APPLYING GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT
AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

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by

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APPLYING GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

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The Department of Defense (DoD) has long recognized the need for interservice cooperation in warfighting and has been slowly evolving to structure, train, and equip the forces to facilitate this joint cooperation. Today, joint cooperation is even more essential at all of the levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. This necessity is due to complexity of operations, budget restraints, and modularity. The Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) significantly improved joint cooperation at the operational and strategic levels but does not meet the joint needs for today’s environment. The GNA did not significantly improve joint cooperation at the tactical level nor did it create a strong joint culture to overcome service parochialism engendered by strong service cultures. The DoD must extend the changes in the GNA to junior officers and create a strong joint culture in every officer early in their careers. Expanding the GNA educational changes to primary professional military education (PME) and creating a common value set through common leadership curriculum can allow the DoD to realize the full potential of the GNA and inculcate the jointness needed in today’s operational environment.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States (U.S.) Government and military leadership have long recognized the need for interservice cooperation in warfighting operations and have been slowly evolving to structure, train, and equip the forces to facilitate this joint cooperation. Operations during World War II first highlighted the need for the services to learn how to plan and fight together to fully succeed in future conflicts. General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in 1946, “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If we ever again should be involved in war, we will fight with all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort” (Murray 2003b, 30).

Congress and other military leaders also realized service infighting and rivalry during World War II was detrimental to military effectiveness. As a result, Congress passed the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. In the hope of increasing service cooperation and communication, this Act established the Department of Defense (DoD) and consolidated all the military services under one organization and one chain of command. While the National Security Act provided an avenue for resolving disputes, later operations demonstrated that more was needed to increase joint cooperation.

United States operations in Vietnam (1953 to 1972) first highlighted the continued problems with the inability for the services to work together in the existing structure and personnel management construct. Retired Air Force General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) from 1978 to 1982, described the Vietnam War as “our worst example of confused objectives and unclear responsibilities in Washington and in the field. Each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others,
considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself” (Cole 2003, 1). Operation Desert One, the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in April 1980, further demonstrated the problems the services had working together. During this operation, there was a significant lack of interservice cooperation, communication, and training that resulted in lowered mission effectiveness. Then, in 1983, the military launched Operation Urgent Fury to evacuate 600 U.S. students from Grenada. Although it was ultimately successful, lack of joint planning, command and control, and coordination negatively impacted the execution.

Although the joint task force (JTF) accomplished its mission, things went wrong. Troops had to use tourist maps, Army and Marine operations were poorly coordinated, and lack of radio interoperability led to casualties among the civilian population and friendly forces. . . . In the words of one member of Congress, “the mission was accomplished, but it was a good deal less than . . . totally successful. . . . It took some luck, an overwhelming force ratio, and we lost more equipment than we should have.” (Cole 2003, 2)

Operation Urgent Fury finally prompted Congress into taking action to improve joint cooperation by passing the Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) in 1986.

The GNA was the most significant piece of reform since the National Security Act. It fundamentally changed the way the services train and equip to prepare for war as well as the way they plan and execute operations. Many of the changes were aimed at creating a joint culture among the services since the GNA crafters recognized that a joint culture was needed in order for the services to effectively work together. After Operation Desert One, General Jones conducted a study to determine the level of joint culture on the Joint Staff. “[The study] found that joint culture was anathema to the services. Less than two percent of the officers who served on the Joint Staff, for instance, had any ‘joint’ experience at all” (Kitfield 2006). In order to introduce a more joint culture, the GNA
introduced initiatives, which addressed fundamental issues creating barriers between the services. The Act tackled the manning, equipping, educating and training paradigms of each service, which were impeding the realization of a joint culture. These changes included restructuring the role of the CJCS and the service chiefs, joint staff manning, joint personnel management, joint training exercises, and joint professional military education (JPME). “The unmistakable thrust of the [GNA] was to improve interservice coordination and foster a more joint culture” (Kitfield 2006) through forced interaction on staffs and in the educational environment. Each of these changes improved joint culture in specific ways.

The first change in the GNA restructured the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that the CJCS was the principal military advisor to the President and made the service chiefs solely responsible for manning, equipping, and training their services. This restructuring encouraged the services to work together to give a single recommendation to the CJCS and realigned the political power from the services to the Joint Staff (Kitfield 2006).

The second change required a joint staff assignment for promotion to general officer. This requirement increased the quality of officers serving on joint staff (Coss 2005, 92). Finally, the GNA mandated joint training exercises and joint education in the all of the services’ intermediate and senior level professional military education (PME) programs. The joint education mandate consisted of a joint curriculum as well as sister service representation from each service at each service’s intermediate and senior level school. As a result of the changes in the GNA, the ability of the services to work with each other in operations has greatly improved. As an example of the improvements, Katherine Boo, author of “How Congress Won the War in the Gulf,” quoting a Brooking
Institution study, agrees the Act was “one of the primary contributing factors to our success in the Gulf” (Osgood 1996).

While most will agree that the GNA has greatly improved joint operations, recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that the DoD could still improve cooperation between the services. The National Military Strategy (NMS) states, “We will enhance our ability to fight as a joint force. Joint teamwork is an integral part of our culture and focus as we develop leaders, organizations, systems and doctrine. We must continue to strengthen trust and confidence among the Service components that comprise the Joint Force” (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004, 21). As the DoD transforms to meet the challenges of the 21st century, the DoD must go above and beyond the changes and improvements in the GNA to overcome the remaining barriers preventing the forces from operating as a true joint team.

Both Joint Vision 2010 and 2020 “emphasize that to be the most effective force, [the United States] must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future” (National Defense University Library 2007, 1). To accomplish this, DoD and service leadership need to continue its efforts to overcome service parochialism by training, educating, and organizing to facilitate the joint fight.

In order to further decrease service parochialism, the DoD needs to examine how the GNA was able to improve joint operations at the operational and strategic levels and leverage those factors to expand the improvements realized so far. If the DoD can identify and exploit these factors to improve the joint culture among the services, it can
also further improve cooperation and cohesiveness between the services. “If a culture is shared and endorsed across the various subgroups that comprise the organization, then a sense of mission exists and the organization is relatively cohesive, both internally and externally and in its approach to the outside world” (Smith 1998, 41). When examining why cultural differences cause tension and how to build cohesion between cultural subgroups, two changes in the GNA show the greatest potential for exploitation in improving the joint culture in the DoD: joint training and exercises and joint education policies.

One of the primary factors that prevent organizations, including the U.S. Armed Forces, from working together is a clash in cultures. In the case of the U.S. Armed Forces, each service has a very distinct culture, which drives its priorities, language, values, and actions (DiMarco 2004, 9-16). These cultural differences can lead to disagreements about personal interactions, mission accomplishment, and priorities. These disagreements are also fueled by misunderstandings between organizations concerning motivations and agendas of the involved parties causing tensions and hard feelings (Smith 1998, 41). Knowing how to minimize these misunderstandings and disagreements can greatly improve the working relationship between organizations with different cultures (Smith 1998, 41).

A common culture and a better understanding of each other's perspectives can mitigate the effects of cultural differences in working relationships (Heffeman 2004, 114). In order to build a common culture among organizations with subcultures, there are barriers the organization must overcome. The components to overcome these barriers that have received the greatest level of academic investigation are trust, commitment,
communication, shared values, cooperation, and social contacts (Heffeman 2004, 117), all of which are elements or by-products of a common culture. Shared values create a common trust and respect between the organizations, which allow parties to overlook differences in styles and work toward a common goal because they have a common baseline with which to work from. A common language prevents miscommunication between parties and allows them to speak accurately. A mutual understanding of each other’s perspectives and cultures allows parties to understand the true motives and agendas between the parties increasing the trust between the organizations. Also, a common foundation of values and experiences improve organizational cooperation and effectiveness. This observation is supported by a RAND study, which found that “a collective, shared sense of a distinct identity appears to be the hallmark of the most successful organizations (Smith 1998, 41). Additionally, the RAND study remarks that changing an organizational culture is “a function of creating shared values and legitimacy leading to a common ‘theory of victory’ (or vision)” (Smith 1998, 42).

One way in which the GNA provides these shared values, shared experiences, and common language is through interaction between sister service officers in the educational environment. This educational construct allows a certain percentage of officers from all the services to learn a common curriculum because the officers attend the same school, which provides a common set of values and a common language, important factors in establishing a common culture. This interaction also allows officers from sister services to share a common experience and to exchange ideas. The resulting discussions provide a greater understanding of each other’s culture, the second key factor in building a common
culture. But, unfortunately, this does not occur until an officer has already been serving for nine to twelve years.

The DoD can extend the benefits from the educational reform in the GNA to increase joint culture and interservice cooperation through implementing joint educational experiences earlier, more broadly, and more frequently. Lt Col James Smith’s research regarding building cohesiveness among the different specialties within the Air Force supports this assertion. According to his study, “The new culture and team must be socialized from the beginning of one’s entry into the closed-career system, either via pre-commissioning education, initial specialty training, or a common Air Force education” (Smith 1998, 49). While the DoD has already taken many steps to increase the frequency of joint exercises and training events, there are further opportunities for improvement in the educational arena.

The current training, education, and organization construct mandated by GNA is effectively promoting joint culture at the operational and strategic levels (Coss 2005, 94), but to fully reach the potential of a synchronized, interdependent joint force, the educational benefits of the GNA should extend to junior officers. “A strong sense of jointness will be even more important tomorrow. The synchronization of joint combat power is occurring at lower levels--brigades, ships, and squadrons” (Chilcote 1999, 59). One factor driving the need for jointness at the tactical level is interdependence between the services.

To fully leverage the capabilities of each service in a budget-constrained environment, the military leadership is currently manning and structuring their services to operate interdependently. To implement interdependence, service department leadership
has reduced redundant capabilities embedded in each service’s deployable units and requires the services to rely on each other for missing capabilities. There are five primary areas of required interdependence at all levels: battle command and control, joint fires and controls, joint force projection, joint air and missile defense, and joint force sustainment (United States Army 2006). “All of our modular solutions depend on enabling even our smallest combat formations to leverage joint fires through mechanisms such as ‘universal observers’ or ‘joint effects control teams’” (United States Army 2006). Implicit in this observation is that junior officers will need to coordinate and operate with their sister services for needed capabilities while planning and executing tactical level operations. As a result, this lack of redundant capabilities and the resulting reliance between services will continue to drive the requirement for jointness to lower warfighting levels. The joint operations during the Battle of Fallujah are an example of the need for tactical level leaders from all services to work together.

When US military forces attacked the insurgent stronghold of Fallujah in Iraq in November 2004, the action featured some of the heaviest urban fighting Americans had seen since Vietnam. The operation was led by Marine Corps light infantry, backed up by Army armored brigades and Iraqi infantry. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps warplanes mounted devastating air attacks. (Kitfield 2006)

This example illustrates that the U.S. Armed Forces are currently fighting jointly at the tactical level of operations. But, the DoD’s joint initiatives have not kept pace with the operational requirements of junior officers. A comprehensive joint education and interaction with sister services, currently available to Field Grade Officers (FGOs) through the GNA, would greatly benefit junior leaders in an increasingly joint environment as it did the DoD’s operational and strategic level leaders.
Unfortunately, while Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) currently mandates an overview of joint capabilities in primary military education (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005c, A-A-6), there is no opportunity for junior officers to interact to increase understanding of sister service cultures or develop a common foundation of values, which normally occurs at the nine to twelve year time in service. As a result, junior officers receive a service centric education in their primary PME, which causes a very service-centric bias and a very limited exposure to officers from other services outside the operational environment. Lt Col James Smith, Retired, noted this service-centric education and its impact on service culture in an article addressing the lack of Air Force cohesion.

The organizational cultures of the US military services are particularly strong because they employ a career system based on the “closed career principle.” . . . The services recruit and indoctrinate new members into their core missions and their requirements. They provide their own professional education programs to prepare career officers to move up the chain of responsibility for that mission. . . . The service culture is institutionalized by the organization and internalized by its members. (Smith 1998, 41-42)

As a result, many junior officers form perceptions of sister services during operations in a high stress environment without time to reflect on the experience or to understand context of the observed behavior. These interactions often result in negative opinions or perceptions of their fellow officers impeding their ability to work with them. As evidence of the problems of junior officers working together, retired Colonel Osgood commented on the bickering and jealousy among the officer at lower levels of command during the first Gulf War (Osgood 1996). Similarly, many officers today could attest to the continued hard feelings expressed through derogatory jokes and comments about sister service officers.
It is very difficult for later educational opportunities and experiences to correct these misperceptions created during their formative years (Murray 2003b, 30). Providing a common foundation and the opportunity to interact in primary education would help instill a joint culture and increase joint understanding as well as service perspective and, in turn, decrease the number of negative perceptions among junior officers formed during operational experiences. Decreasing the negative perceptions and sources of tension between junior officers from the different services would increase their ability to cooperate to solve problems in a fluid, complex environment.

There are also some concerns that the GNA has instilled too much joint culture overriding service perspectives. There are some critics of the GNA who claim that marginalization of the service chiefs in the reformed organization resulted in a loss of individual service perspective. These critics argue that service perspective is critical to effective campaign planning and adequately preparing each service for fulfilling their missions in the future. According to some, only personnel from a particular service will have the necessary and accurate knowledge of the service’s capabilities, limitations, and needs to prepare them for the future. James Kitfield expresses this concern when comparing the capabilities of the joint warfighting commanders versus the service chiefs.

For all of their importance, regional combatant commanders are necessarily focused on their short-term operational needs and not on long-term strategy and long-term requirements. The [leaders from each service, rather than from joint warfighting commands,] are uniquely able to take the long-term view and develop the capabilities the Defense of Department will need in the future. In fact, they are the only institutions capable of fulfilling this vital function. (Kitfield 2006)

The second concern with the GNA is the perception that campaign planning is adversely affected due to the lack of opportunity for the service chiefs to articulate potential shortfalls in their service’s ability to execute the planned campaign. With the
combatant commander’s having full authority, the service chiefs do not have an equal voice in expressing their concerns with their ability to support potential campaigns, possibly resulting in failure. Some claim that this was detrimental to our decision to invade Iraq. “As a result of that streamlined dynamic, there was never a meeting in the tank where the Chiefs actually signed off on the decision to invade Iraq, on the force levels required, on the prudent risks to be assumed, or on the level of resources needed to support the long-term strategy for the country” (Kitfield 2006).

Many would also argue that it is even more important to have officers able to bring their service-unique perspective to the tactical level. The point of view argues that at the tactical level, joint forces must leverage the skills and capabilities of each service to create the powerful joint team that the U.S. enjoys today. But, this point of view assumes one cannot build a joint perspective without losing the necessary service perspective. Blending the service perspective with joint culture at all levels, tactical, operational, and strategic, would still provide a diverse team with the ability to leverage all the capabilities. But, the joint culture would also provide an increased joint understanding and ability and willingness to work with their joint partners while providing their own service perspective. Joint exercises and training programs have made progress toward developing common skill sets among the services. But, in order to improve joint culture, without reducing service-unique expertise, the DoD should strive to increase joint understanding and cooperation at the tactical level through increased understanding and a common set of values.

Regardless of service, leadership competencies provide a common set of values all services can build on without marginalizing the necessary education on each service’s
capabilities. Currently, each service focuses on slightly different leadership competencies with a service-centric application; however, with increasing joint tactical operations, the differences between required leadership competencies are closing. After an examination of the current leadership competencies in each of the services, many competencies are the same, similar, or have a slightly different emphasis but all build upon common needs and expectations of a leader (Fallesen and Horey 2003, Table 3). By leveraging the commonalities between tactical-level leadership competencies with a common joint leadership curriculum and sister-service interaction, DoD could build a common foundation of values to increase joint culture and improve cooperation.

This thesis recommends a new junior leadership development construct, which provides a common leadership competency curriculum for all services and an opportunity for officers to interact to discuss leadership concepts. This new construct answers the research question of how to increase joint cooperation at the tactical level without diluting service-unique warfighting skills. The construct will provide a baseline of shared values concerning the responsibilities and values of a leader and officer. It will also provide an opportunity for junior officers to have a shared experience and common leadership language to refer to as a baseline to improve communication. Finally, it will provide an opportunity for junior sister service officers to exchange ideas and to increase cultural understanding of the other services and further develop a joint culture. Similar to the benefits of the GNA at the operational and strategic levels, the attributes of the new construct will mitigate the cultural differences between officers and increase their ability to cooperate in the operational environment. This ability to work together seamlessly at the tactical level to quickly solve problems in a fluid, complex environment will provide
a key advantage over opponents in the 21st century warfare, which will require flexible and decisive leaders who can quickly bring the entire joint force to bear against the enemy.

Chapter 2 will review the literature pertaining to the necessary research areas of required tactical jointness, building a common culture among organizational subcultures, and tactical leadership competencies in each of the services. Chapter 3 will then explain the methodology used to reach the conclusions in this thesis. Chapter 4 will examine the benefits and shortfalls of the GNA. Chapter 5 will examine the need for greater joint interaction at the tactical level and why increased interservice cooperation at the tactical level will improve the U.S. Armed Forces’ mission effectiveness. Chapter 6 will then analyze the literature on building cooperation between organizations with different cultures and how the DoD can overcome the cultural gaps between the services to improve joint cooperation. Finally, chapter 7 will provide conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

The significance of this study is that 21st century warfare for the U.S. Armed Forces will increasingly need joint cooperation at the tactical level. Continued service parochialism at the tactical level will impede the U.S.’ ability to fight and win its nation’s wars. There are many historical examples of negative operational impact due to lack of joint cooperation at all levels. Going beyond the technological aspects and establishing a joint culture at all levels will increase understanding between the services at the junior officer level and will greatly facilitate overcoming service biases and improve cooperation.
GNA has proven that changing the officer development construct can greatly improve joint culture and cooperation. The DoD’s PME system is poised to provide the framework to expand the GNA benefits to the tactical level. To ensure joint education has the best chance of resulting in a joint mindset, it is important that joint understanding and exposure be started early in the officer’s formative years and continued. This study presents a primary-level leadership educational construct that provides the required early joint interaction and provides a common leadership framework increasing understanding of leadership perspectives among all DoD components. This common leadership framework will increase cooperation throughout the U.S. Armed Forces and enable them to work as a truly joint team enhancing mission accomplishment and saving lives.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Joint cooperation among all of the services has been and will continue to be a key factor in the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to successfully prosecute military operations. To improve the services’ ability to conduct seamless joint operations, active and retired military officers, academic institutions, and think tanks have conducted countless studies and published innumerable articles, theses, and books analyzing how to improve jointness between the services. To answer the research question concerning how to improve joint cooperation at the tactical level without degrading service perspectives, the review of literature will cover four topics. The four topics are the current and growing need for joint cooperation at all levels including the tactical level, how to improve joint cooperation, how to increase cooperation between diverse organizational cultures, and similarities and differences between the service’s leadership competencies. The first area of research is the need for joint operations at the tactical level.

Joint Operations at Tactical Level

There was a consensus among government and academic literature regarding the increasing requirement for joint operations at all warfighting levels in current and future conflicts. Both areas of literature, government and academic, indicated that past and recent operations demonstrated the effectiveness of successful joint operations and the need for the DoD to continue to improve joint operations. This continued need is due to the increased interservice interdependence and resulting necessity for more joint interaction at lower levels. Government publications at all levels articulated the need for
the services to operate in a joint environment and to structure, man, and equip their forces to enhance joint performance.

The most important documents driving military operations, the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, and *NMS* all stressed the importance of joint operations at all levels, including the tactical level. The *NSS*, *NDS* and *NMS* provided a vision of the U.S. Armed Forces conducting warfare in the 21st century as a seamless, fully integrated joint force. The *NSS* also iterated the need for strengthening joint operations. The *NDS* reiterated the need for a strong joint force and detailed joint capabilities and attributes to facilitate the services transforming to be part of the joint team. The *NMS* again stressed the importance of preparing the military to fight as a joint team by defining joint principles, a joint vision, and joint operational concepts. Additionally, the *NMS* required all services to ensure all future systems are joint from idea to implementation. As well as technological solutions, the *NMS* charged the DoD to examine its doctrine, organizations, training, leadership preparation, and manning to improve joint warfighting capabilities. By requiring this level of interoperability, the *NMS* attempts to prompt the services to look at their institutions in order to find cultural, procedural, and doctrinal ways to overcome barriers between the services.

The *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* expanded the joint vision in higher-level guiding documents and stated that everything the DoD does in the future should contribute to its joint warfighting capability. Specifically, the *QDR* identified the following areas as areas in which to improve joint capabilities: joint ground forces, special operations forces, air and maritime forces, joint training, planning, command and control, mobility, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, acquisitions and
information operations (QDR 2006, 41-61). To implement the QDR, the DoD published the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) in 2003, which further defined specific areas of change for the joint force.

In the TPG, strengthening joint operations and implementing joint operational concepts were primary pillars of preparing for the future environment. The TPG identified several areas to implement future joint operational concepts to include intelligence, experimentation, and education. The TPG is another example of the recognition that future warfighting will require joint cooperation. And, in order to improve the joint force fighting capabilities, it is necessary for the services to transform doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to enable joint warfighting (Department of Defense 2003, 6).

In support of the DoD TPG, each service published doctrine and a transformation plan stressing the importance of jointness within their organizations of the future. The United States Army 2004 Transformation Roadmap described its plan to meet the joint capabilities and joint operational concepts through interoperable systems (Future Combat System), logistics procedures, and joint organizations, such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. In this transformation road map, the Army acknowledged the need for joint operations and interdependence at the tactical level as well as operational and strategic level. “To meet the challenges of expeditionary operations, the Army can and must embrace the capabilities of its sister services at all levels, from the land component commander down to the individual Soldier” (United States Army 2004, 1-1). Similarly, the Air Force and Navy Transformation Strategies stated that all transformation efforts would be committed to the success of the joint team.
and acknowledged the reliance of both services on the other services’ capabilities. Both transformation strategies ensured priority on technological systems, from warfighting platforms to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that enable and contribute to the joint fight.

Joint Vision 2020, which guides the DoD’s strategic transformation, further supported the criticality of joint operations in 21st century warfare. According to Joint Vision 2020, “[t]o build the most effective force for 2020, [the DoD] must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically” (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2001b, 2). The conclusion in Joint Vision 2020 that a successful interdependent force needs full interoperability was consistently echoed in other government publications and civilian sector analysis. These references also agreed that one of the impacts of service interdependence and more complex mission sets was increased joint interaction at lower levels, to include tactical level.

Each of these doctrinal publications prescribed joint interdependence as the required future interservice relationship in order to man and equip the forces of tomorrow to fully realize the capabilities of the joint force. The prescribed interdependence ensured there was minimal unnecessary redundancy between the services in capabilities, equipment, and training. To minimize redundancy, DoD leadership reduced certain capabilities in each service, such as long-range field artillery, close air support, and attack air controllers. Increased Navy and Coast Guard interdependence was demonstrated in the article, “Charting New Seas: Navy and Coast Guard Cooperation.” In this article, Rear Admiral Charles S. Hamilton II, U.S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Patrick M. Stillman, U.S. Coast Guard, discussed the increased interdependence between the Coast Guard and
the Navy to conduct homeland security operations, deepwater, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. According to the article, the two services signed a memorandum of agreement promising greater future cooperation in development of the integrated deepwater system and the Littoral Combat Ship (Hamilton and Stillman 2004, 50). The overwhelming trend in the literature from government and civilian analysts is that increased interservice reliance, as well as full spectrum operations, has increased the joint interaction at all levels. Modular operations and full spectrum operations pushes the jointness prescribed in the previously cited documents to the tactical level.

According to the literature, service interdependence, the Global War on Terror, and the increased need for the DoD to conduct nation building and stability operations has pushed many of the responsibilities previously at the operational level to the tactical level. Some of these responsibilities include coordination with sister service officers for fire support, planning, and decision making. The first literary evidence was in the article, “The Evolution of Special Operations Joint Forces.” According to this article, lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan taught the importance of integration between all the services prior to the actual crisis (Braganca 2004, 66). During these operations, Special Forces operators needed to coordinate fires from the Navy, Air Force, and Army to conduct their operations (Braganca 2004, 64). Lack of previous joint training and common tactics, techniques, and procedures, impeded the ability to effectively apply needed fires (Braganca 2004, 65). The article demonstrated the need for integration at the lowest level and to prepare for that interaction through joint training and exercises. This impact of interdependence at the tactical level on Special Operations Force is
representative of the trend throughout the literature of similar impacts on Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Coast Guard forces. There was also a trend throughout the literature of the increased jointness at the tactical level due to the increased need for stability and nation building operations.

This literary trend was represented in the article, “Nation Building: A Joint Enterprise.” In this article, Gregory Cantwell argued that nation building and its inherent stability, security, transition, and recovery (SSTR) operations, has been and will continue to be a needed mission in the U.S. military. According to this article, in order to effectively conduct SSTR operations, there needs to be an integrated effort in planning and conducting these operations between all the services as well as required civilian organizations (Cantwell 2007, 59). Modular, autonomous joint forces, joint coordination groups, and the need to leverage all services’ capabilities during SSTR operations require all of DoD to operate together to plan and execute operations. The article demonstrated that the need for joint cooperation will not only continue but will only increase as the military continues to play a more integral part in SSTR operations as part of its duty to win its nation’s wars. RAND studies also supported this finding that the contemporary operating environment requires more joint tactical operations.

According to a myriad of RAND studies, nation building is not the only mission requiring increased joint cooperation, but conventional operations also require joint cooperation at all levels. As an example of these consistent findings, a study on how to improve Army leader development, pointed out that Army leaders need a better understanding of service as well as joint capabilities and cultures, based on information technology, doctrine, and weapon systems employed in the current environment.
Army leaders will need a better understanding of the capabilities afforded them by the joint forces in which they will operate. Typically in the past, Army leaders at battalion level and below have had relatively little need to integrate joint force capabilities; this requirement was not prominent even at brigade level. Contemporary and future operations, by contrast, are expected to require “continuous, simultaneous planning and execution at all levels. (Leonard, Peterson, Moore, Polich, and Sortor 2006, 35)

This study is representative of the multitude of studies citing the increased need for joint cooperation and understanding at the tactical level.

The literature in this area is consistent in its findings that to succeed in future operations, the DoD will require improved joint cooperation at all levels. Due to service interdependence, complex environment, modular forces, and autonomous operations, junior officers will need to work together with sister service officers in a time constrained environment to make critical decisions. This environment will require true jointness: intellectual, procedural, technological, and cultural. The next section of literature will examine the predominant schools of thought on achieving true jointness between the services.

**Thoughts on How to Improve Joint Cooperation**

Since this thesis is concerned with tactical level cooperation and there was limited research on how to build joint cooperation at the tactical level, this literature area focused on past and current efforts to improve joint cooperation at the operational and strategic levels. The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 will then apply the findings in this literature area to the tactical level.

While there was consensus among doctrine and scholarly publishers concerning the need for increased joint cooperation at all levels, there were two primary schools of thought concerning how to improve joint operations. The predominant school of thought
was that improved joint cooperation required a joint culture with technological, procedural, doctrinal, organizational, and cultural interoperability. The second school of thought was that joint strength is dependent on bringing the diverse perspective of each service to the fight, which required officers to be immersed in their own service’s doctrine, capabilities, and culture. The first school of thought arguing the need for a joint culture was articulated in scholarly studies and indirectly, in joint publications and service doctrine.

According to the literature, a common culture has a large impact on the ability for organizations to cooperate together since the culture of an organization drives the behavior of the organization’s members. “Ultimately, culture affects the individual in terms of his expectations, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior” (Schirmer, Thie, Harrell, and Tseng 2006, 58). The literature also overwhelmingly agreed that each service has a very strong service culture, which affects how its members behave, what they value, and how they interact with each other and other organizations. The predominant trend in literature was that individual service cultures, and their influence on members’ behaviors, have and still do negatively affect the services’ ability to work effectively with each other.

In 2004, Major James Davis, a Marine Corps student at the School of Advanced Military Studies explored cultural perspectives, historical and current, of each of the services and how the gap between the cultures impacted operations in Vietnam, Kuwait, Kosovo, and Liberia. His study found significant differences in cultures had impacted operations in every case study. The cultural differences resulted in less effective campaign planning, differing expectations of risk aversion, lack of timely and quality decision making, as well as hard feelings between the services. He also argued that
instilling joint culture in the younger officers would benefit the DoD’s warfighting ability. This article was representative of the myriad of literature that supported the findings that while GNA increased joint cooperation, strong service cultures, coupled with a weak joint culture, tends to create service parochialism and negatively impacts operations. The literature also indicated that while the GNA has made improvements in creating a joint culture, it has not been enough to overcome service parochialism.

Research predominantly indicated that, although the DoD has made progress towards a joint culture, a lack of common joint culture is impeding the services’ ability to cooperate together. “An organization’s productivity, viability, and success can seriously depend on its culture” (Anderson 2007, 3). According to a RAND study, which analyzed a new strategic approach for joint officer management, cultures can be described in three ways: fragmented, differentiated, and integrated (Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, Schirmer, and Lim 2005, 5). At the time of this research, the military culture was described as moving from a fragmented to a differentiated culture, mostly as a result of the GNA (Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, Schirmer, and Lim, 2005, 5). The differentiated culture means that all the services still bring different and unique cultures and capabilities to the fight but have established procedures and systems to be interoperable (Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, Schirmer, and Lim 2005, 5). But, according to this study, as well as others, this level of jointness is not sufficient anymore. According to the literature, the services must be interoperable culturally and intellectually as well as procedurally and technologically to improve joint cooperation. Indicative of the DoD’s position that the armed forces must improve its joint culture and cooperation, this study quoted the CJCS as saying in a recent speech “[w]e must create a military
culture that embraces a new level of collaboration between the services” (Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, Schirmer, and Lim 2005, 6). The literature asserted because of the impact of culture on the service’s behavior, the DoD needs to create a stronger joint culture to overcome the strong service cultures, which are preventing the full potential of the GNA from being realized and reducing joint operating effectiveness. The findings in these articles are supported by many relevant theses and articles inside and outside of government organizations, including the joint publications and doctrine.

Joint publications indirectly demonstrated the need for a joint culture in the NDS, NMS, QDR, and the DoD’s and services’ transformation documents. The NSS stated that joint training and education, concept development, command and control, and information sharing are avenues for increasing the cooperation between the allies, domestically and internationally. A reader could infer from this requirement in the NSS that the writers believed that joint education, training, and exercises would also improve cooperation between the U.S. Armed Forces. Secondly, the NMS indicated joint teamwork must be integral in the DoD’s culture and the focus of each service’s leader development, training, doctrine, and system acquisition. As stated earlier, the NMS also laid out joint principles, attributes, capabilities, a vision, and operational concepts for all of the services to adhere to. Again, since these publications were written to improve operations and joint effectiveness, a reader could infer that the joint staff believed that these common principles and joint culture would improve joint operations. Similar requirements for joint concepts, training, and interaction were delineated in joint and service documents.
The joint doctrine and published service transformation doctrine acknowledged the success of joint training, exercises, education, and acquisition in improving joint cooperation through increasing the requirements for joint exercises, joint training, and joint acquisition programs. *Joint Vision 2020* stated that a joint team is critical and that joint training, education, experiences, exercises, and liaisons are important to overcoming the cultural barriers between the services. In addition to DoD doctrine and publications indicating that common culture, experiences, and training increase joint cooperation, studies, which analyzed the GNA indicated that its changes introduced a joint culture, which improved joint cooperation. But, the government publications and doctrine also continually reiterated the second school of thought, that joint strength is dependent on each service providing officers who are fully immersed in and knowledgeable of their own service.

The second school of thought is that the strength of the joint team is the ability to leverage the strength of the individual services and that too much jointness will reduce the creativity, innovativeness, and healthy competition between the services weakening the joint team’s power. In reviewing the doctrine, as it moves from the national level to the service level and down, it increasingly stressed the need for each service to maintain it unique perspective and capabilities. The *QDR* stated the need for each service to maintain the expertise in its competencies, but to develop those competencies in support of the goal of the joint fight. Additionally, all of the service transformation strategies articulated the importance of increasing each service’s expertise in their competencies so they can provide them flawlessly when the joint team needs it. In the *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, it clearly stated that joint officers are built upon service
officers thus indicating the need for strong service cultures and capabilities with joint understanding added onto it. In addition to DoD doctrine, there are some civilian studies, although minimal, which caution against diluting service perspectives and expertise.

Some of the civilian literature argued that the interdependence requires less joint expertise and more specific service expertise. In “Joint Professionals Here Today and Here To Stay,” Michael Coss argued that due to the modularity and interdependence between the services, joint professionals in every service at every level are needed to conduct warfare in the 21st century. This article offers several initiatives to maintain joint knowledge management as well as diffuse joint understanding to the lowest warfighting level. The premise for all his initiatives is the argument that the skill of a joint fight is dependent on each service’s maintaining expertise and knowledge in their service’s unique culture and competencies. “A fundamental strength of our system is that the services provide the joint community with officers who are adept at their service core competencies prior to developing joint competencies” (Coss 2005, 96). Additionally, there are a few other sources of literature that argue that training and educating generalists rather than service specialists will reduce the diversity of thought, creativity, and innovativeness of the joint force.

This literature asserted that the lack of divergent opinions and healthy competition reduces the different perspectives and potentially results in group think. At the strategic level, James Kitfield, Defense Correspondent for the National Journal in Washington, DC, argued in, “A Better Way to Run a War,” that the GNA has resulted in a lack of divergent opinions in planning operations (Kitfield 2006). In his article, he argues that the weakening of the individual service perspectives does not allow the service chiefs to
express their concerns on an equal footing with the joint component commanders (Kitfield 2006). Additionally, the criticality of diverse perspectives is articulated in *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New Proposals for Defense Reform*. One of the guiding principles in their recommendation is that a healthy competition between service ideas is important to ensuring all perspectives are considered and accounted for (Murdoch and Weitz 2005, 34). But, even in this light, the author acknowledges that discussion has to be constructive and not contrary to resolving critical joint issues. While the literature supporting the second school of thought presented some valid and well documented arguments, the literature is generally very narrowly focused on warfighting competencies and does not address the importance of a joint culture in determining organizational behavior and cooperation between the services. Also literature, which maintains that service perspectives are the key to a successful joint team, does not consider the synergy of combining a joint perspective with a thorough knowledge of service capabilities. Instead, it generally treated jointness and service perspective as divergent goals.

In summary, the school of thought that cultural understanding and commonalities is very important in improving the cooperation between the services was the predominant thought in the literature. On the other hand, most government publications and a few other articles maintained the need for more service expertise and not more jointness. Invariably, that literature did not address the impact of service culture on teamwork but instead grouped all aspects of jointness together. Due to the overwhelming amount of literature addressing the importance of cultural understanding on cooperation, the next area will review literature on ways to create a cultural understanding and a common culture.
Creating Common Culture Among Organizations

Again, since there is minimal literature on specifically creating a joint culture at
the tactical level, this area will explore related areas and then apply relevant lessons in the
analysis chapters. The first area of related literature is how to change an organization’s
culture and how to build a common culture between organizations. The second area of
related literature covers the effectiveness of the GNA on building a joint culture among
the services and potential reasons for its success and limitations. The literature on
changing an organizational culture and creating a common culture had consistent themes
throughout on key factors for success.

According to the research, there are some key elements to successfully creating a
common culture; shared values, proactive leadership involvement, and trust between the
members of the organization. According to the literature, these factors provide a
foundation to build a common culture and enable overcoming the natural distrust and
competition between organizations. There are many sources, which support the need for
shared values, to include the Air Force’s recent change to an expeditionary culture.

Lt Col Richard D. Anderson, an Air Force Army War College student, studied
this transformation and in his thesis, The Air Force’s Transformation to an Expeditionary
Culture, identified some lessons learned on how to effectively change a culture. In
response to a new contemporary operating environment, the Air Force required
transforming the force from a mentality where only the pilots fought to a force where
every Airman considered himself or herself a warrior and was prepared to deploy and
fight on a daily basis. In order to facilitate this transformation, the Air Force instituted
procedures and systems to enable every Airman’s deployment. Similar to the joint culture
dilemma, although the technology and policies were in place, the Air Force had not affected the culture of the force. Airmen had not bought into the Air Expeditionary Force culture. The result was deployment problems, surprise deployments, a continued feeling of deployments as rare and unfortunate events, and in general, ineffectiveness of the Air Expeditionary Force model. Lt Col Richard Anderson attributed skillful leadership and application of cultural change models in successfully inculcating all Airmen in the expeditionary mindset and turning the corner on the Air Expeditionary Force construct. His research indicated that shared values, ethos, and principles were critical in creating a common bond between subcultures within the Air Force.

According to the paper, Air Force leadership realized that a common culture is a concept “that groups share certain things in common” (Anderson 2007, 2). The common foundation could be among a myriad of ideas; for example, norms, beliefs, values, behaviors, common language, rules, or paradigms (Anderson 2007, 3). The thesis also stated that these concepts have several key attributes: (1) the concepts can be exhibited by common behavior or rituals, and (2) they are unconscious, innate elements that form a group’s structural stability. In order to create these deep lying integrated elements, Lt Col Richard Anderson asserted there are some proven techniques to create a common culture using shared values and concepts.

The first technique is socializing the culture with all new members. Second, efforts to gain commitment to the new culture should address how members perceive, feel, and think. Determining how a member perceives, thinks, and feels cannot be done through observation alone, but members need to reflect, participate in, and discuss new culture during the transformation process (Anderson 2007, 3). Third, establishing
common assumptions are important in building a bridge between subcultures (Anderson 2007, 3). According to this study, the Air Force successfully built common assumptions to create shared beliefs and values to create a common expeditionary culture (Anderson 2007, 3). This successful application of a share values set toward a common culture supports the literature stating that a set of shared values is vital to establishing a common culture.

An article by Paul Hoffman, “Establish Dialogue – Building Trust,” further supported the need for shared vision and language to build a common culture. According to his article, at the macro-organizational level, there must be a shared identity to the greater organization. To build the “we” atmosphere, leaders must find commonalities and build upon them. Another study on increasing cohesion within the Air Force by overcoming functional subcultures also addressed the need for a common set of values.

In an article examining the lack of cohesion within the Air Force, Lt Col James Smith (Retired) supported many of the previously stated prerequisites for cohesion, which he stated is driven by the organizational culture. According to Lt Col James Smith, in order to change the culture of an organization and overcome strong subcultures, the process needs to include recognition of the need for change and inadequate performance, modification of the organizational structure, a changed culture to meet new priorities of the organization’s leaders, and a changed output. Lt Col James Smith explains that creating a common culture is a process of identifying a common vision to motivate individuals within the subcultures to stop protecting turf, budgets, and power base. In order to find a common foundation for the different career fields within the Air Force, leadership created the Air and Space Basic Course. This school had the mission of
instilling an Air Force identity for all Airmen by providing common values and experiences. The articles argued that to improve cohesion among the subcultures in the Air Force, its leadership needed to articulate a clear vision to all levels of the Air Force, change doctrine and institutional documents to reflect its new vision, and finally socialize the new vision with all members of the service. The study also stressed the importance of inculcating this culture into all Airmen from the beginning. “The new culture and team must be socialized from the beginning of one’s entry into the closed-career system” (Smith 1998, 49). The literature also stressed the importance of the organization’s leadership modeling and socializing the desired values to the lowest level.

The second factor consistent in the literature and supported in the Air Force Expeditionary Culture study was that leadership must proactively promote and enforce new values and principles. In the study on the Air Force’s transformation to an expeditionary culture, proactive Air Force leadership socialized the changes through constant strategic messages and communication with all levels of the organization. This communication and behavior modeling was critical in gaining commitment from all Airmen, regardless of rank, to the new expeditionary values. The literature also indicated that this communication should also include institutional changes, such as doctrine and education.

Lt Col Christopher Gehler, an Army War College student, further examined how to institute cultural change in an organization. In his article, he explained that an organization’s culture could only be changed through changing the institutional Army represented in its doctrine and rule set. His findings concluded that leadership changing institutional values through doctrine and educational curricula was critical to infusing a
cultural change throughout a large organization. These findings were supported by the rest of the relevant literature.

The third factor to creating a common culture, according to the literature, was a level of trust between members of the organization. In 2004, Troy Heffemen authored one of the few articles on building cross-cultural business relationships. His research identified trust as an essential element of success to building relationships and further defined components of building trust between members of different organizations. This article, “Trust Formations in Cross-Cultural Business-to-Business Relationships,” as well as the rest of the limited research in this area, identified common elements of trust as expectations of reliability and integrity in interactions. He further identified three components for building an expectation of reliability and integrity: credibility, integrity (referred to as contractual trust), and benevolence (referred to as goodwill trust) (Heffemen 2004, 114).

The article then breaks the model into five stages of relationship: pre-relationship, early interaction, relationship growth, partnership, and relationship stage. The first two stages are relevant to this thesis: pre-relationship stage and early interaction stage. This thesis will focus on the early interaction stage since that stage best represents where most Company Grade Officers are in learning how to work with officers from different services. Heffemen’s study indicated that during the early-interaction stage, contractual trust was the most important because members from different organizations observed how their new team members conducted themselves on the small details, such as how the partner behaved, and how he interacted with others and the environment. The first
impression created a powerful bias for the person evaluating the competence of the potential partner.

In summarizing the literature concerning changing cultures and building a common culture between organizations, leaders must find commonalities between the sub cultures and then proactively communicate and encourage organization members to adopt the new and or common set of values, beliefs, and ethos based on the commonalities. To change these values and beliefs, the members must do more than observe the new values in action. They must believe them, support them, reflect on them, and commit to them. According to the literature on the GNA’s success or failure, the overwhelming sentiment is that the education and promotion changes in the GNA set the framework for a common joint culture, and has had marginal success at the operational and strategic levels, but service cultures still predominate at all levels.

The literature acknowledges that the true joint culture that the drafters of the GNA envisioned, although greatly improved by joint education and sister service interaction, has not come to pass due to continued prioritization of service cultures over joint cultures. But, the literature also indicated that the educational and human resource management constructs in the GNA were very successful in improving joint cooperation, and the DoD could further exploit them to strengthen the joint culture in the services.

According to the literature, the lack of joint culture was leading the services to implement the GNA, not with jointness in mind, but through a perspective protective of service interests and culture. The article, “Service Responses to the Emergence of Joint Decisionmaking,” argued that although the services have changed their decision making models and procedures to adhere to the GNA provisions, the changes and reorganizations
reflect the service’s culture and priorities and do not meet the full intent of joint cooperation (Lewis, Brown, and Roll 2001, 1). The majority of the literature indicated that, despite the GNA, each service continued to fight for recognition that their services and its unique capabilities were critical in the future fight and should therefore receive priority in systems and budgets. Lt Col DiMarco supported this in his monograph, “Service Culture Effects on Joint Operations: The Masks of War Unveiled,” LTC DiMarco stated in his conclusions:

The operations described in this chapter, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, demonstrate that the efforts of the Goldwater Nichols Act had substantially reduced the problems of conducting joint military operations. However, problems directly or indirectly associated with service culture remained important and effected operations. The Goldwater Nichols reforms were successful in standardizing command organizations, processes, and technical compatibility. As the case of the two operations in the 1990s demonstrates, the reforms were much less successful in medicating the effects of service culture. (DiMarco 2004, 59)

Although, the literature suggested that the GNA did not achieve a truly joint culture, it did improve joint cooperation and, has a construct which, if expanded and implemented as intended, could make significant progress toward establishing a joint culture.

The trend in the literature was that the educational and human resource management constructs in the GNA were very successful in improving joint cooperation and the DoD could further exploit them to strengthen joint culture in each service. In a General Accounting Office study conducted in December 2002, the findings indicated that the joint educational and promotion mandates set out in the GNA have made small steps toward increasing joint culture and cooperation among service officers. But, it also found that the DoD has not realized the full potential cultural change because they have not been able to or are not willing to completely implement the officer education and
development recommendation as envisioned in the GNA. First of all, each of the services emphasizes and instructs joint education in a different manner. This divergent emphasis on joint education and development indicates that service parochialism still holds priority over the need to adhere to a joint culture. Secondly, the DoD does not allow all officers who need joint education the opportunity to attend in-residence. Lack of opportunity reduces the number of officers benefiting from a joint educational experience and being exposed to a joint culture. A 2006 RAND study supported these conclusions by finding that joint education was still being conducted very differently due to each service constructing its curriculum with the emphasis on their service and their necessary differences between the services.

A 2006 RAND study examined how the DoD can improve utilization of the education and joint development framework in the GNA to realize the joint culture envisioned in the GNA. In this study, education, training, and human resource management are key factors in achieving the strategic joint goals laid out by the NSS, NMS, NDS, and QDR. But, consistent with previous studies, this study found that the GNA has been marginally effective in affecting culture due to lack of full implementation. One of the impediments to full implementation was each service’s concept of officership and its grounding in the service’s heritage and history, reflected in their service and joint education curriculums. Another impediment was each service’s belief in the necessary uniqueness of their service’s competencies defined again by heritage and history. Although each curricula is different, the interaction with sister services in an educational environment can still instill a joint culture.
According to this RAND article, officers can achieve increased joint culture through attendance at schools with sister service officers, reading and self-learning, operational experiences, and exposure to officers of other services. The author believed that of these avenues to establish a joint culture, JPME could have enormous impact. “To the extent that the intent of JPME II curriculum is to provide acculturation, then the mixed faculty and mixed student body are extremely important” (Thie and Harrell 2006, 95). However, the article also pointed out that a sense of joint culture can be achieved through a joint duty assignment, but it did not compare the effectiveness of school versus assignments in creating the joint culture. Also supporting the importance of joint education was an article by James Kitfield.

In “A Better Way to Run a War,” James Kitfield presented the rationale and the driving factors for Congress passing the GNA. According to James Kitfield, problems in Operations Urgent Fury and Desert One were a result of a lack of clear joint chain of command, joint training, teamwork, interservice communications, and ability to work together. At the heart of all these issues was the lack of a joint culture among the services. The article argued that the three key changes which improved the jointness of the senior leaders were making the CJCS the principal military advisor to the President, requiring joint duty and joint education for promotion to general officer, and finally, shifting operational power and authority from the services to the joint theater commanders. In sum, this article represented the prevailing thought in the literature that sister services interaction, increased joint education, and increased quality of joint staff officers improved joint cooperation through more interservice understanding. These initiatives also created the beginning of a joint culture improving warfighting
effectiveness. The importance of education in changing cultures is present in all of the literature. There are many examples of organizations using education to change an organization’s culture to an innovating culture. The lessons learned from these articles and studies can be applied to changing an organization’s culture to internalize other values, such as jointness.

One such article exploring how to inculcate innovation into an organization’s culture was, “Innovations: Past and Future.” In this article, education was a key factor in changing a unit’s culture. “The impact of changes on doctrine or the education of an officer corps is almost incalculable” (Murray 2003a, 23). Given the article’s definition of culture as “the sum of intellectual, professional, and traditional values possessed by an officer corps” (Murray 2003a, 23), it is clear how education can have a major impact on the way an officer thinks and on their values. The article indicated that PME provided opportunities for the officers to reflect on and analyze their personal and service’s values. This time of reflection was critical in inspiring the necessary innovation during the interwar years. It also indicated that the education and development of its officers’ corps required a commitment by the services and the nation.

In summary, the literature had some recurring themes throughout on creating a common culture. First, a set of shared values was critical to creating a common culture. Second, proactive leadership and socialization were necessary at all levels of the organization. Third, trust between the organizations was a necessary ingredient to success. Fourth, the effectiveness of the GNA and other attempts to change organizational culture, demonstrated that education, institutional policies, interaction and human resource policies are very powerful tools in changing an organizational culture.
The next area of literature review will examine the commonalities of leadership competencies among the services.

**Leadership Competencies Across the Services**

The next area of literature explores the similarities and differences between the needed leadership competencies for junior officers of all the services. While there were slight differences in the names and emphasis areas, literature indicated that there were minimal differences between the services’ leadership competencies. The literature also indicated that the nature of the missions rather than the individual service was driving leadership requirements for junior officers. Since all services need to prepare to operate in all missions in full spectrum operations, all services required a similar set of leadership skills. The literature review is grouped into two areas: the leadership competencies presented in joint and service doctrine and assessments of leadership competencies needed in the current and future operating environment. At the time of this thesis, it was clear that each service recognized leadership as the core of their success and had dedicated a large portion of their doctrine in delineating expected leadership competencies for their officers.

Joint and service leadership has utilized competency development frameworks to determine and articulate what officers in the armed forces are expected to demonstrate as leaders. These competencies also provided a baseline for officer development and education. In a 2003 briefing by the Office of Force Transformation, Mr. John Garstka defined nine major competencies for all officers: change leader, innovation, leading people, personal leadership, results driven, collaboration, problem solving, influence, and strategic thinking. Under each of these competencies were supporting competencies,
which overlap with many of the current service leadership competencies. He also identified in this briefing that 80 percent of the leadership competencies overlapped for all services. Due to the recognized overlap, a working group was activated to develop a set of joint leadership competencies. Unfortunately, the members of the working group were not able to agree on a common set of leadership competencies and the working group was deactivated.

Due to this deactivation, although there was a lot of supporting literature for joint competencies, there was no joint literature after 2003 and the joint leadership competencies were never published. Despite the services not agreeing to a common set of joint leadership competencies, the literature revealed that there is still significant overlap between the service leadership competencies.

Each service published their leadership competencies in their doctrine or manuals. Air Force leadership competencies were broken into three categories: personal leadership, leading people and teams, and leading the institution. Since this thesis focuses on the junior officers, it will look at the first two groups. In those groups, the major groups of competencies were sound judgment, adapt and perform under pressure, inspire trust, lead courageously, assess self, foster effective communications, create shared vision, influence, mentor and coach, and promote teamwork. For the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, defined three major categories of leadership competencies for direct through strategic levels. They were leading and influencing others, developing self and others, and achieving missions. The Navy had four core competencies each with supporting sub competencies: accomplishing mission, leading people, leading change,
working with people, and resource stewardship. The sub competencies for the Navy were very similar to the other service’s competencies.

The Marine Corps had leadership principles and traits instead of competencies but they were still very similar to the other services’ competencies. The leadership principles are know yourself and seek improvement, be tactically and technically proficient, know and look out for your Marines, keep your Marines informed, set the example, ensure task is understood and accomplished, train as a team, sound and timely decisions, sense of responsibility for yourself and subordinates, employ command within capabilities, seek and take responsibility. The leadership traits were justice, judgment, dependability, initiative, decisiveness, tact, integrity, enthusiasm, bearing, unselfishness, courage, knowledge, loyalty, and endurance.

Finally, the Coast Guard’s leadership competencies in Commandant Instruction (COMDTINST) M5351.3 are leading self, leading others, leading performance and change, and leading the Coast Guard. Each of these competencies has sub competencies, which also aligned with the other services’ competencies. The consistency of overlap between service leadership competencies was also supported in a study analyzing the leadership competencies of all the services.

In 2003, Jon Fallesen, from the Army Research Institute, and Jeff Horey, from Caliber Associates, conducted a study comparing the leadership competencies from all the services and the civilian sector to determine similarities and differences between the contents and constructs. To frame the article, the authors compared each service’s definition of leadership and found, for the services that had a definition of leadership, the definitions were very similar. In examining the components of each service’s leadership
competency frameworks, the findings showed there were some core areas of similarity: mission accomplishment, visioning and planning, problem solving and decision making, human resource management, continuous improvement, motivating and leading people, influencing and negotiation, communicating, teambuilding, developing partnerships, interpersonal skills, accountability, values, learning, and technical proficiency (Fallesen and Horey 2003).

Additional areas, which were slightly less common, were transforming and leading change, strategic thinking, diversity management, mentoring, and physical endurance. The article also pointed out that there were more similarities between certain services because of the degree of similarity in their missions. In summary, in about one-half of the cases, the frameworks appear to be saying the same thing (Fallesen and Horey 2003). There were significant differences in terminology and labels of the grouping but the meanings of the competencies were essentially the same (Fallesen and Horey 2003). The table in Appendix A graphically depicts the similarities and differences between the services’ leadership competencies. While there is significant evidence of the overlap between the services’ leadership competencies, there is also literature on why the leadership orientations of the service continue to be different.

In 2002, Russell Frutiger, a doctorate student at the Walden University, published a dissertation on the different leadership orientations of the services and the impact on the DoD’s ability to achieve jointness. His study found that the leadership “differences are indeed prevalent and distinct” and that “understanding the differences will contribute to greater unity within service leadership and an environment conducive to seamless interoperability and true jointness” (Frutiger 2002, Abstract). The study found that each
service had a different leadership orientation (Frutiger 2002, 46-52). The Army had a high structure leadership orientation, which focuses on the procedures and a well-defined hierarchy (Frutiger 2002, 62). The Navy had a high human-resources leadership orientation, which focuses on human relationships, empowerment, and participative environment (Frutiger 2002, 62). The Air Force had the highest political leadership orientation, which places emphasis on building coalitions, negotiating, and recognizing power (Frutiger 2002, 62). Finally, the Marines scored highest on the symbolic leadership orientation, which stresses organizational events, rites, and symbols (Frutiger 2002, 62).

As a result of the different leadership style in each service, leadership has difficulty understanding the other services impeding jointness. So, while the services have similar competencies, their different orientations change how they educate their officers on those leadership competencies. Since these studies, the DoD has attempted to standardize the service’s definition of leadership by continuing to publish common guiding joint principles.

In January 2006, the DoD published *The Armed Forces Officer*. This publication created a common foundation for officers from all services with a definition of what it means to be an officer in the U.S. military. All officers have the oath of office as the common guiding principle. According to the document, this oath drove certain responsibilities for all Armed Force officers. The responsibilities were the role of citizen-soldier, the role as a warrior-leader in their individual service as well as the joint team, its warrior ethos, and the required nobility of life. Throughout the document, leadership is espoused as the binding force that holds officers together. Common themes for each service are the requirement as leaders to conduct themselves with certain virtues.
including honor, respect, and devotion to duty, service, loyalty, excellence, courage, integrity, and commitment. The document specifically stated a common definition of leadership for all Armed Forces. According to the *Armed Forces Officer*, leadership is a bond of trust in which the leader sets and enforces standards, sets the example, models moral and physical courage, and builds and sustains morale. This document also described the importance of each service’s culture as well as the importance of merging those cultures into a joint team. It maintained that the moral obligation of being a warrior and a leader of character in supporting the Constitution is the moral force that unites the different service cultures. In addition to the existing similarities, the majority of the literature noted that the requirement for all services to operate in the full spectrum of operations in the 21st century is reducing the slight differences in leadership requirements.

As an example of the merging requirements for leader development, Colonel David Haight, an Army War College student, published a thesis researching the impact of SSTR operations on leader development. Due to the increased need for joint cooperation, cultural education, and lower level complex decision-making, Col Haight proposed that the DoD must reexamine how it develops and educates leaders to prepare them for the 21st century. While not explicitly stated, the paper implied that any service involved in SSTR operations needed a certain set of leadership capabilities. Since previous literature stated the need for all services to operate in SSTR operations, all services need those leadership traits as well. According to the literature, officers need to be culturally aware and adaptive, and have decisive leaders who can operate in the full spectrum of operations. As a result, all services are or should be reexamining their leadership
competencies to ensure that their officers are competent to lead the entire spectrum of operations in the 21st century.

An example of the mission driving leadership requirements is the Army’s First 100 Days Manual, which reflected leadership requirements in the current operating environment. The Army’s First 100 Days manual collated lessons learned from the field to publish the leadership traits needed in the contemporary operational environment. The results indicated that competence, confidence, accountability to standards, ability to learn from combat experience, leading from the front, trusting subordinates, adaptability, caring for Soldiers, and communicating with Soldiers were critical leadership attributes. This study also stated that the Army needed to reexamine their current leader development to incorporate the needed leadership requirements. The Navy Transformation Strategy articulated the need for more joint and cultural understanding in their leadership development. In a 2007 RAND study, *Compensating for Incomplete Domain Knowledge*, the authors identified that the current Air Force leadership development was not preparing leaders for the complex and fluid operating environment. The study recommended the Air Force reexamine its leadership curriculum at all levels to integrate needed competencies. These are examples of the trend in literature that the missions in full spectrum operations require a new set of leadership traits or competencies and that the need applies to all services. Accordingly, each service needs to adapt their leadership competencies to meet the requirements of full spectrum operations.

There were a small number of articles, which argued that the specific skills sets and culture of each service required different focus on certain leadership skills. But, even in that literature, there was also an acknowledgement that the expected operating
environment of the 21st century will require a unique set of leadership skills. There was also agreement that all the services needed to be prepared to operate in the entire spectrum of operations. In summary, there was overwhelming evidence that there already has been and is a significant amount of commonalities between the service’s leadership competencies. Also, while there were small differences, full spectrum operations continue to decrease the differences between the services. The final area of research will look at the primary PME leadership curriculum from each service and assess how it is meeting the needs of the 21st century officer and the joint force.

Current Leadership and Joint Education

There are many directives, which dictate what each service will teach in primary education. From the joint community, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), prescribed the focus for each level of education: primary, intermediate, and advanced but this thesis will only focus on the primary. According to the OPMEP, primary education should prepare junior officers to serve in their assigned branch or specialty and is inherently service centered. But, it also required curriculum to increase understanding of joint warfighting at the tactical level by embedding joint learning areas in service primary education. In the OPMEP, the learning objectives were joint warfare fundamentals and joint campaigning. But, there was no requirement for leadership education in primary education. There is no requirement to foster a joint culture nor is there any reference to leadership education in primary education. This lack of definitive guidance required each service to develop their own leadership curricula independent of joint requirements.
According to the literature, each service developed leadership and joint curriculum with a service centric perspective. The Air Force delivered its curriculum guidance through Air University’s Continuum of Officer and Enlisted Professional Military Education Strategic Guidance. This guidance applies to the Air Force’s two primary PME schools Air and Space Basic Course for 2nd Lieutenants and Squadron Officer School for Captains. In this guidance, primary education focuses on educating officers on the wider perspective of how to employ air power before officers become immersed in their specialties. It was also focused on leading small groups. It did this through five primary focus areas: Profession of Arms, Military Studies, Leadership, International Security Studies, and Communication Studies. Leadership instruction was infused through the Profession of Arms, Leadership and Communication. In those areas, curriculum focused on officership, accountability, small team leadership, followership, interpersonal communication, and listening. International Security Studies also focused on the Airmen’s ability to lead and follow and to “understand what it means to be an airman in today’s world” (Air University 2003, 15).

According to AR 350-1 (Army Training and Leader Development), the Army junior officer education system consisted of Basic Officer Leadership Course, Phase I and II, and Captain’s Career Course. The intent of the Basic Officer Leadership Course was to provide initial entry and branch qualifying education. Specifically, the curriculum of the Basic Officer Leadership Course is geared towards educating new officers in leadership and tactical and technical required tasks to lead platoon-size units. The tasks generally include leading, supervising, disciplining, training, developing, caring for subordinates, planning missions, and managing resources. Basic Officer Leadership
Course Phase II is branch non-specific leadership training that focuses on leading platoons in combat-like and stressful situations to overcome student fears and develop confidence. The Captain’s Career Course provided advanced branch specific training and branch nonspecific staff process training. The non-specific training focused on the Army leadership competencies, such as establishing a command climate and setting and enforcing standards as well as the importance of warrior ethos, accountability, initiative, and mission accomplishment. Although the training and leader development regulation stated that the Army must prepare officers to operate in a joint and interagency environment, there is no requirement for joint culture or education in PME, resulting in service-centric training and education in all curriculum areas, including leadership development. Instead, the Army relies on joint training events in their future units to ensure Soldiers are proficient on the tasks in the Universal Joint Task List.

According to the Marine Corps University website, the Marines had The Basic School (TBS) for Lieutenants and Expeditionary Warfare School for Captains. The TBS website indicated that TBS’ focus was inculcating junior officers in the high standards of professional knowledge, esprit-de-corps, and leadership with particular emphasis on the duties, responsibilities and warfighting skills required of a rifle platoon commander (United States Marine Corps 2007). According to the TBS Command Brief, the focus of TBS was to reinforce officer competencies of responsibility, accountability, leadership, officership, military skills, decision-making, problem solving, and warrior ethos. The Expeditionary Warfare School provided Marine Captains education in command and control, Marine Air Ground Task Force operations ashore and naval operations to enable them to serve as a primary staff officer. They also had professional studies in leadership
and ethics, communication, battle studies, and culture. The primary goal of the Expeditionary Warfare School is for the graduate to integrate into a Marine Air Ground Task Force.

The Coast Guard professional development website indicated that their officers do not have a structured professional development curriculum but rather had a series of courses they send their officers to. The first course is Leadership and Management school which focused on self-leadership, motivation, leadership theories, team activities, conflict management, meeting management, performance appraisal (Enlisted Performance Evaluation System), personal ethics, and performance problem-solving. A second course was the Supervisory Leadership Seminar which focused on learning to deal with employee issues and problems, managing and valuing, discovering how to avoid hostile workplace environment problems, effectively managing accounting and budgeting responsibilities, learning to communicate successfully with employees, developing basic team development and leadership, and negotiating employee performance and conduct requirements. Finally, the Leadership Potential Seminar educated young officers on the foundations of leadership and how leadership and management interact, the importance of effective followership, the importance of a healthy lifestyle, self-leadership, ethical structure for decision making situational decision making, long-term leadership growth, conflict management, and the importance and methods of feedback (United States Coast Guard 2007a).

Finally, the Navy has a construct similar to the Army with leadership embedded with each specialty school. According to the Navy leadership continuum, there were two junior officer professional development opportunities, Division Officer Leadership
Course and Department Head Leadership Course. Both of these courses were offered within the officer’s warfare pipeline, instead of independent schools.

**Literature Review Summary**

Combining all of the literature reviewed in this chapter, there are some trends that come to the forefront that are important to the future. First of all, there is overwhelming evidence that 21st century warfare will require an increased level of jointness at all warfighting levels, especially the tactical level. The second trend is that a common culture is a key component to enabling improved joint cooperation. Third, shared values and beliefs are important in establishing a common culture. Fourth, there is an indication that they are significant commonalities in leadership values and beliefs but that different service leadership orientations are reducing the effectiveness of these similarities. Next, the requirement to conduct full spectrum operations will require similar leadership capabilities in all of the services. Finally, the current leadership curriculum does not promote joint culture in its primary education and even though the leadership is based on similar concepts, it is presented in a very service centric perspective. The next chapter will explain how the thesis will tie these trends together to draw conclusions and make recommendation to improve joint cooperation at the tactical level.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to provide recommendations on how the DoD can improve the joint cooperation at the tactical level without marginalizing service capabilities. In order to answer this question, this thesis will tie conclusions from broader research areas to answer the specific research question. The broad areas of research in chapter 2 will answer the secondary research questions: (1) Why does the DoD need greater interservice cooperation at the tactical level to increase mission effectiveness? (2) How does an organization increase cooperation among internal subcultures? (3) Are there common leadership competencies for Company Grade Officers (CGOs) among the services? (4) What does each service currently teach in their primary education leadership curriculum? (5) What are the differences between the services’ leadership curricula? (6) Are the gaps in leadership curriculum causing lack of cooperation at the tactical level? and (7) How does interservice interaction in an educational environment increase cooperation between services?

In the analysis in chapter 4, the thesis will use the data in the first area of research, which reviewed literature about the nature of future operations and the need for joint operations, to answer the first secondary question of why the DoD needs to improve joint cooperation at the tactical level to improve mission effectiveness. Specifically, the analysis will examine what functions the services are conducting jointly, the impact of interdependent doctrine, and the impact of full spectrum operations. From this, the thesis will lead to conclusions regarding the need for areas of increased joint cooperation.
The second area of research will answer the second secondary research question how to improve working relationships between organizations with different cultures and the seventh secondary research question, how does interservice interaction in an educational environment increase cooperation and instill a common culture between services. Analysis of the literature in this research area will indicate potential and proven methods to increase understanding and reduce tensions between organizations to improve working relationships. The analysis will then investigate the applicability of those methods to improve the ability of the Armed Forces to work together. Specifically, it will compare similarities and differences between the conditions present in the literature and conditions in the DoD.

The analysis of this literature will also relate the successes of the GNA to methods of creating a common culture among subcultures to determine how the DoD could expand the initiatives in the GNA to improve the joint culture in the services. Specifically, the analysis will look at the organizational, educational, and human resource changes in the GNA and examine the impact of each on joint cooperation and joint culture. The analysis will also compare the changes in the GNA to determine if there are elements of creating a joint culture, which are missing in the GNA. This will allow analysis of the potential impact of changing the education of CGOs to improve joint cooperation and joint culture.

In order to answer the third secondary research question, the thesis will examine the results from the third area of research, CGO leadership competencies commonalities between the services. The data will indicate any differences and similarities between the competencies and impact of any differences. This data will lead to conclusions whether
there are sufficient similarities between the services’ leadership competencies that would allow the DoD to establish a common set of leadership competencies for all of the Armed Forces’ junior officers.

The fourth area of research will review the current leadership curriculum at the primary education level for each service. Analysis of this data will answer the fourth secondary research question. The data will also find the differences between the service’s leadership curriculums, the fifth question. Since concepts of leadership are a primary source of an officer value set, this data will allow conclusions concerning if and how the differences in each service’s leadership curriculum are impacting the organizational culture. The data will also allow conclusions concerning the impact of any differences between the services’ leadership curricula and the leadership needs of the full spectrum operations at the tactical level, the sixth secondary research question.

Finally, the results of these seven secondary research questions will attempt to answer the primary research question of how to improve joint cooperation at the tactical level without marginalizing the benefits of service perspectives. The thesis will examine the methods to improve cooperation between cultures, knowledge of where the DoD needs to improve joint cooperation at the tactical level and existing commonalities between the services and operational needs to develop a proposal to improve cooperation. During this research, due to time and scope constraints, there are some delimiters and limitations in this thesis.

There are several delimiters in the research. First of all, this thesis does not address cost impacts of any recommendations; however, this is a recommended area for further research. Because funding is the basis by which most decisions are made,
budgetary implications are a logical and necessary research area. Secondly, the thesis will only analyze direct leadership and operations at the tactical level. Next, the thesis will only apply to active duty line officers in the services and exclude Guard and Reserve officers, enlisted, civilians, and non-line career fields. The highly unique characteristics of these organizations require further study on the applicability of the research to their organizations. Finally, since the GNA and other initiatives have taken steps to address FGO and senior level joint interaction, this thesis only intends to address CGO education.

There are also limitations on the research methods for this thesis. First of all, this thesis will refer to existing studies and surveys. Secondly, as some of the services are in the process of transforming primary curriculum, the curriculum used in this thesis will be current as of November 2007 rather than the published date. Finally, the research will only use unclassified information, which may limit some of the data sources.

Critical to this thesis are 13 core definitions:

**Company Grade Officer (CGO):** Officers with the grade of O-1 through O-3.

**Cultural:** The distinctive and deeply rooted beliefs, values, ideology, historic traditions, social forms, and behavioral patterns of a group, organization, or society that evolves, is learned, and transmitted to succeeding generations (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-3).

**Cultural Knowledge:** Understanding the distinctive and deeply rooted beliefs, values, ideology, historic traditions, social forms, and behavioral patterns of a group, organization, or society; understanding key cultural differences and their implications for interacting with people from a culture; and understanding those objective conditions that may, over time, cause a culture to evolve (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-3).
Education: Education conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-5).

Field Grade Officer (FGO): Officers with the grade of O-4 through O-6.

Intermediate-Level Education (ILE): A formal, intermediate-level service college; includes institutions commonly referred to as intermediate service colleges, intermediate-level schools, intermediate service schools or military education level-4 producers; education typically received at grade O-4 (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-5).

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): A CJCS-approved body of objectives, outcomes, policies, procedures and standards supporting the educational requirements for joint officer management (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-6).

Leadership: Art and science of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (FM 6-22 2006, 1-2).

Primary-level Education: Education typically received at grades O-1 through O-3.

Professional Military Education (PME): PME conveys the broad body of knowledge and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional’s expertise in the art and science of war (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-7).

Senior-level education (SLE): A formal, senior-level service or National Defense University college; includes institutions commonly referred to as top-level schools, senior Service colleges, senior service schools or military education level-1 producers; education typically received at grades O-5 or O-6 (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, GL-8).

Senior Officer: Officers with the grade of O-7 through O-10.
**Tactical-Level of War**: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war (JP 1-02 2007, 532).

In summary, the thesis will use analysis in chapters 4, 5, and 6 to tie data from literature review in the four research areas to answer the secondary research questions. In Chapter 7, Conclusions and Recommendations, the thesis will analyze the answers to the secondary research questions to deduce an answer to the primary research question, how to improve joint cooperation at the tactical level without degrading service perspectives.
CHAPTER 4

BENEFITS AND SHORTFALLS OF THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT

The literature makes clear that the GNA was extremely successful in improving the joint fight. But there are two shortfalls in the GNA for today and tomorrow’s joint environment. The first shortfall is that the effects of the GNA extend only to the strategic and operational level. “The Armed Forces have consistently demonstrated their skills in conducting joint operations. However, their capability exists almost exclusively on the operational level. To cope with non-state enemies in the global war on terrorism, jointness must extend down to the tactical level” (Mangum 2004, 58). The second shortfall is the Act’s limited impact on joint culture at the operational and strategic levels and non-existent impact on joint culture at the tactical level. This chapter will analyze how the GNA improved joint cooperation to determine if some of the successes the Act achieved at the strategic and operational level can be applied at the tactical level, and why the GNA’s impact on a joint culture was limited.

Examination of Operation Desert Storm and recent operations in Haiti and Bosnia demonstrates some of the examples of the GNA’s success (Locher and Barrett 2003, 34). Although Operation Desert Storm had many problems, the services’ execution of joint warfare was greatly improved, much as a result of four major changes in the GNA. These changes, which improved the services’ ability to execute a synchronized, efficient, and well-orchestrated campaign, are: making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President, ensuring joint theater commanders have more operational authority than service component commanders, making joint-duty assignments mandatory for promotion to general officer
rank, and mandating JPME for intermediate and senior level PME. The first GNA change the analysis will examine is making the CJCS the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense.

Making the CJCS the principal military advisor has tremendous impact on effective coordination between the services during planning and execution at the operational and strategic levels by unifying the joint chain of command. The single chain of command provides a mechanism and motivation for the service chiefs to work together to provide a single recommendation to the CJCS. In order to provide a single recommendation, while individual service chiefs can still submit individual opinions, the service chiefs are required to plan together, understand each other’s capabilities and work through operational issues that arise. Through this process, leaders at the operational and strategic levels appreciate how leveraging each other’s capabilities will allow the DoD to more effectively and efficiently prosecute campaigns. While tactical planners now understand the need to consider other services’ capabilities, the full benefits of this change have not reached the tactical level. The lack of a similar single joint chain of command at the tactical level has prevented the full benefits of this change reaching the tactical level.

At the tactical level, although the plans and strategy are issued from a joint authority, each service plans and executes its portion of the plan solely within its service chain of command. While there are liaisons to the other services, they are not part of the chain of command and their effectiveness is dependent on the credibility of the liaison and the willingness of the commander to prioritize the liaison’s advice over service priorities. “While liaisons exist within each component commander’s staff, they can only
go so far in ensuring integration of air, land, and sea forces and usually lack the rank or authority to properly overcome doctrinal and operational disconnects. Therefore, liaisons exist but their effectiveness has the potential to be limited, particularly by interservice disagreement” (Naisbitt 2003, 39). In order to realize the benefits from a unified joint command structure at the tactical level, the new command and control structure would require similar functions across the services to be organized under a joint commander at the tactical level. For example, the civil engineers from all the services would be aligned in one organization and required to plan and execute missions together. Based on the scope of this thesis, the impact and feasibility of this change will not be fully explored. But the apparent benefits from this organizational construct at the operational and strategic levels suggest a future research area which could improve joint operations. Based on a cursory examination of the benefits at the higher warfighting levels, similar results could be achieved at the tactical level.

With this organization, tactical level leaders would be required to know and understand each service’s capabilities, work through issues together, and listen to and account for each other’s perspectives prior to actual operations, when there is little time to understand other points of views. Also, a common source for commander’s intent would mitigate the conflicting priorities and relieve the tactical planners from having to reconcile different agendas from the joint and service perspective. Finally, due to the requirement to look across services, this change would also begin to inculcate a joint perspective within tactical level leaders.

The unified chain of command and single objective mandated by the GNA was instrumental in instilling this joint perspective at the operational and strategic levels.
because it made the joint objective more important than service objectives. As will be discussed more in detail in chapter 6, a common culture requires a common baseline to build agreement and understanding. With this new organization, while joint staff officers may still identify themselves as loyal to their services, a common mission and common chain of command provides a baseline for them to understand each other and work together toward a common goal. While the new organizational structure has the capability to instill a sense of joint culture, because service cultures are so strong, this change provides a joint perspective but does not significantly instill a joint culture. Also, as soon as the joint order is delegated to lower levels, the planning quickly dissolves into service specific lines and joint priorities are again subordinate to service specific priorities. This planning within stovepipe organizations, which are motivated by service-specific cultures, limits the ability for the common joint perspective to filter to the tactical level.

The second important change in the GNA strengthens the power of the field commanders and provides a clear chain of command from the joint commander to the field forces, lessening the impact of parochial service interests during planning and execution (Osgood 1996). During the Gulf War, for the first time, the joint commander had true command and control over the forces in the field, which greatly improved his ability to effectively coordinate the forces from all the services (Osgood 1996). Again, in order to realize the benefits of this power shift, the DoD would need to restructure the command and control of its forces to a functional alignment across the services.

The benefits and limitations of the power shift from service commanders to joint commanders are the same as the benefits of the reorganization making the CJCS the
principal military advisor because it provides a single chain of command with a joint perspective. This power shift reduces the need for field commanders to coordinate with service commanders during operations. As a result, there is a clear chain of command with a joint commander, which will subordinate service interests and present a common mission for services to work together to achieve. But, unfortunately, the limitations are also the same. Because the lower level echelons break into stove pipe service organizations, there is an increasing necessity to work across service lines to complete missions through liaisons. As a result, service priorities begin to usurp joint priorities in lower echelons. These limitations interfere with instilling a joint perspective at lower levels. Also, its effect on joint culture would be limited due to strong service cultures overcoming joint goals.

The third important change is the requirement for a joint assignment to be promotable to general officer. Prior to this change, joint duty was undesirable for many officers because of the promotion statistics. Also, when officers did serve on a joint staff, their loyalty was to their service and not to the joint staff (Locher and Barrett 2003, 34). As a result, services did not prioritize filling joint staff positions with quality officers. The requirement for general officers to serve on a joint staff, however, changed the importance and priority of joint staffs.

Since the GNA requires joint duty for potential general officers, the services began to send better quality people to joint staff (DiMarco 2004, 15). Because the officers on staff were now knowledgeable of their own service’s operations, were respected in their own service, and had normally served in a joint assignment and were therefore more knowledgeable in sister service capabilities, the quality of joint doctrine improved and
gained credibility. As a result, joint doctrine began to gain momentum within the services, and the services began to gain a joint perspective. Joint doctrine, however, is still very general with much room for services to customize its employment within their own service doctrine. Additionally, joint doctrine is not authoritative so the services can take what they want and ignore what they do not want. As a result, much of the joint doctrine is translated into service doctrine with service-centric biases, which reduces the impact of the increased joint perspective at lower levels. Although minimal, this change does have some positive impact on joint culture.

By creating a common joint language and a common framework, joint doctrine successfully creates a baseline from which to develop a joint culture. Although the joint doctrine is successful in providing a start point for a joint culture, there is still a sense of obligation by joint officers to protect the interests of their services (RAND, 2002). This indicates that joint staff officers still first identify themselves as officers loyal to their services rather than to the joint team. This service parochialism rather than the identification with the joint team impedes the ability to develop a joint culture and impacts the effectiveness of joint doctrine and planning.

While maintaining service perspective is important, joint officers must be able to overcome their service parochialism and prioritize the effectiveness of the joint team to truly employ a joint force effectively and demonstrate a joint culture. In summary, the increased quality of joint staff officers initiated by the GNA has improved joint cooperation at operational and strategic levels but has not significantly contributed to developing a joint culture due to existing service loyalties of joint staff officers.
On the other hand, the educational framework in the GNA, the fourth change, has created the foundation for the development of a joint culture but only at the operational and strategic levels. There are two significant educational changes mandated in the GNA that served to create a joint culture between the services: joint education and sister service interaction at resident intermediate and senior service PME. The first part of the educational framework requires joint PME for all officers prior to serving on a joint staff. This joint PME framework attempts to ensure that joint staff officers are familiar with the capabilities of all the services, how the joint forces should be employed during operations, and perspectives of the other services. Additionally, increased knowledge allows more realistic expectations of each other and fewer frustrations between the services. This element in the GNA hopes to build a level of common understanding through a common language and common experience (joint PME) and create a joint culture. Unfortunately, because of joint PME’s limited attendees and delayed introduction, this element of the GNA lays the foundation for a joint culture and improved joint cooperation but is unable to significantly inculcate a joint culture within the services.

Realizing the importance of joint education and its positive impact at the operational and strategic level, the DoD has taken initiatives to introduce joint education at the tactical level through primary PME schools in each service. In the Officer Professional Military Education Program, each service’s primary education is required to include an introduction to joint warfighting (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, A-A-7). This introduction includes education on the Joint Task Force organization, combatant command structure, characteristics of a joint campaign, how national and joint systems
support tactical-level operations, and the capabilities of the relevant systems of the other Services (CJCSI 1800.01C 2005, A-A-7). By establishing a common language and knowledge base and introducing a joint perspective, the DoD has begun to exploit the potential in the GNA and to lay the foundation for a joint culture at the tactical level.

Unfortunately, at the same time, the DoD’s implementation of the joint education at the tactical level lessens their chance of developing a joint culture. While the OPMEP mandates certain areas of instruction, there is no standardized instruction or any assurance that the topics are covered with sufficient emphasis and in sufficient detail. The Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) provides oversight for JPME through audits and provides recommendations to improve the joint learning objectives at all levels (CJCS 1800.01 2006, F-1, F-2). But, the PAJE staff does not have the authority to ensure that all CGOs are receiving the same experience, the same knowledge set, or the same language. Additionally, the OPMEP requirements are very general which allows the services much latitude in implementing the guidance. Because of the lack of sufficient oversight and latitude, the DoD’s initiative to instill joint culture at the tactical level is unsuccessful as a result of differing values, knowledge, and understanding being instilled in junior officers from each service.

If the services were to provide standardized curriculum with sufficient emphasis, CGOs would have the beginnings of the needed joint culture. Through the resulting common language, common experience, common understanding, increased knowledge of sister service capabilities, CGOs from all services would have a common framework and more realistic expectations when they deploy in a joint environment. This would reduce frustrations and improve joint cooperation at the tactical level. But, according to the
literature, in order to truly instill a joint culture, CGOs would also have to have a trust, a common value set and a common experience. In ILE and SLE, interaction between sister service officers in an educational environment has been a large component of providing the common value set and common experience that has resulted in the small amount of joint culture the DoD’s FGOS currently have.

The interaction between sister service officers in intermediate and senior level PME greatly enhances the understanding and trust between officers from the different services. According to the GNA, each service’s intermediate and senior PME programs must admit 20 percent of each class from sister services departments (Buckley 2007, 10). During the intermediate and senior service education, officers learn about and discuss warfighting, leadership, and other military issues in a non-threatening environment with officers from their own services as well as from the other services. Through discussions, officers gain a greater understanding of each other’s responsibilities, organizations, and perspectives. Understanding perspectives is important in establishing trust and confidence between the services because there is an understanding of the context of each other’s actions. This new framework produced a cadre of joint warfighting professionals at the operational and strategic level whose joint perspective contributed too many of the successes since the GNA (Coss 2005, 92).

Unfortunately, the GNA does not require interaction between sister service officers in a PME setting until ILE, which is received at an average of nine to twelve years of service. As a result, the only interaction junior officers receive with sister service officers is through field experience. This field interaction between officers without an awareness of service cultures and perspectives can result in officers acquiring
misinformed biases and misperceptions during their formative years. While the knowledge-level education can mitigate the misperceptions, only with non-operational interaction can officers have the opportunity to discuss their knowledge and understand why the services organize and fight the way they do. Since GNA did not mandate this same framework at the tactical level and DoD has not taken the initiative, CGOs do not benefit from any of the interaction in an educational setting with their sister service officers until they are majors or higher.

There are increasing opportunities for CGOs to train and exercise together due to the increasing need for joint cooperation in certain career fields. During these technical schools and exercises, CGOs from different services are trained in their specialty to ensure there is procedural interoperability between the services facilitating joint cooperation during deployments. They also have the opportunity to discuss how their different services can complement each other to accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently. These exercises can positively impact the development of a joint culture if they were supported sufficiently by the services.

Unfortunately there is still reluctance from each service to fund and provide manpower to these joint exercises due to the perceived greater need to train and educate CGOs on service specific doctrine, functions, and capabilities. Additionally, the joint training is specifically focused on ensuring officers from those career fields are able to work together with officers from the other services on matters pertaining to their specific area of expertise. Another reason is that since they are only available to a relatively small number of officers in each service, the exercises and training events are limited in their impact. Finally, the scope of discussions is limited in these exercises and training events.
As a result of these limitations, DoD initiatives, including joint exercises and training events facilitate technological and procedural interoperability but minimally address the cultural differences between the services that are impeding a joint culture for DoD. Each school or exercise is narrowly focused on specific warfighting skills rather than developing an overall common language, experiences, and understanding. As a result, while joint training and joint exercises have potential to facilitate a joint culture, the narrow focus and limited participation limit its potential impact.

In summary, the GNA has been successful in facilitating technological and procedural interoperability and has laid the foundation for cultural interoperability at the operational and strategic levels. Since the GNA was enacted, the DoD has taken initiatives to expand the successes of the GNA to the tactical level. Except for the small attempt to include joint education in primary education, however, the DoD initiatives at the tactical level primarily focus on joint technological and procedural interoperability through events such as joint training and joint exercises. To develop a joint culture, the DoD should focus on the changes in the GNA which address cultural differences between the services, such as a joint education, an environment for educational interaction, a common language, a common experience, opportunities for discussion, opportunities to plan and work together in resolving operational issues, common objectives, and a sense of belonging to the joint team. In the next chapter, the analysis will examine the future warfighting environment to determine where the DoD needs to begin to inculcate this joint culture in its officers.
“With the ongoing transformation of the DoD and the current world situation, jointness will soon be the norm rather than the exception (Frutiger 2002, 36). Since Russell Frutiger made that observation in his dissertation, U.S. military operations have increasingly required joint cooperation at lower and lower levels. All of the Armed Forces have gradually accepted the importance of fighting as one team at all warfighting levels and have taken steps to improve its ability to do so, sometimes prompted by Congress. Congress passed the GNA in 1981 as a direct result of the interservice challenges experienced during Operations Eagle Claw and Urgent Fury with the intent of forcing the services to work together and laying a framework to increase trust and understanding between the services.

As shown in the improved joint planning and execution during Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, the changes directed by the GNA, as well as other service initiatives, have been successful in improving cooperation between the services at the strategic and operational level. But, today and in the future, more jointness will be needed at all levels, especially at the tactical level. This increased level of cooperation will not only require technical and procedural interoperability, but also cultural interoperability. Cultural interoperability between the services’ CGOs will facilitate the interpersonal relationships needed to operate in the complex and rapidly changing environment facing the services’ CGOs today and in the future. This chapter will analyze the literature to determine the current and future joint requirements, specifically at the tactical level, and determine the importance of resolving the
interservice cultural incompatibilities at the tactical level. The first part of answering this question is to determine the joint tactical-level requirements of today and tomorrow.

The need for joint cooperation at the tactical level manifests itself by multiple trends in the literature: strategic DoD leadership calling for improved joint cooperation at all levels due to interdependence between the services combined with modularity and the complex nature of current and future operations, increased number of joint technical and warfighting schools for CGOs, and increased need for technical interoperability at the tactical level. Together, these trends indicate that the future CGOs will be required to successfully work with sister service CGOs in preparing for, planning for, and executing military operations.

The first trend in the literature is the need for interdependence between the services. Due to shrinking budgets and variety of missions to prepare for, DoD strategic leadership has realized there cannot be unnecessary redundancy in capabilities between the services. Instead, the services are focusing their efforts on core functions and rely on the other services to fill the gap in internal capabilities. As an example, instead of continuing to invest in long-range artillery, which many perceive as redundant with Air Force close air support capabilities, the Army will rely on the Air Force.

Similarly, the Navy and Coast Guard have been developing interdependent relationships to ensure the brown water and blue water missions are well covered using the strengths of both services (Hamilton 2004, 50-57). This requires the services to coordinate with each other for support whereas previously they would have been able to coordinate within their own service. Initially, this analysis would only indicate that there is more joint cooperation at the operational planning level. But, because the modular
force and complex nature of operations pushes decisions and coordination responsibilities to the tactical level, further analysis indicates that the interdependence will also require more joint cooperation at the tactical level.

Since the Army transformed to the modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure, many of the division-level responsibilities have been pushed down to the BCT level (Grant 2007, 37), including planning and coordinating operations. Due to interdependence, planning operations increasingly require coordination with sister services at the BCT level. Since this is the level where many CGOs are involved in planning, coordinating, and executing operations, CGOs in the BCT are now responsible for liaising with their sister service counterparts, conventional and special purpose, to plan and execute successful operations. In addition to CGOs planning and coordinating operations with sister services, the complex nature of the operations has required tactical level leaders to closely work with sister services while executing operations.

The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will be similar to future conflicts, require highly decentralized, small unit operations. The environment also calls for rapid decision making. In this environment, there is often not time to defer decisions and coordination to higher levels. As a result, CGOs are often required to make on the spot decisions to take advantage of opportunities. Also, as a result of interdependencies between the services, other services many times have the key capabilities needed to exploit the situation. Therefore, lower level units, and their CGO tactical level leaders, must interact with sister services to bring in the needed capabilities in a timely manner. So, while an initial look at the implications of interdependence would indicate that it will increase joint requirements at strategic and operational levels at most; further analysis
indicates that interdependency combined with modular organization and a complex environment will push this joint interaction down to the tactical and CGO level. This analysis is validated by another trend in the literature: an increased number of joint warfighting and technical schools and exercises for CGOs.

The review of literature indicated that the DoD has taken the initiative to consolidate different services’ schools for an increasing number of career fields based on the need for procedural interoperability in the field. While interoperability is forcing CGOs to work together in certain areas, such as fire support, to effectively synchronize each service’s capabilities, the environment also requires CGOs from different services to share responsibilities in other areas. As an example, due to the need for Army troops to conduct operations outside established base perimeters, the Air Force is now conducting perimeter security for Air Force bases. This realignment of responsibilities requires the Army and Air Force to ensure their operations are synchronized to ensure full base protection from outside and inside the base. This synchronization requires constant communication during planning and execution between Air Force and Army tactical units, joint patrols, and the same or clearly understood operating procedures. This requirement is also coming to the forefront in the civil engineering community. In that area, CGOs from all services are working together on a daily basis because of shared responsibilities and the need to deconflict operations.

This trend is a by-product of the interdependence between the services since each service has slightly different expertise in those career fields. To effectively use limited resources, tactical level leaders are forming ad hoc tactical cooperative agreements to work together. With no prediction of increased defense spending or overall strength
increases, this trend will continue and will continue to require closer working relationships and better personal relationships between services at the tactical level for an increasing number of career fields. This required tactical cooperation is also evidenced by the call by many for more joint tactical-level exercises.

Many published articles emphasize the need for more joint tactical warfighting exercises to enable members of the various services to learn about each other before the conflict has started. Unfortunately, due to lack of priority within individual services and funding, joint exercises are often not really joint because they do not have the right tactical-level representation from all the services. This lack of working together during peacetime at the tactical level results in Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors having to learn each other’s techniques, tactics, procedures, strengths, and weaknesses during conflict due to the increasingly joint nature of tactical operations in conflict. As a result, the tactical warfighters do not have time to resolve the procedural, technological, or cultural misunderstandings and are forced to work around them. The recognition by warfighters that true joint tactical-level exercises are needed is another indication of the joint environment at the tactical level. Finally, DoD’s herculean efforts to build interoperable systems at all levels are indicative of the need for tactical-level leaders to plan and execute operations together.

From the Global Information Grid, which attempts to tie all the services’ systems into one large global network to ensure they can share information, to the acquisition efforts to ensure all systems are born joint, it is apparent that the DoD understands the need for interoperable tactical communications systems. The DoD, with prompting from Congress, has taken the initiative to buy joint communications systems, such as Joint
Tactical Radio System, to ensure that tactical level leaders can communicate in the field and ensure that systems are developed so that all the services can use them.

After analyzing the literature, the need for the services to work together at the tactical level is present today and will continue, if not increase, in the future. Some may argue that the current level of tactical interservice interaction is due to the amount of Army requirements being filled by other services due to lack of Army manpower, known as “in-lieu of taskings”, rather than the nature of operations. Naturally, “in-lieu of taskings” are increasing the interaction between services since Air Force, Navy, and or Marines are filling current shortfalls in Army manpower and performing Army functions. But this analysis deliberately did not consider “in-lieu of taskings” due to the temporary nature of that arrangement, as currently the Army is increasing its size and number of BCTs. Rather, this analysis took into account warfighting doctrinal and organizational changes as a result of reduced funding, the nature of future military operations, and technological changes since those changes will have an impact on the Armed Forces for the foreseeable future.

Based on these changes in the operating environment, tactical level leaders, which are primarily CGOs, will have to work together to plan and execute operations for the foreseeable future in most career fields. As the DoD is continually required to do more with less, the amount of tactical cooperation will increase and expand to include other career fields. There is, and will continue to be, a requirement to train together to ensure procedural interoperability, plan operations together as planning functions are moved to lower echelons, and coordinate with each other during execution due to a decentralized, modular environment. Success at this level of tactical cooperation requires procedural,
technological, doctrinal, and organizational cultural compatibility. As the level of required interaction increases, CGOs will have to put aside service-unique agendas and work with each other to develop the best joint solution. In order to improve CGOs ability to do this, the CGOs need to not only understand the cultures of the other services but they need to have a common culture, which values the joint team.

Joint exercises, joint acquisition programs, and joint training schools are but a few examples of the initiatives the DoD is taking to improve the interoperability between services. While, these initiatives have great promise, they only address a piece of the joint cooperation puzzle. The initiatives address the doctrinal, technical, and procedural interoperability but do not address the human dimension, the cultural interoperability. As shown in this chapter, the increased level of interaction and the complex environment requires the success of interpersonal relationships, facilitated by a common joint culture.

In the next chapter, the analysis will examine the literature on ways to build a common culture. The chapter will also determine what new steps the DoD can take, or what parts of the GNA the DoD can extend to build a joint culture.
“To [eliminate redundancy and inefficiency], the United States must indoctrinate military employees—uniformed and civilian—into a capability and effects-based joint force. These force providers must be joint-oriented, not service-oriented” (Hopkins 2004). Currently, the DoD is comprised of strong distinct subcultures, each developed and nurtured as the service matured. The Air Force culture is based around technology and its toys, the Army culture is based on the good of the country and the selfless Soldiers who serve, and the Navy culture is based on its tradition and independence (DiMarco 2004, 10-14). Each of these cultures bred individual organizational behavior, priorities, and interests, many of which are incompatible with that of the other services.

The incompatible aspects of the services’ cultures and priorities negatively impact the services’ ability to work together effectively during peacetime and conflict (DiMarco 2004, 59). In order to overcome the service parochialism, there needs to be a common set of organizational behaviors, expectations, priorities, and interests. In other words, there needs to be a joint culture that is stronger than the service cultures. This chapter will examine and integrate the successes of the GNA explained in chapters 2 and 5 and the literature on building a common culture among service cultures to determine possible solutions for developing a joint culture.

In chapter 2, the literature had recurring themes throughout on how to successfully create a common culture. First, the effectiveness of the GNA and other attempts to change organizational culture demonstrate that education, institutional and human resource policies, and interaction are very powerful tools in changing an
organizational culture. Second, proactive leadership and emphasis are necessary at all levels of the organization. Third, trust between the organizations is a necessary ingredient for success. Finally, a set of shared values is critical to creating a common culture. There are currently opportunities to create or improve these conditions in the DoD to inculcate a stronger joint culture among the services.

As explored in chapter 2, the GNA has been successful in utilizing education, institutional and human resource policies, and interaction to begin a joint culture at the operational and strategic levels. The human resources policies are responsible for ensuring quality officers are assigned to joint staffs, improving joint doctrine and cooperation between the services. While this improves joint staffs, officers still come to the joint staff with strong service cultures and service parochialism. The continued influence of strong service cultures is supported in LTC DiMarco’s thesis exploring the impact of the GNA to today’s operations.

[The continued service parochialism] is indicative that the services have not internalized the value of joint staff experience. They regard it as a block to be checked rather than a valuable professional experience for the assigned officer. The process then sets the conditions wherein service acculturated officers bring their service culture to the joint organization with the potential for negative impacts on the joint organization’s functioning. (DiMarco 2004, 62)

In order for the DoD to fully realize the potential of this human resource policy change, joint culture must be developed prior to an officer’s assignment to the joint staff.

In order to develop the joint culture prior to their assignment on a joint staff, the GNA policies should extend to the CGO. As shown in chapter 5, more and more CGOs are working with sister service CGOs in the field planning and executing operations. But, joint field experiences alone are not enough to inculcate an officer with a joint culture demonstrated by the fact that most officers continue to put service agendas before joint
agendas after serving on joint staff. The joint experiences need to be complemented by a promotion system, which rewards and promotes officers who serve in joint field assignments before joint staff duty. Promoting and rewarding officers who serve in joint tactical assignments as CGOs would ensure that quality officers are sent to joint field assignments. As a result, the quality of interaction and the trust between sister-service tactical level officers would increase. As the analysis will later demonstrate, trust is a major factor in establishing good working relationship between organizations.

Another important factor to the GNA’s success is the educational framework and resulting interaction between sister service officers. The educational framework within the GNA provides several important conditions to developing a joint culture: a common language and doctrinal framework through a joint curriculum, an increased understanding of the other service capabilities, and an opportunity for sister service officers to interact in a secure, risk-free environment. Through these initiatives, officers gain an increased understanding of the other services’ perspectives, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Also through this interaction, the FGOs are able to put into context many of the experiences they had in the field mitigating the impact of any negative interactions the officers might have had. Similar interactions would allow CGOs to put their experiences into context and reduce misunderstandings, which taint interactions in later years.

Although the educational framework has been beneficial to joint understanding, many times, the education and interaction is unable to overcome perceived negative experiences in the field.

As currently mandated by the GNA, educational joint interaction does not begin until the officer has between nine to twelve years of time in service. By that time, most
officers are firmly engrained with service perspectives. A survey conducted by Brooks L. Bash, author of “Leadership and parochialism: An enduring reality?” indicates that joint experience “may be insufficient to overcome parochial attitudes developed during an officer’s formative years” (Bash 1999, 64). Although small, the initial success of the educational framework in ILE and SLE shows that PME can have a positive impact on inculcating officers with a joint culture.

PME provides an environment for officers to take time to accurately reflect on experiences, engage in dialogue with peers, and learn from their experiences and think about how they will apply those lessons learned in the future. In an operational environment, perceptions of fellow sister service leaders are usually formed through interactions in high-stress environments with little time to understand context and reflect on interactions. These stressed interactions many times result in misunderstandings and negative opinions of sister service officers. In the “Joint Expeditionary Culture Gap,” Major James Davis, a School of Advanced Military Studies student, cited a multitude of operational and tactical inefficiencies, such as rules of engagement miscommunications and tactical turnover procedures, resulting from a lack of joint culture and understanding (Davis 2004, 52).

Currently, CJCSI 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), mandates that an overview of joint operational concepts be introduced during primary education (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005c, A-A-6). However, this overview is introduced in a service-centric environment with no input from sister service officers and limits the ability for junior officers to truly gain the benefits of a joint introduction. A more comprehensive joint education and exposure to sister service
officers earlier in their careers would provide junior officers the opportunity to learn the
other services’ culture and would minimize potential negative experiences in the
operational environment. Earlier exposure to comprehensive joint curriculum and
educational interaction between CGOs would greatly improve the chance of inculcating junior officers with a joint culture.

In addition to earlier exposure, there are more steps the DoD can take to increase the chance of a successful joint culture. Proactive senior leadership supporting a joint culture is a critical aspect of inculcating junior officers with a joint culture. In order to ensure a joint culture is instilled in junior officers, DoD leadership from each service must emphasize the importance of working as a joint team and respecting and trusting the other services. As well as promoting and rewarding those who serve in joint capacities, a powerful way to socialize the importance of joint culture and teamwork is through PME. Because every junior officer receives primary PME, senior leaders would be able to reach throughout their officer corps to ensure they all understood the importance of working with their sister services. By crafting a comprehensive joint education and ensuring that each service’s basic PME stresses the important of jointness, senior leaders in each service could inculcate junior officers with the importance of joint teamwork and increase the trust of the other services prior to field interaction, which is critical to a creating a joint culture people will support.

The third predominant theme throughout the literature, military and civilian, is that trust is critical to working relationships and bridging gaps between subcultures. According to Troy Heffeman, author of *Trust Formation in Cross-Cultural Business to Business Relationships*, there are several types of trust critical in a relationship:
competency, good-will, contractual and search trust (Heffeman 2004, 114). During the pre-relationship stage, parties establish search trust by finding out as much as they can about their proposed partners and use the information they find to make a value judgment on their trustworthiness (Heffeman 2004, 114). In their formative years, CGOs get the majority of their education through PME and supervisors. This source of search trust presents an opportunity for the services to establish a positive search trust by providing a comprehensive joint curriculum, which emphasizes the importance of the other services and the importance of joint teamwork. In the early interaction stage, search trust is still very important as are contractual and competency trust (Heffeman 2004, 114). PME can be a valuable vehicle in facilitating search, contractual, and competency trust between sister service officers.

In Heffeman’s article, trust was identified as a critical variable to establish in a relationship at the early interaction stage. At the early interaction stage, “the relationship builds at many different levels, but it is based on one of mutual respect, mutual trust, if things are to go well” (2004, 114). Further, “mutual trust is absolutely essential in the early stages of the partnership, and as it develops” (Heffeman 2004, 114). Contractual trust is established by the parties doing the “little things” for each other such as timely responses to questions, sending emails, helping with projects (Heffeman 2004, 114). Whereas the ability for CGOs to do little things for each other are many times restricted in an operational environment by operations tempo, political constraints, and lack of resources, PME provides ample opportunities for CGOs to establish contractual trust between officers. Opportunities to build competency trust are also ample in a PME environment.
Competency trust means that one party trusts the other parties’ ability to do the job in a competent manner (Heffeman 2004, 114). In an operational environment, because of the lack of comprehensive joint education, there are often inaccurate expectations or misunderstandings about the responsibilities of the other services. Based on these misperceptions, many CGOs feel that their sister services officers are unable to help them complete the mission or lack the necessary knowledge. A more comprehensive joint education would improve knowledge of the other services’ capabilities and limitations helping to manage expectations and prevent misunderstandings, which decrease competency trust.

Finally, trust is also established by the fourth critical foundation in developing a shared culture: shared values. According to LTC DiMarco’s article, each of the services has a distinct set of core values and understanding the differences is important to the services working together successfully. But, according to the literature, values are also a foundation for establishing a culture and driving force behind attitudes, behaviors, and priorities. Understanding the other services’ values would increase joint cooperation and interoperability, but not necessarily create a joint culture. If the DoD wants to develop a true joint culture rather than joint cooperation, DoD leadership should find a common set of values and socialize them throughout their service. As stated earlier, the GNA educational framework was successful in establishing a common language through joint curriculum and a joint mission through joint doctrine and as a result was successful in creating an environment of joint cooperation. However, the GNA did not develop a common set of values between the services at any level. Understanding the importance of
a common value set, the DoD has taken further initiatives through joint doctrine to instill officers with a set of joint values.

DoD leadership has documented, through joint doctrine, the importance of values in assuring the correct action by military leaders and that jointness is one value that must be instilled in all military personnel for successful future operations. “[The] US military service is based on values that US military experience has proven to be vital for operational success” (JP 1-02 2007, ix). “When the members of the Armed Forces of the United States internalize and embody these values of joint warfare, their attitude about joint warfighting produces a synergy that multiplies the effects of their individual actions” (JP 1-02 2007, I-5). In order to develop a common set of values that each service adheres to, the joint staff established integrity, competency, physical courage, moral courage, and teamwork as the values that all of the services need for operational success (JP 1-02 2007, x). While these values serve as a foundation, each service has further defined its own set of values, and those service values are stressed in each service’s military education.

Each service has adapted its set of values to the personality of the service and therefore the effect of the joint value set has been marginalized. The Air Force has integrity, service before self, and excellence in all we do as their values (AFDD 1-1 2006, iii). In the Army leadership manual, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, the Army values are defined as loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. The Navy and Marine Corps values are honor, courage, and commitment (Department of the Navy 2007). The Coast Guard values are honor, respect, and devotion to duty (United States Coast Guard 2007b). In examining the definitions of these core values, although
they seem different at first, there are common meanings and intent through all of them on which to build a common foundation. The commonalities are evident when looking at the leadership competencies of each service, which are derived from the service’s core values.

Examining the literature on the leadership competencies of the services, there is sufficient overlap between leadership competencies of the five services to build a common foundation for a joint culture. But, also according to the literature, the different leadership orientations of each service result in different leadership curriculum, and in turn, different interpretations of those leadership competencies. According to the Webster’s Dictionary, culture is defined by “the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization” (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, Culture). How the services define leadership is a driving factor in what values and beliefs the service instills in its officer corps. And since the officer corps sets the culture of its organization, the values and beliefs associated with its concept of leadership is a critical piece in establishing the service’s culture. Figure 1 graphically depicts this relationship. Based on this relationship and the similarities between the services’ leadership competencies, a joint culture should already be present. While there is the foundation and the potential for a joint culture from this circumstance, there are other factors impeding the DoD’s ability to exploit this situation.
As shown by the many different definitions of culture, an organizational culture is also defined by its practices. In the DoD’s case, this is equivalent to the service’s capabilities influencing its culture. Currently, the services’ capabilities heavily influence how the service leadership defines its values and beliefs and therefore heavily influence the service’s culture. As evidence of this, the majority of ILE and SLE curriculum in all of the services is dedicated to learning the service’s warfighting functions versus understanding and discussing leadership values and beliefs.

Similarly, in the primary PME schools for lieutenants and captains, while there is a heavier emphasis on leadership and ethics, the uniqueness of the service capabilities and the traits required to implement those capabilities is stressed. As a result, despite a commonality of leadership competencies between the services, the values, ethics, and leadership competencies are taught in a very service-centric perspective stressing the uniqueness of the respective service. And this unique culture is emphasized through later schooling at ILE and SLE. In order to utilize the commonalities between leadership
competencies to develop a joint culture, the services should stress the commonalities between the leadership, values, and beliefs amongst the services. Since leadership competencies are a primary source for officer’s values and beliefs, instilling the same leadership competencies in all service officers would create a common set of values and beliefs among the officer corps to facilitate understanding, trust, and respect.

In summary, there are four primary ways to create a common culture among subcultures: educational, institutional, and human resources policies, senior leadership emphasis, creating trust between the services, and a common set of values and beliefs. The GNA successfully uses the first method through its educational, promotion, and doctrine policies. But, these policies take effect too late in the officer’s career and do not address the other elements needed to successfully create a unifying culture. The policy changes in the GNA instill a temporary joint perspective in officers when they are FGOs. This joint perspective does not overcome years of service-unique education stressing unique service requirements. In order to overcome the service parochial perspectives, the manning, promotion, and education systems implemented in the GNA need to be introduced earlier in the officer’s career. Additionally, the DoD needs to implement changes to address the other factors needed to change an organizational culture: senior leadership emphasis, creating trust between the services, and a common set of values and beliefs.

Basic PME is the ideal avenue for creating these conditions. DoD leadership can inculcate a joint culture in CGOs through emphasis on joint teamwork and the value of all the services in early PME and continue through the educational curriculum. Similarly, PME offers opportunities to discuss controversial issues and thoroughly understand
capabilities to prevent misunderstandings and inaccurate expectations, which hurt trust between the services in the officer’s formative years. Finally, the DoD can use PME to create a set of common leadership values and beliefs increasing respect and trust between junior officers, an important piece to creating and getting support for a common culture. The next chapter will present conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis in the chapters 4, 5, and 6.
CHAPTER 7
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In order to answer the research question, “How can the DoD improve joint cooperation at the tactical level without marginalizing service perspectives?” this chapter will draw from the analysis and conclusions in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

In chapter 4, the analysis concluded that the GNA, through organizational, educational, and human resource changes, has made great progress in improving the ability for operational and strategic level leaders to work together seamlessly to plan for and execute operations. But, the analysis also showed that these changes did not adequately address the required cultural changes at any level within the services to remove the barriers to fully effective joint cooperation. This chapter also found that the benefits of the GNA changes did not significantly affect the tactical level due to continued influence of service cultures at the tactical level.

Chapter 5 concluded that there was a need for the Armed Forces to plan for and execute operations in a dynamic, fast tempo environment. In order to do this successfully, technical and procedural interoperability is necessary but no longer sufficient. Additionally, CGOs from all the services need to be culturally compatible in order to work together seamlessly at the tactical level in a wide variety of specialties and warfighting functions.

Finally, chapter 6 concluded that implementing organizational and human resource changes in the GNA at the tactical level would improve joint cooperation at the tactical level but would not adequately address the cultural incompatibility, which is limiting interservice cooperation. In order to address the cultural differences, the DoD
leadership needs to instill and emphasize common joint culture, the socialization needs to start earlier in an officer’s career than it currently does, and there needs to be increased trust and a common value set among the services. The analysis further concluded that junior officer PME presents an excellent forum to effect these changes and that leadership competencies provide a potential common set of values among the services.

Synthesizing these conclusions allows an answer to the primary research question. Based on the findings in chapter 4, joint cooperation should extend to all CGOs regardless of specialty and warfighting function. Since all officers attend primary education in their service, primary PME provides an appropriate forum to socialize and instill a joint culture in all junior officers. Since all officers also attend a technical school in their formative years, those schools present another opportunity. However, given the disparities between the format, content, timing, and length of all the technical schools, even within one service, ensuring the quality of the necessary changes would be much more time consuming and difficult to achieve. Therefore, primary education would be the optimal avenue for inculcating a joint culture in all CGOs. However, in order to fully leverage primary PME to instill the importance of joint cooperation in all officers, the curriculum and format of primary PME needs to change. The curriculum should mirror the JPME initiatives at ILE and SLE as well as create opportunities to achieve other elements needed to build a common culture, stated in chapter 6.

In order to inculcate the needed joint culture, primary PME should facilitate a thorough understanding of each service’s capabilities, emphasize the benefits of working together to achieve joint objectives, provide an opportunity to interact and share perspectives, and teach a common set of values to every junior officer. First, joint PME in
ILE and SLE is successful at introducing a thorough understanding of each service’s capabilities and the benefits of working together to achieve joint cooperation. Accordingly, a similar joint education at the tactical level would introduce that same knowledge, understanding, and appreciation of the importance of jointness in CGOs. However, in contrast to today, the curriculum would have to provide sufficient contact hours and higher-than-knowledge-level instruction to provide the necessary level of understanding and importance. A robust curriculum would also indicate the priority that jointness has at senior levels of leadership, which would increase the support from junior officers.

Second, as argued in chapter 5, interaction between sister service officers in an educational environment can provide opportunities for officers to understand sister service perspectives and reach agreement on or at least respect for positions. Currently, aside from joint technical training schools, which are narrowly focused, there is no opportunity for CGOs to interact in an educational environment such as in ILE and SLE. Providing an opportunity for sister services to interact in primary PME would allow CGOs to share their foundational knowledge with each other and allow officers to put their service education in context with what the other services are learning to understand how all the pieces fit together. The interaction and sharing of knowledge will increase understanding of how each service complements each other as well as the appreciation of the other services’ perspectives and in turn, increase trust.

Finally, in order to address the missing piece of GNA, the cultural gaps, the DoD should leverage primary PME to instill a common set of values in all officers, regardless of service. Since leadership is the core of an officer’s value set, the DoD could use the
existing commonalities among the service’s leadership competencies and implement the same leadership curriculum in all primary PME. A common understanding of what constitutes leadership would mitigate some of the perceived differences between the services which impede the respect between sister service officers. For example, the Air Force is regarded more as managers, than leaders, and as valuing things over people, which create respect problems between the Air Force and the other services, especially the Army. A common understanding of leadership would reduce those tensions and stereotypes by instilling the same leadership priorities in all officers. Additionally, using a robust joint education in primary PME and a common leadership definition, the DoD can instill a joint culture without marginalizing benefits of service perspectives.

Currently, DoD philosophy requires officers to be service experts first and then joint officers, but as previously discussed, it is difficult to overcome service parochialism to instill the importance of jointness after a strong service culture has been built. In order to minimize the affect of service parochialism but still retain service perspectives, service expertise needs to be built upon a joint culture. After instilling a common value set as junior officers, in the form of a common leadership curriculum, and a comprehensive joint education, services would then provide the necessary education on their distinct service capabilities. The service education could then build on the foundation of joint knowledge and understanding by educating officers on how their service’s unique capabilities are critical to the joint fight. Therefore, primary education curriculum would instill how the service distinct capabilities can contribute to the joint fight from the very beginning of an officer’s career instead of how the capabilities are an end unto themselves. A common leadership value set would provide a sense of belonging to the
same team and same culture. Additionally, a leadership curriculum would provide an avenue for sister service officers to interact and discuss issues without impeding the service’s instruction.

If the DoD truly wants to succeed in 21st century conflict, with limited resources, the services must overcome service parochialism and develop a joint culture to fight seamlessly as a joint team. According to Lt Col James Smith, who wrote an article about achieving full interoperability between the Army and Marine Corps, “[t]rue organizational change requires a cultural transformation—not simply accommodation and incremental modification but changed organizational output in terms of structure, professional incentives, and changed professional behaviors” (Smith 1998, 42). To change the DoD’s culture, each service’s source of cultural identity needs to be transformed. The DoD must change to an officer development model, which develops service officers from joint officers rather than joint officers from service officers. A common leadership curriculum, with interaction, and robust joint PME at the tactical level is the key to this transformation. In order to begin this transformation, this thesis proposes the following recommendations.

The recommended initiatives are: (1) The DoD should closely examine its leadership competencies, remove the slight variations in emphasis that currently exist, and develop one joint list of leadership competencies for all services. (2) Based on a set of joint leadership competencies, the DoD should develop a common leadership curriculum and implement it in all the service’s primary PME institutions. (3) The DoD should provide a forum for CGOs from all the services to interact and discuss leadership and warfighting issues in primary PME. (4) The DoD should increase the quality of joint
education in primary PME by providing higher than knowledge-level learning and more contact hours. (5) The DoD should review its service distinctive capabilities instruction in Primary PME and ensure capabilities are taught consistent with serving the joint team. Due to the limitations of this study, this thesis also recommends further areas for further study.

Further areas of study include: (1) potential forums of interaction between sister service officers in Primary PME and financial impacts, (2) impact of recommendations on Reserve, National Guard, and non-line officers of all services, (3) specific content of improved joint PME curriculum, (4) common leadership values, and (5) impact and feasibility of joint command and control structure at the tactical level.

The DoD is realizing the importance of culture in today’s and future operations. But, it has only applied this importance to understanding foreign cultures to interact with people from other countries. It is just as important to understand the importance of the DoD’s cultures in operations. It is also important, if an organization is to move forward, learn, and adapt to new environments, that it be able to change its culture. The DoD is in a position where it must adapt its culture to the new joint environment if it is to succeed. Jointness is only going to increase in the future and personal relationships are continually cited as the key in making joint operations succeed. Strong service cultures can interfere with those relationships and a joint culture would facilitate the personal relationships. The DoD must create a joint culture to facilitate the relationships needed now in the future to succeed in military operations.
## LEADERSHIP COMPETENCY COMPARISON

**Table 3**
Leadership Competency Components Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>ECQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance</strong></td>
<td>Executing/Operating</td>
<td>Ensure assigned tasks are understood, supervised, and accomplished</td>
<td>Leading the Institution; Driving Execution</td>
<td>Accomplishing Mission; Effectiveness</td>
<td>Results Driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vision Development and Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Planning/Preparing</td>
<td>Creating and Demonstrating Vision</td>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>Vision</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Customer Focus</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-Making and Problem-Solving</strong></td>
<td>Mental/Decision Making; Conceptual</td>
<td>Make sound and timely decisions; Decisiveness; Judgment</td>
<td>Commanding; Exercising Sound Judgment</td>
<td>Decisiveness/Risk Management; Problem Solving; Decisiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Management</strong></td>
<td>Applying Resource Stewardship</td>
<td>Resource Stewardship</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Workforce Management; Systems; Performance Appraisal</strong></td>
<td>Attracting, Developing, and Retaining Talent</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical</strong></td>
<td>Shaping Strategy</td>
<td>Strategic Thinking</td>
<td>Strategic Thinking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management and Process Improvement</strong></td>
<td>Improving</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Driving Continuous Improvement</td>
<td>Continuous Improvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working with Others</strong></td>
<td>Motivating</td>
<td>Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities</td>
<td>Leading People and Teams</td>
<td>Leading People; Working with People</td>
<td>Leading People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influencing Others</strong></td>
<td>Influencing</td>
<td>Influencing and Negotiating</td>
<td>Influencing and Negotiating</td>
<td>Influencing and Negotiating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect for Others and Diversity Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leverage Diversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Looking out for Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leverage Diversity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


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