discussions, the articles are edited on the basis of the comments, then published.

The Central Committee apparatus also directly controls two mass-media organs: the Party daily, Trybuna Ludu, and the daily Television News. Their editorial processes closely match those of comparable non-Party media, differing only in that the content of the Central Committee media is not controlled by the censors' office. These organs are supervised directly by the Central Committee Secretary in charge of propaganda and media and by officials from the Press Department. Their editors are higher in the Party hierarchy than are those of other media.

Trybuna Ludu was more like other, non-Party newspapers under Gierek than in previous periods, even though it was designated as the authoritative voice of the Gierek leadership. Ironically, at this time, its staff lost the perquisites of Central Committee status normally granted to a central Party organ. Until 1976, Trybuna Ludu had its own publishing house and received far more generous financial support than any other daily, and its staff had the same privileges in the Central Committee building as other Central Committee officials. These privileges
were withdrawn under Gierek and Trybuna Ludu was placed under the same financial constraints as other journals.[1] Nevertheless, its articles are still read as the Party line, and therefore its journalists must exert more self-censorship than they would otherwise. In line with this role, Trybuna Ludu adheres to the axiom that it can neither directly enter into a discussion with other journals nor directly attack them.[2]

Nowe Drogi

We shall discuss the organization and role of Nowe Drogi in more detail than those of the other Party journals. The Party leadership exerts control over Nowe Drogi through staff selection and a monthly (and normally cursory) review of the upcoming issue's table of contents. This review is done by a Politburo member designated to supervise the journal; under Gomulka, the monitors were Ochab, Morawski, Strzelecki, and Kliszko. We do not know who performed this role under Gierek. These monitors on occasion provide some specific control and direction, but normally the journal is self-directed. The general pattern, according to our respondents, is for the chief editor of Nowe Drogi to go to the responsible Politburo member twice a month and ask, "What do you have for us to do?" When the Politburo member has specific concerns, he suggests articles and authors, and the chief editor tries to meet his demands. Otherwise, staff editors make their own selections and plans.

No long-term planning is done by the journal staff. Editors simply make up monthly plans on the basis of their own reading of the political

[1] Its journalists and editors see their work as no different from work on any other daily.
[2] Interview data.
situation. The Politburo gives some guidance and makes some requests, and the chief editor's contacts with the Secretariat and Politburo provide other guidance. When the Politburo monitor reads over the plans, he may call into question any article, but he seldom does. Significant articles that deal with issues of interest to the leadership--especially economic (but not agricultural) questions and critical foreign affairs issues--are customarily checked by relevant Central Committee departments. The selection of topics and authors in the areas of culture, book reviews, ideology, social questions, and agriculture, and the editing of their contributions have been left almost entirely up to the editors.

Most articles on economic questions are written by a minister, the head of a Central Committee department, or the head of some economic concern suggested by the Central Committee Economic Department. They are normally then read and approved by the head of the Central Committee Economic Department. Similarly, international affairs articles written by political officials are reviewed in advance by the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Department, whose review is considered essential because foreign analysts might take a Nowe Drogi article as a statement of the Party's position.[4] (No respondent, however, could remember an instance from the 1960s when Nowe Drogi had taken the lead and done any more than provide standard restatements of foreign affairs issues.)

The editors of the Party affairs section of Nowe Drogi are in direct contact with the Central Committee Organizational Department.

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[3] Interview data.
[4] Interview data.
They receive internal reports on Party work and problems around the country (much as the editors in other areas receive the bulletins relevant to their specialties). From these reports and their daily informal contacts, editors are able to draw up a plan of publication almost autonomously. In fact, the Party section was of little concern to the Organization Department in the 1960s, once *Zycie Partii* appeared as a separate publication. (Previously, the two publications had been collapsed into one, but it was found that *Nowe Drogi* was too theoretical to attract the less-educated Party activists as regular readers.)

*Nowe Drogi* and the other Party journals all have small staffs by Polish standards. The staff members, on the whole, are compilers rather than writers. In the 1960s, *Nowe Drogi* had a staff of approximately 12 "editors": a chief editor, his assistant editor, three editors for the Party department, and an editor for each of the remaining departments—culture-education, book reviews, economics, agriculture, foreign affairs, and ideology.

Staff members select topics and ask contributors to write articles. In areas where there is leadership interest, they get recommendations or approval from the Politburo monitor. Then, as individuals or as an editorial board, staff editors read and edit the drafts for style and content. In the 1950s and 1960s, at least, even high officials' articles were often extensively edited for style.

To publish an article in *Nowe Drogi*, high officials (including Central Committee members, heads of Central Committee departments, and government ministers) must have the permission of the Central Committee Secretariat. This is required even though most of the initiative for
their contributions comes from Nowe Drogi editors, who do most of the editing as well. Finally, the lead articles in Nowe Drogi, even if they are merely reprints of top leaders' speeches, are given to the Politburo official in charge to review after they have been approved by the staff.

The Nowe Drogi editorial process has evolved since the 1950s. The Stalinist practice was to have articles read by almost every staff member. Then every article was discussed by everyone on the Editorial Board. The articles were then edited by three to four people on the Board. The author had to sit with the entire Board while it conducted a major discussion. As a result, the author’s style was lost in the process.[5]

This practice ended in 1955. The tradition of collegial editing remained, but the Editorial Board began to meet only occasionally to discuss lead articles. Individual articles were generally discussed only by the author and editor or chief editor.[6]

According to our interviewees, this practice continues, and few, if any, substantive changes are ever made. However, even with this more cursory review, the time lag between the soliciting of an article and its publication is at least three months, so it is impossible for the journal to deal with unexpected events.

In addition to its editorial work, the Nowe Drogi staff has occasionally been used as a "brain trust" for discussions on ideological matters. In these instances, the chief editor usually receives an informal suggestion that he have the staff organize a discussion on some

[5] Interview data.
[6] Ibid.
controversial book or subject. These discussions may feature divergent viewpoints. This advisory work, however, is the only activity that has meant a public forum for Nowe Drogi editors.

In spite of the formal authority and patterns of involvement of the Politburo monitors, most departments of Nowe Drogi have been able to work with relative autonomy because the monitor and his fellows provide little active direction at any stage. In fact, most of our respondents felt that the impetus for Politburo involvement came not from the Politburo but from the editors themselves.

As the political leadership showed little interest in the substance of the journal in the 1950s and 1960s (and according to individuals with recent contact with Nowe Drogi, this pattern continued in the Gierek era), so too did it show only minimal interest in its personnel. The chief editorship for Nowe Drogi has traditionally been a retirement sinecure for a trusted Party worker.[7] Even changes in top Party leadership have not been accompanied by changes in the editorial board. The Gomulka-period editors were selected in 1950 by the chief editor when the journal staff was established from Central Committee nomenklatura lists. Despite factional infighting in the Party and the changes in the political climate between 1950 and 1968, there were few changes in the staff during that period. Even in 1968, the staff was only partly purged.[8]

In sum, although Nowe Drogi (like the other Party journals) is an organ of the Party leadership, it is little used as a platform for key

[7] Interview data.
[8] Interview data.
Party pronouncements. Nor has Nowe Drogi played any special role as a mirror of internal discussion or leadership concern. At best, the journal (and other Party journals) contains diluted reflections of what appear to relative insiders to be appropriate discussions that will not arouse concern among Party leaders.

SOCIOPOLITICAL WEEKLIES

The core group of journals in Poland—those that set the tone of the media, generate the most interest at all levels of the system, and dominate most of the media discussions—are the sociopolitical weeklies, Polityka, Kultura, Literatura, Zycie Literackie, and two more specialized journals, Zycie Gospodarcze and Prawo i Zycie. Since these journals are directed at the intelligentsia and are modeled on the more critical and literary traditions of the prewar Polish press, they naturally take more independent positions than mass dailies or periodicals. The distinctions in coverage among these six journals have varied depending on the ambitions and positions of their chief editors and the leadership's tolerance of press criticism and discussion. Each of these journals has its own editorial style, growing out of the idiosyncracies and traditions of its editors and staff. The staff members of these journals are among the most prominent individuals in the profession.

Because of the prestige of the journals and the significant role they have played in Party politics, the chief editors normally have been powers in their own right. Polityka, Kultura, Zycie Literackie, and Prawo i Zycie were directly engaged in the factional infighting of 1968, and all six journals have had visible impacts on specific social
discussions and policies in the last 20 years.[9]

With the exception of Prawo i Życie, none of these journals has a specific sponsoring organization. Prawo i Życie is formally an organ of the lawyers' association, but in reality it has always been the organ of its chief editor. (Under the editorship of Kazimierz Kakol, in the 1960s, it often went so far as to attack its own sponsors.) The sociopolitical journals are all intended to appeal to and provide outlets for the intelligentsia. All but Życie Literackie (which was instituted in the late 1940s to appeal to the intelligentsia of Krakow) were founded in response to intellectual unrest.

Polityka and Kultura were established as substitutes for or as "loyal equivalents" to the liberal journals that emerged during the Polish October of 1956. Polityka was founded in 1956 as a sociopolitical weekly that would present the Party line to the liberal intelligentsia and counteract the effects of Po Prostu, the liberal cultural journal. Kultura began in 1960 when Przeglad Kulturalny and Nowa Kultura were closed down. It was intended to be a "loyal" journal, addressed to the national literary intelligentsia. In fact, it was boycotted by many writers throughout the 1960s and became, in reputation and in reality, a nationalist and Moczarist organ with little connection to most writers and intellectuals.

The newest of the sociopolitical weeklies, Literatura, was founded in 1972 in an attempt to woo intellectuals to Giełek. It was to counteract the boycott of Kultura and give the writers who were banned in

[9] See Note N-1514/5, Section II.
1968 a chance to write. Its success in becoming a popular literary organ has been limited.

_Prawo i Zycie_ and _Zycie Gospodarcze_ (in its present form) were also products of 1956. In October 1956 they were the organs of liberal, reformist specialists who wanted to promote open, popular discussions in the areas of law and economics. The "revisionist" staff of _Prawo i Zycie_ was not affected by the post-October 1956 "stabilization," but its chief editor was a victim of that stabilization. He was accused of "revisionism" and was removed after six months. Jan Glowczyk, the current chief editor of _Zycie Gospodarcze_, was one of the economists who founded the journal in 1956 and has led it through its increasingly conservative evolution.

**Polityka**

_Polityka_ is Poland's leading journal, as well as its leading sociopolitical weekly. In the last 20 years, it has come to represent the liberal, technical intelligentsia. It is the only one of the sociopolitical weeklies that makes any pretense of being a Party journal, and it is the only one that is actually supposed to concentrate on general sociopolitical issues.

_Polityka_ has departments and regular columns dealing with economic, sociopolitical, cultural, historical, foreign, and national affairs. The general focus of the journal clearly has shifted toward economic issues, but the staff has remained quite stable. _Polityka_ carries much foreign feature reporting, particularly in times of strict censorship, because that is the most readily publishable material. The journal has
a letters-to-the-editor department and a group that does reader surveys for its own use.

The staff of Polityka is one of the most stable in Poland. Most of the current staff came to the journal soon after 1956. Many previously worked on Sztandar Młodych or Po Prostu. Because of this stability and the status attached to being a Polityka journalist, there is a great deal of staff cooperation and interaction, which has facilitated a shared political philosophy. The general ideology of Polityka, according to Polish journalists we interviewed, has been (1) "internationalist" (in terms of playing an active role in the world arena), (2) pro-modernization, (3) pro-technocracy and rationalization, and (4) liberal in social and cultural affairs.

The stability of the Polityka staff, and the common philosophy, enabled the journal to survive open attack in 1968, when it was explicitly condemned in Party meetings as "Zionist, cosmopolitan, and anti-Polish" and attacked only slightly less directly in the Moczarist media.[10] The verbal attacks were accompanied by problems with telephones and other kinds of open harassment. But this is a staff that is committed in good and bad times to achieving its goals, willing to work together, and prepared to compromise to protect both the journal and its editor from political reprisals.

One major factor, however, tends to diminish this staff solidarity: Because of their prominence in the journalism community and because Mieczysław Rakowski (the chief editor) allows it, all Polityka staffers can and do write elsewhere, appear on radio and television, and serve as public speakers. This gives them a number of subsidiary but competing

[10] See Note N-1514/5, Section II.
commitments. It also keeps them away from the Polityka offices and the informal interaction that common offices normally facilitate. All the same, comparisons of the situation at Polityka with that at other journals indicate that this is an unusually close-knit staff.

Mieczyslaw Rakowski has been the chief editor of Polityka since 1958 and has been a major force in its development. He came to the journal as the assistant editor, having been a member of the Central Committee Press Department in the 1950s. He had, according to most respondents, a close personal relationship with Gomulka, which—along with his relationship with Kliszeko and Starewicz, key Gomulka associates—helped to make Polityka the target of attacks by Moczardites but allowed him to preserve the journal and to push through some censored articles even when the journal was under strong attack in 1968.

Rakowski managed to establish an independent and individualistic political position. In the 1960s, for example, in spite of Soviet pressure, he refused to allow a staff member to write an article critical of Solzhenitsyn.[11] His independence notwithstanding, Rakowski is said to calculate how far the journal can deviate without jeopardizing his or its position, and he keeps the journal within those limits. He tells journalists when it is possible to be highly critical and when it is appropriate to write criticism that will satisfy Party leaders. He has ordered journalists whose articles are offensive to Party leaders to prepare compensatory, very positive articles.

Unlike most Polish chief editors, Rakowski also writes regularly. He often publishes tough critiques aimed at encouraging general policy

change. In the 1970s, he published articles advocating greater decentralization, equality of opportunity for Party and non-Party members, and a serious rethinking of leadership policies. Normally, his articles are both sharper critiques and on more general topics than those of staff journalists. There is no indication that these articles are commissioned; rather, his Central Committee membership and his leadership contacts appear to allow him more leverage with the censors and more protection against post-publication criticism.

Early in the Gierek era, Rakowski and Polityka were identified with the Gierek program. Being interviewed by Rakowski in the late 1960s helped Gierek gain national prominence as a leader. In late 1970, the Polityka staff drew up a yearly publication plan that was, in reality, a critique of the Gomulka regime and an alternate platform. The staff reportedly distributed the plan to five sympathetic, potential "heir-apparents" or powers in the Party. Gierek eventually took the plan as his initial program. Polityka was even given a special position as a journal free of censorship in 1972; but that lasted only two weeks. As the economic situation degenerated and the Gierek leadership became more stabilized in the mid-1970s, the Rakowski-Gierek connection weakened and Polityka began to lose its special position. The journal once again was controlled by the Press Department—many of whose officials were connected with the Moczarist group in 1968—so that Polityka became more censored and less able to successfully appeal censorship decisions than ever before.

The editorial process at Polityka is unique, partly because the staff and editorial board are so stable and partly because both are
closely identified with the journal as an institution and an ideology. As a result, there are ongoing political discussions among staff members. In recent times, these discussions have been formalized and speakers have been brought in for off-the-record discussions on various important topics. There are also give-and-take discussions at weekly staff meetings in which editors and journalists evaluate the current issue and make plans for the next issue. Except when Rakowski is out of Warsaw, he reads every article he or a staff member feels is significant and is closely involved in the layout of upcoming issues. Whether or not he talks to censors directly, he keeps close track of what is censored and participates in the decisions about what to fight for and what to agree to. Even his own articles have not been preemptory; he generally gives them to other staffers to edit and comment on. Rakowski sometimes uses staff meetings to give the staff a briefing on what he has learned from his contacts and their reaction to Polityka. Finally, staff members comment on issues they consider crucial and discuss how they can and should be handled.

The pressures for self-censorship are much less significant in this atmosphere than at other journals. There is virtually no stigma attached to having one's article censored or taking critical positions in other public forums. Polityka, for instance, is unique in that it pays in full even for censored articles or portions of articles. Other journals pay at most 50 percent for material that is censored. Censorship decisions are discussed and fought by the journalists and editors, working as a group, so everyone is clear on what was censored and how it was handled. Rakowski and the staff generally protect each other from
outside attacks. Polityka staffers, having multiple work commitments, can withstand some outside pressure because they are important to the public and they have potential or real alternate sources of income. If more pressure is exerted and journalists are blacklisted or harassed, as happened in 1968, other Polityka staffers continue their contacts, facilitate their writing anonymously or under pseudonyms, and help them get public support. Rakowski himself has often stepped in to protect individual staff members.

Kultura

Kultura was also a product of the retrenchment process after the Polish October. It began in 1960 as the fusion of the two leading cultural journals of the liberalization period, Nowa Kultura and Przegląd Kulturalny. But in fact, only a few journalists from each staff were retained. Most of the former, liberal staff members and almost the entire cultural intelligentsia boycotted Kultura after its founding because they saw it as a "police journal" and they viewed Nowa Kultura's liquidation as the "first act to destroy the literary intelligentsia."[12]

Kultura has been identified with two diametrically opposed ideologies. Until 1974, when Janusz Wilhelmi ceased to be chief editor, Kultura was patriotic-nationalist, disinterested in socioeconomic and modernization questions and distrustful of democratization. It played up the heroism of Poles during World War II and the glory of the anti-Communist Home Army (AK) underground, as well as the Communist

[12] Interview data.
underground.[13] In doing this, the journal became closely connected with Moczar at least until 1968. After the repression of the March student riots, the editors began to withdraw their personal support from Moczar, although they did not change their own ideological tenets. After 1974, when Dominik Horodyński became the chief editor, Kultura increasingly urged socioeconomic reforms, greater cultural freedoms, and greater contact with and use of non-Polish experiences and international contacts. This change of viewpoint has been accompanied by an almost complete change of staff.

In both of these periods, Kultura's editorial process was far less structured than that of Polityka or other journals. The staff has also been less cohesive. The chief editor's office in the Wilhelmi years was characterized by one respondent as "like a club--people sat there and talked. That's how ideas developed." At the same time, there has been little editorial planning and supervision. Articles have sometimes been printed without having been read by the editors, and at times, there have not been enough articles to fill the allotted space until just before the journal went to press. Because of Horodyński's individualistic style of editing and the independent work style of most cultural writers, few staff members are regularly in the office. Most have little more contact with the journal than the regular outside contributors.

This means that the staff exerts little, if any, control over the chief editor. He can make his own plans and follow his own program if

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[13] Janusz Wilhelmi and Roman Bratny, the deputy editor, were members of different branches of the AK underground. Bratny is known for his precedent-setting book, Kolumbrowie, the first major work published in Poland to portray the AK in a positive light.
he wishes. On the other hand, if he is disinterested in the journal and in using it for his own public platform, the journal can become little more than an accidental collection of articles. In the pre-1968 period, Wilhelmi had little direct interaction with his staff concerning their articles. Rather, he and Bratny wrangled with each other over the specific tone of the journal, with each one taking advantage of the other's absence to fill the journal with outside material, following his own line.

*Kultura*'s focus, though, does not require direct and constant participation by the staff. Much of its space is devoted to poetry, prose, literary reviews (by regular columnists and guest authors), historical articles, and cultural debates. Each of the four sections of *Kultura* now has a different editor who basically prepares his portion himself.

Since 1974, *Kultura* has also tried to become increasingly international in its analyses and coverage--both because international features are publishable and appealing and because greater popular knowledge of foreign developments has been viewed by *Kultura*'s editors as important in promoting economic modernization. Only one of its four sections is directly related to sociopolitical affairs. That section, however, currently edited by a former *Polityka* staff member, tends to have many more feature and literary-style articles than appear in *Polityka* or, certainly, *Zycie Gospodarcze*.

Although the editorial process has not changed, there have been other significant changes in *Kultura* since the departure of Wilhelmi. Strong assistant and department editors have been given authority to carry on discussions and campaigns they consider important. The staff,
most of whom have come since Wilhelmi's departure, has been enlarged from 15 to 40 people and includes many young writers. The journal's size and circulation have also been increased because of Horodynski's willingness to lobby with RSW Prasa and the Central Committee Press Department. Finally, and most important, there has been a significant jump in the authority of the journal because of the switch from the Moczarist line to the liberal philosophy shared by most of the intelligentsia and championed by Horodynski. In the late 1970s, Kultura was considered by most journalists and readers to be as respectable as Polityka.

Zycie Literackie

Zycie Literackie has existed since 1945. It was founded by Wladyslaw Machejek to appeal to the Krakow literary intelligentsia, traditionally a strong but insular grouping, and it has continued to be his organ. Since it is limited both in circulation and in public demand, the journal has been allowed to run as Machejek's own "fiefdom." Except during the Moczar campaign, Zycie Literackie has been far less oriented to political and economic affairs than Polityka or Kultura. It has, in large measure, limited itself to staff-produced, culturally related articles and political and economic articles by outside writers.

The staff is smaller than that of either Kultura or Polityka, and it has been basically stable. But unlike the Polityka staff, few, if any, of its journalists are prominent. Only among the contributing writers are there occasional "big names." Who writes is determined by the whim of Machejek. Although Machejek was closely associated person-
ally and ideologically with the Moczar camp in the late 1960s and used his journal to forward that ideological line (especially through his own writings and those of outside contributors), *Zycie Literackie* does not have a coherent policy. In the late 1970s it had a member of the dissident Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) on the staff, yet it also published articles by Moczar. The extent to which Machejek regards *Zycie Literackie* as his personal journal on which his personal prestige rests is clear from the fact that he allows no editing of his unpolished prose and asks the censor to read his articles on a consultative basis before they are set in type.

**Literatura**

*Literatura* is the weakest of the cultural *qua* sociopolitical journals. It began publication in 1972 as an attempt by Gierek to get the support of the cultural intelligentsia. It was originally edited by Jerzy Putrament (a prominent older writer and an official of the Union of Polish Writers) and Gustaw Gottesman (the former editor of *Nowa Kultura*). It was hoped that with Putrament and Gottesman as editors, the journal could be liberal and yet controlled in its presentation of themes and writers of interest to the cultural intelligentsia. It was to include foreign news and analysis, as well as commentary on domestic events.

The journal never "took off." First, as *Literatura* was beginning, *Kultura* was renovated by Horodynski and attracted the audience *Literatura* was intended to appeal to. Second, Gierek's media policy, which gave birth to *Literatura*, quietly became very restrictive. *Literatura*
was never able to enjoy the degree of freedom that would have allowed it to truly appeal to the intelligentsia. Third, Putrament, who as chief editor should have provided the focus for the journal, was too old and ill to participate fully in running it, and Gottesman was fired after six months. Even when they worked together, their personal ideologies were so diametrically opposed that the journal had no direction. This left Literatura with no center. Little planning was ever done at the editorial-board level. No long-range programs were attempted, and the journal has had little or no sense of staff identity and interaction. Articles are simply self-generated by staff members, submitted by outsiders, or requested by individual editors. What is submitted is copy-edited and then censored. But there is no resident authority who can battle with the censors or guide writers.

Prawo i Życie

Prawo i Życie grew out of the liberalization of 1956. Its founding editor was removed as a revisionist after only six months. Kazimierz Kakol served as its chief editor throughout the 1960s. The journal's original goal was to popularize legal discussions in Poland. But in the mid-1960s, because of the personal ambitions and ties of its chief editor, it became a leading proponent on some issues connected to the Moczar campaign. It dealt with topics far removed from legal issues and took positions that were not only different from but actually sharply critical of those taken by the legal profession it was supposed to represent. Staff members worked with Kakol and were protected by him, but they had no control over the selection of new staff members or the
direction of the journal. If they disagreed with the Moczarist line, they were simply told to "wait out" the campaign and do innocuous work.

Like other specialized journals, Prawo i Życie has a consultative board of specialists and professionals who meet with the editors to suggest new topics and evaluate past issues. The impact of the consultative board is, in large part, dependent on its individual members, their available time, and their interest. It also depends, in part, on the chief editor's interest in having the consultants involved in editorial decisions or in using them to fight political battles. The advisory board of Prawo i Życie had no influence during the mid-1960s. Meetings were simply not called, and individuals who objected to the journal's work were dropped. Kakol arranged the board so that supporters of the Moczarist line were dominant. After the decline of the Moczar group and Kakol's departure, however, the journal returned to popular legal and criminal questions. This change in significance and role is a clear example of the extent to which chief editors are able to "create" a journal.

Zycie Gospodarcze

Zycie Gospodarcze was founded in 1956 as the journal of a group of young revisionist economists. Its chief editor for the last 20 years, Jan Glowczyk, was a member of that group. Others from the group who gained policymaking positions include Mieczysław Mieszczankowski, who became director of the Institute of Finance; Józef Pajstka, who became head of the Organization of Polish Economists and was formerly the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission; and Zbigniew Madej, Vice Minister of Finance.
In addition to its ties to these influential individuals, the journal has other, more immediate formal and informal ties to the leadership. It has an advisory board of government and Party officials as well as academic economic specialists. In the 1970s, board members were proposed by the journal editors and then approved by Jan Szydlak, the Party Secretary responsible for Życie Gospodarcze. They included Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Stanisław Długos, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Czyrek, some academic researchers, factory directors, the head of the Huta Lenina Party organization, and the assistant director of the Press Department in charge of economic publications, Wiesław Ilczuk. The board met once a year to review the previous year's coverage and make suggestions for the next year. Some of the members of the board, including Rajkiewicz, Gierek's assistant on social affairs, and Mieszczankowski, played an active role: They came to the editorial office, talked to journalists, offered them materials, or wrote articles themselves. Others treated their board membership as an honorary position.

The same kind of idiosyncratic contact occurs with the various government bureaucracies. The Ministry of Finance, the Polish National Bank, and the Ministry of Labor "help the journal very much" and are in constant contact with it.[14] Other institutions contact the journal only when something is published that does not please them. In terms of personal contact, Jan Glowczyk and Stanisław Chelstowski (the senior managing editor and effectively the acting editor) had very close

[14] Interview data.
personal ties with Politburo members Szydlak and Olszowski. In fact, the two editors often wrote speeches dealing with economic questions for Girek, Szydlak, and Olszowski.

Given the nature of these personal and institutional connections, Zycie Gospodarcze's editors have tended to emphasize the need for careful, limited investment rather than constant increases in investment. As a result, the 30 staff journalists were encouraged not to report that more investment was needed but to report on how the economy could be better managed. In the 1970s, this policy led to some very real conflicts for Zycie Gospodarcze. It was strongly opposed by the Ministry of Mining and the Ministry's "lobby," because of the journal's emphasis on light industry and limited foreign investment. Premier Jarosiewicz attacked Zycie Gospodarcze directly. He attempted to remove Glowczyk by making Zycie Gospodarcze a government organ and putting the chief editor under the Council of Ministers, but he was unable to actually remove him. In policy conflicts between the Central Committee and the specialized government lobbies, Zycie Gospodarcze has generally, through nuanced writing, favored the position of the Central Committee.

The actual work of Zycie Gospodarcze is typical of the general process of economic journalism, although its staff is far larger than that of economic departments on more general journals. There are three assistant editors: The most senior handles social welfare problems, consumption, light industry, consumer goods, investment, and building and heavy industry; the second handles theoretical articles, reviews, and the ongoing production process; and the third handles foreign affairs, transportation, regional affairs, and agricultural issues. The
staff includes 24 full-time journalists. Each journalist specializes in a thematic area for his first three years and is then transferred to another area so that he develops an in-depth knowledge of a given area and yet does not become committed to the special interests of that area. After this initial period, journalists tend to gravitate to and develop lifelong specialties.

Journalists at *Zycie Gospodarcze* and other periodicals specializing in economic questions have an ongoing conflict over whether to be the advocates or the critics of a given industry. Journalists feel that if they constantly criticize, they will lose the ability to get information. If they are advocates, they will have broken the canons of the profession and will be scorned by their colleagues as being "bought" by an industry. The problem of sources is particularly problematical for economic journalists because they have fewer independent sources and so much of the information is confidential. The best contacts for many economic journalists are fellow journalists who have left the profession to work for economic institutions or industrial ministries. Ideas for articles come from these informal, personal sources and also from formal meetings and contacts with ministry officials and Central Committee Economic Department officials. Such meetings are held whenever there is an "economic event" (i.e., an international fair) or whenever the Central Committee decides that publicity should be given to a topic. Journalists are given background information and are then told how they are expected to treat the given subject.

*Zycie Gospodarcze* is reportedly censored far less than *Polityka*, with most of the censors' actions taking the form of "recommendations"
and references to the regulations. In fact, real censorship goes on through the complex set of personal connections, institutional involvement, and professional processes on which Zycie Gospodarcze's reporting of facts and statistics is dependent. Criticism and advocacy occur in highly veiled form, through nuance rather than direct statements, because of the interrelationships that tie the journal to government and Party institutions.

Przeglad Techniczny

One other journal, Przeglad Techniczny, has become prominent as a highly critical and well-funded economic journal. Until 1976, it was a trade magazine for the technicians who belonged to NOT, the Engineers' and Technicians' Association. Then, Aleksander Kopec became Minister of Machine and Engineering Industry and the head of NOT. Unlike his predecessor, he was an activist who was concerned with augmenting his position. Kopec appointed as his chief editor a former journalist from Silesia, Jerzy Drzewanowski, who had also been involved with Zycie i Nowosci; and Drzewanowski brought in a new, technically oriented staff to the journal. Many of the new staffers were former members of such journals as Zycie Warszawy who were seeking a platform to encourage technical values and modernization. In the first year and a half, with the help of special funds that Kopec had allocated to it, the journal increased its circulation from 30,000 to 100,000 and was transformed into a highly critical, investment-oriented journal able to attack inefficiency in specific industries and to publish a large number of statistics. It does not deal with high-level criticism or theory. Rather, it
is premised on the thesis that "professional people have a right to know hard facts and that what they need is these facts and not opinions."[15]

Przegląd Techniczny was not seen in a positive light by the Central Committee Press Department. Although Kopec was not able to protect his first chief editor (Drzewanowski was soon ousted), he was able to force the Press Department to concede to the nomination of another of his supporters as chief editor, after a brief period when a Press Department candidate was placed in that position. He has also been able to continue special funding for the journal and protect it enough for it to expand its coverage.

[15] Interview data.