POLAND’S ROLE IN EUROPEAN AND WORLD SYSTEM OF STATES 1979-2007

by

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The present study is a work of contemporary history. It describes and analyzes the personalities, events, and broader social and political trends that have helped to reconcile Poland’s interests in Europe with its desire to retain the close friendship of the United States. It considers Poland’s role in European and World affairs between 1979 and 2007, with a special focus on political events that have taken place between 2003 and 2007. In both of these periods, Poland was a driving force behind changes occurring in Europe. From 1979-1989 Poland’s aspirations to independence were a signal for other Eastern European nations to begin a similar process. For the next fourteen years, Poland conducted a strongly pro-American and pro-Western policy. Thanks to correspondingly strong support from the United States, Poland became a NATO member and a strong, democratic European state. Subsequent events, including the decision to send Polish troops to Iraq and to accept some parts of America’s missile-defense shield in Poland, have been viewed negatively by some European NATO states. The result has been a gradual change in Poland’s attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP, and increasingly active Polish participation in European policies.

**Subject Terms:** Poland, Iraq, U.S.A., Ballistic Missile Defense, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defense Policy.
POLAND’S ROLE IN EUROPEAN AND WORLD SYSTEM OF STATES 1979-2007

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The present study is a work of contemporary history. It describes and analyzes the personalities, events, and broader social and political trends that have helped to reconcile Poland’s interests in Europe with its desire to retain the close friendship of the United States. It considers Poland’s role in European and World affairs between 1979 and 2007, with a special focus on political events that have taken place between 2003 and 2007. In both of these periods, Poland was a driving force behind changes occurring in Europe. From 1979-1989 Poland’s aspirations to independence were a signal for other Eastern European nations to begin a similar process. For the next fourteen years, Poland conducted a strongly pro-American and pro-Western policy. Thanks to correspondingly strong support from the United States, Poland became a NATO member and a strong, democratic European state. Subsequent events, including the decision to send Polish troops to Iraq and to accept some parts of America’s missile-defense shield in Poland, have been viewed negatively by some European NATO states. The result has been a gradual change in Poland’s attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP, and increasingly active Polish participation in European policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE

1. Purpose

The present study analyzes Poland’s history between 1979 and 2007, with a special focus on political events that have taken place between 2003 and 2007. This thesis will answer the following question: taking into consideration the tension between Poland’s interests in Europe, versus its desire to retain the close friendship of the United States, how can Poland best manage these competing interests in the future, given the present international system and its challenges?

2. Significance

The work at hand analyzes events that took place from 1979 to 2007. During this time, Poland was an important driving force behind changes occurring in Europe. From 1979-1989, Poland’s aspirations to independence were a signal for other Eastern European nations to begin a similar process. The process of changes initiated by Poland significantly contributed to the fall of Communism in Europe, and in the USSR itself.

For the next fourteen years, Poland, on the one hand, conducted a strongly pro-Western policy, and, on the other hand, a policy whose main aim was the reduction of tensions with Poland’s eastern neighbors. During this period, the Polish state was strongly supported by the United States of America. The considerable support from the U.S. eventually enabled Poland to become a NATO member and a strong, significant, democratic European state.

Subsequent events (sending Polish troops to Iraq and the idea of hosting some parts of America’s missile-defense shield in Poland) have suggested that Poland continues to put good relations with the U.S. first, even before relations
with its other NATO allies and European neighbors. Such a trend in Poland’s foreign and security policies have been viewed negatively by some groups of people in Europe and in the world.

As a member of NATO and the EU, Poland is now looking for a solution that would both strengthen (or at least retain) its position in Europe, and allow for close cooperation with U.S. It is an extremely difficult task, bearing in mind that in many cases EU and U.S. interests are divergent, and that Poland almost unconditionally backs all U.S. initiatives.

There is little dispute nowadays that Poland, although an active member of NATO and the EU, should also conduct an active Ostpolitik \(^1\) oriented toward the states of the former Soviet Union. Overall, however, Poland’s policy toward the United States of America is currently dominated by two issues: the war in Iraq and the proposed American anti-missile shield. These problems are the central focus of this thesis.

B. ARGUMENT

The post-Communist Polish foreign policy has been dominated by the need to balance Polish interest in good bilateral relations with the U.S., and its interest in being part of an increasingly integrated European community. In order to understand the trends in Poland’s foreign policy, it is necessary to know what role Poland played in the international arena from 1979 to 2003.

Poland experienced a number of significant changes between 1979 and 2003. It transformed from a communist, totalitarian state into a democratic state, and became a new, important “player” on the European continent and in the world. In order to achieve this goal the Poles in most cases supported by the third states, put a lot of effort into strengthening their homeland.

Winston Churchill once said that there are few virtues the Poles do not possess and few mistakes they have not made. When it came to putting a peaceful end to communism, the Poles proved him wrong. Between 1979 (the first visit of the Polish pope to his native land) and 1989 (the end of communism negotiated by Solidarity at a round table), they were the European pioneers of a new kind of non-violent revolution.2

In analyzing the Polish contribution to the fall of Communism, what comes to the fore are Solidarity, the engine of the Polish Revolution, and two famous names: Lech Walesa and Karol Wojtyła. These two personalities made a great contribution to European politics.

In Eastern Europe, Poland was the only place where it was possible to organize serious political or public opposition.3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter, explains that “almost everything in Polish society and in Polish history conspired against a communist system imposed on Warsaw from Moscow.”4 Solidarity was a “phenomenon” which built up people’s hopes in Poland.

The first success of Solidarity was in fact its own legalization, which took place on 31 August 1980, when Lech Walesa signed the August Agreement with a “plastic ballpoint pen, decorated with a photograph of the Pope.”5 It was an unprecedented situation, because for the first time in the history of Poland (or any other Communist country), the state recognized the legitimacy of an organization whose ideology was different from its own. Moreover, the events of

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August got a lot of publicity abroad because Solidarity became “the first independent trade union in the Eastern block.”

Unfortunately, that was a short-lived success, because in 1981, General Jaruzelski and the Polish military carried out a coup, the main goal being to destroy Solidarity. In the face of an unfortunate turn of events, Solidarity had to go underground. “Solidarity survived, underground, despite the imposition of martial law and massive repression…”

After the end of martial law, there was a gradual process of Solidarity rebirth. The further course of events and ensuing circumstances (the deteriorating Polish economy and strikes breaking out around the country) resulted in re-legalization of Solidarity and the so-called “round-table” talks. On the strength of the Round-Table Agreement in 1989, the first semi-free elections were held in Poland, although the country was still a member of the Communist Bloc. Solidarity won the elections, and its victory led to the eventual collapse of Communism in Poland. This significant event “initiated the fall [of] communism in other countries, so called snowball effect in the rest of Eastern Bloc.” What is more, the events of the 1980s in Poland “became one of the major contributing factors bringing about the end of Cold War.”

After the collapse of communism in Poland and the end of the Cold war, the Polish state found itself in a new political situation. Since 1989, Poland

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6 Jarosław Kurski, *Lech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator*? (San Francisco: Westview Press 1993), XVII.
9 Kurski, *Lech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator?* XIX.
started to conduct a dual policy. Simultaneously with a pro-Western policy, Poland has conducted an active Ostpolitik - the reduction of tensions with Poland’s eastern neighbors.12

Pursuing a pro-Western policy, Poland has concentrated its main efforts on accession to NATO. In order to achieve this goal, the Polish Armed Forces had to undergo a transformation and more importantly, Poland had to prove its reliability as a new, potential NATO member. Poland proved it by its military participation in foreign missions to the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The integration with NATO’s structures was a difficult and long-lasting process.

The events, which took place between 1992 and 1999, show the immense efforts of the Polish diplomacy to insure NATO’s inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Names such as Walesa, Kwasniewski, Onyszkiewicz, and Geremek, will go down in the history of Polish and European diplomacy.

One might say that the Polish diplomacy was very active in the NATO enlargement process only because of Poland’s own security interests. Indeed, but its commitment to this process turned out to be a significant factor that had influenced the decision-making process of NATO members, and it turned out to be helpful for the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Before the NATO enlargement, (between 1995 and 1999), some critics of this process claimed that “such enlargement would cripple decision making for collective defense, bankrupt national treasuries with the costs of defending the meadows and forests of Moravia and the plains of the Hungarian Pusta, and needlessly provoke the Russians into a new confrontation that would resemble the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.”13


Those fears turned out to be unwarranted and Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary proved their reliability during the first NATO peacekeeping mission to Kosovo after the NATO enlargement.

Simultaneously with the process of joining NATO, Poland started the process of joining the European Union. The Polish state successfully met the EU’s requirements, and along with Hungary and the Czech Republic, became a full member of the EU in 2004.

Since 1990 Poland has cooperated closely with the U.S., NATO and the EU. On the one hand, the United States of America significantly helped the Polish state to become a “new” European power, so Poland has perceived it as the closest ally and, to some degree, as guarantor of its security. On the other hand, Poland is a European state and it has sought a common ground for agreement with Europe.

C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

Following the introduction, this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II examines Poland’s support for the U.S. in Iraq against a background of the transatlantic rift. It discusses Poland’s distinctive Atlanticism during the period when Poland, along with ten other European States, was a candidate to join the European Union. Chapter III analyses Poland’s stance on the U.S. proposal to deploy a ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) on Polish soil. It discusses Polish-Russian and Polish-American relations in the context of BMD, as well as the stance of other NATO members on the American plan to deploy some elements of its anti-missile shield in Europe. Chapter IV analyzes the evolution of Poland’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This chapter examines the factors that influenced a change in Poland’s views on the CFSP and ESDP. The final chapter concludes by considering the means and measures by which Poland might continue to play its currently constructive role in world and European affairs.
II. POLAND IN THE IRAQ WAR

Poland’s will in 2003 to take an active part in the “coalition of the willing” and all the same to support the U.S. in Iraq was very important, if not the most important decision made by the Polish Government since 1989. The Polish involvement in the Iraqi war that has been the second stage of the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) seems to be the logical turn of events initiated after 9/11, when Poland supported the U.S. in Afghanistan during the first stage of the “GWOT.” Those two enterprises have been reflecting Poland’s solidarity with the U.S. and its reliability in supporting strong American unilateralism. However, Poland’s decision to participate in the coalition that invaded Iraq with further intent to occupy this country drew harsh criticism from many European countries. This decision might have complicated the pending process of Poland’s enrollment in the EU’s structures.

Initially in 2002-2003, there was not a public debate in Poland on the Polish involvement in the Iraqi crisis and all major political parties agreed on sending the Polish troops to Iraq. However, owing to the worsening situation in Iraq and lack of tangible political and economic benefits for Poland, a part of the Polish public and some part of the political elite began to submit for discussion the legitimacy of the Polish troops’ involvement in Iraq.

A. THE RATIONALE BEHIND POLAND’S DECISION TO GO TO WAR

The Polish discussion on Iraq was characterized by a lack of details with reference to the Polish interests in that region. Neither did political elites in Poland debate on such issues, nor did these kinds of issues pervade public discussion. Moreover, as Marcin Zaborowski has observed, “there was not justification of Poland’s involvement in the campaign in terms of responding to a
direct threat, there simply was no suggestion that Iraq presented a 'clear and present danger.'"\textsuperscript{14} Instead, the Polish debate was predominantly dominated by moral and historical arguments.\textsuperscript{15}

Poland's decision about sending Polish troops to Iraq was a result of its strong pro-Atlantic Foreign and Security Policy initiated by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government in 1989.\textsuperscript{16} The driving force behind the Polish decision was a desire to actively demonstrate Poland's loyalty and solidarity with the U.S. and to be perceived as "America's model ally."\textsuperscript{17} Learning a lesson from the past, when in the interwar period the Polish State was geopolitically vulnerable, Poland has been eager to be in very good relations with the U.S. and to co-operate more closely with this country. Developing a relationship of reciprocal obligation with its overseas ally, Poland has counted on mutual support between these two countries, should the need arise. In this context, the Polish decision to support the United States of America in Iraq seems to be aimed at arousing a sense of responsibility and obligation for Poland's security in the U.S.\textsuperscript{18} Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland wrote in 2003 that Poland had never abandoned its allies in need and that the support of the U.S. in Iraq had been an investment in Poland's security.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{16} Adam Rotfeld, “Europe-America-Poland: Foreign Policy Dilemmas Faced by the Republic of Poland,” Transcript of discussion, Warsaw, 5 June 2003, \textit{The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest}, Vol. 4, No. 2(11), 2004, 105-106.

\textsuperscript{17} Dunn, “Poland: America’s New Model Ally,” 63, see also Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zabrowski, \textit{The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities} (London: Blackwell Publishing 2007), 47.

\textsuperscript{18} Zabrowski, “From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in the twenty-first century,” 12.

The second apparent reason behind Poland’s decision to participate in the Iraq crisis concerned the preservation of transatlantic bonds and NATO. Again, because of its painful history, the Polish State did not want to be marginalized or, in the worst case, excluded from American foreign policy. Several years before the Iraqi war, the transatlantic relations had begun to deteriorate and some concern about the U.S. commitment to European security had emerged in Poland. Poland has seen the U.S.-led NATO as the guarantor of its own security, and that is why it would make every effort to keep Washington’s commitment to European security issues. Starting with the premise that supporting the U.S in Iraq would help to strengthen good relations with America and discourage it from disengaging from European security issues, Polish politicians decided to send troops to this Arab country. Mark Melamed claims that “Polish participation was motivated as much by loyalty to the U.S. and the desire for a robust transatlantic alliance as by any pressing national interest in the specific campaign in Iraq.”

The third set of rationales regarded moral issues such as the humanitarian promotion of democracy and freedom. These arguments found a voice in many Polish politicians’ statements. Aleksander Kwasniewski, the President of the Republic of Poland, during his speech at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in 2003 argued that Poland’s decision to send Polish troops to Iraq was right. "Being convinced that international security was at stake, that this was about combating evil, about regaining freedom and establishing justice in lieu of the bloody dictatorship-Poland took part in the military action in Iraq." Another politician, Adam Michnik, affirms that in the moment of the attack on the World Trade Centre, the World faced a new, totalitarian challenge. He also states that violence, fanaticism and lies issued a challenge to democratic values, and that

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21 Ibid.

22 Aleksander Kwasniewski, „Speech by HE Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. The Royal Castle, Warsaw, June 3, 2003.” The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2(7), 2003, 11.
overthrowing a tyrant (Saddam Hussein) who supported the terrorism, was justified. Moreover, he affirmed that on the 11th of September 2001, Islamic fundamentalism declared war on our democratic world, the world which all of us have to defend. In the case of Poland, the spreading of democracy acquires a special significance, due to its past when the Polish State was oppressed by the communist regime and democracy did not exist in Poland. Therefore, according to Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, because of its past, Poland took responsibility for spreading of democracy in Iraq. At that time many Poles believed that Iraqis wanted to be delivered from the regime of Saddam Hussein and that an outside help would be welcomed.

The fourth argument for supporting the U.S. in Iraq was the threat posed to Poland by international terrorism. Islamic terrorists proved that were able to strike in almost every place in the world: the U.S., the Middle East, Southeast Asia, etc. Therefore, some Polish politicians recognized that the acts of terror might affect Poland. In those circumstances, Iraq was recognized as a place where the larger war on global terror would be continued. Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, argues that Poland took up the fight against terrorism not only because of allied obligations, but also because the Polish could not wait to be attacked by terrorism on their own land. He also declares that the strike against Saddam’s regime was a blow against “nationalized terrorism,” and also against the global structures of terrorism, which treated Iraq as “their own battleground.” Moreover, Poland believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.


26 Cimoszewicz, "Irak to także nasza sprawa."
The fifth argument was immediately linked with the desire (of President Kwasniewski and Leszek Miller’s government) to enhance Poland’s prestige in the international arena and its profile as a global actor. In this context, the Polish position needs to be understood against the background of a divided Europe over Iraq, and Poland’s ambitions to be involved in the EU’s decision-making process. Taking into consideration strong French and German opposition to military intervention in Iraq and a rejection of a second UN resolution concerning Iraq, Poland found itself in a situation where France and Germany determined the EU foreign and security policies, while Polish influence was being reduced. Simultaneously, the Polish efforts to play a crucial role within the Convention on the Future of Europe were thwarted. Marcin Zaborowski claims that “these policy developments fed into the paradigm of ‘exclusion and inclusion’ in Polish security thinking and consequently influenced Warsaw’s decision to sign the ‘letter of the 8’, which was widely perceived as defying the Franco-German attempt to speak for the whole of the EU.” Moreover, he thinks that “rather than following the anti-war camp, Poland chose to side with what appeared at the time a more inclusive United States.” In addition, he affirms that “Poland, as one of the most vociferous and consistent supporters of American foreign policy and of solidarity between the United States and Europe, was likely to be among the group of states shaping the new Europe and its foreign policy.”

Another justification for Poland’s decision to take part in the war was its willingness to attain the potential benefits of an active supporter of the U.S. in

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29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.
Iraq.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, Polish policy-makers had great hopes for the U.S. investments in Poland. In a situation where many of America’s allies were strongly opposed to the military intervention, the Polish policy makers recognized it as an opportunity to move closer to the U.S., cherishing the hope of reaping potential benefits from this relationship.\textsuperscript{33} The Polish expectations ranged from the access of Polish companies to the reconstruction process in Iraq and the participation of Polish armaments companies in the re-armament of the Iraqi army to the abolishing of visa restriction on Poles. Moreover, the Polish politicians expected that Poland would be recognized in the international arena as a regional power, which enjoyed a “special relationship” with the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{34} Adam Rotfeld, the then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, during one of the many discussions on Iraq, said that Poland’s presence “should be more noticeable from [the] point of view of contacts with the Iraqis. Iraq needs investment now, and we can invest somebody else’s funds. Having good relations with large companies, we can send thousands of Poles to work. There are many Iraqis who studied in Poland and settled here, and now we are cooperating with them.”\textsuperscript{35} In the Polish papers it was rumored that Poland might acquire the right to the exploitation of Iraqi oil and natural gas deposits.\textsuperscript{36}

B. THE DECISION IS MADE

In 2003, when Poland sided with the U.S., the main EU players, France and Germany, harshly criticized its decision and some other EU countries

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Aleksander Smolar, “National Interest in Poland’s Foreign Policy since 1989,” The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2(11), 2004, 96.
\item Melamed, “Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq,” 96.
\item Rotfeld, “Europe-America-Poland: Foreign Policy Dilemmas Faced by the Republic of Poland,” 115.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
expressed concern about Poland’s decision. In 2003, Poland was among ten others European States as a candidate to join the European Union in 2004. A decision to go to war might have slowed down or permanently blocked the process of Poland’s integration into the EU structures because the main EU players, France and Germany, were strongly opposed to the war.

1. American Unilateralism and Poland’s Distinctive Atlanticism

The American response to the tragic events of 9/11 was the GWOT, the first stage beginning in Afghanistan. Preceding the war in Afghanistan, the first heralds of American unilateralism emerged. Despite the fact that the U.S. was offered the full support from the side of its NATO allies, it decided to act on its own. The American behavior, however, did not alienate Poland. At the end of November 2001, when President Bush requested troops from Aleksander Kwasniewski, the Polish president responded positively. In January 2002, a contingent of 300 Polish troops was sent to Afghanistan with the aim of taking part in “Operation Enduring Freedom.” This act demonstrated Poland’s loyalty and solidarity with the U.S.

The subsequent manifestation of American unilateralism was seen in January 2002, in President Bush’s State of the Union Address. In his speech he said that:

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world... States like these, [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq] and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They


could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.39

This address left little doubt that the countries of an “axis of evil” still threatened the U.S. In 2002, Poland still pursued its pro-American policy unwaveringly, which was reflected in the Polish foreign policy priorities. These priorities were defined in March 2002, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland in his exposé to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy in 2002.40

The United States National Security Strategy of September 2002 was consistent with President Bush’s State of the Union Address. In this document concerning the fight against terrorism, it was written that the U.S. would destroy terrorist organizations by:

- defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country…41

While the U.S. strategy seriously alarmed many European states, Poland’s support for the American policy remained unchanging. In November


2002, during an interview granted by Aleksander Kwaśniewski to the German daily paper “Tagesspiegel”, the Polish president said that President Bush held distinctive views and had a constant system of values. He also said that Bush was not a man who ignored his allies’ opinions, and that he was not a cowboy fighting alone with evil. Moreover, Kwasniewski admitted that he trusted the American president.42

In January 2003, when the U.S. prepared itself for the military action against Iraq, it tried to fully legitimize its action by urging the members of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) to pass the “Second Resolution” concerning Iraq. At that time, however, the United States made known publicly that it was ready to act even without any further approval of the UNSC, arguing that Resolution 1441 gave it the authority to move. 43 That same month the Polish side showed its strong support for the leading role of the U.S. in the world and its policy on Iraq. On 13 January 2003, Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski, during his working visit to the United States, delivered a lecture to the West Point Military Academy. In his speech, President Kwasniewski said that the U.S.’s leading role in the world could not be questioned and that “it should be exercised.” Moreover, he affirmed that Poland and the U.S. together could play a significant role in improving European and transatlantic security.44 The more robust view about the Iraqi issue was voiced by the Polish Foreign Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, on 23 January 2003, in his speech addressed to the Polish Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee. He said that Poland was ready to support the U.S. in the possible military action against Iraq in the extreme situation, also without the UN approval. He also said most emphatically that the


43 Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: Brookings, 2004), 147.

44 Speech by Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland to the West Point Military Academy, January 13, 2003, http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=6042904&eventId=501062 [Accessed April 26, 2008].
Republic of Poland kept to the UNSC resolutions, but in this special case, Poland did not rule out making a decision without waiting for an UNSC resolution.45

2. Poland’s Support against a Background of the Transatlantic Rift

The decision on Iraq was made by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Prime Minister Leszek Miller, and Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Poland’s active involvement in both consecutive stages of the Iraqi operation was the most controversial enterprise of Polish Foreign and Security Policy since the end of the Cold War. Contrary to some Polish politicians’ claims, the decisions concerning the participation of the Polish Armed Forces, at first in military intervention and then in the stabilization mission in Iraq, came relatively easily and swiftly.46 These decisions were made when Europe was divided into two camps. On the one hand there were the countries supporting the military operation against Iraq (among them the United Kingdom and Poland), and on the other hand the countries which were strongly against this idea (among others, France and Germany). The decision to go to war along with the U.S. was a token of the Polish pro-Americanism and Atlanticism.47

On 30 January 2003, Poland, among eight other European States, signed the “Letter of Eight.”48 The signatories of this letter pledged to support the U.S. in its effort to “rid the world of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.”49 This letter showed that many European countries (including

45 Speech by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland to the Polish Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee, January 23, 2003, Warsaw

46 Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 3.


49 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, 129.
Poland) held a different view on the Iraqi issue than the Franco-German tandem. Moreover, the “Letter of Eight” challenged the Franco-German leadership in Europe and was a kind of response to the Franco-German statement released during the January Elysée Treaty celebration. Schröder and Chirac asserted then that “For 40 years, each decisive step was taken in Europe thanks to the motor that Germany and France represent…. Experience shows that when Berlin and Paris agree, Europe can move forward; if there is disagreement, Europe marks time.”

It should be emphasized that Poland neither consulted nor notified France and Germany about signing the “Letter of Eight.” Poland continued to put good relations with U.S first, even before relations with France and Germany - the two main EU players. Furthermore, the political act, as the “Letter of Eight” can be acknowledged, was the signal of the future military intervention in Iraq.

The “Letter of Eight” and the “Vilnius 10” made the French president very angry. According to Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Chirac was “deeply irritated with the notion that sovereign European countries, aspiring to EU membership, were taking instructions from an American ‘lobbyist’ with ties to the Bush White House.” On 17 February 2003, at the EU summit in Brussels, Jacques Chirac criticized the pro-American policy pursued by Poland and other Central European candidates for EU membership, saying that “they missed a good opportunity to keep quiet.” The French president also suggested that in the face of the ensuing situation, the candidate countries’ EU membership was in danger. He said that

50 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, 130.
51 Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 4.
52 On 5 February 2003, ten European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania- known as the “Vilnius 10” issued a common text expressing their support for Bush’s policy on Iraq.
53 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, 133.
It should not be forgotten that a number of EU countries will have to ratify enlargement by referendum. And we already know that public opinion, as always when it’s a matter of something new, have reservations about enlargement, not really seeing exactly what their interest is in approving it. Obviously, then [what the Central Europeans have done] can only reinforce hostile public opinion sentiments among the 15 and especially those who will hold a referendum. Remember that all it takes is for one country not to ratify by referendum, for [enlargement] not to happen. Thus, I would say that these countries have been, let’s be frank, both not very well brought up and rather unconscious about the dangers that too quick an alignment with the American position could have for them.55

At the Brussels summit, not only Jacques Chirac responded negatively on the “Letter of Eight,” but also EU Commission President Romano Prodi expressed anxiety about the candidate countries’ behavior. Prodi said that by their strong pro-Americanism, these countries revealed their failure to understand that the EU was not only an economic union but also the body which shared other values.56 Poland’s participation in a “gang of eight” was a subject of much controversy in Europe. The leaders of Germany and Russia harshly criticized Poland’s decision about signing the “Letter of Eight” and one of Germany’s newspapers called Poland “America’s Donkey.”57

On 17 March 2003, ignoring the French warnings and the other countries’ criticism (and after Iraq ignored 14 consecutive resolutions of the UNSC calling this country to disarmament), the Polish Government decided to dispatch a relatively small contingent of 200 Polish troops to Iraq. The Polish Government perceived Poland’s participation in Iraq as the completion of NATO agreements concerning the endorsement of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 that were comprised in the “Prague Summit Statement on

55 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, 134.
Iraq.”58 The same day, at the request of Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller, Polish President Kwasniewski endorsed the Polish Government’s decision about sending the Polish troops to Iraq.59 On 18 March 2003, he released a statement concerning the Polish decision:

…we appeal to the international community for peace, but not at the cost of accepting crime, violence, and terrorism. We say ‘yes’ to peace if we can ensure it to all people across the world… I am convinced that the Cabinet’s request and my decision are right given the threats we must overcome, given the need to ensure global peace, and given commitments to our allies…. We are ready to use the contingent of Polish troops as part of the international coalition forces to contribute to enforcing compliance by Iraq with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 and the related earlier resolutions….60

These parts of Kwasniewski’s statement, which concerned a war with terrorism were fully coherent with Bush’s opinion on this issue. Moreover, the Polish president did not forget to mention that one of the main reasons that influenced the Polish decision were Poland’s commitments to its allies.

On the day the decision was made, the Polish Defence Minister, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, informed the press that the Polish chemical decontamination platoon would be sent to the region of military conflict within a few days. In addition, he said that the Polish Operational Maneuver Reaction Group (GROM) and Polish logistical ship, Xawery Czarniecki, had already been in the Persian Gulf region. This public announcement left little doubt concerning the involvement of the Polish troops in the invasion on Iraq. Poland’s participation in military action against Iraq acquires special significance on account of the fact

59 Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 14.
that except for the U.K., only Poland, among others signatories of the “Letter of Eight,” militarily supported the U.S. in the first days of the invasion.

The presidential-governmental decision about sending Polish troops to Iraq was formally presented to the lower house of the Polish parliament (Sejm) only after the invasion, where it won the support of the majority. During the April parliamentary debate dedicated to the Iraqi mission, 328 MPs were in favor of the country’s involvement in an Iraqi conflict and 71 were against it. The Sejm and the Senat (the upper house of the Polish Parliament), which were trying to get more influence on the decision making process regarding Iraq, were pushed into the background. The initiative remained in the government’s and president’s hands. That approach was in conformity with the Polish Constitution and allowed faster and more effective decision-making.

C. THE EMERGENCE OF A DEBATE IN POLAND

Unlike in the United Kingdom and Spain, initially in Poland there was virtually no debate or discussion on the decision concerning the participation of the Polish Armed Forces in the military intervention in Iraq. Moreover, there was no approval or formal resolution in the Polish Parliament. When Poland was asked to leave its troops and take up command of a multinational division in Iraq, there was no opposition from the side of the main Polish political parties. This situation nevertheless, changed when the situation in Iraq got worse and it became clear that the Polish expectations of tangible benefits turned out to be premature.

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61 Wągrowksa, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 14.

62 Ibid. 15.

63 Smolar, “National Interest in Poland’s Foreign Policy since 1989,” 97.
The invasion in Iraq was preceded in Europe by a wave of anti-war mass demonstrations. On 15 March 2003, Europe witnessed demonstrations of many millions of people. In London there were nearly one million people, Rome witnessed one to two million people on its streets and nearly one million people crowds demonstrated in both Barcelona and Madrid. In contrast, that day and within the next weeks in Poland there were not any mass demonstrations. Moreover, as already mentioned, the April parliamentary debate of 2003 reached the consensus regarding the country’s involvement in the Iraqi conflict. In such circumstances, on 6 June 2003 President Kwasniewski signed the decision concerning the participation of the Polish troops in the stabilization process in Iraq. It was decided that Poland would command a “Multinational Division Central South,” and the same would take responsibility for one of the occupation zones in that Arab country. The same month, during an interview granted to the press, the Polish president said that the decision to support the U.S. in Iraq considerably strengthened the Polish-American friendship. He also declared that Poland’s stance on Iraq had enhanced the position of Poland in the international arena.

Initially, the decision about the Polish participation in the stabilization process in Iraq did not give rise to any controversy among the Polish political elites. In addition, that decision was recognized by the political circles in Poland as a good opportunity to enhance Poland’s position as a close ally of the U.S. and Poland’s role as a security provider.

Overall, however, because of a domestic and international criticism, the Polish-American “honeymoon” seemed to come to an end in the latter half of

64 Gordon and Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*, 144.
65 Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 18-19.
2003. Simultaneously, the relatively easily reached Polish political consensus as to the country's involvement in the stabilization process in Iraq became a contentious issue.68

In October 2003, one of the most fervent advocates of strengthening the Polish–American relations, the former national security adviser to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed his opinion in the Polish paper “Gazeta Wyborcza” regarding the Iraq issue. Regarding Poland's presence in Iraq, he said among other things, that Poland "should avoid the exaggerated and unilateral manifestations" of its loyalty towards the U.S. and take into consideration the Franco-German stance on that issue.69 His comments stimulated strong public criticism of the Polish government, and also among the Polish political elite, where doubts were rising about the legitimacy of the Polish presence in Iraq.

Critical opinions were strengthened further when on 6 November 2003, the first Polish soldier, Major Kupczyk, perished in Iraq. From that moment on, the policy makers in Poland were under pressure to withdraw the Polish contingent. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, director of the Institute for Public Affairs, argued that "people don't understand why we should mess in other people's countries. These are not our problems, not our continent, not our issues. The term international solidarity is hard to explain, especially when you express it in terms of army and occupation."70 Jan Lopuszanski, a member of the League of Polish Families party, suggested that the Polish troops in Iraq did not struggle for Poland's independence, but they fought against independence of other nations.

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68 Wagrowska, "Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku," 4-7.
69 Artur Domosławski, „Przez głupotę i fanatyzm.” Wywiad ze Zbigniewem Brzezińskim. Gazeta Wyborcza, (October 8, 2003), [http://szukaj.gazetawyborcza.pl/archiwum/1,0,2209908.html](http://szukaj.gazetawyborcza.pl/archiwum/1,0,2209908.html) [Accessed April 30, 2008].
His opinion was that Polish intervention in Iraq had desecrated the honor of Poland, and that the motto of the “GWOT” has been only an excuse for achieving intended, political goals. 71

On 7 November 2003, in the American paper “The Washington Post,” Radek Sikorski, the then executive director of the American Enterprise Institute’s New Atlantic Initiative expressed his disappointment in the “Washington Post” about the lack of tangible benefits from the Polish presence in Iraq. With reference to the Polish and Bulgarian companies that hoped to get contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq, he wrote that unlike the American companies, both the Polish and Bulgarian companies “are still on the sidelines.” Moreover, he wrote that Poland and Bulgaria hoped that by siding with America they would be able to recover money that Iraq owed them for their people’s work. He further wrote that although that was a lot of money (some billions of dollars), Poland and Bulgaria “were being pressured to write off the money.”72 In his article, Sikorski also raised the visa question. The author states that Poland, although a close ally with the U.S., still did not get permission for its citizens to enter the U.S. without visas, while the citizens of France and Germany could enter America lacking visas. As Sikorski observed, “Small issues sometimes have a political effect out of all proportion to the cost of dealing with them, and this is one.”73

An opinion poll carried out after the first Polish soldier perished in Iraq indicated that the majority of Poles did not support the Polish presence in the Republic of Iraq. According to a poll taken by CBOS (Public Opinion Research


73 Ibid.
Centre) on keeping the Polish presence in Iraq, 67% of respondents were opposed this idea, and 28% supported it. 74

The Polish leadership’s stance on Iraq remained unchanged. During an interview granted to the Spanish daily “El Mundo,” the Polish president said that Polish troops would stay in Iraq because if Poland had then changed its strategy, it would have agreed with terrorists. In addition, he affirmed that although Poland was paying a high price, the aim was noble and that the Polish contingent would stay in Iraq to fulfill its mission.75 The Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Miller, said that Poland would not withdraw its troops from Iraq because Poland’s participation in combating terrorism was a struggle for its own security.76

In 2004, the Polish governing coalition-Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Labour Union (UP) began to grow weaker. The Iraq issue was discussed seldomly in Sejm and the Polish Government was under growing pressure from public opinion and some political circles.77

In the springtime of 2004, three Polish political parties: the Polish Popular Alliance (PSL), Self Defence (Samoobrona), and the League of Polish Families (LPR) issued an appeal to the Polish government for the withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq. In the autumn of that year, the co-governing Labour Union joined that initiative.78 Moreover, the two opposition parties: the Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS), which had voted for sending the Polish troops to

76 Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 7.
78 Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku.” 24.
Iraq, began to express their disappointment and criticize the government for the lack of material benefits from Poland’s presence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{79}

In September 2004, a poll by CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre) on the withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq, showed that 71\% supported it.\textsuperscript{80} In October 75\% of the respondents said that Poland should withdraw its troops, a sentiment that was undoubtedly influenced by the growing number of Polish casualties.\textsuperscript{81} In view of the worsening situation in Iraq, the Polish public that had deeply believed in America’s ability to create positive changes in the world was becoming more and more disappointed about the U.S.’ difficulty in successfully fulfilling its mission in Iraq.\textsuperscript{82} In addition, the Polish citizens were disillusioned with the lack of American policy makers’ will to solve the problem in the case of non-visa movement for Poles, as well as with the low level of Polish companies’ involvement in post-war reconstruction projects in Iraq.\textsuperscript{83} Telling it in a diplomacy way, only a handful of Polish firms were allowed to take part in the reconstruction projects in 2004. The disenchantment of Poles deepened when “BUMAR,” one of the biggest Polish arms companies, was deprived of a chance to sell its products to the new Iraqi army. From that moment on, the protests about Poland’s presence in Iraq grew stronger and what is more, an argument for closer cooperation with the EU emerged in Poland.\textsuperscript{84}

In view of growing domestic criticism aimed at the president and government regarding the visas issue, in August 2004, President Kwasniewski went on to the U.S. with the aim of exerting direct pressure on the visa issue. He was told that his query was inappropriate and that America’s stance on entry

\textsuperscript{79} Zaborowski, “From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in the twenty-first century,” 14.

\textsuperscript{80} Komunikaty CBOS „Opinie o obecności polskich żołnierzy w Iraku”(September 27, 2004), http://www.zigzag.pl/cbos/details.asp?q=a1&id=3203 [Accessed May 2, 2008].

\textsuperscript{81} Wągrow ska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” 29.

\textsuperscript{82} Melamed, “Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq,” 11.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. 11-13.

\textsuperscript{84} Longhurst and Zabrowski, The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities, 49.
visas for Poles was unchanging.\textsuperscript{85} Kwaśniewski made no attempt to hide his disappointment at that decision and said that he was hurt by it. Moreover, he said that as a politician he understood that decision, but “as a man, a human being, a friend of America, I do not understand it. In my opinion, a big country should be open, and sometimes more flexible, more gracious.”\textsuperscript{86} The visa question was raised again by Kwasniewski in February 2005, during his visit to the U.S. Again, Polish hopes of abolishing visas for Poles turned out to be in vain. Jakub Jedras, a correspondent of “TOL,” stated that the best example of President Bush’s attitude to Poland was a visit of the President of the Republic of Poland to the U.S. in February 2005:

There was talk of the ‘strategic, lasting character’ of Polish-U.S. cooperation and a promise from President George Bush to try and squeeze $100 million from Congress to help modernize the Polish military, an offer that seems to have defused a Polish threat to scale back its presence in Iraq. The only thing marring the public performance was that Kwasniewski suddenly discovered that, to Bush, he was ‘Prime Minister Kwasniewski,’ not President Kwasniewski. \textsuperscript{87}

The author stressed that for some observers it seemed to be clear that Washington treated Warsaw seriously only in the case of Iraq.

In the face of that course of events, on 15 October 2004, in Sejm, Marek Belka, the then Polish prime minister, pledged a reduction of the number of Polish troops in Iraq from 2,400 to 1,500 soldiers. It was promised that the process of a gradual reduction of the Polish contingent in Iraq would start at the


very beginning of 2005. The same month, during an interview granted to the newspaper “Gazeta Wyborcza,” the then Minister of Defence Jerzy Szmajdzinski said that Poland would withdraw its troops from Iraq in December 2005, when the UN mandate expired. He emphasized that it would be done regardless of the situation in Iraq.

For the first time since 2003, Poland had not made its decision conditional on the American stance on Iraq. However, that promise of Minister Szmajdzinski turned out to be short-lived because Jaroslaw Kaczynski's government, which took over in autumn of 2005, proclaimed that Poland would keep its partly reduced contingent in Iraq “until the mission was accomplished.” In Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zabrowski’s opinion, “The new government’s allegiance to the United States also manifested itself in the decision to continue with preparations for Poland's inclusion in the U.S. missile defence system, a plan that had reached a critical stage by the autumn of 2006.”

In 2007, Donald Tusk (the candidate for premiership at that time), a leader of the Civic Platform party, was in favor of the withdrawal of Poland's troops from Iraq. During a pre-election debate on Polish public television, he said that the time had come to withdraw Polish troops from Iraq, because the Iraqi State had already been able to independently maintain law and order, so the presence of Polish troops in the Republic of Iraq was unnecessary. After

91 Ibid.
92 Donald Tusk is a leader of Civic Platform party that won the Polish parliamentary election of 21.10.2007.
Tusk became a prime minister, the government kept that election promise and decided that the last Polish soldier would leave Iraq no later than on 31 December 2008. This initiative is presently being carried out.

D. THE POLISH SUPPORT OVER THE LONG HAUL

Among the many arguments for Poland’s involvement in Iraq, only one turned out to be entirely feasible - the liberation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s bloody dictatorship. The argument about the humanitarian promotion of democracy and freedom turned out to be very difficult to carry out. Today, both the politicians and military men seem to be much more skeptical in their assessment of the chances for Iraq’s democratization than they were in the period preceding the war. The threat posed to Poland by international terrorism is far from clear. Unlike the U.S., Poland is a country with a small Muslim minority and before the war, it did not pursue an active policy in the Middle East that could threaten the interests of terrorist groups. Taking into account those demographic-political conditions, it can be asserted that Poland was not exposed to terrorist attacks before the war in Iraq. After Poland first took part in military intervention and then in the stabilization mission in Iraq, the risk of the terrorist attacks’ occurrence in Poland significantly increased.

Another justification for Poland’s decision to take part in the war, supposed benefits, met with mixed results. Many Polish companies did not get reconstruction contracts in Iraq. Moreover, one of the biggest Polish arms companies, “BUMAR,” bid on selling the armaments to the new Iraqi army but it

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96 Smolar, “National Interest in Poland’s Foreign Policy since 1989,” 95.
did not succeed, in part because this bid’s conditions were unclear.\textsuperscript{98} The Polish hopes for the U.S. military investments, connected with offset contract for selling F-16 jets to Poland, turned out to be premature.\textsuperscript{99} Henryk Szlajfer, the Polish ambassador to OSCE, admits that he has never believed, and he will never believe the theory, that thanks to the Iraqi war and close cooperation with the U.S., Poland was able to make a fortune. However, he believes that from the Iraq situation, Poland was “still reaping certain benefits, political included.”\textsuperscript{100} Overall, however, the issue that stirs up much controversy is the visa question. Despite the fact that Polish politicians have tried to bring their influence to bear on the American authorities to abandon the entry visas for Poles, the U.S.’ stance on this issue remains unchanging. Poles are embittered that they have such a difficult time getting the entry visas to the U.S. and that they have to pay a non-refundable $100 fee just to talk with a consular official.\textsuperscript{101} Tomasz Wróblewski, editor-in-chief of the Polish edition of “Newsweek,” claims that by the abandoning entry visas for Poles the U.S. would prove its political respect for Poland and, all the same, would value Poland’s effort in Iraq.\textsuperscript{102} Presently the EU is negotiating with the U.S. for the condition of including the EU member states to the Visa Waiver Program. Poland is excluded from these talks due to the substantial proportion of rejected visa applications.\textsuperscript{103}

The Polish expectation that a close relationship with the U.S. would enhance Poland’s profile as a global actor and increase its prestige in the


\textsuperscript{100} Henryk Szlajfer, „Balance Sheet of Polish Foreign Policy, 2004: Debate, Warsaw, 7 March 2005.” Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2005, 291-293.

\textsuperscript{101} Jakub Jedras, „Poland: A bridge of Sighs.”

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.

international arena was not groundlessly optimistic. The fact that President Bush’s administration chose Poland to command a “Multinational Division Central South” in Iraq reflects the growing American perception of Poland as global actor.\footnote{Melamed, “Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq,” 13.} Moreover, the Polish diplomatic involvement during the 2004 Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” enhanced Poland’s profile as a global actor in Washington’s eyes.\footnote{Melamed, “Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq,” 13.}

Poland’s participation in the Iraqi crisis significantly worsened its relations with France and Germany. Adam Krzeminski claims that the decision to send troops to Iraq was right, in the sense that from the Polish perspective this decision was rational. However, he argues as well that the way in which Poland presented this issue to its European partners was a total disaster, and that “instead of, thanks to the support of America, gaining points in ‘inner core’ Europe we found ourselves in a situation resembling a constellation from a wholly different era: the Germans, French and Russians—our immediate neighbors-side by side in a ‘Petersburg Triangle’—and us with faraway Anglo-Saxon allies.”\footnote{Adam Krzeminski, „Balance Sheet of Polish Foreign Policy, 2004: Debate, Warsaw, 7, March 2005,” Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2005, 282.} Nevertheless, as the passions inspired by Poland’s initial support for the Americans have cooled, and as Polish public opinion has come to resemble that of the rest Europe, its relations with its EU partners have improved. Even after Poland took part in the war, the Franco-German tandem recognized Poland’s right to shape Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and, all the same, recognized it as a global actor.\footnote{Poland’s participation in CFSP/ESDP is discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis.}

E. CONCLUSIONS

The decision to send Polish troops to Iraq significantly strengthened the Polish-American relationship. However, the lack of tangible benefits for Poland
has subsequently cast a shadow over that relationship. It cannot be said that Poland attained no benefits, but these benefits were political and military, rather than economic in nature. Thanks to its involvement in Iraq, Poland enhanced its prestige in the international arena. Moreover, the intervention in Iraq was a good opportunity for the Polish troops to gain invaluable experiences.
III. THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM CONTROVERSY IN POLAND

In June 2001, during the NATO Brussels summit, Poland endorsed Washington’s ballistic missile defense program. In this matter, as in its subsequent support of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish State wanted to prove its loyalty toward the United States of America and underline Poland’s political Atlanticism. Russia and the other European-NATO members were on the other side of this issue, as would be expected.

In 2006, when Poland was invited by the U.S. to take part in bilateral consultations about deploying some elements of the American anti-missile shield on Polish soil, Russia and the other NATO capitals again voiced their criticism. Nevertheless, Poland decided to take part in negotiations about the U.S. proposal to deploy a “ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)” in Poland. Among European NATO members, it is generally believed that direct talks with Poland were intended by the United States to marginalize the Atlantic Alliance. In the ensuing controversy, the U.S. officials tried to reassure its European NATO partners.

Against the background of inter-NATO debate, Russia demonstrates its strong opposition to the U.S. initiative. By means of intimidation, Russia wants to force Poland to withdraw immediately from negotiations on the U.S. proposal. Poland’s stance on this issue, however, stays constant. However, Donald Tusk’s government, which took over in Poland after the parliamentary elections of 2007, wants some tangible benefits for Poland from its involvement in this project.

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108 Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst, „America’s Protégé in the east: The emergence of Poland as regional leader” International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 2003, 1015.
109 Ibid.
A. DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON THE ISSUE IN POLAND

Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that Poland should agree to host elements of America’s missile defense shield on its territory, on the condition that the U.S. provide Poland with additional safety guarantees against the threat resulting from it. 111 The United States of America should specifically promise Poland to respond militarily, if Poland were to become the target of a hostile military action because of the shield’s presence. 112 He has also emphasized that the U.S. should assure Poland that it will not be guided by Russia’s reservations, and will commit itself to compensating Poland for any negative consequences, including political or economic retaliation from Russia. 113

Another scholar, Henryk Szlajfer, supports the idea of placing the American shield in Poland, and simultaneously challenges some critics’ claim that the shield has an offensive character. He emphasizes its deterrent character:

I think that either we are dealing with a confusion of notions or with a peculiar ‘roundabout reasoning’: the system assumed to neutralize or—with the use of intercepting missiles—to substantially reduce the effectiveness of an enemy (conventional and/or nuclear) ballistic missile attack, i.e. of the enemy’s offensive weapons, as its ‘side’ effect improves the effectiveness of our own possible ‘response’ with offensive weapons (missiles). Even if this is the case, this does not change the basic description of the missile defence system, of a ‘shield’ rather than of a ‘sword,’ with a strongly emphasized strategic deterrence function. 114

Another author, Pawel Zalewski, claims that the anti-missile shield will give Poland a new, very beneficial geopolitical position, and that Poland will reap rewards for playing host to U.S. interceptors. He suggests that, thanks to the shield, Poland’s security will increase, and what is more important, that Poland

112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Henryk Szlajfer, „The USA and European Family: Polemic with Roman Kuźniar” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, No. 4, 2006, 22.
will become a part of America’s defense system. Given that the United States’ defense budget dwarfs that of the EU, Poland would be sacrificing a good deal of security if its defense policy rested only on cooperation with Europe. 115

Public opinion in Poland opposes the deployment of an anti-missile shield on its territory. According to a poll taken by CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre) on deployment of an anti-missile shield in Poland, 60% of respondents oppose the move, and 26% support it. 116

Roman Kuźniar states that if Poland agrees to deploying the elements of an American anti-missile shield on its soil, it will cause the appearance of “an asymmetry of benefits.”117 “The possible installation of elements of the system will in practice make our security situation worse and will result in a serious curb on our sovereignty.”118 Kuźniar also argues that the system is dangerous for Poland, because it will be created not to protect Poland’s territory but U.S. territory, and what is more, the U.S. will improve its security at Poland’s expense. 119 He believes that if the system were deployed within NATO structures, it would not be dangerous: “an allied anti-ballistic missile system is more difficult to build and to operate, but it excludes commercial motives for building one and minimizes the risk of its unjustified, offensive use. It would be a deterrent rather than an element of coercion against the others.”120

Olaf Osica, an analyst at the Natolin European Centre, argues that Poland would theoretically become a part of the American defense system and that the


118 Szlajfer, „The USA and European Family: Polemic with Roman Kuźniar,” 22.

119 Kuźniar,” Polityka Polski wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych”

120 Szlajfer, „The USA and European Family: Polemic with Roman Kuźniar” 24.
U.S. system would cooperate with the Polish one. 121 “However, the disparity in power between the two states gives rise to concerns that this type of consolidation may, in practice, only translate into a lasting dependence on the stronger partner and, more importantly, a dependence of an institutional nature.”122 He also affirms that if Poland really becomes an inseparable part of the American defense system, then two aspects of the Polish-American relationship have to become a subject of special attention. “Firstly, the shield has to be of an ally-like nature. Secondly, the appropriate burden of obligations must be placed on the U.S., which would allow Poland to pursue its objectives. This burden cannot be a general political promise to ‘defend against threats’ or ‘support initiatives’, but needs to have a tangible and concrete and lasting institutional and financial dimension. Unlike the situation in Iraq, if a decision is taken with respect to a joint national defence system there will be no turning back for many decades to come.”123

B. LINKAGE TO NATO

The U.S. proposal to deploy a “ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)“124 in Europe has been carried out bilaterally with the Czech Republic and Poland, the countries that are the potential hosts of this installation. The U.S. proposes deploying 10 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland, and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.125 The GBIs guided by the radar would intercept the missiles aimed at the U.S. and most of NATO Europe from the Middle East.126 The U.S.

121 Olaf Osica, “With the Shield or upon it,” The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 5, No. 4(17), 2005, 71.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., 74-75.
125 Ibid.
government indicates that the installation in Poland would protect 75 percent of European territory, while the southeastern part of Europe and Turkey would be outside of the shield’s scope and would have to be protected by shorter-range missile defense systems.\textsuperscript{127}

In March 2005, the North Atlantic Council launched the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence programme (ALTBMD).\textsuperscript{128} “ALTBMD will integrate various theatre missile defence systems into a coherent network for the protection of deployed forces, with an initial operational capability in 2010.”\textsuperscript{129} This system “will be a NATO-funded command and control ‘backbone’ which will integrate sensors and interceptors provided by member nations, such as American and multi-national systems of various capabilities.”\textsuperscript{130}

The fact that the U.S. started bilateral negotiations about the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System with Poland and the Czech Republic without any consultations with its NATO allies and the EU has led to considerable tensions within NATO and the EU. The EU has been upset because two of its members (Poland and the Czech Republic) have been negotiating with the U.S. on an issue that affects the European Security and Defence Policy.\textsuperscript{131}

In bypassing NATO in its talks with Poland and the Czech Republic, the U.S. caused the marginalization of the Atlantic Alliance and this could not be perceived as a good sign for European security issues.\textsuperscript{132} Some critics implied

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{128} David S. Yost, “Analysis Missile Defence on NATO’s agenda,” NATO Review, Autumn 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Michael Mates, „The Missile Defence Debate,” \url{http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1289} [Accessed March 7, 2008].
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Stephen Pullinger, “Missile Defence and European Security” Policy Department External Policies November 2007, 27.
\end{itemize}
that Washington did not want to work primarily through its NATO allies because of the unlikelihood of reaching a compromise on the system.\textsuperscript{133}

As Alexander Bitter has observed, “When the debate about the American plans arose in Europe at the beginning of 2007, the USA began to canvass its European partners.”\textsuperscript{134} In February 2007, Lieutenant General Trey Obering, Director of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency (MDA), went to Berlin to talk about the main goals of the U.S. BMD undertaking and seek European support for that enterprise.\textsuperscript{135} In March the same year in Berlin, Obering presented the opinion that if NATO decided to establish an Alliance-wide BMD system, capable of intercepting long-range missiles, the U.S. missile defense components in Poland and the Czech Republic could become American contributions towards the system.\textsuperscript{136} At the same briefing, the MDA Director was “skeptical about whether NATO members would be willing to pick up the costs of such a system.”\textsuperscript{137}

On 19 April 2007 at NATO headquarters in Brussels, at a NATO-Russia Council meeting, the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman discussed successful NATO cooperation in the field of defense during the Cold War and underlined his view that such coupling is a good idea nowadays in the face of new threats and new challenges.\textsuperscript{138} In response, “NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer concurred, saying 'the principle of the indivisibility of security' is a view held unanimously by the 26 NATO members.”\textsuperscript{139} Apart from Eric Edelman, two other U.S. government officials (Lieutenant General Trey Obering,...

\textsuperscript{133} Hildreth and EK, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe.” 9.


\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{136} Pullinger, “Missile Defence and European Security,” 27.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
Director of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency, and Assistant Secretary of State John Rood), were present in Brussels on that date to address the NATO-Russia Council and the North Atlantic Council. Their address was about “plans to negotiate the deployment of 10 ground-based interceptor missiles to Poland and a radar system to the Czech Republic as a way to broaden the effectiveness of the anti-missile shield.”

According to the U.S. government officials, the U.S. proposal for Poland and the Czech Republic permits NATO to avoid duplicating some elements of its missile defense system, and what America is planning to deploy in Europe has been designed to complement the proposed NATO system.

The NATO members share the view that any U.S. missile defense installations deployed in Europe or North America should complement any NATO missile defense installations.

On 27 May 2007 in Madeira, Portugal, at the joint meeting of the Defence and Security Committee and the Science and Technology Committee on Missile Defence, Robert Bell, Senior Vice President, European Business Development, SAIC, said that in view of the absence of a NATO defence system capable of protecting territories (NATO ALTBMD will be limited to the protection of deployed forces), the U.S. system seems to offer the solution which would increase the

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140 Jacquelyn S. Porth, “U.S. NATO Countries Agree on Need To Maintain Defense Linkage: Russia said to be studying U.S. proposal for missile defense cooperation.”
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
safety of NATO citizens.\textsuperscript{144} He also suggested that ALTBMD could protect those remaining parts of Europe that would be beyond the scope of the U.S. missile defense system.\textsuperscript{145}

On 14-15 June 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Brussels, Belgium, and took part in meetings with NATO defense ministers and with the NATO-Russia Council. Gates said that throughout the meetings in Brussels, none of the NATO countries criticized the U.S. missile defence plans regarding Poland and the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{146} He also stated that NATO and the United States would discuss how to make both missile defense systems work together.\textsuperscript{147}

On 14 June 2007 in Brussels, NATO defence ministers decided to carry out a study “of a complementary ‘bolt-on’ anti missile capability that would protect the southeastern part of alliance territory that would not be covered by the planned U.S. interceptors.”\textsuperscript{148} American officials interpreted that decision “as an implied endorsement of the U.S. GMD plan and an adaptation of NATO plans to fit the proposed U.S. system.”\textsuperscript{149}

On 14 June 2007, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer released a statement. “In essence, the alliance will pursue a three-track approach,’ de Hoop Scheffer said in the statement. The three tracks include: continue the ongoing NATO project to develop by 2010 a theater missile-defense for protecting deployed troops; assess the full implications of the U.S. system;\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{144} Presentation by Robert Bell, Senior Vice President, European Business Development, SAIC at the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee and the Science and Technology Committee on Missile Defence, Madeira, Portugal, \url{http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1363} [Accessed January 28, 2008].

\textsuperscript{145} Presentation by Robert Bell, Senior Vice President, European Business Development, SAIC at the meeting of the Defence and Security Committee and the Science and Technology Committee on Missile Defence.


\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
and continue existing cooperation with Russia on theater missile defense, as well as consultation on related issues.”

According to NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, nowadays for NATO the most important principle is not only “indivisibility of security,” but also protection for all 26 allies against future threats.

C. POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF BMD

During the term of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government, diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia were bad. Kaczynski’s government didn’t seem to attach great significance to Russia’s stance on the idea of hosting elements of America’s missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Moreover, Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government refused to discuss the issue with Russia.

From the very beginning of Polish and Czech consultations with the U.S. about deploying some elements of the American anti-missile shield on Polish and Czech soil, Russian opinion on that issue was very skeptical.

On 22 January 2007, Russian General Wladimir Popowkin criticized the idea of planting some elements of the U.S. anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. He said that a Russian analysis showed that anti-missile interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic would threaten Russia’s territory. In response, Poland’s vice foreign minister said that the Russians know that those missiles are designed to intercept other missiles and are not to be used as an offensive weapon, so the territory of Russia is not threatened.

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152 Judy Dempsey, “Russia and Poland to Discuss U.S Missile Shield,”
153 Joanna Dziuba, „Polska/ Negocjacje ws. tarczy rakietowej w połowie lutego”
154 Dziuba, „Polska/ Negocjacje ws. tarczy rakietowej w połowie lutego.”
When Poland and the Czech Republic started an official bilateral negotiation with the U.S., Russian expressions of discontent and criticism got stronger. On 26 October 2007, at an EU-Russia summit in Mafra, Portugal, Wladimir Putin, the president of Russia, argued that “American plans for a missile shield in Europe pose as grave a challenge to Moscow as the Cuban missile crisis did in the 1960s.”155 According to Putin, “For us, technologically, the situation is very similar. On our borders such threats to our country are being created.” 156 Moreover, Putin declared that Russia was planning to withdraw from the treaty of limitation concerning conventional forces in Europe, and suggested that that “Russia would find it difficult to stay in the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty (INF), signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in December 1987.”157

On 21 October 2007, a parliamentary election was held in Poland. Jarosław Kaczyński’s government was defeated by a center-right party, the Civic Platform. Donald Tusk, a leader of the Civic Platform, became the new prime minister of the Republic of Poland. This government declared that it was much more interested in keeping good bilateral relations with Russia than the previous one.

Russia seemed to be pleased with such a declaration from the Polish side. However, Moscow’s discontent and criticism about planned U.S. initiatives did not let up, and Russia even started to intimidate Poland.

On 15 December 2007, the head of the Russian armed forces' general staff Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky said that Russia might wrongly perceive an antimissile

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157 Ibid.
An interceptor launched from Poland as a missile with a nuclear warhead. In such a case, he added, Russia automatically would reply by launching missiles against installations in Poland. 158

He explained that the U.S. antimissile interceptors would fly over Russian territory, and that Russian surveillance systems are governed by a computer. If the computer made a mistake and incorrectly concluded that the U.S. had attacked Russia, it would reply with saturation bombing. The main targets would include the antimissile rocket launchers in Poland.159

Moscow's message was that the only means of safety in this situation for Poland would be an immediate breaking off of the talks with the Americans.160

In response to Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky's threats on 16 December 2007, on Polish television TVN-24 Donald Tusk said that any Russian generals' statement would not change the course of Polish-American negotiations on the antimissile shield. Moreover, Tusk said that such statements are unacceptable and expressed his regret over the ensuing situation.161

The first signal of a thaw in Polish-Russian relations came on 18 December 2007, when Poland and Russia said “that they would hold consultations over plans by the United States to deploy elements of a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe.”162 President Putin's advisor Sergei V. Yastrzhembsky said that Polish-Russian talks could be held in Poland at the beginning of 2008.163

159 “Rosjanie grożą atakiem.”
160 Ibid.
162 Dempsey, „Russia and Poland to Discuss U.S Missile Shield.”
163 Ibid.
On 21 January 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Radosław Sikorski, paid a working visit to Moscow and met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. During his visit Sikorski said that Poland, “unlike Russia, has no ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons. The anti-missile defense system will defend Europe against ballistic missiles’ threats and we understand Russia’s interest in this aspect.” Simultaneously, he said that the decision about the deployment of Ground-Based Interceptors would be taken between the U.S.A. and Poland. Sergei Lavrov said that Russia “will not exert pressure on Poland or on other participants in the negotiations on the U.S. plan to build missile defense bases in Europe.”

After a six-year break in mutual visits between Polish and Russian Prime Ministers, on 8 February 2008 the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, paid a one day visit to Moscow. This visit was a chance to thaw the Russian-Polish relation that had chilled under Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government. Tusk talked to President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev. “The meetings were cordial although Russia did not soften its stance on any of the key issues regarding Poland.” During his visit to Moscow, Tusk did not talk to Putin about the idea of placing the American shield in Poland, and the subsequent course of events showed that Russia’s stance on that issue remained unchanging.

On 14 February 2008, at the annual conference with reporters at the Kremlin, President Putin said that Russia may have to target its rockets at the planned U.S. BMD installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. According to


166 “Russia will not pressure Poland over U.S. missile shield.”


168 Ibid.
Putin, this step would be dictated by the opinions of Russian experts who believe that the system poses a threat to Russian security. 169

D. POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF BMD

In April 2001, an anonymous Senate staffer said that “For Poland, unlike other U.S. allies, the issue of ballistic missile defence does not represent a serious bone of contention between Washington and Warsaw. Indeed Poland has been more forthcoming than most European allies in its support for this initiative.”170

The U.S. proposal to deploy a “ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)”171 in Poland was well received by the Polish government. During the Polish-U.S. bilateral consultations about deploying some elements of an American anti-missile shield on Polish soil, the Republic of Poland received an official U.S. invitation to take part in negotiations on that issue.

On 23 February 2007, during the term of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted to the U.S. Embassy a diplomatic note comprising:

- “the Polish Government’s consent to start negotiations;

- the Polish Government’s stance emphasizing that for Poland the main aim of negotiations will be strengthening the security of Poland, the security of the U.S., and the international security;

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170 Dunn, „Poland: America’s New Model Ally“ in Poland-A new power in Transatlantic Security, 76.

• a reservation saying that the possible negotiated agreements will become then in Poland the subjects of ratification.”172

Kaczyński’s government, as well as the previous one, almost unconditionally supported the idea of hosting America’s missile-defense shield in Poland. The Polish government’s position maintained that “the shield would serve as a deterrent against possible enemies, believing that although there is no direct danger at the moment, it might appear within 10 to 20 years. Some government officials have also emphasized a perceived threat from Russia.”173

Kaczyński’s twin brother, Lech, the Polish President, also expressed himself positively on this project. On 16 July 2007 Lech Kaczyński paid an official visit to the U.S. After talks with President Bush, at a press conference the Polish president said that “The matter of the shield is largely a foregone conclusion….The shield will exist because for Poland this will be a very good thing.”174

The present Polish government, unlike the previous one, takes the view that Poland should take a tougher position on the question of hosting elements of America’s missile defense shield in Poland.

On 7 January 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Radosław Sikorski, said that the new Polish government “is not prepared to accept American plans to deploy missile-defense bases in Poland until all

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costs and risks are considered.” 175 Two days later, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland’s agreement to the deployment of an American missile defense shield on Polish soil “is going to be directly tied to increasing Poland’s security.”176 He also expressed the opinion that so far Poland “has not received assurances or a guarantee that hosting an American missile defense base in Poland will increase the security level of our country.”177 The same week, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich said that if the U.S. did not equip the Polish Armed Forces with short-and-medium-range systems like THAAD and Patriot, Poland would refuse to host some elements of America’s missile defense shield on its territory.178

After a visit of Polish Ministry of Defence officials to the U.S.A. in January 2008, Polish Minister of Defence Bogdan Klich said that the U.S. government was more ready to meet Poland’s demands connected with hosting elements of America’s missile-defense shield in Poland than it had been before.179

The January course of events showed that Donald Tusk’s government was a much harder negotiator than Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government. The Polish government officials acted very decisively to force the U.S. reaction. Within a few weeks, the U.S. reacted positively for Poland.

In February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Radoslaw Sikorski, paid a visit to the U.S. During one of the meetings, he talked to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about the American initiative and the Polish expectations of tangible benefits for the Polish Armed Forces. At the press

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
conference, both Rice and Sikorski suggested that “the United States would help with Polish air defenses, which Poland requested in the deal.” Moreover, Sikorski said that “There is still a great deal of work for our experts but yes, I am satisfied that the principles that we have argued for have been accepted.”

On 10 March Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk met President Bush in Washington. President Bush said that “the U.S. will help modernize the Polish military as part of a deal to place part of a new U.S. missile defense system in the country.”

E. CONCLUSIONS

For Poland, the best solution would be to “bolt” together the U.S. antimissile shield (including 10 U.S. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland, and a radar installation in the Czech Republic) with the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD). This solution is probable, taking into account the fact that NATO decided to assess the full implications of the U.S. system by March 2008. It would allow Poland to avoid being perceived as an “American Trojan Horse” among the NATO allies. Nevertheless, Russia will still try to intimidate Poland. As the negotiations move closer to the final “deal” between the U.S. and Poland, stronger reservations may be expressed by Russia.

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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF POLAND’S CFSP AND ESDP POLICY

Initially, the Polish stand on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was skeptical and lacking in enthusiasm. This was not surprising in view of the events that took place in 1999 and 2000. Poland regarded the ESDP initiatives as an attempt to exclude it from the European decision making process. Polish decision-makers viewed the CFSP/ESDP as a policy competing with NATO and the U.S.A. However, since 2003, the Polish attitude towards CFSP and ESDP has gradually begun to change. After Poland in 2004 joined the E.U. structures, its involvement in the CFSP/ESDP initiatives significantly increased.

A. POLAND’S CFSP AND ESDP POLICY BEFORE 2003

On 4 June 1999, at the EU summit in Cologne, leaders of EU member states decided to create a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which “would leave non-EU NATO states, like Poland, ‘consulted’ but crucially ‘excluded’ from the actual decision-making process.” For Poland, that enterprise was a serious bone of contention between the EU and Poland.

At this point, Warsaw harbored two kinds of reservations concerning ESDP. Firstly, Warsaw argued that NATO was the best place to develop European defence capabilities and, more precisely, within NATO’s European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), launched in the mid-1990s. Moreover, unlike ESDI, ESDP ushered in an institutional and political competition between

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183 Zaborowski, „From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in the twenty-first century,” 17.
184 Zaborowski and Longhurst, „America’s Protégé in the east: The emergence of Poland as regional leader,” 1016-1018.
185 Zaborowski, „From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in the twenty-first century,” 17.
the EU and NATO. Secondly, Warsaw noted that Poland, like other non-EU NATO European states, found itself formally excluded from ESDP.\footnote{Olaf Osica, "In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relations" in \textit{Poland-A new power in Transatlantic Security}, 33-34.}

Before the next EU summit, which was scheduled to take place in December 1999 in Helsinki, Polish government officials nurtured a hope that their doubts and fears on the character of the ESDP would be dispelled. However, the future evaporated their hopes.\footnote{Olaf Osica, “Wspólna europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony (CFSP) w perspektywie Polski,” Center for International Relations, Warszawa 2001, 18.}

The Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence declared that:

\begin{quote}
The European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)...Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets...Other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation. ...Russia, Ukraine and other European States engaged in political dialogue with the Union and other interested States may be invited to take part in the EU-led operations. \footnote{Annex I to Annex IV Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, \url{http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki European Council - Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions} [Accessed March 20, 2008].}

For Poland, the candidate to the EU, it became clear that the EU placed the non-EU NATO European countries on an equal level with Russia and Ukraine. This situation was unacceptable for Poland. Bronisław Geremek, the
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, reticently delivered the Helsinki Presidency Report, saying that those regulations did not give him satisfaction.  

The tension between Poland and the EU persisted until June 2000, when Poland at the Feira summit “submitted its own proposal envisaging the more comprehensive involvement of the six in ESDP. With active support from the United Kingdom, most of the Polish proposals were agreed in Feira and shortly afterwards. As a result, a ‘15+6’ committee was created with the purpose of discussing ESDP issues between EU member states and non–EU European NATO members. The six were also given an opportunity to take part in the Political and Security Committee (PSC).” The PSC linked the ESDP with the broader CFSP. According to Olaf Osica, “The agreement broke Turkey’s resistance to allowing the EU permanent and guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities, and to the talks on the rules underpinning EU cooperation with the Alliance.” The Polish state made an effort to “bridge the gap between the EU-15 and the non–EU-6.”

Since 1999, Poland has generally perceived CFSP/ESDP as a policy competing with NATO and the U.S.A. For Poland, the United States of America was perceived as the ultimate guarantor of its security. Simultaneously, the EU was regarded as the organization dealing with social, economic and political issues, while NATO was considered as a body which provides Poland with hard security guarantees. When the EU launched the ESDP, it was not surprising that Poland was not enthusiastic about the EU’s interference in matters that fell within

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191 Osica, „In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relations,” 35.
NATO’s competence. But, bearing in mind the future EU enlargement, Poland did not want to overly criticize the ESDP, but tried to make this enterprise more Atlantic.193

The EU’s intention to broaden its CFSP’s scope to the military dimension became a factor creating concerns not only in Poland, but also in the United States. It can be said that Polish and American stances on the ESDP coincided in many respects. The Polish government and the Bush administration realized that “there was a certain inevitability over some form of ESDP and as such the most important approach to this policy initiative is one which seeks to manage its impact on the alliance rather than to fight it on principle.”194 Bronislaw Komorowski, the Polish Minister of Defence, said that Poland wanted its best friend, the U.S., to be involved in European issues, and simultaneously the Polish State wanted to support the development of European initiatives within the scope of defence and security.195

The events of 11 September 2001 mobilized the NATO members to fight against a common enemy, terrorism. The Global War on Terrorism started in Afghanistan, where NATO members sent their troops. Poland has actively participated in this enterprise.

On 4 November 2001, at British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s invitation, a meeting of six EU member state leaders took place in London. The leaders of the U.K, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Holland met to talk about the common EU response to the events of 9/11. The other members of the EU were not invited, including the Belgians, who then held the EU's presidency. This enterprise made the smaller EU member states furious because they found themselves excluded.

195 Ibid.
from the decision making process and recognized the British-French-German initiative as a big countries’ “directorate.”196

Non-EU states, including Poland, were disappointed with the British-French-German project. For Poland, as a candidate to join the EU, the idea of creating a “steering committee” aimed at a directorate in CFSP/ESDP matters was absolutely unacceptable.197

Overall, before the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis and Poland’s admission to the EU in 2004, CFSP and ESDP were never the center of attention for the Polish political elite or the public.198 By 2003, Warsaw conducted a policy aimed at limiting the scope of the ESDP; and, to some extent, this process has been carried on today.199 Moreover, Poland almost unconditionally backed the U.S. initiatives, thereby enhancing its role as America’s protégé in the Eastern part of Europe.200 However, Poland’s attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP has changed since its engagement in Iraq.201

B. POLAND’S CFSP AND ESDP POLICY 2003-2007

The second stage of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was continued in Iraq. In spite of harsh world and European criticism, Poland sided with the U.S. The decision to support the U.S. in Iraq considerably strengthened the Polish-American friendship and enhanced the position of Poland in the international arena. It was not an unimportant matter for Polish politicians and Polish citizens


200 Ibid.,44.

201 Trzaskowski and Osica, “CFSP WATCH 2004.”
who depended on some kind of benefits that might potentially be accompanied with that enterprise. The future events proved that Poland’s expectations of notable economic and political benefits pinned upon its participation in operation “Iraqi Freedom” turned out to be overly optimistic. More than that, Poland was disappointed with American leadership in Iraq. 202

Looking back on the gradual change in the Polish attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP some years later, it can be said confidently that the Iraqi factor, together with two others, was the main contributor to the initiation of this process. The second factor concerned the closeness of the Polish membership in the EU, thereby gaining the right of inclusion in the ESDP decision-making process. The third factor concerned positive changes in the nature of the ESDP. Initially, this European project expressed ill-defined priorities and aspirations that were not necessarily viewed positively by Poland. Throughout 2003, the role of the EU as a foreign and security actor became clearer as did the purpose and the “mission” of the ESDP.203

In 2003, as a part of the ESDP, the EU launched three missions: in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

On 1 January 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) started in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The EUPM took over from the United Nation International Police Task Force in BiH. The main aim of this mission was to establish local law enforcement capabilities through mentoring, monitoring and inspection activities. Poland, as a non EU member state contributed to the EUPM twelve police officers. On 31 March 2003, the EU launched its first-ever military operation “Concordia” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was aimed at securing a stable environment and allowing the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. Poland contributed 17 military officers.

202 Melamed, “Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq” 7.
During this operation NATO assets and capabilities were used. In 2003, the EU conducted the military operation "Artemis" in Bunia, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This was the first EU mission outside Europe, and during this operation, the NATO assets were used.204

Thanks to those three missions, the EU not only demonstrated that it could “go global” but also this organization began to be perceived as a security actor. Moreover, Poland concluded that NATO and the EU were able to cooperate successfully within realms, which in the past, according to the Polish point of view, had been separately assigned to each of them.205

On the eve of the first EU military operation “Concordia” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on 12 March 2003 at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Berlin, the Polish Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, addressed the lecture entitled “Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.” During the lecture, he claimed that:

Poland regards the developing European Security and Defence Policy as a necessary complement to the CFSP in its operational dimension, and as its integral part. Being a NATO member and regarding the Alliance as the guarantee of its members' security, Poland believes that the tasks of the Alliance and EU are complementary, to the benefit of all member states. We do not find any contradiction in developing NATO defence capabilities and an efficient ESDP. Moreover, it is only by co-operating and acting together that NATO and the EU can effectively serve our security interests. 206

Moreover, he said that Polish officials believed that further close cooperation between NATO and the EU would lead to further strengthening of those two organizations.207 In a similar tone was a statement by the Secretary of

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204 The operations: EUPM, Concordia, Artemis. [Accessed March 20, 2008].


207 Ibid.
State in the Polish MoD, Andrzej Towpik. On 23 March 2003 in Warsaw at the conference entitled “European Union as a security community,” he said that “Poland regards itself as militarily capable of participating in CESDP, and has political ambitions to act as one of the European leaders in the field.”

In December 2001, as a result of the Laeken Declaration, the European Council established the Convention on the Future of Europe or the European Convention. The main purpose of this body was to produce a draft constitution for the EU. Some proposals regarding the CFSP/ESDP, which emerged from the European Convention’s working groups were welcomed by the Polish government within the twelve months of 2003. Poland was forthcoming about issues concerning the CFSP and supported the idea of Jean-Lucks Dehaene’s working group to broaden the authority of a foreign minister on the European Commission and the Council of Ministers (so called “double hat”). Moreover, Poland backed the idea of establishing the European Union’s diplomatic service and giving the union a “legal personality.” In addition, Polish representatives recognized the necessity of developing the EU security strategy (ESS). Warsaw also recognized the EU’s need to enhance its planning capacity and supported the British initiative to install a European autonomous planning cell at NATO headquarters - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium.

However, not all the European Convention’s proposals and initiatives regarding the CFSP/ESDP were positively perceived by Poles. On the proposals concerning the ESDP, which were put forward by Michel Barnier’s working group, the Polish stance was qualified. Warsaw supported the inclusion of a mutual

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208 Trzaskowski and Osica, “CFSP WATCH 2004.”
211 Zaborowski, „From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in the twenty-first century,”18.
defence clause and the creation of an EU Armaments and Research Agency, but voiced reservations about the idea of “enhanced cooperation,” stressing the need for the inclusive nature of that cooperation.  

On 29 April 2003, in Le Touquet, Belgium, four EU Member States, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Belgium met at the invitation of the Belgian Prime Minister. They discussed enhanced cooperation between them in the field of security and in more detail, the ESDP. The same day, they issued a joint communiqué in which those countries encouraged the European Convention “to consider including a number of provisions in the new Treaty with defence implications and to open up the possibility for a group of countries to seek enhanced cooperation in defence matters should they so wish.” Poland could not accept such a stance and, in consequence, on September 9, 2003, the government of the Republic of Poland formulated a critical judgment in regard to the European Convention’s approach to the CFSP issues proposed in the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe. Poland made a postulate, which involved “ensuring the participation of all EU members in decisions defining the cooperation mechanisms in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (and in issues concerning the ESDP), as well as including a stipulation regarding the role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security system (which in practice meant an objection to the establishment of defence structures in the EU which could be competitive towards NATO).”

The Republic of Poland, however, had changed its stance before the meeting of foreign ministers, which took place in November 2003 in Naples, Italy. The change in Poland’s stance was brought about by an agreement on the

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concept of “structural cooperation” (enhanced cooperation) by the three major EU players—Germany, France and Great Britain. A new version of the draft protocol concerning structural cooperation was settled. This draft did not exclude from the structural cooperation those countries which were less technologically developed, and the number of conditions which those countries had to meet to participate in this process significantly diminished. Poland therefore decided to back the concept of structural cooperation.215

The year 2003 also witnessed Warsaw’s support for the European Security Strategy, which is the integral part of the CFSP and ESDP. Poland welcomed the ESS as a valuable contribution to the European security. The idea of a stronger EU, which would be more active in the international arena appealed to Warsaw because it was compatible with Polish interests. Moreover, Poland held the view that some kind of independence from the UN was needed, and took the view that in some situations a decision to use force might be taken without the mandate of the UN Security Council. In addition, Polish officials tried unsuccessfully, through a separate paragraph on transatlantic relations, to be included in the ESS.216

On 1 May 2004, Poland became a fully-fledged member of the European Union. As a new member of this organization, the Polish state no longer had to be afraid that it would be perceived as an “outsider” in the European “league.”

From the very beginning, Poland opposed many initiatives concerning the CFSP and the ESDP, such as the Franco-German-British Directoire or structural cooperation which emerged from the European Convention, and which were aimed at greater flexibility and closer cooperation within the group of the biggest EU member states. Entering the new structures, the Polish government realized that Poland could become a member of that group. The Polish politicians drew

215 Trzaskowski and Osica, “CFSP WATCH 2004.”
such a conclusion by taking into consideration two factors. Firstly, in their view, Poland performed a prominent role in Iraq. Secondly, the perception of Poland as an “irritating partner” had changed and was replaced by a view of Poland as a natural member of the EU.\textsuperscript{217}

Those Polish judgments proved to be true in view of the further course of events. In June 2004, the French Minister of Finance caused a lot of controversy by arguing that “France had to distance itself from an ‘exclusive’ dialogue with Germany and work with other large member countries, namely the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Poland.”\textsuperscript{218} In June, the same year, Edmund Stoiber, the leader of Germany’s Christian Social Union (CSU), expressed a similar view.\textsuperscript{219}

The reason why successive Polish governments took a cautious approach to CFSP was that before 2004, they did not see particular benefits for Poland in Polish support for EU’s common positions towards Poland’s eastern neighbors (i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia).\textsuperscript{220} This approach, however, has changed, owing to what was seen as an active support from the EU on the side of Polish politicians in solving the Ukraine’s presidential crisis in 2004.\textsuperscript{221}

Since 2004, Poland has been taking an active part in many CFSP/ESDP initiatives. In 2004 Poland, together with Germany, committed itself to taking an active role in the formation by 2009 of an international battle group consisting of personnel from Latvia, Slovakia and Lithuania.\textsuperscript{222} Simultaneously, Poland will be a group coordinator and contribute the largest force.\textsuperscript{223} In December 2004, the

\textsuperscript{217} Longhurst and Zabrowski, \textit{The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities}, 55.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{220} Trzaskowski and Osica, “CFSP WATCH 2004.”
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
EU took over the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Poland has been actively contributing to this enterprise (currently with 170 to 220 soldiers\textsuperscript{224}). Moreover, on 27 April 2006, contributing to “the EUFOR RD Congo” mission, Poland sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo a military police (MP) contingent consisting of 131 MP personnel.\textsuperscript{225} This region has never been an area of Polish interest. Such Polish involvement proves that Poland takes the issue of CFSP/ESDP seriously. Presently, a contingent of 400 Polish troops is ready to be deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic within the EU operation “EUFOR Tchad/RCA.”\textsuperscript{226}

C. CONCLUSIONS

As presented above, the Polish stance on the CFSP/ESDP has undergone a kind of revolution during the last 16 years. It can be said that Poland changed its attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP because the Polish national interest demanded it. Poland took part in most CFSP/ESDP initiatives because it wanted to pacify the EU member states and show them that Poland, although the closest ally of the United States, was still looking for the solutions which would be the best for Poland and Europe. The author of this thesis believes that the U.S. is and will be Poland’s closest ally and a guarantor of its security. But Poland is a European state and requires good relations with Europe.

\textsuperscript{224} Dominik Jankowski, “Poland’s participation in the EU missions – unnecessary risk or an essential endeavor?” \url{http://www.pulaski.pl/publikacje.htm} [Accessed March 4, 2008].

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{226} Jankowski, “Poland’s participation in the EU missions – unnecessary risk or an essential endeavor?”
V. CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY

The post-Communist Polish foreign policy has been dominated by the need to balance Polish interest in good bilateral relations with the U.S., and its interest in being part of an increasingly integrated European community.

In 2003, when the transatlantic rift about Iraq emerged, Poland as a future member of the European Union was forced to choose between the United States and Europe. In a face of a difference of opinion between the U.S. and the Franco-German tandem over Iraq, Poland supported America in Iraq and all the same proved that it put good relations with the U.S. first, even before relations with Poland’s European allies. Supporting the U.S. in war the Polish decision-makers sacrificed Poland’s good relations with Europe for the special relations with the U.S. and expected the political and economic benefits from Poland’s involvement in Iraq. The decision to send Polish troops to Iraq significantly strengthened the Polish-American relationship. However, the lack of tangible benefits for Poland has subsequently cast a shadow over that relationship. It cannot be said that Poland attained no benefits, but these benefits were political and military, rather than economic in nature. Thanks to its involvement in Iraq, Poland enhanced its prestige in the international arena. Moreover, the intervention in Iraq was a good opportunity for the Polish troops to gain invaluable experiences.

From the very beginning, Poland supported Washington’s ballistic missile defense program. In this matter, as in its subsequent support of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish State wanted to prove its loyalty toward the United States of America and underline Poland’s political Atlanticism. Russia and the other European-NATO members were on the other side of this issue, as would be expected.
In 2006, when Poland was invited by the U.S. to take part in bilateral consultations about deploying some elements of the American anti-missile shield on Polish soil, Russia and the other NATO capitals again voiced their criticism. Nevertheless, Poland decided to take part in negotiations about the U.S. proposal and all the same again proved its loyalty toward the U.S. Among European NATO members, it is generally believed that direct talks with Poland were intended by the United States to marginalize the Atlantic Alliance. In the ensuing controversy, the U.S. officials tried to reassure its European NATO partners. By means of intimidation, Russia wants to force Poland to withdraw immediately from negotiations on the U.S. proposal. Poland’s stance on this issue, however, stays constant. However, Donald Tusk’s government, which took over in Poland after the parliamentary elections of 2007, wants some tangible benefits for Poland from its involvement in this project.

For Poland, the best solution would be to “bolt” together the U.S. antimissile shield (including 10 U.S. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland, and a radar installation in the Czech Republic) with the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD). This solution is probable, taking into account the fact that NATO decided to assess the full implications of the U.S. system by March 2008. It would allow Poland to avoid being perceived as an “American Trojan Horse” among the NATO allies. Nevertheless, Russia will still try to intimidate Poland. As the negotiations move closer to the final “deal” between the U.S. and Poland, stronger reservations may be expressed by Russia.

Initially, the Polish and American stands on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were skeptical and lacking in enthusiasm. Polish and the U.S.’s decision-makers viewed the CFSP/ESDP as a policy competing with NATO and the U.S.A. However, since 2003, the Polish attitude towards CFSP and ESDP has gradually begun to change. This change of the Polish attitude towards CFSP and ESDP was not negatively recognized by Bush’s administration because, for its own
sake, it is good to have a close ally (Poland) involved in the CFSP/ESDP initiatives that would hinder the dictatorial inclinations of the Franco-German tandem. The Polish stance on the CFSP/ESDP has undergone a kind of revolution during the last 16 years. It can be said that Poland changed its attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP because the Polish national interest demanded it. Poland took part in most CFSP/ESDP initiatives because it wanted to pacify the EU member states and show them that Poland, although the closest ally of the United States, was still looking for the solutions which would be the best for Poland and Europe.

**B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Within the last seven years, Poland proved its loyalty several times towards the United States. In some moments of this period, the U.S. did not seem to see Poland’s sacrifices. However, Poland should continue to be heading the path with the U.S. as a leader of NATO and not attach great significance to “incidents” like Iraq. Unlike the U.S., Poland is neither a military nor economic power and needs an ally which would support it should the need arise.

Simultaneously, Poland is a European state and requires good relations with Europe. As a member of the EU, Poland should take part in its CFSP/ESDP initiatives, but on the condition that they will not be competitive with NATO and the U.S.A. The EU is not and will not be a military alliance, so it will not be able to provide Poland with the safety guarantees. The author of this thesis believes that the U.S. is and will be Poland’s closest ally and a guarantor of its security. However, it must be emphasized that Polish-American relationships should be based to some degree on partnership and not based on serfdom.
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