THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION CONCEPT: MEETING STRATEGIC LEVEL REQUIREMENTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

ALLEN D. ADKINS, LCDR, USN
B.S. United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, NY, 1995

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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In October 2007, the combined maritime services of the United States released “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” defining how they will operate to support strategic considerations. One concept looking to support this strategy is the Global Fleet Station (GFS). The GFS concept uses US Navy ships and other governmental assets to set up a self-sustaining base from which to conduct shaping and stability operations. The purpose of this study was to review the GFS concept and its 2007 deployment to Central America to determine if GFS meets defined strategic requirements. A qualitative analysis was applied to conduct the research. The primary research question was: using the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower as guidance, does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? The analysis of this, and secondary, research questions allowed the author to build a graded rubric based on tasks outlined in the Universal Joint Task List. This graded rubric shows that the proof-of-concept deployment met the strategic level guidance and that the GFS concept is a valid concept for future naval endeavors.
Name of Candidate: Allen D. Adkins

Thesis Title: The Global Fleet Station Concept: Meeting Strategic Level Requirements

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
CDR Kenneth A. Szmed, M.B.A.

______________________________, Member
Ted A. Thomas, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
LCDR Terry L. Bauer, M.E.M.

Accepted this 13th day of June 2008 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


In October 2007, the combined maritime services of the United States released “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” defining how they will operate to support strategic considerations. One concept looking to support this strategy is the Global Fleet Station (GFS). The GFS concept uses US Navy ships and other governmental assets to set up a self-sustaining base from which to conduct shaping and stability operations. The purpose of this study was to review the GFS concept and its 2007 deployment to Central America to determine if GFS meets defined strategic requirements. A qualitative analysis was applied to conduct the research. The primary research question was: using the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower as guidance, does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? The analysis of this, and secondary, research questions allowed the author to build a graded rubric based on tasks outlined in the Universal Joint Task List. This graded rubric shows that the proof-of-concept deployment met the strategic level guidance and that the GFS concept is a valid concept for future naval endeavors.
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I’d also like to thank CDR Bornt from CUSNS for working with me and allowing me to attend the GFS Lessons Learned meeting in Mayport, FL. Attendance at this event was critical to the research of my paper, allowing me to gain first hand reports of the proof-of-concept deployment and make contacts with important personnel involved with the concept.
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ACRONYMS

AOR: Area of Responsibility
BNCG: Belizean National Coast Guard
CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNA: Center for Naval Analysis
COCOM: Combatant Commander
COI: Courses of Instruction
COMREL: Community Relations
CTG 40.9: The GFS07 Command Element, Commander Task Group 40.9
CUSNS: Commander U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (Mayport, FL)
DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military Economic
DoD: Department of Defense
DoDD: Department of Defense Directive
DoS: Department of State
DV: Distinguished Visitor
EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESG: Expeditionary Strike Group
ETC: Expeditionary Training Command
EUCOM: European Command
FAO: Foreign Area Officer
GFS: Global Fleet Station
HN: Host Nation
HSV-2: High Speed Vessel 2 or HSV SWIFT
LCS: Littoral Combat Ship
MARFOR SOUTH: U.S. Marine Corps Forces South (Miami, FL)
MCAG: Maritime Civil Affairs Group
MCHQ: Marine Corps Headquarters
MILGRP: Military Group
MTT: Mobile Training Teams
NECC: Naval Expeditionary Combat Command
NIOC: National Information Operations Command
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OPNAV: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
PAO: Public Affairs Officer
PDSS: Pre-Deployment Site Survey
RHIB: Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat
SC MAGTF: Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force
SOUTHCOM: Southern Command
SSTR: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
UJTL: Universal Joint Task List
USMILGRP: US Embassy to Military Group
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a hub where all manner of Joint, Inter-Agency, International Organizations, navies, coast guards and non-governmental organizations could partner together as a force for good (Naval Office of Information 2007).

ADM Mike Mullen, CNO

On November 28, 2005, the Secretary of Defense signed Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” This directive marked the beginning of the developmental process for future naval capabilities and missions. While it did not reduce emphasis on major combat operations, it elevated security operations to the same priority (Department of Defense 2005, 2). Released at about the same time was National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) on the subject of management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization. The primary purpose of NSPD-44 was to improve the security of the United States by providing reconstruction and stabilization assistance for countries at risk of, or recovering from, conflict or civil upheaval (Bush 2005, under “Introduction”). Both documents focused on coordinating U.S. efforts between government agencies and enhancing U.S. efforts on international cooperation. DoDD 3000.05 directly supports the strategic requirement on international cooperation when it states that DoD “shall develop greater means to help build other countries’ security capacity” (Department of Defense 2005, 3). These documents demand an answer from the naval service on how to respond to strategic challenges.
In October 2007, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard, released “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” Taking some guidance from objectives articulated in NSPD-44 and Directive 3000.05, the Cooperative Strategy defines how the maritime services will operate using the full range of military options to support strategic considerations on establishing positive security conditions (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Introduction”). The Cooperative Strategy emphasizes the use of seapower to influence nations not just on the sea, but ashore as well. The strategy says that it will use seapower to secure the United States against direct attack. It also says that it will use seapower to advance security interests (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Maritime Strategic Concept”). The strategy will use U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks. These six key tasks are: limit regional conflict with forward deployed maritime power, deter major power war, win our nation’s wars, contribute to homeland defense in depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners, and prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Maritime Strategic Concepts”). To meet the six key tasks, the Strategy describes six core capabilities of the sea services to prevent war and take advantage of other nations’ naval assets to support mutual interests (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Expanded Core Capabilities”). These core capabilities are forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. While the Cooperative Strategy provides overarching guidance, it does not provide specific recommendations on how the sea services execute these tasks. This task will fall to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and their subordinates. According to DoDD 3000.05, the Geographic Combatant Commanders
(COCOM) will forward new stability concepts to the Secretary of Defense (Department of Defense 2005, 9).

Given this initial DoDD guidance, Navy leadership began formulating concepts on how to support the COCOMs to this end. Navy leaders envision a need to capitalize on the globalization process that interweaves other nations’ security requirements with those of the United States. Navy leaders also know global security requirements will require more than just the U.S. Navy, and that they will need to take advantage of other nations’ naval assets to support mutual interests. Naval leadership then uses the idea of sea basing to take the concept a step further by using at-sea forces for staging with little or no reliance on land bases. Sea basing is a concept using the sea services’ multiple war fighting capabilities and putting them on a single, or multiple, at-sea platform where they operate with little or no reliance on shore support. There is little question that for these ideas to achieve any measure of success (e.g. a qualitative improvement in regional stability or decline in local terrorist activity within a country), strong international relationships are required. A combination of sea basing and strong local relationships was a concept developed to meet this purpose.

In building concepts to support the SSTR mission, the Navy can rely on its storied history for solid examples upon which to build. One of the most recent examples was the Tsunami relief effort in 2004/2005. I witnessed these relief events first hand as a member of the USS SHILOH (CG 67), a ship in the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) Carrier Strike Group. The training and equipping of the carrier strike group prior to deployment did not offer any preparation for humanitarian assistance operations. However, within days of arriving off the coast of Sumatra, the strike group adapted and
transformed from a war-fighting focused force to one focused on providing humanitarian relief. The Strike Group used its large base of manpower and helicopter assets to deliver thousands of pounds of water, food, and medical supplies to the stricken areas in Indonesia. Watching the effect this mission had to promote a positive image of the United States provides me a unique insight to focus my research. The lessons learned from this relief effort, and the second and third order effects of that mission, are critical lessons learned to consider when developing new capabilities to support SSTR operations.

As the Navy builds concepts for missions it can use within the deployment process/cycle to support this transformation, the service will focus on ensuring SSTR is a core capability while building strong international ties in the process. One concept under trial is the Global Fleet Station (GFS). This concept entails using U.S. Navy ships and other governmental assets with existing host nation basing arrangements to set up a self-sustaining base from which to conduct shaping (Phase 0) operations ranging from construction assistance, to coastal warfare training, to maritime interdiction (U.S. Department of the Navy 2006, 30). GFS is intended to be a dedicated COCOM asset with a primary mission to support national security objectives by working directly with other service and interagency components to develop and sustain regional partnerships.

The purpose of GFS is to establish a base of operations to use as a coordination point from which to launch multiple types of missions within a regional area, focusing primarily on shaping and stability operations, Theater Security Cooperation, and other tasks supporting the War on Terror (Navy White Paper, 2006). As in today’s security operations in Iraq, cultural awareness plays a critical role in helping promote stability.
One cannot learn cultural awareness in a classroom; it comes through firsthand experience and interaction with the local population and their leaders. This interaction serves not only U.S. national interests, but the host nations’ as well. One cannot fully learn cultural awareness or understanding in a matter of days. It takes months, sometimes years, to learn and benefit from an understanding of culture. This is an important theme in the Cooperative Strategy. It speaks to cooperative relationships with international partners, “trust and cooperation cannot be surged” (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). GFS port visits can greatly facilitate cultural learning and understanding during a port visit. This is not a typical Navy port call for rest, relaxation, fuel, and shopping. A GFS visit is a dedicated two-week port visit that focuses specifically on tailored security training or community relations projects as requested by the host nation (Navy White Paper, 2006). Cultural awareness is important for a visit to any country.

An important aspect of GFS is that it is critical for other governmental agencies, such as the Department of State, to take the lead in many matters. CTG 40.9, the GFS proof-of-concept deployment command element, already noted this observation in a specific lesson learned submitted to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (CUSNS). CTG 40.9 stated that U.S. Embassy personnel who embarked HSV-2 SWIFT, the GFS proof-of-concept platform, prior to port stops provided invaluable information to help meet GFS strategic communications objectives. Claims by CTG 40.9 that this allowed them “to achieve a level of information operations success that would have been impossible without DoS assistance” and that DoS participation was a “huge force multiplier,” confirm participation by other governmental agencies is necessary to be
Participation such as this supports the Cooperative Strategy. The Sea Services must become skilled at forging international partnerships while working in conjunction with other departments within the U.S. government (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”).

Specifically, the purpose of this study is to review the GFS concept and its 2007 proof of concept deployment to countries in Central America, using raw feedback reported from all associated sources, in an attempt to determine if GFS is the right vehicle to meet strategic requirements for SSTR operations. With the possible exception of facing a future threat from growing naval forces in China and/or Russia, there is little need for a large naval strike force built around cold-warfare concepts or in preparing for large-scale blue-water battles. The Navy has perhaps accepted this reality by not arming Frigates (FFG’s) with standard missiles, by shifting their shipbuilding focus from the advanced Destroyer and Cruiser (DDX and CGX) concepts to the smaller, modular based, brown-water Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and by aggressively pushing the establishment of Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). This change in focus by the Navy and development of GFS show an attempt to answer the strategic questions on supporting SSTR operations.

Primary and Secondary Questions

The primary question I will answer, using the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower as guidance, is: Does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations?
I will also explore secondary questions to support this research. The primary question requires identification of the strategic level requirements that are associated with GFS. I will investigate what the GFS concept is. How does it provide security and stability in regard to the national instruments of power – diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)? What were the reported second and third order effects of this multinational exchange of information and training?

Significance of Research

The level of requirements coming from the primary documents (NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, the National Maritime Strategy, and Cooperative Strategy) justifies the reason for this thesis. The guidance in these documents supports the overall National Security Strategy and support the National Strategy for Maritime Security where it states, “freedom of the seas is a top national priority” (Department of Homeland Defense 2005, 7). The services, specifically the Navy, must develop a valid concept of operations that focuses not just on fighting a conventional nation-to-nation war, but also on the requirement of providing security and stability on a strategic scale. The significance of this study is to expound on the Navy program proposal for GFS beyond the basic information provided in a concept paper. This writer can form a valid recommendation on how GFS meets its strategic goals by taking the GFS concept, applying the lessons learned reported in the proof-of-concept deployment, and tying these lessons learned to the reported second and third order effects.
Assumptions

The main assumption is that the Naval service is going to perform missions across the full spectrum of military operations based on the October 2007 Cooperative Strategy. The Navy will transition from its current force structure and deployment cycle process to comply with the guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen. Contained in the Navy Operations Concept 2006, he describes a distributed force that provides increased forward presence. Global Fleet Station represents one possible solution to the current challenge. Another solution might involve using the current carrier strike groups (CSG) or expeditionary strike groups (ESG). This paper works under the assumption that GFS will be used and that the CSG and ESG will remain a primary tool in the national maritime arsenal against wartime threats.

Limitation/Delimitation

A limitation is my dependence upon CUSNS personnel to supply research materials such as lessons learned and operational data. While I am receiving information from my contact, my research is limited to unclassified materials. I am also limited to the lessons learned from the initial proof-of-concept deployment of GFS to the SOUTHCOM area of operations. I researched information on the pre-planning of the next GFS proof-of-concept deployment to Africa, but did not review any lessons learned data.

The delimitation is that I will not discuss the effects GFS may have on the current carrier/expeditionary strike schedule/system. While it is a given that adding any additional requirement will have an effect on force structure due to limited number of assets, it is not my goal to weigh how important GFS is compared to other “big Navy” requirements or to attempt to qualify or quantify the relative importance.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Since GFS is an emerging concept, there are no manuals or studies on the subject. However, this study researched other resources that reference the emerging concept of GFS. Therefore, to research the primary research question, the resources were broken down into four main categories. First is Concept Documents. This area includes material detailing the Global Fleet Station concept. Second is Strategic Documents and Policies. Contained in this section are documents such as the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, and DoD 3000.05. The third section is Articles and is comprised of any news media on the subject, such as Navy Times articles and items posted online through Navy News. The last and most critical section of literature consists of any official lessons learned, staff feedback, lectures, or studies by personnel involved with the GFS proof-of-concept deployment to Central America.

**Concept Documents**

The 2006 Navy white paper on Global Fleet Stations is the primary source of information in this section and is the first source in this literature review. Published in March of 2006, this document established the GFS concept, detailing how the Navy would use GFS to support shaping and stability operations. It states, “our Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) need tools that are not only instruments of war, but implements for stability, security, and reconstruction” (Navy White Paper, 1). Prior to getting into detail on GFS, this Navy White Paper reviews other methods in which the Navy is transforming to support stability and shaping operations, such as establishment of Naval
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), establishment of a riverine force, the establishment of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) expansion program (Navy White Paper, 2). NECC combined previously disparate commands under one warfare specialty. It includes areas such as the Seabees, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and the Maritime Civil Affairs Group. NECC initially established a riverine force in FY06. Riverines focus on patrol and security protection of inner waterways. The Navy then took another step in focusing on the littoral water-space with the LCS program establishment. The LCS program is intended to give the Navy the necessary combat power and access in shallow, coastal waters that it is currently denied with deep draft vessels. Lastly, the FAO program will assist the Navy to better understand other languages and cultures, and therefore enhance knowledge of other societies (Navy White Paper, 2).

After reviewing the recent Navy Transformation history, the GFS white paper provides a detailed explanation of the GFS concept. The white paper also provides suggestions on what capabilities GFS should include and how the GFS program should be started. In the capabilities section, the white paper brings out the idea of the single “mother ship” concept that the first GFS proof-of-concept deployment used. It further envisions multiple ships, frigates or LCSs, to provide larger training platforms for foreign Navy and Coast Guard elements (Navy White Paper, 3). Regarding how the GFS program should be started, the white paper suggests Central America as the location eventually used in the proof-of-concept deployment. The document concludes with a statement about how GFS will support the global partnership of navies as eventually

The N3/N5 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) updated this white paper concept document on 30 July 2007. Like the paper before it, the July 2007 paper provided a definition for GFS. It also listed enablers and suggested locations for supporting GFS. The last portion of the paper provided details on current and future GFS efforts (OPNAV 2007, 2). Together, the two documents provided a solid starting point on the definition of what GFS is.

Another document that detailed the GFS concept was the *Naval Operations Concept 2006*. It covers a range of topics, from national strategy and the security environment to emerging missions in response to changing maritime environment, to how naval forces would respond to emerging challenges. Of specific interest was a section on “Methods” where it detailed the sea basing concept. There is specific mention of GFS, providing information on how the concept fits into the broader naval operating concept (U.S. Department of the Navy 2006, 30). Specific mention in a higher-level naval operating document reinforces the GFS concept’s importance.

Lastly, official government reports were reviewed for more background information. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Maritime Prepositioning Ship programs and a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Joint Seabasing benefits were particularly notable. Both touch on GFS’s initial concept and how it fits into the emerging Navy force structure. The CRS report provides background of Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship programs. It also has detailed sections on the seabasing concept, how it offers the benefit
of affordability and cost-effectiveness, and how GFS may affect this as a future requirement (O’Rourke 2007, 26). Likewise, the GAO report did not focus on the GFS concept, but it provided details on how more experimentation would be required prior to the Maritime Services moving forward with spending billions of dollars on Joint seabasing efforts. While the very nature of both these documents lends credence to the GFS proof-of-concept deployment, they were used to provide additional background on the seabasing concept.

Strategic Documents and Policies

The primary research question focuses on Global Fleet Station meeting national strategic objectives based on documents from multiple levels within the nation’s strategic security structure. The foundation document is *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006* (NSS). It is the capstone document and provides guidance for all lower level military strategies. The overview section addresses many main points, three of which directly support GFS: strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, working with others to diffuse regional conflict, and developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power (Bush 2006, 1). Regarding the first point, any project that supports building alliances is a critical tool in meeting the NSS objectives. By collaborating with more nations on a daily basis, the U.S. ensures fewer future locations terrorist networks have to establish a base of operations. The second point, regional conflicts, speaks to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Working with other nations to improve internal security forces will provide “long-term stability and prosperity” (Bush 2006, 16). The third point, developing agendas for cooperative action, specifically addresses certain geographic areas. It states that the U.S.
must strengthen both regional and strategic alliances with nations in Central and South America (Bush 2006, 37). It lists the goals of stability and increasing prosperity in Africa and recognizes that U.S. security depends upon partnership with Africans to reinforce weak and/or failing states (Bush 2006, 37). All of these goals are supported in the subordinate levels of national strategy. They will be important to remember as I review the primary research question.

The National Defense Strategy of the United States (NDS) supports the NSS. It establishes four strategic objectives. Two of these objectives are important to this study: strengthening alliances and partnerships, and establishing favorable security conditions. Alliances and partnerships are a principal source of strength. Their primary benefit is a high level of cooperation in the war on terrorism (Rumsfeld 2005, 4). The specific objective is to “help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests” (Rumsfeld 2005, 7). In the second objective, establishing favorable security conditions, the NDS explains that the United States will work with others against any dangerous aggression or instability by honoring our security commitments (Rumsfeld 2005, 7). To meet these objectives, the strategy lists key operational capabilities. The last of eight capabilities is of particular importance to this thesis, “increasing capabilities of partners – international and domestic” (Rumsfeld 2005, 15). The NDS addresses another important concept in the area of joint, combined training and education. The NDS suggests meeting this concept by working with other agencies of the U.S. government and the militaries of our partner nations. This thesis will study how GFS supports this concept. Listing overarching objectives, the NDS meshes with the NMS and serves as a basis for DoDD 3000.05.
The National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS) supports the NSS. These strategies directly inform two of the NMS’s primary objectives: establishing security conditions conducive to a favorable international order and strengthening alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges. Meeting these two objectives is discussed through a variety of ways. One “way” to increase the capability of our allies and increase their willingness to cooperate in military operations is thru forward presence (Myers 2004, 11). The strategy further suggests that the COCOMs must recommend changes to the level and composition of this presence, and posture their forces to establish favorable security conditions (Myers 2004, 11). These are important concepts to remember over the course of this thesis as GFS is a strategic level initiative aimed at this very strategy. The NMS also specifically notes that for global security and stability to be successful, the United States military must engage with other nations’ forces to promote trust, cooperation, and confidence (Myers 2004, 12). Lastly, consistent with the other higher strategies, it specifies that for stability operations to succeed close cooperation with other departments of the US government is required (Myers 2004, 13).

In conclusion, while the NMS is focused on the Armed Forces and how they will win battles, the areas devoted to full spectrum operations and preventing conflict are important for this thesis.

The aforementioned documents provide the basis for the documents framing the primary research question: the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21CS). The first of these documents is the NSMS. In the introduction, it stresses the importance of maritime security as a national interest and specifies that the U.S. “must
take full advantage of strengthened alliances and other international cooperative agreements” (Department of Homeland Security, 1). The document’s “Strategic Objectives” section states “This strategy describes how the U.S. Government will promote an international maritime security effort that will effectively and efficiently enhance the security of the maritime domain” (Department of Homeland Security, 7). One way it suggests doing this is by aiding international partners in protecting their own internal waters through a number of means (Department of Homeland Security, 12). An example provided is the United States funding to support coastal security programs in Africa (Department of Homeland Security, 12). Lastly, in the “Strategic Actions” section of the document, it stipulates that in order to be successful in securing the maritime domain, the U.S. must work with a coalition of nations, representing a strong and united front (Department of Homeland Security, 13).

To achieve this objective, it lists five strategic actions. Of these actions, three were important to the research and analysis of this thesis: enhancing international cooperation, maximizing domain awareness, and deploying layered security. On enhancing international cooperation, the document specifically outlines how the United States looks to reduce regional conflicts by offering maritime and port security training programs and expanding international Port Security and Maritime Liaison Officer programs (Department of Homeland Security, 15). To maximize domain awareness, it speaks of forming international coalitions to share maritime situational awareness and build a global maritime intelligence database (Department of Homeland Security, 17). Lastly, the layered security section of the document suggests how all levels of the Government, such as the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, must
work together to integrate effective maritime security programs (Department of Homeland Security, 20). In conclusion, while the overall document has a primary focus of defending the homeland coastal areas, it outlays the strategy of how the U.S. should operate in international locations to provide defense-in-depth.

National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) is on the subject of managing interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization. The primary purpose of NSPD-44 is to improve the security of the United States by providing reconstruction and stabilization assistance for countries at risk of, or recovering from, conflict or civil upheaval (Bush 2005, under “Introduction”). It describes how the United States has an interest in enhancing its ability to support reconstruction efforts for other nations. This is especially true for nations in transition from conflict as they try to transition to a peaceful society, with the bottom line being to avoid countries from being a safe haven for terrorist organizations (Bush 2005, under “Policy”).

NSPD-44 established the Department of State as the lead coordinator for these efforts. It explains how the DoS must harmonize its efforts with the DoD’s military plans and operations (Bush 2005, under “Responsibilities of the Department of State). NSPD-44 then continues to explain the responsibilities of other agencies, such as DoD, to enable the DoS to carry out the initiatives set forth in the document. In its closing paragraph, it makes note that the directive does not affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or any command relationships it has with the armed forces. Its purpose is merely to act as an impetus to bring together multiple departments of the United States when working on stabilization efforts. The DoD answer is Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.
DoDD 3000.05 “provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over
time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop” (Department
of Defense 2005, 1). It serves to establish the policy within the DoD for assignment of
responsibilities across the spectrum of stability operations, from planning to training to
execution. DoD 3000.05 directs that “stability operations are a core U.S. military
mission” (Department of Defense 2005, 2). It further explains the idea that military-
civilian teams are the critical element of stability operations, and DoD will seek advice
and assistance from the Department of State (Department of Defense 2005, 3). It further
states “the DoD shall develop greater means to help other countries’ security capacity”
(Department of Defense 2005, 3). Lastly, the policy instructs the Service Secretaries to
develop stability operations capabilities (Department of Defense 2005, 10). The GFS
concept appears to be a direct result of this DoD directive.

DoDD 3000.05 delineates two key terms that run throughout this thesis. The first
is Stability Operations: “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum
from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions” (Department
of Defense 2005, 2). The second term is Military support to Stability, Security,
Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR): “Department of Defense activities that support
U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition
operations, which leads to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests” (Department
of Defense 2005, 2). These definitions and the policy guidance surrounding stability
operations are important to keep in mind as they underpin the entire GFS concept.

Finally, the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21CS) is
the last reviewed higher-level guidance for this thesis. CS21CS brings together the
combined military services of the U.S Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard to answer the directives presented in the previously reviewed strategic level policies. It represents the first time the maritime forces of the United States have come together to form a unified strategy. CS21CS “stresses an approach that integrates Seapower with other instruments of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies” (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under Signature Page). Again, a guiding strategy highlights the theme of interagency and multi-national support.

CS21CS defines and describes six core capabilities of the sea services to take advantage of other nations’ naval assets to support mutual interests (U.S. Coast Guard 2007, under “Expanded Core Capabilities”). These core capabilities are forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Forward presence is a key task in any discussion on GFS. The strategy speaks to having tailored forces based on regional requirements, acting in conjunction with interagency partners (U.S Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). It explains this is best done by “fostering critical relationships overseas,” with the theme that “trust and cooperation cannot be surged” (U.S Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). By maintaining forward presence and remaining engaged in relationships that are mutually beneficial, our maritime forces will enhance security across the globe (U.S Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). Lastly, the strategy discusses how better prepared at working with the international community the personnel of all the services must be. Indeed, better regional and cultural expertise is essential to successful partnerships (U.S. Coast Guard
2007, under “Implementation Priorities”). While CS21CS provides overarching strategic guidance for the maritime services, it does not provide specific recommendations on how the Navy, or other sea services, will meet its objectives. That is the purpose of this thesis as it relates to the GFS concept.

The last document in this section of the review is CJCSM 3500.04D, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL provides standards for planning, conducting, evaluating, and assessing joint and multinational training. This manual provides tasks in a common language that combatant commanders and other organizations that answer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can perform (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005, A-2). A staff will use this common language to identify required capabilities to meet mission requirements in their area of operations.

The UJTL is organized into four parts: strategic level – national military tasks, strategic level- theater tasks, operational level tasks, and tactical level tasks (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005, B-A-2). Provided under each task are measures and criteria to establish performance standards. Each sequentially numbered measure (e.g. M1, M2, etc.) directly relates to a task and has a measurement standard (e.g. hours, instances, percents). Following this measure, there is a stated criterion to define an acceptable level of performance (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005, B-B-1). UJTL tasks identify “what” is to be performed, but does not describe “how” it should be done or “who” should do it (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005, A-2). The “who” and “how” remain at the discretion of the commander. Reviewing CJCSM 3500.04D provides insights into what measures of performance a combatant commander may
expect from GFS. This manual is important to this thesis because it provides grading measures to build the rubric used in Chapter 5’s conclusion.

Articles

A review of articles from the available sources that have been written on GFS and supporting strategies showed that almost all of the media presentation has been positive. This is not surprising since this thesis only reviewed U.S. based journalism, with a specific focus on Public Affairs related articles. However, it was noted by the Center for Naval Analysis that only five of the 74 articles published by foreign media was assessed to be negative (Gonzalez 2007). Regardless if the U.S. articles seemed biased, the main information gathered from them was on the specific events that occurred during each port visit. They also educated this author on what information the public has already been presented.

The Navy Times in particular presented a number of articles relating to the topic of this thesis. Even though the cooperative maritime strategy was just published in October of 2007, there were already a couple of useful articles analyzing its direction and impact on Navy and Marine Corps forces. While not specifically addressing the GFS concept, they discussed topics that were related to its implementation. These ideas could be directly tied to the concepts that GFS was trying to support. Notably, there was a good article by Andrew Scutro on the second GFS proof-of-concept deployment. This article explained the direction the program is headed with respect to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), one of the U.S.’s geographical combatant commands, theatre of operations.
Other valuable sources of information in this section were articles obtained online through the U.S. Navy public affairs channels. From the beginning of the concept in April 27, 2007, articles such as “Global Fleet Station Deployment Begins,” to port visit reports such as the September 5, 2007, article “Global Fleet Completes Training in Belize,” highlight the positive results achieved by the proof-of-concept deployment and provide important first hand feedback from the end users. While they did not provide many specific details, it was easy to cross-reference an article to a number of lessons learned provided from the CUSNS staff.

An article of note that provided a good counterpoint to the Department of Defense’s role in stability operations and thereby targeted the GFS concept was “Pentagon, State struggle to define nation-building roles.” Corine Hegland wrote the article and published it in the National Journal. The focus of the article is how the Department of Defense has failed to take into account the full spectrum of issues that come from stability operations, and in some cases clashed with the direction the State Department was looking to move concerning a country’s regime. This article provided some proof to the old adage that even the best intentions can be flawed, and the necessity of working together at all levels of government is a core requirement to a program such as GFS.

Lessons Learned/Official Reports

The lessons learned and official reports on the proof-of-concept deployment served as critical sources of information for this thesis. I received helpful feedback from my primary point-of-contact at CUSNS, Commander Floyd Bornt. He supplied me with initial lessons learned as provided by the GFS Command Element (CTG 40.9) regarding
the proof-of-concept deployment. By feeding me these reported lessons without additional commentary, it allowed a review of the raw data so that I could draw my own conclusions and recommendations. One of the most important additions to my research was the ability to attend the GFS07 Lessons Learned Meeting on 15 November 2007. This meeting provided numerous documents and sources supporting the research of this thesis. Lastly, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) report, the Impact of the Global Fleet Station (GFS) 2007 Deployment of the High Speed Vessel-2 (HSV-2) SWIFT, was the most beneficial document to my research.

The GFS07 Lessons Learned database was large. The first portion of this database was in the form of National Information Operations Command (NIOC) reports. Overall, I received 87 total reports as generated by the GFS command element. These reports were each 2-3 pages in length, and focused on media events, distinguished visitor (DV) events, and Community Relations (COMREL) projects that occurred in each of the port visits over the course of the proof-of-concept deployment. The media and DV event reports detailed the invitees and attendees to each event, the location and details of any speeches, the impressions of both the host and audience, and how the event supported the overall mission. The COMREL reports detailed the project, coordination, incentives, supplied materials, media attendance, and impressions of the hosts and audience. These reports were invaluable in providing a clear picture on the conduct of each port visit. The general impression of the media for each visit on the deployment proved to be favorable, lending important credibility to the GFS concept.

Another good source of information was the GFS07 Mid-Point Lessons Learned. This document provided input from the GFS Command Element, MARFOR SOUTH, and
CUSNS. The GFS Command Element provided the most input, covering subjects such as GFS port scheduling, GFS platform outfitting, and Department of State (DoS) public affairs support. The DoS lesson learned input spoke to how DoS participation was a huge force multiplier, and how DoD should seek strong DoS participation in any future GFS deployment (Bornt 2007). Inputs from the other sources commented on the benefit to the USMC by participating in future GFS deployments, and how COMREL projects could be expanded for future GFS missions.

All of these ideas and lessons learned were discussed and debated at the GFS07 Lessons Learned meeting. While there were briefs on topics such as GFS Funding, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), and Project Handclasp, the main briefs of interest to this thesis were given by CTG 40.9 and the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). The commander of GFS Command Element, Captain Douglas Wied, presented the first brief. In his opening remarks the commander provided valuable insight on the success of the proof-of-concept deployment. He stressed the importance of visiting each nation twice during the proof-of-concept deployment, strongly supporting the idea of persistent presence and building upon the relationships and trust established during the first visit. He went further by stating that the second visit needed to be the longer of the two, as the first visit focused on meeting and building partnerships, where the second visit was focused on the necessary training and other host nation desires. In conclusion, he offered some recommendations on how to better “communicate” the GFS vision through the right strategic communication. His main points were that emblematics were a must, and that the overall concept was more of a business plan than an OPLAN. In his words, it was important to sell “what is GFS” and tell the media “why we’re here” (Wied 2007).
Commander Tave, AOIC for CTG 40.9, presented the staff wrap-up brief at the
conference. Of the 30-40 lessons learned generated over the course of deployment, he
provided his top six. The first two stressed the importance of working with the DoS.
CDR Tave declared that the Military Group (MILGRP) was key to every port visit. The
MILGRP is the COCOM’s representation on an Embassy staff. Commander Tave
stressed that the established relationship a MILGRP had developed with the local
authorities was far more valuable than what a deployed naval staff could do by itself
using a pre-deployment site survey team (PDSS). Besides the MILGRP, he stressed the
importance of interaction at all levels by the DoS. Another key lesson learned that
supported the research of this thesis occurred when he stated that not all host nation
maritime security forces are military (Tave 2007).

The CNA presented a brief that held specific interest for this thesis. The study
was generated at the request of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) to
analyze the impact of naval engagement in nations visited during the proof-of-concept
deployment (Gonzalez 2007). They briefed that they conducted this research through on-
site interviews in the ports of Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica through
structured media and content analysis. CNA reported that the ship had the desired impact
in the Dominican Republic, as well as a second order effect in Jamaica. In the
Dominican Republic, it reinforced the perception of US interest in the nation. In
Jamaica, there had recently been an election and the port visit lent legitimacy to the new
government by providing a perception that the new Prime Minister was “in” with the US
government (Gonzalez 2007).
The next portion of the CNA brief focused on the media and messages presented during the deployment. As stated earlier, there were only five negative articles in 74 presented by the foreign press. The open access afforded the media by the commander and crew signaled friendly US intent. The message perceived by the target audience was that the US was interested in partnerships and committed to security in the region. The briefing then covered future host-nation requests and recommendations for future deployments. This information will be critical in the final analysis portion of this thesis, and the final report will surely provide a wealth of information to help answer the primary question (Gonzalez 2007).

CNA published the final report in February 2008. The title of the report is Impact of the Global Fleet Station (GFS) 2007 Deployment of the High Speed Vessel-2 (HSV-2) SWIFT. The report introduces the GFS concept, providing its own explanation of what the GFS concept is. It utilizes the same documents described in the opening section of this chapter. The report describes the 2007 proof-of-concept deployment, including a full overview of the training programs offered. Throughout the report, it offered up analysis of GFS on three different levels: the tactical, the operational, and the strategic. The closing section of the report offers recommendations on future GFS deployments.

The most important part of the GFS report to this study covers the impacts and effects of the 2007 deployment. This section was critical in answering the secondary questions of how the GFS concept uses DIME elements to support its strategic concepts and what the second and third order effects from the deployment were. The first section is on the impact on partner nation militaries. This section included valuable feedback from trainees on the effect of the US military training. Overall, 18 partner nation military
personnel were interviewed, focusing on areas ranging from coordination and planning of each visit, training issues, media and civilian awareness, and overall effects of the ship visit (Gonzalez 2008, 1). CNA assured all interviewees of non-attribution. The range of interviewees went from junior, to mid-level, to high-ranking officers. No foreign government officials were available for questions, but the higher-ranking officers did report comments made by government officials (Gonzalez 2008, 10). The next section described impacts on both the partner nation governments and the partner nation civilian population. A major theme on the impact on governments was that SWIFT was able to communicate three important strategic messages: the US is interested in partnerships with partner nations; the US is committed to security in the region; the U.S. military supports engagement with partner nation militaries (Gonzalez 2008, 39). The section of the report on civilian reaction focused on media coverage of the deployment. In conclusion, the CNA report was an invaluable tool providing insight into the impacts, both intended and unintended, that the 2007 GFS proof-of-concept deployment had on some of the countries visited.

Even without any formal doctrine or manuals on the subject, the reference materials provide sufficient means to conduct a thorough inquiry into the primary and secondary research questions as proposed in the introduction. I started with the original GFS concept paper and supporting documents, reviewed capstone national and military strategic documents, reviewed the numerous published articles on GFS, and finished by studying the collected feedback on the proof-of-concept deployment. This detailed research allowed the study to move to the next step: presenting the research methodology.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter 2 offered a summary of the materials used during the research portion of this thesis. This chapter discusses the methodology used to conduct the analysis of these materials in Chapter 4. The analysis was dictated by the primary and secondary questions. In review, the primary question is: using the 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* as guidance, does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? The secondary questions are: What is the GFS concept? What are the strategic level requirements associated with GFS? How does it provide security and stability in regard to the national instruments of power – diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)? What were the reported second and third order effects of the multinational exchange of information and training? To present the methodology used to analyze the research materials, this chapter will first identify the techniques used for analysis. Second, it will review how the research was conducted. Third, it will cover how this research will answer the secondary research questions, thereby allowing a conclusion to be drawn regarding the primary research question.

With any analysis, it is the data’s nature and the problem that dictate the research design or methodology. Methodology is defined as the study of a particular method, or methods, to reach a desired end. Put another way, it is the framework in which the data is placed to clearly see the answer (Leedy 1993, 139). Since the nature of the data for this thesis is opinion or anecdotal, this was a qualitative study. This differs from a
quantitative study in which data is measured and presented numerically (Leedy 1993, 139). A qualitative study is a straightforward means of investigation and considers the “words” of the researched data. It is primarily an inductive approach for data analysis (Leedy 1993, 139). This thesis author evaluated comments and statements on the subject from various resources and used this “evidence” to draw a conclusion.

Based on Paul Leedy’s book *Practical Research, Planning and Design*, there were several specific categories this thesis used as a qualitative study. The categories used were inherently qualitative in nature and were from the following areas: insider instead of outsider perspective, flexible instead of rigid research procedures, subjective data rather than objective data, and natural instead of controlled conditions (Leedy 1993, 144). The first category is outsider versus insider perspective. A qualitative study sees firsthand experience as providing most meaningful data. Consequently, this study utilized firsthand experience in the form of lessons learned from the leadership involved in the GFS proof-of-concept deployment to the SOUTHCOM AOR. The next category is the use of rigid versus flexible procedures. Qualitative research uses more flexible research procedures and is discovery oriented. This thesis applied the concept of flexibility, as it did not confine itself to any strict procedures or data over the course of the study. I was open to any new articles on the GFS concept at any point during the research process. In fact, very late in the research process I obtained a copy of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) report on the effects of the proof-of-concept deployment. This document was invaluable to the final analysis. Next is the category of objective versus subjective ideas. Qualitative studies rely on subjective data. Subjective data exists within a person’s mind. One conveys it through written or oral means. This is different
from objective data. Objective data considers no “feelings” and is numerical in form (Leedy 1993, 144). This thesis again followed the qualitative design; it focused on subjective data from individuals in both written and verbal form. The CNA report on the 2007 GFS proof-of-concept deployment supports this idea where it says “observations of potential strategic effects and impacts are by necessity, qualitative in nature” (Gonzalez 2008, 15). The last category highlights controlled versus natural conditions. Qualitative data is collected as it occurs, or in natural conditions. One does not collect qualitative data in a laboratory environment under a controlled set of criteria. This thesis used articles and lessons learned from GFS events as they occurred, following this qualitative notion. This thesis used the above four categories all in the qualitative manner, following a qualitative methodology.

Next, this chapter outlines the conduct of the research and analysis. First, the research for this thesis began with a review of the materials listed in Chapter 2. A review of both Navy White Papers on GFS and supporting concept documents was required to define GFS. An analysis of the proof-of-concept deployment was also required to enhance the definition of what GFS is. This analysis focused only on the basic components of the proof-of-concept deployment, such as GFS make-up, training programs offered, and port locations visited. This research provided a solid foundation based upon the GFS program’s key messages and goals.

The next step was to review the higher-level strategic guidance, both national level and military strategies. The study of these strategies further enhanced the author’s understanding of strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. This understanding made it possible to answer the subsequent
secondary question concerning strategic level requirements. It is important to note that the CNA report was NOT used in this portion of the analysis. All conclusions from the higher-level strategies were made without outside influence. The review of these strategic level requirements allowed this author to deduce three guiding policy goals. I used these policy goals in the next portion of the analysis, reviewing the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). This review identified key strategic requirements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders that the GFS concept should support. The choice of tasks was subjective, based on the thesis author’s experience and all completed research to date. Twenty tasks were selected, ten each from the strategic national and strategic theater listings. I assigned these tasks to whichever policy goal they most applied, some applying to more than one goal. This set of tasks became the graded checklist used in Chapter 5 to form the conclusion to the primary research question.

The primary research question, does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, was analyzed using the UJTL checklist, acting as a grading rubric. Grades were assigned based on the answers to the secondary research questions concerning what the GFS concept is and the review of the proof-of-concept deployment. Each UJTL task has measures and criteria, listed under each task as sequentially numbered measures (e.g. M1, M2, etc.). Each measure directly relates to a task and has a measurement standard (e.g. hours, instances, percents). This author chose only measures that applied to the GFS concept goals. The grades assigned were straightforward: positive, negative, or null. This simple grading criterion was chosen because of the difficulty in measuring effect in a qualitative study. The CNA report on the proof-of-concept deployment supports this
notion, saying that finding the true value of naval engagement operations is difficult, as quantitative ideas such as measures of performance or measures of effectiveness do not correlate to qualitative observations and reports (Gonzalez 2008, 15). Before grading the checklist, however, there still remained two secondary questions to be answered.

Once an understanding of the higher-level guidance was established, the analysis moved to the question concerning the uses and effects of diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) uses of power. The analysis continued with a review of reported second and third order effects of the multinational exchange of information and training. The analysis utilized the 2007 GFS proof-of-concept deployment as a case study to review and answer these questions.

The most important factor in reviewing the proof-of-concept deployment was finding a primary point of contact at Commander U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (CUSNS) who provided hard data for analysis. This point of contact was CDR Floyd Bornt from CUSNS. He was the primary lead at CUSNS for collecting lessons learned data from the 2007 proof-of-concept deployment. He passed this data in the form of Navy lessons learned. Lessons learned are official messages from commands involved with any specific event regarding both the positive and negative learning experiences. The analysis also used news articles based on the deployment to provide an outside view on the impact of the deployment. Of most value was my attendance of an after action meeting at CUSNS on the GFS deployment. This meeting provided an opportunity to meet the primary individuals responsible for operationalizing the GFS proof-of-concept deployment and allowed a firsthand review of the initial findings from the CNA study on the deployment. The analysis of the proof-of-concept deployment provided the
knowledge base from which this author could assign outcomes to the checklist of UJTL tasks, thereby forming the basis of the conclusion to the primary research question as presented in Chapter 5.

In summary, this chapter presented the research methodology of this thesis. This thesis used the qualitative methodology as shown by the categorical method of data collection and analysis. The design explained how the thesis answered the secondary research questions, then the primary question. The secondary questions were answered through presentation of the research data. The primary research question was answered through use of a rubric of tasks derived from the Universal Joint Task List. This rubric and conclusions are presented in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter 3 defined the research methodology for this thesis. This chapter uses this methodology to conduct the analysis of the primary and secondary research questions. In review, the primary question is: using the 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* as guidance, does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? The secondary questions are: What is the GFS concept? What are the strategic level requirements associated with GFS? How does it provide security and stability in regard to the national instruments of power – diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)? What were the reported second and third order effects of the multinational exchange of information and training? This analysis will begin with the secondary question: What is the GFS concept?

**What is the GFS Concept?**

The GFS concept entails using US Navy vessels and other governmental assets with existing host nation basing arrangements to establish a self-sustaining base from which to conduct shaping (Phase 0/Stability) operations ranging from construction assistance, to coastal warfare training, to maritime interdiction (US Department of the Navy 2006, 30). GFS is intended to be a dedicated COCOM asset with a primary mission to support national security objectives by working directly with other service and interagency organizations to develop and sustain regional partnerships. The GFS concept is a possible solution to a component commander’s request for a method to support
security cooperation and capacity building exercises using more appropriate assets other than a Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group (OPNAV 2007, 1).

The intent of GFS is to establish a base of operations to serve as a coordination point from which to launch multiple types of missions within a regional area, focusing primarily on shaping and stability operations, Theater Security Cooperation, and other tasks supporting the War on Terror (Navy White Paper, 2006). GFS must be highly visible and remain consistently engaged with partner nations (OPNAV 2007, 1). It achieves its mission goals through active engagement with the host nation, promoting goodwill while engendering a minimal footprint ashore (OPNAV 2007, 2).

The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states that “trust and cooperation cannot be surged” (US Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). The GFS concept intends to build this trust and cooperation in theater by promoting greater maritime interaction. A key benefit from this interaction is an improvement in cultural awareness, which can play a critical role in helping promote stability. It is difficult to learn cultural awareness in a classroom; it is better done through firsthand experience and interaction with the local population and their leaders. In effect, GFS serves not only US national interests, but the host nations as well. A GFS port visit, which features tailored security training or community relations projects as requested by the host nation, can greatly facilitate cultural learning and understanding through its dedicated two-week port visits (Navy White Paper, 2006).

The capabilities of a GFS vary depending on the operating environment and mission assigned by the Combatant Commander (US Department of the Navy 2006, 30). It must include one ship that acts as the logistical base and command and control center
It can include other ships, smaller vessels that support helicopter operations, or non-traditional naval units, such as a hospital ship or a high speed catamaran, to support humanitarian relief efforts (OPNAV 2007, 1). In summary, GFS is a tailored and adaptive capability package designed to support the COCOM’s theater security cooperation initiatives mission. Possible mission sets include maritime security training (both classroom and hands on), medical training, or supporting humanitarian and education efforts through non-governmental organization such as Project Handclasp. The proof-of-concept deployment to SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility is a good example of the range of GFS operations.

The proof-of-concept deployment was a SOUTHCOM directed operation utilizing the HSV-2 SWIFT, a high-speed catamaran, as the primary GFS platform. The deployment was designed to analyze the GFS concept for the Navy while concurrently supporting SOUTHCOM objectives by building on cooperative partnerships. The intent of this cooperation was to improve working relationships between maritime services while also improving the operational readiness of participating nations (Clark April 9, 2007). The NAVSOUTH mission statement directed:

COMUSNAVSO will employ HSV–2 SWIFT in the SOUTHCOM AOR with joint, combined, and interagency assets to establish a persistent presence with a minimal footprint ashore in the Caribbean Basin and Central America in support of the Proof of Concept for the Navy’s Global Fleet Station (GFS) (Gonzalez 2008, 19).

The SOUTHCOM commander, Admiral James Stavridis, stated, “It’s a great way to help strengthen our ties with regional partners and provide a more persistent presence” (Clark April 9, 2007). He further stated, “Our active engagement program with our partner navies and the interoperability we work toward during exercises provides certain aspects of the ideal backdrop to test the GFS concept” (Clark April 9, 2007). The partner nations.
GFS was scheduled to visit included Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Panama (Clark April 9, 2007). Port visits were conducted twice in each country with the exception of Nicaragua and Jamaica. Table 1 outlines the deployment schedule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>29 April–11 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>13–18 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>21 May–1 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3–8 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>10–21 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Republic</td>
<td>25 June–6 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>12–20 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>5–17 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>19–24 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>26–31 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4–14 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>17–28 September</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Disrupted 5–8 September, iso HA due to Hurricane Felix, returned 9 September)

Source: Gonzalez, HSV–2 Swift’s GFS deployment schedule (Center for Naval Analyses: 2008), 19.

A critical component of the GFS concept is training. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) report on the GFS 2007 proof-of-concept deployment supports this assertion, explaining the GFS “mission was naval engagement with partner nation militaries via training” (Gonzalez 2008, 14). Both the Expeditionary Training Command (ETC) and the US Marine Corps conducted training during the deployment. ETC is a component of Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC); its mission is to provide focused maritime training to foreign nations on a variety of maritime related missions at the basic and intermediate level (Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Feb 2007).
ETC supported the deployment with courses of instruction (COI) conducted by Mobile Training Teams (MTT) (ETC 2007, 3). The Marine Corps service embarked onboard and offered training through a Marine Corps Mobile Training Team. These training teams which embarked on HSV-2 SWIFT offered training topics as listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Training Courses Offered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETC Training</th>
<th>Marine Corps Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Management</td>
<td>Military Operations in Urban Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Physical Security/Port Vulnerability</td>
<td>Patrol/Raid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterborne Security</td>
<td>Intro to Orders Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Medical Combat Life Saver</td>
<td>Org/Comp/Employment of Rifle Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Leadership</td>
<td>Land Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outboard Motor Maintenance</td>
<td>Fundamentals of Marksmanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHIB Coxswain/Small Boat Operations</td>
<td>Basic Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Corps Martial Arts program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small Unit Tactics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ETC (November 2007), 4 and Gonzalez, GFS deployment training courses, (Center for Naval Analyses: 2008), 21.

ETC retained each courses’ core purpose, but tailored all the courses to a specific country’s request or capabilities. The purpose of the “Maintenance Management” course was to familiarize students with preventive maintenance procedures on maritime related equipment and systems, and helped students identify problems before systems became inoperable (ETC 2007, 21). The purpose of the “Port Physical Security/Port Vulnerability” course was to teach students how to conduct port security surveys and port vulnerability assessments. From these assessments, students could learn how to design security measures to mitigate risk from identified threats (ETC 2007, 18). The
“Waterborne Security” course taught students the whys and hows of small boat maneuvering to best defend a high value asset (HVA) that is moored, at anchor, or underway (ETC 2007, 20). The purpose of “Field Medical Combat Life Saver” was to teach students basic CPR and initial life saving actions in a fighting environment (ETC 2007, 23). The “Non-Commissioned Officer Leadership” course introduced good leadership traits and management skills in any working environment (ETC 2007, 17). The “Outboard Motor Maintenance” course focused on basic operations and preventative maintenance/troubleshooting procedures for small boat motors (ETC 2007, 22). Lastly, the “Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB) Coxswain/Small Boat Operations” course familiarized students with the safe operations of small boats, focusing on coxswain and navigation skills, as well as fire fighting and engineering casualty control skills (ETC 2007, 19).

The courses the Marines offered were also tailored to the specific country request and capability. The purpose of the “MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain)” course was to train for movement to and from objective, techniques, MOUT operations, casualty evacuation, POW handling and debriefing techniques. The “Patrol and Raid Operations” course taught ambush and counter ambush techniques and counter insurgency operations. “Introduction to Orders Process” covered five paragraph orders, warning orders and fragmentary orders. “Organization, Composition, and Employment of Rifle Squad” taught types of danger areas, hand and arm signals, combat formations and signals, and offensive combat operations. The “Land Navigation” course taught map reading and orientation, and terrain model construction. In the “Fundamentals of Marksmanship” course, trainees did not shoot weapons except in the indoor simulator.
marksmanship trainer, or ISMT, a mobile marksmanship simulator. “Basic Human Rights” taught principles of law of war and POW handling (Gonzalez 2008, 21).

“MCMAP (Marine Corps Martial Arts Program)” was basic hand to hand combat principles and was the most popular of the Marine courses offered (Halem, 15 November 2008). “Small Unit Tactics” course training covered information on organization, capabilities, and limitations.

Combining the Marine Corps and ETC training courses, the total number of students trained, by country, was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Students Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gonzalez, *Number of students trained by country* (Center for Naval Analyses: 2008), 22.

The definition for GFS has been answered. It involves using US Navy vessels and other governmental assets to establish a self-sustaining base from which to conduct shaping operations in support of direct COCOM requirements. It does this by offering tailored mission sets depending on host nation requests for security training or
community help projects. The analysis included a description of the proof-of-concept deployment to understand how it supported this definition. The next step is to move on to the subsequent question: what are the strategic level requirements associated with GFS?

**Strategic Level Requirements Associated with GFS**

It is imperative that for any higher level military concept, such as GFS, to succeed it must support strategic level requirements as outlined in the guiding political and military strategies of the times. To determine strategic level requirements for the purposes of this thesis, the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006* (NSS), the *National Defense Strategy of the United States 2005* (NDS), the *National Military Strategy of the United States 2004* (NMS), the *2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security* (NSMS), NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21CS)* were analyzed.

The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006* (NSS) is the nation’s capstone security document and provides guidance for all lower level strategies. For GFS to be a successful strategic level program, it must support some requirements of this strategy. As noted in the literature review, the “overview section” of the NSS lists three main points which serve as strategic goals associated with GFS: strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, working with others to diffuse regional conflict, and developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power (Bush 2006, 1). Accordingly, any project that supports building alliances is a critical tool in supporting NSS objectives. Working with other nations to improve internal security forces will support diffusing regional conflicts (Bush 2006, 16). When developing
agendas for cooperative action, the NSS explains that the US must strengthen both regional and strategic alliances with nations in Central and South America (Bush 2006, 37). The GFS proof-of-concept deployment was a direct response to this strategic requirement. In summary, the basic policy goals of building alliances and improving theater security are the themes of the NSS most relevant to GFS. Subordinate levels of national strategy further outline and support these themes.

*The National Defense Strategy of the United States* (NDS) supports the NSS. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the NDS delineates two objectives directly supported by GFS: strengthening alliances and partnerships, and establishing favorable security conditions. To meet these two strategic objectives, the strategy defines key operational capabilities. One operational capability is of particular importance to strategic requirements of GFS: increasing capabilities of partners both international and domestic (Rumsfeld 2005, 15). The NDS addresses another important concept in the area of joint, combined training, and education. The NDS suggests working with other agencies of the US government and the militaries of our partner nations. Therefore, the main themes of the NDS, with relation to the GFS concept, are building alliances, increasing security capacity, and building interagency relationships. Using these overarching objectives, the NDS meshes with the National Military Strategy and serves as a basis for DoDD 3000.05.

*The National Military Strategy of the United States* (NMS) also lists primary objectives that define strategic level GFS goals: establishing security conditions conducive to a favorable international order and strengthening alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges. The NMS describes meeting these two objectives through a variety of ways. One way to increase the capability of our allies and increase
their willingness to cooperate in military operations is thru forward presence (Myers 2004, 11). The strategy further suggests that the COCOMs must recommend changes to the level and composition of this presence, and posture their forces to establish favorable security conditions (Myers 2004, 11). GFS is a way to serve as this forward presence, and acts as a COCOM tool to establish more favorable security conditions. The NMS also specifically notes that for global security and stability to be successful, the United States military must engage with other nations’ forces to promote trust, cooperation, and confidence (Myers 2004, 12). Again, as defined as a concept, GFS answers this strategic level requirement through consistent and positive interaction with other nations. The NMS is consistent with the other higher strategies as it specifies that successful stability operations will require close cooperation with other departments of the US government (Myers 2004, 13). GFS supports this close cooperation by promoting more interaction between the Defense and State departments. In summary, the portions of the NMS devoted to full spectrum operations and preventing conflict outline the strategic level requirements of the GFS concept.

The introduction to the 2005 *National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)* stresses the importance of maritime security as a national interest and specifies that the US “must take full advantage of strengthened alliances and other international cooperative agreements” (Department of Homeland Security, 1). As reviewed in Chapter 2, one way the NSMS suggests promoting maritime security is by aiding international partners in protecting their own internal waters (Department of Homeland Security, 12). By definition, GFS can act as this aid for international partners. The NSMS also stipulates that in order to be successful in securing the maritime domain, the US must
work with a coalition of nations, representing a strong and united front (Department of Homeland Security, 13). Three strategic actions that GFS supports are important to reach this objective: enhancing international cooperation, maximizing domain awareness, and deploying layered security. The proof-of-concept deployment training courses offered by both ETC and the Marine Corps serve as prime examples of how GFS promotes these strategic actions through port security training. While the overall document has a primary focus of defending the homeland coastal areas, it outlays the strategy of how the US should operate in international locations to provide defense-in-depth and provides further guidance on strategies GFS must promote to support NSMS. Indeed, the conclusion of the GFS White paper from July 2007 claims that GFS is a concept that responds to COCOM demands for a capability that supports the NSMS (OPNAV 2007, 3). This thesis will determine if this is a true statement.

"Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization" is the title of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). The primary purpose of NSPD-44 is to improve the security of the United States by providing reconstruction and stabilization assistance for countries at risk of, or recovering from, conflict or civil upheaval (Bush 2005, under “Introduction”). As covered in Chapter 2, NSPD-44 describes how the United States has an interest in supporting reconstruction efforts for other nations. NSPD-44 goes further to explain that any work done toward this end should be conducted such that countries can exercise the required security on their own. Agencies must conduct these efforts quickly, ready to respond to crisis events, in order to be effective (Bush 2005, under “Policy”). Therefore, an implied task is that
all agencies of government must practice working together in times of peace, so that relationships and procedures are already in place to respond during times of crisis.

NSPD-44 established the Department of State as the lead coordinator for these efforts and required that the DoS harmonize its efforts with the DoD’s military plans and operations (Bush 2005, under “Responsibilities of the Department of State”). NSPD-44 recognizes how different situations will call for different command relationships. Agencies can exercise different types of command relationships through concepts such as GFS. NSPD-44 then continues to explain the responsibilities of other agencies, such as DoD, to enable the DoS to carry out the initiatives set forth in the document. While NSPD does not specifically state that the DoD will develop strategies to this end, it is an implied task that DoD does so. This is why a program concept, such as GFS, was developed. GFS may be a solution to the DoS task outlined in NSPD-44 where it states that they will “develop strategies to build partnership security capacity abroad” (Bush 2005, under “Coordination”). The determination if GFS is that solution lies in the purpose of this thesis.

Chapter 2 details how NSMD-44’s encouragement to have departments work with each other led to the DoD response, DoDD 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05 provides guidance on stability operations and describes how those stability operations should evolve into joint operating concepts and mission sets as lessons learned are developed (Department of Defense 2005, 1). It explains the idea that military-civilian teams are the critical element of stability operations (Department of Defense 2005, 3). Later, this chapter explains how the GFS proof-of-concept deployment supported this task. In conjunction with the NSMS and other higher strategies, DoDD 3000.05 states “the DoD shall develop
greater means to help other countries’ security capacity” (Department of Defense 2005, 3). Lastly, the policy instructs the service secretaries to develop stability operations capabilities (Department of Defense 2005, 10). DoDD 3000.05 directs strategic themes of interagency support and building security capacity. The GFS concept is a direct result of this DoD directive.

The 2007 *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS21CS) is the guidance for the combined military services of the U.S Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. As reviewed in Chapter 2, CS21CS seeks to integrate seapower with other instruments of national power, as well as those of allied countries (US Coast Guard 2007, under Signature Page). Working through six core capabilities (forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response), the strategy outlines having tailored forces based on regional requirements, acting in conjunction with interagency partners (U.S Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). CS21CS proposes doing this by “fostering critical relationships overseas,” with the theme that “*trust and cooperation cannot be surged*” (U.S Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). Simply stated, the sea services must develop capabilities that promote coordination with not just other US governmental agencies and organizations, but other countries as well. By maintaining forward presence and remaining engaged in relationships that are mutually beneficial, our maritime forces will enhance security across the globe (U.S Coast Guard 2007, under “Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces”). GFS takes this concept of forward presence, something the maritime services have done since inception, and multiplies it through key
interaction during longer than normal port visits. The strategy also discusses how better prepared at working with the international community the personnel of all the services must be. The GFS concept improves ability to work with other nations and services through increased interaction. CS21CS provides overarching strategic guidance that the maritime services must meet when outlining the strategic objectives of GFS.

This review of the guiding strategies is complete. This analysis concludes that there are three common policy goals that represent the strategic aims of the GFS concept. Those policy goals are the strategic objectives of the GFS program:

**STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES**: Strengthen alliances with other nations through cooperative action programs.

**IMPROVE SECURITY CONDITIONS**: Work with other nations to set favorable security conditions and increase the capability of those nations to defend themselves.

**INTERAGENCY/MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT**: Establish joint/combined training and cooperation programs with other agencies of the US Government and with other nations.

The next step is to take these policy goals and apply them to tasks from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). As covered in Chapter 2, the UJTL, CJCSM 3500.04D, represents a comprehensive list of functional tasks that supports the services of the Department of Defense in developing new concepts. Taking the three policy goals and applying UJTL tasks provides a COCOM with defined objectives to apply to the GFS concept. The UJTL divides the tasks into four types: strategic national tasks (SN), strategic theater tasks (ST), operational tasks (OT), and tactical tasks (TT). This thesis only uses the strategic level tasks.
There are many strategic national tasks that could apply to the GFS concept. This analysis only identified 10 tasks each from the SN and ST lists. From the whole of the UJTL, these combined twenty tasks are the most relevant to the GFS concept.

The Strategic National tasks are:

1. SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events
2. SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host Nation Support
3. SN 7.4.4 Provide Joint, Multinational, Interoperability, and Interagency Training of Assigned Forces
4. SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations
5. SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups
6. SN 8.1.2 Support Nation Assistance
7. SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action
8. SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign HA and HCA
9. SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies
10. SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures

The Strategic Theater tasks are:

11. ST 8.1 Coordinate Coalitions or Alliances, Regional Relations, and Security Assistance Activities
12. ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations
13. ST 8.1.2 Promote Regional Security and Interoperability
14. ST 8.2.2 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater
15. ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
16. ST 8.2.6 Coordinate Military Civic Action Assistance
17. ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater
18. ST 8.3.2 Establish Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements
19. ST 8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support Against Nonmilitary Threats
20. ST 8.5.3 Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure

Next, this analysis will provide the most relevant grading measures of each of these tasks as pertaining to the GFS concept. Note that a full definition of each task is provided in Appendix A. Following a review of the remaining secondary questions on impacts of the proof-of-concept deployment, the analysis will use these measures in Chapter 5 and establish a conclusion as to whether GFS meets the strategic level
requirements. An assigned grade of positive, negative, or null will be used to measure the impact of the GFS concept based on the UJTL tasks.

*Note: Each measure is taken verbatim from the UJTL, Enclosure B, Appendix C, Annexes A and B.

**Strategic National Tasks**

- **SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events** (B-C-A-53).
  - Measure 4: Percent. Of exercises conducted primarily for training purposes.

- **SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host-Nation Support** (B-C-A-94/95).
  - Measure 5: Percent. Of increase in availability of tactical forces through use of HN security

- **SN 7.4.4 Provide Joint, Multinational, Interoperability, and Interagency Training of Assigned Forces** (B-C-A-180).
  - Measure 4: Percent. Of trainers available for conducting training
  - Measure 8: Percent. Of forces fully trained.

- **SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations** (B-C-A-183).
  - Measure 5: Weeks. To provide assistance to other nations (upon request).

- **SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups** (B-C-A-183/184).
  - Measure 2: Percent. Of Country team’s foreign military students nominated/completed training.
  - Measure 5: Percent. Of nations in theater that have politico-military agreements with the US.
  - Measure 8: Instances. Of nations declining military assistance.

- **SN 8.1.2 Support Nation Assistance** (B-C-A-185).
  - Measure 1: Weeks. To deliver assistance.
  - Measure 4: Percent. Of requested assistance actually provided.

- **SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action** (B-C-A-185).
• Measure 2: Percent. Of civic action projects completed.
  • Measure 3: Percent. Of population supportive of civic action projects.

• **SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign HA and HCA (B-C-A-186).**
  • Measure 2: Days. For military forces/supplies to arrive in theater.
  • Measure 4: Percent. Of requested supplies, provided.

• **SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies (B-C-A-192).**
  • Measure 3: Percent. Of US agencies w/ INTEL sharing agreements w/ combatant command.
  • Measure 4: Days. To initiate support to requesting agency.

• **SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures (B-C-A-195).**
  • Measure 1: Hours. To coordinate action/option w/ agency.

**Strategic Theater Tasks**

• **ST 8.1 Coordinate Coalitions or Alliances, Regional Relations, and Security Assistance Activities (B-C-B-137).**
  • Measure 1: Instances. Of US senior officers and civilian gov’t officials’ visit to theater nation.
  • Measure 2: Instances. Of initiating community action projects.
  • Measure 9: Percent. Participation in interagency working groups.
  • Measure 17: Instances. Of combined exercises, port visits, or bilateral activities.

• **ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations (B-C-B-138).**
  • Measure 4: Incidents/month. Involving US Service personnel.
  • Measure 5: Instances. Of country team sponsored bilateral events.
  • Measure 7: Instances. Of initiating community action projects.

• **ST 8.1.2 Promote Regional Security and Interoperability (B-C-B-138).**
  • Measure 10: Instances. Of combined exercises/bilateral activities.
  • Measure 12: Percent. Of combatant command’s theater sub regions w/ an exercise every 2 years.

• **ST 8.2.2 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater (B-C-B-142).**
  • Measure 6: Percent. Of civil unrest incidents handled by HN forces.
• ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (B-C-B-143).
  o Measure 2: Days. To organize relief effort in country.

• ST 8.2.6 Coordinate Military Civic Action Assistance (B-C-B-144).
  o Measure 1: Days. To process and answer DoS or Country team request.
  o Measure 5: Percent. Of projects deemed long-term investments (pay-off for at least 5 years).

• ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater (B-C-B-147).
  o Measure 2: Percent. Of allies/coalition partners actively participating on joint force HQ staff.

• ST 8.3.2 Establish Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements (B-C-B-151).
  o Measure 2: Percent. Of nonalliance nations have conducted exercises w/ US w/in last year.
  o Measure 10: Percent. Of nations have extradition treaties with US, covering terrorism offenses.

• ST 8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support Against Nonmilitary Threats (B-C-B-152).
  o Measure 3: Percent. Of nations share police data with US military law enforcement agencies.
  o Measure 6: Frequency. Of recurring theater-wide exercise of DoD support ops to US agencies.

• ST 8.5.3 Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure (B-C-B-158).
  o Measure 6: Percent. Country teams in theater that have participation w/ combatant commander.
  o Measure 10: Percent. Of US departments/agencies, including DoD agencies in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms w/ combatant commander.

This analysis assigns the tasks under at least one of the three common policy goals of the guiding strategies. Some tasks apply to more than one goal. Table 4 shows assignment of tasks to policy goals. The next step in the analysis is to review the proof-
of-concept deployment, answering the secondary questions regarding effects of different elements of the DIME and reported unintended effects of the deployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES</th>
<th>SECURITY CONDITIONS</th>
<th>IA/MN SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events</td>
<td>2) SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host-Nation Support</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations</td>
<td>5) SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups</td>
<td>9) SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action</td>
<td>8) SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign HA and HCA</td>
<td>7) ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign HA and HCA</td>
<td>9) ST 8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support Against Nonmilitary Threats</td>
<td>10) ST 8.5.3 Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2) ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations</td>
<td>3) SN 7.4.4 Provide Joint, Multinational, Interoperability, and Interagency Training of assigned forces</td>
</tr>
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<td>2) ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. UJTL Tasks Assigned to Strategic Guidance Policy Goals

Proof-of-Concept Deployment Review

The proof-of-concept deployment began 25 April, 2007 with the HSV-SWIFT departing for its mission to the SOUTHCOM AOR. This analysis previously reviewed the basics of the deployment. This portion of the analysis focuses on two secondary questions: stability/security effects using elements of the DIME and reported 2nd and 3rd order effects from the concept deployment.

The proof-of-concept deployment featured many elements of the DIME that affected security and stability in the countries visited. Being a program overseen by the Navy, the military was the primary element involved. However, it is important to review
how all factors of the DIME contributed to the concept goals of strengthening alliances, promoting security, and supporting interagency/multi-national functions.

The diplomatic element was essential in building interagency support. CTG 40.9, the command element for the deployment, reported in their wrap-up brief that the #1 lesson learned from deployment was that the MILGRP was key (Tave 2007). Nothing happened without the MILGRP. Contact with the DoD member of the Ambassador’s State Team ensured proper use of the diplomatic element, supporting the strategic policy goals of strengthening alliances and building interagency support. The state team led the efforts to ensure media presence was at the pier in every port upon arrival of SWIFT (Bornt 2007). The state team was also essential in using established contacts to solicit participation in the training programs GFS offered. An example of this was when MILGRP Jamaica solicited participation from the Jamaican Defense Force and Jamaican Constabulary Force prior to the port visit in Port Antonio, Jamaica (CTG 40.9 Staff, GFS 0087). Out of the 172 quotas available, the MILGRP succeeded in filling 135 (CTG 40.9 Staff, GFS 0087). Another example of the diplomatic element support to GFS strategy was through events where the ambassador was present. One occasion was September 22 in Jamaica. At a distinguished visitor (DV) event onboard HSV-2, the US Ambassador to Jamaica was present, along with the Honduran and Mexican ambassadors while the Prime Minister of Jamaica made a speech. The Prime Minister stated that the Jamaica-US security partnership would continue (Gonzalez 2008, 38). This DV event serves as an important example of how diplomatic support, using the GFS concept as a platform, strengthens alliances.
For the information element of the DIME, there were multiple examples supporting the three strategic guidance policy goals. In building interagency support, lessons learned reported by CTG 40.9 clearly outlined the importance of working with the Department of State on Public affairs support (Bornt 2007). Prior to the deployment, Mr. Brian Naranjo from the US Embassy Public Diplomacy section for Panama embarked with the CTG 40.9 staff. During the course of the transit to Colon, Panama, Mr. Naranjo provided staff and crew with detailed information on the culture and politics of Panama. He also worked with staff on setting up pre-arrival coordination between the GFS Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and the host nation media. This achieved “a level of information operations success that would have been impossible without DoS assistance” (Bornt 2007). CTG 40.9 reported conducting this same effort between the Embassy and GFS staff prior to port visits in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. Similar results were reported. The final statement by CTG 40.9 in the lesson learned is “DoS participation has been a huge force multiplier and the resulting ability to project a positive image of the US has surpassed anything that the DoD or DoS could have accomplished independently” (Bornt 2007).

Another example of using the information element of the DIME was through the NECC led Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG). NECC established the MCAG on March 30, 2007. The mission of the MCAG is to conduct civil affairs activities in the maritime operational environment (Savage 2007). As a new organization, MCAG sought to participate in the proof-of-concept deployment to assist in further developing their CONOPS (Bornt 2007). Unfortunately, CTG 40.9 reported that MCAG provided little value to the deployment because of its limited organic capability. CTG 40.9
recommended MCAG choose one or two locations in the AOR and send teams there to work with the MILGRP to build relationships and provide coordination for future civil affairs projects. Coordination with the GFS planning elements at the COCOM or Maritime Component Commander would get this done. The recommendation concluded by stressing how the MCAG fell short of the exceptional level of service provided by coordination with the DoS (Bornt 2007).

An additional important element of the information section of the DIME occurred through use of what Captain Wied, the commander of CTG 40.9, called “emblematics.” Emblematics was the term applied to any memento given to a DV or trainee, acting as a GFS brand-name product. This was part of the strategic communication to “sell the vision” (Wied 2007). As part of his commander’s assessment on the proof-of-concept deployment, Captain Wied stated that the GFS communications model should look more like a business or marketing plan than an OPLAN. This plan would include procuring more emblematics prior to deployment. These emblematics would stay in country and remind those who participated that the United States is an ally. The emblematics would, in their own small way, continue to strengthen alliances with other nations. Further support of this point came in the CNA GFS study when it mentioned how special ceremonies, commemorative photographs and handing out plaques, coins or ball caps were all part of the positive message of US interest in combined maritime security (Gonzalez 2008, 39).

Concluding the analysis of the information portion of GFS is a focus on what messages were reported as received following the military-to-military engagements. This analysis comes from information reported in the after-action report conducted by CNA.
The majority of comments that came back from student critiques were positive. Their thoughts were:

- The US is interested in partnerships
- The US is committed to regional security
- US military professionals support engaging with other nation’s militaries (Gonzalez 2008, 39).

The above three observations are in line with the three guiding strategic policy goals as deduced by the analysis in this thesis: Strengthen Alliances, Improve Security Conditions, and Improve Interagency (Multi-national) Support. This CNA report conclusion is critical to supporting this thesis.

Since GFS is a DoD led concept, the military support of the DIME is inherent. It is still important to highlight specific examples from the proof-of-concept deployment. First, the use of a military vessel was integral in showing naval presence and US commitment to the concept in the eyes of many host nations. A Commandant in the Belizean National Coast Guard (BNCG) stated:

This is a significant time for a ship of this size [SWIFT] to come here. It made a very good impression for the BNCG in front of the other Belizean agencies who sent trainees—“wow, look at the high level of coordination the US government is doing with the BNCG” (Gonzalez 2008, 36).

The CNA reported further concluded that sending a dedicated naval asset of appreciable size signaled the high level of US interest and could have lasting effects on partner nations concerning maritime security (Gonzalez 2008, 36).

One effect of military involvement that affected both interagency support and strengthening alliances occurred during the port visit to Guatemala. The naval port
facilities in Guatemala were a 7-9 hour drive from where the MILGRP was located in Guatemala City. Because of that distance, the MILGRP had never made contact with the Guatemalan Navy. The GFS concept deployment made this a requirement and allowed the MILGRP to establish a working relationship with the Guatemalan naval component (Wied 2007).

Another instance of military support was not specifically part of the GFS concept, but coincided with the SWIFT visit to the Dominican Republic. At each visit to the Dominican Republic, the SWIFT delivered two FMS fast boats as part of purchases under Foreign Military Sales. These deliveries had a significant impact on media coverage of GFS and the SWIFT visit to the Dominican Republic, generating 25 articles that were positive or factual (Gonzalez 2008, 37). This served as a good example of three elements of power (military, economic, and information) working together.

The GFS proof-of-concept deployment also provided economic support to strengthening alliances. GFS conducted this in two ways. The first was through COMREL projects. The second was by delivering Project Handclasp donations. COMREL projects included working on schools and hospitals, and delivering goods that were not primarily focused on maritime security. A lesson learned reported from CTG 40.9 was that the COMREL projects provided the positive impact the Navy and US was looking for, more so than usual because of the long port visit times (Bornt 2007). After 10 projects, COMREL spending was only $6193. This amount was minimal because project money was allocated based on normal US Navy port visits. CTG 40.9 staff recommended an increase in funding to $5000 per port visit, allowing for increased number and complexity of construction or repair projects (Bornt 2007).
recommendation would allow for a longer-term pay-off as far as presenting a positive influence on the local population. For Project Handclasp, SWIFT made six deliveries over the course of the deployment, with material worth an estimated $91,000 (Preddy, 15 November 2007). Once again, lessons learned from CTG 40.9 suggested these deliveries had the positive impact the Navy was looking for (Bornt 2007). Supporting this feedback, the CNA report states, all of these activities were highly visible and contributed in a positive way to the social perception that the US cares about the countries visited (Gonzalez 2008, 37).

The last analysis of how economics was involved with supporting the strategic policy goals of GFS was in how little the overall deployment cost. While it is impossible to assign a dollar value to the effects from the GFS proof-of-concept deployment, you can still look at the final cost summary of the deployment and make an educated assumption about cost-to-benefit. Initial estimates had the cost of the deployment at $8 million, but the final total cost of the deployment, as reported by Fleet Forces Command, was only $2.2 million (Lentjes and Richards 2007). This cost, compared to strategic level benefits gained from the deployment, is minimal.

Second and Third Order Effects

The proof-of-concept review focused on direct, or first order, effects as a result of direct actions of the GFS concept. Recognizing indirect, or second and third order, effects can be difficult as they are usually long-term effects that may not be seen for years. However, the CNA study on the SWIFT deployment reported a few unintended effects that supported the primary strategic policy goal of strengthening alliances. One was in Jamaica with an effect on the status of the new Prime Minster and another was in
the area of the un-intimidating appearance of the SWIFT affecting the “message” GFS was trying to impart.

In September 2007, the country elected Bruce Golding of the Jamaica Labor party as Prime Minster, a change in 20 years of leadership by the People’s National Party (Gonzalez 2008, 37). The Prime Minster and many high-ranking members of the newly elected government were present at a DV function onboard SWIFT on 22 September. It has already been discussed how the Prime Minster used this platform to announce the continued security partnership with the US. A second order effect was found when CNA interviewed Jamaican officials. Those officials stated how they had heard comments from the general population, such as friends and family, that the PM must be very powerful if he can bring a US naval ship to Jamaica so soon after his election (Gonzalez 2008, 38). Another unintended element reported from the DV event was that more than the usual number of high-ranking government officials attended. The US Military Liaison office reported how this was out of the ordinary due to politics regarding support of the US (Gonzalez 2008, 38). As the CNA report states, “this unintended effect was the result of both election outcome and government motivation – the new party and its Prime Minster wanting to establish a visibly strong and different position than previous Jamaican governments – and fortuitous timing” (Gonzalez 2008, 38). It is important to note that GFS can act as a strong platform to strengthen alliances through these occasions, but planners must also be careful about the overall message sent. By coordinating with the DoS prior to any port visit, it will be easier to ensure the overall message is one the US supports, otherwise GFS may unintentionally lend credence to a political theme not in line with US policy.
Another unintended effect was how the SWIFT, being an unusual Naval platform, offered a less intimidating presence. While being an object of curiosity to the locals, the platform, according to one respondent in the CNA report, looked like its primary purpose was for training, not war (Gonzalez 2008, 31). The ship’s configuration also ensured 100% access during protocol events and media visits. A normal US naval asset will have at least one or two classified spaces that would be off limits to visitors. SWIFT had none.

The Director of Naval Training for the Dominican Republic Navy noted:

The Ministry of Defense informed the press and there was good open press coverage of the ship and the purpose of its visit. The ship does not give the impression of a ship of war and the open access granted for everyone to visit the SWIFT helped give the public a good opinion of the visit (Gonzalez 2008, 31).

In addition to the open access on the ship, open sharing of information about the ship deployment planning and coordination reinforced local opinions regarding the purpose of the port visit. The CNA report noted that many interviewees remarked how “open dissemination about SWIFT’s visit was a good sign that the ship, and therefore the US, had nothing to hide” (Gonzalez 2008, 5).

**Review**

The analysis is complete. A review of the concept documents provided the definition for GFS. A thorough review of the guiding strategies provided a basis to form the conclusion that there are three primary policy goals relating to the GFS concept. These policy goals were paired with strategic level tasks from the UJTL to build a grading rubric that will be used in Chapter 5. Using the proof-of-concept deployment as the primary example, the analysis successfully answered the questions about how efforts in the diplomatic, information, military, and economic realms supported the overall
policy goal of strengthening alliances, building security capacity, and supporting interagency/multi-national relationships. The analysis also demonstrated how 2nd and 3rd order effects contributed to supporting the guiding policy goals. The answers to these secondary questions provide the basis to form a conclusion for the primary research question: Does GFS meet its strategic level requirements? This conclusion is presented in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The GFS deployments, if they become persistent in our region, could help toward the building of a 1000-ship navy and help build greater maritime security (Gonzalez 2008, 41).

Brigadier General, Commander, Belize Defense Force

This chapter presents the conclusions from Chapter 4’s analysis of the primary and secondary research questions. In review, the primary research question is: using the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, NSPD-44, DoDD 3000.05, and the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower as guidance, does the Global Fleet Station concept meet strategic level requirements for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations? The secondary questions are: What is the GFS concept? What are the strategic level requirements associated with GFS? How does it provide security and stability in regard to the national instruments of power – diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)? What are possible second and third order effects of the multinational exchange of information and training? A thorough review of the literature and documentation on GFS was presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 described the qualitative analysis conducted using that literature.

Conclusions

National strategic guidance documents such as the NSS, NDS, and NMS contain nested policy, with each strategy mutually supporting each other. The policy goals of strengthening alliances, improving security conditions, and improving interagency and multinational support act as a compass for the services to follow. The maritime services,
specifically the Navy, must develop a valid concept of operations that focuses not just on fighting a conventional war between nation states, but also on providing security and stability on a strategic scale. Based on the research and analysis, GFS meets these strategic security and stability requirements. The proof-of-concept deployment did not support the later portion of the primary research question on the areas of transition and reconstruction operations. Future GFS deployments may better support those areas, representing a topic of further research. However, based on this research, it seems unlikely that the GFS concept is a prime candidate for transition and reconstruction operations.

The previous chapter presented UJTL tasks as the rubric to evaluate the ability of GFS to meet the strategic requirements of the primary research question. Analysis of the GFS concept and its proof-of-concept deployment resulted in conclusions drawn on how well the GFS concept met the rubric’s specified tasks. The rubric and associated grades are presented with a grade of Yes, No, or Null, in Table 5. The results were overwhelmingly positive for GFS. Each of the three major broad policy goals (Strengthen Alliances, Improve Security Conditions, and Improve IA/MN Support) received an overall grade of “Yes.” The analysis uncovered evidence positively supporting almost every UJTL task under each of these major policy goals. Criterion such as improving percentages, adding more instances, and lowering time to coordinate with different commands/agencies received positive results. Only two UJTL tasks failed to earn a positive grade. Those exceptions are discussed below.

Strategic National Task 8.1 (Support Other Nations or Groups) had three measurable criteria pertaining to GFS. The first measure involved percentage of foreign
military students that had been nominated for and completed training. As there were no report of students dropping out of the training programs offered it is easy to assume that this overall percentage for the COCOM increased. The next measure involved percentage of nations that have politico-military agreements with the United States. The very nature of GFS improves and expands on relations with other countries, therefore this measure will increase. The final measure of SN task 8.1 is number of instances of nations declining military assistance. Since GFS pre-deployment planning requires bringing in the various countries and US government agencies, it is likely that there might be more occurrences of nations refusing assistance. As a result of this negative impact, I awarded an overall grade of Null. In addition, the goal of improving security conditions is to prepare a nation’s security forces so that they do not need US assistance. If these instances of refusal were to increase, then further analysis would be required to determine the true reason for a nation declining assistance. Before that analysis, though, the perceived impact on these criteria would be two positives and one negative. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis conclusion, a grade of “Null” was assigned.

The second UJTL task which received a grade of “Null” was Strategic Theater Task 8.1.1 (Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations). The first of its three measured criteria was number of negative incidents per month involving US service personnel. GFS requires longer port visits; this makes the possibility of a liberty incident more likely. The impact of any criminal event perpetrated by a US service member would have negative repercussions on local relations. This possible rise in the number of criminal incidents is balanced by the other two measures involving higher numbers of bilateral events and community action projects. This balance causes the grade to shift
from “No” to “Null.” Two out of twenty-four tasks are of minor consequence when compared to the overwhelming support GFS provides to the three major policy goals.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Null</th>
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<td><strong>STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES</strong></td>
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<td>SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events</td>
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<td>SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host Nation Support</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action</td>
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<td>SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign HA and HCA</td>
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<td>ST 8.2.2 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater</td>
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<td>ST 8.2.6 Coordinate Military Civic Action Assistance</td>
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<td>ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST 8.3.2 Establish Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements</td>
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<td><strong>SECURITY CONDITIONS</strong></td>
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<td>SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host Nation Support</td>
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<td>ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations</td>
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<td>SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies</td>
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<td>SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures</td>
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Table 5. GFS - UJTL Graded Rubric
GFS has the goal to strengthen alliances. Each port visit provides multiple opportunities for the COCOM to conduct combined training events, thereby increasing the potential for better alliances with those nations. Each civic action project or donation through programs such as Project Handclasp strengthens alliances by improving public perception of the United States. Increased cooperation between US military forces, US DoS forces, and host nation military forces, ensures reduced time to coordinate any future relief efforts that may be required for events such as a natural disaster. As the Brigadier General in command of the Belize Defense Forces stated, other nations recognize the potential of the GFS concept. This recognition shows that GFS can support a combined maritime strategy by strengthening alliances.

GFS has the potential to improve local security conditions. The training conducted by GFS assets ensured increased host nation (HN) support for future visiting US forces by increasing the proficiency in security capabilities of HN security forces. If one can assume there is a direct relationship between training, practice, and proficiency, then each GFS port visit promotes better regional security. Lastly, GFS ensures the improvement in future security conditions through coordination of multinational operations in theater. Again, in concurrence with the Belize Brigadier General, the GFS concept can improve security conditions.

GFS has the potential to strengthen interagency and multinational support. The high level of coordination between the state department and GFS planners helped foster interagency relationships. These improved relationships will pay future dividends by decreasing the amount of time it takes to support the state department when it has a request. As the adage goes, “it is not what you know, it is who you know.” Having
established habitual relationships between government agencies will increase mutual understanding and thereby increase overall efficiency. These contacts will establish interagency cooperation structures, meeting the required UJTL task. According to the commander of CTG 40.9, “DoS participation has been a huge force multiplier and the resulting ability to project a positive image of the US has surpassed anything that the DoD or DoS could have accomplished independently” (Bornt 2007).

As this paper is being published, the Navy continues to move forward with the GFS concept through another proof-of-concept deployment taking place supporting EUCOM/AFRICOM strategic objectives in the Gulf of Guinea. This deployment centers around the USS FORT McHENRY, a dock landing ship well suited to support security and medical training, while also conducting humanitarian missions in support of GFS (Second Fleet 2007). In addition, the SWIFT deployed to support the EUCOM GFS. One non-traditional mission conducted by SWIFT was buoy repairs in support of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These repairs were important to long term strategic goals in Africa as it supported important research regarding the environmental impact on fishing areas in the Gulf of Guinea (Merriam 2008). This GFS deployment to EUCOM offers an area for further research. An analysis of that deployment could be compared to the effects of the SOUTHCOM proof-of-concept deployment to further prove the utility of the GFS concept.

Further proof that the military services are moving forward with GFS is the latest Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept. The Marines are developing a Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF), a battalion sized combined arms organization that is task organized and regionally focused to meet COCOM
requirements for building partner nation security capacity (U.S. Marine Corps 2008, 17). The SC MAGTF is intended to be regionally focused and would include specialized training in culture and language (U.S. Marine Corps 2008, 19). This is particularly important to this thesis because the SC MAGTF employment concept envisions their deployment as an inherent part of GFS (U.S. Marine Corps 2008, 19). The recognition of GFS by the USMC serves to support and promote the strategic importance of GFS.

Recommendations

Because of the overwhelming support of the three major policy goals, this paper recommends that the Navy continue to support, and expand on, the GFS concept. It is important to move past the proof-of-concept. Captain Douglas Wied, the Commander of CTG 40.9, echoed this in his commander’s assessment when he concluded that the proof-of-concept deployment validated the GFS concept and that it is time to implement GFS on a continuous basis (Wied 2007). This author agrees: the military requirements to conduct stability and security operations are not going to disappear anytime soon. The GFS initiative must expand to all the Geographical Combatant Commander’s areas of responsibility (AOR) and must be fully supported by all maritime services. It is imperative that GFS become a continuous presence in each AOR because GFS demands constant engagement. Only through a continuous, habitual presence will the benefits of GFS be seen. One port visit every 3 or 4 years will not get the job done and is a waste of limited maritime resources.

There is obviously a cost in expanding GFS. Without adding additional ships to the inventory, the dollar cost impact would be nominal. This paper already addressed how little the GFS proof-of-concept deployment cost, and the “bang-for-the-buck” in
supporting security and stability operations is much higher from a GFS when compared
to the cost of sending a CSG. However, “cost” cannot only be reflected in dollars.
Manpower will be affected as more and more junior officers and sailors “grow-up” in a
maritime force focused on building stability and security through concepts such as GFS.
It is highly likely that a military member could go through a majority of his career
without taking place in a major war-fighting exercise. Also, expanding GFS will require
taking frigates, destroyers, or cruisers away from CSG’s or ESG’s in a war-fighting
capacity, or supporting the war on drugs. There will be an impact on the total force. As
the balance shifts from fighting wars to supporting SSTR operations, war-fighting skills
will decline. This is the risk that our leaders must accept in order to meet the nation’s
guiding strategic concerns.

Final Thought

Regardless of the risks, our maritime services must pay for GFS now. Other
nations’ maritime services are eager to build their security capacity and become part of
the 1,000 ship global maritime force. The overwhelming positive response from
countries visited during the GFS proof-of-concept deployment supports this conclusion.
Using GFS as the primary means for training and engagement, the United States maritime
services have the capacity to support the stability and security requirements as outlined in
our national strategic documents.
APPENDIX A

UJTL DEFINITIONS

* Note: the following definitions for the Strategic National and Strategic Theater tasks are taken verbatim from the UJTL, Enclosure B, Appendix C, Annexes A and B.

Strategic National Tasks

SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events
To coordinate, schedule, and conduct designated joint/multinational training events. This task includes arranging for the participation of forces from other nations and from international organizations, when obtaining such participation is beyond the purview of the combatant commander. It also includes the deconfliction of training events, both between combatant commands and with nonmilitary instruments of national power. At times the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be the officer scheduling the joint training events, but will almost always delegate to the combatant commander the conduct of the training event or allow the combatant commander to further delegate conduct of the training event (B-C-A-53).

SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host-Nation Support
To negotiate and contract for support and services from a HN for US forces in a theater and within the United States if in response to homeland security missions. The scope of HNS is a function of US capabilities in theater, but can include any portion of the range of combat support and combat service support activities (B-C-A-94/95).

SN 7.4.4 Provide Joint, Multinational, Interoperability, and Interagency Training of Assigned Forces.
To assist with analysis, planning, and execution of joint, multinational, interoperability, and interagency training for assigned forces perform those tasks, to specified conditions and standards, in support of the commander’s requirements (B-C-A-180).

SN 8 Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations
To work within the Interagency process and with representatives of other nations and regional organizations. This task ensures the accomplishment of US politico-military objectives through the combined action of different US organizations and friends, allies, neutrals, and other nations overseas. Includes missions in support of homeland security within the United States (B-C-A-183).

SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups
To provide assistance to other nations or groups (counterinsurgencies or insurgencies) in support of the national security, national military, and theater strategies across the range of military operations. This task includes security assistance, coalition support to multinational operations, counterproliferation and counterforce programs and activities,
combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, countermine activities, humanitarian assistance, and civil-military operations (CMO). CMO activities involve the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population. CMO activities include assisting the host-nation's development, undermining insurgent grievances, gaining support for national government, and attaining national objectives without combat. These include medical, engineer, communications, transportation and logistic activities undertaken incident to the combined exercises and operations (B-C-A-183/184).

**SN 8.1.2 Support Nation Assistance**
To support and assist in developing other nations, normally in conjunction with the Department of State and/or a multinational force, and, ideally, through the use of host-nation resources. Interagency orchestration of all the elements of national power is essential, and it must be supportive of both the ambassador's country plan and the combatant commander's regional plan (B-C-A-185).

**SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action**
To support the use of predominantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populace (of a host-nation) in fields contributing to economic and social development such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. Such actions serve to improve the standing of the local military forces with the population (B-C-A-185).

**SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign HA and HCA**
To conduct assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters, including consequence management (CM), or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing relief, dislocated civilian support, security, and technical assistance. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) is a specific and distinct program, which is also included in this task. HCA generally includes activities such as medical, dental, and veterinary care; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. HCA activities are authorized in legislation and are controlled in accordance with title 10, US Code, section 401 (B-C-A-186).

**SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies**
To support non-DOD agencies (e.g., DOS, USAID, USIA, FEMA). Support includes military support to civil authorities and civilian law enforcement agencies, counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation, and building a science and technology base (B-C-A-192).
SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures
To work within the interagency process, ensuring knowledgeable personnel represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. This task includes participating within the process of those Departments and Agencies not normally represented in the interagency process, to ensure full coordination within the Executive Branch. This task also includes the establishment, where needed, of informal processes of liaison (B-C-A-195).

Strategic Theater Tasks

ST 8.1 Coordinate Coalitions or Alliances, Regional Relations, and Security Assistance Activities
To build cooperative relationships with other nations in the region and international commands and agencies. Actions must be taken with careful consideration of the diversity of extant political systems, alliances, and the unique character of the people and their leadership. This task includes promoting regional stability and requires sensitivity to the perceptions and interests of the different nations in the region (B-C-B-137).

ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations
To strengthen and promote alliances through support of regional relationships. This task includes understanding and adjusting to national and regional concerns and differences, reviewing and advising the Country Team and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on status-of-forces agreements (SOFA) and similar types of issues (B-C-B-138).

ST 8.1.2 Promote Regional Security and Interoperability
To work with allies within the framework of military alliances to improve or secure US posture in the region. This task includes establishing multinational command relationships and authority, developing agreement on the threat, assessing operational capability deficiencies, establishing multinational interoperability arrangements, determining international logistic arrangements, defining and disseminating multinational rules of engagement, and conducting multinational training—all while developing favorable host-nation relations (B-C-B-138).

ST 8.2.2 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater
To coordinate those activities that foster relationships between theater military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area. This task includes providing the necessary support for civil affairs activities in a theater(s) of operations/JOA (B-C-B-142).

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
To anticipate and respond to national, multinational, and interagency requests for assistance for such events as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, or other natural or man-made disasters, such as terrorist or rogue state use of CBRNE weapons, that occur
outside the United States and its territories and possessions. Combatant commanders anticipate these events from their knowledge of current conditions or historical patterns and prepare contingency plans, forces, and equipment for rapid response to requests. This task includes seeking advance agreements on procedures and restraints on the use of multinational resources. This task also includes providing assistance before, during, or after hostile action, to reduce the probability of loss of life or damage, minimize effects, and initiate recovery. Additional activities include surveying the disaster area, prioritizing needs, conducting medical assessments, and providing medical services, communications, shelter, subsistence, water, engineering support, transportation, fire fighting, mass care, urban SAR, HAZMAT response, and energy distribution (B-C-B-143).

ST 8.2.6 Coordinate Military Civic Action Assistance
To coordinate with or assist host-nation forces on projects useful to the local population. Such projects contribute to the local community’s economic and social development and improve the standing of the military forces with the population. These activities could include education, training, public sanitation, and others (B-C-B-144).

ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater
To coordinate with allies and coalition partners and appropriate international organizations to ensure mutual support and consistent effort in the theater. Effective coordination is achieved when all parties understand and agree to the desired end state, concept of operations, intent, objectives, priorities, and support requirements (B-C-B-147).

ST 8.3.2 Establish Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements
To establish, in anticipation of requirements to conduct operations with friends and allies outside an alliance command structure, mutually agreed procedures. This task includes harmonization of the approaches of the respective national forces, including actions to preclude or minimize fratricide. This task also includes taking into account differences in language, customs, organization, military capability, level of training, and political constraints. This activity includes establishing command relationships (B-C-B-151).

ST 8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support Against Nonmilitary Threats
To identify and obtain cooperation and support of allies and friends for protection against nonmilitary threats to civilian and military personnel and to key facilities in the theater. Threats of this nature may come from illegal drug trafficking and terrorism (B-C-B-152).

ST 8.5.3 Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure
To establish formal and informal relationships with other USG departments and agencies in the theater for the mutual exchange of information and support (B-C-B-158).
REFERENCE LIST

Bornt, Floyd. Commander, US Navy stationed at CUSNS. GFS07 Mid-Point Lessons Learned (e-mail September 19, 2007).


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CDR Kenneth Szmed
Naval Element
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Ted Thomas
Department of Leadership
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LCDR Terry Bauer
DJIMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352