PREEMPTING AND COUNTERING AL QA’IDA’S INFLUENCE:
DEVELOPMENT OF A PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS AND
STRATEGY REFINEMENT TOOL

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Strategy

by

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From shortly after its inception, Al Qa’ida has sought sanctuaries from which it could safely operate and provide support to Islamist groups around the world. It found one in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, in Afghanistan from the late 1980s to 2001, and in northern Pakistan in the 1980s, 1990s, and even after 2001. It also sought a sanctuary in Somalia in the early 1990s but had only limited success due to a number of societal factors.

Operation Enduring Freedom ousted Al Qa’ida from its Afghani safe haven, forcing it to find a secure environment elsewhere. Initially it was in northern Pakistan, but Al Qa’ida undoubtedly will search for other areas to expand its influence as international influences pressure the Pakistani government to allow more and more operations into the northern provinces. This thesis develops and validates a hypothesis that identifies eight characteristics of a society that attracts Al Qa’ida and helps them establish a secure environment from which to operate. The characteristics defined in this hypothesis will aid in predicting Al Qa’ida’s future engagement endeavors and help develop more tailored, poignant engagement strategies to preempt or counter Al Qa’ida’s expansion efforts.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PREEMPTING AND COUNTERING AL QA’IDA’S INFLUENCE: DEVELOPMENT OF A PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY REFINEMENT TOOL, by LCDR Andrew J. Charles, 139 pages.

From shortly after its inception, Al Qa’ida has sought sanctuaries from which it could safely operate and provide support to Islamist groups around the world. It found one in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, in Afghanistan from the late 1980s to 2001, and in northern Pakistan in the 1980s, 1990s, and even after 2001. It also sought a sanctuary in Somalia in the early 1990s but had only limited success due to a number of societal factors.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges of Combating International Terrorism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Grass Roots” of Al Qa’ida</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahhabism, Salafism, and “Salafabism”</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usama bin Ladin’s Foundation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahidin to Terrorist</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Significance and Format</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Al Qa’ida’s History</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background Sources for the Case Studies</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background Sources for Kenya</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Sources</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison Method</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Selection and Explanation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar Ideology or Strategy</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links With Other Islamist Groups</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies / Renowned Islamic Scholars</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amenable To External Influences</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Movement Across Borders</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of State Counterterrorism Threat</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusted Local Providers of Security</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study Selection</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Importance of Analytical Rigor ........................................................................................................ 49

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................. 52

Historical Case Study Analysis.................................................................................................... 52
  Similar Ideology or Strategy ................................................................................................. 53
  Links with Other Islamist Groups ....................................................................................... 59
  Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies / Renowned Islamic Scholars ................. 64
  Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances ....................... 71
  Amenable To External Influences ....................................................................................... 76
  Freedom of Movement Across Borders .......................................................................... 83
  Absence of State Counterterrorism Threat .................................................................. 90
  Trusted Local Providers of Security .................................................................................. 96
  Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 102

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................... 105

  Example of Hypothesis Application: Kenya ................................................................. 106
  Future Hypothesis Testing Recommendations .............................................................. 119
  Significance of the Hypothesis ......................................................................................... 121

GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................. 123

REFERENCE LIST .................................................................................................................... 124

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................................. 130
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIAI</td>
<td>Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya or Islamic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qa’ida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Groupe Islamique Armé or Armed Islamic Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat or Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEC</td>
<td>Higher Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIC</td>
<td>Popular Arab and Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPKEM</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations’ Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

Table 1. Historical Comparisons ........................................................................................................53
Table 2. Kenyan Analysis .....................................................................................................................109
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

As long as the ideology of the group remains appealing, Al Qa’ida recruiters will enlist more and more members, thus replenishing its losses. While the coalition response to Al Qa’ida has been largely military and financial, Islamist groups have a broader agenda, challenging their enemies on the political, religious, social, cultural and educational planes, as well as the military. If the U.S., its allies and coalition forces overlook the nonmilitary factors and conditions that strengthen Al Qa’ida and other Islamists in the long term . . . the community of nations is highly unlikely to win a strategic victory.

Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda

Challenges of Combating International Terrorism

In the initial phases, Operation Enduring Freedom sought to defeat or destroy Usama bin Ladin’s Al Qa’ida (AQ) network by killing or capturing leaders and other members of the network while removing the safe haven that the Taliban provided in Afghanistan. By December 2001, both the Taliban “government” and the AQ network were dispersed. Some AQ militants went underground in Afghanistan to continue to fight as insurgents; others left the country in search of safe havens to continue the fight from abroad.

AQ’s dispersal throughout the globe to “low-observable” areas and its efforts to expand its jihadist influence have made it more difficult for the Coalition to seek and destroy AQ elements. The key tasks of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism that describe a broad plan to counter this spread of AQ and the ideologies that foster terrorism are: (1) prevent attacks by terrorist networks, (2) deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them, (3) deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of
rogue states, and (4) deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror (U.S. National Security Council 2006, iii).

The challenge lies in identifying ways to prevent Al Qa’ida and similar organizations from recruiting, training, and building support among people in areas that AQ perceives as relatively safe. As these cells decentralize and become increasingly harder to identify and track, the National Strategy focuses efforts on eliminating sanctuaries, safe havens, and accessibility to funds, resources, and weapons in an effort to establish a more secure environment for the world’s population and to prevent AQ’s spread. The AQ network and networks of groups with similar ideologies threaten global security and force governments to expend resources and lives to protect their national interests. While efforts to track the threats have proven successful, the criticality of getting in front of AQ’s spreading influence to turn otherwise potential supporters against them is discernable from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

To meet this challenge of preemption, one must understand AQ’s foundation and its enduring goals following the events of 2001. Building upon this foundation AQ formed relationships, alliances, and trust with radicals throughout the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and even Europe, Australia, and the Americas. It is important to understand how AQ gained allies, enticed investors, and spread its ideology before and after the Coalition operations were launched in 2001. Armed with a better understanding of what AQ desires in its allies and confidants, as well as AQ’s strategies pre- and post-2001, strategists representing each of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) can better tailor their strategies and synchronize their engagement plan.
strengths with those countries or regions that could fall prey to AQ’s influence, countering and preempting AQ’s movements and efforts to recruit and operate.

“Grass Roots” of Al Qa’ida

To better understand the roots of bin Ladin’s AQ, one needs to start with the disillusionment of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian educator and writer (Wright 2007, 9). Qutb had witnessed how British and French governments exploited his home country during the occupation of Egypt in the first half of the 20th century, greatly benefiting from the revenue generated by the Suez Canal but showing no interest in modernizing Egypt’s military force, the result of which led to the embarrassing loss of Egyptian territory to the newly formed Jewish state in 1948. Because of this and the overall treatment of the British toward the colonized continent, Qutb developed a view of the West as a civilization that was focused on haphazardly converting the entire non-Western world to Western ideals and thereby removing any existence or even evidence of other cultures, such as Islam (Wright 2007, 10).

Qutb nonetheless had a favorable opinion of the United States since the U.S.’s eighteenth-century break from British colonization represented a possibility for colonies such as Egypt to break away from their European colonizers. From 1948 to 1950, Qutb visited the United States to further his education and enjoy the lifestyle that he had seen in Hollywood films and read about in books. Instead of the “fantastic” New World that he envisioned, he encountered racism, free-spirited sexuality, and a growing apathy toward religion, causing him to proclaim to a friend, “The soul has no value to Americans” (Wright 2007, 27). His esteem for the American way of life was now tarnished with visions of sin and racism. Qutb also felt betrayed that the U.S. had lent support to Israel
in the war against Egypt, an act that greatly enraged him (Wright, 10). He wrote, “We are endowing our children with amazement and respect for the [U.S.] who tramples our honor and enslaves us. Let us instead plant the seeds of hatred, disgust, and revenge in the souls of these children” (Wright 2007, 27-28).

Qutb returned to Egypt and imparted this stronger tone to his writing. His more radicalized writings centered on deconstructing the “…entire political and philosophical structure of modernity and return[ing] Islam to its unpolluted origins” (Wright 2007, 28). His sentiments were echoed by one of the most significant Islamist leaders in Egypt at the time, Hasan al-Banna, the cofounder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al –Banna and his supporters felt that the time had come for Egypt to return to a true and pure Islamic life governed by the laws of the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed; in other words, they desired Sharia law (Wright 2007, 30-32).

During this time period, Ayman al-Zawahiri was growing up in the suburbs of Cairo. Qutb’s message influenced him significantly, especially since his uncle was a protégé of Qutb and wrote for the Muslim Brotherhood magazine. Stories of Qutb’s religious journey inspired al-Zawahiri to devote his life to realizing Qutb’s vision of a grass roots Islamic world. Later accounts of Qutb’s persecution by the Egyptian government greatly angered al-Zawahiri and led him to explore achieving these goals through violence (Wright 2007, 43-44).

Contrary to the Muslim Brothers, al-Zawahiri would not employ politics or compromises in his quest, as he believed that such soft approaches would counter the ideals of the “pure Islamic state” (Wright 2007, 50). Instead, he demanded the government surrender its claim to the Presidency to make way for a truly Islamic
government to take control. The effectiveness of Al-Zawahiri’s approach of direct and forceful conversions was confirmed when Iran was transformed in 1979 from what appeared to be a westernizing, modern state to a pure Islamic state virtually overnight. This was taken as proof that such a transition was capable in any state, given the correct environment and the proper application of force, and became part of AQ’s foundation described in the *Al Qaeda Training Manual* (a.k.a. *The Manchester Document*) that states, “Islamic governments have never been and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils” (Gunaratna 2003, 7). Al-Zawahiri set out to create such a jihadist force, which he hoped to use to return Egypt to a true Islamic state…but the security environment in Egypt did not allow for a covert force to be raised and trained beyond the watchful eye of the government (Wright 2007, 52). Ayman al-Zawahiri turned to the conflict in Afghanistan with the Soviets and the fertile environment in Pakistan to create a camp to train radical Muslims for this jihadist mission in Egypt.

A second element that helped form the AQ movement stemmed from the abrupt modernization of the Arabian Peninsula in the 1950s, when immense deposits of oil were discovered. The large influx of money into the Saudi Arabian populace was used by some to adopt a lavish, luxurious lifestyle. Others saw this as corrupting the religious purity of the country’s official religion, Wahhabism. More than two decades earlier, King Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud had reestablished the house of Saud’s power over the peninsula and established Wahhabism as the official religion of the Saudi state (Wright 2007, 73).
Before examining the impact of this modernization and the significance of Saudi Arabia’s official religion, it is important to understand the basic foundations of Wahhabism and its close relation, Salafism. As this thesis is not centered on the theological debates within Islam, it will only briefly describe the theologies as they apply to understanding Usama bin Ladin and how his ideals affected the spread of Al Qa’ida.

The Wahhabism movement was started by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab on the Arabian Peninsula in the mid- to late-1700s. Al-Wahhab was angered by the increasing influence that cultural rituals and social norms had on the practice of Islam. He felt Islam and its foundations were being corrupted by Muslims who were interpreting the laws of the Qur’an to better fit their society, introducing idolatrous worship of Imams tombs, saints, and even elements of nature into the process (Pike 2005b). Al-Wahhab therefore urged those people who considered themselves “true” Muslims to return to the laws and practices of Mohammed and the first three generations of Muslims, called the Al-Salaf Al-Salih or Salafis. (El Fadl 2003, 55).

Al-Wahhab taught that only through a strict adherence to the literal laws described in the Qur’an and Sunna could Muslims rid themselves of the sinful nature of modern philosophies and practices and return to the pristine lifestyles of the Prophet Mohammed. Muslims or non-Muslims who did not subscribe to such a lifestyle and continued to live contrary to Al-Wahhab’s direction were declared infidels and killed. It is this extremism that hindered the widespread acceptance of his beliefs. At the same time, however, it was this fervor that attracted the Al Saud of the late-eighteenth century family into an alliance with Al-Wahhab to combat the Ottoman influence on the Arabian
Peninsula (El Fadl 2003, 52) and that caused the Al Saud family of the early twentieth century to return the country to this form of Islam to help “...purify the Arabian Peninsula in the name of Islam” (Wright 2007, 72).

Salafism was created by reformers in the late nineteenth century. Like the Wahhabs, the Salafis believed that Muslims should return to the practices and lifestyles of the Salafs, instead of being enslaved to 1,200 years of interpretations and precedents of Islamic scholars who were examining the Qur’an under circumstances prevalent in their time and that were not necessarily applicable to more modern situations. The Salafis, like the Wahhabis, thought that Muslims should seek answers directly from the Qur’an and Sunna for purer guidance. One difference though was that the Salafis were more tolerant of persons who did not follow their guidelines. Salafis also accepted the modern world and thus taught Muslims to use the Qur’an to live within the new society (El Fadl 2003, 55). It is this tolerance and acceptance of intellectualism, a trait considered heretical by the original Wahhabis, that cause modern-day Wahhabis to prefer to be called Salafis, since “Wahhabi” has connotations of extreme intolerance and violence.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the lines between Salafism and Wahhabism blurred. As Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl of UCLA describes it, Salafism “...degenerated into an intellectual carelessness” while Wahhabism distanced itself from some of the intolerant behavior to which its followers previously subscribed. El Fadl coins the term “Salafabism” to describe the eventual combining of Salafism and Wahhabism into a “…contemporary orientation that is anchored in profound feelings of defeatism, alienation, and frustration.” These feelings, paired with the elitist self-image of Salafis and Wahhabis when they compare their beliefs to other sects and religions, have
fostered ire toward the *jahiliyya* (the non-Islamic world), especially those who seek to impose modern views of democracy or equal rights on the Salafabists (El Fadl 2003, 57-58).

Usama bin Ladin grew up and was educated in western Saudi Arabia, where there are both Wahhabi influences from Saudi Arabia and Salafi influences from Yemen. In his lifetime, as El Fadl describes, these two sects were coalescing. Their merger, along with the imposition of modern ways of life and thinking following the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula, was the ideal environment in which someone like Usama might be influenced by the Salafabist ideology and negatively-impacted by the lavish lifestyles of the modernizing Saudis around him.

El Fadl points out a key motivation of the Salafabists that helps one to understand the founding ideology of AQ and the motivation of its efforts and alliances. To the Salafabist, which Usama bin Ladin can be considered to be, only two ways of life can be followed: the narrowly defined path of God described in the Qur’an or the way of Satan. The persons who choose the latter (not necessarily choosing the path of Satan, but simply not following the Salafabists’ “pure Islamic” view) are committing an offense against God and, therefore, must be actively prosecuted and killed. The Salafabists believe they are justified in their actions as long as they are within the Islamic Law and regardless of how they may impact other people’s moral or ethical values (El Fadl 2003, 58-59).

**Usama bin Ladin’s Foundation**

In the 1950s Saudi Arabia experienced its first major oil boom and thus the transformation of a poor, Bedouin state into a booming nation with seemingly endless money. Many Saudis, especially members of the royal family, began living extravagant
lives. To make the point, Wright retells a story of King Saud, King Abdul Aziz’s successor, riding through the streets throwing money into the air (Wright 2007, 76).

Usama bin Ladin was born and raised in this environment. His father, Mohammed bin Ladin, had reaped the benefits of the building craze that swept Saudi Arabia following the oil boom of the 1950s. Mohammed bin Ladin had a reputation of being an honest builder of quality products and thus was awarded many contracts by the royal family (Wright 2007, 74). As a result, bin Ladin’s entire family became very wealthy. While this transformation was taking place, many Saudi’s began to question the well-to-do’s lavish lifestyle, seeing it as a sinful life distant from the ideals of Wahhabism or Salafism. Many Saudis, as Wright describes, felt this rapid pace of modernization throughout the Arabian Peninsula was “eroding” the sacred character of Saudi Arabia (Wright 2007, 99).

This seemed to be Usama’s outlook. According to his mother, Usama “…thought Muslims [were] not close enough to Allah.” His passion for an ideal Salafi society and concern about the temptations of modern life continued throughout his formative schooling. While at King Abdul Aziz University, Usama’s passion was stoked by his professors from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, one of whom was Sayyid Qutb’s brother. The professors propagated Qutb’s works and told of the Brotherhood’s efforts to merge religion and government into “a single, all-encompassing theocracy” despite persecution (Wright 2007, 91; Gunaratna 2003, 22).

The perceived corruption of Salafi ideals by the jahiliyya and the antagonistic teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, combined with the news of “Soviet aggression” against the Afghani Muslims, drove Usama bin Ladin to Afghanistan. Shortly after the
Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam was hired to lead prayers at the King Abdul Aziz University mosque in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Wright 2007, 109). A dynamic speaker, Azzam spoke of the struggle of Islam with the jahiliyya, which was “…corrupting and undermining the faithful with the lures of materialism, secularism, and sexual equality” (Wright 2007, 111). Azzam used this description as the backdrop of the “poor” Afghani’s struggle against the Soviet Union to incite his listeners, such as Usama, to take up arms and fight alongside their Islamic brothers.

Azzam’s call to arms, as well as Usama’s distaste for the spreading jahiliyya influence, convinced Usama that he had to act. Initially, his involvement was purely as a financier and a courier of donations to the Afghans (Wright 2007, 109). In 1984, bin Ladin and Azzam agreed to join forces and lead the coordination of all the Arab volunteers who wanted to fight alongside the Afghans but lacked sufficient training. Azzam issued a fatwa to say it was the entire Muslim world’s duty to fight against the invaders until the Soviet invaders were removed from Islamic soil (Wright 2007, 117-118).

**Mujahidin to Terrorist**

For the next three years, Usama bin Ladin and Abdullah Azzam tried to train and equip a motley group of foreign fighters into a credible force to help the Afghans defeat Soviet aggression. Usama saw it as the beginning of a force that would defend Islam worldwide (Wright 2007, 130). It was not until the latter half of 1987, a year after the Soviets had announced a timetable for their withdrawal from Afghanistan, that this force would achieve a “victory”, marking the beginning of Usama’s dream. At that time,
Usama led his group from the newly formed training and base camp called Maasada, or the “Lion’s Den”, to attack a Soviet outpost. The Soviets launched a counterattack against the Lion’s Den, but the Arab forces outflanked the Soviets. Not having air cover, the Soviets withdrew, providing a perceived victory to the Arabs. As Wright explains:

> From the Soviet perspective, the battle of the Lion’s Den was a small moment in the tactical retreat from Afghanistan. In the heightened religious atmosphere among the men following bin Ladin, however, there was a dizzying sense that they were living in a supernatural world, in which reality knelt before faith. For them, the encounter at the Lion’s Den became the foundation of the myth that they defeated the superpower…Al Qa’ida was conceived in the marriage of these assumptions: Faith is stronger than weapons or nations, and the ticket to enter the sacred zone where such miracles occur is the willingness to die. (Wright 2007, 138)

Following the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the Muslims, who had come to the aid of the Afghanis, returned to their homes with religious fervor. Their experience of Islam uniting to defeat an enemy, and a Super Power at that, against seemingly insurmountable odds forged a desire to use similar methods and motivations to affect radical social and religious changes in their own countries. Usama bin Ladin and AQ, using Islamic charities and covert actions, helped to fulfill their revolutionary desires by providing resources, funds, and training to these budding Islamist movements from Algeria to the Philippines and from Tajikistan to Somalia (Gunaratna 2003, 6-7).

As Islamic extremist movements took hold, AQ’s relationship with radical groups grew. AQ saw these groups as “force multipliers” that increased AQ’s ability to conduct operations and spread its ideology throughout the world. These groups sought Muslims who felt betrayed by secular Islamic governments that had become “corrupted” by the jahiliyyas and Muslims who felt oppressed by the sinful influence of modernization. AQ worked through the Islamist movements in their homelands to recruit new members and
leaders from these disgruntled populations. AQ also enlisted the aid of Islamic non-
governmental organizations (NGO) and religious leaders in mosques worldwide to
infiltrate these societies and reach out to the disgruntled Muslims to offer opportunities
for vindication (Gunaratna 2003, 8). AQ recruited those with similar ideologies who
supported AQ’s missions to: (1) overthrow Islamic governments that were influenced by
Western ideals (e.g. elections, modernization), (2) “…expel the infidel invader from
Muslim lands” (started as focused on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and grew to all
invaders of all Islamic countries), and (3) to “…punish America and the West
for…crimes against Islam” (Wright 2007, 146).

As a result of Western Coalition operations in Afghanistan in late 2001, and even
prior to Operation Enduring Freedom actions, AQ leadership identified other locations
and populations potentially sympathetic to AQ’s cause or susceptible to AQ’s
propaganda in order to establish safe havens and sanctuaries from which AQ could
carry out its operations. They capitalized on the stories of Usama bin Ladin taking a stand
against the Soviets, and then the United States, to enlist the support of persons who
idolized his actions and fearlessness (Gunaratna 2003, 71). These militants continue to
support radical Islamic uprisings throughout the world. Their efforts have produced
relationships permitting AQ to decentralize its organization in order to prepare operations
in more secure environments and to train in areas not scrutinized by the Coalition forces.

One area that AQ specifically targeted for support was the Horn of Africa.
Initially, Usama was drawn to the Horn by a request from religious leaders in the Sudan
for support in their battle against the predominantly Christian Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan and in efforts to install other non-secular Islamic
governments throughout the Caliphate. As this relationship grew, Usama also saw the benefits of other areas in the Horn of Africa, such as Kenya, Somalia, and, later, Eritrea, due to their proximity to AQ’s Middle East support base, the widespread Islamic influence in the Horn, and their vast ungoverned areas.

**Thesis Significance and Format**

These relationships, and other’s like them around the world, are the focus of this thesis, to help understand the elements that foster trust and lead to acceptance of the security-conscious Al Qa’ida. The thesis examines aspects of different societies that AQ contemplated when considering a relationship with a state or Islamist group and that impacted the success that AQ had in recruiting widespread support for its movement within the community. The resultant hypothesis answers the main thesis question of what characteristics enticed Al Qa’ida to consider establishing operating bases in other lands in order to spread its influence and expand the Salafabist movement. The hypothesis also creates a tool to aid in predicting future AQ efforts and identifying as-of-yet unidentified relationships. Through this matrix of characteristics, one will be able to more accurately adjust engagement strategies to better preempt or counter AQ’s attempted expansion.

Chapter Two provides brief descriptions of the main sources that were used for this thesis to provide background for the analysis and to help guide follow-on research. As one might expect, it is difficult to obtain factual data on the motivations and methods of such a security-conscious organization, especially when it is being hunted globally. It is therefore important to understand the perspective of the authors of the key cited works and the level of access each had.
Chapter Three describes the methodology used to create the hypothesis. It discusses the reasons for selecting a qualitative methodology and why the lack of substantial “factual” data for studies of such an organization as Al Qa’ida prevented a quantitative approach. It explains how, in absence of solid facts, the cross-referencing of multiple sources helped identify common themes or details from which the characteristics were identified. It also describes the challenge of ensuring proper rigor in the analysis of these sources, the selection of the characteristics, and the assessment of their applicability in each case study because of conscious and unconscious application of bias by the cited authors, their sources, and this thesis’s author. It further describes why these eight characteristics were selected and the reasons for and benefits of the five selected case studies.

In Chapter Four, the author analyzes numerous reports and studies on AQ’s relationships within various countries and the environment during the selected period of each case study to rank how prevalent each characteristic was, in an effort to answer the following two subordinate thesis questions: (1) considering the motivations and methods prior to 2001, what fostered AQ’s engagement with entities in Afghanistan, Sudan, and northern Pakistan and (2) what was different about Saudi Arabia that prevented it from widely adopting AQ’s objectives? The author also examines AQ’s engagement efforts in Somalia in the early 1990s to answer the final subordinate question: already with linkages to entities in Sudan, what led AQ to seek additional linkages in Somalia and why were their efforts largely unsuccessful? In the end, the hypothesis suggests patterns of relationships whereby AQ nurtures future recruits and allies that U.S. officials might consider in the development of engagement strategies at the theater and national levels.
In closing, Chapter Five demonstrates how the criteria described in Chapter Four can provide meaningful insight into the contemporary operating environment by applying the characteristics to modern-day Kenya (2005-2008). In doing so, the model provides a sense of Kenya’s true susceptibility to AQ’s influence and highlights areas where Coalition elements of national power can best be applied to counter AQ’s ideological draw. This chapter also suggests follow-on studies and methods to test the hypothesis to refine the tool and further validate its accuracy, a significant step in any qualitative analysis.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Sources of AlQA’ida’s History

The *Looming Tower*, written by Lawrence Wright and published in 2007, tracks the formation of Al QA’ida from the roots of the modern radical Islamic movement that started with Sayyid Qutb in the late 1940s, as well as explains the development of the modern jihadist movement in the minds of Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Usama bin Ladin. Wright used documents that have surfaced in court cases involving AQ or were obtained in Coalition raids of AQ-related locations. He interviewed 560 sources, including U.S. officials and members of Usama bin Ladin’s family, as well as Abu Rida al-Suri, whose name appears as the recorder of the minutes of the August 11, 1988 meeting that formally established AQ…although al-Suri denies having been there. While Wright admits that he still had information gaps and conflicting stories, he nevertheless weaves the stories of his various sources in such a way that they provide an in-depth explanation of AQ’s motivations and operations. For his work, Wright received the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction in 2007.

*Inside Al Qaeda* by Rohan Gunaratna, published in 2002 with an update in 2003, also provides an in-depth study of Usama bin Ladin’s and AQ’s motivations, their initial work, and subsequent operations. It begins with a study of Usama bin Ladin and those forces that shaped his beliefs and drove him to organize a global terrorist network to fight for Islamic movements worldwide. It then describes the ideologies and strategies of AQ and its spreading influence to Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe. Gunaratna’s research began in 1993 with interviews of the mujahidin remaining in Pakistan following the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Since then, he has conducted interviews with AQ’s senior leadership, operatives within the organization, and government officials involved in countering AQ’s international terrorism. As a research fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrew’s in Scotland, an honorary fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel, and principal investigator of the United Nations’ Terrorism Prevention Branch, Gunaratna has significant access into research, studies, and sources involved in understanding Islamic terrorism, its roots, and its strategies.

**Background Sources for the Case Studies**

Brigadier General Vijay K. Singh, Indian Army, provides a perspective of the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan in his Strategy Research Project, *Security Implications of the Rise of Fundamentalism in Afghanistan and its Regional and Global Impact.* The paper, completed in April 2001, attempts to explain the threat that the Taliban presented prior to 2001 to the regional neighbors and the West. While the monograph displays an Indian bias in its analysis of the relationship developing between the Taliban and Pakistan at the turn of the millennium, the paper provides valuable insight into characteristics that facilitated AQ’s return to Afghanistan following the five-year stay in Sudan. The paper facilitates understanding of the environment during the period of interest to the case study, as it was written prior to Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001.

*Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks,* a study conducted by the RAND Corporation for the U.S. Air Force, is a significant source for understanding the impact of the security environment on terrorist, insurgent, and criminal
organizations as a whole vice specifically focusing on any one group. It identifies those factors that reduce a state security organization’s authority and ability to govern a region, increasing the potential for an unwelcome organization to establish a presence and conduct illegal activities within and from within the ungoverned region. Recognizing that the existence of an ungoverned territory does not always mean an insurgent or criminal activity is present, the study also describes those attributes that make the ungoverned territory conducive to infiltration by these organizations. This study identifies the characteristics of ungoverned territories that AQ saw as attractive and, through the case studies, describes the environment in the Arabian Peninsula, northern Pakistan, Somalia, and the Sudan during the periods of interest.

The Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy, in a study called *Al Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, analyzes recently declassified documents that were captured as part of the Global War on Terror counterterrorism operations and have been replicated in the U.S. Army’s Harmony Database. These documents, from the period of 1992 to 1994, reveal AQ operatives’ opinions about the successes and failures they experienced in their efforts to expand their influences in the Horn of Africa. The terrorism analysts at the Combating Terrorism Center specifically looked at the efforts in Somalia and Kenya to demonstrate that it is the weakly governed states, instead of the failed states, that provide a beneficial environment for foreign, radical groups, such as AQ, to expand their influence.

In addition to the analysis, the translated documents in the Harmony database provide insights about AQ’s intentions in attempting to establish a relationship in Somalia and Kenya and the obstacles that were encountered in the early 1990s which are
specifically useful for this thesis. The letters between AQ’s Africa Corps and AQ’s leadership reveal AQ’s analysis of what they expected in Somalia and Kenya, the unexpected challenges that their envoys faced, the strategies considered to address these issues, and the reaction of the local clans to their operations. In doing so, these letters provide additional insight to aid the selection of the characteristics for this thesis’s hypothesis.

A myriad of other sources used in the case studies provide background data, analysis, and viewpoints that help rate the case studies against the hypothesis’s characteristics. Jack Davies’s *Reunification of the Somali People*, written for the Institute of Development Research and Development at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum in Germany, provides an anthropological explanation of the Somali clan structure and its importance to Somali life. Polly Nayak’s *U.S. Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11 – Challenges and Implications for the Future*, written for the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, explains the security challenges that the Musharraf government in Pakistan had to balance to maintain internal order in the Pashtun-centric north and the Pakistani military’s opinions of his unpopular decisions. Seven articles from *The Chronicle of Higher Education* journal and Boston College’s Center for International Higher Education were used to describe the status of the universities and institutes of higher learning in Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Both sources provide reviews and analysis of post-secondary education systems throughout the world. Articles from worldwide organizations, such as the World Bank, the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime, BBC News, and Jane’s Intelligence Review, and from local sources, such as the *Sudan Tribune*, the Saudi Press Agency, and Arabian
Modern Equipment (AME) Information Online, were used to provide internal and external viewpoints on the characteristics of the countries. Articles from Human Rights Watch, Radio Free Europe, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi provide important historical data and viewpoints not often captured in mainstream, often moderate, media or Western academic sites.

It is a challenge to obtain factual data on a security-conscious and internationally-wanted organization such as Al Qa’ida. It is equally as difficult to obtain accurate statistics and reports on traits that are considered attractive to international terrorist organizations, as the countries that have been infiltrated are not eager to highlight such negative attributes about themselves and the international community often struggles with cultural or ideological bias and incomplete access to the data for their analysis. As will be described in Chapter Three, many sources from a variety of perspectives were used in an attempt to identify the common “threads” to facilitate the formation and analysis of this thesis’s hypothesis, as well as to separate as much bias, propaganda, and conjecture as possible from the facts.

**Background Sources for Kenya**

Deborah West’s report entitled *Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen* captures the discussion of regional experts and academics at the “Examining ‘Bastions’ of Terror: Governance and Policy in Yemen and the Horn of Africa” conference held at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government on November 4-6, 2004. Experts from the diplomatic, NGO, policy, security, and scholarly communities examined the current environment in each of the countries, identifying aspects that might be exploitable by terrorist groups and areas where each state’s
government was succeeding or failing at countering such movements. In the end, they reviewed the current U.S. engagement strategies and made recommendations on improving the policies. While the year of this conference (2004) is outside the “defined” contemporary period for the Chapter Five analysis (2005-2008), it nonetheless provides a valuable foundation for the analysis of Kenya and highlights many issues that are still very apparent today.

*East African Muslims After 9/11*, a study by Rüdiger Seesemann for Germany’s Universität Bayreuth, explores the impact of AQ’s attacks in New York City and Arlington, Virginia on September 11, 2001 on the Islamic population of Kenya and Tanzania. He highlights speeches from prominent Islamic leaders in the region that condemned the violence of these and previous attacks in the region and explains how the direct impact of international terrorism was felt three years earlier when AQ targeted the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya. Seesemann describes the growing East African negativity toward the West as coming from the West’s very different responses to AQ’s August 1998 and September 2001 attacks, showing the perception of disparity in the West’s concern for American lives versus the lives of Africans. He further points to the impact of the Coalition’s Global War on Terror policies on the East African Islamic population and the resultant sense of Western religious discrimination as additional reasons of the decreasing opinion of and support for the West. He concludes by emphasizing that the East African Muslims are at a crossroads in their support for democracy and Western policies and that the near future is critical in maintaining their moderate nature.
In addition to these and some sources mentioned earlier in this chapter, a multitude of other sources were used to understand the applicability of the thesis’s characteristics in the contemporary environment of Kenya. The 2005 and 2007 International Religious Freedom Report published by the U.S. Department of State provides the U.S. Embassy Nairobi’s perspective of religious freedoms in Kenya, concerns of the nation’s Muslims, the government’s efforts (or sometimes lack of) to address these concerns. They also provide the results of public opinion polls on the average Kenyans sense of religious freedoms and rights within Kenya. Articles from The Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus journal, a hearing of the U.S House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs’s Africa and Global Health Subcommittee, and the U.S. Department of State’s Director of the Office of East Africa, Bureau of African Affairs, were analyzed to better understand Kenya’s border issues, the impact of the recent election riots on the population, and Muslims’ dissatisfaction with the Kibaki regime.

Understanding the local Kenyan perspective on these and other issues is also important to the analysis. Therefore, sources from Kenya’s newspaper The Standard, the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance web site, and Kenya’s Commission for Higher Education web site were explored. On the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance site, for example, a repository of articles, publications, and press releases provides examples of how the country’s Islamic leadership has addressed concerns and issues diplomatically with the government; it also contains speeches of Islamic leaders condemning violence in the name of Islam, both very important factors in the hypothesis’ assessment. The combination of such articles from the local Kenyan Muslims, international academic
studies, and U.S. Embassy reports identify “common threads” in describing the current environment and increases confidence in the assessed rankings of Kenya’s characteristics in Chapter Five.

Additional Sources

The “Ugly Modern and the Modern Ugly” by Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor of Islamic Law at the University of California, Los Angeles, provides a comprehensive description of the foundations of Wahhabism and Salafism through a comparison of their objectives and ideologies. He explains how both have ideals that are in line with the modern-day Islamic extremist movement, although neither, in their intended and pure forms, is solely responsible for its propagation. He coins the term “Salafabism” to describe a bastardization and merger of the worst features of the two sects into a belief structure that couples a supremacist and puritanical ego with feelings of “…defeatism, alienation, and frustration.” Considered a moderate Muslim and a world renowned expert in Islamic law, El Fadl received a Ph. D. in Islamic Studies from Princeton University, was named a 2005 Carnegie Scholar in Islamic Studies, and was formally trained in Islamic jurisprudence while in Egypt and Kuwait, giving him a wealth of experience from which he bases his writings and teachings.

Robert Berschinski’s monograph *AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global War On Terrorism” “Capacity Building” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy In Africa*, written for the Strategic Studies Institute in November 2007, critiques American policies in Africa and the Department of Defense’s efforts in the continent to suggest a modified approach for AFRICOM, the newest U.S. combatant command, to more effectively engage Africa. He explores the factors of religion, political instability,
poverty, and disease in shaping the environment. He discusses the U.S. military deployments in the Western Sahara (Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara) and in the Horn of Africa (Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa) and the successes and failures of these deployments in improving the respective environment’s willingness and ability to counter the spread of the Salafabist movements. He argues, citing the U.S. State Department’s Chief Strategist for Counterterrorism David Kilcullen, that past U.S. policies in Africa tend to “aggregate” individualized issues of a region into a single, generalized problem. Strategies are then developed to address the oversimplified problem, resulting in an engagement plan that often overlooks the true issues and causes more damage than success. Instead, Berschinski encourages “disaggregation” in AFRICOM’s development of engagement strategies, considering each issue or challenge individually and creating a more poignant, tailored plan to help the countries create a stabilized, controlled environment.

Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research by Anne-Marie Ambert, et al., and How We Ensured Rigour In A Multi-Site, Multi-Discipline, Multi-Researcher Study by H. Ken Crawford, et al., provide understanding of the advantages of conducting qualitative research and the points of potential contention when using this method. George and Bennett describe the usefulness of qualitative analysis in political science research and the benefits and challenges of the different styles of case studies in developing and testing social theories. Many of their warnings for developing decision calculus theories are directly applicable to this thesis’s attempt to define the factors that impacted Usama bin Ladin’s and other AQ leader’s strategic
decisions. Specifically, they identify the dangers in forming generalizations from specific recounts of history and making “spurious correlations” in case studies that lack complete data. George and Bennett therefore recommend complete transparency in a researcher’s methods and assumptions to explain the hypothesis’s derivation and concepts. Ambert, et al., discuss their decision to use qualitative methodology in their study of familial relationships and societal impacts on families. While the results of their studies are not the focus of the article nor germane to this thesis, the analysis of human behavior in relationships and the explained challenges in theory development to describe human relationship formation are applicable to the analysis of AQ since in both cases the researcher must use inherently biased data from second- and third-hand sources. Similarly, Crawford, et al., conducted a study of the learning processes of pastoralists in Australia that required rigorous analytical considerations in selecting criteria to reduce the biases that could be introduced as a result of collecting data through multiple sources from multiple locations. Again, this study itself is not relevant to this writer’s thesis, but the concerns raised by Crawford et al. in conducting their research apply in the present case. The lessons these authors learned in their selection of criteria and their warnings of areas in which biases can enter analysis were thus useful in developing this hypothesis and so are included in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Comparison Method

The sources listed in Chapter Two provided insight and background in answering the thesis question: what characteristics have enticed Al Qa’ida to consider establishing operating bases in other lands in order to spread its influence and expand the Salafabist movement? Subsequently, Chapter Three explains the how these sources were used in the development of the eight characteristics of the hypothesis that appear to affect AQ’s decision to establish a connection in a country and their ability to maintain an influence and presence. It also discusses the rationale for selecting the five case studies to test the validity of the developed hypothesis. First, however, some time must be spent describing the challenges in analyzing “tainted” information to discern what can be considered “fact” and in testing the hypothesis in the absence of complete data collected in a controlled manner to allow quantitative comparisons.

As should be apparent from the literature descriptions in Chapter Two, the sources that the cited texts used and the information available on this topic make for a challenging analytical process. The information is obtained through indirect means, whether it is a relative of someone involved, a story that has passed through a variety of sources, assessed information intended to connect disjointed facts, or data obtained from detained or formerly detained members and affiliates of AQ. The information has almost certainly been tainted, either intentionally by persons who want to protect AQ members and affiliates still at large or unintentionally by those who believe they are relaying the facts of the story or are making an honest attempt at filling in the gaps of others’ stories.
In addition to propagating tainted information, authors analyzing such incomplete information inherently insert a bias reflecting cultural and religious differences or misconceptions in their assessments, albeit often unintentionally.

This analysis is also challenged by the incompleteness of the data available at the unclassified levels. This thesis was written intentionally at the unclassified level to allow for greater dissemination to and use by the foreign elements assisting in the Global War on Terror. The source data is thus limited to that which has been declassified by the various governments or that has been obtained by authors and journalists from sources aware that the data would be used publicly, thus increasing the potential for cover stories or disinformation provided by the authors’ sources.

As discussed in Chapter Two, accurate analysis of AQ’s strategies and of the characteristics that impacted the leadership’s decisions is also hindered by a lack of surveys of AQ’s decision makers that captured their calculus and by an aversion of governments to fully admit to the extent that their country’s policies and culture attracted this international terrorist organization. Given these limitations and lack of quantitative data, qualitative analytical methods were selected to aid in the research and development of the hypothesis. The characteristics were selected through inductive reasoning in what political scientists Arend Lijphart and Henry Eckstein would label heuristic case studies (George and Bennett 2005, 75). As described below, the characteristics were derived by analysis of the historical accounts of AQ’s movements and expansion from the early 1990s through their “escape to Pakistan” following Operation Enduring Freedom’s commencement. The case studies were used in a similar manner to the congruence method described by political scientist Alexander George and international relations
professor Andrew Bennett in which within-case analyses tested the characteristics’ ability to predict the “successes” and “failures” that AQ experienced (George and Bennett 2005, 181-183).

As stated in the study by Anne-Marie Ambert, et al., such qualitative methods trade comparative, objective studies of a broad range of subjects for depth in understanding on a more finite sampling. Its efforts are centered on “…how and why people behave, think, and make meaning…rather than focusing on what people do or believe on a large scale.” Another benefit, as described by Ambert, is that qualitative research allows the researcher to analyze data from the macro to the micro level without risking analytical integrity by comparing the proverbial apples to oranges (Ambert, Adler, Adler, and Detzner 1995, 880).

The congruence method, a subset of qualitative analysis, allows for such challenging data to be analyzed and compared within each individual case study to extract the impact of the various relational characteristics without the necessary requirement of finding multiple case studies that can be compared on an even plane to objectively measure the accuracy of the hypothesis. The congruence method tests a hypothesis’s ability to predict “…whether [the variables] vary in the expected directions, to the expected magnitude, along the expected dimensions, or whether there is still unexplained variance in one or more dimensions” (George and Bennett 2005, 181-183). It helps form an initial hypothesis on a subjective topic for future confirmation and testing, as data becomes available to support quantitative analysis or qualitative controlled comparisons. The next step of transforming the hypothesis into a theory, per the scientific method, would be to apply the eight characteristics from Table 1 on page 53 (individually
or in various combinations) to additional case studies quantitatively so as to confirm or refute the hypothesis or to make necessary modifications.

**Characteristic Selection and Explanation**

The first step in the development of the hypothesis was to examine available background material on the rise of AQ and their efforts to spread their influence and infiltrate societies around the world. As already discussed, the lack of authoritative, complete recounts of AQ’s strategy development and regional engagement discussions required a study of various authors’ understandings and numerous studies’ analyses. The characteristics were identified from instances where different authors citing different sources came to similar conclusions or where assessed theories seemed to be accurate in the actions, letters, or stories of AQ members or affiliates. This section provides a closer look at each characteristic and why it was selected for the hypothesis. The criteria used in the subjective ranking in Chapter Four is also described to provide the reader transparency into each score and to aid in further application and testing of this hypothesis by subsequent analysts.

**Similar Ideology or Strategy**

The first criterion listed in Table 1 is “Similar Ideology or Strategy”. It should be obvious that at least some members of the population must have an ideology similar to AQ’s and accept or, at a minimum, understand its strategies. As evidenced in the minutes from AQ’s initial meetings, AQ stated that new members had to “…[obey the] statutes and instructions of Al Qa’ida” (Wright 2007, 153). Central to having a strong alliance with AQ was a group’s desire to return to the way Mohammad and the al-Salaf lived, the
imperative for a non-secular Islamic government, the pursuit of reestablishing the
Caliphate, and the defeat of the jahiliyya’s modernization efforts…at least, this was ideal.

As is found later in Somalia (discussed in Chapter Four) and in Iraq (as noted in
al-Zawahiri’s letter to al-Zarqawi), AQ’s demand for strict compliance with their
Salafabist beliefs weakened as AQ recognized the short-term benefits of allies that do not
adhere to AQ’s ideology (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 42; al-Zawahiri n.d.).

Therefore, the importance lays in similar ideologies vice exact.

Similar strategies also are important for groups with whom AQ is considering an
alliance. The population that AQ attempts to influence needs to be willing to accept AQ’s
methods in achieving the objectives, e.g. terror tactics, using power vice democracy to
accomplish goals, etc. For example, AQ lent its support in 1993 to the Groupe Islamique
Armé (Armed Islamic Group, aka GIA) in Algeria by training its leadership and
financing its cause (Gunaratna 2003, 183). The GIA, primarily formed by rebels who had
fled to the mountains after a military coup in 1992 threatened their Islamist movement,
wanted to negotiate with the government. Usama’s religious background taught him that
such negotiations were sinful, and the only way to rightfully install the Islamic
government was through “total war.” Usama’s continued support was earned by the
GIA’s agreement to wage such a war in line with AQ’s ideology (Wright 2007, 216).

In 1995, the GIA expanded the total war concept to include targeting every voting
citizen, entire villages, and all public institutions under the government. The resultant
bloodbath of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims alike turned Usama’s support away
from the GIA and to GIA’s European leader, Hassan Hattab, whose objectives and
methods were more in line with AQ’s. In 1998, Hattab merged his European cell with the
Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, aka GSPC), bringing Usama’s resources and support with him (Gunaratna 2003, 166).

This characteristic is judged in Table 1 by how closely the examined population supports AQ’s ideology and accepts AQ’s methods in achieving its objectives. A score of “++” is given to a community that shares the Salafabist views, or something similar and tolerable to AQ, and that agrees with the use of violence or force to wrest control of the government in order to install one based on Sharia Law. The score is reduced by the degree in which the people abhor the violent methods or they have an aversion to a foreign influence preaching Salafabist views.

Links With Other Islamist Groups

Similar to the previous characteristic, AQ took advantage of the existence of, or its connections to, radical Islamist groups to expand AQ’s efforts to establish the pure Islamic Ummah. An already active organization provided AQ at least a basic infrastructure and a somewhat united group of people from which to expand AQ’s influence. The existence of a radical group or a number of radical groups provided AQ security in its movements and operations, as well as in their connections (RAND 2007, 19).

AQ’s efforts in Southeast Asia reveal this strategy and its benefits. Usama sent his brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to the Philippines in 1988 and 1993, respectively, to penetrate the local Islamist groups and assert AQ’s influence. Usama’s objective was to spread his influence throughout the Philippines and then the remainder of Southeast Asia. AQ first established links with the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) in the Philippines, a link that was strengthened through Usama’s personal relationship with ASG’s founder and leader Abdurajak Janjalani (Gunaratna 2003, 233). Then AQ branched out to connect with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and, later, its branch, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Gunaratna points out that AQ’s ties with the MILF grew stronger than with the other groups because the MILF’s network of Islamic NGOs in the Philippines and the region provided vast overt and covert avenues through which to infiltrate neighboring societies and Islamist groups, such as Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) (Gunaratna 2003, 246-247). By establishing links with these groups, AQ had options regarding which element to support and whom to trust. AQ could quickly disassociate itself if security officials were getting too close or if there were indications of the radical Islamist group becoming too politically mainstream and public. At the same time, “diversification” allowed AQ to plan and conduct operations in many different countries simultaneously, greatly increasing their success rate.

Rating of this characteristic is based on the existence of Islamist groups in the studied area that would be useful to AQ’s efforts to spread its ideology. A rating of “++” is given to the country that has numerous Islamist groups that span borders to conduct operations, providing cross-border transportation and a larger span of influence. This rating is decreased if there is only one Islamist group present, if the group(s) is only supporting the internal struggle, or if the available evidence shows that the Islamist group(s) was not part of Usama bin Ladin’s calculus when considering expansion to the studied area, e.g. Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.
Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies / Renowned Islamic Scholars

This characteristic is probably the most contentious and will inevitably spark debates. The lack of at least semi-autonomous quality institutions of higher learning, specifically in Islamic studies, and the related shortfall of native, respected, and “credentialed” Islamic scholars tend to create ill-prepared Islamic students and teachers susceptible to Salafist teachings. This characteristic may not consciously attract AQ, but it does facilitate indoctrination of the population.

Historically, Islamic institutions of law and theology were responsible for training and certifying Islamic scholars as jurists, i.e. those who possessed the necessary authority and respected training to analyze and interpret Qur’anic verses with respect to Islamic life. Often this analysis sparked debates, but the debates were accepted as part of humanity’s futile attempts to understand God’s will. These scholarly institutions were primarily funded through private donors and were overseen by the fuqaha, who ensured that the institutions and the training in jurisprudence remained semi-autonomous from political influences (El Fadl 2003, 46). These institutions and the authoritative intellectuals who they produced were mainly responsible for the marginalization of past extremist movements, such as the Khawarij who were responsible for the assassination of Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and the fourth Caliph of Sunni Islam, and the Assassins of al-Hasan ibn-al-Sabbah from Persia who conducted mass killings in the name of Islam (El Fadl 2003, 48).

Following Western Colonialism, many of these types of religious educational institutions were nationalized to allow the state to better control the impact that the jurists
might have on public acceptance of the government’s authority and subsequent obedience. The long term result, as El Fadl describes, was:

…virtually every Muslim was suddenly considered to possess the requisite qualifications to become a representative and spokesperson for the Islamic tradition, and even Shari’a law…Consequently, persons, mostly engineers, medical doctors, and physical scientists, who were primarily self-taught and whose knowledge of Islamic text and history was quite superficial were able to position themselves as authorities on Islamic law and theology (El Fadl 2003, 47).

With less academic rigor being placed in Qur’anic interpretations, it becomes easier to take the puritanical view of Islam, faulting the West for all that is wrong in the world and justifying all actions of a Muslim, whether “universally” moral or immoral, as God’s will (El Fadl 2003, 47). It begets false scholars who use the Qur’an to further political and social power, while belittling those scholars who attempt to apply critical thinking to understanding and applying the Qur’an in modern society. Those who do attempt to interpret the Qur’an as figurative guidance versus literal law are accused of succumbing to Western influences and abandoning true Islamic ways (El Fadl 2003, 42-44). Such is the ideology of the Salafabist, who sees contemporary modernization efforts as “temptations of Satan” (El Fadl 2003, 58).

What is apparent in the analysis of AQ’s expansion is that those countries with significant investment in the education of “true” Islamic scholars, with the intent of training experts to authoritatively interpret the Qur’an, have greater success in reducing or countering AQ’s influence. For example, Gunaratna explains that the radical groups in Indonesia are often influenced by Muslims of Arab origin or who migrated to the Middle East for work and returned home with more radical beliefs. He says that Indonesia’s Islamic population is predominantly moderate however, pointing to the country’s Islamic scholars as the force that encourages understanding and the moderate culture, countering
the radical Salafabist views of those who were impacted by travels in the Middle East (Gunaratna 2003, 270).

Ranking each case according to this characteristic requires analysis of the indigenous institutes of higher Islamic education and the existence of natives that are recognized experts and leaders of that nation’s Islamic population. The latter is especially important in countries that do not have the post-graduate studies available, as the Islamic expert can at least temper the population’s thoughts and impulses with educated Islamic jurisprudence. A “++” for this characteristic is given to a country that lacks any Islamic training beyond high school (or some equivalent) or has institutions that are not accredited by an official organization that ensures proper academic rigor. This score is also attained by a country that has removed control of the curriculum and hiring of instructors and administrators from the institute in order to better control the education program, as this often leads to untrained people being placed in positions of authority, resulting in sub-par education standards. Furthermore, this score is achieved by a lack of credentialed Islamic leaders who have received post-graduate training in Islamic jurisprudence and are therefore extremely susceptible to a foreigner who claims to be an Islamic expert but lacks the requisite training to be an official jurist. The score decreases if the country has accredited Islamic institutes of higher learning, allows the schools to operate at least semi-autonomously, makes the schools available to the Islamic population (e.g. close to Muslim population centers and affordable), and has credentialed and recognized Islamic leaders that can represent the Muslim population in political matters. While the existence of moderate vice radical training can also lower the score, simply the
presence of an Islamic body that encourages critical thinking and analysis in decision making will aid in countering the influence of Salafabists.

Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances

It should not be a surprise that AQ seeks to spread its influences in Muslim populations worldwide. AQ’s main objective of spreading Salafabism and reestablishing the Ummah with a non-secular Islamic government requires an Islamic population base from which to begin. Furthermore, the people must be unhappy with their state of life if AQ is to have any possibility of influencing them to seek change. AQ's audience may include immigrants or minority populations that do not feel adequately represented in the government, disadvantaged people who feel they have not been given their “deserved” portion of the country’s wealth, or graduates of master or doctorate programs who find themselves unemployed, as is becoming a growing issue in Saudi Arabia (see the paragraphs on Saudi Arabia under this characteristic in Chapter Four).

In RAND’s study Ungoverned Territories, the authors analyzed the susceptibility of “ungoverned territories” being influenced by radical entities owing to the areas’ “ungovernability” and “conduciveness”. Ungovernability is broken into “state penetration into society”, “monopoly on the use of force”, and “control over borders” (RAND 2007, xvi). It is the effectiveness of the state’s penetration of Muslim societies that is the focus of this characteristic. If the state is unable to set its roots of legitimacy in the Muslim populations or to demonstrate equal concern for immigrants’ well-being, the Muslim population within the state will seek to be represented by other entities, often from external sources (RAND 2007, 9).
Traditionally, Saudi Arabian, Emirati, and other Islamic scholars, leaders, and financiers have sought to establish mosques and non-governmental organizations (NGO) in such areas to provide comfort and support to disgruntled populations. In distant and unfamiliar lands, the mosques and NGOs provide an oasis of familiar culture, similar ideals, and security (Wright 2007, 344). The Wahhabi and Salafi mosques, which propagate the evils of modernization and the sinful nature of contemporary luxury, often provide the foundation on which is heightened the sense of discrimination of social outcasts or persons on the margins of secular society.

It was the influence of such mosques that provided comfort and meaning to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the 1993 bomber of the World Trade Center in New York City. While growing up in Kuwait during the oil boom, Yousef felt that he and his expatriate family were treated like second-class citizens. He turned to Wahhabi and Salafi preachers for support and became “radicalized” by their messages (Gunaratna 2003, 236).

RAND’s study further points out that “…terrorist groups are more likely to penetrate an ungoverned territory if the surrounding population abides by a set of social norms that are either similar to or at least can be manipulated by the terrorist organization,” referred to by RAND as “favorable demographics and social characteristics” (RAND 2007, 17-18). Often due to covert AQ or other radical group infiltration, the mosques and NGOs that propagate Wahhabi or Salafi beliefs with a radical overtone can more easily shape an environment having these “favorable demographics and social characteristics.”

Another potential carrier of the Salafabist beliefs to disgruntled populations is the financially poor citizen who travels to a radical Wahhabi- or Salafi-influenced region for
work, is influenced by radical teachings, and then returns home empowered with hopes of avenging perceived wrongs committed against himself and his people by his own government, as was often the case of those returning from the Soviet-Afghan War.

Gunaratna points out that Indonesia’s radical Islamic movements, for example, are led and staffed by Indonesians of Arab decent, Middle Eastern immigrants to Indonesia, and *Indonesians who once worked in the Arabian Gulf region* (Gunaratna 2003, 269-270). These workers, if sufficiently influenced by Salafabist-like ideologies while working in the Arabian Gulf or similar regions, can return to their unhappy communities and create the requisite “favorable social characteristics.”

As explained by RAND’s theory, AQ sought out the areas with favorable ideological orientation and emotionally-wanting populations. AQ operatives then used sermons and vast financial resources to infiltrate the population, often through the Wahhabi- or Salafi-based mosques and NGOs and frequently without the imam’s or NGO staff’s knowledge, so as to pursue their jihadi objectives (Gunaratna 2003, 91). Such was the case among the Muslim immigrant populations of Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, and many other countries throughout the world (Gunaratna 2003, 168-172). After being accepted, AQ militants worked within these channels to recruit members or larger support for their movement, gather intelligence against the nation’s government or AQ’s enemies who might have a presence in the area, and to conduct operations using the population to conceal AQ’s movements and efforts (Gunaratna 2003, 102).

The keys to ranking this characteristic lie with the extent in which the Muslim population rallies behind specific issues and the responsiveness of the government to the complaints. The more the population feels that their concerns are not being addressed
because of religious differences, the higher the score will be as this provides an ideal stage for the radical Islamist groups to “come to their rescue”. A score of “++” is given to the Muslim population who perceives their community being marginalized by other religions or secular authorities based on religious beliefs and who does not have an organization or governing entity that can adequately address their grievances. These feelings may be felt by a Muslim country toward the jahiliyya world, as in Sudan, or it may be a population segment that blames their national government, such as in Pakistan. The score decreases in populations that have adequate representation willing to work through established governmental procedures, or clan procedures as will be seen in the Somalia case study, to have their concerns addressed, do not have an overwhelming majority among the population that sense the same level of oppression, or whose complaints are not necessarily based in religious discrimination.

Amenable To External Influences

Similar to the previously described characteristic, the population among which AQ is attempting to exert its influence must be willing to be influenced by external forces. At its foundation, there must be “favorable social characteristics” in order for the population to understand the benefits that a new ideology, a foreign influence, or a different lifestyle would bring. These “favorable social characteristics” may include a “set of social norms that…at least can be manipulated by the terrorist organization,” “a preexisting state of violence or communal ethno-religious cleavages,” or “communities vulnerable to outside co-option or intimidation” (RAND 2007, 18).

For such a change to have an effect however, the population must want to change in the manner presented by the organization and be willing to listen to and follow those
presenting it. This might mean a willingness to accept much needed financial support even though there are less than ideal conditions attached, accepting support from a foreign NGO in areas that the resident government is unable to fulfill, or internalizing the teachings of a foreign proselytizer. As is often the case with Usama in the current environment, it might be the draw of a revered public figure that boasts unimaginable feats (e.g. defeating the Soviet Army in Afghanistan) and mesmerizes wanting audiences with promises of spiritual fulfillment (Gunaratna 2003, 71).

Scoring of this characteristic is based on the needs of the society, the ability of AQ to provide for those needs, and the willingness of the community to accept AQ’s help. As will be seen in the case studies, AQ was welcomed into some communities because of their willingness to use their Afghanistan experiences to train inexperienced fighters from other Islamist groups and Usama’s ability to apply his wealth and connections to provide funding and equipment to Islamist groups. This characteristic is also tied into the first characteristic, “Similar Ideology or Strategy”, as the group receiving support and opening itself up to AQ’s influences must want the kind of help that AQ is willing to provide. As will be seen in the Somalia case study in Chapter Four and in the Kenya application in Chapter Five, Muslim groups who would rather seek support from internal groups or less violent groups tend to challenge AQ’s ability to significantly infiltrate the society. Therefore, a score of “++” is provided to the society that lacks the resources to continue the Salafabist or similar struggle and is willing to accept AQ’s help and guidance. The score is decreased in cases where diplomatic solutions are preferred, AQ’s ideologies or methods are not accepted, or there is not a significant need for or acceptance of outside help.
Freedom of Movement Across Borders

While open borders do not necessarily entice AQ to recruit operatives from the local population, they do indicate attractive options for future safe havens or operating bases. Organizations such as AQ benefit from borders (terrestrial, maritime, or aerial) that can be easily transited. This freedom allows illicit goods to be imported and exported, permits operatives to transit to training areas or operational targets, and provides routes of escape from law enforcement officials. As RAND points out in *Ungoverned Territories*, such freedom of movement exists in border regions because the borders are often “…remote from the capitals of their respective states, where [no] regime can successfully exert control over them and where the exact location of the frontier is not obvious” (RAND 2007, 12). This lack of control also applies to a country’s inability to control maritime traffic into its coast and monitor passengers flying into the nation’s airports, as insurgents can infiltrate countries just as easily across these “borders”.

As an example of the benefits of open border crossings, Sudan’s Red Sea ports provided easy access to shipping lanes that are commonly used to move goods throughout the Middle East and that have a high enough volume of shipping to minimize the detection of illicit shipments in and out of Sudan. AQ used these lanes, while in Sudan, to move weapons from Iran and criminal gangs in Russia and the Ukraine to its bases in Sudan and then out to its operatives worldwide (Gunaratna 2003, 210). Wright states that it was AQ’s strategic discussions in late 1992 concerning the U.S. presence in Somalia and Yemen and the threat that this posed to AQ’s freedom of movement from
the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea that further pushed AQ into a jihad against the United States (Wright 2007, 193).

Most countries lack the ability to completely patrol their borders and control movements across them, especially in lands where borders were drawn without regard for tribal or similar social group boundaries. Therefore, this characteristic will most often be scored as a “++”, especially for a country with a terrestrial border having easily traversed terrain, ineffective airport immigration and customs procedures, and a navy incapable of adequately patrolling maritime traffic. The score is also high in areas where tribal territories are bisected by national boundaries since the tribes are often granted freedom of movement across the borders. This freedom can be used to the insurgent’s advantage to mask their movements, as long as the tribe will allow it.

On the other hand, those governments that realize the danger posed by insurgents entering their country with the intent of attacking their finances, credibility, or other costly targets may choose to invest more heavily in border security and monitoring technology. They also may establish relationships with the bisected tribes to gain their support in protecting the nation’s borders, as will be discussed in the Saudi Arabian case study. The score for this characteristic will be lower for countries who improve their security structure, increasing the insurgent’s fear (whether a reality or merely perception) of being captured while attempting to enter or exit the country.

Absence of State Counterterrorism Threat

In addition to lax border security, international terrorist organizations, such as AQ, seek areas where they are relatively free of the threat of state-sponsored counterterrorism operations. Such operations may come from the state government in
whose country AQ is attempting to establish a safe haven or operating base, or it may come from other countries and international coalitions, as seen in the current Global War on Terror operations, who are given permission to enter a country to conduct counterterrorism missions. Counterterrorism threats force terrorist organizations to divert attention from recruiting, training, and planning efforts to ensure the safety of their leaders and members. These threats can also limit a terrorist organization’s access to critical infrastructure to move funds, supplies, and people in to and out of a country.

One manner in which safe havens are created is through, what RAND calls, a “lack of state penetration”, where the state’s security force either cannot exert its authority throughout the entire country or the state has decided to pass on the security responsibilities to other, more powerful groups, e.g. clans and tribes (RAND 2007, 7). This is often due to a lack of resources, funds, manpower, or training. For example in the early 1990s, Usama saw an opportunity to establish a base of operations and logistics in Yemen, where the state only directly controlled approximately 35 percent of the population (Gunaratna 2003, 186). Yemen’s tribal culture was more prominent than the state security structure and thus the tribes enjoyed significant autonomy in the country, effectively limiting the Yemeni security forces’ influence.

Another manner in which an environment favorable to groups like AQ can be created is through national laws that support such terrorist operations or prohibit their prosecution by state authorities. Wright discusses the laws in Germany prior to 2001 that served to indirectly allow terrorist groups to recruit, solicit funds, plan operations, and operate from within the country, as long as the target of the operation was outside of
German borders. “Naturally, many extremists took advantage of this safe harbor” (Wright 2007, 345).

This characteristic depends on the nation’s desire to prevent AQ or other Islamist movements from infiltrating, the ability of their forces to exert their power throughout the entire country, and the willingness of the nation to allow foreign security forces to enter their sovereign territory to prosecute known terrorists. A score of “++” in this category is given to the country whose government supports AQ’s objectives (a trait found more often prior to 2001), whose security forces cannot extend their sphere of influence throughout the country due to resource or legal constraints, or whose government will willingly harbor an internationally-known terrorist fugitive. Countries that are part of the Global War on Terror Coalition and take an active role in bringing terrorists to justice are given a lower score based on the extent of their commitment, efforts, and capabilities.

Trusted Local Providers of Security

As stated in the previous section, security is arguably as critical to AQ as it is to the forces pursuing them. And while AQ needs an environment that is relatively secure from counterterrorism efforts, it also needs an environment in which AQ can operate with minimal concern of attacks or betrayals by the local population. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, Usama chose to move his headquarters from Sudan back to Afghanistan in 1996, as that was the only choice of four that presented a secure local environment from where he could build, train, and lead AQ (Gunaratna 2003, 47-52). Without local security, as explained in the Combating Terrorism Center study, the environment is often more costly and challenging to operate in because of the increased security requirements to protect against “local bandits”, the increased cost of gaining and
maintaining allies within the population due to the ever-changing environment, and the
difficulties in opening and retaining access to necessary infrastructure for
communications, travel, and resupply (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 15).

This characteristic – an environment in which AQ can operate with minimal
concern of attacks or betrayals by the local population – may not be completely known to
AQ until its operatives are in place. Populated areas where the government’s influence
and population support infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, sewage, welfare, and electricity) are
little developed can be and have been perceived as locations where foreign investors,
NGOs, religious organizations, and similar groups can inject support and spread
influence (RAND 2007, 7). As discussed in the section on “Significant Muslim
Population With Religious-Centered Grievances”, Islamic NGOs and mosques often
sought such situations to extend their influence. The AQ members who had infiltrated or
were known to be part of these organizations would use these opportunities to proclaim
their messages and, by providing aid to the population, build support that could assure a
relatively secure environment in which AQ could operate (Gunaratna 2003, 242-245). As
will be discussed in Chapter Four however, the relationships built are neither always deep
nor do they always last, thus presenting AQ with just as challenging an environment as
any other foreign agent might experience.

Scoring this characteristic depends on how strongly the population supports AQ’s
objectives and the sense of dependency on AQ to achieve the desires of the local
population. A population that centers their hopes on AQ’s resources and operations will
be more willing to protect them from security forces and not betray their trust, earning a
score of “++”. Populations who see AQ with nothing more than a supporting role will
receive a lower score, as they will not necessarily make significant sacrifices to protect AQ. Communities who strongly support AQ but lack the size to provide ample protection from the state security forces will also receive lower scores.

Case Study Selection

The next step in developing this hypothesis is to test the eight identified characteristics against the known facts of various case studies involving AQ. To provide an accurate and rigorous test of the hypothesis, five case studies were selected with a wide range of factors that could serve to disprove the concept. If too narrow a selection of cases or variables was selected, the test might not highlight inconsistencies or incorrect assumptions in the characteristics.

Sudan, Afghanistan, and the northern Pakistani provinces of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province were selected as known areas where AQ had successes in establishing sanctuaries. Sudan is examined from 1991, when Usama was considering the Sudanese government’s invitation, to 1996 when Usama felt that the environment no longer was secure for AQ. In doing so, the characteristics can be examined at the time Usama was making the decision in order to attempt to understand his calculus, while considering how the scores of the characteristics might be different as the environment changed leading up to AQ’s departure in 1996. Two periods are studied in Afghanistan: prior to AQ’s headquarters moving to Sudan and from 1996-2001 when AQ returned its operations center to the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. The ranking of the characteristics focus on the latter period, examining the evolution of AQ’s relationship with the Taliban and its leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar.
The northern provinces of Pakistan that border on the Afghanistan border, FATA and NWFP, were selected because of the sanctuary that the Taliban and AQ found following the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. This case study introduced another variable into the analysis as the provinces were within the borders of a country that was supportive of the Global War on Terror operations…why was Musharraf’s support to the Coalition not enough to steer AQ away from these northern provinces? To understand the environment that existed when Usama had a choice of using Pakistani territory for his operations and training camps, this case study analyzes the eight characteristics in Pakistan during the 1990s when Pakistan was supportive of AQ’s efforts and after 2001, when AQ and the Taliban fled to the FATA and NWFP, to identify any changes that may have modified the total score of the hypothesis. The case study stops prior to Musharraf’s 2004 shift in policies regarding the commitment of troops in the FATA, when the security environment changed.

Somalia was selected as a case study because of the difficulties that AQ had in spreading their influence into this war-ravaged country. Many often assess that Somalia is a fertile environment for an AQ sanctuary because of its lack of state-run security, its rampant poverty, its close proximity to the Middle East, and its apparent affinity for violence. In fact in 1992, AQ felt that Somalia was an obvious choice for its next sanctuary. As will be discussed, however, Somalia proved to be too challenging for AQ to establish a large footprint. This case study examines an environment that resulted in poor results for AQ in order to further test the hypothesis’s validity, showing that the total score of the hypothesis is different for environments that may appear ideal at the surface but, when broken down, have aspects that challenge AQ’s spreading influence.
The fifth case study, Saudi Arabia, was selected to analyze an environment that, at least superficially, was an ideological match for Usama and AQ. In fact, Saudi Arabia was a major contributor to the mujahidin in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and continued to provide support in the early 1990s. But, Saudi Arabia has seemingly been successful in limiting AQ’s influence among its population. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is studied primarily in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Usama was no longer welcomed in the country and AQ was trying to infiltrate the secure environment to attack the government’s credibility and right to the throne.

These case studies were selected to provide a wide spectrum of starting conditions and results in the independent variables. Sudan welcomed AQ but had a shift in the security environment that caused AQ to depart. Afghanistan was weary of AQ’s motives initially, but Usama still decided to return and was able to build a relationship that resulted in a sanctuary from international prosecution. Pakistan was allied with arguably the largest counterterrorism coalition ever, but two provinces were still welcoming to AQ’s international terrorism organization. Somalia presented an ideal environment in theory but failed to foster widespread AQ influence. Saudi Arabia was an ideological match to AQ and a strong supporter of the foreign Islamic fighters in the 1980s and early 1990s but has since been able to prevent significant pockets of AQ supporters from challenging the Saudi Arabian government. Even with these diverse environments, the hypothesis resulted in scores that were indicative of the degree of success that AQ had in each region, establishing the validity of this predictive analysis tool.
Importance of Analytical Rigor

As discussed previously, the data available for each case study in this thesis is not extensive enough to allow for a complete and equal comparison of the cases. AQ’s strategy is not readily apparent in any of the cases nor is an accurate, honest survey of each characteristic in each case available from an unbiased source. Therefore the case studies are analyzed qualitatively in order to validate this hypothesis and attempt to create a relatively objective method at studying a subjective environment to predict and help preempt AQ’s spreading influence.

George and Bennett; Ambert, et al.; and Crawford, et al. each warn about the challenges of maintaining the reader’s confidence of the author’s analytical integrity in a qualitative study, as samples are often small, the criteria are often subjective and immeasurable, and hypotheses often include analytical data instead of data obtained through controlled tests (George and Bennett 2005, 106; Ambert, Adler, Adler, and Detzner 1995, 888; Crawford, Leybourne, and Arnott 2000, 2). George and Bennett further warn of the loss of “particular qualities” when deriving general explanations from specific data within a case study, as was necessary in forming the hypothesis’s characteristics (George and Bennett 2005, 114). They also discuss the potential of “spurious correlations” when trying to understand and predict human decisions, as all the factors that impacted the decision under scrutiny may not have been known to the observers documenting the decision process (George and Bennett 2005, 183). George and Ambert suggest the need for transparency of methods and clarity of examples to allay concerns arising from qualitative analysis (George and Bennett 2005, 106; Ambert,

These were the goals of the research and analytical methods of this thesis. The literature reviewed records from hundreds of different sources, although very few speak on any one topic. For a topic with limited data and with less than completely trustworthy sources, this thesis uses multiple sources to cull out the applicable characteristics. The characteristics are then compared in five case studies: three known to have been a sanctuary for AQ (Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan), one that AQ assessed would be an ideal safe haven but turned out to be extremely challenging (Somalia), and one that spawned the ideology of AQ’s founders but did not spawn a significant AQ cell itself (Saudi Arabia).

Even with the explanation of each characteristic’s scores, this comparison has many factors that inevitably affect each rank, preventing a purely objective analysis of the characteristics. The resultant success of AQ’s efforts in each case study is well-known, which further challenges the objectivity of the scores. Therefore, an additional measure was taken to prevent author bias in ranking these test cases. The analysis was completed “horizontally” in the matrix, i.e. completely ranking one characteristic against each case study to focus the analysis on the characteristic, as scoring the analysis vertically might have permitted the ranking to be improperly modified to ensure a country’s score was better (or worse) than the previous country analyzed in order to ensure the total scores reflected historical truths. By scoring the matrix horizontally, the
final results of the validity test remained hidden until each characteristic’s assessment was completed, reducing the author’s ability to bias the results.

Chapter Four displays the results of the characteristic analysis and provides data from the numerous sources listed in Chapter Two as evidence to support each score. In addition to testing the hypothesis’s validity, this analysis examines the thesis’s sub-questions: (1) considering AQ’s motivations and methods prior to 2001, what fostered AQ’s engagement with entities in Afghanistan, Sudan, and northern Pakistan, (2) already with linkages to entities in Sudan, what led AQ to seek additional linkages in Somalia, and (3) what was different about Saudi Arabia that prevented it from widely adopting AQ’s objectives? The results demonstrate that in these five cases, the hypothesis is valid and should be considered for future testing to improve its accuracy. It also demonstrates the hypothesis’s ability to highlight the factors of environments that make an area more susceptible to or more shielded from AQ’s influence, aiding strategists in developing focused engagement plans.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

By the dispersal of Islamists and the patient building of their organizations outside the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, Al Qa’ida avoids the arrest of its operatives, the seizure of its resources, and the detection of its future plans.
Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda

Historical Case Study Analysis

As the quote above infers, AQ is actively seeking other territories that can provide the security and operational flexibility that Sudan and Afghanistan provided in the 1990s. The hypothesis developed and described in this paper is intended to aid in predicting where AQ will attempt to infiltrate so that measures can be taken to counter their expansion and focused strategies can be developed to strengthen a country’s resistance to the violent Salafabist movement. This chapter validates the hypothesis by using the sources in Chapter Two to apply the chosen characteristics to the selected case studies, each described in Chapter Three.

Table 1, below, lists the characteristics identified in the study of AQ’s relationships and attempts to spread its influence in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Each characteristic is ranked with respect to the countries listed in the first row with “-” meaning a negative or counterproductive effect to AQ’s spread of influence, “+” meaning a supportive effect, and “0” meaning the characteristic had no effect or was not applicable to the situation (Chapter Three explains the scoring criteria in more detail). A “++” or a “--” is used, when necessary, to emphasize the significance of the characteristic. As AQ’s history is not the focus of the thesis, the complete recount of
these engagements is not included, with the exception of those elements that aid in

describing the characteristic’s role in building the alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>FATA &amp; NWFP (Pakistan)</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similar Ideology Or Strategy</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Links With Other Islamist Groups</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack Of Institutions Of Higher Islamic Studies / Renowned Islamic Scholars</strong></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Muslim Population With Religious-Centered Grievances</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amenable To External Influences</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom Of Movement Across Borders</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absence of State Counterterrorism Threat</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trusted Local Providers Of Security</strong></td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: +15  +14  +6  +12  +2

**Similar Ideology or Strategy**

This characteristic examines the similarities between the ideologies of AQ and the studied society. It also looks at the degree of the society’s acceptance of AQ’s methods in achieving their objectives. As will be discussed, AQ began with a strategy that required
strict adherence to their policies and guidelines (Wright 2007, 153). Their experiences in Sudan and Somalia caused them to begin considering more flexibility in accepting their allies’ beliefs, leading this hypothesis to examine the degree of similarity. The willingness of the society to accept the violent methods, whether or not they had identical ideologies, was also identified as a factor in the extent of AQ’s successes and is part of this characteristic’s measure.

In June 1989, Brigadier General Omar Hasan al-Bashir and Hasan al-Turabi overthrew the democratically-elected government of Sudan and replaced it with an Islamic government. Like the AQ leaders, al-Turabi, the ideological leader of the coup d’état, felt the Arab world was failing because its governments were “…insufficiently Islamic and too dependent on the West.” He wanted to create an Ummah, or united Islamic community, starting with Sudan. He opened the borders to any Muslim who wanted the same objective, thus attracting Usama bin Ladin and AQ (Wright 2007, 186).

While Usama and al-Turabi agreed on the objective of creating the Ummah, the finer details were sources of many debates. Al-Turabi envisioned the eventual merger of Sunni and Shia sects of the Muslim population, an idea that Usama saw as heresy (although AQ would eventually consider such a merger for the sake of the movement). He also spoke of “…integrating ‘art, music, and singing’ into religion” and women’s rights, topics on which Usama vehemently disagreed (Wright 2007, 188). Nevertheless, the two needed elements of each other’s organization and agreed on the main objective and basic ideology of a non-secular Islamic state, thus the score of “++” in Table 1 under “Similar Ideology or Strategy”.

54
When Usama returned the AQ headquarters to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996, he found the Taliban fighting the Northern Alliance for control of Afghanistan. Usama was unsure of the Taliban and their goals, as he had only heard rumors describing the Taliban as a communist army. But Usama was familiar with Afghanistan and the bordering Pakistani areas from his days during the war with the Soviets and thus wanted to return his headquarters to this familiar land. Similarly, the Taliban hesitated at accepting AQ’s presence and support as the Taliban were concerned with AQ’s objectives in Afghanistan, not wanting the negative international attention brought on by terrorist actions committed from Afghan soil (Wright 2007, 260).

It turned out that the two were ideologically very close. The Taliban was comprised of a number of mullahs and talibs, or students, from Pakistani madrassas who wanted to reunite the warring tribes in Afghanistan under a “pure Islamic regime”. They had Sunni beliefs and were thus supported by the Pakistani and Saudi governments as a Sunni counter to the neighboring Shia in Iran and Hindu in India. Specifically, they subscribed to the Deobandi sect of Islam, as they were educated in Pakistan’s Deobandi schools, a fact that influenced AQ’s welcome in the FATA and NWFP provinces in Pakistan (Singh 2001, 10).

Deobandi is a sect of Islam that originated as a sub-sect of Sunni Islam. Its scholars teach that Islamic communities have been “…seduced by the amoral and material accoutrements of Westernization and have deviated from the original pristine teachings of the Prophet,” an ideology that is in line with that of the Salafis and the Wahhabis. Deobandi Muslims strive to return to a pure Islamic lifestyle by recentering
their lifestyle on the teachings of the Qur’an and the practices of the Prophet Mohammed, while shunning Western influences (Pike 2005a).

The Deobandi-influenced Taliban were an ideological match for Usama and AQ. Furthermore, the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was a “devoted” listener of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam’s lectures, one of Usama’s mentors (Wright 2007, 256). Therefore, although much of Afghanistan was Sufi prior to the Taliban uprising (Wright 2007, 115), a rating of “++” is placed in the “Afghanistan” column of Table 1 under “Similar Ideology or Strategy” to represent AQ’s ideological similarities with the Taliban who were in control of much of the country when Usama returned from Sudan in 1996.

In 1992, Usama sent his Deputy Emir for Military Operations, Muhammad Atef, to Somalia to engage the locals and establish a Salafabist network (Gunaratna 2003, 206), with the intention of helping “…the Somali Salafi in its fight against Somali communism” (Al-Wahlid n.d., 26). He also saw the U.S. presence in Somalia as a “target of opportunity” to begin his crusade to rid Saudi Arabia and the Middle East of the American presence and influence (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 5). What Atef and others who followed him found was that most Somalis were Sufi, vice Salafi, and were more devoted to their clan than to any outside influence (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 22). One gets a sense of the importance of Somalia to AQ’s operations as the relatively staunch ideologues in AQ begin to consider not limiting the search for an ally to those with “an identical focus,” but rather to seek a partnership with any friendly Somali entities to include the secular, Sufi Somali population segment…at least initially (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 42).
Also in Somalia, AQ found an ally in the al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (Islamic Union, aka AIAI), an Islamic movement attempting to establish a pure Islamic government over the entire Somali-inhabited area of East Africa, to include the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. While the aim was similar to that of AQ, there still remained conflicts between the AQ representatives in East Africa and the AIAI leadership as to how to achieve these ends, since AQ was still a foreign influence and relatively unproven to the AIAI leadership (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 40-43). Nevertheless, it was the objectives of AIAI and the possibility that some of the Somali population could be converted to AQ’s ideology that led to AQ’s pursuit of allies in Somalia, thus a score of “+” is given on Table 1 under “Similar Ideology or Strategy”.

In the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, as well as along the Baluchistan border with Afghanistan, Usama bin Ladin and other soon-to-be AQ leaders developed relationships with many mujahidin groups that were forming to aid in expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan. Following the departure of the Soviet forces, the newly formed AQ continued to expand its influence with these groups. But Usama provided only military assistance to Harkat ul-Mujahideen (formerly Harkat ul-Ansar and Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami) and Hezb-ul-Mujahidin. These groups were the most ideologically similar to AQ, as they sought to establish a pure Islamic state in Kashmir and combat “…U.S., nonbelievers, and anti-Islamic forces” (Gunaratna 2003, 278).

In addition to the jihadi groups, the people in the FATA had beliefs similar to AQ’s, even though the former might not have agreed with all of the latter’s methods. Most FATA inhabitants are members of the Pashtun tribe, the tribe from which many of
the Taliban belong, and are members of the Deobandi sect of Islam. As discussed previously, the Deobandi sect shares many beliefs with Salafis, Wahhabis, and Salafabists. Given the operations and existence of the jihadi groups in this region, the tribal connection of the populace to the Taliban, and the influence of the Deobandi sect, the FATA is given a score of “++” in Table 1 under “Similar Ideology or Strategy”.

The ideological link between AQ and Saudi Arabia is probably the easiest to make. Usama bin Ladin received his religious education in the Salafi mosques and schools in western Saudi Arabia. His religious mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, as stated in Chapter One, was hired to lead prayers in the school mosque at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he significantly influenced Usama’s religious views and encouraged Usama to aid the Muslims fighting in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, prior to Usama’s August 1995 derogatory statements about the Saudi government for its support of a U. S. military presence in the Kingdom and King Fahd’s mismanagement of the country’s oil income (Wright 2007, 238), Saudi Arabia directly and openly supported bin Ladin’s efforts in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia’s chief cleric, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, issued a fatwa in support of Usama’s and Azzam’s efforts in encouraging Muslims to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Wright 2007, 116). Over ten percent of the private fundraising in Saudi Arabia was funneled through Usama to support his efforts in organizing the mujahidin (Wright 2007, 119). Such support from the population, religious leaders, and the government demonstrates the close ideologies of Usama’s AQ and Saudi Arabia, thus a score of “++” is given in Table 1 under “Similar Ideology or Strategy”. Even after the split in the mid 1990s between Usama and the Saudi
government, their ideologies remained significantly similar, with the exception of the ethical and social perspective of Western forces being based on Arabic soil.

**Links with Other Islamist Groups**

This characteristic examines the existence of potential allies in the regions that AQ was attempting to influence or establish sanctuary. It also considers the breadth of influence of the indigenous Islamist group(s), the extent of important infrastructure that the Islamist group(s) could control or use, and their willingness to coexist with AQ.

Following the 1989 coup in Sudan, al-Turabi opened his country to any Muslim, no questions asked. He wanted to foster his ideals of “Islamist revolution” among other Muslims, with the objective of supporting and providing leadership to their revolutionary efforts upon returning to their home countries. Because of Usama’s successes in Afghanistan and the financial and expertise resources that his organization had, al-Turabi encouraged Usama’s involvement in his vision (Wright 2007, 186).

Al-Turabi’s efforts paid off as Usama transferred AQ’s headquarters to Khartoum in 1992. Al-Turabi also attracted the Egyptian terrorist organizations al-Jihad and Islamic Group; Palestine’s Hamas, Abu Nidal Organization, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, to name a few (Wright 2007, 196-197). Eventually, al-Turabi established the annual Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) to act as a forum for these and other Islamist groups to coordinate efforts and learn from each other’s operations. PAIC, which grew into a meeting of over 80 Islamist organizations, was often attended by Usama bin Ladin (Gunaratna 2003, 211). Sudan is given a rating of “++” on Table 1 under “Links with Other Islamist Groups” because of
the access to these numerous groups with goals similar to AQ’s that AQ had in Sudan and through the PAIC.

Usama’s initial attraction to Afghanistan had nothing to do with easy access to the various radical Islamic movements throughout the world. However, it provided access to willing mujahidin who would benefit from Usama’s and AQ’s support. Usama’s initial role in the Afghani-Soviet conflict was funneling funds from the various contributors to the Arabs who were fighting the Soviets. In late 1986, he established the first all-Arab training camp in an effort to prevent continued embarrassment of the novice Arab fighters in their support of the more experienced Afghanis (Wright 2007, 128). As the war with the Soviets came to an end, Usama and his mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, envisioned the creation of a “rapid reaction force” of mujahidin trained and equipped to support movements of oppressed Muslims anywhere in the World (Gunaratna 2003, 29). This was the foundation on which AQ was built.

Usama and the founders of AQ aggressively pursued this vision from two directions in Afghanistan. First, they offered a home and training to the veteran foreign fighters in Afghanistan who were not allowed by their own governments to return home because of past criminal activities in their home countries or because of their own government’s fear of the fighters’ newly energized fanatical beliefs and jihadi desires (Wright 2007, 121). AQ gained the allegiance of these Muslims by accepting them and training them at the growing number of camps along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.

Second, AQ used the veterans who were allowed to return home, and the Islamic NGOs that AQ had infiltrated, to provide training and backing to Muslims who wished to establish pure Islamic states in their native lands (Gunaratna 2003, 6-7). AQ’s links to the
Afghanistan veterans, its training camps and experts in Afghanistan, and AQ’s resources rapidly spread AQ’s influence and significantly increased the available pool of recruits from which AQ could choose.

In 1996, Usama bin Ladin returned from Sudan because of increasing mistrust of his sponsors in Khartoum and growing international pressure on al-Bashir’s government to turn Usama over to the Saudi Arabian government. Afghanistan presented the only safe haven for Usama and AQ, as Somalia was not yet secure nor friendly to AQ’s cause, his home country of Saudi Arabia wanted to prosecute him, and Pakistan was being pressured to register its resident mujahidin or arrest them (Gunaratna 2003, 47). Usama also had established bases in Afghanistan, further making Afghanistan an obvious choice.

While numerous Islamist groups trained personnel at AQ camps in Afghanistan, their presence at the camps does not appear to have been the main motivation behind Usama’s decision about where to locate his headquarters or to expand his influence. The camps were created by Usama bin Ladin out of a need to train the foreign fighters entering Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in the 1980s and not to entice additional Islamist groups to join AQ’s movement. Nevertheless, the camps remained open after the Soviets withdrew to train the new Islamic “rapid reaction force”, Al Qa’ida. The camps’ continued existence provided a familiar and established infrastructure to which Usama could return in 1996, as well as an ideal environment from which to network with other movements worldwide. Thus, Afghanistan is given a score of “+” in Table 1 under “Links with Other Islamist Groups” to reflect the benefits provided AQ by the presence of these groups in the training camps, even though their attendance did not necessarily attract Usama and AQ to Afghanistan.
After establishing AQ’s headquarters in Sudan, Usama dispatched representatives throughout the Horn of Africa to spread his Salafist ideology and to identify people to recruit and potential territories where AQ could establish operating bases and training camps. As discussed earlier, Usama sent, Deputy Emir for Operations Atef, and many other operatives to Somalia to explore AQ’s opportunities to target U.S. entities involved with the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), to prevent the influence of communism, and to establish an Islamic government that was supportive of AQ’s ideologies and objectives. Additionally, Atef directed the AQ operatives for the Somali mission to “…attempt to help the brothers in Somalia and [the] Ogaden,” the southeastern region of Ethiopia inhabited by people of Somali descent (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 5).

Here, Atef is referring to the Salafi organization AIAI, which was fighting to unite all Somali people under a single Islamic government in the Horn of Africa, as mentioned earlier. Certainly, the existence of such an organization in the region meant that AQ had a foot in the door, through which it could begin to spread its influence. However, as AQ found out, the AIAI leaders had their own objectives, strategies, and allegiances (to the clan) that often outweighed the influence and support of AQ (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 20-22). Nevertheless Somalia is given a score of “+” under “Links with Other Islamist Groups” because supporting the “…brothers in Somalia and Ogaden” was part of the mission of the AQ operatives, albeit seemingly low in priority based on its rank in Atef’s listed guidance.

The FATA and NWFP had over two dozen Islamist groups resident in the region, some focused on the struggle for control of Kashmir and some centered on expelling the
Soviets from Afghanistan (Gunaratna 2003, 275). These areas, as well as the Baluchistan Province to the southwest, provided ideal locations for the foreign fighters in the war with the Soviet Union to congregate before and after operations in Afghanistan. Given the existing infrastructure created by the Pakistani Islamist groups, Usama, Azzam, and other militants would have found it easy to establish guesthouses, coordinate transportation, set up and access financial networks, and provide other support networks to aid the foreign fighters’ entry into Afghanistan.

The FATA and NWFP became even more beneficial to AQ and the Islamist groups in the late 1990s, as the Taliban had strong ties with the madrassas and radical Deobandi and Salafabist leaders in the area. As discussed previously, these schools and leaders were instrumental in educating the Taliban in Shari’a law. AQ fostered strong ties with the Taliban, as well as the Harkat ul-Mujahideen, Hezb-ul-Mujahidin, and other Islamist groups in the FATA and NWFP region, by providing training and resources, as mentioned earlier. The strong links to these Islamist groups and the availability of the infrastructure through which such groups moved and conducted their operations, as well as the proximity to the battleground in Afghanistan, made this area an easy “escape route” for Usama and his AQ leadership and operatives in the fight against the Soviets and again following the 2001 Coalition operations. Therefore the FATA and NWFP are given a rating of “++” in Table 1 for their links with other Islamist groups.

Gunaratna points out that “…no well-defined group engaged in sustained terrorism has emerged in Saudi Arabia.” Although terror attacks have taken place in Saudi Arabia, each was conducted by a small cell that AQ established and supported rather than separate Islamist groups that later established ties with AQ. The lack of such
groups could be attributed to the extensive network of religious scholars who are recognized by the public as authorities on Islamic law and interpretation, as well as the very capable religious police, or *mutawwa’un*, who keep a close watch on the country’s religious activities (Gunaratna 2003, 190), two facets that will be discussed in following sections of this chapter.

This is not to say that Saudi Arabia is not an environment in which leaders and members of the Islamist groups cannot congregate. In fact, the annual hajj to Mecca is open to any Muslim desiring to make the pilgrimage, making it a potential place for such people to meet and discuss Islamist movements. When Usama and Azzam did their initial recruiting in Jeddah (Wright 2007, 111), they undoubtedly took advantage of the hajj to discuss ideologies with radical Islamists on their pilgrimage. However, Usama’s efforts in Saudi Arabia have not been primarily to connect with other Islamist groups nor does AQ necessarily make extensive use of the infrastructure that has been set up by such groups. Therefore Saudi Arabia is given a rating of “-” in Table 1 under “Links with Other Islamist Groups”.

Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies / Renowned Islamic Scholars

This characteristic investigates the extent of higher Islamic education opportunities, producing indigenous Islamic scholars trained in jurisprudence and critical thinking by an accredited institution, as well as understanding the native environment and what is best for the indigenous population. As will be highlighted, countries have attempted to rapidly expand their education systems, only to see it watered down due to a lack of funding or credible leadership in the Islamic Studies programs. Regions will also turn to madrassas to provide baseline education to the masses, but without accredited
post-graduate training to identify the true jurists, a society is susceptible to self-
proclaimed, unqualified Islamic scholars preaching false messages. As El Fadl points out,
it is these institutions and the authoritative intellectuals that were central in marginalizing
and quelling past extremist movements (El Fadl 2003, 46).

In Sudan, the higher education system has struggled to maintain the academic
standards expected of such institutions. Zaki El-Hassan points to the coup by Jaafar
an-Nimeiri in May 1969 as the point when political desires began to greatly affect the
intellectual freedoms of the country’s universities. During the last four decades, the
Sudanese government has not funded the required programs to maintain such institutions,
while protecting the government from uncontrolled intellectuals inciting political unrest
(El-Hassan 1995, 3-4).

One year after the 1989 coup, al-Bashir began a “higher education revolution” in
an attempt to “…catch up with industrialized nations.” The government program created
24 new universities in less than eight years, a seemingly impressive feat for a country
with a GDP per capita ranked in the lower 20% of the world (Useem 1998, 2; CIA’s The
World Factbook 2008). The dramatic increase in universities and the subsequent rapid
increase of accepted students (6,080 in 1989 to 38,623 in 1999: see El Tom 2003) to fill
the new universities without an equal increase in funding and training for the university
staffs meant an inevitable shortfall in books, laboratory equipment, and qualified
instructors. Further compounding the problem, al-Bashir’s government initiated new
controls in the universities that reduced the authority of the university staffs. The
government also removed or demoted deans, department heads, experienced staffs, and
all the senior staff of the Higher Education Council and replaced them with loyal
National Islamic Front members who were often inexperienced and lacked the scientific or educational credibility to maintain standards of higher education (El-Hassan 1995, 5-6).

Not surprising, many observers see the new universities as façades that are meant to demonstrate progress in the intellectual goals of the al-Bashir government. El-Hassan states, “Institutions which were founded to provide graduates with vocational qualifications were normally upgraded to university status…and in most cases the changes meant nothing more than the conferment of some titles on staff members and modification of degree titles.” This was specifically the case with some of Sudan’s religious institutions (El-Hassan 1995, 4). Similarly, Ahmed Alzobier questions the ability of these schools to pass the internationally accepted standards for university accreditation, given the 275% increase in PhDs and a 290% increase in Masters Degrees between 1991 and 2002 while research output decreased by 22% (Alzobier 2007, 3). The former Sudanese Minster for Higher Education, Abdel Wahab el-Mubarak, commissioned a group to study the universities that were created under this new program while he was still in office. The resultant report showed “very clearly” that many of these schools were not teaching to the standards of higher learning (Useem 1998, 4).

These statistics neither directly address the quality of the Islamic programs nor do they necessarily indicate a complete lack of quality Islamic scholars who can credibly debate such difficult issues as interpreting the Qur’an in a modern society; however, the probability of such academics coming from these Sudanese institutions is greatly reduced as a result of the decades of political repression of or interference with the institutions of higher learning and the rapid expansion of universities under al-Bashir’s revolution.
without a similar rapid expansion in funding to these educational institutions.

Additionally, the quality of the education, as questioned above, increases the likelihood of an Islamic student attaining the “authority and credibility” of a PhD, without being evaluated against the internationally accepted standards of such a degree. These factors translate into a score of “+” on Table 1 under “Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies”.

Both Afghanistan’s and Somalia’s higher education systems were devastated by their respective civil wars. Afghanistan’s educational system has suffered due to two decades of warfare beginning with the Soviet invasion in 1979 followed by the infighting after the Soviet forces left, and finally under the Taliban rule that began in 1996 (Tierney 2005, 1). Many faculty fled the country or were killed during this period because of conflicting ideologies and differing opinions on increased government control.

Additionally, during the tribal wars of the 1980s and 1990s, it was commonplace for the tribe that had gained power to destroy the intellectual infrastructure of the opposing tribes in order to prevent future uprisings (Singh 2001, 9).

When the Taliban came to power, their first decree essentially banned women from teaching or attending schools at any level (prior to Taliban control, 60% of the students and faculty at Afghanistan’s main university, Kabul University, were women) (Del Castillo 2001a, 1-2). The schools also suffered from the looting of books and laboratories, low budget support from the government, and damaged infrastructure caused by battles nearby. By 2001, only 4,000 students remained in the highly centralized, severely damaged institutes, and they were being taught by educators who
lacked the basic training and credentials necessary to provide higher education (World Bank 2007, 1).

During the time when AQ was exploring expansion into Somalia, all the universities were closed. In June 1993, some of the professors from the closed Somali National University decided to reopen an institute of higher learning, primarily to give former students of the Islamic Studies and Languages Department an opportunity to complete their degrees. But, the “school” was overrun and looted by the local militias a week after it opened, forcing the school to close again (Mogadishu University 2005). For these reasons, both Afghanistan and Somalia are given a score of “++” in Table 1 under “Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies”.

Since its inception, Pakistan’s higher educational system has grown significantly, from only the University of Punjab in 1947 to 187 colleges, universities, and degree-awarding institutions in 2007, 109 of which are accredited by Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission (HEC) (Higher Education Commission’s web site n.d.). In the NWFP and FATA regions, there are 38 schools of which 20 are accredited by the HEC.

Such apparent growth is often caused by organizations falsely assuming titles of universities and offering degrees that do not adhere to international standards, thus over-inflating the number of institutions, as was the situation in Sudan in the 1990s. This was the case in Pakistan. Instead of allowing it to continue unchecked, the Pakistani government established the HEC in 2002 to ensure that schools are meeting the proper standards, to evaluate degree programs, and to accredit institutions that meet the requirements of higher education (HEC’s web site n.d.).
Many of Pakistan’s accredited schools of higher learning offer degrees and minors in Islamic studies encouraging critical thinking and historical studies of Islam and its laws. For example, the University of Peshawar’s Shaykh Zayed Islamic Center, established in 1988, offers an honors program that uses the Bachelor of Arts degree program as a foundation on which additional academic training in Islamic Studies and Arabic is built, “…as no Muslim can have a complete comprehension and understanding of the Holy Qur’an and teachings of Islam until and unless he/she is well-grounded in the modern disciplines of knowledge” (University of Peshawar’s web site n.d.). The Jamia Farooqia in Karachi, a school that offers education from the primary level through PhD equivalents in Islamic Studies, has a Department of Islamic Jurisprudence comprised of “reputed and renowned scholars” to provide training and examples to the students on addressing various issues through Qur’anic insight (Jamia Farooqia’s web site n.d.).

Not only is the quality of education important as a characteristic of the thesis’s hypothesis but also the extent of the government’s control and limitation on the academics. Under the late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s regime in the early 1970s, all education was nationalized: grants, faculty appointments, and administratorhirings now fell under national government control. As stated in this section’s opening paragraphs, completely nationalized institutions run the risk of having their educational freedom’s curtailed, as was witnessed in Sudan. However, Pakistan did not follow this dangerous path. In the mid-1980s, the government allowed private institutions to reestablish themselves in Pakistan as long as they adhered to basic standards in education. While some government regulation, such as the HEC, remains today, educational institutions retain semi-autonomous authority over their curriculum (Coffman 1997, 2).
The FATA and NWFP are given a score of “-” in Table 1 under “Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies” because of their significant number of schools of higher learning that have programs designed to promote critical thinking and the historical study of the religion, which has proved important to quell radical Islamic movements. The score is also due to the country’s attempts to ensure quality education is available without completely controlling the curriculum or the faculty of the schools. It is not given a “--” because of the existence of unaccredited religious institutions that claim university status, such as Jami Dar al-Ulum Haqqania, that cater to the poor and lower classes that cannot afford the exorbitant prices of many of Pakistan’s accredited universities (Del Castillo 2001b, 2). Schools like Haqqania, in which much of the Taliban leadership was educated, have the potential of spreading often ireful and inaccurate ideologies through educators whose credentials and research methods are not accountable to accreditation authorities and international education standards.

Saudi Arabia only has eight public universities, although it has numerous private universities and schools of higher learning. Three of the eight public schools are specialized Islamic universities, while many others have Islamic studies deeply ingrained in their curriculum. Del Castillo reported in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* in 2003 that most Saudi doctoral-level students are pursuing PhDs in Islamic disciplines (Del Castillo 2003, 2). This should not come as a surprise for a country known as the Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Unlike other countries that have been examined in this thesis, Saudi Arabian universities and Islamic schools of higher learning are controlled by the clerics in the country vice the government. The schools do not have the semi-autonomy that
encourages free and critical thinking, as the clerics and religious judges in the country oversee the curriculum (Del Castillo 2003, 2-3). Their influence is different from what may be found in Sudan as it is not driving the faculty in Saudi Arabian institutions to teach to the political desires of the government but rather to ensure the faculty remain true to the Salafi ideals of the Saudi Arabian clerics. The result is a deep education and understanding of the religion taught by qualified and credentialed instructors. Saudi Arabia’s educational system is thus given a rating of “--” in Table 1 under “Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies”, as its strong roots in academic rigor and the authoritative identification of Islamic leadership help prevent the influence of self-proclaimed jurists or persons who lack the research experience of true Islamic scholars.

Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances

A discontented Muslim population that feels overlooked by their national government, or the jahiliyya in general, is often receptive to support and comfort that Islamic organizations (e.g. charities, mosques, etc) can provide. This characteristic ranks the case studies on the degree of unified dissatisfaction among the Muslim population and the presence of a representative body that is trusted by the population and heard by the government, or international community in the case of a country like Sudan in the early 1990s.

In Sudan, AQ established alliances with the al-Bashir government, as Khartoum had similar goals as AQ…a non-secular Islamic government with visions of spreading the Ummah. Sudan was not a case of a Muslim population with grievances toward the government but an Islamic government that was unhappy with the state of the Arab world, as described early in this chapter. This dissatisfaction led to Khartoum’s support
of radical Islamic movements in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as well as al-Turabi’s creation of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) that, by the late 1990s, had brought together over 80 “Islamist political parties and terrorist groups” (Gunaratna 2003, 211). The combination of approximately 70% of Sudan’s Sunni Muslim population (CIA’s *The World Factbook* 2008) and the ideologies and objectives of the ruling party made it easy for AQ to establish its headquarters in Sudan, especially given Usama’s ability to invest heavily in Sudan’s failing economy (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 17). Therefore, a rating of “++” is given in Table 1 to represent the presence of grievances among the government, and thus in this case the population.

The tribal divisions in Afghanistan and the foreign support given to certain tribes characterized the country’s social dynamics through decades of civil war. In a country that is 99% Muslim (80% Sunni and 19% Shia, per CIA’s *The World Factbook*) and is viewed as an entrance-way to the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, such chaos presented perceived opportunities for many foreign entities, especially Islamic Pakistan, to exert influence and create allies. The chaos also created a much divided population that would align itself, at least temporarily, with any outside influence that would provide the necessary resources to address the group’s grievances.

The Taliban received such support from the Pakistanis, who were seeking to establish a devoted ally in the north (Gunaratna 2003, 53), as well as to ensure that the overland pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan’s seaports remained secure (Singh 2001, 11). The Taliban also received support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in hopes of establishing another Sunni influence on Iran’s eastern border. With this
support, the Taliban were able to raise a credible force to establish a presence in the country and eventually wrest control of the country from the Northern Alliance and the various mujahidin elements not aligned with the Taliban (Gunaratna 2003, 52). The Taliban were also able to achieve their goals of establishing a pure Islamic state under Shari’a law and halt the “lawlessness and barbarity” that was rampant in Afghanistan (Wright 2007, 258).

Usama bin Ladin returned to Afghanistan in 1996, when the Taliban were consolidating their power in the country (Wright 2007, 258). This ideologically-similar movement of Sunni Muslims, with grievances against the unruly state, was taking action to address these complaints and install a non-secular Islamic government, an ideal situation facilitating Usama’s and AQ’s return and support. Usama’s support to the Taliban’s cause earned Mullah Mohammed Omar’s protection. Thus the Taliban’s struggle against the chaos in Afghanistan and to install a pure Islamic state in charge of the country justifies Afghanistan’s score of “++” in Table 1 under “Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances”.

Somalia was characterized by an environment of clans and tribal warfare when Usama sent his representatives there in the early 1990s. Clan warfare in Somalia can be traced to Arab traders in the 7th century AD who married into the African “settlers” of the Horn of Africa, forming the clans with allegiances to each trader and creating an environment of competition for the scarce resources of the region and trading rights along the coast. The Arab traders also introduced Islam to the region. Instead of replacing the local religions, however, Islamic law became intertwined with the stronger elements of
the local religions and created a Sufi-like version of the Islamic practices of the Arabian Peninsula (Davies 1995, 4).

What AQ found in Somalia was a Muslim population (85% per CIA’s *The World Factbook*) that practiced mainly Sufism, vice Salafism, and was more devoted to clan alliances than to foreign influences (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 22-41). And while there were grievances among the population, the grievances were centered on clan and sub-clan disputes and not necessarily the religious divides or discriminatory sentiments in which AQ thrives (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 21-22). Somalia is thus given a score of “-” in Table 1 under “Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances” for this time period, although AQ seemed to alter its strategy and recruit individuals who could be convinced of AQ’s Salafabist ideologies and the evils of the jahiliyya’s efforts to subjugate followers of Islam.

The FATA and NWFP regions of Pakistan, as described earlier, are inhabited primarily by Deobandi Muslims. The Deobandi madrassas and mosques in the region, such as Jami Dar al-Ulum Haqqania and Lal Masjid (that was in the international media in 2007 for its anti-Musharraf riots), are known for teaching radically conservative Islam and jihad against Western ideals and the dangers of modern lifestyles. Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, such teachings were openly accepted in Pakistan (Hasan 2007).

However, following 2001, the Global War on Terror’s Coalition turned their attention to the madrassas and mosques in the NWFP and FATA in which the senior Taliban had been taught and whose leaders continued to teach and preach lessons of jihad against the West. Persons in the region who accepted the views of the Taliban turned
against Musharraf because of his support of the Global War on Terror and the Coalition’s operations that removed the Taliban from power. Such dissatisfaction was reflected through the Lal Masjid’s call for Musharraf’s assassination following his announcement of support for the Enduring Freedom operations (Hasan 2007). The grievances against modernization, and now Pakistan’s government, by the students of the radical institutes of these areas justify the rating of “++” under “Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances” in Table 1.

There is no question of the existence of a Muslim population in Saudi Arabia. According to the CIA’s *The World Factbook*, 100% of the Saudi Arabian citizens in the country are Muslim. The score of a “+” (bordering on “++”) in Table 1 under “Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered Grievances” reflects the restlessness of the unemployed, especially among the nation’s new graduates. The unemployment rate was officially reported at 9.6 percent by the Saudi Minister of Labor in May 2004 (Saudi Press Agency 2004). However, external sources, such as the Abu Dhabi-based Arabian Modern Equipment (AME) Information Online, more recently put the rate upwards of 25 to 30 percent.

RAND’s *Ungoverned Territories* study points to the “population explosion” of the oil boom years (1960s-1980s) and to the average Saudi’s negative view of physical labor as significant contributors to the large number of unemployed youth in Saudi Arabia today (RAND 2007, 24). Education is also an issue. A journalist of the Jeddah-based newspaper *Arab News* was quoted in a 2006 BBC article as blaming the Saudi education sector, one “…based on memorizing…[not] on critical thinking” and heavily influenced by the country’s religious leaders. She reported that 80% of the college
students are majoring in history, geography, Arabic literature, and Islamic studies, instead of the “much needed” science, engineering, and medicine (Hardy 2006). The drop in oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s also affected the Saudi Arabian work force, as evidenced by the 40% drop in average income (AME n.d.) and the emergence of “slums” in the 1990s outside cities like Jeddah and Riyadh (RAND 2007, 24).

Besides growing unemployment, one cannot overlook the Saudis who, like Usama, are agitated by their government’s decision to allow U.S. forces to establish bases in a Muslim country. The continued American presence was one of the main motivators behind Usama’s August 1995 letter to the Saudi Arabian government (Wright 2007, 238). Those Muslims who perceive Operations Desert Storm, Northern and Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom as the West’s continuing efforts to destroy Islam see the government’s acceptance of American forces on Saudi soil as heretical, thus inciting hatred and distrust of the Saudi Arabian government.

Those Muslims who have benefited from the oil boom and modernization of Saudi Arabia and who understand the actions taken against the Saddam Hussein regime, the Taliban, and Al Qa’ida have a different perspective of the West’s objectives and the Saudi Arabian government’s internal and foreign policies. Thus Saudi Arabia is given a “+” in Table 1 to represent that part of the population with grievances toward the government and its policies, as well as the positive outlook of the Saudis who understand or support the government’s decisions.

Amenable To External Influences

In order for a foreign entity to successfully infiltrate a community, the community must be willing to listen to what the outside influence can provide. The needier a
population is and the more willing it is to accept foreign support, the more susceptible the population is to AQ’s influence. As will be discussed below, AQ can bring money, resources, insurgency experience and training, and an ideology that provides comfort to those that feel neglected and slighted by their government or rapid modernization.

As discussed earlier, al-Turabi opened Sudan, following the coup of 1989, to any Islamist group seeking similar objectives as Khartoum’s or that was willing to invest in such efforts. In this vein, Al-Turabi pursued Usama and AQ because of the experience that AQ could bring to the other Islamist groups and the massive resources (relative to Sudan’s economy) to which Usama had access (Gunaratna 2003, 39-41). Sudan’s treasury had been decimated by the ongoing civil war with the Christian south and welcomed any foreign investment offered (Wright 2007, 190). Usama’s money and similar goals made him a very desirable investor to al-Turabi.

When Usama first arrived in Sudan, al-Turabi greeted him with a lavish reception, calling Usama “the great Islamic investor.” Usama lived up to this title, reportedly investing over $350 million into the Sudanese government and Sudanese projects. For example, he lent $80 million to the government to pay for much needed wheat, provided hard currency for the government’s import of oil and military equipment, and used his construction companies to aid in constructing an airport, roads, and other much needed infrastructure in the country (Al-Quds Al-Arabi 2001, 1-4).

He also created thirty businesses in Sudan, providing business opportunities and income to the population. These businesses and investments helped Usama secure protection from the Sudanese government, as many established links with political leadership, the military, and Sudanese intelligence. For example, he invested $50 million
in a Sudanese bank that was linked to the Sudanese elite (Gunaratna 2003, 42-43). While AQ was certainly not attracted to Sudan because of the investment opportunities, the special privileges and exalted status that Usama and AQ received because of these investments allowed AQ to use Sudan as an operating and training base...at least until international pressure became too great for Khartoum. Sudan is thus given a rating of “++” in Table 1 as the government was certainly amenable to AQ’s influences and operations as a result of the resources that Usama brought into the country.

Initially in Afghanistan, Usama was a focal point for Saudi Arabia and other foreign investors to funnel much needed money, equipment, and other resources to the anti-Soviet movement (Wright 2007, 109). As Singh points out, Afghanistan’s economy is mainly dependent on outside resources so any supplier of resources or funding is welcome. The Soviets were a significant contributor to the Afghani economy and military, so insurgents fighting the Soviets and their puppet Afghani government had to seek other resources to sustain their efforts (Singh 2001, 15). Usama helped funnel such resources to those fighting the Soviets. More important to his future though, Usama later began to personally recruit, organize, and manage additional resources to support the movement, making him a more significant icon to foreign fighters and investors in Afghanistan.

When Usama returned from Sudan, he represented access to two seemingly enormous coffers of money that the Taliban could use. First, the stories of Usama’s investments in Sudan preceded him. While the Taliban did not like AQ’s methods, they could certainly benefit from such investments as they tried to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan (Wright 2007, 260). Second, Saudi Arabian government officials had told
the Taliban leader, Omar, to monitor Usama and “keep him quiet” (Wright 2007, 256). Omar and the Taliban hoped that by following Riyadh’s request, they would attract Saudi Arabian investments and aid (Wright 2007, 260).

Afghanistan is given a rating of “++” in Table 1 as being amenable to external influences. In a country with limited industrial or agricultural potential (per the World Bank, its GDP in 1980 was $187) and whose infrastructure has suffered due to decades of warfare, external resources are often welcome and can tempt governments to make decisions that may not be beneficial. Usama successfully exploited this resource deficit to create a name for himself against the Soviets and to establish a safe haven for himself, his family, and his organization, even though his efforts and methods were not always appreciated by his hosts.

Somalia presented a different dimension that frustrated AQ attempts to spread its influence and ideologies. Somalia, like Afghanistan, had suffered from civil unrest and was consequently a poor economy. The average Somali was willing to accept foreign aid, but two Somali characteristics challenged AQ influences. First, as pointed out by the Combating Terrorism Center, “…Somalis tend to be suspicious of the motives of foreigners and quick to take offense at perceived imposition of foreign values” (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 30). Reinforced by the strong bond that Somalis have with their clans and/or sub-clans, the clan leader and his directives became a significant counterbalance to any foreign interest attempting to establish long-term alliances or connections.

The second trait that hinders foreign movements is the Somali “culture of negotiation”. Probably due to the traditionally pastoral lifestyle of Somalia and its very
trying climate, Somalis tend to make decisions on the basis of current facts and realities and not on what the future may provide. So in relationships, Somalis will “…recalculate their bargaining position in partnerships on a daily basis” and not necessarily hold to past agreements, especially when it involves foreign influences (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 30).

AQ was able, however, to influence some of the Somali youth through the adventure and prestige that the successful jihadi operations seemingly offered. AQ’s Africa Corps discovered that the youth had not yet had enough experiences with their clan to fully develop strong bonds within it and to understand the importance of such bonds. Additionally, the youth’s foundation in Sufism was immature and could still be molded to accept the Salafi (or Salafabist) ideology. Therefore, the youth were found to be more susceptible to the influences external to the clan (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 23). This part of the population did provide limited numbers of recruits but certainly not the level of support that AQ hoped to achieve in the early 1990s. So Somalia is only given a score of “+” in Table 1 to represent the population’s minimal amenability to being influenced by external entities.

In the northern provinces of Pakistan (NWFP, FATA, etc), AQ offered training and expertise to the Islamist groups that were fighting India for control of Kashmir. AQ selected experts from the mujahidin after the war with the Soviets and used them to train Usama’s rapid reaction force. As part of his vision to support Salafabist and other Islamist movements worldwide, Usama employed many of these experts in the training camps of Pakistani-based Islamist groups, such as Harkat ul-Mujahideen and Hezb-ul-Mujahadin, to enhance their capabilities against the Indian security forces in
Kashmir. AQ trained and encouraged these groups to expand their target sets to include
the Indian capital, New Delhi, and other urban centers to cause the general population to
question New Delhi’s ability to provide for their security, subsequently increasing the
strain on the Indian security forces (Gunaratna 2003, 275-276).

AQ’s success in influencing these local fighters is evident in the abrupt shift in
objectives and rhetoric of their organizations. For example, the Hezb-ul-Mujahidin and
the militant arm of the Harkat ul-Mujahideen shifted from Kashmiri-centric statements to
messages of a “…broader global Islamist war against the West” (RAND 2007, 67). Also,
leaders from Lashkar-e-Toiba, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, and Jamaat-i-Islami publicly
voiced their support for and offered their organizations’ aid in defending AQ following
the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan in 1998 (Gunaratna 2003, 277).

In the heavily Deobandi-influenced FATA and NWFP, AQ’s efforts to expand the
Salafabist influence did not have to first overcome ideological differences, as it did in
Somalia. AQ could focus on spreading its influence through services provided to the local
population. In the FATA and NWFP, AQ’s influence was spread through fighting
alongside the indigenous groups in their incursions into northern India and providing
much needed training (Gunaratna 2003, 276). The Islamist groups in northern Pakistan
welcomed the support of AQ and, in return, provided support to AQ objectives,
demonstrating the successful infiltration of AQ ideals. Table 1 reflects these successes
with a rating of “++” under “Amenable to External Influences”.

There is no doubt that the Saudi Arabian government and population supported
Usama bin Ladin in his endeavors to combat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Usama
began losing Saudi support when he sought its support in his organization’s operations
elsewhere, such as Usama’s plan to overthrow the Marxist regime in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1989 or his offer to lead the operation to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990 (Wright 2007, 175-180). He nevertheless, retained support, albeit primarily financial, among the portions of the population and clergy who endorsed his organization’s attempts to spread the Salafi ideals. A smaller cohort empathized with Usama’s dissatisfaction with the ruling party. It is this grouping that has potential to succumb to AQ’s methods and provide more direct support to its operations.

As discussed previously, the Saudi Arabian government struggles with increasing unemployment amongst educated youth and persons who disapprove of the Saudi Arabian government’s relationship with the U.S. military. The large gap in economic classes following the oil boom, tribal favoritism, and religious differences (radical versus moderate Salafism) also increase the potential of some people to be influenced by extremist groups such as AQ (RAND 2007, 102). Since one of Usama’s goals is to oust the Saudi Arabian regime, any strong dissention within the Kingdom can be exploitable by AQ. As Gunaratna points out, fifteen of the twenty September 11th hijackers and the numerous Saudi Arabian nationals involved in the attacks within the Kingdom in the 1990s and 2000s are evidence of AQ influence in the Arabian Peninsula and “…demonstrate an overwhelming antipathy toward the Saudi royal family” (Gunaratna 2003, 190).

However, AQ does not seem to have had vast success in attracting Saudi Arabians for operations within the Kingdom. Gunaratna wrote in 2003 that “…no-well-defined group engaged in sustained terrorism has emerged in Saudi Arabia” (Gunaratna 2003, 190), indicating the lack of widespread success. Even with the emergence of Al Qa’ida
on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the size and complexity of its attacks seem more on par with an AQ “off-shoot” or novice insurgency than the large-scale, intricately planned attacks in which AQ’s senior leadership traditionally are involved. The successes that AQ has had in recruiting Saudi Arabians to join its ranks and participate in operations outside the Kingdom may nonetheless indicate other factors making operations within Saudi Arabia more difficult (e.g. the Saudi security forces and anti-terrorism programs) rather than a lack of an amenable population. Table 1 has a rating of “+” in the Saudi Arabian column of “Amenable to External Influences” because of the explained potential for AQ’s influence to spread and the recruiting of resources and manpower that AQ has achieved, although there is still a lack of a large following inside the Kingdom that would indicate a stronger susceptibility of the population to follow AQ’s violent movement.

Freedom of Movement Across Borders

This characteristic examines a country’s ability to monitor all that enters its borders, either across terrestrial borders, by way of the coast, or through the airports. Porous borders are a blessing to insurgents and other illegal organizations, as they represent open passage to smuggle people, weapons, money, and other resources into or out of a country. This characteristic is one of the more difficult to counter, but as it appears in the following case studies, simply the perception of a tight security posture can be threatening to a transnational terrorist organization.

Sudan’s porous land borders can be best described by the number of rebel forces and refugees who cross its borders, either to enter or exit Sudan. Along the 435 kilometer border with Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army uses bases in southern Sudan to launch attacks against the Ugandan government. Similarly, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA) allegedly shipped weapons and equipment through Uganda to support the SPLA’s fight against Khartoum. From across the 1360 kilometer border with Chad, the Sudanese Janjaweed militias have raided Chadian villages, while the Chadian government allegedly allows Darfur rebels to kidnap Sudanese refugees in Chad for use in the Darfur conflict (Human Rights Watch 2006). Along the 605 kilometer border with Eritrea, militias such as the Beja Congress and the Rashaida tribe’s Free Lions have conducted attacks against Sudanese forces (RAND 2007, 150). While these groups are not affiliated with AQ, the frequency of their cross-border attacks and movements demonstrate the porous nature of the border. Combined with the freedom of movement that the Red Sea coastline provided AQ in the early 1990s, a rating of “++” is given for Sudan in Table 1.

Border security along Afghanistan’s 5,500 kilometer border can definitely be characterized as porous. The mountainous terrain, vast deserts, and tribes whose territories span the internationally-defined borders have proven daunting challenges to controlling the cross-border movement. In a 2007 UN Office on Drugs and Crime report, the Afghani government claimed at least 167 unofficial border crossings existed along its borders, a number that the UN called “…on the low side” (United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime 2007, 21). The opium drug trade network in Afghanistan serves as a testament to the openness of the borders, as the drug cartels are able to move enough precursors into Afghanistan and refined product out of it to supply over 90% of the world’s opium (Singh 2001, 27; United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime 2007, vi).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the southern and eastern borders were further opened, as the Pakistani government supported the anti-Soviet fighters and, later, the Taliban in an
effort to establish an ally to their north. Pakistan and foreign governments, such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, were able to move manpower, equipment, money, and other resources into Afghanistan to support the conflicts. During this era, Usama took advantage of this border crossing freedom to train foreign fighters at camps in Pakistan in preparation for operations in Afghanistan. With Pakistan’s support to the foreign fighters crossing the border into Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s massive drug export, a score of “++” is given in Table 1.

Security for Somalia has been the responsibility of other countries and the internal clans since at least the coup in 1991, as the central government and national security forces ceased to function or exist. With the clans monitoring only their territories, the neighboring countries and other international forces have been burdened with attempting to secure the 2,340 kilometers of international borders and 3,025 kilometers of coastline. But even if Somalia had a functioning national security force, the borders would present a significant challenge. The border with Kenya to the south is characterized as “…dense forests and savannah” and has many informal crossing points, making it very difficult for Kenya’s security forces to monitor and secure (RAND 2007, 150 and 157). In fact, when Kenya’s security apparatus secured the border during the 2006-2007 conflict in Somalia, more than 1,000 refugees crossed into Kenya each month (U.S. Department of State 2007a). Somalia’s border with Ethiopia is also a savannah, providing limitless informal crossing points. The significant ethnic Somali presence on the Kenyan and Ethiopian sides of these two borders is a further challenge to the security efforts, as the ethnic Somalis will often protect and aid the movement of fellow Somalis as they cross the border.
The Somali coastline is also wide open as the Somali Navy (two patrol craft with guided missiles, four with torpedoes, and several smaller boats) ceased to be operational in 1991 (Pike 2005c). Without a security force to guard the coast or provide centralized port security, the historical smuggling and trade routes have become a lucrative channel for the transport of equipment, people, money, and other illicit cargo between Somalia and the nearby Middle East. The smaller dhows and fishing boats can easily make the short trip from Somalia’s northern coast to Yemen, using the large volume of traffic in the Gulf of Aden to mask their movements. On both the north and east coasts, smugglers can make use of the numerous ocean-going dhows that travel between Somalia, Pakistan, and the Middle East to covertly move illicit goods or people into or out of the region, as AIAI did when moving foreign fighters to Afghanistan (Gunaratna 2003, 208).

The lack of a recognized, authoritative central government and the absence of a military and police force to uphold the laws have sent the country into anarchy, with clan leaders controlling only their territories and interests and no Somali force available to secure the international borders. The ethnic links in the border regions, the terrain, and the large coastline allow smugglers to avoid detection, requiring from them at most the permission of clan leaders who oversee the transited land…which AQ discovered was not always inexpensive or easy (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 20). Somalia’s open borders are given a rating of “++” in Table 1.

As discussed earlier, the Pakistani border with Afghanistan was opened to support the movement of foreign fighters, equipment, and supplies to the Pakistani-supported movements in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. The drug trade that was also discussed highlights the porosity of the border, as much of the drug production is along
the Afghanistan/Pakistan border (United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime 2007, 25).

From here, the opiates travel along well-established routes through the FATA, the
NWFP, and Baluchistan to either Pakistan’s coast or through Iran to Iran’s Gulf of Oman
coast for transshipment by way of the numerous fishing boats and merchant ships plying
their trade along this coastline (Chouvy 2003, 1).

Movement across the borders in the FATA has traditionally not been tightly
controlled for many reasons. First, the political status of the FATA puts the tribal elders
in control of their land and has traditionally limited the authority of Pakistan’s security
forces. The result, as described by RAND, is “…an almost complete lack of state
penetration into tribal societies and high social resistance to government authority”
(RAND 2007, 23). Second, the Pakistani security presence in this border region is
essentially limited to the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force comprised of primarily
members of the local tribes under regular Pakistani Army officers (RAND 2007, 51). The
U.S. State Department, in December 2004, further characterized the security posture in
this area as being manned by, for the most part, corrupt, under-resourced, and untrained
customs officials with “almost nonexistent” immigration procedures (RAND 2007, 57).

The third challenge to border security in the FATA, as well as in the NWFP, is the
Pashtun tribal boundaries that span the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, which means that
tribe members often need to cross the border to see family and friends or to conduct tribal
business (RAND 2007, 57).

The FATA and NWFP border region of Pakistan has benefited organizations like
AQ. The terrain, drug trade routes, and border region demographics create a challenging
security environment for Pakistan’s security force. The political traditions in the FATA
and the limited state security penetration, prior to the government’s 2004 operations in the FATA, meant that persons with amicable relations with the Pashtun tribes could cross the border at will. Furthermore, the Pakistani government’s support of foreign fighters in Afghanistan made the border almost non-existent to groups such as AQ and Usama’s Arab fighters. In the post-2001 era, the special political and security situation in FATA provided a territory where the Taliban and AQ could to launch continued operations, provide support to ongoing cells of resistance, and retrograde to safety without fear of being captured by border control authorities. Table 1 reflects this border-crossing freedom with a rating of “++”.

Saudi Arabia’s border security is challenged by its size, limited road infrastructure, its nomadic tribes, and the annual hajj to Mecca. With 4,431 kilometers of land borders and 2,640 kilometers of coastline, Saudi Arabia has turned to technological solutions to help the border guards monitor cross-border traffic. The authorities have installed thermal cameras along border crossing areas, placed surveillance equipment along the borders and coasts, and employed survey aircraft to monitor gaps in border security stations. Saudi Arabia has also enhanced the road networks in the border provinces to improve the border security force’s ability to patrol the informal crossing sites (RAND 2007, 94-95).

Border security has not always been such a high priority for the Kingdom, however. These efforts were primarily energized by the terrorist attacks and threats that began in the mid-1990s. Not only was the success of terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia embarrassing to the government, but it also introduced a significant threat to Saudi Arabia’s most significant financial resource…the oil industry.
This threat highlighted two other challenges to border security: the pilgrims participating in the annual hajj to Mecca and the Bedouin tribes that populate rural areas along the Saudi Arabian borders. The pilgrims presented the problem of verifying the identities and intentions of several million foreign visitors, as well as monitoring their movements within the country. To address this dilemma, RAND says, “Nearly every Saudi government agency and ministry becomes involved one way or another…,” from policing the border traffic to setting up tented communities to help control and monitor the population (RAND 2007, 85).

The Bedouin tribes present a different issue as they do not cross on a well-publicized timetable as the pilgrims do. Much like the Pashtun in Afghanistan and the FATA, they have family and businesses that span the border regions. Since 1980, the ruling family has taken steps to incorporate tribal leaders into government positions and make them a part of the border security effort. The tribal leaders have positions in regional government offices, are invited to audiences with key Saudi Arabian officials to discuss issues, and have representation in each office of the senior al-Saud princes (RAND 2007, 87). These efforts to build stronger bonds with the tribes help expand the Saudi Arabian security efforts into the semi-private lands of the tribes.

Saudi Arabia is given a rating of “+” in Table 1 as the continued attacks within the country demonstrate that the borders are still penetrable. However, the government has taken steps in the last decade to expand its security influence. Without certainty of safe border crossings, AQ has not been able to aggressively pursue its objective of removing the Saudi government from power and so AQ seeks other territories from which to train, plan, and conduct attacks.
Absence of State Counterterrorism Threat

Similar to the reasons that were given in the previous section regarding the benefits of an open border, the absence of a state counterterrorism threat increases the insurgent’s ability to operate within the country or region. The absence includes not only the lack of a state-run security force’s ability to control law and order within its borders but also the government’s unwillingness to permit foreign counterterrorism forces from entering its sovereign territory to prosecute a known terrorist. Both provide an environment that has a strong potential to become a sanctuary for an insurgent group and when combined with the previous characteristic, a transnational terrorist group such as AQ.

Sudan’s security apparatus, operating under the Islamic objectives of al-Turabi and al-Bashir, protected the radical Islamist movements and therefore presented no threat to AQ. As discussed previously, Khartoum opened its borders after the 1989 coup to any Islamist group that was fighting for a non-secular Islamic government in its native country. As Pakistan was being pressured to register or expel the mujahidin within its borders following the attack on New York City’s World Trade Center in 1993 and numerous mujahidin incursions into northern India, Sudan became one of the safe havens for the fleeing Islamists because of Khartoum’s support to their causes (Gunaratna 2003, 206).

AQ and other Islamist groups enjoyed this sanctuary until Khartoum began to receive international pressure to turn over the renowned terrorist Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, a.k.a Carlos the Jackal, to the French. Al-Bashir’s agreement to allow the French authorities to enter Sudan in August 1994 and “kidnap” Sánchez sent a signal to Usama
that his protection was not as assured as it once had been. The international pressure and
subsequent sanctions placed on Khartoum in April 1996, after being implicated in the
February 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City and the 1995
assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak, further increased the threat to
Usama and AQ, forcing them to depart Sudan in May 1996 (Gunaratna 2003, 213;
Wright 2007, 250). This case study shows how the security environment can be tenuous
as Sudan’s counterterrorism threat rating went from a score of “++” in 1992 to a “--” in
1996. For the sake of the comparison in Table 1, the “++” rating is entered to reflect the
security environment in 1992 when Usama decided to shift his organization’s
headquarters and expand AQ’s base of operations to Sudan.

In the early 1990s, AQ was viewed in Afghanistan as a group of foreign fighters
that had helped remove the Soviet forces from the country. From their somewhat
embarrassing experiences in the mid 1980s, these fighters were probably not seen as
threatening. The Afghans who had bought the myth of the Soviets’ defeat at Maasada at
the hands of the Arabs (Wright 2007, 132-138) and who had seen the benefits of the
resources and training that the Arabs were providing other Islamist groups probably
provided sanctuary to the AQ for their training camps. Consequently, there was little
“counterterrorism” threat from the Afghani tribes alongside of which AQ was fighting in
the continuing civil war among the tribes following the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan.

In the latter half of the 1990s, AQ provided training, resources, and money to the
Taliban, as well as fought alongside them against the Northern Alliance (Gunaratna 2003,
54). These actions earned them an alliance with the Taliban and a pledge from the
Taliban leader Mullah Omar to protect them (Wright 2007, 58). It was during this time that the international community began to recognize the involvement of AQ in the attack on New York City’s World Trade Center (1993), the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak (1995), the attack on the U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (1996), and the near-simultaneous attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998). But as the world was slowly realizing the actions that Usama and AQ were behind, Usama was earning the protection of Omar and the Taliban. As an example of the protection afforded AQ, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the head of Saudi Arabian Intelligence, made two trips to Afghanistan to convince Mullah Omar to hand Usama over to the Saudi Arabian government to stand trial for his wrongdoings. Both times, Mullah Omar, in keeping with the Pashtunwali code of conduct, replied he was not able to hand over a guest of his to another entity that would do him harm (Wright 2007, 303-327).

Afghanistan (the tribes in the early 1990s and the Taliban in the later 1990s) presented a low counterterrorism threat to Usama and AQ. By the time other countries witnessed and experienced AQ’s terror methods, AQ was under the protection of the Taliban, who had a code of conduct that did not allow them to turn over their guests to other authorities. This protection against internal and external counterterrorism operatives explains the rating of “++” given Afghanistan in Table 1.

Somalia presented AQ a more difficult environment to understand and operate within. As there was no state government, there was no counterterrorism threat from a Somali state-sponsored security force…a central security force did not exist. Instead, the role of security within the borders of Somalia was filled by Somali clans, which
presented AQ an unanticipated set of problems which will be discussed in the Somalia section under the next characteristic.

External security efforts during the early- to mid-1990s can be divided into two main arenas. First, the United Nations sponsored a force to provide protection to the humanitarian convoys and aid distribution centers in Somalia during the violent era that followed the ousting of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) mission lasted from April 1992 until March 1995, when the UN decided that the warring clans were not making an effort to end the violence in Somalia. These UN forces, which included the U.S. Task Force that was in place from August 1992 until March 1994, were focused on the warlords and their factions. AQ operations were, more than likely, not of concern at that time.

The second arena is the Ethiopian operations against the AIAI in the Ogaden region along the Ethiopia/Somalia border. The Ethiopian Army conducted operations into the Ogaden region in 1992, 1993, and 1995 to quell the AIAI movement. Much like the UNOSOM forces, AQ was not the focus of the operation and probably was not even considered a target for Ethiopian counterterrorism operations at the time.

Overall, the security threat from state-sponsored counterterrorism forces was negligible during the time period that AQ was attempting to establish its influence in Somalia. At this time, the danger that AQ represented was still largely unknown due to AQ’s own security measures to mask its operatives’ true names and affiliations, as well as AQ’s relatively new and unproven organization being eclipsed in international circles by better known organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This relative anonymity
and the lack of a central security force in Somalia are the reasons for the rating of “++” for Somalia in Table 1 under “Absence of State Counterterrorism Threat”.

The FATA region in Pakistan is governed by local tribal laws and regulations, rather than federal or provincial laws, following the tradition set by the British in the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to Islamabad’s operations in the FATA in 2004, the Frontier Corps, manned primarily by FATA tribesmen, was the only national military force in the region (RAND 2007, 51). As Gunaratna describes, “…the Pakistan Army and its intelligence organization…find it hard to operate freely [in the FATA]” (Gunaratna 2003, 15). Therefore even after Pakistan began receiving international pressure in the late 1990s to control the mujahidin operating from its territories, Islamist groups still were able to operate with little fear of Islamabad intervening, especially groups that were supporting the Pakistani goals of Islamic rule in Kashmir and an Islamic ally controlling Afghanistan.

After the 1999 coup in Pakistan, the new president, General Pervez Musharraf, pursued counterterrorism efforts in the NWFP to address increasing international pressure. He enacted new laws to control weapons, to stop “terrorist fund-raising”, and to ban certain Islamist groups in Pakistan, such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Toiba. By the end of February 2002, Islamabad had detained over 2,000 members of Islamist groups (Gunaratna 2003, 289). Not until 2004, however, did Musharraf take action in the FATA, where evidence suggested the Taliban and AQ had sought sanctuary following the 2001 commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom.

In Table 1, Pakistan is given a rating of “+” because of the relative absence of credible government security operations in the FATA and NWFP regions, as well as
increased support of the Taliban and Islamist groups because of Islamabad’s shifting its internal policies in reaction to Western demands. The action that Islamabad has taken against the Islamist groups has nonetheless been characterized as intermittent and incomplete. Musharraf has had to commit his Army and other security forces against the once supported Taliban and Kashmiri militant organizations, causing many Pakistanis including Army officers, Musharraf’s strongest supporter, to question his “about-face” policy against groups who had been fighting to achieve Pakistan’s objectives (Nayak 2005, 4-6; Tarzi 2006, 2). Musharraf’s policies have ironically strengthened the Pashtun’s resolve to protect fellow Muslims pursued by the Global War on Terror Coalition and to target instead Pakistanis that support U.S. policies against the Islamist groups, putting Musharraf’s future in jeopardy. “Musharraf’s regional policy shifts reportedly also have encouraged some parts of the Pakistani establishment to keep Islamabad’s options open by discreetly retaining ties to Taliban remnants and to militant groups that operate in Kashmir, and to turn a blind eye to activities by all these elements” (Nayak 2005, 6). Without a complete commitment, Pakistan’s ability to fully execute counterterrorism operations in these Pashtun-dominated provinces will be limited.

As Gunaratna points out, “…it was and is difficult to conduct operations inside such a tightly policed state as Saudi Arabia” (Gunaratna 2003, 190). For fear of the oil infrastructure being damaged or the regime losing credibility, the Saudi Arabian security apparatus has taken numerous measures to expand the Kingdom’s ability to monitor its borders, to track and prosecute criminal elements, and to protect its population and critical infrastructure since AQ’s threats and attacks in the mid- to late-1990s. Some of these measures were discussed in the “Freedom of Movement Across Borders” section of
this thesis. Other examples include a $750 million dollar increase in the Saudi security budget from 2005 to 2007; 5,000 security guards employed by Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company (in addition to the National Guard, regular military forces, and Interior Ministry officers); and a countrywide police sweep in 2005 that reduced national crime levels by 50 percent (RAND 2007, 93-103). While AQ has been able to establish temporary safe areas within the Kingdom, Saudi Arabian anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, and law enforcement efforts have seemingly disrupted AQ cells and have prevented their long-term existence and overt operations and recruitment. Saudi Arabia is given a rating of “-” in Table 1 to reflect its counterterrorism successes, albeit not countrywide.

Trusted Local Providers of Security

A secure environment for a wanted organization not only depends on the absence of state-run counterterrorism forces but on the cover and security that the local population is willing to provide. This may be an unwillingness to report the presence of illegal people and conduct of illegal activities or it may be safety from local bandits or warring tribes. Without the local security, the insurgency group must expend time and resources, a costly expenditure as it detracts from the available coffers supporting the group’s operations, providing that necessary layer of security.

In Sudan, Usama bin Ladin and AQ enjoyed security from their hosts who had invited them to set-up AQ training camps and the headquarters in the African nation. Al-Turabi, as discussed, had invited Usama and AQ with the hope of using their experience and resources to train and prepare other radical Islamist groups. Conversely, Usama worked to maintain a close relationship with al-Turabi to ensure the government would protect his organization and operations. Usama also built relationships with the
Sudanese “elite”, the leaders of departments within its government, and the Sudanese intelligence apparatus, thereby forming relationships of dependence on his organization. As discussed in the section titled “Amenable to External Influences”, he established businesses, invested in the economy, and even helped to pay Khartoum’s international trade expenses. To embed AQ within Sudan’s intelligence services, AQ provided counterintelligence services against foreign Islamist groups, identifying spies for Sudanese intelligence (Gunaratna 2003, 43).

In late-1996, the secure environment in Sudan came to an end. International pressure and UN sanctions on Khartoum forced President al-Bashir and al-Turabi to choose between continued support of one of their main investors or international favor by turning over Usama to Saudi Arabian officials. Usama understood that the security that Khartoum had provided him and his organization was no longer available so he would have to leave Sudan (Wright 2007, 250-253).

Regardless of the situation in 1996, Usama had still considered the security environment one of the most important factors in deciding whether to move to Sudan, as evidenced by the four-man team he sent there to assess the operating environment prior to making the final decision to move. In fact, some of the AQ members had shown concern about al-Turabi’s European education, questioning his trustworthiness (Gunaratna 2003, 40-41). The advanced team brought back an encouraging assessment of al-Turabi’s Islamic experience, objectives, and willingness to allow AQ to operate freely in Sudan, which led Usama to agree to move (Wright 2007, 186-187). Therefore, Sudan is given a score of “++” for the secure environment provided to AQ both by the state, as discussed in the previous section, and the population that supported Khartoum’s leadership.
In the 1980s, security for most foreign fighters in Afghanistan was provided by Pakistan. Guesthouses and training areas were created in the border regions with Pakistan. Toward the end of the Soviet war, Usama’s foreign fighters (those who would soon become AQ) began to establish training camps and operating bases within controlled areas of Afghanistan. Presumably, local “security” was provided by those tribes and mujahidin that saw the benefit of AQ’s resources and objectives.

When Usama was planning AQ’s departure from Sudan, Usama looked at Egypt, Somalia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as potential options for his new headquarters. Egypt’s terrain and security forces did not present an attractive environment for AQ and, as will be discussed later, Somalia’s clan structure and distrust of foreign influences was too hostile. Pakistan had been under international pressure to register the mujahidin in its country or arrest them following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and increased Kashmiri militant activity in the early 1990s. This pressure resulted in thousands of mujahidin leaving Pakistan and a deteriorating security situation for AQ (Gunaratna 2003, 47-52). Afghanistan presented the only secure option for Usama.

Upon his return to Afghanistan, Usama learned of a new, growing power in Afghanistan that was unknown to him and his organization…the Taliban. Usama learned that the Taliban and AQ had similar ideals and their leader, Mullah Omar, was a fervent admirer of Usama’s mentor, Azzam (Wright 2007, 256). Usama, realizing the future of the Taliban, began providing money and resources to the Taliban to establish a good relationship and a secure environment for AQ (Gunaratna 2003, 54). To further develop the dependence on AQ, AQ attached the 055 Brigade, a unit of approximately 2,000 experienced guerilla fighters, to the Taliban fighters engaged in the fight against the
Northern Alliance (Gunaratna 2003, 78), a measure that undoubtedly earned AQ the trust and protection of the Taliban soldiers.

From the time of Usama’s return to Afghanistan in 1996 until fall of 1998, Usama continued to court Omar’s protection, but Omar continued to discuss with Riyadh turning over Usama to Saudi Arabia (Wright 2007, 260-304). Omar did not want a foreigner to turn the international community against the Taliban and jeopardize its efforts to conquer the entire country. At the same time however, Omar had promised to protect Usama and AQ (Wright 2007, 281), invoking that part of the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali, called *melmastia*, that prevents a guest from being harmed or surrendered to an outside security apparatus (RAND 2007, 18). Finally in 1998, Usama swore an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar, acknowledging him as the “noble emir” and earning Omar’s promise of security (Wright 2007, 326) and thus the protection of the population that supported the Taliban. Even though a period of uncertainty did exist though between 1996 and 1998, Afghanistan is given a score of rating of “+” in Table 1 to describe the local security environment in 1996 to which Usama and AQ returned, not the more secure environment that was eventually attained following the pledge in 1998.

Somalia appeared to be an ideal location to operate because of its lack of state security influence, its open borders, and the perceived ability to easily influence and recruit the “disaffected and isolated people.” But once in place, AQ discovered that it could not erase ties to a Somali’s clan or easily gain the support of the local populace. AQ also found that lawlessness and its inability to secure long-term allies rendered unacceptable the cost of establishing local security for AQ members and operations (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 19).
As discussed earlier in “Amenable to External Influences”, the Somali “culture of negotiations” challenged AQ’s ability to establish enduring alliances with clans or sub-clans within Somalia. Without strong ties to clan leaders, travel through a clan’s territory proved dangerous and costly. In a letter to AQ’s senior leadership, one AQ representative in Somalia reported using 80 local men to guard eight Arabs while traversing the Ogaden region along the Ethiopia/Somalia border. Another AQ operative wrote of an ambush in the Ogaden region that resulted in the death of 11 of his group and 12 being wounded. The Combating Terrorism Center’s study reported, “[AQ’s Africa Corps] sustained continual leakage through extortion from local clans and unintended losses during transportation as convoys and clan movements fell victim to banditry” (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 15-20). While security may have been assessed as easy in initial planning, AQ quickly discovered that influencing the clans, and therefore receiving local security while operating in and transiting Somalia, was “…constraining their ability to create a secure base” (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 3). Therefore, Somalia is given a rating of “--” in Table 1.

In the FATA and NWFP provinces of Pakistan, AQ has consistently enjoyed the protection of the locals. As discussed earlier in this section, security was provided in Pakistan to Islamists fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. The foreign mujahedin were allowed to operate in northern Pakistan, as they trained and fought alongside the Kashmiri Islamists in India and later with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition to Islamabad’s permissive attitude towards AQ’s operations and training camps, AQ undoubtedly enjoyed, and still enjoys, the protection afforded it under the Pashtunwali concept of melmastia, as well as sanctuary in the radical Deobandi
madrassas, due to the relationships between Usama, Mullah Omar, and their respective movements (RAND 2007, 68-69; Wright 2007, 326). Furthermore, the security agreement that the FATA tribes had with Islamabad that traditionally kept the Pakistani security forces out of the FATA and the populace’s primary allegiance, by far, to their respective tribe leaders (RAND 2007, 52) ensured that Usama and AQ would be protected by the Taliban’s fellow Pashtun in this region of Pakistan. This environment, prior to Pakistan’s 2004 operations into and subsequent active role in the security of the FATA, justifies the score of “+++” given in Table 1.

Saudi Arabia’s vast rural or remote regions challenge Riyadh’s security services to exert their influence in a sustained manner throughout the country. As previously discussed in this chapter, throughout the Kingdom, some Bedouin tribes may feel unrepresented by the government, educated youth with post-graduate degrees are unemployed and unwilling to engage in physical labor, citizens are unhappy with the ruling party, and the jihadi movement is expanding (RAND 2007, 87-103). Each group can potentially be influenced by their “Salafi” brothers in AQ if left unchecked by the government’s security forces and therefore offer a possible sanctuary from which AQ may operate. As evidenced by AQ’s attacks in the 1990s and 2003-2004, its influence has already reached these “ungoverned spaces”, as defined by RAND, and it has at least temporarily established secure areas (RAND 2007, 89). This fact notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia is given only a score of “+” in Table 1 as AQ has seemingly not established as significant a secure network and infrastructure as one might expect, given the myriad of possibilities presented by the abundance of vulnerable population groups.
Conclusion

As demonstrated by the characteristics in Table 1, one would expect AQ to have had its strongest influences in Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Area and the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, while having only limited success in Somalia and even less in Saudi Arabia. An examination of historical accounts of their activities in these countries and the communications between AQ members shows that this is indeed the case. Following the 1989 coup, Sudan was opened to Islamist groups seeking to establish a “pure Islamic government” in their native lands to provide secure locations to train their operatives, organize their operations, solicit funds, and coordinate with other groups. The conflict in Afghanistan brought Muslims together to aid the Afghani resistance against Soviet forces and ended up giving birth to AQ. In their rise to power, the Taliban took advantage of AQ’s resources and, in return, provided sanctuary to AQ members. The border regions of Pakistan served as safe havens to foreign fighters, and later the Taliban, who were supporting Islamabad’s objective of an Islamic ally in control of Afghanistan. The close relationship between the Taliban, AQ, and the Pashtun tribe members in the FATA and the NWFP, as well as the Pashtun code of conduct, ensured sanctuary for the Taliban and AQ in these regions, even in the face of international pressure on Islamabad.

Somalia presented one of AQ’s first challenges to its spreading influence. The Somali’s allegiances to clans, Sufi backgrounds, and traditional distrust of foreign influences made it difficult for AQ to establish a safe haven in this lawless, chaotic country. AQ was able, however, to co-opt some Somali youth, who did not have the strong clan allegiances that the elders exhibited, and did establish a limited presence that
continues today. In Saudi Arabia, it was the government’s heavy investment in the security apparatus and the respected authority of the Saudi Arabian clerics that probably checked AQ’s influence and ability to establish significant safe havens. Persistent economic challenges and an expanding jihadi movement in Saudi Arabia have nevertheless made it possible for AQ to establish limited pockets of resistance to government authority and support for AQ operations.

As demonstrated in the five case studies, the combination of the eight characteristics appear to accurately display environments that are widely susceptible, have potential to be influenced if AQ presents a concerted effort, and those that are not easily infiltrated by AQ. The analysis also seems to accurately identify those aspects of a society that are already challenging AQ’s efforts and those that need additional attention to keep AQ at bay.

As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this hypothesis has relevance in the contemporary environment as the Coalition’s pressure on AQ is forcing AQ’s leadership to seek other locations to establish sanctuaries and other Islamist groups to co-opt to further decentralize its organization. This hypothesis can help identify those locations that may be future targets for AQ’s efforts or that may already be falling under AQ’s influence. In doing so, Coalition engagement strategies can be enacted to address those areas that this hypothesis identifies as overly susceptible in an effort to counter or even preempt AQ’s efforts. Chapter Five will also recommend follow-on studies and analyses that the hypothesis should undergo to refine its definitions and improve its accuracy. While it appears to be valid based on these five case studies, no hypothesis is considered
a law until it is put through additional rigorous testing, passing all efforts to disprove its ideas.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Al Qa’ida’s life span will be determined by the ability and the willingness of the antiterrorist coalition to destroy its leadership, counter its ideology, marginalize its support and disrupt its recruitment.

Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*

“We should neither assume that Al Qa’ida’s members are any more adept at operating in foreign countries than we are nor should we inflate the appeal of their rhetoric or the resonance of their extremist ideology” (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, i). As stated in this quote from General Wayne Downing, U.S. Army (ret), it is just as important for Al Qa’ida (AQ) to know the environment it is attempting to influence and have a strategy that attracts the population to its movement in an effective manner as it is for the Global War on Terror Coalition governments to develop an effective engagement strategy to bolster those aspects of a country’s society that can counter or preempt AQ’s infiltration efforts. This highlights the importance of understanding *all* aspects of the environment in which AQ prefers to operate when analyzing a country’s chances of being infiltrated or influenced. Those countries that superficially may seem to be ideal for AQ may actually have societal norms or lifestyles that turn the population away from its ideology or methods. The hypothesis described and validated in Chapters Three and Four is designed to help analysts more thoroughly examine the cultures of a country or a population when attempting to predict where AQ has the best chance of establishing a sanctuary.

For the strategist and foreign policy maker, the hypothesis highlights those areas that make a country more vulnerable, allowing a *tailored* strategy to be developed to
specifically address the enticing aspects of the environment. A tailored engagement strategy vice a broad, regional “cookie-cutter” strategy can more effectively provide the necessary support to a country and their people to improve their resilience to insurgency-like unrest. In a 2007 Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Robert Berschinski quotes Small Wars Journal author Dave Kilcullen to warn against such “aggregation” or “…lumping together all terrorism, all rogue or failed states and all strategic competitors” when developing strategies to counter transnational terrorist organizations. Berschinski argues that attempting to envelop all the insurgencies and grievances of a region in a “monolithic enemy” results in counterproductive strategies that often fan the flames of the Salafist movement. Instead, insurgencies should be deconstructed and examined at their lowest level. Says Berschinski, “Local and regional insurgencies [should be] evaluated for their specific ties to the global jihad, and these precise links…neutralized” (Berschinski 2007, 12-15).

Example of Hypothesis Application: Kenya

The following example examines the environment of Kenya between 2005 and 2008, to demonstrate the hypothesis’s effectiveness in both areas: prediction and strategy development. Of note, the order in which the characteristics are discussed will be in an order that facilitates “painting the picture” of the contemporary environment in each country, vice the order displayed in Table 2, to help the reader better “visualize” the environment. The table will be presented in the left-hand margin and filled in as the characteristics are ranked to also help the reader track the analysis’s progress.

AQ has had an interest in the Horn of Africa since the early 1990s, when Usama bin Ladin and AQ were invited into Sudan to provide training to and share their
Afghanistan experiences with other Islamist groups that were the guests of the Khartoum government. While there, Usama and AQ took an interest in the numerous conflicts throughout the continent in which Muslim populations were involved, as these represented environments where AQ could support its Islamic brethren and expand its Salafabist ideology (Wright 2007, 225). AQ’s support for the Islamic struggle in Africa continues even today, as demonstrated by: al-Zawahiri’s call on January 5, 2007 for Muslims to “…aid their Muslim brethren in Somalia” (BBC 2007); AQ Strategist Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitmaryam Nasar’s (a.k.a. Abu Mus'ab al-Suri) 2004 recommended opening of a “new front” in the Horn of Africa (Griffin and Scherr 2007, 7); and AQ recruiter Abu Yahya al-Libi’s February 2007 plea for jihadists to aid “…the expulsion of the occupier and his helpers and the establishment of an Islamic state in the land of Somalia” (al-Libi 2007, 6).

The Horn of Africa has provided AQ access to targets central to its objectives. The Horn’s proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the historical smuggling activity between the two land masses has provided established routes for AQ to launch operations against the U.S. and Western forces “occupying” Saudi Arabia, even after Operation Desert Storm (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 5). Today, the Western presence in the Horn of Africa and support for actions like Ethiopia’s December 2006 incursion into Somalia feed AQ’s perception of a “Christian onslaught” (Gunaratna 2003, 202) in the region and serves to motivate AQ and its affiliates to take action.

Recently, Kenya has emerged in many analysts’ minds as a potential magnet attracting AQ’s influence, due to the growing dissatisfaction of its large Muslim population reaching a threshold of international concern, its proximity to Somalia and the
Middle East, and the continued corruption of President Kibaki’s regime. Kenya has the potential for its Muslim population to be infiltrated and recruited by transnational terrorist groups such as AQ. It has been the site of at least three of AQ’s attacks (1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, 2002 STRELA 2 surface-to-air missile attack against an El Al airliner, and the 2002 attack against the Paradise Hotel in Mombassa). Two of the three most wanted African AQ members are Kenyan (D. West 2005, 17). Experts are beginning to look at “weak” states, of which Kenya has been identified, as those that have the strongest susceptibility for AQ’s expansion. The significant corruption, porous borders, and significant Muslim population, as well as the ability of AQ to conduct three attacks previously, all seem to point to an environment in which AQ would thrive. But how accurate are these conjectures?

Many sources approximate Kenya’s population to be ten percent Muslim although some sources claim the percentage to be almost 30 percent (U.S. Department of State 2007b). The Muslim populations are predominantly along the coast where Arab traders historically landed, along the ethnically-Somali eastern border, and along the northern border with Ethiopia where the population has ethnic ties to the Ogaden.

Among these people, some admire Usama bin Ladin for his defiance of the “…global political and economic hegemony of the United States.” Rüdieger Seesemann quotes Kenyan Imam Sheikh Ali Shee as saying, “He is a hero.” While the Islamic community may agree with AQ’s intentions and objectives in principle, the messages delivered by Kenya’s Islamic leadership show displeasure with AQ’s tactics. The Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) issued a statement on the first
anniversary of the U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi saying: “What would be the reason for planting bombs in Nairobi…if not to disrupt the spread of Islam in East Africa, which has been enhanced by the existing peaceful atmosphere?” (Seesemann 2005, 5-6). In a 2007 speech to the Kenyan Muslim Youth Parliament, Chief Khadi, head of Kenya’s Islamic court system, closed by saying “Islam prefers the solving of political problems through peaceful negotiations whenever possible” (Kassim 2007, 4). This distaste for violent action to achieve political goals, at least among the Islamic community leadership, may be the strongest deterrent of internal insurgent-type movements and is probably a significant reason for the relative lack of support, verbal or otherwise, of the various regional Islamist movements, as one might see from Eritrea or Sudan. Therefore, a rating of “--” is given in the “Links with Other Islamist Groups” row.

When examining the Muslim population, one sees that their grievances are like those in other areas of the world in which radical Islamist movements have taken root and attracted AQ, thus a rating of “++” is given in Table 2 for Kenya’s “Significant Muslim Population with Religious-Centered

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Grievances”. The mainly Islamic Coast Province’s tourism and transportation industries are responsible for 35 to 40 percent of Kenya’s revenue, but its population receives a lower percentage of health and education funding from the central government (D. West 2005, 17). Muslims in this province have complained of the government taking Muslim land “by force” and reallocating ancestral property among the national government leaders’ tribes (Kohli 2007). The legality of the Kadhi Courts, which have the constitutional authority to rule over marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other Islamic law proceedings involving only Muslim parties, is being questioned by some Christian groups in the redrafting of Kenya’s Constitution, even though these courts have existed for more than 200 years (U.S. Department of State 2007b). Some Kenyans see an imbalance in the value of an American life versus an African life as the perception is that Western investments in Kenya following September 11, 2001 have been largely centered on fighting terrorism while other sectors of the country are suffering. In comparison, the investment and international interest in Kenya following the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi where over 200 people were killed and 5,000 wounded, many of whom were Kenyan, was significantly lower (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 57-58; Seesemann 2005, 6). Muslims further question the government’s commitment to the Muslim population, as the country’s anti-terrorism and counterterrorism efforts seem to target Kenya’s own Muslim population. This sentiment was reinforced by news that Nairobi deported 19 Muslims in early 2007 suspected of committing terrorist acts in Somalia to Ethiopia, Somalia, and the United States (S. West 2007).
Kenyan Muslims as a whole, however, consistently have chosen a more peaceful approach to address these issues than AQ’s ideology prescribes. As Seesemann describes, the Muslim demonstrations against the seemingly discriminatory GWOT policies and the “...frequent anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstrations in Nairobi” have resulted in only an occasional confrontation with police. Even a 2002 attempt by some mosques to convince Kenya’s Islamic population to boycott U.S. goods in Kenya failed to incite a strong Muslim reaction (Seesemann 2005, 7).

Kenya has 25 official organizations that represent Islamic concerns to the government. Organizations such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), the National Muslim Leaders Forum, the Muslim Human Rights Forum, and the National Muslim Civic Education Consortium act as forums for the Islamic leaders throughout the country to discuss topics of concern to the Kenyan Muslims with the central government (Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance 2008; Kohli 2007; U.S. Department of State 2007b). In the relatively successful democratic transition in Kenya (save for the Presidential election debacle of December 2007), the Muslim vote is a significant minority vote. In anticipation of the 2007 election, Sunguta West described incumbent presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki’s campaign team as “nervous” because of the potential loss of the over 2 million Muslim voters and reported that Kibaki had taken measures to directly address the complaints of these Muslim organizations (S. West 2007).

Seesemann describes the current environment as a “crossroads” for Kenyan Muslims and Nairobi. The increasing awareness of world events, as result of the internet and expanding worldwide media feeds, and the international impact of AQ’s attacks in
the last ten years have increased the sense of Ummah among the East African Muslims (Seesemann 2005, 10-11). Kenya’s Islamic population is increasingly aware of AQ’s messages of action against Islamic oppression and the constant reference to a new “Crusade” against Muslims. While many Muslims believe their religious rights are protected in Kenya, they still feel the impact of Nairobi’s anti-terrorism and counterterrorism efforts, the political challenges of a minority in getting its voice heard on issues such as the Constitution and landownership, and the social, educational, and health disparities between the Muslim communities and the Christian communities (U.S. Department of State 2007b).

Kenya is given a rating of only a single “-” in Table 2 for “Similar Ideology or Strategy”. Kenya’s Muslim leadership continues to engage the government and the Christian community in open debates on important issues affecting Muslim centers, with at least some success as demonstrated by Kibaki’s campaign efforts and the continued defeat of draft Constitutions that would remove the Islamic Khadi court system from the broader judicial system (U.S. Department of State 2007b). These leaders also

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continue to condemn the violence that AQ encourages, even the attacks against the Israeli targets in 2002 (Seesemann 2005, 8). At the same time though, some Muslims feel like second-class citizens and perceive the government to be more concerned about Western investments than their rights as Kenyan citizens. These sentiments could prompt members of the Kenyan Islamic community to turn a blind eye to AQ activities within the country or even to provide support to AQ’s Salafabist movement and take up arms against the government and Western and Israeli entities in Kenya.

A score of “+” is given in the “Amenable to External Influences” row of Table 2 because such an environment in a region with close ties to the Arabian Peninsula provides fertile ground for Arabian investors to fund charitable activities supporting their Islamic brethren. In fact, the number of Saudi Arabian mosques, madrassas, and charities in Kenya has been increasing. According to a regional expert at a Horn of Africa policy and governance discussion at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The marginalization [of Muslims in Kenya] has led to resentment and opened the door to Arab charities, Saudi

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Arabian largesse, and madrassas” (D. West 2005, 17-18). The existence of Saudi investment and the spread of their religious beliefs do not automatically beget Islamic-based insurgencies and violence. In fact, the presence of established, representative Islamic organizations in Kenya has helped temper the spread of such an ideology. However, Salafism does provide common ground in which AQ can more easily establish roots. What remains to be seen is whether or not the current Islamic leadership in Kenya will continue to be trusted to represent Islamic concerns in a peaceful and democratic manner or if some Muslims will decide to circumvent the traditional process and take violent action against the government and Western entities within Kenya.

One action that could help strengthen the indigenous Muslim’s trust in its Islamic leadership would be the establishment of an accredited institution solely devoted to post-graduate studies and research in Islamic fields. Kenya has seven public and seven private universities with post-graduate programs accredited by Nairobi’s Commission for Higher Education, which is further accredited under the UN’s Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Commission for Higher Education 2006). Of these, only Moi University, Kenyatta University, and Maseno University, each located in the predominantly Christian west, offer master and doctorate degrees in Islamic fields, according to each school’s web site. The degrees are in Religion or Religious Studies with programs offering coursework in Islamic Studies, as distinguished from an Islamic Studies degree like that conferred by the institutes mentioned in Chapter Three. In light of five Christian and one Mormon accredited universities, the Muslims view the education system as preferential to the Christian majority. They consider the absence of even a single accredited university in the heavily Islamic Coast Province as an attempt to
restrict higher educational opportunities opened to Kenya’s Muslim population (U.S. Department of State 2007b). The establishment of an accredited university in a Muslim population center would encourage the Islamic leaders to further their education and to train apprentices, thereby strengthening the Islamic organizations and establishing themselves as credible, educated spokespersons for the population. In the absence of a higher Islamic studies institute in Kenya, its Muslim leaders are left to seek education in other countries, risking a more radical influence taking hold in Kenya’s religious minority. Table 2 shows a score of “+” in the “Lack of Institutions of Higher Islamic Studies/Renowned Islamic Scholars” because of the absence in Kenya of an Islamic institute accredited to teach Islamic jurisprudence.

Given the perceived discrimination and the disgruntled feeling among Kenya’s Muslim population, the likelihood of an AQ operative or supporter being turned over to the Kenyan authorities is low. In an informal survey of a diverse representation of Muslims conducted by the Combating Terrorism Center, it was noted that less than 30 percent would report someone who was involved in

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Table 2. Kenyan Analysis
planning a terrorist attack in the name of Islam. A former elected official from the Coast Province said, “I don’t believe any Kenyan Muslim could [commit an act of terror]; but they can know who these people are, and keep quiet, even if they don’t support what they want to do” (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 143-145). The sentiment undoubtedly has increased with Nairobi’s recent deportation of wanted Muslims to Ethiopia, Somalia, and the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, each of which has a negative connotation among human rights advocates (Kohli 2007; S. West 2007). This sentiment is also fueled by Nairobi’s history of mishandling high-profile terror suspects, such as: Rwanda’s most wanted genocide fugitive Felicien Kabuga who lived in Kenya for years without arrest; AQ suspect Harun Fazul who escaped a day after being captured; and all the suspects in the 2002 Mombasa attacks who were acquitted. In fact, a 2006 survey conducted by Kenya’s Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs revealed that only 40 percent of crime victims reported the criminal offense to the authorities (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 53). The fear about reporting a criminal who will likely not be prosecuted and the solidarity about the Muslim’s plight in the contemporary anti-terrorism and counterterrorism environment increase the local protection that AQ may enjoy among Kenya’s Muslim population, and thus accounts for the rating of “++” in Table 2 in the “Trusted Local Providers of Security” row (see next page).

Given Kenya’s porous borders, the population sees the terrorism problem as one for the security apparatus and not for the local communities. In the eyes of Kenyan Muslims, a member of their community could not commit an act of terror; rather, it would more likely be a foreign element operating from within the Muslim centers (Seesemann 2005, 8). Kenya’s almost 3,500 kilometer border with Somalia, Sudan,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia’s Ogaden region make for a challenging border security problem for Nairobi. For example, even after Nairobi closed its 682 kilometer border with Somalia in January 2007, over 1,000 refugees were still crossing into the ethnic Somali regions of Kenya each month (U.S. Department of State 2007a). Kenya’s 536 kilometer coastline is protected by a 13-boat Kenyan Navy, 6 of which were acquired from the United States in 2006 (Ndegwa 2006). While a navy of this size can conduct limited patrols along the coast, maintaining constant coastal surveillance and managing the numerous cargo ships that enter Mombassa, East Africa’s largest cargo-handling port, is a monumental challenge for a force of this size. Regarding the air routes into the country, AQ has made use of Kenya’s commercial air, traveling on forged passports, according to the transcripts from the 1998 embassy bombing trials (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 50). This is easy to understand in a country that is repeatedly among the most corrupt countries, according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. In its 2008

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**Total**
survey, Kenya was ranked 160 out of 180 countries (Combating Terrorism Center 2007, 50-52; Transparency International 2008).

In response to AQ’s proven ability to infiltrate Kenyan borders, Nairobi has accepted outside help in training and equipping its security services. The United Kingdom is providing law enforcement training to Kenya’s police force. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is teaching forensics and investigation techniques to Kenyan law enforcement officials and has established a Legal Attaché Office in Nairobi to foster cooperation. The United States has provided coastal and border patrol training and equipment to Kenya’s military, as well as over $30 million from the East Africa Counterterrorism initiative to enhance border patrol and airport immigration services (D. West 2005, 18). While Kenya’s porous borders warrant a score of “++” in the “Freedom of Movement Across Borders” row, Nairobi’s counterterrorism efforts, professional military, and cooperation in the Global War on Terror present a credible threat to AQ’s operations in the contemporary environment. Kenya is thus given a rating of

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Given the marks described above, Kenya’s overall total in Table 2 is “+4”. This score is comparable to the score for Somalia in the early 1990s (+6). AQ perceived Somalia as an ideal environment from which to operate, but found Somali clan loyalties too strong to greatly influence. Nevertheless, AQ was able to recruit youth to support their cause. One might draw a similar conclusion for Kenya, where the population’s loyalty lies with Kenya’s strong Islamic representation and leadership. As this leadership continues to speak out against violence, engages the politicians, and perceives an equal platform from which to speak, the Muslim centers will support the democratic process rather than the Salafabist ideologies and terror tactics of Al Qa’ida.

**Future Hypothesis Testing Recommendations**

Given the sources described in Chapter Two, this hypothesis appears to be a valid litmus test for an area’s susceptibility to AQ’s influence. Further testing and analysis is required, though, to improve the confidence in its
accuracy. Future development of the hypothesis should include a more detailed analysis of the components of each characteristic to determine if one component is more indicative of susceptibility than the others or if the components of the characteristic must be measured together to accurately predict AQ’s chances of success. Analyzing the components will also provide more fidelity on the grading criteria to improve the hypothesis’s objectivity. The hypothesis would also benefit from quantitative comparisons of the characteristics in cases that allow for a more controlled comparison, possibly through population surveys, or in-depth research into a smaller subset of environments in which some of the characteristics can be held constant while the others are compared. Finally, the hypothesis’s validity would certainly be improved with the additional analysis of the vast amounts of classified data that has been collected on AQ and their associates.

In addition to “tuning” the characteristics, additional analysis can be done to determine which characteristics apply to AQ’s selection of operatives and senior leaders and what additional characteristics or modifications to the existing hypothesis are necessary to accurately predict or identify those personalities types. In areas like Somalia, the environment was not conducive to establishing a sanctuary for AQ. However, AQ was able to recruit some personalities whose clan bonds were able to be overshadowed by AQ’s draw. Saudi Arabia has been a major contributor to AQ’s membership, although the country has been able to limit AQ’s ability to establish a significant sanctuary within its borders. These phenomena indicate that AQ’s influence can still penetrate societies with limited success even if the environment is not conducive to their ideologies.


Significance of the Hypothesis

This hypothesis demonstrates that through analyzing a society’s environment for eight key characteristics, one can predict with some certainty where AQ would have success in establishing a safe haven. The right combination of weaknesses in the identified characteristics appears to make the society very fertile for AQ’s ideologies to take root.

Recognizing these traits, strategists and policy makers can develop more tailored plans and methods to engage a nation and its population to increase its defense against AQ more holistically, instead of using the “aggregate” policies that Kilcullen and Berschinski challenged. As Gunaratna points out, AQ and other Islamist movements can be defeated if the Coalition is willing to “…destroy its leadership, counter its ideology, marginalize its support, and disrupt its recruitment” (Gunaratna 2003, 318). The first is a method that many understand, especially in the militaries of the Coalition hunting Usama bin Ladin and his “lieutenants”, and has a relatively common strategy in any location around the world. The later three require a more thorough understanding of those factors that AQ thrives upon when recruiting and spreading its influence among susceptible populations. They also require strategies that provide individualized aid and training in the areas that are vulnerable. That is where the hypothesis provides assistance…in identifying those vulnerabilities of a given society.

Islamist movements have been defeated or marginalized before, and AQ will suffer the same fate as those that went before it. The solution, however, is not purely military and is not the same in every society around the globe. It requires a myriad of strategies based in understanding AQ and the individual communities of interest. A
proper engagement strategy, demonstrating a concern for the population and the state’s interests and focused in the correct areas, will save resources and time while building the confidence of the global population in the Coalition’s capabilities, efforts, and concern for their security, thus achieving the objectives set forth in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.*
GLOSSARY

fuqaha. The guardians of the Islamic institutions who ensured the political independence of the schools and the training of the Islamic jurists.

jahiliyya. The non-Muslims or “unbelievers” of the world.

melmastia. Part of the Pashtunwali code of conduct that affords a Pashtun host’s protection to anyone who is considered a guest of the tribe.

Pashtunwali. A code of conduct of the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Ummah. United Islamic community
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