BEYOND TRIAGE: THE ESCALATION OF EMPOWERMENT
BY U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN SUPPORT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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M.D.Y., Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, 2007

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2008

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Beyond Triage: The Escalation of Empowerment by U.S. Military Forces in Support of International Disaster Response

This study provides a broad operational-level survey of the conditions for the U.S. military response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004, Operation Unified Assistance, and to the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007, Operation Sea Angel II, observed in relation to the concepts advocated in Joint Publication 3-07.6 Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Bridging the divide between a military culture founded on command and control and a civilian culture dependent on collaboration and cooperation would present opportunities within the complex joint, multi-national, and inter-agency arena. Getting it right in international disaster relief creates a solid foundation for less permissive environments.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work is dedicated unconditionally to our daughter Amelia, without whose light in my life I would never have found the drive to live in the moment and to strive simply to make the world a better place for our children.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Katrina was a watershed moment in American history, exposing the vulnerability of the social fabric of a nation founded on principles of democratic resilience. The rapid breakdown of law and order and the perception of a government that abandoned its people cast the challenges of natural disasters in an entirely new light. The tendency to victimize troubled people in a far off land seemed almost embarrassing when the same conditions of disorder, helplessness, and indifference arose in a modern American city in the 21st century.

The images of the 82nd Airborne Division patrolling in downtown New Orleans, Louisiana in 2005 against a backdrop of reported looting and ethnic tensions stood in unsettling contrast to the ongoing debate over the role and mission of the United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soul-searching for answers to explain the government response to Hurricane Katrina came only months after the U.S. military had demonstrated to the world a sure-footed response to a devastating earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Growing public outcry over the plan for the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing the joint term of “Phase IV Operations” into the mainstream media, furthered the call to redefine the place for America’s military in a post-Cold War, post-9/11, post-20th century world.

Charismatic military leaders like Lieutenant General Russel Honoré brought a no-nonsense, here-to-help professionalism to disaster response that reflected a competency much sought after in times of distress (CNN 2005). In retrospect, however, the “John Wayne” approach of taking charge and getting results elicits a dangerous side effect: the
vacuum of power filled by strong external personalities or forces can just as easily return on their departure. Therefore, in order to successfully respond to the catastrophic degradation of civil infrastructure and the breakdown of social order associated with unexpected natural and man-made disasters, *it is imperative that responding agents and agencies identify and reinforce available local leaders.*

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced on 10 September 2007 that the National Response Framework would succeed the National Response Plan, the over-arching document for managing domestic incidents. The deployment of active and reserve component military forces in support of Hurricane Katrina relief operations in 2005 demonstrated that the U.S. military role in disaster response goes far beyond merely providing logistical support. The national response to Hurricane Katrina resulted in the signing of the National Response Plan in January 2008.

The international community’s complex response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 indicated that the role of the U.S. military in support of national objectives and international responsibilities has not yet been fully articulated when it comes to international disaster relief. The scale and extent of the U.S. military response in conjunction with multi-national government and military contingents, various U.S. government agencies, international institutions, and a mass of non-governmental organizations shed new light on the difficulties of disaster response. The U.S. military response to Cyclone Sidr in 2007 in Bangladesh, far from a repeat of the 1991 disaster in the same country, demonstrated the absolute value of capturing lessons and acting on them.
The “why” the U.S. should be involved in saving lives is not in question, but rather the “how:” how best to balance relief with recovery. Where the military fits in from immediate response to the transition to civil authority. A consistent focus on a logistics-based response– of getting the most food, water, and shelter to the most people in the least amount of time with limited resource commitments– fails to leverage the full capability that the U.S. military can bring to a given crisis. Fixation on departure and fear of “mission creep” can equally damage the enduring strategic impact of U.S. military operations.

**Key Factors**

Three key factors affect the success or failure of U.S. military response to disasters abroad. First, the U.S. military operates in and among the constraints of international law. Observing a jurist approach to the problem places the role of the military in an international context. Second, the U.S. military functions against a results-based standard of performance. Measuring the effectiveness through a realist approach qualitatively places the problem on a state-to-state metric. Third, the U.S. military endeavors to manage expectations of adherence to universal principles. Evaluating the military from a humanist perspective inherently makes the problem personal. The jurist, realist, and humanist approaches drive the levels of analysis throughout the study.

Within the broader context of existing regimes of international law and the advocation of human rights norms, natural disaster response provides a forum for projecting legitimacy and responsible global power, often without the constraints of a culpable enemy, recurring threat, or fear of reprisals. Establishing an appropriate role for military force in a joint, interagency, international environment must focus on
establishing and reinforcing local self-organization capacity rather than a logistics-centric response. The unique characteristics of natural disasters, representing a model for military engagements in a complex, turbulent environment in the absence of a clearly threatening hostile enemy (ie, faultless chaos), provide a starting point for synthesizing the intensity of combat capability with the resilience of peace-building.

The medical concept of triage is an appropriate launching point for discussion of disaster response. A cadre of medical providers and first responders find themselves overwhelmed beyond their own capacity to treat victims of an incident. In extreme cases, those trained to provide aid are victims as well. Providers categorize patients and treat against a measure of success that yields maximum effort to the most treatable. Delaying and/or deferring the treatment of two extremes—the lightly wounded and the mortally wounded—triagetractitians balance necessity against outcomes.

Triage as a model for decision-making insists on the assumption that in an environment constrained by resources where every second counts, assigning an expected survival value to individual cases allows for maximizing the aggregate result. Some patients are assessed and simply not treated, the idea being that the expenditure of resources would not yield a favorable result given the circumstances. Triage provides a clinical calculus that matches conditions to effects. By rounding down the extremes, focused effort is expended on the people most likely to pull through. Although vulnerable to moral dilemmas about assigning a value to individual lives, triage is generally accepted as a method of averting even worse results overall.

Getting beyond triage requires a re-alignment of the direct relationship between victim and provider. When affected individuals are treated as part of the solution and not
merely part of the problem, the potential to energize cascading effects emerges. Using the medical aspect of triage, the best possible scenario is one in which patients turn into providers themselves. Using the decision-making aspect of triage, the best possible scenario is to leverage capability to achieve effects (address root causes) rather than merely address the conditions (treat symptoms). Instead of orienting on those most able to be helped, orient on those most able to help others.

Triage evolved out of response to the realities of the modern battlefield (Iverson 2007, 276-278). It is appropriate, therefore, that the military should re-evaluate the construct of victims and responders in natural disasters with the same level of critical scrutiny imposed on the construct of enemy and friendly in war. In war, enemies have been demonized in order to streamline the discipline of killing in a morally trying environment (Grossman 1995, 161-164). In disaster relief, the victimization of affected populations to elicit support can also backfire. The de-humanization of huddled masses becomes a justification for donor fatigue. Whether in times of peace or war, the objectification of individuals runs the risk of the moral slippery slope. The self-imposed moral comfort of retrospection does not pave the way for clear decision-making in the moment when the stakes are life or death.

Under conditions of violence or the threat of armed conflict, the military determines appropriate rules of engagement for the use of force with two basic premises: the inalienable right of self-defense and the preference to use the minimum force required that matches necessity and proportionality (FM 27-10 1956; FM 3-0 2008, 1-19 to 1-20).

The concept of escalation of force dictates a deliberate decision-making process given the opportunity and allows for an instinctual decision-making process when
conditions demand it. Applied to disaster relief, getting beyond triage requires an escalation of empowerment. With increasingly permissive environments come increasingly flexible opportunities to rely on local capacity for self-help. In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, the avenues available for reliance on local response are undermined. As the situation develops, a constant pressure to build up local efforts should be exerted not with the purpose of allowing the disengagement of outside forces but to ensure the engagement of affected populations with their own well-being.

The hierarchical, scalable, and adaptable methodologies explored in the domestic arena by the National Response Framework suggest an integrative approach that, with some refinement, can be made ready and relevant for the application of joint military doctrine in international disaster response. Moving beyond triage and relying on the escalation of empowerment reframes an understanding of the problems facing societies devastated by disaster.

The typical focus on the quantification of needs and the delivery of matching resources (food, water, shelter, security, reconstruction) with deliberate prioritization decisions to accommodate expected shortfalls in the short term often fails to address the underlying stresses to the victimized or traumatized population. States, institutions, and organizations must deliver the most effective on-the-ground response and not necessarily the most efficient package of aid. Addressing short-term life threatening conditions must account for the long-term environment of rebuilding societies and economies in human terms as well.

Understanding and reinforcing relationships among those in need and those able to provide it is a task that exceeds the infusion of vital outside support. Doctrinally
relegated to a supporting role, the United States military obliges what is asked of it within boundaries of what is legal and what is militarily prudent. Significant capability exists within the military, however, to rapidly assess and then employ a wide range of capabilities oriented on more than the victim-provider relationship. Demonstrating participative involvement builds the perception of resiliency among host nation populations in ways unachievable by methods of “arrive-deliver-depart.”

In the current international environment, the United States military can be expected to continue if not to increase their role in responding to natural disasters (O’Leary 2007). The cost of perceived inaction or indifference toward human suffering places lasting burdens on U.S. legitimacy. Military support operations beyond the borders of the United States are a vital component of overall United States Government (USG) foreign policy.

Military forces increasingly operate in interconnected (not to be mistaken for inter-dependent) relationships with many other U.S. government agencies. The Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency has undertaken a great deal of effort to capture lessons learned in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. While the debate over the range of military options in a domestic disaster is timely and valuable, the world is a much larger place than the United States.

With much of the institutional focus of the U.S. military directed toward combat action and counter-insurgency operations, a complementary analysis of military doctrine for international disaster response may be lacking. The problem is that there may be a gap, lag, or disconnect between existing joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian
assistance and (1) norms for international disaster response law, (2) initiatives for domestic disaster relief, and (3) principles for voluntary humanitarian relief.

**Primary and Secondary Research Questions**

Therefore, the primary research question is: Does current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalize on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework?

The primary research question requires understanding of five subordinate critical issues, phrased below as secondary research questions:

1. What authorities and responsibilities does existing international law impose on U.S. military operations concerning the sovereignty and control of afflicted states?
3. What does existing joint military doctrine discuss as recommended operational methods for the application of military capacity in support of foreign humanitarian assistance?
4. What exclusive capacity, if any, does the U.S. military bring to international disaster response unavailable from Non-Governmental Organizations, International Institutions, and Private-Voluntary Organizations?
5. Does an initial focus on providing logistical support during disaster response supersede critical population needs for situational awareness (what’s going on, who’s in charge, where is my family, when will things change) and self help (who will make us safe, when should we take matters into our own hands).
The first secondary question addresses the factor of international law from a jurist approach. Secondary questions two, three, and four deal with the results-based requirements of a realist approach. The fifth secondary question encourages observation of the humanist principles of the voluntary regime.

Limitations and Delimitations

To be clear, this thesis will avoid the convergence of armed conflict with natural or man-made disaster and focus exclusively on events that, although not free from blame, do not fixate on causality. My research will also be limited to unclassified source documentation and analysis to ensure the broadest applicability of results.

Reference will be made to tools for domestic disaster relief, but only insofar as they have direct application in the international arena. In the context of blame avoidance, the funding processes for disaster response will also not be evaluated. The mobilization of resources and the shaping of public opinion through mechanisms like ReliefWeb, the USG inter-agency transference of funds, and the disconnect between the obligation and commitment of donor support—although important— affect the scale and durability of efforts but are not relevant in this study to the key issues of baseline military effectiveness.

Key Definitions

The key terms and their definitions that follow ground the research and focus the discussion within a unified frame of reference.

Natural Disaster. Conditions that are of sufficient magnitude to threaten life, property, and governance and do not involve partisan armed conflict. Disasters must be
responded to. For this study, natural disasters can be considered man-made (a dam bursting) but not deliberate (arson). The consideration is that wildfires do not target first responders.

**Natural Hazard.** Conditions that may lead to natural disaster. Hazards can be prepared for. Or not.

**Response.** As defined in the National Response Framework, “includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs” (NRF 2008, 1). Prevention, protection, long-term recovery, and restoration activities needed by communities to rebuild their way of life are generally outside the purview of response.

**Foreign Disaster Relief.** As defined in *JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 04 March 2008)*: “prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.”

**Humanitarian Relief.** Provisions for the sustenance of life, reduction in acute suffering, and maintenance of basic dignity, typically temporary in nature. The United Nations defines a continuum from relief to rehabilitation to development (UN GA 46/182 1991 and 60/126 2005).

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** As defined in *JP 1-02*: “programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions
such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or than can result in great damage to or loss of property…The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.”

**Phase.** A purposeful description of limited timeframes bounded by conditions of risk. For example, the response phase of a disaster is immaterial to the ability, purpose, or willingness of forces and organizations to act. Specific descriptive terms will be used with the context of the document specified, i.e. “recovery phase (NRF).”

**Assumptions**

This thesis assumes the continual refinement of U.S. joint military doctrine within bounds of existing processes. Additionally, any directive legislation by the U.S. Congress or any binding international commitments (treaties either bilateral or multilateral) will remain within the general trends of reducing friction and increasing cooperation among major actors in humanitarian relief. For example, if the Beyond Goldwater Nichols project resulted in the rebalancing of the U.S. military requirement for competency in stability operations or if the United Nations empowered a new regulatory body to do for disaster relief what the Peacebuilding Commission does for armed conflict, the basic environment for this thesis would be dramatically altered. Conclusively, the need for USG response to a humanitarian crisis will not be assessed against any current or projected budget shortfalls.
Scope

The scope of this thesis is the enduring applicability of joint U.S. military doctrine, specifically *Joint Publication 3-07.6 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, within the confined framework of U.S. military involvement in disaster response in a foreign state or region. This environment, characterized by international, multi-national, military, civil, corporate, and public involvement with marginally defined authorities and debatable priorities, provides a rich environment for exposing solutions to complex problems without the added complications of recurrence or resistance. In this context, recurrence is not the probability of an event to repeat itself (seasonal flooding) but the expectations of sequential episodes (lightning striking twice). Resistance here is the promotion of agendas by armed conflict and not the omnipresent friction of human society struggling over scarce resources.

Summary

Chapter One introduced the problem of military doctrine for response to international disasters, that there may be a gap, lag, or disconnect between existing joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance and (1) norms for international disaster response law, (2) initiatives for domestic disaster relief, and (3) principles for voluntary humanitarian relief. The primary research question to address the problem is: Does current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalize on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework?
Presenting five secondary questions addressed the critical subordinate issues involved. Limitations and delimitations focused the nature of the research, and key definitions were provided to establish a baseline of reference. Necessary assumptions were drawn to provide the reader with context for the discussion that follows. Finally, in order to manage expectations, the scope of this research outlined the future utility of this work.

In the next chapter a review of the current literature on international disaster relief will be framed in context of the applicability to conducting joint military foreign humanitarian assistance operations. The review categorizes existing work along three themes: the relations of states to states (jurists approach), military forces to states (realist approach), and organizations to populations (humanist approach). These three themes are explored through problems in international law, existing military doctrine, and the structural integrity of humanitarian relief non-governmental organizations.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Earnest discussion and cautionary analysis of how to prepare for a natural disaster predates the written word, yet the usefulness of hindsight can be measured against every village built in the shadow of a volcano or the dense saturation of populations residing in floodplains. Particular to this research, however, is the complex set of relationships between military forces and civil society within the loose framework of the international system. Consistent with approaches to a vexing and seemingly insurmountable problem, significant study has already taken place along several of the relevant thematic axes.

The literature review that follows captures observations and analysis relevant to the primary research question: Does current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalize on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework?

Specifically, the current literature can be assessed as revolving around the following: problems in international law (jurist approach), existing military doctrine (realist approach), and the structural integrity of humanitarian relief non-governmental organizations (humanist approach). The relations of states to states, military forces to states, and organizations to populations provide a meaningful orientation to categorize the complicated horizontal and vertical relationships between major actors in international disaster relief.
Jurist Approach

First, problems in international law help define the pressures that sovereign states must deal with in order to relate to each other. The controversial position taken by the United States government advocating pre-emptive unilateral action to protect the national interest (Bush 2002) simply does not translate well to humanitarian assistance. Although the policy approach of pre-emption appears to have been tempered between the *National Security Strategy* of 2002 and the 2006, the implications of unilateralism remain (Kem 2007, 9; NSS 2002, 15; NSS 2006, 37). The fundamental tenet of international disaster response remains one of *invitation* by an afflicted state. The U.S. refusal of Cuban medical assistance during the Hurricane Katrina response (Zunes 2005) provides a case in point.

Susan Strange examined the erosion of state power in her 1996 *The Retreat of the State*, concluding that the factors which provide exclusive monopolies to the structures of governance are increasingly undermined by the increasingly interdependent international system. The monopoly of the state to exercise the legitimate use of force within its territorial borders is a right directly tied to the responsibility to provide security for the populace. Strange’s assessment of the threat to state sovereignty by organized criminal enterprises, both national and transnational (Strange 2005, 81-82), can also be observed in the catastrophic risks to public safety brought about by natural disasters.

Susan Strange differentiates public confidence in the state and in the economy by describing the changing nature of civil society in terms of time. Trust in the state is developed slowly, while economic risks present themselves alarmingly quickly (Strange 2005, 86). Therefore the ability of a state to retain its power and authority rests on the
state’s ability to meet the demands of crisis without succumbing to perceptions of incompetence or, worse, direct blame for the situation. Asking for and managing outside intervention in the wake of a natural disaster, whether from another state or from a non-state entity, requires acute attention to the potential for undermining state power.

The stresses to state action in the international community are not restricted to the outcomes of cause and effect between states or between states and organizations. The United Nations, specifically designed from its inception without legislative authority over member states, chartered the International Law Commission as a body to study and encourage “the progressive development of international law and its codification” (UN Charter Article 13).

Edith Brown Weiss analyzed the United Nations’ International Law Commission (UN ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts in her 2002 article “Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century.” The Draft Articles, commended by the UN General Assembly and sent for state review again in 2007, propose the relationships of states to the international community within a legal framework and reinforce the concept that internal national laws do not supercede responsibilities among the community of states (UN A/56/10 2001, Article 32). Weiss noted the limited accommodation for non-state actors, at best a minor acknowledgment to the shifts in international law since the establishment of the Westphalian system in the 17th century, as a trend pushed forward by human rights, environmental protection, and foreign investment (Weiss 2002, 809-813).

Following trends particularly relevant to international disaster relief, the UN ILC began work on Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations in 2000 to
address the gap between states and non-state organizations. Establishing the liability of international organizations for wrongdoing under international law, these Draft Articles legally articulate the separation of state-sponsored action from independent international organizations. Chapter II, “Attribution of Conduct to an International Organization,” mirrors the extension of responsibility that a state has for any agent or organ’s action (e.g., a state is responsible for the actions of its military forces). Legally, first responders operating on behalf of the International Red Cross represent that international organization in word and deed the same as soldiers represent their nation.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies provides extensive resources for the disaster response community, notably country studies, echeloned disaster management structures, and explanatory material about disasters with the intent of mobilizing involvement across a broad spectrum. As the world’s largest humanitarian organization, the International Federation relies on a network of National Societies. Of the 192 member states of the United Nations, five do not have National Societies. It is important to note that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) deals primarily with conditions of armed conflict and is a related but distinct organization.

The International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and Principles (IDRL) program, part of the International Federation’s disaster management function, “seeks to address how legal frameworks at the international, regional and national levels, can best address the operational challenges in international disaster relief operations carried out by States, international organisations [sic], NGOs, military forces and private companies” (IDRL 2007).
Horst Fischer’s “A Preliminary Overview and Analysis of Existing Treaty Law” for IDRL surveys the broad array of bilateral and multilateral treaties (the foundation of “hard” international law) that form a patchwork of international agreements, drawing two significant conclusions. First, a majority of available treaties are between European nations, with a “significant absence of treaties concluded at a regional level in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East” (Fischer 2003, 8). Second, despite common themes of: offers and requests for assistance; responsibility and coordination; access of personnel and equipment; relief goods and customs; status, immunities and protection of personnel; and cost sharing, “a majority of the law relating to IDRL remains disparate and inconclusive” (Fischer 2003, 5-8).

The IDRL’s *Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance*, adopted by the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on 30 November 2007, provides non-binding guidance to help facilitate minimum standards of “coordination, quality, and accountability” (IDRL 2007, 1). The document stresses “increasing resilience” and building “regional and international support for domestic capacity” (IRDL 2007, 6). It specifically qualifies the initiation of military relief under conditions of specific request or consent “after having considered comparable civilian alternatives” and with deliberate agreement on details such as length of deployment, armed or unarmed forces, use of a national uniform, and relationship to civilian actors (IDRL 2007, 6-7).

Victoria Bannon and David Fisher compiled their “Legal Lessons in Disaster Relief from the Tsunami, the Pakistan Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina” in 2006 with a similar assessment of the complicated and disjointed legal framework. Describing the
problem of foreign supplies failing to wind their way through customs chokepoints and
the failure of existing procedures to accommodate the rush of support, Bannon and Fisher
review the haphazard response of national legislatures to posture for future calamities.
The lack of binding international legal standards for non-governmental relief operations
contributed to disruptions on the scene as well. They conclude that “there is a clear
tendency for governments and relief agencies to resort to ad hoc arrangements and the
development of policy on the run” (Bannon and Fisher 2006, 3). The implication is that
as the need to increase disaster response capacity is realized, legislation at the domestic
and international level through existing legal mechanisms will increase to meet this
demand.

David Fidler’s 2005 article “Disaster Relief and Governance after the Indian
Ocean Tsunami: What Role for International Law?” refutes the IFRC argument by
aligning the trends of humanitarian law with disaster relief. Rather than streamline
response through internationally recognized standards, Fidler argues that just as the
movement to impose standards of human rights has encroached upon state sovereignty so
to would technical or proscriptive disaster relief commitments. By reframing the issue of
disaster response to one of fundamental domestic capacity to govern, Fidler perceives a
shift by states to resist external pressures to protect their citizens to a standard they may
not be able to while retaining the freedom to chart their own course for building
resiliency or ‘disaster-survival.’ For Fidler, the question is one for states to grapple with
on their own, not one for the international community.

The United Nations and its associated entities have compiled a vast array of
documents, decisions, and protocols for orienting the international community on rapid
action in the face of natural disasters. Essential documents include the ongoing work of
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) through
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), UN Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC), and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
(INSARAG). These organizations have worked out broad standards for what a
successful response should look like, yet they remain fundamentally non-binding.

The IASC’s *Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian
Assistance*, endorsed by the IASC Working Group in November 2007, outlines three tiers
of contingency planning: inter-agency or Common Planning Framework, sector or
Cluster Planning, and organization-specific planning. The functions and interactions can
be loosely correlated to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military planning
with one key discriminator: each level integrates organizations that have no distinct
commonality. For example, a corps, division, and brigade may primarily operate at
different levels, but they remain military organizations. For the IASC contingency
planning framework, government actors, NGOs, international institutions, corporations,
and private voluntary organizations are the building blocks within the planning
environment.

The IASC references include their 2004 *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex
These two documents reinforce the international legal distinction between combatants
and non-combatants and acknowledge the fundamental blurring between roles of armed
forces and humanitarian aid workers in complex emergencies. The basic principles of
distinction, security, and the use of force relevant for hostile areas splinter into issues of
agenda, perception, utility, and consent for disaster operations. The historical association of military forces as belligerents waging war casts long shadows over the perception of military forces operating along an entire continuum of peace to war. The inherent threat of foreign armed forces on native soil, regardless of stated intent, remains a significant component of civil-military relations.

The need to make chaotic and wildly unpredictable interactions understandable leads to the development of rules. From the Newtonian mathematical characterization of models that explain the movement of both planetary bodies and cannon balls comes a meaningful simplification of otherwise seemingly random outcomes. The codification of the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War in Europe continues the historical trend of organizing masses of people through instruments that powerfully constrain and protect interests held in common.

The study of how complex systems organize themselves in order to form a more perfect relationship with their environment rests on proponents who advocate chance and probability. The classic works of Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* for biology and Werner Heisenberg’s *The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory* for post-relativity physics cast the problem of environmental interaction as driven by chance. The very construct of cause and effect came into question. Albert Einstein provided one succinct counter-point to arguments that deeply challenged the issue of free will in a letter to his friend Max Born in 1926 that simply read “He [God] is not playing at dice” (Einstein 2005, 88).

Building on the conceptual framework of the interaction of complex systems at differing scales, from the sub-atomic to the generational, Niklas Luhmann blended the
disconnected and fractious nature of groups into a unified theory for social interaction. His 1984 work *Social Systems* launched on an exhaustive utilization of systems theory to understand social dynamics that incorporated both the flexibility of a self-referential system and the scalable architecture of the biological drivers of component actors. He applied the work of Humbert Maturana and Francisco Varela’s descriptions of awareness and self-organization in their 1972 landmark *Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living* to discuss protections against danger at the societal level. Luhmann’s later works compounded the strengths of his theory’s utility for understanding decision-making in *Risk: A Sociological Theory* and for communicating the place of law in building a resilient society among other societies in *Law As a Social System*.

The intrinsic utility of Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social systems in examining the nature of self-organizing and self-referencing rules, in this case the regime of international law, is the instrumental role of communication and distinction. International law is based on precedent, and only instruments of law decide what is international law. All other factors, issues, or components that are not part of international law can only “irritate” or “perturb” the system of international law (Seidl 2004, 2-4). Recognition of change within international law is just that: within international law. Therefore the abrasion of systems, the boundary interactions between the rules of international law and the needs for international disaster response as an example, draws distinctions between how a system processes (within itself) and how a system interacts (without itself). From this perspective, the legitimacy of action arising from either within the state or outside the state gains a richness of meaning and context.
The international law approach frames the issue of international disaster response in terms of the exercise of state sovereignty, risking demonstrations of state incompetence with the requirement to provide basic governance despite the possibility of overwhelming catastrophe. Considerations for requesting and managing foreign assistance under local direction pose the question: “what will be done?”

Realist Approach

Second, the assessment and revision process inherent in the U.S. military doctrine system is a forcing function for continued relevance. If the doctrine is no good, it doesn’t get used. Eventually, and in many cases regularly, someone will find themselves in the position to update, fix, or simply change the doctrine. Accepting at face value the assumption of time-tested foundational concepts within U.S. joint doctrine (hierarchies of authority, delineation of roles and responsibilities, the consistency of contingency or the “it depends” backstop) can be hazardous.

The functional purpose of doctrine is at its root the facilitation of purposeful activity. A wide range of possibilities exists, from the prescriptive, lock-step recipes for practical drills to the visionary guidelines that encompass the entirely philosophical realm. Doctrine, military or civilian, remains ultimately about getting results. In this context total passivity or inaction can still be considered as a negative value for action. Action and results are the objects of doctrine.

The determination of action as components of a broader activity whose meaning and value is illuminated only in the structural context of actors, processes, and the environment can be found in Soviet research on cultural-historical psychology. Lev Vygotsky, A.N. Leont’ev, A.R. Luria and others struggled to promote Marxist ideology
while re-defining the relationships of individuals to themselves, to each other, to their environment, toward collective goals, and with available tools or artifacts. From early research in the 1930’s Vygotsky developed these ideas in his 1968 work *The Psychology of Art* and his 1978 work *Mind in Society* with an exploration of the role that goals or expectations have on the interaction of cognition and behavior. Similarly Leont’ev’s 1977 *Activity, Consciousness, and Personality* described the connections that allow motives to drive toward goals through activity.

Gregory Bedny, Mark Seglin, and David Meister succinctly traced the acceleration of activity theory toward modern use in their 2000 article *Activity Theory: History, Research and Application*. Paula Jarzabkowski then extended the discussion to explore the nature of contradictions in interpretations in her 2003 article *Strategic Practices: An Activity Theory Perspective on Continuity and Change*. How an actor or actors proceed in order to reach goals through actions based on precedence is a dynamic contest of competing interpretations of the situation (past, present, and future). The more effective the existing patterns in meeting goals the *lower* the drive to change; the less effective the existing patterns or the greater the divergence of conditions from when the previous patterns proved useful the *greater* the drive to change.

Activity theory informs change over time through reliance on interaction between a historical context, actors, and a purposeful subtext of activities. The tools or processes available, both shaped and used by each component (context, actors, activities), endure even beyond the point of their initial refutation. The dynamic patterns examined by activity theory, then, if successful unchanged are persistent and if successful changed are resilient. If unsuccessful they fade with disuse. Using this construct, doctrine plays the
role of dated signposts or shifting weathervanes in need of constant attention if they are
to succeed in directing the potential for achieving lasting results in a turbulent world.

The ideas within *Joint Publication 3-07.6 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* reflect the environment near the time
of its publication: August 15, 2001, just prior to September 11th. Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance is summarized in terms of the utility to U.S. interests (a starkly realist
approach to international relations) with projections that “humanitarian and political
considerations are likely to make HA operations commonplace in the years ahead” (JP 3-
07.6 2001, Executive Summary). This subtle friction between state interest and state
responsibility, a fundamentally political concern rooted in the civilian control of the U.S.
military, is reflected in the changing dynamic between the Department of Defense and the
Department of State since 2001.

Identified by the Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System (JDEIS) as a
publication under review, *JP 3-07.6* is the primary target for the findings of my research.
The signature draft date is December 2008 under the title *JP 3-29 JTTP for Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance*.

National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), issued in August 2005,
re-oriented the U.S. Government roles and responsibilities for reconstruction and stability
within departments and agencies. While issued in the context of terrorist threats and
global risks to national security, NSPD-44 identified the Department of State as the lead
agency for a wide range of “complex emergencies” (NSPD-44 2005, 2) in environments
transitioning into or out of armed conflict. This broad expansion beyond international
disaster relief in a permissive or generally benign environment is caveated with
stipulations that DoS is “to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations (NSPD-44 2005, 2). This guidance frames the relationships required for military operations in international disaster relief to fuse operational realities with political and diplomatic objectives within an immature interagency environment.

Both the articulated and the assumed boundaries of acceptable and expected state behavior frame the United States Government’s strategy toward international disasters. The United States’ Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) operates as the USG lead for disaster response. Their Field Operations Guide (FOG) is the capstone document that formulates doctrine within the parameters of DoS policy, U.S. law and, to a lesser extent, international law. Additionally, the DoS Bureau of Public Affairs offers carefully shaped explanations of the purpose and capacity of U.S. programs and organizations designed to promote U.S. interests.

Subsequent implementation of Presidential foreign policy guidance at DoS centered on the establishment of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the creation of a deployable civilian capacity to perform vital– essentially “non-military”– tasks under the conditions envisioned in NSPD-44. The existing doctrinal standard, USAID’s Field Operating Guide, last updated September 2005, outlines the requirements and procedures for “individuals sent to disaster sites” (FOG v4 2005, xvii). USAID’s OFDA role to assess needs, report conditions, and recommend priorities in support U.S. interests through the embassy’s Chief of Mission are measured against three primary criteria: appropriateness, timeliness, and cost effectiveness (FOG
The themes of cost-benefit analysis and U.S. interests recur throughout the doctrinal literature.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense Directive 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, issued November 2005, dramatically expands on the intent of NSPD-44. It defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions” (OSD 3000.05 2005, 2). This clearly includes intervention and assistance in support of natural disasters whose impact overwhelms a government’s ability to respond, even in times of peace.

While NSPD-44 assigned jurisdictional responsibility to DoS for a wide range of stability operations with potential for hostility or armed conflict, OSD 3000.05 comparatively leveled the playing field. It required DoD to “be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so” (OSD 3000.05 2005, 2) and to do so with the same vigilance and determination historically reserved for combat operations. Particularly relevant to this research, however, is the characterization of the “development of indigenous capacity” as a *long-term goal* (OSD 3000.05 2005, 2). Immediate goals for stability operations are security, restoration of essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs (OSD 3000.05 2005, 2).

The articulation of policy to shape the integration of efforts and agendas underneath the broader umbrella of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government unveils significant underlying gaps between military and civilian cultures. As the separate components of doctrine continue to evolve, the interagency process concurrently responds to tests under conditions of crisis. Challenges as basic as sharing a common
vocabulary or constructing complementary notions of time-periods demonstrate the
systemic complexity and, to an extent, the cultural immaturity resisting broader
integration (Kem 2007, 4-5, 10-11).

The current literature includes several MMAS theses covering doctrinal topics
upon which my thesis builds. Notably, Major Allan Selburg’s *The Adequacy of Current
Interagency Doctrine* explores the basic inadequacy of *Joint Publication 3-08
Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Coordination during Joint Operations*. Acknowledging the unmet need for inter-agency
coordination protocols with case studies of Hurricane Katrina and the Indonesian
Tsunami, Selburg examines the failure of *Joint Publication 3-08* to articulate the
relationship of DoD doctrine with other U.S. agency doctrine. Although in circulation for
more than a year prior to the publication of *JP 3-08*, the National Response Plan, which
outlined the U.S. government approach to domestic natural disasters, was not integrated
into DoD doctrine (Selburg 2007, 54-55). Whether an oversight or intentional, the
disconnect between government agencies appears to be institutionalized.

The National Response Plan itself shifted in January 2008 to the National
Response Framework, a leaner and more approachable document inheriting many of the
key features of interagency relationships. The lag between military and civilian doctrine
identified in 2007 remains.

Major Steven Hildebrand’s 2007 School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph *The New Coin of the Realm: How the Military Services Can Combine
Emerging Warfare Doctrine with Innovative Methods of Interagency Coordination to
Provide Improved Disaster Response and Relief* draws parallels between the
counterinsurgency and disasters. The challenges of hostile actors deliberately attacking government capacity and legitimacy approximate in effect the destruction and disabling wrought by natural calamity. While Hildebrand suggests a non-doctrinal use of existing military doctrine to approach the interagency issue, the failures and successes he describes are fundamentally attributable to the disparity between the application of military resources under existing doctrine and the application of military resources in a dynamic, “learn as you go” improvisation. Deliberate attention to breaking down interagency obstacles is sorely lacking.

The publication of the Department of the Army’s *Field Manual 3-0 Operations* in February 2008 indicates the dawning of a realization within the military culture that the road ahead relies heavily on embracing additional “non-military” ways for success. The need for concerted effort is stressed in the treatment of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Taking the military analogy further, the revolution from defending the flanks of a unit to prevent envelopment in classic ground warfare toward the three-dimensional combined arms maneuver of air and land battle to dominate the enemy now finds a military shifting perspective: the nature of civilians are seen not as operational obstacles but as the objective of operations.

*FM 3-0* recalibrates the lens with statements that “soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them” and that “shaping the civil situation is just as important to success” as winning battles (FM 3-0 2008, vii). This expansion to account for a considerably broader array of variables with which to contend places enormous burdens on the military to quickly sharpen every tool that can be made available to meet the tasks ahead. The idealistic beating of swords into ploughshares at
the end of a campaign now requires the pragmatic use of swords *alongside* ploughshares, the toil of strong hearts with sharp minds to keep hands from becoming idle.

The United States Department of Homeland Security uses the National Response Framework, signed by the President in January 2008, as the holistic integration tool that provides direction and leverages best practices for “all-hazards incident response.” As DoS is the designated lead for stability operations and foreign humanitarian assistance, DHS is the designated lead for domestic incident response. The national interests for protecting the United States domestically are definitive, and resources are allocated accordingly. The insulation of operationally adjacent agencies, whether in the local-to-state or Department of Justice-to-Department of Defense realm, is the primary target of the NRF. Compartmentalization of response procedures or retention of self-defeating “turf battle” siege mentalities interfere in moments of crisis just as starkly as speaking different languages. By forcing discussion on the creation and maintenance of common standards, the NRF is moving forward to accommodate for previous failed efforts.

The intellectual energies devoted to domestic disaster response and incorporated into the NRF will cue application to international disaster relief. U.S.-centric legal and governance realities can be extrapolated onto a global scene. The key components of value of the NRF for my research are the mechanisms of the document itself (“flexible, scalable, and adaptable”) and the categorization of standards for any catastrophic incident.

The doctrinal approach frames the issue of international disaster relief in terms of opportunity cost, balancing the projection of national influence against incurrence of
acceptable risks to military readiness. Considerations for employing elements of national power in concert pose the question: “what can be done?”

**Humanist Approach**

Finally, the integrity of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) stepping up to provide humanitarian relief can be questioned through public opinion, indications of performance, and the durability of their support. Emphasizing the non-governmental facet of NGOs, these organizations operate under the umbrella of existing doctrinal and legal constraints with a very important distinction: they do what they want. Criminal enterprises notwithstanding, NGOs are driven by motivations of their own choosing and supported by their own capacity to sustain themselves. Their financial security and identity is not beholden to a public constituency. NGOs as a whole, therefore, can conceivably conduct operations in a significantly rapid, adaptive, innovative, and novel way should they so choose. The foundation of NGO integrity, then, is their adherence to theoretical or practical models of behavior.

Goal-oriented disaster response, separate from proselytizing religious organizations or purely profit-minded enterprises, tends toward easing human suffering in acute crisis and building the capacity for self-help. Francis Fukuyama’s 2004 *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* describes “a conflict in donor goals between building institutional capacity and providing end-users with the services that the capacity is meant to produce” (Fukuyama 2004, 89). While focused on governance under normal operating conditions, his argument bears direct relevance to an otherwise healthy government enduring the shock of a natural disaster. In real terms the immediate approach of providing remedy through direct material aid or the more
deliberate approach of encouraging self-help lies at the root of the problem. Fukuyama comes down strongly on the side of indigenous capacity building, forecasting grave levels of instability if the state squanders away power to external agents.

Similarly, the full extent of catastrophe comes through in Jared Diamonds’ assessment of fatal societal choices in his 2005 *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. Looking over the historical precipice, he identifies five factors attributable to the termination of a society: infliction of environmental damage, climate change, decline in support from neighbors or trading partners, societal anticipation and reaction to problems, and hostile contact with neighbors (Diamond 2005, 176 and 266). With armed conflict delimited from this research, the remaining four factors provide insight into the vulnerability of states to natural disaster.

Climate change and environmental damage can be tied together as factors largely beyond the scope of intervention. Building a dike to protect against twenty-foot waves risks the thirty-foot waves. Structures designed to withstand earthquakes of magnitude fare better than shacks. Preparing for natural disasters is not the same as defending against them. Soliciting support from neighbors and implementing methods to increase the resiliency of society, however, makes sense. This helps explain the popularity and size of the Red Cross movement compared to professional associations of engineers.

Descriptive insight into the strength of NGOs can be found in two seminal works on psychology and sociology. Abraham Maslow’s 1946 “A Theory of Human Motivation” describes a hierarchy of needs that, conceptually, orders behavior along lines of immediacy to eventuality. Someone with a gun to his head has different needs than someone lost in the woods without food and water. Maslow also accounts for external
triggers, or ‘field’ determinants, that place situational or environmental conditions into play with internal motivations. Kurt Lewin’s work, *Resolving Social Conflicts* and *Field Theory in Social Science*, expresses the complexities of causality and response through the lens of observable structures, providing a methodology for analyzing the interactions of inter-related individual and group dynamics in time. The tension between Maslow’s and Lewin’s understanding of human behavior nonetheless reinforces the philosophical drive for intervention, whether selfish or self-less, for NGOs to promote their principles through action.

The nearly universally applied principle of local primacy of responsibility for natural disaster is found in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which reads: “Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.” Despite this, calls for consensual support continue to face challenges in implementation and execution.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Emergency Relief Coordinator commissioned the 2005 *Humanitarian Response Review* in order to provide an assessment on the entire humanitarian response system’s capabilities and shortfalls. The review examined three networks: the UN, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs. The capacities of the private sector and the military were not analyzed. The recommendations focus on how to integrate response networks in both objectives and methods; how to mesh interoperability with actual preparedness; how to consistently set and measure benchmarks for progress; and how to match
accountability against meeting needs. A major shortfall was identified between the assumed and the actual capacity of the humanitarian system.

Marwaan Macan-Markar’s "Tsunami Impact: NGOs Can Add to Disasters" concisely portrays the seemingly lawless environment from which NGOs spring. Macan-Markar describes an almost carnival atmosphere of unregulated NGOs, citing instances of one group vaccinating children against measles without bothering to maintain any records of who was inoculated or where. Differentiating between top-tier organizations and organizations that jockeyed for photo opportunities on the scene, Macan-Markar outlines the lack of regulation or consistency concerning NGOs.

He cites three existing templates: the IFRC’s Code of Conduct, the Humanitarian charter or Sphere Project, and the Humanitarian Partnership Accountability International (HAP-I) Seven Principles of Accountability. All three discuss the imperative for transparency and accountability toward those in need and imply what the Sphere Project articulates as “right to assistance” (IFRC 2006; Sphere 2004, 5; and HAP 2003). Primacy of effort is directed toward the building of response capacity, but in this framework the capacity is of the relief organizations themselves and not the local structures being supported. Conclusively, however, these three standards for relief organizations are not complemented with any mechanism for enforcement, either professionally or legally.

Placing into wider context the difficulties that NGOs and all others face, Arjun Katoch shapes the environment clearly in “TheResponder’s Cauldron: The Uniqueness of International Disaster Response.” Of direct relevance is his analysis of the presence of the military in natural disasters and the subsequent friction with humanitarian organizations from experiences in conflict areas (Katoch 2006, 157-158). The
establishment of and viability of what is termed a “humanitarian space” by multiple actors becomes a crowded area indeed. The conceptual model of an area divorced from military, political, and profit motives remains a sacrosanct idealization held apparently exclusively by NGOs. An almost romanticized “neutral-zone,” the perception of the environment of a natural disaster as a “humanitarian space” vice an “operational area” helps explains the disconnect between competing and cooperating civil and military agents. The rush to provide aid and support, driven by universal ideals, can run aground of corruption, incompetence, and posturing during response operations.

John Telford and John Cosgrave’s *Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report*, published in July 2006 by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, recommends that the “international community needs a fundamental reorientation from supplying aid to supporting and facilitating communities’ own relief and recovery priorities.” The relationship of NGOs amongst themselves, in context within the international community, and with government agencies complicates the desire to do good with the practical execution of actually doing so.

The voluntary regime approach frames the issue of international disaster relief in terms of moral imperatives, demanding intervention and system-wide cooperative effort despite obstacles to permissive involvement and restrictive structures of authority. Considerations for engaging all available parties, whether legitimate or inappropriate, pose the question: “what must be done?”

**Summary**

The existing literature in total spans an enormous range of sources that bound the problem of international disaster relief, but very little of it actually addresses the specific
challenges of the U.S. military operating in a joint environment under current doctrine in the contemporary operating environment (post-9/11 and post Katrina/ Tsunami). Those isolated works that bear directly on my research largely address the problem from an inter-agency friction perspective (a challenge grappled with by the Beyond Goldwater Nichol’s project, the National Response Framework, and to some extent the Embassy of the Future project) or a doctrine-of-the-moment perspective (cornered into the wider debate of counter-insurgency vice full spectrum operations).

The intent of this work is to critically assess the blocking-and-tackling doctrine of *JP 3-07.6* with a view toward capturing the inertia of the USG focus on domestic response in light of ongoing UN and NGO cooperation. In the realm of international disaster response, the U.S. military must tread carefully and thoughtfully. How we intend to help others help themselves speaks volumes about ourselves.

This chapter reviewed the literature in terms of three approaches to international disaster relief: international law, doctrinal, and voluntary regimes. The consistency of these jurist, realist, and humanist approaches in justifying intervention on their own terms demonstrate the compartmentalization of policy regarding foreign humanitarian assistance. The treatment of military roles and responsibilities under existing U.S. military joint doctrine in the context of rapid repair of indigenous capacity will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter lays out the research methodology used to answer the primary research question: does current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalize on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework? The process described in detail below takes two condition sets, the Department of Defense response to the Indonesian Tsunami of 2004 and the Department of Defense response to the Bangladesh Cyclone of 2007, and evaluates *Joint Publication 3-07.6 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* in three steps.

First, doctrinal screening criteria are applied. The international law or jurist approach measures Go/ No-Go or Pass-Fail criteria to ensure that current military joint doctrine conforms to normative standards of international law.

Second, an operational level assessment is conducted using the construct of an analytic wargame. The doctrinal or realist approach establishes the broad assessment of each condition set (tsunami and cyclone response) as an overwhelming success, success, failure, or catastrophic failure.

Third, the results of the analytic wargame provide the basis for evaluating the doctrinal evaluation criteria. Against the voluntary regime or humanist approach standards, the performance of current military joint doctrine is measured as more or less ideal in terms of overwhelming success, success, failure, or catastrophic failure. An overall doctrinal assessment captures the process with summary findings that will drive future research.
Condition Sets: Indonesian Tsunami 2004 and Bangladesh Cyclone 2007

The condition sets are not case studies. Limited to unclassified source material from military, non-governmental, and open source media publications in print and on the web, the DoD response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 (Operation Unified Assistance) and to the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007 (Operation Sea Angel II) provide a backdrop for evaluating current military joint doctrine. Attempts are not made to evaluate whether an action or outcome in Aceh, for example, was a direct result of deliberate application of a doctrinal construct, a coincidental alignment of decision-making with method, or an act of initiative to adapt or innovate as a workaround to inadequate doctrine. Rather, the known facts or reliable assumptions about the conditions will be used to decide if, given these circumstances, existing doctrine applies.

The baseline source for the condition sets is the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COEDMHA), a DoD entity that reports directly to U.S. Pacific Command. COEDMHA’s stated mission is to “improve civil-military coordination internationally, particularly for humanitarian assistance, disaster management, and peacekeeping… primarily through training and education programs, consultations, and information sharing” (COEDMHA 2008). With the potential for errors of omission or institutional bias taken into consideration, collaboration with COEDMHA provided valuable unclassified primary source material and after-action review analysis whose audiences demand transparency, accountability, and professionalism. The use of lessons learned reveals relationships between expectations (before and during) and outcomes (after) that are richer than merely investigating the chain of possible causes and
effects. The use of condition sets de-emphasizes the “how did we do” and explores “how can or how should we be doing it?”

## Doctrinal Screening Criteria

The first step in the analysis methodology is the application of doctrinal screening criteria. The screening criteria are derived from the International Disaster Response Law, Rules, and Principle Programme. The international law or jurist approach requires a formalized Go or No-Go determination. A No-Go drops the argument of whether current military joint doctrine operates into a murky, gray, quasi-legal area– much like the question posed in the literature review of the unilateral response doctrine in international conflict. A No-Go for the purpose of this research for any of the four screening criteria enumerated below will immediately prejudice any further assessment.

The four doctrinal screening criteria are as follows. First, disaster relief must be initiated with the consent of the affected State. This is the baseline normative reliance on sovereignty. Second, there must exist explicit consent for military relief. Forgiveness after the fact is impermissible. Third, a comparison of civilian alternatives must be made. In terms of international disaster response law, military forces are, as in central banking, the “lender of last resort.” Fourth, the terms and conditions for military operations must be agreed to. Latitude exists in this criterion, with flexibility favoring the nature of the crisis and the willingness of the state to assume risk. For obvious reasons, a deliberate parliamentary process resulting in mutually agreeable conditions in the form of a bilateral agreement is less likely than a tacit “don’t bring weapons in and leave when we tell you” agreement. Consensus building demands luxuries of time and willingness to compromise.
rarely present in crises during which *who* makes the decision is often more important than *what* decision is reached.

The first step of the analytic process helps answer the following secondary question: what authorities and responsibilities does existing international law impose on U.S. military operations concerning the sovereignty and control of afflicted states? In addition, analysis of Operation Unified Assistance and Operation Sea Angel II under the doctrinal screening criteria sets the stage for the analytic wargame.

**Analytic Wargame**

The second step in the process is the conduct of an analytic wargame. Originally conceived in the 1950’s to understand the relationship between opposing commander’s choices for different courses of action in a tactical engagement (Haywood 1950 and Haywood 1954), the analytic wargame exposes relationships and outcomes of competing interests within the limits of information available (Ravid 1989 and Cantwell 2003). Bridging the heightened uncertainty of life and death choices in combat with the orderly rationalization of available options in rules-based games, the analytic wargame concisely frames probability for action in terms of likelihood of desirable results.

The inherent utility of this method rests on the nature of game theory. Non-zero sum games like the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in which two players are faced with two choices— cooperate or defect— capture intricacies of behavior that link the gradation of increasingly beneficial outcomes with increasingly unstable control of those outcomes (Dresher 1961, 1-5; Tucker 1983, 228). Understanding the rules of the game is the gateway to playing, much like adherence to international law is a pre-requisite to legitimate participation on the international stage. Understanding the other players at the
table, however, is the crux of the challenge of winning. Gaining insight into the other players, however, only illuminates the intangible goal of predictability. The difficulty of winning a single encounter eases with the shading of the value of choices over repeated exposure to multiple encounters. Simply, the more a learning player plays the better the player gets (Pareto 1897, 493; Nash 1950a, 21-24; Axelrod 1980, 4; Sen 1993, 527). Distribution of understanding over time is key.

Consideration for a non-actor in game theory is also possible, in which the roles, relationships, and responsibilities of a “player” are in fact relatively fixed in pursuit of a single strategy (the State, for example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma) (Tucker 1983, 228). In this way, the specified operational environment stands in for Player A (condition sets), and the doctrinal requirements (“strategy” rule sets) step up for Player B. The one-time evaluation of results can therefore suggest deeper relationships for multiple iterations in the future.

Modified for the purpose of this thesis, the analytic wargame conducted takes the two condition sets, the Tsunami response and the Cyclone response, and assesses them against three requirements. Each interaction is described in terms of doctrine (expectation) and outcomes (results): what are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats presented. Strengths and weaknesses reflect the single-step analysis of the particular condition sets. Opportunities and threats represent future implications for repetitive encounters.

The two condition sets have been described above. The three requirements are derived from the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework (NRF). The primary NRF requirement, that governments are responsible for the
management of their own emergency functions, is incorporated in the international arena as the screening criteria described above. Therefore, the three NRF requirements used in the analytic wargame are: (R1) Coordinating Initial Actions; (R2) Coordinating Requests for Initial Support; and (R3) Identifying and Integrating Resources and Capabilities. The NRF requirement for coordinating communications is used below as evaluation criteria. Figure 1 graphically represents the relationship of the condition sets and requirements used in the analytic wargame resulting in the initial assessment.

![Analytic Wargame](image)

Figure 1. Analytic Wargame
The resulting assessment for each condition set across three requirements yields either overwhelming success, success, failure, or catastrophic failure. These are defined in terms of the payoff for the two “players:” condition sets and requirements. When the payoff both for the condition sets and requirements is high, overwhelming success results. When the payoff for the condition sets is high but requirements is low, success results. This indicates a “workaround” for existing doctrinal requirements to “get the job done.” When the payoff for the condition sets is low but requirements is high, failure results. The requirements simply do not address the needs of that particular condition but is otherwise tenable. Lastly, when the payoff for the both the condition sets and requirements is low, catastrophic failure ensues. This represents a fundamental disconnect between the pressing needs of the crisis and the ability of the requirements to grasp those needs. Figure 2 charts the scoring relationship for results. Again, the results of the analytic wargame orient on joint military doctrine and not the particular DoD response itself.
The engagement of joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance to meet requirements under conditional needs occurs in the analytic wargame. The resulting match, setting the requirement for coordinating initial actions against the environment of the Tsunami, for example, yields a decision of doctrine and outcomes in terms favorable or unfavorable to meeting the needs and in terms favorable or unfavorable to meeting the requirements. The contact points of the three systems— the conditions exposed by the response, the requirements imposed on doctrine, and the position of doctrine on the matters themselves— score indelible marks on the relationships that define value for each of the systems separately. These multiple contact points can then be assessed in terms of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
The relationships and outcomes observed in the analytic wargame process help answer the following secondary questions:


R2: Coordinating Requests for Initial Support. What does existing joint military doctrine discuss as recommended operational methods for the application of military capacity in support of foreign humanitarian assistance?

R3: Identifying and Integrating Resources and Capabilities. What exclusive capacity, if any, does the U.S. military bring to international disaster response unavailable from Non-Governmental Organizations, International Institutions, and Private-Voluntary Organizations?

The realist approach results of the analytic wargame will then carry over to the evaluation criteria in step three.

**Doctrinal Evaluation Criteria**

The third and final step of the analysis methodology takes the results of the doctrinal screening criteria and the analytic wargame to assess the doctrinal evaluation criteria. The voluntary regime or humanist approach incorporates the analysis described above and measures against standards of being *more* ideal or *less* ideal. The two resulting analyses of the Tsunami response and the Cyclone Response are evaluated against three criteria derived from the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) Code of...
Conduct, the Humanitarian Partnership Accountability International (HAP-I) Seven Principles of Accountability, and the Sphere Project Standards.

The evaluation criteria are: transparency, accountability, and participative local capacity. In this context, transparency requires outside agencies or entities access to DoD operations to the maximum extent allowable. Accountability reinforces multilateral decision-making that directly affects others, encourages understanding explaining decisions and actions, and allows for the management of consequences of those decisions and actions. Participative local capacity is the cornerstone of the response: the commitment to partnership, mutual reliance, and the respect given to vulnerable populations to avoid their objectification as hopeless and helpless. For each of the three evaluation criteria, more is better.

Each response will be categorized against each evaluation criteria as again either an overwhelming success, success, failure, or catastrophic failure. The evaluation criteria results score the needs of the conditions and the utility of doctrine in meeting the requirements. The discussion of doctrinal evaluation criteria will help address the final secondary question: Does an initial focus on providing logistical support during disaster response supersede critical population needs for situational awareness (what’s going on, who’s in charge, where is my family, when will things change) and self-help (who will make us safe, when should we take matters into our own hands)? An overall doctrinal assessment for each response will be summarized as depicted graphically in Figure 3.
This chapter framed the research methodology used to answer the primary research question: Does current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalize on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework?

Working through the process of the screening criteria, analytic wargame, and evaluation criteria, the five subordinate questions are also addressed. The analysis and findings presented in the next chapter answer these questions.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the three components of the research methodology and describes the themes, patterns, and relationships that answer the five secondary research questions. Together, this evaluation at the operational level of Joint Publication 3-07.6 Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance answers the primary research question of whether current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalizes on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework.

The analysis follows the research methodology described in the previous chapter using a three-step model. The three steps are the doctrinal screening criteria, relying on a jurist approach; the analytic wargame, leveraging a realist approach; and the evaluation criteria, weighing the humanist approach.

Policy considerations are first explained to provide a historical context for the analysis that follows. Next, the condition sets of the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 and the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007 are briefly described to shape the environmental context.

The three steps for analysis are then presented in turn.

The analysis using the three-step model lays out the relationships between the two condition sets and the five baseline priorities of coordinating response actions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework for domestic disaster. The baseline priorities are: (1) managing emergency functions, where affected governments are responsible for the management of their emergency functions; (2)
coordinating initial actions; (3) coordinating requests for initial support; (4) identifying and integrating resources and capabilities; and (5) coordinating communications (NRF 2008, 36-37).

First, the consideration of doctrinal screening criteria addresses the Department of Defense response to requests for support in terms of the management of emergency functions of a sovereign state. The norms and customs of the jurist approach are derived from the International Disaster Response Law, Rules, and Principles Programme. The doctrinal screening criteria establish the relationship of U.S. military forces to other agencies within the international setting. The analysis of results yields a GO/NO-GO measurement, where a GO indicates agreement with international law and a NO-GO indicates significant friction that must be dealt with in order to proceed.

Second, the results of the analytic wargame examine the relationships between the two condition sets and the three results-based response actions: coordinating initial actions, coordinating requests for initial support, and identifying and integrating resources and capabilities. Here the strengths of joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance operations lead to potential opportunities and the weaknesses of the doctrine pose threats to mission accomplishments. The analytic wargame results provide context using the two condition sets, Operation Unified Assistance (the U.S. military response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004) and Operation Sea Angel II (the U.S. military response to the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007). The results-based orientation of the realist approach focuses on the relationships of U.S. military forces within the operational setting.
The analysis of results for the analytic wargame takes into account both the expectation (doctrine) and the results (outcome), so that high payoff for both the conditions and the requirements scores overwhelming success. High payoff for the conditions with low payoff (excessive divergence) for the requirements scores success. Low payoff for the conditions and high payoff for the requirements scores failure. Low payoff for both scores catastrophic failure, where both expectations and results leave in their wake unmet needs.

Third, the consideration of evaluation criteria based on humanitarian assistance principles draws on the response action of coordinating communications to qualitatively examine the performance and effectiveness of the Department of Defense responses guided by joint doctrine. The code of conduct, principles, and standards advocated by the humanist approach and adhered to by the voluntary regime for humanitarian assistance are the benchmarks for success. The evaluation criteria draw out the relationship between the U.S. military operational environment and lasting strategic impacts. The analysis of results concludes with a scoring along the same metric of overwhelming success, success, failure, or catastrophic failure and an overall assessment of doctrine against the standards of the principled humanitarian ideal.

Following the analysis, findings that address the five secondary research questions are given in sequence. The findings presented align the five secondary research questions with results from the three-step analysis. The triangulation of the three steps, each positioning the analysis from the perspective of a different analytic lens, provides a coherent balancing of potential bias or oversight. An interlaced relationship is presented, overlapping the five response actions of the National Response Framework and the five
secondary research questions summarized below. A summary reviews the analysis and findings, and the chapter is concluded.

1. Authorities and responsibilities imposed by international law on U.S. military operations for foreign humanitarian assistance.
2. Alterations to the interagency operating environment in light of DoDD 3000.05 (2005) and DoDD 5100.46 (1975)
3. Recommended operational methods for the application of military capacity
4. Any exclusive capacity that the U.S. military brings to international disaster response.
5. Relationship of an initial focus on logistical needs over meeting local population needs for situational awareness and self help.

Policy

DoD Directive 5100.46 “Foreign Disaster Relief” in December 1975 created the basic mechanism for interaction between the Department of State and the Department of Defense for the initiation of foreign humanitarian operations. This policy remains in effect. The process occurs sequentially: the Department of State first determines that foreign disaster relief shall be provided. DoS then communicates to DoD the following: which countries and/or organizations are to be assisted; the form of assistance; the type and amount of materiel and services; fund allocation information; and any additional information as required. DoD then responds rapidly “subject to overriding military mission requirements” (DoDD 5100.46 1975, 2). Compliance remains the prerogative of DoD. This particular policy mechanism remained fixed in place, while other significant components of the interagency operating environment have since received considerable Executive and Congressional attention.
Within DoD, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reforms re-oriented the Services to operate and function as a joint force. Changes at DoS in 2006 with Transformational Diplomacy to work “with other people, not for them” (Rice 2006) demonstrate resolve to refocus both diplomatic culture and its perception abroad. Meanwhile, the international community has seen a dramatic rise in the number and influence of NGOs since 1975 (Strange 2005, 94-95 and 170-171; Fukuyama 2004, 60). In response to these changes, DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” from November 2005 greatly expanded the mandate of the armed forces.

While preserving the policy established in 1975 and with it the relationship of DoS and DoD in initiating foreign humanitarian assistance operations, DoDD 3000.05 required military forces to give priority to stability operations “comparable to combat operations” (DoDD 3000.05 2005, 2). An analysis of the response actions for Operation Unified Assistance in 2004 and Operation Sea Angel II in 2007 provides findings insightful into the shifting relationships brought about in November 2005. Written in August 2001, JP 3-07.6 continues to lag behind.

**Condition Sets**

The use of condition sets allows for analysis that examines both expectations and results. Case studies typically orient on the outcomes of a historical event with deliberate attempts to rebuild a chain of causality to elucidate salient points. Under the construct of an analytic wargame, the condition sets presented here play the role of an actor with needs to be fulfilled against requirements of doctrine. In this way, the process of achieving results is on par with the results themselves. Especially when it comes to issues
of sovereignty, self-help, and humanitarian assistance, who makes the decision is as important as what the decision itself is. The condition sets used are the Department of Defense responses to the Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunami in 2004 and to Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh in 2007. Brief explanations for each follow in order to provide historical context.

Explanation of Condition Set 1: Operations Unified Assistance

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale created a tsunami in the Indian Ocean that devastated a multi-state region, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. There was little to no warning. The U.S. Department of State requested immediate Department of Defense support. On December 27, U.S. Pacific Command issued orders preparing for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to Marine Forces, Pacific. December 28 III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) formed the nucleus of the newly designated Combined Joint Task Force 536 (later re-designated a Combined Support Force). The first military Disaster Relief Assessment Teams deployed to Thailand the same day. The mission stated:

CSF-536, in support of USAID/OFDA, provides humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief support to the governments of Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia and other affected nations in order to minimize the loss of life and mitigate human suffering. On order, transition U.S. military HA/DR activities to designated agencies and/ or host nations, in order to facilitate continuity of relief and redeployment. (Dunard 2005, 5)

The CJTF Commander, Lieutenant General Blackman, led the U.S. military response through to transition with civilian authorities on February 12, 2005. Operation Unified Assistance engaged 36 national militaries and over 500 NGOs, IOs, and
government agencies. The Tsunami killed over 225,000 people and displaced over 1 million more.

Explanation of Condition Set 2: Operation Sea Angel II

On November 15, 2007, Cyclone Sidr made landfall in Bangladesh with 150 mph winds and massive flooding. The Government of Bangladesh issued evacuation orders 27 hours prior to the expected landfall. Government response centers were established and USAID/ NGOs pre-positioned supplies and equipment. A U.S. Army Pacific medical team was in place on November 16. The same day U.S. Pacific Command issued orders to direct preparations for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. On 17 November the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific directed the deployment of the 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST), which arrived in Bangladesh on November 18. On November 21, the Bangladesh Chief of Army Staff accepted offers of U.S. military aid for water purification, lift and medical activities; USAID officially requested DoD assistance with transportation; and DoD released executive memo authorizing USPACOM to provide HA/DR to Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh issued blanket diplomatic clearance for U.S. Navy vessels and U.S. aircraft in support of humanitarian assistance on November 22. The mission stated:

On 26 November 2007, U.S. Embassy Bangladesh, USAID, and 3d MEB conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in partnership with the government of Bangladesh and host nation agencies in order to reduce further loss of life, mitigate suffering, reduce the scope of the disaster and set conditions for transition of sustainable efforts to the government of Bangladesh and NGOs. On order, transition recovery operations to appropriate government agencies and redeploy forces to home station. (Young Brief 2008, 23)
Brigadier General Bailey commanded the U.S. Marine component, 3 MEB, through to transition and redeployment on December 9. Rear Admiral Pottenger commanded the Combined Task Force 76 U.S. Naval component, including the 11th and 22d Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and the USS Kearsarge and the USS Tarawa. Operation Sea Angel II retained Service-component emphasis command relationships, with the 3 MEB and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) coordinating with the Government of Bangladesh, U.S. Embassy, USAID/ OFDA, and numerous NGOs. The Cyclone killed over 3,500 people and forced the evacuation of over 3.2 million more.

Condition Set Norms

Condition sets 1 and 2 provide the basis for analysis throughout the chapter and will be referred to as the Indonesian Tsunami or Operation Unified Assistance and the Bangladesh Cyclone, Cyclone Sidr, or Operation Sea Angel II. Operation Sea Angel refers to the response to the Bangladesh Cyclone in 1991. The Indonesian Tsunami is also referred to in source documents as the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. It is understood that the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 had impact regionally, affecting several countries directly and many more indirectly, and the name is used as a convention for clarity only.

Analysis

Screening Criteria

The doctrinal screening criteria examined each condition set, the Tsunami response and the Cyclone response, in terms of four rules-based elements of international
law. Developed from the International Disaster Response Law, Rules, and Principles Programme, the four screening criteria for military action are:

1. Disaster relief initiated with consent of the affected state
2. *Explicit* consent for military relief
3. Comparison of civilian alternatives
4. Terms and conditions for military operations agreed to

A brief description of the results for each condition set will be followed by an analysis of the results with an emphasis on the communication and observation of norms dictated by international law.

**Tsunami 2004**

The sudden onset nature of the earthquake, Tsunami, and aftershocks in the Indian Ocean delayed understanding of the full extent of the damage inflicted, but the assessment that the damage would be overwhelming came immediately (Telford 2006, 32; Dunard 2005, 7). The call for international assistance in general and the consent for military relief in particular occurred within the first day and matured throughout the crisis. The number of foreign national tourists in the affected area also played a role in the pressure for broad international response (Telford 2006, 38). Comparison of civilian alternatives took place, but mostly as an issue of controlling their sequencing and timing. In many cases too much uncoordinated civilian support created its own friction (Telford 2006, 55; Macan-Markar 2005). Lastly, the terms and conditions agreed to for U.S. military support relied heavily on the existing multi-lateral relationships built up through recurring regional exercises (DRW 2005, 7).
Cyclone 2007

The ability to track the building storm meteorologically allowed the Government of Bangladesh to conduct preparations for the potential effects of Cyclone Sidr, to include issuing evacuation orders 27 hours prior to the actual landfall (Young Brief 2008, 4). Consent, to include the expectation of possible U.S. military involvement, occurred in conjunction with the storm’s arrival. A U.S. military medical team was coincidentally already deployed to the area for a routine mission. Forward positioning of international civilian agencies early on indicated the need to complement civilian capacity with military alternatives in the short term. Despite the employment of a military Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team within two days, diplomatic clearances and a formal acceptance of military aid did not occur until nearly a week after Cyclone Sidr hit (Young Brief 2008, 8; Reagan 2008, 9 and 18). The terms and conditions for military assistance appeared to have been gradually worked out after the fact, with a case in point showing a lack of clarity for casualty evacuation procedures for host nation civilians that nearly resulted in bypassing the local health care system (Young Brief 2008, 9; Reagan 2008, 3).

Analysis of Results

The screening results above provide a basis for analyzing the first screening criterion: disaster relief must be initiated with consent of the affected state.

Joint doctrine addresses the requirement of consent for approval in three ways. First, by clarifying the authority of the National Command Authority to direct foreign humanitarian assistance missions. Second, by describing the primary role of the U.S. Ambassador in offering assistance and/ or gaining host nation approval for involvement.
Third, by referencing the U.S. legal framework that dictates Department of Defense involvement in foreign humanitarian assistance (JP 3-07.6 2001, I-3 and II-2-3). While not in the military chain of command, the Department of State provides the Department of Defense with the U.S. government “green light” for consideration of executing foreign humanitarian assistance. Exception is made, however, for extreme circumstances.

Very similar to the principle of the inherent right of self-defense for military rules of engagement, commanders of military forces retain an authority to act on behalf of victims “at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so” (DoD 5100.46 1975, 3 and JP 3-07.6 2001, C-2). The authority of a military commander to act essentially “without permission” as a representative of the U.S. government bridges the policy framework with the historical legacy of the duty to render assistance at sea. The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea in Article 98 dictates that rescue should be made with “all possible speed” unless such action would jeopardize their own safety. Joint doctrine is therefore in concurrence with international law in reinforcing the concept that governments are responsible for the management of their emergency functions.

The affected state is responsible for requesting or accepting offers of assistance from the United States. The U.S. Ambassador is the gatekeeper for any USG response. With the exception of the specific circumstances stated above, military assistance falls under the scope directed by the Department of State. Even when a military commander unilaterally acts under the authority of immediacy, resolution of action taken is directed as soon as practicable. In the current environment of global communications, the
expectation appears to be that a commander would notify appropriate channels within a matter of hours and coordinate further diplomatic actions within at most a matter of days. The rule, then, that military doctrine outlines is that disaster relief is initiated with the consent of the affected state. This consent is communicated from the Department of State to the Department of Defense.

The broad consent required by the first screening criterion then narrows the focus to the specific requirement posed by analyzing the second screening criterion: the explicit consent for military relief.

The request for assistance or the acceptance of an offer of assistance encompasses a broad spectrum of possible responses. For the purpose of this research, the focus is on military relief. The most concise rationale for the requirement for explicit consent for military relief is discussed in joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance on the topic of intelligence gathering. Non-governmental organizations and international organizations (NGOs and IOs) “must not have the perception that their neutrality is compromised by providing intelligence to the military” (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-15). These “sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated by working with military organizations” (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-15) are not limited to NGOs and IOs: host nation cultural and political sensitivities to any foreign military presence are rooted in the clear relationship between U.S. military forces and U.S. national interests (JP 3-07.6 2001, II-13, II-14). To paraphrase a divisive saying, one man’s aid worker is another man’s collaborator.
In order to justify the explicit consent dictated by the second screening criterion, consideration and balance must be provided with an analysis of the third screening criterion: comparison of civilian alternatives.

The role of U.S. military forces as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy to attain national objectives abroad begs the question for any host nation: why not just request civilian alternatives? A brief discussion of three possible relationships between military capacity and civilian capacity will prove insightful for the remainder of the analysis. Consider two blocks, one military and one civilian, on either end of a seesaw.

The first relationship is one in which the military and civilian blocks are on opposite sides of the fulcrum. Depending on their weight in relation to each other, they compete to tip to seesaw closer to the ground and thus have more impact toward the host nation. A second relationship is one in which the military and civilian blocks are on the same side, each pulling together. In this way, they coordinate and provide more support than either one individually could. A third relationship, more in the spirit of the seesaw, is one in which the seesaw is initially empty. The military block arrives and tips toward supporting the host nation. Once the civilian block arrives, the military block must exert additional energy, timing, and coordination to get the civilian block on the seesaw and itself off.

This carefully orchestrated collaboration most closely resembles the joint doctrine construct of adding value as needed, when needed, and how needed as an intermediate step to facilitate both rapid response and deliberate “gapless” transition to civilian capacity (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-25; DRW 2005, 16). Hence the comparison of civilian alternatives is a matter of when and not if. Military doctrine adheres conceptually to what
is explicitly stated in a DoD policy memorandum: “DoD is a provider of last resort in
disasters because other agencies, both within USG and internationally, are designated as
the primary responders to disasters” (DoD SO/LIC 2004). The employment of U.S.
military forces for foreign humanitarian assistance clearly removes them from attending
to other military operations. Withholding a force prepared for a contingency operation,
standing idly by within operational reach of a humanitarian catastrophe, also figures into
the political calculus of the employment of the U.S. military toward U.S. national
interests.

The mutual understanding of matching needs and capabilities derived from the
third screening criterion generates the conclusion of analysis that examines the fourth
screening criterion: terms and conditions for military operations are agreed to.

The central theme balancing host nation requests and military necessity is one of
clearly defined relationships. Joint doctrine emphasizes the utility of concise mission
statements, realistic objectives, and deliberate transition criteria (i.e., exit strategies) (JP
3-07.6 2001, IV-5, IV-11-12, and IV-22-26). Host nation concerns vary from anything as
flexible as transit of military personnel into and out of the area, as simple as weapons
posture (armed or unarmed), to as complicated as air traffic control (Reagan 2008, 2 and
9; Young OPSUM 2008, 12). While joint doctrine spends considerable effort covering
rules of engagement and legal considerations, the emphasis is placed on the commander’s
role in protecting service members from host nation laws through status of forces
agreements (JP 3-07.6 2001, Appendix A). Broader clarification on the negotiation and
common understanding of the terms and conditions for military forces at the outset of
foreign humanitarian assistance operations would enhance the merging of military and civilian culture in times of crisis.

For the two condition sets, the analysis drew clear indications that the first two screening criteria, the consent of the affected state reinforced with the explicit consent for military relief, are “gateway” measures for U.S. military involvement in foreign humanitarian assistance operations. The third screening criterion, comparison of civilian alternatives, is a “threshold” measure for broadening and reinforcing the legitimacy driving decisions for criteria one and two. The fourth screening criterion, terms and conditions agreed to, is a “progressive” measure with baseline initial requirements that allow for considerable improvement over time. The relationships of the condition sets to further requirements proceeds with the analytic wargame.

Analytic Wargame

The analysis of the analytic wargame that follows consists of explanation and scoring of the engagements between each of the two condition sets– the Indonesian Tsunami response and the Bangladesh Cyclone response– and each of the three requirements– coordinating initial actions, coordinating initial support, and identifying and integrating resources and capabilities. Analysis of the results of the analytic wargame derives strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance operations with an emphasis on the production of outcomes.
**Tsunami Response.**

Requirement 1: Coordinating Initial Actions

The nature of a sudden onset natural disaster with little or no warning, as with the case of the Indonesian Tsunami, limits the preparation phase of coordinating initial actions and sets the framework for a reactionary response. Joint doctrine emphasizes under these conditions the criticality of assessing the situation, where intelligence preparation drives the quality of planning and execution (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-1 to 4). The outcome resulted in an enormous response from the U.S. military that struggled to assess the operation as it unfolded. Planning and execution began with minimal information, the magnitude of the disaster changed daily, and the phasing of the operation (deployment, execution, transition, redeployment) wound up occurring largely simultaneously (Dunard 2005, 22). Given the circumstances, the U.S. military sought to “go large,” deciding it was better to send too much rather than not enough. The initial tasking of 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) quickly followed with the addition of three disaster relief assessment teams (DRATs), a Carrier Support Group, an Expeditionary Support Group, forensic teams, contracting officers, an air detachment (Dunard 2005, 7-9).

Options presented themselves in the Tsunami response for military forces by the sheer enormity of the disaster. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) later described the “unprecedented” military response in the region in terms of complexity and re-iterated that “the force required to support the relief must be flexible and scalable” (DRW 2005, 7 and 11). This view reinforces the baseline construct of the National Response Framework and supports joint doctrine’s strengths in planning and execution.
In light of the significant U.S. military combat power sent to the region and their need to integrate operations with United Nations entities, international and national non-governmental organizations, and national government structures in several states, the name of Combined Joint Task Force 536 needed to be changed. The military reliance on command and control (C^2) needed to incorporate the other actor’s method of collaboration and cooperation.

The designation of Combined Joint Task Force 536 as a Combined Support Force reflected the need to shift perspectives of C^2, with LTC Robert Krieg, lead planner for mobilization operations, reporting: “This is a very unique organization here in that it's more of a cooperative arrangement…It's not a command structure" (Quigley 2005). The diversification of the decision-making structures to accommodate a wide range of activities in support of the host nations shared a common goal: provide appropriate aid where needed and ensure a consistent matching of capabilities to requirements (DRW 2005, 16).

The Tsunami response in coordinating initial actions resulted in overwhelming success. The limited initial information available led to a robust force structure. The enormous scale of need was met with an equally enormous scale of initial response.

Requirement 2: Coordinating Requests for Initial Support

The need to discover missing information in the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami and the difficulty in sharing information held in isolated processes severely hindered the coordinating of initial support. Joint doctrine places demands on information for internal use while placing controls on information for external dissemination (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-14 to 15). Even in cases where information sharing was encouraged, the
standing procedures and information systems did not readily break the barrier to the open
civilian system (Dunard 2005, 29-30; DRW 2005, 22). Elsewhere, large file format
geospatial intelligence products had to be express mailed or hand carried to host nation
leaders simply to get the right map to the right meeting (Dorsett 2005, 17).

Lack of aggressive efforts to de-classify types of information that might
significantly improve the ability to save lives can be a very real threat to the success of
foreign humanitarian assistance operations (DRW 2005, 3). Looking at the Tsunami
response, immature methods to fuse and disseminate information and requests across the
classified/ open-source divide standing between military forces and civilian organizations
caused disturbances both ways. From an execution perspective, the limited distribution of
geo-spatial information products impeded such basic coordination as determining where
on the map a specific event was occurring. From a planning perspective, a robust
mapping of logistical and infrastructure capabilities (airfields, ports, fuel depots, etc) in
foreign countries prior to a disaster could have come across as imperative for the military
(DRW 2005, 7) and invasive for sovereign governments.

The Tsunami response in coordinating requests for initial support resulted in
failure. The entanglement of information security and information sharing supported the
joint doctrine requirements for internal controls but led to debilitating friction among
partners against the backdrop of the volume of requests. Additionally, the number of
NGOs feeding into (or off of) the support system intermittently overwhelmed the
handling of requests (Telford 2005, 92-93,118-122).
Requirement 3: Identifying and Integrating Resources and Capabilities

The level of destruction and the lack of warning, combined with the volume and diversity of actors providing support to local governance, generated extraordinary levels of need and a commensurate level of effort to gain traction and move forward. Joint doctrine offers an array of planning factors to instigate a thoughtful yet rapid pathway for response. The planning factors are arranged into a series of questions seeking clarity for how to define success, how to build relationships, how to encourage mutual understanding, and how to match logistics with cost control measures (JP 3-07.6 2001, J-1 to J-2). The complexity of the multi-national arrangements in the Tsunami response was exacerbated by the impact of numerous pockets of disconnected local governance. In Aceh province, for example, four percent of the population was killed, to include some 60 senior leaders of civil society; 5,200 staff from local authorities; and 3,000 civil servants (Telford 2005, 42).

The outcomes of the Tsunami response relied less on the logistical capacity available to the U.S. military and more on the advantages of command and control. The World Food Program, identified as the world’s largest humanitarian assistance organization, reflected, “the military was the only organization that had the resources required for the initial response to a disaster of the magnitude of this tsunami” (DRW 2005, 8). Similarly, the United Nations Joint Logistics Center observed that “no other organization could have done what the militaries did to support the tsunami relief efforts and that the size of the disaster and complexity of operations justified immediate response by the military” (DRW 2005, 18).
The component of coordinating the flow of aid in a complex environment superseded the actual volume of aid itself, where the “military served as a ready reference for local nationals, other militaries, foreign volunteers, and NGOs/IOs/International agencies trying to locate where areas were in need of support” (DRW 2005 13). The factor of exclusivity is addressed in context of time: “deployment of military assets to support a relief effort buys time for the international agencies and organizations which do relief for a living to marshal and deploy their expertise and resources” (DRW 2005, 3 and 8). The intent remains the immediate relief of human suffering followed by eventual reemergence of local capacity. The military acts as a placeholder for stability, setting the conditions for transition to civilian assumption of involvement.

Voids in cross cultural awareness, however, caused turbulence to the success of the Tsunami response in two related ways. First, with the U.S. military acting as an instrument of national policy and the civilians operating “on principles of neutrality and impartiality” (DRW 2005, 3) an inherent divide existed. Second, the devastation of local governments posed severe challenges to the military to coordinate relief activities in a vacuum. In some instances no local officials were available, and in other instances many host nation military members were on leave to take care of their own families during the crisis (DRW 2005, 14-15).

The Tsunami response in identifying and integrating resources and capabilities resulted in success. The flexibility with which command and control added equal or greater value to the supply of logistics than the actual logistics provided, leveraging the power of military organization skills, inverted the priority need in favor of capabilities rather than resources. Needs were met in the short term with an over-abundance of
support, especially when there was little or no local leadership present to further integrate the assistance.

Cyclone Response

Requirement 1: Coordinating Initial Actions

The advantage of having even a short amount of early warning for a natural disaster becomes clear when posturing presence ahead of the crisis. The Government of Bangladesh leaned forward and made deliberate arrangements as it became apparent that Cyclone Sidr would affect the coastal regions of the country in a major way. Joint doctrine promotes the direct linkages of organizations through the use of liaison officers, either from the military to an organization or from another agency or both (JP 3-07.6 2001, E-1 to E2). Reaching back from crisis action planning to contingency planning—even if on a tightened timetable—enables greater latitude in setting up protocols for response actions. Determining where and with whom to engage in Bangladesh rested on bracing for and easing tensions of individual and organizational personality.

Coordinating initial actions for the 2007 Cyclone Sidr response was largely in the hands of liaison officers (LNOs) sent forward. The integration of LNOs between military forces, the U.S. country team, and USAID reduced the impact of understanding capabilities, so much so that the operational summary refers to embedding LNOs as a “best practice” (Young OPSUM 2008, 13). Discussing the culture differences between Marines and U.S. DoS Foreign Service Officers, a military recommendation to “influence a generation of FSOs” to appreciate “how focused we are on mission accomplishment” would help reduce the shock that “our presence during crisis, can be intimidating for many embassy personnel” (Reagan 2008, 8). In the particular case of Bangladesh, the
military found itself relying on strong DoS, DoD, NGO, and government of Bangladesh relationships to mitigate friction based on lack of trust between NGOs and the government of Bangladesh (Reagan 2008, 5).

The Cyclone response in coordinating initial actions resulted in overwhelming success. The reliance on early outreach between actors as suggested by doctrine reduced the potential for delay in approval of decisions vested in the Government of Bangladesh. While often not as rapid as U.S. military forces would have preferred, the pace set by the host nation met their needs. Patience and responsiveness facilitated the receptiveness of a government without particularly strong ties to the West in general and the United States in particular.

Requirement 2: Coordinating Requests for Initial Support

Translating expectations into reality during the response to Cyclone Sidr unfolded progressively. The coincidental presence of a military medical unit in the region and the real-time tracking of the storm by international monitors drew out refined options for deliberate requests for help. Joint doctrine states that a joint task force is “the most common type of organizational structure used for FHA” based on the inherent suitability of being adaptive, capable, and rapidly deployable (JP 3-07.6 2001, III-1). Delineating lines of command authority, mission responsibility, coordination, and communication are also key to the structuring of a military force responsive to meeting requests.

During the Cyclone Response, the question of organizing U.S. military forces did not result in the creation of a joint task force as recommended by joint doctrine, resulting in “unity of effort but not unity of command” and the observation that “designating a JTF would have provided clarity and reduced friction” (Young OPSUM 2008, 8). The
designation of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST), and robust aviation command and control, however, enabled the U.S. military forces to mesh command and control of U.S. forces with cooperation and collaboration with the Government of Bangladesh and NGOs (Young OPSUM 2008, 3,4, and 12). Worth noting is the pre-mission training emphasis on cultural sensitivities that would frame the scope of the operation (Young OPSUM 2008, 6).

Binding organizations together requires effective communication. In addition to the classification of intelligence and information, the levels of handling and disseminating data must be considered. Emphasis was placed during the Cyclone Sidr response on the requirement that “the proper balance of tactical, operational, and strategic communications are in place to effect coordination of all parties involved” (Young OPSUM 2008, 13). The dynamic of knowledge as power can undermine as well as enhance relationships. Subtle and unintended marginalization of key players can result from something as simple as a request forwarded to one agency and not copied to another.

The Cyclone response in coordinating requests for initial support resulted in success. By avoiding the creation of a joint task force, the U.S. military cobbled together a suitable response to the conditions presented by and to the Government of Bangladesh but degraded the ability to functionally handle internal and external communications.

Requirement 3: Identifying and Integrating Resources and Capabilities

From the outset the U.S. military response to Cyclone Sidr was designed to be logistics-centric. Joint doctrine emphasizes a “retail-centric” model of logistics where logistics bases are “as close as possible to the relief recipients” (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-7).
Allowances are made to ensure that the logistics concept mutually supports the operationally strategy, but the warning against the undesirable consequences of relief recipient “migration” away from their economic and social areas is clear (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-7). The accommodation of NGOs and Bangladesh authorities into the relief distribution system divorced the U.S. military logistics plan and created an aid flow with numerous intermediaries.

The emphasis on delivery of supplies during the Cyclone response focused the military advantages that would be brought to bear on the situation. The commander’s intent left little room for interpretation: “We are here at the invitation of GOB and will remain until the major critical items associated with the disaster relief have been delivered” (Young OPSUM 2008, 6). The three step plan consisted of (1) establish liaison and posture for support; (2) distribute supplies in coordination with the Government of Bangladesh; (3) transition U.S. relief efforts and redeploy (Young OPSUM 2008, 7).

The initial configuration for the provision of humanitarian assistance flowed supplies using the “ship to shore” model, where military forces used tactical lift for delivery to relief agencies that would then distribute the aid (Young OPSUM 2008, 14). Without sea re-supply, however, the subsequent flow of aid went to inland airports (Young OPSUM 2008, 7). Mobile medical units and water purification systems pro-actively addressed the impending possibility for disease and took into consideration long-term effects of the crisis (Young OPSUM 2008, 14). For example, the Government of Bangladesh turned down on-hand reverse-osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs) from the military in favor of commercial water purification units provided through
USAID (Young OPSUM 2008, 15). Bracing against dependence on the military demonstrated an appreciation of the temporary nature of military commitments to foreign humanitarian assistance.

Further integration challenges faced the military during the response to Cyclone Sidr. In one instance, the planning structure for military operations ran up against the Government of Bangladesh decision cycle, the result being “to press the HN to plan for more than three to four days out would be counterproductive” (Young OPSUM 2008, 6). In defining priorities even of military operations, the U.S. military recommended opening a secondary air/sea port in order to increase the flow of aid into the country. The Government of Bangladesh, however, was “comfortable with the tempo of the operations” and did not concur (Young OPSUM 2008, 10).

The Cyclone response succeeded in identifying and integrating resources and capabilities. The logistics plan met the needs of the conditions at the expense of adherence to requirements to holistically integrate resources and capabilities. Success in this manner sacrificed efficiency—both in time and volume—for effectiveness, namely the level of control and participation of the Government of Bangladesh.

Analysis of Results

The subsequent analysis of the results of the analytic wargame draws out strengths and weaknesses of joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance that present opportunities and pose threats for future operations.
Strengths.

The strengths of joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance in coordinating initial actions are the reliance on planning and preparation, establishment of standing procedures within the military, and the incorporation of lessons learned into training for future operations. JP 3-07.6 frames foreign humanitarian assistance operations in the context of military operations other than war, specifying that the military take a supporting, not leading, role (JP 3-07.6 2001, I-1). The existing organizational structures within military formations (joint doctrine at the operational level emphasizes joint task forces) are designed to be flexible and capable. For example, the standing capacity for a crisis action team can recommend a rapid reorganization to create a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST), or a Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) (JP 3-07.6 2001, II-8-10). These teams focus on integration (HACC), assessment (HAST), and materiel coordination (LRC).

Another strength of joint doctrine is the stress placed on the supporting role of the military, “designed to supplement or complement” efforts of other agencies (JP 3-07.6 2001, I-1). The military focus is to fill in gaps, inherently examining the difference between the pre-disaster baseline and current unmet needs. Thus the scope of the operation drives the both the endstate and the mission statement.

An additional strength is the emphasis at the outset on setting out realistic transition criteria. Firmly establishing the measures for success (what) in order to determine the timing for handover (when) demands understanding of the arbitration of disputed measurement (who). One method has been described as movement from “a push effort to a pull effort and then to a pull-from-others effort” (Daniel 2006, 53). Not to be
mistaken for the “exit strategy” sought after in combat operations, the transition from military to civilian control aims to leverage the speed of military responsiveness with the depth of civilian capacity.

The scale of the operation balances military capability with military necessity as a function of speed. More is not necessarily better, but sooner is almost exclusively better. Scaling the force size requires the commitment of a military organization that best matches the projected provision of assistance. A challenge exists in matching the positive impacts of military effort with the negative potential for a massive influx of even apparently “benign” combat power. The challenge of perception for freedom fighters and terrorists applies comparatively to the sighting of a rescue ship on the horizon and gunboat diplomacy.

Other strengths of joint doctrine, then, leverage the reinforcing advantages of equipment and personnel constantly working together. While a joint task force may combine elements as diverse as aviators, physicians, and truck drivers, the integration of tasks and the allocation of resources occur under common operating procedures distinct to the military. The issue is not one of total scale, like comparing the economy of the United States to the economy of Brazil, because the entire Department of Defense conducts hundreds of concurrent operations, from the routine to the unexpected. Even considering the sub-components does not adequately illuminate the issue, like taking the economic output of California and measuring it against the European Union. Rather, the dynamic of military interoperability at every level facilitates a synergistic effect upon still limited resources. Compounding equipment and resources for a specific goal in the civilian arena rarely captures a unity of purpose and discipline that a chain of command
enforces. The U.S. military brings with it a self-defined order. Thus the exclusive capacity of the U.S. military in foreign humanitarian assistance can be viewed as a structure that, when mobilized, can act as a temporary repair or replacement of an incapacitated local governance.

Overall, the strengths of joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance are the strengths of joint doctrine in general, with one key factor. The emphasis placed on the supporting role of the military places a subtle contextual change over the military competencies of planning and preparation; the reliance on standing processes; and the foundational relationship where equipment, supplies, and personnel are built into teams. The consistent incorporation of lessons learned through critical self-assessment back into the operations process greatly aids in the focus on determining realistic transition criteria. These strengths provide opportunities to be seized in future application.

Weaknesses.

The weakness of joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance in coordinating initial actions is the lack of constructive means to achieve unity of effort. As a bold understatement, *JP 3-07.6* warns: “although there is no command relationship between military forces and OGA, UN agencies, NGOS, IOs, affected country elements, and allied or coalition governments, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction between participating organizations” (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-8). With the exception of referrals to lessons learned, reliance on LNOs, and training exercises, joint doctrine leaves commanders and their staffs destined for “discovery learning” for a crucial aspect of foreign humanitarian assistance in the interagency environment.
Engaging unfamiliar actors and establishing rapport across cultural barriers in order to influence outcomes and achieve consensus without resorting to force or authority is not within the comfort zone of many currently serving in the military. This trend is rapidly being eroded due to the circumstances and necessity of the current operational environment, and the declarative nature of DoDD 3000.05 to work the “non-lethal” piece can accommodate for the gap between doctrine and reality.

Another weakness of joint military doctrine is the over-emphasis on security that favors force protection to the deficit of mission accomplishment. A critical dimension of scale that joint military doctrine discusses repeatedly is the security required for force protection (JP 3-07.6 2001, I-9, II-1, IV-3, and IV-15). The security needs of the civilian population and organizations of the world relief community, however, are merely encapsulated in a brief delineation of “security mission” as a component type of foreign humanitarian assistance (JP 3-07.6 2001, I-6). A broader context of risk management and the relationship of rules of engagement that define “engagement” beyond the scope of lethal force would improve the current doctrine immeasurably.

An additional element of security that consistently creates friction is the handling of information. Operational security and information classification pits the need for protection of “secrets” with the benefit of full disclosure and understanding of the situation on the ground. Joint doctrine adheres to regulatory policy standards without an adequate consideration of the impact to mission accomplishment, interagency coordination, civil population confidence, and host nation legitimacy that a more permissive intelligence-information conduit might provide.
A notable weakness of joint military doctrine is the defining of relationships between military forces and the myriad of civilian agencies and actors. Admiral Fallon stated clearly the issue that joint doctrine skirts around: “Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations cannot be successfully concluded with military forces only” (DRW 2005, 5). Fully understanding the capabilities of NGOs, IOs, and host nation agencies before a crisis develops provides a context for military planners to determine how and when to best brace local governance capacity with what the military brings to bear.

Overall, the weakness of joint doctrine is in the lack of clarity of discussion on the establishment of roles and responsibilities in a complex environment. Negotiation, positive influence, and above all else open communication must be stressed. Achieving unity of effort without the luxury of unity of command is not the sole purview of the military commander. Neither can the military expect to arrive with the scene already set by the diplomats. In the immediate aftermath of crisis, rapidly understanding and coming to agreement on who does what where for whom must be placed in the full context of all actors involved. Concern for the level of permissiveness in an environment can pale in comparison to the threat posed by the hostility of a potential supporter to the mission that, perceived as having been marginalized, walks away or passively undermines the legitimacy of the operation.

Opportunities.

The opportunities presented by joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance in coordinating initial actions come down to generating working relationships and building on experience. For both Operations Unified Assistance and Sea Angel II, the
employment of liaison officers (LNOs) proved critical in overcoming barriers between organizations generally unfamiliar with each other’s methods (Dorsett 2005, 16 and 17; Young OPSUM 2008, 13). Seizing opportunities may not always overcome cultural or institutional hesitation, however. For example, the World Health Organization noted of their participation in the Tsunami response: “WHO should have reacted more quickly and interacted with the military sooner” (DRW 2005, 11).

The advantage of experience can directly improve initial coordination. Sri Lanka “had been free of a major disaster for nearly two thousand years and was not prepared for a disaster of this magnitude” (DRW 2005, 14) in 2004. Sri Lanka suffered over 30,959 dead (Dunard 2005, 4). Cyclone Marian struck Bangladesh in 1991, causing damage to infrastructure comparable to that of Cyclone Sidr in 2007. Cyclone Marian killed over 152,000 people, whereas the experience of the Bangladesh government mitigated the loss of life from Cyclone Sidr to 3,200 (Reagan 2008, 1-2). Significantly, the rehearsed interoperability among military forces conducting recurring exercises such as Cobra Gold paid enormous dividends during crisis response (DRW 2005, 7). Establishing protocols and processes that can be tested, improved, and trained reinforces success.

Both the response to the Tsunami and the Cyclone emphasized the utility of seabasing military forces in reducing the congestion and footprint in disaster areas (Reagan 2008, 26; Young OPSUM 2008, 15). Somewhat attributable to the lingering sentiment of Service parochialism, the point worth considering is the line between interaction and interference. The opportunity to seize in foreign humanitarian assistance operations is the ability to work “behind the scenes,” where the credit goes to local civilians and host nation governments as much as possible.
The correlation of U.S. good will in the face of crisis with a rapid improvement in living conditions can unravel unexpectedly with perceptions of victimization and dependency. Joint doctrine warns: “NGOs and IOs may have the propensity to view the military as an inexhaustible resource reservoir” (JP 3-07.6 2001, II-12). The criticality of “expectation management” defines the unstable balancing of scope and scale to meet requested needs.

Overall, the fleeting opportunities in international disaster response for military involvement reflect the time-sensitive nature of foreign humanitarian assistance. Generating working relationships, building on experience, and allowing for an inclusive command and control hierarchy that ties in diverse organizations and actors as they are, not as the military would like them to be, is important. So too is the design of a flexible and scalable force, with as minimal a footprint as practicable, able to lean heavily in the direction of sharing both information and risks with partners. There is little room for parochialism, cultural arrogance, or over-reliance on “the way its always been done.”

Threats.

Observing the trends between 2004’s Operation Unified Assistance and 2007’s Operation Sea Angel II unveils a common threat to the success of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Resounding feedback from the review of the Tsunami response came from all quarters: the interface between the military and civilian international agencies and even the other U.S. government agencies faced challenges of each party not understanding what the other could do (capabilities) and would do (approaches to the problem) (DRW 2005, 6-8). In addition, the “roles and relationships between military and
civilian organizations are not well defined” (DRW 2005, 27). Inexperience and mismanagement of expectations leads to disconnect between organizations.

The disconnect most apparent was the “protection” gap. On the one hand, the civilian organizations’ “humanitarian approach” appreciates caring for others to do the job. On the other hand, the military “security concerns” recognizes the need to care for themselves to get the job done (DRW 2005, 8). In attempts to cast broad coverage while avoiding redundant overlap, the lack of early integration among responders resulted in aid going to the wrong locations, wrong aid going to the right locations, and no aid going to other locations (DRW 2005, 12, 17; Macan-Markar 2005).

The timing of events and actions in foreign humanitarian assistance operations presents considerable threat to mission accomplishment. Communication and perception of the timing, moreover, is more susceptible to danger than the actual execution. Taking into consideration the scope, scale, speed, security, and transition of the operation, how these factors are conveyed and what cues support or undermine what is being conveyed can make or break an operation. Applying balance to military resources and capabilities involves the shaping of a clear explanation of purpose of where and how the military response fits in to the overall picture.

Overall, the gravest threats to mission success left exposed by current joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance fall into four avoidable categories.

First, a vacuum of cultural awareness and cultural understanding can be a threshold event: military forces must expect limited information and prioritize efforts accordingly in order to gain a foothold on the basics. Reliance on the country team to shape these efforts is the way to success.
Second, the withholding of critical information from partners can be as debilitating as negligence in building rapport to begin with. Restrictive classification of intelligence, the unwillingness to share, and weak communications systems, the inability to share, can be equally devastating.

Third, engaging too quickly at the wrong level can result in local leadership at the scene becoming disenfranchised. Determining who to engage with and meeting their needs on their terms cannot be over-emphasized.

Fourth, communicating effectively with the affected population requires attention to setting and holding to goals. Again, the message sent and the message received do not automatically match, especially under conditions where digital communications turn into written products that become distributed by word of mouth. Understanding and meeting these potential areas of concern during foreign humanitarian assistance operations leads directly to the perception of mission success or failure, immaterial of the tonnage of aid delivered or number of lives saved.

Assessment.

The completion of the analytic wargame revealed key relationships between the two condition sets and the three requirements. The composite score for Condition Set 1, the response to the Indonesian Tsunami, takes overwhelming success for coordinating initial actions, failure for coordinating requests for initial support, and success for identifying and integrating resources and capabilities to produce overwhelming success. The composite score for Condition Set 2, the response to the Bangladesh Cyclone, takes overwhelming success for coordinating initial actions, success for coordinating requests for initial support, and success for identifying and integrating resources and capabilities
to produce success. Table 1 summarizes the key relationships brought forth from the analysis. Figure 4 reviews the scoring relationships and Figure 5 represents the scoring for the analytic wargame.

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<tr>
<th>Table 1. Analytic Wargame Doctrine-Outcome Relationships</th>
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<td><strong>R1: Initial Actions</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Opportunities</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Threats</strong></td>
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Note: C²:C² refers to the engagement of command and control with collaboration and cooperation
Figure 4. Assessment Scoring

Figure 5. Analytic Wargame Results
Evaluation Criteria

The analysis of the evaluation criteria examines the results of the screening criteria and the analytic wargame in the context of the compatibility of the two condition sets– the Indonesian Tsunami response and the Bangladesh Cyclone response– with three principled requirements– transparency, accountability, and participative local capacity. Analysis of the results of the evaluation criteria postures the framing of an overall doctrinal assessment retaining the scoring scale of overwhelming success, success, failure, or catastrophic failure with an emphasis on the management of expectations of humanitarian principles.

Tsunami Response Evaluation

Transparency

The challenge of transparency for military forces is no small issue. The pursuit of actionable intelligence against a thinking adversary remains at the core of the contest of armed conflict. During foreign humanitarian assistance, lowering the guard and embracing a wide range of parties with unclear intentions does not appear prudent.

In the case of the Indonesian tsunami response, the collective response yielded a pronounced theme: information sharing is key, because inclusion of the major NGOs/IOs in military headquarters yielded disclosures that “improved trust and collaboration” (Dunard 2005, 30). The audience included the local populations, where “suspicion of Western military forces quickly receded as Indonesians saw the sheer magnitude of aid and the genuine concern of other nations for their welfare” (Dorsett 2005, 13). Of particular interest is the perception of aid as both supplies and, more importantly, assistance. Broad sharing of information among all concerned requires an emphasis on...
personal contact when the communication infrastructure collapses. In cases where actions and words match, “success [is] measured by satisfaction of host nation and U.S. Ambassadors, not by gross tonnage of relief supplies” (Dunard 2005, 5). It invariably helps to have a sincere face connected with the helping hand.

Consequently an appreciation for the need for information sharing and the facilitation of information sharing are comparable to the differentiation of goals and objectives. The need to share information was a goal: a condition sought after but not demanded. The facilitation of information sharing was not an objective to supercede standing procedures for information security. Reliance on commercial civilian networks for an “unclassified common operating picture” and the posting of sensitive information to “unprotected” networks demonstrated friction and misgivings on the part of the military to push toward greater integration (Dunard 2005,24-25). Despite praise for the intelligence communities ability “to adapt and respond with agility” gaps persisted in the medium of transmission, where lack of interoperability or lack of capability constrained communications (Dorsett 2005, 18).

Transparency for the Indonesian Tsunami response was a failure. The inability or unwillingness of the U.S. military to make greater accommodations, adjust the adherence to security procedures, and enable interoperable infrastructures shortchanged the civilian partner organizations. Needs were left unmet based on the military’s adherence to their own definition of transparency.

Accountability

Accountability in foreign humanitarian assistance operations goes beyond the efficient use of resources. Accountability entails the acceptance of responsibility for
taking or not taking action. As an instrument of national policy, the military must fight an uphill battle against a cultural prejudice that sees armed forces as enormous machines driven by people “just following orders.” The emphasis on force protection can also lead to backlash, prioritizing human life in some cases or locking arms to “take care of their own” in the wake of legal troubles. The chain of command must be promoted as the mechanism through which good order and discipline instills accountability for all actions, regardless of whether the results were favorable or regrettable.

An incident of perception plagued the Indonesian tsunami response regarding the accountability of military forces. The mismanagement of aid delivery—wrong items at the right place, too many items at the wrong place, or no items at other places—presented huge problems to the affected populations. Within the non-military aid community a perception grew that as a primary transportation conduit, the “military failed to keep proper accountability of relief supplies while moving supplies for USAID to CMOCs,” immaterial of the level of inventory control feeding into the system or effectiveness of distribution at the working end (Dunard 2005, 28). Accountability can be likened to integrity, in this case: it can be lost as much through perception as through actual failure.

While singular incidents of suspicion or resentment can be isolated in the examination of the efficiency of the Tsunami response, the wholesale surge of U.S. military assistance backed by the demonstration of goodwill turned the tide of popular sentiment. The U.S. military overcame diplomatic and cultural obstacles and “suspicion of Western military forces quickly receded as Indonesians saw the sheer magnitude of aid and the genuine concern of other nations for their welfare” (Dorsett 2005, 13).
Accountability for the Indonesian Tsunami response was an overwhelming success. Driving the local perception that U.S. military forces accepted responsibility for their own actions was the military’s shift toward the center to facilitate the efforts of other actors rather than to force the efforts under military direction. Needs were met and the requirements for accountability were embraced.

Participative Local Capacity

Participative local capacity defines the core of successful foreign humanitarian assistance. The measure of success, however, is an awkward one. Given a hypothetical baseline that a country fully able to weather any crisis on its own should be ideal, then zero external assistance could be described as the 100% solution from which to base all other responses. Considering the nature of disasters, however, even a state that could fully provide for its own response within a narrow timeframe, any and all additional assistance from outside forces could conceivably improve the quality (not the quantity) of the response.

The Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 devastated the local infrastructure throughout the region with little or no warning. In areas with no discernable government contact, the military struggled to accomplish more than emergency relief (DRW 2005, 14). In areas where local governance remained viable, the military engaged as a hub able to guide support based on the direction of the host nation (DRW 2005, 13). In every case the intent remained consistent: provide direct leadership where none existed, and empower non-governmental leadership to bridge the gap until full transition to host nation leadership could resume.
Measured against the stew of international non-governmental organizations that descended on the region the professionalism of the U.S. military stood apart. Taking the role of managing traffic of goods and supplies, military forces avoided to some extent the marginalization and undermining of local authorities by an “overwhelming flood of international agencies controlling immense resources” that offered “supply-driven, unsolicited and inappropriate aid” which led to “inequities…indignities, cultural offence and waste” (Telford 2005, 93).

Participative local capacity for the Indonesian Tsunami response was a success, due largely to the differentiation of professionalism between the military and several civilian agencies lacking any sort of oversight or cohesion. Backing the needs of the local authorities and working to mitigate the effects of distraction of a disorganized NGO assembly, the U.S. military drifted away from the need to be in charge. Needs were met while requirements for participative local capacity were undermined by the multiplicity of actors.

**Cyclone Response Evaluation**

**Transparency**

The response in Bangladesh, smaller in both scope and scale, deferred to operational security to the detriment of greater transparency. The reliance on restricted information systems (Common Access Card enabled Microsoft Sharepoint Portals) “defeats the goal of full coordination and information sharing…we continue to build walls around what should be a very open space to maximize coordination” (Reagan 2008, 4). Inclusion of strategic communication as a line of operation, an important theme to consider and assess against in order to achieve the endstate, “didn’t have the guidance or
resources to fully capture the power of a focused effort to influence the population and
governments we are there to help” (Reagan 2008, 17). Limiting the command emphasis
on transparency falls within the guidelines established by joint military doctrine but fails
to understand the context of humanitarian assistance.

Transparency for the Bangladesh Cyclone response was a failure. The self-limiting retention of information dominance led to self-defeating behaviors further constrained by communication systems designed to meet military needs for security. Compensation for internal demands with a strong strategic message of inclusiveness did not occur satisfactorily. Needs were again left unmet by the military’s entrenched position on secrecy.

Accountability

The most direct approach to resolve the accountability concerns for the military during foreign humanitarian assistance operations was demonstrated during the response to Cyclone Sidr. The commander, responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do, takes on the public leadership role not of the U.S. response but for his or her unit’s actions. The commanding general had three viable options: remain at sea with the majority of his forces; situate at the key logistics and liaison hub of Barisal; or locate himself alongside the diplomatic, political, and host-nation military center of Dhaka. By tying in to the U.S. Embassy at Dhaka, the military commander integrated his forces “by, with, and for” the Government of Bangladesh (Reagan 2008, 21; Young OPSUM 2008, 10). Working in support of the U.S. Ambassador also frames the boundaries of accountability of the U.S. military as a component of an overall U.S. government response.
Accountability for the Bangladesh Cyclone response was an overwhelming success. The personal example of military leadership and the public demonstration of being a “team player” made lasting impacts on the perception of the U.S. military in Bangladesh. Needs were met and the requirements for accountability were demonstrated.

Participative Local Capacity.

The Cyclone in Bangladesh in 2007 stressed the host nation government to avoid a repeat of the devastation wrought by the cyclone in 1991. Under these conditions, the Government of Bangladesh request matched USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) recommendation that the U.S. military adopt a “wholesale” delivery model, “supporting smaller and more agile implementing partners, UN agencies, and NGOs who deliver the actual ‘retail’ assistance to beneficiaries and work hands-on with the affected populations” (Wilhelm 2007, 33). The initiation of an evacuation plan helped Bangladesh to shape the expected needs of its people. Medical support, due to its very nature, required a balancing of face-to-face contact with economies of scale. Again, retaining some ability to gather survivors together ahead of time facilitated the maximum contact for treatment.

Participative local capacity for the Bangladesh Cyclone response was an overwhelming success. Assisted in no small measure by the building efforts of the Government of Bangladesh to learn from their past experience, the preparation phase allowed by early warning cemented the relationships of the U.S. military as a supportive partner in time of need. Needs were met and the requirements to place the mantle of responsibility on local governance were fulfilled.
Evaluation of Results: Overall Doctrinal Assessment

The overall assessment of the utility of joint military doctrine for conditions presented with the Tsunami response is one of overwhelming success. The failure of transparency, overwhelming success of accountability, and success of participative local capacity indicate subtle but important trends worth observing.

Joint doctrine should further explore (1) the relationships between command and control and collaboration and cooperation between military and non-military organizations, (2) reassess the relationship of security to the inter-agency environment in terms of both force protection and information security, and (3) determine how to integrate military forces into an environment devoid of critical local contacts.

The overall assessment of the utility of joint military doctrine for conditions presented with the Cyclone response is also one of overwhelming success. The failure of transparency, overwhelming success of accountability, and overwhelming success of participative local capacity demonstrate the progressive improvement of execution of foreign humanitarian assistance operations while drawing out areas for emphasis in the underlying joint doctrine.

Joint doctrine should clearly articulate (1) the advantages of organizing joint task forces for internal military unity of command, (2) the risks associated with reliance on standard methods, specifically sea-based logistics, in a complex environment, (3) synchronizing the planning and decision cycles of the military with the host nation government, and (4) intelligence preparation of the infrastructure is a more viable factor in increasing tempo than gambling on the accuracy of pre-positioning equipment and supplies.
Table 2 summarizes the key relationships brought forth from the analysis. The results of the evaluation criteria scoring are represented in Figure 6. From this analysis findings are drawn below that address the five secondary research questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tsunami Response</th>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Participative Local Capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Ability)</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Supporting Effort</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
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<td>(Willingness)</td>
<td>Information Security</td>
<td>Command Emphasis</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
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<th>Cyclone Response</th>
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Figure 6. Evaluation Criteria Results
Findings

International Law and U.S. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Secondary Research Question 1.

The first secondary research question concerns international law: What authorities and responsibilities does existing international law impose on U.S. military operations concerning the sovereignty and control of afflicted states?

Discussion.

The norms of customary and conventional international law impose well-defined authorities and responsibilities on U.S. military foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Two binding concepts shape the sovereignty and control of states afflicted by disaster. One the one hand, the United Nations Charter enshrines the sanctity of state sovereignty, that a state is the basic operating unit of the international system and as such enjoys the primary control for its own domestic affairs. This is state authority.

On the other hand, under international law and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a state owes its subjects and its peers a basic standard of security (social as well as physical) and stability. This is state responsibility.

When a state is unwilling or unable to perform to basic threshold standards, justifications for external assistance form. The contentious nature of intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, especially under the pretext of addressing humanitarian concerns, is alleviated through consent. Thus U.S. military foreign humanitarian assistance operations require specific U.S. government approval for nearly all type of aid rendered on behalf of a foreign nation.
Findings.

The screening criteria demonstrated that in the two condition sets analyzed the routine application of existing procedures to ensure compliance with norms of international law. The four screening criteria demonstrated a pattern of escalation, from “gateway” or entry criteria, up to “threshold” criteria, and on to “progressive” criteria. This characterization of the quality of the decisions required to introduce U.S. military forces revealed a useful concept of minimal, recommended, and optimal conditions during initial response that will be shown to parallel approaches available to define the endstate of the response. Latitude within accepted norms complicates the potential for deviation from those same accepted norms.

Joint military doctrine acknowledges and generally conforms to the authorities and responsibilities that international law imposes on U.S. military operations concerning the sovereignty and control of afflicted states. “Black-and-white” exceptions are specified for the unilateral action of commanders at the right place and the right time to act in direct support of a crisis without prior coordination or permission. The clock is on, however, for the commander to report and request further guidance. “Gray-area” exceptions are implied for the applications of military force under direction of the National Command Authority that edge into the debate about interventionist policies for humanitarian assistance to failed or failing states. Outright violation of state sovereignty under the banner of humanitarian assistance remains a flagrant affront and would likely be treated as such within the international community. The construct for military foreign humanitarian assistance operations can be summarized as: “be invited, be considerate, be helpful, and be gone.”
Pulling the Trigger in the Inter-Agency Environment

Secondary Research Question 2

Answering the first secondary question explained how the stage is set for the initiation of U.S. military action in support of foreign humanitarian assistance. The second secondary research question is: Has DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (28 NOV 2005) altered the inter-agency operating environment established under DoD Directive 5100.46 “Foreign Disaster Relief” (04 DEC 1975)?

Discussion.

Answering the second secondary question addresses the coordination of initial actions. As envisaged for domestic disaster relief by the National Response Framework, able and responsible parties need to rapidly integrate their organizations, tie in, and set up. International disaster relief decisions occur within the U.S. Government Executive Branch under a Constitutional framework built upon by over two hundred years of legislation, operational experience, and debate. The inter-agency environment context of 1975 required close fiscal oversight of limited resources granted by Congress and direct acknowledgement of authorities between two Executive agencies, the Departments of State and Defense. As with the end of the Cold War, the waning of the largely bipolar State-Defense arrangement of the interagency environment presents challenges of both jurisdiction and capability.

With U.S. military assistance to foreign humanitarian assistance a set of conditions must be met and common obstacles should be avoided within the inter-agency environment as within the multi-national environment. With no one else on the scene, the
military as a first responder must exercise both haste and caution. With several actors of varying capabilities on the scene, the military must avoid the trap of agencies stepping all over each other to help. With a handful of strong actors already in place, especially the host nation government, the military must blend with the enclaves of familiarity that inevitably form, often with the military as an outsider. In each of the three cases, the military operates from a constant state of military readiness that must be adapted to the particular mission of promoting civil-military readiness in an interagency environment.

Findings

Analysis of the responses to the Indonesian Tsunami and the Bangladesh Cyclone revealed three approaches for the military to take, situation dependent, within the bounds of current policy. First, step up and take the lead. Second, step in and help direct. Third, step around and work among the actors present. Whether the leader, manager, or team-member, the U.S. military requires a level of self-sufficient competence that can be ingrained immaterial of the situation or other actors. This ultimately reinforces the dynamic of autopoietic self-organization, where a military, competent across each of the roles required, regenerates itself as an enabling force and not a self-serving force. Strengthening internal structures that simplify complex tasks in uncertain environments can be as austere as focusing on broadly applicable skills in rapid relationship building.

While there is little direct evidence that the direction to military forces to become proficient in particular stability tasks specifically resulted in increased proficiency after November 2005, each iteration of civil-military interaction in the inter-agency environment reinforces the institutional memory of cooperation. DoDD 3000.05 rebalances the importance of understanding diplomatic and non-lethal means for military
forces but does not subsequently require DoS or other government agencies any
compensating effort for understanding the military culture of mission accomplishment
and hierarchical command authority.

Therefore, the interagency operating environment established under DoDD
5100.46 in 1975 remains a framework within which DoDD 3000.05 places the emphasis
on military forces to take the lead as required to ensure that national objectives are met.
Rather than emphasizing the sharing of logistics and funding (circa 1975), the stress is on
sharing of effort and competence (circa 2005). Any alteration in the inter-agency
environment can be attributed to the shifting of emphasis toward greater expectations of
military forces to operate in ways previously considered the domain of the diplomats.

How to Apply U.S. Military Capacity

Secondary Research Question 3

The third secondary research question is: What does existing joint military
document discuss as recommended operational methods for the application of military
capacity in support of foreign humanitarian assistance?

Discussion.

Once the request for support from the host nation has cleared the US government
through the Department of State and initial coordination has been established within the
interagency environment, coordinating requests for initial support shapes the military
response. In planning and execution, foreign humanitarian assistance operations are
distinct from other types of operations in their reliance on a different type of C2. Rather
than the hierarchical responsiveness of command and control, foreign humanitarian
assistance operations demand the influential finesse of cooperation and collaboration. The guideline to “project humility” concisely portrays the inherent human-interest story that is foreign humanitarian assistance (JP 3-07.6 2001, IV-19).

Careful attention to detailed directives and to doctrinal guidelines has the potential to render military forces blind to the subtle effects of altruism and adaptation. Benefits that could be gained by taking unconventional action may not present themselves under models where people become numbers and relationships are defined in terms of statistics.

**Findings**

The analysis of the condition sets yielded insights into the relationships between relying heavily on existing processes and allowing for deviation from routine during international disaster response. Especially in cases where handling of information with partners, finding appropriate partners to begin with, or going in without internal unity of command with which to work with partners seriously degraded operations, a hard look at the available tools used is worth the effort. This validates the dynamic interaction of activity theory connecting actors, structural context, and purposeful activities, faced with the stresses to change. Critical self-examination tempers the urgent press to surge reliable capabilities with the insightful pull of options for meeting objectives through other ways or means.

Joint military doctrine recommends operational methods for the application of military capacity in support of foreign humanitarian assistance that focus on the scope, scale, speed, security, and transition aspects of the mission. A mission seen as too limited in scope hints at a lack of true commitment to the relief of humanitarian suffering. One
too broad in scope brings to bear images of aggrandizement or imperialism. So too with scale: too small a force smacks of indifference and too large a force overbearing. An instantaneous response should be welcomed as a coincidence, but perceived delays create suspicion of incompetence or lack of will. A security posture too restrictive in favor of force protection begs the question of whose life is more important, while a security posture too lax implies a cavalier recklessness. Finally, a rapid transition to civilian capacity that creates unnecessary gaps in support can be equally detrimental as a lingering military presence unwilling to hand over control of the situation to others.

Therefore, the application of U.S. military forces in support of foreign humanitarian assistance runs an operationally narrow margin. The greater the appreciation for altruism and the more flexible in the response to the needs communicated by the local government the better. The dangers of aggrandizement of achievement and even the hint of aggressiveness in pursuit of objectives not directly matching the situational needs of the affected populace force a careful consideration of just what the U.S. military brings to the table.

Exclusive U.S. Military Capacity

Secondary Research Question 4

The fourth secondary research question is: What exclusive capacity, if any, does the U.S. military bring to international disaster response unavailable from Non-Governmental Organizations, International Institutions, and Private-Voluntary Organizations?
Discussion

Joint military doctrine unequivocally states that “U.S. forces are uniquely equipped and structured to provide a rapid and capable response” to provide foreign humanitarian assistance (JP 3-07.6 2001, vii). The imperative is not the particular aspect of capability—whether the function can be performed or not— but of capacity—whether the function can be performed at an equal or greater scale. Hundreds trans-national corporations can move tons of logistics around the world. Numerous organizations can leverage a body of professionals to plan, execute, and assess complex operations. The question is whether Fed-Ex® can simultaneously distribute emergency rations and purified water, or whether Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) can deploy a hospital ship. Finally the capacity entails a measure of timeliness, not in being the quickest but being quick enough to be useful.

Findings

Analysis of the Indonesian Tsunami response and the Bangladesh Cyclone response revealed two factors. First, the U.S. military’s ability to mobilize resources, whether projecting combat power or directing the deployment of cohesive teams, is unparalleled in any other single organization. Second, the U.S. military is built around organizations that work and train under the common culture of a chain of command. The expeditionary, results-driven nature of combat operations imbues a professional ethic where incorrect choices can lead directly to fatal consequences. Attention is consistently given to build processes that reduce unnecessary delay and accept risk in an environment with gaps in information. The U.S. military therefore mobilizes far more effectively and on a larger scale than is possible from other civilian and governmental agencies.
The currency of on-demand strategic lift and as-needed tactical lift, both fixed wing and rotary (airplanes and helicopters), stands as the highest demand advantage of involving the U.S. military. It should be noted that the availability of the equipment alone does not create the effects sought after. The investment in technology, human resources, and professional values creates the payoff.

The U.S. military does not enjoy any privilege of efficiency, however, and in many cases of specialization is outmatched by smaller, more nimble organizations. Movement of supplies and material en masse, at the right time and right place, for example, is openly competitive throughout the both international humanitarian community and private enterprise. When it comes time to identify and integrate resources and capabilities from within an organization, the U.S. military exists in a doctrinally bounded, self-referential system designed both legally and professionally to deliver results.

Another key aspect of military capacity is the extent to which intelligence products designed for use in conflict prove useful during disasters. Whether reports, analyses, or just imagery, the delivery of products during the Tsunami response helped “facilitate international dialogue and improve the momentum of humanitarian relief” (Dorsett 2005, 16). A call for further declassification of such products argues the point for evaluating the barriers between intelligence and information discussed previously (DRW 2005, 8). The connectivity of the U.S. military to link “boots on the ground,” remote sensors from space, and dedicated analysts created unmatchable “near real-time feedback” (Dorsett 2005, 14 and 18).
An unexpected finding of the research revealed that the coupling of intelligence processing with decisive actions fell upon a subtle shortcoming. In the military calculus for foreign humanitarian assistance, more often than not the local population get placed in the “problem to solve” column and not the “solutions available” set. This victimization of civilian populations during disasters, of treating affected nations as “failed states” (Telford 2006, 19), overlooks critical capabilities. Interviews revealed that within the first 48 hours of the disaster in Indonesia, 91% of rescue services were from private individuals; in Sri Lanka 72% from private individuals; and in India 51% from the local community (Fritz 2005, 4). In this context, pick-up teams built from scratch lack resources and training but rely heavily on common culture. Such self-empowerment under stress revisits the hierarchy of needs theory from an individual perspective and field theory from a broader social construct. Scalable self-reliance and confidence can have a powerful effect.

The rapid generation of equipment, supplies, and trained teams bundled under a common culture of command and control stands as a testament to the exclusive capacity that the U.S. military can bring to international disaster relief. The larger international humanitarian relief community, comprised of non-governmental organizations, international institutions, private-voluntary organizations and in a growing sense corporate entities, can provide more volume collectively and more specialization individually. But when speed is of the essence, the “in case of emergency break glass” holistic integration of U.S. military forces provides a military-off-the-shelf capability that is unmatched in flexibility and scalability. Therefore, the challenge of employing this exclusive military capability lies in the meshing of this driving speed with the other parts
of the international and local humanitarian assistance machinery. Bearing in mind the synchronization of a clutch or a similar matching of gears, rushing in the U.S. military must consider both the immediate ability of the local capacity to receive and the eventual desire for the disengagement of military force.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance through the Lens of Humanitarian Principles

Secondary Research Question 5

Answering the second, third, and fourth secondary questions described the nature of the scene on which the stage was set. The fifth secondary research question is: Does an initial focus on providing logistical support during disaster response supercede critical population needs for situational awareness (what’s going on, who’s in charge, where is my family, when will things change) and self help (who will make us safe, when should we take matters into our own hands)?

Discussion

An orientation on the provision of goods and services, the material logistics transactions of donors and beneficiaries, fixates on the equation of an achievable endstate with tangible metrics. Involving the population from the outset, both through communication and empowerment, requires an up-front commitment of effort without easily recognizable gains. The immediate stimulus to hand over clothing, food, and water is difficult to forestall. As with initial impressions, however, the blanket treatment of a population as in need of assistance is extraordinarily difficult to overcome.

Success follows where military operations most align themselves with the standards advocated by the international humanitarian assistance community. The
potential for failure looms where, in the name of mission accomplishment, an over-reliance on information security, unilateral objectives, and disenfranchisement of host nation actors stray afield.

Findings

The three-step analysis used illuminated tensions between doing what was requested, doing what was required, and doing what ought to be done in the two condition sets. The abrasion of competing systems occurred whether coordinating initial responses, coordinating initial requests for support, or identifying and integrating resources and capabilities. The residue of these frictions was most pronounced, however, in the coordinating communications between the U.S. military array of governmental and non-governmental civilian actors.

Matching realistic transition criteria to ongoing needs for support (a function of the extent of devastation and the corresponding capacity of local governance) proved at best contentious. The establishment of transition criteria (the “way out” for the military) shaped nearly every aspect of planning and execution under the paradigm of “backwards planning.” This appeared diametrically opposed to many civilian perspectives of “the way ahead,” an ongoing, open-ended, and fluid process. The military found itself working to exert influence, to move the will of others, while many civilian counterparts worked on streamlining the operational confluence, the flowing together of many in the same direction.

Meeting critical population needs for situational awareness outweighed the imperative to initially focus on the provision of logistical support during disaster response. This is a significant disconnect between the proscriptive, support provision of
Joint Publication 3-07.6 and the descriptive, support enabling of both the National Response Framework and the principles of the international humanitarian community.

Therefore, when determining the scope, scale, speed, security, and transition aspects of even an entirely local, “native” response, there comes a point when burden sharing makes perfect sense. The measure of success for participative local capacity, then, is a function of how well the local response, whatever its actual capacity during the crisis, (a) is entirely empowered to take charge and (b) uses outside support to its own, self-directed ends. The idea is that even if one local leader is left standing amidst a devastated structure of governance, all actors that descend on the scene ask first: “what can we do for you, what can we do with you, and how would you like us to do it?” Under these preferred conditions, the rate at which participative local capacity returns to or exceeds pre-disaster capability truly depends on the extent of damage inflicted by the disaster and not the interference or support of external aid.

Summary

The triangulation of the three approaches—jurist, realist, and humanist— to the problem of how to successfully respond militarily to catastrophic degradation of civil infrastructure and breakdown of social order associated with natural disasters pinpointed the strengths and weaknesses of the position of Joint Publication 3-07.6 Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Drawn from a self-referential culture of hierarchical command and control, reliant on the interchange between the guidance of doctrine and the feedback of experience, joint doctrine rests on a solid foundation of the subordination of powerful teams to support civilian efforts. The erosion of self-serving methods of protection and a lack of fluency with non-military
cultures, however, undermines the value of joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance operations when dealing with complex, multi-actor situations in a time-constrained environment.

Greater attraction to the common principles of the international humanitarian relief community—transparency, accountability, and especially participative local capacity—would serve the U.S. military well in deepening the currently immature capacity to conduct stability, support, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. The bread and butter of the military—conducting combat operations—faces the bill for an entire buffet of full spectrum operations of which the demand for foreign humanitarian assistance is only one side item.

This chapter presented an operational level analysis of current U.S. military joint doctrine for humanitarian assistance using three components: screening criteria, analytic wargame, and evaluation criteria. The five secondary research questions were examined in relation to the five baseline priorities from the National Response Framework, yielding an overall doctrinal assessment within the context of the conditions sets of the Department of Defense response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 and the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007.

The final chapter draws conclusions and summarizes the extent to which U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalizes on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework. Chapter Five also lays out the avenues for further research that may help address the gap, lag, or disconnect between existing joint military doctrine for foreign
humanitarian assistance and (1) norms for international disaster response law, (2) initiatives for domestic disaster response, and (3) principles for voluntary humanitarian relief.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Does current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance capitalize on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework? No. This chapter explores the meaning of this answer to the primary research question and provides a way ahead for getting to yes.

The current U.S. military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance fails to move beyond a triage mindset, compartmentalizing the affected population into the problem set and disenfranchising their active participation as the key element of the solution set. A broad operational-level survey of the conditions for the U.S. military response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004, Operation Unified Assistance, and to the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007, Operation Sea Angel II, bear out this disconnect between Joint Publication 3-07.6 Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and the imperative to build on local capacity.

Joint doctrine misses the emphasis on the rapid regeneration of indigenous capacity for self-organization advocated in the response architecture of the U.S Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Framework. Until the U.S. military can bridge the culture divide between martial command & control and civil collaboration & cooperation the synergy that drives the success of results-driven operations will remain isolated, self-contained and self-limiting. This means that the gradual shift in military doctrine and policy towards leveraging influence is only one step in the right direction. Further efforts are within reach for the military as a profession to
embrace the cascading effects of *confluence*, where many forces flow together in a common direction. Therefore joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance must cease and desist victimizing and dehumanizing civilians as environmental components or objects and instead focus on escalating their empowerment, always.

**Conclusions**

The overwhelmingly successful outcomes of the U.S. military response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 and the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007 cannot be attributed to an equally competent joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance. Under the conditions of the Tsunami, where a large-scale, multi-national response arose without warning and without the benefit of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. military found itself as much directing traffic among agencies as providing logistics to people in need. Under the conditions of the Cyclone, where a directed, single nation impact event developed with time to prepare and with the added benefit of both lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and a similar event in 1991, the U.S. military focused on providing logistics and diluted even within its own formations the benefits of unity of effort. Each response operated under the same doctrinal framework of *JP 3-07.6*. Both events lay out the groundwork for much needed improvement of joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance.

Clear gaps can still be identified between joint military doctrine and the flexible, scalable response architecture developed in the National Response Framework and echoed throughout the international humanitarian community. In measuring the effectiveness of disaster response, there are three benchmarks for the outcomes of disaster response: a return to normalcy (the international law concept of equilibrium),
leaving it better than it was before (the results-based metric of a realist approach), and making it right (the holistic idealism of humanist principles). This good-better-best model leans heavily on the rapid and durable transition from military to civilian effort. Framing the problem in this context is noticeably absent from current military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance.

The themes that emerge from an analysis of both necessity and outcomes fall into three major patterns that joint military doctrine must address. First, the importance of building working relationships and not becoming trapped in reliance on recurrent “ad-hocracy.” Second, the meaning of risk inclusive of affected populations as actors and not just objects. Third, incorporating deviation into existing practices that complement the situation in lieu of attempting to force a system onto others.

First, minding the relationships existing prior to the disaster and building upon them with military forces that act in concert with other organizations provides a robust framework for achieving national objectives. Every disaster response will inevitably stress the standing relationships between the U.S. military and other actors due to the inherent tension that lives are on the line and seconds count. Dealing with unpredictability begins with reverting to the recognition of similarities to experience. Thus strengthening existing ties assists in the rapid establishment of new connections. Areas catastrophically disrupted by essentially fault-less chaos began with an infrastructure for governance whose restoration and improvement lies at the heart of the matter. Especially when local contacts themselves are disrupted, military forces must seek out ways to integrate into the existing power structures.
The second critical vulnerability of joint doctrine is in the characterization of risk. The military survivalist culture that categorically denies equity of information and fights to maintain dominance in decision-making cycles against a thinking enemy starves non-adversarial allies’ situational awareness. The attention given to information security in joint doctrine can undermine the unconditional demand for not a *common* operating picture but a *complete* operating picture. Specifically, the association of force size and force protection can hinder the execution of a truly synergistic civil-military operation. More military personnel delivers more force protection; more force also means that there is more force to protect. When civilians are added to the equation, the added capacity for effort does not correspond to an added level of force protection. The “weakest link” paradigm from a military outlook considers not just under-performance but untrustworthiness. In addition, the tendency to shift to an “operational defilade,” a position of greater protection but weaker effectiveness, can be seen in an over-reliance on standing procedures that work well in exclusively military environments and poorly elsewhere. Burden sharing begins with a basic agreement that the local affected population has a stake in outcomes. Further military experience working “among the people” will help defray the costly tradition of minimizing both the impact and role of civilians during operations.

Finally, the power of existing military doctrine as an inclusive system supported by a cohesive culture bound by tradition cannot simply be an export product. Simply put, when something works internally to the military, it should be allowed to work. If a military protocol must be adapted in order to function in an environment devoid of clearly defined relationships, then adaptation demands change on both sides of the table.
In disaster relief, a host nation may not share the same perspective on the time allowable to make a decision or even what an acceptable risk to the population is as a military commander. This is in no way shape or form an indicator to work around the process. Instead, additional effort must be made to match divergent needs with the local government in the lead. Vigilant adherence within military organizations to processes that work must also endure. A Joint Task Force commander would not be impressed by a staff “gone native” and deliberating at length over decisions or guidance already committed.

Until the military doctrinal framework adjusts to build upon local capacity—incorporating instead of just imposing— the calculations of costs and benefits over time will consistently come up short. Failure to integrate the needs of military necessity with the nuanced agendas of the multiplicity of actors during international disaster relief can itself be catastrophic.

Bridging the divide between a military culture founded on command and control and a civilian culture dependent on collaboration and cooperation would present opportunities within the complex joint, multi-national, and inter-agency arena— not just for foreign humanitarian assistance. Getting it right in international disaster relief creates a solid foundation for less permissive environments.

Stripping away the hostile antagonism of an adversary bent on armed violence and lessening the impact of blame brought about by civic corruption or popular malice, the arena of international disaster relief lays bare the foundations of conducting military operations under crisis conditions with a clear goal: uplift the host nation governance and reduce or relieve human suffering.
Recommendations for Further Research

To capitalize on the conclusions and explore the potential that they hold for future military operations, the following four areas are worth consideration. They are: repeat the analytic process for additional condition sets to validate the findings; take the logical conclusion of an operational assessment to the tactical level; consider the issue of foreign humanitarian doctrine from the Department of State perspective; and evaluate the roles and missions of the military to determine how demands for foreign humanitarian assistance competency mesh with overall responsibilities in the contemporary operational environment.

The selection of the response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 and the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007 capture lessons within the context in which they occurred. Prior to or in conjunction with further updates of joint doctrine, an examination of other condition sets would be valuable. Considering the significant political tensions between state authority and state responsibility and the role these factors play with national and international perceptions of legitimacy, an evaluation of the response to Cyclone Nargis which struck Myanmar (Burma) on May 2, 2008, and resulted in tens of thousands of dead is strongly encouraged. The earthquake which struck the People’s Republic of China on May 12, 2008, provides a counter-point to consider the extent to which the employment of state capacity shapes international response. Understanding the role of strategic communication in handling consent under such conditions could also be unraveled.

The broad survey at the operational level established a starting point for improving joint military doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance. Recent experience
of serving service-members and an increasingly available rich document base would provide insight into the factors at the tactical level that can make or break a successful disaster relief operation. Analysis of the role of small unit assessment teams (Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team and Disaster Assessment Response Teams) and their relationship to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities model (DOTMLPF) of force management for either the Departments of Defense or State would have lasting value. Comparison of the HAST-DART model and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) would help make the connection between disaster relief and stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition (SSTR) operations.

Underlying the challenges faced by military forces in applying joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance is the current nature of the interagency environment. Considerable debate continues on ways to apply cohesion to the Executive branch of the United States Government, often neglecting the fact that the Constitutional balance of power deals with the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. The apparent disorder among agencies is partly by design and partly by the nature of bureaucratic inertia. Examination of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance would be timely. Special consideration could be given for the utility and function of the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the applicability of a similar model within the U.S. Government for disaster relief, both foreign and domestic. The design of the National Response Framework as a guide post to the future of inter-agency planning, preparation, and execution could be incorporated into such a study.
Lastly, the nature of military response to requests for foreign humanitarian assistance from host nation governments through the Department of State can be pursued in light of the expanded role of the U.S. military. Given the realities of the contemporary operational environment and the simultaneous transformation and maturation of much of the armed forces, effort made to harness the “street wisdom” of combat hardened forces should be made. Research into the future benefits or perils to the military that exposure to complex humanitarian assistance deals to combat proficiency could drive considerations for policy.

This research explored the relationships of military joint doctrine for foreign humanitarian assistance to building participative local capacity during international disaster response. Demonstrated through examination of the Department of Defense response to the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 and to the Bangladesh Cyclone in 2007, military joint doctrine must fundamentally reorient on understanding and reinforcing the existing local social structure during disaster response. Better understanding of the mechanisms of resiliency under the conditions of natural disasters would lay strong foundations for fulfilling the growing expectation that U.S. military forces be able to conduct stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations on par with combat operations.
**foreign disaster relief.** As defined in *JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 04 March 2008)*: “prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.”

**foreign humanitarian assistance.** As defined in *JP 1-02*: “programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or than can result in great damage to or loss of property…The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.”

**humanitarian relief.** Provisions for the sustenance of life, reduction in acute suffering, and maintenance of basic dignity, typically temporary in nature. The United Nations defines a continuum from relief to rehabilitation to development (UN GA 46/182 1991 and 60/126 2005).

**natural disaster.** Conditions that are of sufficient magnitude to threaten life, property, and governance and *do not* involve partisan armed conflict. Disasters must be responded to. For this study, natural disasters can be considered man-made (a dam bursting) but not deliberate (arson). The consideration is that wildfires do not target first responders.

**natural hazard.** Conditions that may lead to natural disaster. Hazards can be prepared for. Or not.

**phase.** A purposeful description of limited timeframes bounded by conditions of risk. For example, the response phase of a disaster is immaterial to the ability, purpose, or willingness of forces and organizations to act. Specific descriptive terms will be used with the context of the document specified, i.e. “recovery phase (NRF).”

**response.** As defined in the National Response Framework, “includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs” (NRF 2008, 1). Prevention, protection, long-term recovery, and restoration activities needed by communities to rebuild their way of life are generally outside the purview of response.
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