THE DRAFT AS A DETERRENT INFLUENCE ON U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

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by

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The Draft as a Deterrent Influence on U.S. Military Interventions

With the growing unpopularity of the war in Iraq, Americans are once again discussing the draft. Congressman Charles Rangel has argued that we need the draft to fill the ranks or force disengagement from Iraq and prevent entry into unnecessary wars. Rangel’s idea of the draft as a tool to raise middle class America’s awareness of the president’s use of the military is not new or unique. The premise of the argument is two-fold. The first aspect is that under the draft, men from all segments of society are placed at risk for military service. The second aspect is that the risk of military service, when placed on the middle class raises their scrutiny of any war. This risk forces a president to be selective when considering military action. This thesis will examine how America practiced conscription, who was inducted under the draft, and what opinions about the draft were held in America in order to determine the impacts of and attitudes toward the draft. This thesis will then analyze the draft in light of the U.S. entry into the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In conclusion, the author will discuss the relevance to the Global War on Terrorism.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


With the growing unpopularity of the war in Iraq, Americans are once again discussing the draft. Congressman Charles Rangel has argued that we need the draft to fill the ranks or force disengagement from Iraq and prevent entry into unnecessary wars. Rangel’s idea of the draft as a tool to raise middle class America’s awareness of the president’s use of the military is not new or unique. The premise of the argument is two-fold. The first aspect is that under the draft, men from all segments of society are placed at risk for military service. The second aspect is that the risk of military service, when placed on the middle class raises their scrutiny of any war. This risk forces a president to be selective when considering military action. This thesis will examine how America practiced conscription, who was inducted under the draft, and what opinions about the draft were held in America in order to determine the impacts of and attitudes toward the draft. This thesis will then analyze the draft in light of the U.S. entry into the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In conclusion, the author will discuss the relevance to the Global War on Terrorism.
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ACRONYMS

AVF    All Volunteer Force
CBO    Congressional Budget Office
DOD    Department of Defense
SSS    Selective Service System
UMT    Universal Military Training
UNS    Universal National Service
U.S.   United States
ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Context

As reports of recruiting shortfalls for the military continue to make the news, and the tenuous situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan hold little promise of a much hoped for reduction in troop commitments, op-ed pieces and political rhetoric predictably revive the subject of reinstating the military draft. The topic of the draft has received additional attention from time to time since it was terminated in 1973. Increased discussion of conscription occurred when Selective Service registration for young men resumed in 1980 and later during Operation Desert Storm in 1990 to 1991. However, since 11 September 2001, it has been discussed with much greater seriousness. The United States (U.S.) is currently engaged on two fronts, Afghanistan and Iraq, and there are certainly no shortages of potential hot spots around the world, hot spots to which the U.S. would have difficulty applying the military element of national power to should other options fall short.

In a 10 August 2007, interview with National Public Radio, Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, President Bush’s new “War Czar,” stated that the draft remains an option and that it “makes sense to certainly consider it.”\textsuperscript{1} Congressional Representative Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York) has introduced three separate bills seeking a resumption of induction into the military since 11 September 2001.\textsuperscript{2} Representative Rangel has clearly stated that his motive for reinstating the draft is to bring an end to the war in Iraq and prevent future unpopular or unnecessary wars. Echoing a point of view used in arguments against America’s transition to a volunteer military, Rangel believes
that the threat of America’s sons and daughters being compelled to serve in the military would push the civilian leadership of the U.S. to bring about a hasty end to the conflict in Iraq and prevent future episodes of military adventurism. Representative Rangel is not alone in supporting a return to conscription in America, even if his justification is not in line with other supporters of the draft. Among conservatives, a common pro-draft position springs from a different motive. Some, especially those who were subject to the draft during World War II, Korea, and even Vietnam, believe that reinstating the draft would restore a sense of patriotism and duty to the young people of America; serving to re-solidify what the older generation often views as a fractured nation. Related is the idea that citizens of the U.S. are greatly blessed and owe some sort of service to their nation in repayment. While in agreement about the return of the draft, it is not hard to imagine that those desiring a return to conscription for patriotism and national unity would quickly find themselves at odds with those seeking a return to the draft for Rangel’s motives.

Despite the diverse positions of draft supporters they remain a minority in America. Less than a third of Americans surveyed would support a return to conscription. One viewpoint on the draft holds that the draft would allow the U.S., by way of an abundance of available military manpower, to become engaged in unnecessary conflicts. The large pool of human resources would make the support of Congress or potentially even the American people unnecessary. Still others, such as Senator Edward Kennedy and Congressman Daniel Webster, oppose the draft because they believe that forced service is unjust, immoral, and un-American. To them it is a clear violation of the freedom that we, as Americans, pride ourselves on as a nation. Congressman Ron Paul
shares their sentiments but also agrees with economist Milton Friedman in believing the draft to be an inefficient means of supplying military manpower.⁷

Surrounding the subject of the draft in general, and all of the popular and not so popular positions on the draft, there are many unknowns and misconceptions. A significant portion of America’s population does not remember the draft. Those that do remember the draft likely recall it as practiced during the waning days of the Vietnam War, as this is America’s most recent experience with the practice of conscription. Fewer still are those in America who remember the draft’s implementation in 1940, a draft that would last nearly thirty-three years uninterrupted. The drafts of the American Civil War and World War I are now the domain solely of history books.⁸

With the migration of the topic of the draft from the realm of the extremist and activist websites and newspapers and into the mainstream media, public statements of general officers and the legislation of U.S. civilian leadership, it certainly warrants renewed study. With so little first hand experience and yet so much talk of the draft, we are in need of a clearer picture of what the draft in America really was? With a clearer understanding of the draft, it may be possible to determine if the draft, or measures approximating a draft, had a deterrent influence on military interventions by Presidents of the U.S. There are a few basic questions that must be answered to determine this. Did conscription lead to an increased military participation rate across all segments of the population? If so, did the increased participation rate lead to an increase in public connection with the military and subsequently an increased public awareness and concern about the use of the military abroad? If so, did increased public awareness and concern
about the use of the military abroad threaten or create political pressure through potential or actual loss of favorable public opinion between 1940 and 1973?

There are few limitations in researching the draft or the Selective Service in the U.S. There is a large volume of books, reports, essays, and articles that cover the topic. In fact, the scope of works on the draft can be intimidating and this, in and of itself, is somewhat of a limitation. The major limitation to the research is the bias inherent in many of the pieces written about the draft. Many authors writing directly about the draft sought to influence the debate in one direction or another. Throughout the last fifty years in America, the idea of involuntary military service has been quite polarizing. It is not surprising to find that many of the books and articles written on the subject reflect this polarization. Whether intentionally or not, the author’s own feelings on the topic often creep into the way certain information is handled or presented and what conclusions are drawn. Additionally, very little seems to have been written about the relationship between national strategic and defense decisions and the draft. While politicians, economists, editors, and authors have opined on this matter, it appears that few have committed any real effort in proving or disproving a particular position on the draft’s influence over national decision-making.

The underlying assumption in this thesis is that Presidential decisions are impacted by public opinion. It must be assumed that an administration is aware of public opinion on controversial decisions and takes this into account when making the final decision. This is a necessary assumption because the chance of finding a documented instance where a President has altered his decision to employ the military abroad based
on concern about political backlash over use of conscripted troops is tenuous. Finding multiple instances to establish a pattern seems nearly impossible.

**Structure of the Study**

This study will consist of an introduction to the draft and the Selective Service in the U.S. It will discuss the history of the Selective Service and the draft in the U.S. in order to lay the groundwork for and frame the discussion to come in the following chapters. Beginning with a discussion of what the draft has “looked like,” generally speaking; in America this chapter will then discuss conscription during the Civil War and World War I. While both of these time periods fall outside the scope of the paper, they are included in order to demonstrate the origins of the draft in America and to provide proper context for later examination and discussion. Much of how the draft was conducted after 1940 can be traced back to these first two periods of American conscription. Also, it would be a disservice to the uniformed to leave the impression that the first draft in America was immediately prior to World War II. This chapter continues with an outline of the draft from 1940 to 1946, 1948 to 1973, and the reinstitution of Selective Service Registration in 1980.

Chapter 3 examines who was drafted (demographics) and how this changed over the course of thirty-three years. How egalitarian was the draft? One of the more contentious aspects of the draft over the years has been that of the demographics of those selected by the Selective Service. Much of American society has come to believe that the poor and minorities experienced a disproportionately high selection rate by the Selective Service, especially in the final years of the draft, during the Vietnam War. There certainly seems to have been a perceived inequity in the means of selection, but how did this come
about? During the World War II years, there were outcries from the public and special interest groups for the deferment of a myriad of groups within the population. Many, during this time frame, complained that the draft was too fair, sports fans and coaches saw their favorite athletes had to exchange their baseball and football uniforms for Army uniforms. Were either of these perceptions accurate? Either way, was the selection process so much different throughout the draft years? How does the draft years’ demographics compare to the demographics of the All Volunteer Force (AVF)? Was one system better than the other in ensuring that all of America was fairly represented in the armed forces? In addition to the demographics of those drafted and those deferred, chapter 3 also examines the composition of local draft boards. Chapter 3 also discusses changes that effected demographics of those selected and those doing the selecting.

In chapter 4, the opinions and attitudes held by Americans about the draft are explored. Significant opinions of the key stakeholders (population segments, civilian leadership, and the military) are covered. Having gained an understanding of what the draft was, who was drafted, and how they were chosen, an examination of the opinions of those involved is in order. What aspects of the draft influenced the opinions of the key stakeholders? Were these opinions rightly formed and based on fact or misperception? If misperceptions were to blame, how did these misperceptions come about? Were attitudes about the draft out of synch or in opposition between political parties? Were attitudes about the draft out of synch or in opposition between military and civilian leadership? Which political party, if any, agreed most closely with the military?

The fifth chapter discusses conscription in the context of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The final chapter brings together the relationship between demographics, public
opinion, Selective Service policy and implementation, and the national strategic decisions made both during and after the period of the draft. This chapter makes the linkages between national decisions on commitment of troops and the presence or absence of the draft, opinions on the draft, and decisions to change the policies on Selective Service inductions. Here, it is determined what was cause and what was effect to the greatest extent possible. Did the draft play a part in public opinion of a particular war or did the opinion on the war play a part in how America felt about the draft? Did its equity or perceived equity play a part in public opinion of the conflict that was current at that time?

The information compiled in the preceding chapters is discussed in light of the circumstances immediately prior to and in the early stages of each war. What were the changes to Selective Service policy and/or implementation and why were they made? What drove the changes to the system for drafting young men, were these changes based on the needs of the civilian leadership, military leadership, or public pressures? How many men were inducted by Selective Service? What services used draftees? All of these questions will be considered in the context of the two time frames and in comparison to public opinion on the war and the draft.

Chapter 6 will synthesize the conclusions drawn out in the previous chapters. For comparison’s sake and greater relevance the sixth chapter will end with a comparison to the situation America faces in Iraq today. This chapter will also give recommendations for areas warranting further research and analysis.

Upon completion, the reader will be able to enter into any discussion on re-initiation of the induction by Selective Service with a clear understanding of what the
draft in America has been and how it has affected the nation. Armed with the facts and reasonable conclusions an intelligent debate may well be possible.

Research for this thesis included a thorough immersion in all aspects of the topic. The scope of literature examined includes articles in professional journals and in the media; reports by government agencies and contractors, documents from Presidential Libraries, as well as books from the 1940s to present day. Many of these sources, including primary sources, are presently available on line.

The research generally followed the outline of the chapters above, concentrating first on general history of the draft, then selection processes, policy, and demographics. Much of this information was taken from primary source documents. Charts and statistics in the reviewed books and articles proved very helpful in locating useful primary source documents. Secondary sources were used to find popular opinions and attitudes on the draft at various times during its history. Sources included articles from newspapers, magazines, journals, and the compiled results of thirty-six years of the Gallup Poll. For this phase, the materials provided by the Combined Arms Research Library were very useful. The final major phase of research was on commitment of U.S. troops abroad. Limiting this portion proved to be the most difficult part of the research, it potentially covered a vast amount of material. Therefore, examples were selectively limited to those cases that were deemed appropriately representative, Korea and Vietnam. Since this portion drew largely on previous chapters to demonstrate the impact of the draft on the decision to enter Korea and Vietnam, it required only limited research to back up conclusions made.
Literature Review

Writings on the subject of the draft and the Selective Service abound. A visit to the library or an Internet search will yield an extensive list of works covering the topic from the 1950s to 2008. While securing a number of sources on the draft is easy, determining what is of value and what is not is no simple task. As stated earlier, in the section on limitations, the draft has been, and remains, a very polarizing topic. Many Americans are very passionate about their particular viewpoint on conscription. Not surprisingly, many of the books and articles written about the draft are aimed directly at attacking or defending the draft for various reasons. Even those works that appear, at face value, to be unbiased accounts often have some degree of bias introduced intentionally or unintentionally by the author. Sometimes this bias is due to the author’s beliefs or values and sometimes it is simply a function of the knowledge available at the particular time the work was written.

Writings on the draft can be loosely grouped under three broad headings, but these are tenuous at best. Again, the body of work is so large it resists neat classification. That being said, historical accounts, persuasive or argumentative works, and reports are probably the three categories into which most of the works can be placed.

The historical accounts as one would imagine focus primarily on telling the story of the draft or some portion or aspect thereof. Others select one or two aspects, such as policy, systems, or interest groups and analyze topically in detail. Sometimes context and overview are sacrificed in these accounts. All of the historical accounts must, as in any other work, be taken in the context of their time. Date of publication is important.
Opinion articles, editorials, and books usually fall into the persuasive or argumentative category. The works of the 1960s and early 1970s focused on ending or reforming the draft. Some were critiquing or proposing new solutions for reforms of the draft. Those written in the last twenty years focus on reinstating the draft or defending the decision to end the draft in the context of the performance of the AVF.

An enormous amount of reports have been published on the draft and Selective Service. The Selective Service System itself generated many of these. Despite being manned largely by volunteer civilians the Selective Service reports filled volumes over the years. To this day, the Selective Service continues to render regular reports. The numerous presidential commissions, government contractors, and other governmental agencies have also contributed to the vast collection of reports. Rich in facts and figures, these reports have been well visited by almost all of the authors that have written about conscription in America.

The most prolific author on America’s draft is George Q. Flynn. Flynn’s work definitely falls into the history category. He has written several books on the draft in the U.S. *The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in World War II* (1979), *Lewis B. Hershey: Mr. Selective Service* (1985), and *The Draft, 1940-1973* (1993) are most notable among his works. Flynn is probably the most knowledgeable man on American conscription and the Selective Service System. In addition to his books he has also authored several journal articles. Flynn’s, *The Draft, 1940-1973*, is a detailed account of the implementation of Selective Service in the U.S. in 1940 and the following thirty-three years of the draft’s activity. Flynn offers a thoroughly interesting examination of Selective Service composition, policy, and implementation and how Selective Service
changed over the thirty-three lifespan it enjoyed in America. Along with these, Flynn examines who was selected for service and the details of factors affecting their selection and public opinion thereof. Flynn provides the reader with an excellent historical account. Not simply a narrative of the institution, it is a multi-faceted examination of all the factors affecting the institution. Flynn thoroughness is evidenced by the great deal of endnotes and the eleven page bibliographical essay. After writing two previous books on the topic, he appears to be completely knowledgeable in the subject. The book is supplied with ample, but not excessive, charts and photographs to illustrate the major themes. Sufficient and relevant statistics are provided without detracting from the overall readability of the book. Anyone undertaking a study of Selective Service or the history of conscription in America would do well to make *The Draft, 1940-1973* his or her first stop. With the abundant facts and figures and the wealth of sources cited, the reader would have a firm foundation upon which to launch continued study of the subject. Published in 1993, this is still easily one of the most comprehensive studies of the topic to date.

For those wishing to delve deeper into the history of the draft and military service in America, a potential source would be John Whiteclay Chambers’ *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (1987). Chambers’ topic is generally the decisions and debates leading up to the institution of the draft in 1917, just prior to World War I. However, Chambers goes much deeper in history in developing his points. A good portion of this book discusses Colonial America and the U.S.’ systems of dealing with military manpower needs.
For a good account of the inner workings of the presidential administration and the governmental departments in the months leading up to the initiation of draft by the Selective Service in 1940, J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr. wrote an excellent book published in 1986, *The First Peacetime Draft* (1986). An extremely large number of primary sources were studied in the writing of this book, in addition to interviews with many of the people directly involved with the decisions, policies, and implementation of the draft. Spencer and Clifford’s, *The First Peacetime Draft*, devotes an entire book to what is covered in chapter two of Flynn’s, *The Draft, 1940-1973*. They render a good account of the dynamic between the draft and America’s attitudes and polices toward the war in Europe. It is an interesting behind the scenes look at the people, policies, parties, and issues in effect when America instituted its “first peacetime draft.”

Another very focused, specific history, *Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System* (1968) by James W. Davis Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare leverages its title from the image that the Selective Service attempted to portray of the local draft boards. Those doing the selecting at the Selective Service were not distant bureaucrats, out of touch with the population but “little groups of neighbors” who knew the community the best. Stated in the preface, *Little Groups of Neighbors* is an attempt to peer deep inside the Selective Service System as an institution. *Little Groups of Neighbors* attempts to analyze the organization, make-up, operations, and communications of the Selective Service System. Most interesting is an examination of how little the Selective Service as a whole changed over the course of thirty years when viewed in light of the great changes the nation underwent. A two-year field study in Wisconsin conducted by the authors, reports on government commissioned studies of the draft, newspaper coverage, polls, and
surveys are analyzed for insights into the Selective Service and attitudes and opinions of the public. The analyses are used to study the Selective Service’s “interaction with its environment” that it operates in. Later chapters delve into the cause and effect relationship of the Selective Service and public policy. The authors end the book with some limited recommendations for policy changes and areas for further study. *Little Groups of Neighbors* contains a wealth of interesting information and informative charts and tables. However, printed in 1968, *Little Groups of Neighbors* was written when termination of conscription and movement to a volunteer military was being seriously considered in America; this should be born in mind when reading this particular work.

In *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945-1970* (1971), James Gerhardt delivers another history of the draft, especially focused on policy. In Gerhardt’s work, strategy and policy would ideally dictate force structure, force structure would dictate manpower needs, and manpower needs would dictate draft policy, Gerhardt explains why this did not happen following World War II. He states that there were five major shapers of policy and programs that varied in importance over time: national security, cost, American aversion to compulsion, equity, and other social goals. A thorough representation of the key stakeholders and their positions in relation to the draft is presented. While *Little Groups of Neighbors* looks at the impact created by the draft, *The Draft and Public Policy* focuses on those things that impacted the draft, somewhat the flip side of the coin. But, as Clyde E. Jacobs put it in his review, “its interest for students of defense and foreign policy would have been enhanced if greater attention had been given to relationships between American global strategies and military requirements and possibilities.” Gerhardt’s apparent bias is that he is not a fan of the
decision to transition to a volunteer force. Published in 1971, *The Draft and Public Policy* went to press just over a year shy of conscription’s termination. Understanding that Gerhardt was in favor of reforming the draft, not ending it, and that this certainly shaped his writing to some degree.

A similar sentiment comes from George E. Reedy. Prior to authoring his book, Reedy served on the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service (also known as the Marshall Commission), a study commissioned by President Johnson in 1966 to investigate the many claims of unfairness and bias in the Selective Service System. In *Who Will Do Our Fighting For Us?* (1969) Reedy, in a persuasive essay, makes the case against a volunteer military. Not that Reedy thought the Selective Service and draft policies in effect were good ones, quite the contrary. *Who Will Do Our Fighting For Us?* takes a look at many of the perceived problems and injustices of the mid to late 1960s draft. Reedy both critiques the position that advocated movement away from conscription and towards volunteerism as the sole source provider for military manpower and the policies and procedures that were in effect at that time. Reedy advances the idea that making the military a volunteer proposition will only exacerbate the problems of inequity of service based on social factors. While rare, Reedy proves that there are works that take extreme positions on the draft, which can be taken seriously, and he has the credentials to do it.

Some works, such as Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss’ *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War, and The Vietnam Generation* (1978), straddles the categorical fence. Both were on President Ford’s Clemency Board and they see the problems with the draft as justification for violation of draft laws. *Chance and
Circumstance has absolute value for those seeking a better understanding of the draft in the late 1960s and its context within the draft years as a whole. Baskir and Strauss give a detailed account of Americans who resisted or “dodged” the draft and those who deserted after entering the service. However, Baskir and Strauss no doubt have an ax to grind. Their aim, in telling this story is to advocate a different approach to reconciliation with resisters and deserters. Without a doubt, some data and information is presented in a manner constructive to their case and this has compromised the objectivity.

An alluring title to the student of involuntary military manpower procurement, The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription (1982), offers forty-two articles and essays under the subheadings of; History, Philosophy, Constitutionality, Economics, Universal National Service, Foreign Conscription, Conscription (Pro), and Conscription (Con). From American History, Ben Franklin, Daniel Webster, Caspar Weinberger, James Monroe, and a host of other notable names are published in The Military Draft. No attempt at analysis or critique is made; each piece is allowed to stand on its own. The Military Draft offers the reader an excellent reference for the varied positions, and opinions on conscription. Regardless of subheading, most essays in The Military Draft fall into the persuasive or argumentative category. However, the utility of having such a wide variety in one source is quite valuable.

With such a broad and varied selection available to researchers on the draft, what is the value of one more piece? Sorely lacking is a work that addresses the impact of the draft on decisions to employ the military abroad. Specifically the ability, or inability, of the President to respond at the strategic level due to the presence or absence of conscription has fallen through the literary cracks. Through the course of this paper it will
be demonstrated what the linkage between conscription and “going to war” was. Was the U.S. afforded a greater deal of flexibility in strategic decisions and responses by retaining the draft after World War II or were the successive administrations weighed down by a system not unlike the U.S.’ economy’s dependency on slavery in the 1850s?


2The three bills introduced were House Resolution 163 of 2003, House Resolution 4752 of 2006, and House Resolution 393 of 2007.


5CBS News.


CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF CONSCRIPTION AND SELECTIVE SERVICE

Overview

The draft has a relatively short history in the U.S. From the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775 to the present day, the people of the U.S. have only been subject to approximately thirty-five years of conscription. During that same time period, Americans have had approximately forty-seven years of war.¹

From the Washington Administration to the present, Congress and the President have enacted 11 separate formal declarations of war against foreign nations in five different wars. . . . In the modern era, the international legal consequences of declarations have become less determinate; in fact, declarations have rarely been issued since World War II.²

The same time period has seen four periods of conscription. Some quick calculation, using either events or years, would lead to the supposition that Americans have fought roughly 80 percent of their wars with conscription but a more thorough analysis shows that the conscription and warfare years do not overlay one another so conveniently on a timeline. Once other military commitments are considered, such as the Indian Wars, the Punitive Expedition into Mexico, and the 1989 invasion of Panama, it becomes apparent that the U.S. has conducted most of its military business in the absence of conscription.

U.S. Civil War 1863 to 1865

President Abraham Lincoln made history by introducing conscription to the U.S. This first draft in U.S. history came about as a direct result of the miserable situation the U.S. found itself two years into the Civil War. Initially, in 1862 efforts were made to
work through the state governors, utilizing their militia powers. The War Department issued quotas and guidelines for exemptions. States would break up their quotas among the counties and or other local subdivisions. Counties would then attempt to meet the quota by means of a recruiting drive, often paying hefty bounties as an incentive to join. If the recruiting drive failed to meet the quota, the difference was drafted. A year later the 3 March 1863, Enrollment Act of Conscription was enacted. This moved the draft from a state to a national draft. Both systems had a myriad of ways to avoid service. Replacements could be secured or a $300 commutation fee could be paid to secure exemption. Exemptions were granted to individuals based on occupation, age, marital status, health, and religious conviction. Very quickly, people began to see many of the methods for excusal from the war as evidence that it was a rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight. Riots broke out, especially after the federalizing of the draft. The most notable occurred in New York City. Reasons ranged from perceived unfairness in the drafting and exemption policy to lack of interest in or disagreement with the stated objectives of the war. Considering the number that served during the Civil War, those who were actually drafted made up a very small number. The negative stigma often attached to being drafted and the bounty incentives that were paid appear to have done more to fill the Army’s ranks than actual induction by conscription. The last draft call occurred in March of 1865, and conscription in America was not utilized for over fifty years.

World War I 1917 to 1918

On 18 May 1917, the Selective Service Act was signed, two months after the formal declaration of war. Supervised by the War Department’s Office of the Provost
Marshal General, it was administered through state and local boards. Most personnel administering the system were civilians. In fact, the system had a decidedly more civilian face than did the system of the American Civil War. Other key departures from the Civil War era system were the abolition of large-scale deferments, payment of bounties, substitutes, or commutation fees. Being “selective” as to who served in the military and who stayed home and worked was within control of the system. The idea was to provide military manpower with as little interruption to the economy and the home front as possible by close management of the nation’s military age human resources. While proponents of the draft may have desired the appearance of egalitarianism, it was never the intent of the system that all serve in the military.

Twenty-four million men were eventually registered for service under the Selective Service Act of 1917. Registration was done on three separate dates from 1917 and 1918. By the end of the war, about 2.8 million had been called for service according to Selective Service records. Nothing on the level of the New York City draft riots was seen this time around but America, somewhat isolationist in opinion, had some misgivings about forced military service in a foreign war. Most Americans may have sympathized with the Allies but only the minority favored intervention to save their European friends. The Green Corn Rebellion of Oklahoma is ample evidence of the discontent some, particularly Socialists, had with the Selective Service Act. In this little known episode, between four and five hundred Oklahoma farm workers cached guns and explosives and prepared to rally tens of thousands to their cause of armed resistance to the draft. The Green Corn Rebellion is certainly the exception, but it is fair to say that on the whole enthusiasm to head “Over There” was somewhat lacking. As with Lincoln in
the Civil War, poor enlistment was the motive for President Woodrow Wilson’s request for conscription as only about 35,000 volunteers initially enlisted. The biggest contrast with the Civil War was the number of troops the Selective Service Act of 1917 provided and the portion of the population affected.

The Selective Service Induction Act of 1917 established the system for procuring citizen-soldiers for the rest of the 20th century. Some 72% of all who served during WWI were draftees--50% of the men in France were conscripted. In all, the U.S. mobilized 20% of the male population between 18 and 45 (9.2% were black).¹⁰

It would seem that the World War I draft did more than scare people into joining. This may be a function of the short timeline and the great need for men but either way, unlike the Civil War draft; the World War I draft filled the ranks in a time of national need. Like the Civil War draft, when the smoke cleared from the battlefield conscription was gone from the American landscape once again.

The draft of the Civil War contributed to the draft of World War I both in positive and negative lessons learned such as decentralization and civilian control. In turn, the Selective Service Act of 1917 would heavily influence the Selective Service and Training Act passed in 1940. Unlike World War II and subsequent conflicts, both the Civil War and World War I drafts came after the commitment to hostilities. Both lasted no longer than the conflict for which they were instituted, again in contrast to the draft that emerged in 1940.

Interwar 1919 to 1939

The interwar period saw the idea of a Universal Military Training (UMT) program rise and fall. Different from Selective Service, which selected men for immediate service in the active military, Universal Military Training would have
obligated all able-bodied men to undergo compulsory military training and a short period of military service. This would provide America a large pool of trained men in the reserve that could be called upon in time of national emergency. While UMT did not come to be, it did not go away forever either.

**World War II 1940 to 1945**

Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Selective Service and Training Act on 16 September 1940. This was America’s first peacetime draft. America instituted both previous periods of conscription after she was already at war. Leading up to the draft in 1940 was a pattern of stunning victories by Nazi Germany. Public opinion was warming to conscription as a means of defending the homeland. The military likewise favored a draft and had been preparing for it since shortly after World War I. Understanding how bleak the situation in Europe was, newly elected President Roosevelt also supported a draft to grow the military. Like the military, he did not believe the public would accept it until after a declaration of war, if it came to that, so he did not push for it. Greenville Clark and a group of likeminded individuals attempted to pressure the President into adopting a draft; failing this, they directed their efforts towards the Congress. These efforts, coupled with a media campaign, eventually resulted in the Burke-Wadsworth Bill and an increase in positive public opinion of the draft. The War Department, fearful of having its well-laid plans ruined, entered into liaison with Clark’s lobby and successfully influenced the final form of the bill that would become the Selective Service and Training Act at the end of a three month struggle in Congress. Key in these negotiations was Brigadier General Lewis. B. Hershey, the man who would come to embody Selective Service for decades.
In this first iteration of the World War II draft, there were certain limitations imposed. Conscription was limited to 900,000, the age bracket was set at twenty-one to thirty-six, service was limited to the Western Hemisphere and U.S. possessions abroad, and length of service (if called) was one year active and ten years in the reserves. Initially, volunteers were accepted but eventually volunteering was halted and men were directed to wait until they were called. Every effort was made in the opening months of the draft to ensure that the public accepted Selective Service as fair. While overwhelming public support was gained and things went fairly smoothly, the machinations over the new system were many, both at the individual and group level. On the eve of war, draftees’ tours were extended to eighteen months. Following the entry of the U.S. into World War II, necessary modifications were made to draft policies to accommodate the engagement of American forces abroad. Volunteering was stopped in order to better manage manpower. Restrictions on deployments were gone, and draftees were obligated to serve six months beyond the end of the war. Steps were taken to protect vital industry, stabilize the economy and preserve the family, setting into action a system of deferments that would grow in scope and complexity until 1973. Despite this, Selective Service eventually inducted over ten million men to fight World War II.

1945 to 1947

Following World War II, demobilization began in earnest. Prior to the end of the war, it had been necessary to extend Selective Service, initially set to expire 15 May 1945. Congress extended it until 15 May 1946, or presidential proclamation of the war’s end. Following World War II, most people in America wanted to see American service members return from overseas and the military size greatly reduced. Many also wanted to
see an end to conscription, not least of which were the administration and the military. After all, America had always ended the draft shortly after ending the war. Unlike the previous two uses of the draft, however, America never had occupation duties on the grand scale that it faced in 1945. Despite their desires, the administration and the military realized that they would need the draft to accomplish occupation duties in Europe and the Pacific. President Truman took the opportunity to resurrect the campaign for Universal Military Training. Universal Military Training came to dominate the debate in the interwar period and was again often confused with the draft, despite the fact that Selective Service and Universal Military Training had completely different objectives. Once again, Congress failed to adopt Universal Military Training. Selective Service’s days were also limited following the war. One more extension, to 31 March 1947 would be granted, but only after extensive debate.¹⁶

1947

In the spring of 1947, an attempt was made to return to life without a draft. The attempt was short lived. Lasting only a year, it was soon discovered that without the threat of a draft and with a vibrant economy, America could not meet its military manpower requirements without conscription. Recruiting goals were not met and America returned to conscription the following year. The Truman Administration took the opportunity to push, once again, for Universal Military Training. The White House had been building momentum for this issue since 1945 with support of the military as well as interest groups like the Veterans of Foreign Wars and American Legion. Opposition was present, largely in the form of religious, educational, and labor groups. Eventually UMT would wind up shelved by the Senate, just as it had been previously.¹⁷
Unfolding world events, especially the rise of the Soviet Union, began to bring home the seriousness of the international situation to America in late 1947 and 1948. Given the state of affairs, a volunteer military did not seem possible. Army and Marine Corps strengths were below Congressional and budget authorized levels and reserve forces were dwindling. The military’s ability to keep up with its overseas commitments was at risk and the ability to respond to a crisis requiring military intervention was nearly out of the question. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified in their position, urged resumption of Selective Service even before the UMT issue was decided. Troops were needed immediately. While great debate raged, the Selective Service Act of 1948 was finally passed on 24 June. Reinstitution of Selective Service made Truman’s desire for UMT unattainable. Conscription, unbeknownst to the America of 1948, was here to stay for the next twenty-five years.

Like the Selective Service Act of 1940, that of 1948 was passed during peacetime. Unlike 1940, there was no great war raging and America’s major European allies were all relatively safe. Despite this, the Selective Service System itself looked much like it had during World War II. Men aged eighteen to twenty-six were registered and those over nineteen were liable for a twenty-one month tour if called. Selective Service registered about ten million men by 1950. A little over 30,000 were drafted in that time period. Once again the threat of conscription brought more than sufficient, high quality volunteers to the recruiting offices. Surprisingly, in late 1949 and 1950, the military was once again beginning to downsize with the arrival of a new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, and decreased budgets. Inductions ceased in 1949 and voluntary
enlistments were halted in 1950. Much of the Selective Service was operating part time on the eve of the North Korean invasion of South Korea.\textsuperscript{21} Despite the downsizing and the lack of awareness of the North Korean threat, the extension of 1948 Act was in the works, presumably due to the unsettled nature of the world and the threat of Soviet expansion.\textsuperscript{22}

**Korean War draft 1950 to 1953**

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces attacked across the 38th Parallel, marking the beginning of what would be three years of a major U.S. military commitment and fifty plus years of a smaller scale troop commitment. The response for this crisis was a large-scale mobilization of the reserve component and a ramp up of the Selective Service operations. A great public outcry over the activation and deployment of so many World War II veterans soon arose. Understanding the political implications, the White House was keen to return World War II veterans as soon as possible but reversing the demobilization and downsizing of the military took time. Several months were needed to get a draftee from the induction station to the field in Korea so the Truman administration was forced to endure the negative public relations incurred by mobilizing the reserves. In the end, Selective Service did a commendable job, between June of 1950 and June of 1953 over a million and a half men were inducted.\textsuperscript{23} Given sufficient time the system had supplied the nation with the military manpower it required in its time of need.\textsuperscript{24} During the Korean War, the length of obligation was extended to at least twenty-four months and induction age was lowered to eighteen. Unique was the concept of a partial mobilization. Unlike World War II, when over ten million were inducted, the draft of the Korean War was relatively small; more men were inducted in 1944 alone than during the Korean
Also in contrast to World War II, volunteers were taken throughout the conflict in Korea. With fewer called, due to limited mobilization and enlistees, the question of who was selected and who was not, and why, came to be more difficult to answer. The system of deferments began to grow. “By June 1953 the draft pool had suffered a massive leakage of manpower through deferments.”

1953 to 1965

Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Selective Service inducted about 100,000 men a year to meet the needs of the Cold War military. Each year from 1954 through 1966 enlistees outnumbered draftees. Once again, the notion that the best recruiting program was the threat of conscription seems to be confirmed. With the Korean War settled and relative peace established, that favorite of American military traditions was once again observed; post-war downsizing. 1955 saw the armed forces dip below three million, and 1960 would see the military below the two and a half million mark. As a result, the draft calls generally declined during this period. This only exacerbated the consternation over the question of who was selected and who was not. The scope and complexity of the deferment system continued to grow between the Korean War draft surge and the Vietnam War draft surge.

(General) Hershey informed Congress that, “inducting men is now only a collateral, almost, you might say, a byproduct of its operation.” Local boards who had originally demanded proof that a man should be deferred began to seek excuses not to draft men. Such a conversion meant the United States had a universal military obligation and a draft, but two-thirds of all men reaching 18 ½ avoided military service.
Vietnam War Draft 1965 to 1973

Having learned a valuable lesson at President Truman’s expense, Lyndon B. Johnson entered Vietnam without calling on the reserve components. Johnson pursued his policy in Vietnam using active component forces only. Accordingly, inductions from 1965 through 1969 jumped from approximately 100,000 a year to 200,000-300,000 a year. This call up was not as drastic as the Korean War call up; the end strength of the military did not need a growth spurt of the same magnitude. However, this did mean that the near permanent deferments enjoyed by “two-thirds of all men reaching 18 ½” simply could not continue.

In his campaign for the presidency in 1968, Richard Nixon pledged to abolish the draft. After his election, the Congress and the President began modifying the draft system. In 1969, legislation was enacted to permit a draft lottery, and in December of that year, the first draft lottery was conducted--ending the system in which local draft boards had solely determined, on basis of the draft law, who must report for possible induction in the military. In the early 1970s, occupational, agricultural, new-paternity, and new-student deferments were largely eliminated.

The Selective Service System on a whole went through several studies and subsequent reforms. Most of these efforts, which included changes to deferments, personnel changes on draft boards and the implementation of the controversial lottery system, were intended to increase the fairness of the system. As public opinion of the war turned, Selective Service became a convenient target. Ultimately, the Vietnam War would be conscription’s undoing in America. Bowing to political pressure and realizing that disengagement from Vietnam was impending, President Richard Nixon ended the draft in 1973.
End of the Selective Service 1973 to 1975

The momentum had been building throughout the Vietnam period for an end to the draft. When President Nixon ended the draft in 1973, it was no surprise. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there had been loud voices on both sides of the AVF debate but ultimately the military was forced to give up its thirty-year reliance on conscription. The true end of the draft was in 1972 as there were no draft calls that year. With only a brief intermission, the armed forces had filled their ranks with the assistance of conscription since 1940. Recruiting campaigns and budgets had been bolstered in the years leading up to 1973 in order to deal with both the lack of a drafted Soldiers and the lack of enlistment incentive the draft provided. Nevertheless, the early years of the AVF were shaky at best. Authority for induction ended in 1973 and Selective Service registration ceased in 1975.

Selective Service Returns 1980

On 27 June 1980, registration once again became mandatory. The Carter administration, concerned over tensions in the Middle East, successfully reinstated Selective Service registration. While initially opposed, and elected while promising to end registration, even President Ronald Reagan came to realize that the insurance afforded by Selective Service registration was worth the cost, and a small cost it was. Military end strength was to remain relatively stable for many years (see figure 1). Most Americans shared President Reagan’s opinion on the matter. Since the day registration was re-instituted, there have been those that warned that a return to the draft was coming soon, those that urged a return to the draft as a cure for various ills (military, societal, and political), and those (which number the greatest) that have paid little if any attention to either.
Conclusion

The history of the draft gives some interesting insights into involvement of the U.S. in foreign wars. World War II, Korea, and Vietnam all occurred within one of the two major draft periods of the Twentieth Century. The Selective Service Act of 1940 was signed into law fifteen months before America was attacked at Pearl Harbor but Japan continued its conquest of the Pacific, Paris was occupied by the Germans, and the British had been driven off the continent and were suffering an intense bombing campaign that would come to be known as the “Battle of Britain.” It would have been foolish for Americans to not make some preparation for defense. Certainly most reasonable people of the time had come to understand that America could hide behind her oceans only so
long. Therefore, it seems a stretch to say that the conscription resorted to in 1940 was truly a peacetime draft; indeed the only peace seems to have been in the Americas, while the rest of the word was at war. While Americans had not joined the battle, the draft enacted in 1940 was enacted under the growing shadow of World War II.

In 1950, when the North Koreans attacked across the 38th Parallel, America was taken completely by surprise. Present on the Korean peninsula as a part of the post war occupation of Japan and Japanese territories, American forces found themselves center stage in the U.S. strategy to contain communism. Following the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, the Selective Service act was extended in 1950, but given America’s experience with recruiting and volunteers in 1947, it is likely that Selective Service would have been extended had the North Koreans not attacked. While draft calls of Korea were small compared to World War II, fighting the Korea War may well have been impossible without the draft. Given the sad state of military manpower at the time and America’s growing inability to meet its commitments elsewhere in the world, it is hard to imagine the successful reestablishing of the territorial integrity of South Korea with the limited assets available. Would reliance on a smaller, volunteer force have limited General Macarthur’s objectives? The U.S. advance into North Korea precipitated the Chinese entry into the war. Had the U.S. forces only reestablished the 38th Parallel, due to limited available human resources, would the Chinese have sat out the war and American soldiers been “home by Christmas” after all? Conscription cannot be faulted for getting America into the Korean War, but is it possible that conscription is a factor that indirectly helped involve the Chinese in the war and ultimately prolonged the conflict.
Given the great dissatisfaction with the call up of veterans who were a part of the reserve component for the Korean War, President Johnson used conscription to take on the task of combating communism in Asia. The draft has been credited with the undoing of the Vietnam War, but Flynn argues that this is a bit backwards. The draft was the unfortunate victim of an unpopular war in his estimation. “Most Americans were not young, not active, and not affected by the cultural revolt of youth, but were tiring of the war in Vietnam, and the draft was a symbol of the war. Boards existed in every local community, reminding everyone of the frustration in Asia.”36 So, while the Vietnam War may have been the demise of conscription in America, conscription allowed the U.S. to become involved without mobilization of the reserves, a mobilization that was controversial in the Korean War and has come under scrutiny in the current Global War on Terrorism.37 President Johnson could have mobilized reserve forces to enter Vietnam but at what political or strategic price?

This brief history of the draft raises some interesting questions about its bearing on U.S.’ involvement in wars. Before any judgments are made, more aspects of the draft need to be examined. Who was drafted, what were the attitudes and opinions about the draft and the wars, and what other international events were occurring?38


3Douglas G. Cooper, Commander USN, “Stumbling Towards Total Civil War: The Successful Failure of Union Conscription 1862-1865” (Strategy Research Project,


5War was declared on Germany 6 April 1917.


12Ibid., 18.

13Ibid., 25-29.

14Ibid., 54-56.

15Selective Service System, “History and Records.”


17Ibid., 68-73.

18Ibid., 88-122.

19Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973, 108; and Gerhardt, 126-127. Note: One additional attempt was made at UMT in 1949 but it had no real chance at passage by this time.


23Selective Service System, “History and Records.”


25Selective Service System, “History and Records.”


27Selective Service System, “History and Records.”


29Gerhardt, 192.


31Ibid., 170.

32Selective Service System, “History and Records.”

33Gerhardt, 273.


36Ibid., 236.

Some people believe that the best way to assign that risk to members of society is through a draft system, which can compel citizens from geographically, racially, and economically diverse backgrounds to serve in the military. Through the years, some proponents of the draft have stated that the AVF would create inequities because low-income people or racial minorities would be more likely to join the armed forces than other groups and thus would disproportionately bear the risks associated with military service.¹

### Context

Joseph A. Califano Jr., in speaking about the termination of conscription said that, “we remove perhaps the greatest inhibition on a President’s decision to wage war.” He based this on the notion that by ending the draft the influential middle and upper classes would no longer have a vested interest in the President’s “bellicose adventures around the world.” Only the poor and underprivileged would serve in a volunteer military.² Yet, an examination of who was filling the ranks of the conscript and volunteer militaries in America reveals some interesting statistics. Numbers drafted and major reasons for their draft have been examined, so at this point it is relevant to learn who made up those numbers and who was doing the selecting at the Selective Service. Largely a misunderstood aspect of the draft, this chapter will bring clarity to the demographics of the draft, reveal some interesting facts and dispel some common misperceptions about draftees. Did the draft really ensure that the middle and upper classes were represented in the ranks, considering that inequity was a major theme of many anti-draft sentiments? In *Chance and Circumstance*, the authors state that, “But by far the greatest number of escape routes were open to youths from privileged backgrounds.” “The draftees who fought and died in Vietnam were primarily society’s ‘losers.’”³ This chapter will
determine if the draft really provided the nation with a military that was demographically similar to society at large or a military made up of the lower class and underprivileged. This chapter will also make a brief comparison to the demographics of the AVF that followed the draftee military. This comparison, coupled with the previous chapter will assist in better understand how the military’s demographics shaped public attitude and opinion. That topic will be discussed in the next chapter.

Who Was Drafted?

The first answer is fewer and fewer as a percentage of the population. Following World War II the draft eligible cohort continued to grow, taking a rather large leap in the years leading up to the Vietnam War as the children of the “baby boom” came of age. Following World War II the draft eligible cohort continued to grow, taking a rather large leap in the years leading up to the Vietnam War as the children of the “baby boom” came of age. Between 1958 and 1964 the age eligible cohort grew by fifty percent. Conversely, the number of draftees required grew smaller. Many politicians, including President Truman, believed the idea of a large land army to be an outdated strategy. Nuclear weapons were thought to be the future, the answer to the containment of communism. Even during periods of increased draft calls following World War II, the percentage of the eligible cohort actually drafted remained quite small. Both Korea and Vietnam were limited wars, not calling on the nation’s manpower the way World War II had. Selective Service inducted a little over 1.6 million men during the Korean War and slightly over 1.7 million during the Vietnam War. By comparison, 1942 and 1943 each saw inductions in excess of three million, 1944 was over 1.5 million, and even 1945 saw almost one million men inducted by Selective Service.

Almost as many men were inducted in the last full year of World War II as were inducted during the entire Korean or Vietnam conflict. Viewed another way, almost as
many men were drafted in 1943 as were drafted in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars combined.\(^7\) This was not some function solely of the wars; the interwar years also saw a sharp decline in draftees. Fifty-eight percent of the Soldiers in the Army were draftees in 1954; by 1961 this number had dropped to twenty-two percent, the size of the Army decreased by one half.\(^8\) Because of the inverse trends in population and military size, the primary role of the Selective Service eventually came to be one of deferring people. With the available pool growing and the size of the military shrinking inductions, the Selective Service claimed, were a byproduct of the system.\(^9\) As can be seen in the chart below, despite an increase in requirements that correlated with the Vietnam War, the number of those inducted by draft remained a relatively small percentage. A ramp up in 1964 peaked within a couple of years and then started on a downward trend that continued through the end of the draft. Figure 2 indicates that the Vietnam War had the largest separation between the two plots, indicating the smallest percentage of draftees.
Regulation Age, and Age Routinely Inducted

Initially, when the draft was enacted in 1940, men aged twenty-one to thirty-six were registered and eligible for induction. Following the entry of the U.S. into World War II, the registration was mandated for all men ages eighteen to forty-five. After negotiations with the education establishment, a new law was signed in November of 1942, which allowed the drafting of eighteen to twenty year olds. While men in their thirties were liable, the numbers actually inducted were much smaller. The military quickly determined that men over twenty-six had a very poor cost-benefit ratio. Problems during both the induction examinations and initial training phases were the basis of this opinion. When possible, the draft boards did their best to respect the military’s position on older men. By the end of World War II, one-half of all those that fought were still under age
This indicates that the majority of those men drafted prior to and during World War II were in their early twenties. In 1948 when the draft was again reinstated, the legal age for registration was eighteen to twenty-six with those nineteen to twenty-six eligible for induction. When the Korean War broke out, the age for induction was lowered to eighteen and one half. The oldest eligible men were generally called first, in accordance with Selective Service guidance to local boards. This process continued largely unchanged until the final years of the draft. In December of 1969, a lottery was instituted and a man was liable for one year. Birth dates were drawn and this determined the order of call. Those drawn first had the highest chance of being called and those called last had the lowest chance of being called. Those who had no deferments were liable the year after they turned nineteen (calling those aged nineteen to twenty), while those that had deferments and were not previously available were treated as nineteen year olds when they were no longer deferred. This system was intended to offset a perceived issue with the system, that of fairness. Instead of being held in suspense for eight years (age nineteen through twenty-six, inclusive) a man was “at risk” for one year and could then go on with his life, barring another World War. Not only was this of psychological benefit, it allowed a young man to plan his life and it allowed employers to hire him without fear of losing him to the draft.\textsuperscript{15} However, the lottery did nothing to change who was classified 1A and who received a different classification that would defer them.

\textbf{Marital Status and Dependents}

Draft eligible men that were married were often passed over by local boards. Sometimes this was policy, sometimes their prerogative. In 1940, there was not a blanket deferment for married men although draft policies granted men who had dependents a
deferment and married men were often considered part of this, even when they had no children. Demonstrating the leeway that Selective Service System exercised at the local level is the fact that many, but not all, local boards deferred teachers while some deferred mechanics and some did not. The Selective Service Act of 1948 deferred married men and men with children. In 1951, married men without children lost their deferments, but were called after single men. In 1956, the married men were placed on the same level as unmarried men for induction purposes. Those that became fathers after 1953 no longer received deferments, but they were granted a lower priority of call, not being inducted until all men without children were called first. Fathers regained their deferment in 1963 under President Kennedy but lost it again in 1970 under President Nixon, however, there was a clause protecting those that already held that particular deferment in 1970. Kennedy also placed married men, without children, one step lower in priority than unmarried men but President Johnson reversed this in 1965, placing childless men who were married and unmarried on the same level. As usual, this policy was not retroactive and only applied to those married after the law was enacted. Part of the basis for the marriage and dependent deferments was the fact that social bias of the times was towards protection of the family. In addition to this social bias, there was also the bias of the military. They preferred single men without the complications inherent in men with spouses or children. These biases were in turn balanced against the actual needs of the military at that given time to arrive at policy.

Income Level of Draftees

Draftees tended to come from households with all but the highest and lowest income levels. While a slightly higher number of draftees may have come from lower income
homes, they were not disproportionately represented in the military. Flynn explains it well when he writes that during the Korean War 75 percent of the sons of both blue and white collar families served in the military with 67 percent of the sons of professionals and managers serving. While the draft may have taken more men from the lower classes, draft inducement ensured that the sons of the middle and upper classes volunteered for active and reserve military duty. Later studies during the Vietnam War years found that only sons of farmers and sons of those holding graduate degrees served at a lower than average rate. The same general trend held true for education level.

**Education Level of the Draftee**

Overall, there were more men rejected for lack of education than men who escaped the draft through education. It must be remembered that when enacted in 1950, enrollment in college was a deferment, not an exemption. This fact remained true until the draft ended in 1973. After the draft was renewed in 1950, college students were required to take a standardized test and achieve a minimum score if they desired to qualify for a deferment. Additionally those ranking in the top half of their class were automatically deferred until graduation. Upon graduation, four months were allowed to find employment that would qualify them for further deferment. So, despite educational deferments, college students and college graduates volunteered and many were drafted. A study conducted in 1964 revealed that 74 percent of high school graduates and 70 percent of college graduates who were past their draft eligible years (aged twenty-seven to thirty-four) had served in the military. At 41 percent and 27 percent respectively, those who completed eighth grade or less and those with a graduate degree were the two groups that were significantly under represented in the military. This can be attributed to failure of
entrance exams for the former and continued educational or dependency deferments through age twenty-six for the later. But, this is military participation, not those who were drafted.23 Again, as with income level, those with more education were apparently more inclined to enlist or receive a commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, choosing service on their own terms instead of waiting to see what the military gave them. Due to the inducement to volunteerism the draft caused, there may have been an inequity in the draft that correlated to education (or income level) but there does not appear to have been an inequity in service based on education levels.

Gender

From its inception until its termination, the draft was male only. This policy is probably both cultural and practical in nature. There seems to have been little in the way to challenges to this policy. Even when President Carter reinstated the requirement for eighteen-year-old men to register with the Selective Service, the male only policy was upheld.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Congress’s decision to exempt women from registration “was not the ‘accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females’” and did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women, because of combat restrictions on women, were not “similarly situated” for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress’s judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the Military Selective Service Act.24

Race

After 1950, the Selective Service removed information pertaining to race from its forms. Prior to 1950, draft calls had been made based on race. With segregation the standard practice in the military, the numbers of African Americans inducted at any given
time could be no more than “negro” or “colored” facilities were able to handle, therefore
draft calls were executed based on this limiting factor. With the integration of the
services, this was no longer an issue and Selective Service, like the military as a whole,
was directed to operate without consideration for race. During the draft years, minorities,
particularly African Americans served in numbers roughly representative to their
numbers within the overall population. Eligible African Americans though, were drafted
in higher numbers than their Caucasian counterparts. More African Americans were
rejected, due to health and education, but African Americans attained fewer student or
employment deferments and experienced almost no access to reserve component slots
and Reserve Officer Training Corps programs. Therefore, African Americans who were
eligible tended to be inducted in higher percentages than Caucasians who did have access
to deferments and reserve slots.25 While more African Americans may have entered by
draft than enlistment, because of the increased opportunities in the military, African
Americans tended to re-enlist at a much higher rate than Caucasians. This gave them a
slightly higher representation within the service, when compared to their percentage of
the U.S. population.26

Volunteers

As stated earlier, the draft was a great inducement to volunteerism. While it is
difficult to ascertain the actual number of volunteers that enlisted or received
commissions in order to serve on their own terms, at various times estimates have been as
high as one-half for the different branches of the service.27 During World War II
volunteering was eventually terminated. Volunteers were not accepted in order to allow
Selective Service to better manage the eligible pool. During the entirety of the Korean
and Vietnam conflicts, all branches continued to accepted volunteers. Difficulties in managing the eligible pool, especially during the Korean War, proved the wisdom of the policy used in World War II.

**Religions**

Ordained ministers, and at times even students preparing for the ministry, were classified so as to preclude their induction. No denomination, however, was granted a blanket deferment based on their doctrine or theology. While generally religious in nature, religious or denominational affiliation was not the litmus test for granting conscientious objector status. Conscientious objector status was granted when an individual’s personal moral convictions prohibited him from bearing arms in any war. Conscientious objectors, if granted this status by the local draft board, were deferred. Following World War II, conscientious objector status became easier to obtain and the number of men classified as such grew, especially during the Vietnam War.

**Students**

Probably the most notable class of deferments was the educational or student deferments, notable because of the perceived inequity they created. Student deferments were granted to those in high school, college, and graduate school. Initially, this was meant as a way of protecting the sciences and professions such as engineers and chemists, but eventually student deferments were seen as a place for the wealthy to hide from the draft. Upon completion of the semester, degree, or upon disenrollment from the program, an individual’s deferment was lost and he was reclassified. At times, college students were deferred only until the end of the current semester, while at other times
local boards allowed college students to complete their degree, provided they were making satisfactory progress. In years when degree completion was allowed, many college graduates were particularly susceptible to selection because they were the oldest in the eligible cohort.

Quite a few young men chose a commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps as an alternative to conscription while many took their chances and became college educated privates. In fact, 1959 saw the Army with almost four and one-half percent of its enlisted population with college degrees, a high for the peacetime Army. The other services, which were relying on volunteers, had less than 1 percent college graduates.\(^{30}\) A Korean War era study conducted by the Selective Service concluded that the higher one’s education level the more likely one was to serve, either through draft or volunteering. Conversely, the lower one’s education level the less likely he was to serve due to his inability to score well on pre-induction tests. Studies conducted in 1969 determined that the military participation rate for college graduates was 71 percent.\(^{31}\)

**Employment**

One’s job could serve as an effective shield from induction. The Department of Labor issued guidance on essential jobs that should be given consideration when classifying registrants. Selective Service generally deferred those who held public office, those who were employed in jobs related to the Department of Defense, and those that held jobs in other vital industries or fields. Farmers apparently had a very powerful lobby and effectively fenced off agricultural workers throughout World War II and the following years through Korea. Flynn contends that agricultural employees are probably the only group that was significantly under represented in the military.\(^{32}\)
Disqualified

Some men were effectively disqualified because the status they were assigned placed them in a position to be drafted only in the most extreme cases or classified them as entirely unfit for military service. Extreme lack of education, mental and physical handicaps, and serious health issues were all conditions that would place one in a classification that would make induction highly unlikely with near permanence.

Classification

Table 1 is a current menu of classifications available to registrants should a draft be put into effect again. While this list has changed over the years, it is not radically different from the system implemented prior to World War II. With so many classifications, it is easy to see how some were able to move from one deferred status to another, for example from student, to father, to Defense Department employee until age twenty-seven.
Table 1. Selective Service Classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-A:</td>
<td>Available for unrestricted military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-A-O:</td>
<td>Conscientious objector available for noncombatant military service only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-C:</td>
<td>Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or the Public Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-D-D:</td>
<td>Deferment for certain members of a reserve component or student taking military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-D-E:</td>
<td>Exemption of certain members of a reserve component or student taking military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-H:</td>
<td>Registrants not subject to processing for induction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-O:</td>
<td>Conscientious objector to all military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-O-S:</td>
<td>Conscientious objector to all military service (separated/discharged from military service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1-W:</td>
<td>Conscientious objector ordered to perform alternative service in lieu of induction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2-D:</td>
<td>Registrants deferred because of study preparing for the ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3-A:</td>
<td>Registrants deferred because of hardship to dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3-A-S:</td>
<td>Registrants deferred because of hardship to dependents (separated/discharged from military service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-A:</td>
<td>Registrants who have completed military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-A-A:</td>
<td>Registrants who have performed military service for a foreign nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-B:</td>
<td>Official deferred by law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-C:</td>
<td>Alien or dual national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-D:</td>
<td>Minister of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-F:</td>
<td>Registrants not acceptable for military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-G:</td>
<td>Registrants exempted from service because of the death of his parent or sibling while serving in the Armed Forces or whose parent or sibling is in a captured or missing in action status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-T:</td>
<td>Treaty alien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4-W:</td>
<td>Registrants who have completed alternative service in lieu of induction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Equity

If a smaller percentage was being drafted because of the growth of the age eligible cohort and the diminishing size of the military, the question arises, “Who serves when not all serve?” In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? (1967) is the title of the
report submitted by the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service. The commission found that the Selective Service System had been operating since 1940, largely unchanged.\textsuperscript{33} The commission also found that locales with the lowest income levels had more men rejected, due to education and health reasons and locales with the highest income levels had more men with student deferments.\textsuperscript{34} It also found that eligible African Americans were drafted in higher numbers but African Americans were represented proportionally, giving the impression that no racial group bore an unfair burden. So, if the very poor were rejected and the rich were deferred, African Americans and Caucasian served proportionally, then who did serve? Based on the National Advisory Commission’s findings, it would seem that the middle and lower class men bore the burden of service. However, as discussed earlier examining draft statistics only can be misleading. Flynn points out that a class bias did exist in the draft but not in military service over all.\textsuperscript{35} Many who trumpeted the inequity of the draft failed to factor in the volunteers. Flynn also holds that while the draft had biases towards religion, family, and education these were all things that Americans held dear and so the deferments offered to students, preachers, and fathers were fully endorsed by the public. A more thorough treatment of society’s opinions and biases in regards to the draft will be covered in more detail later.

Who Was Selecting Those That Were Drafted?

A Selective Service Local Board is a group of five citizen volunteers whose mission, upon a draft, will be to decide who among the registrants in their community will receive deferments, postponements, or exemption from military service based on the individual registrant’s circumstances and beliefs.\textsuperscript{36}
A decentralized system comprised of local boards was responsible for classifying and selecting men for the draft. Decentralization was meant to prevent the problems of the Civil War, where the unpopularity of the draft was blamed on a large impersonal government organization. Under the decentralized system, those who best knew a young man could best determine his classification and fitness for military service. They understood the community they represented, fully understood the impact of each man’s service on the community, and could make the most informed decision for the good of both the man the community. They could best decide who would benefit the nation best by continuing in their present endeavors and who could benefit the most by serving in the military.37

Local Draft Boards

“Little Groups of Neighbors” is how one report to Congress characterized the local boards; a Selective Service bulletin termed them “friends and neighbors.” As America’s draft eligible population grew, the concept of “friends and neighbors” melted away. George E. Reedy, author of Who Will Do Our Fighting For Us? (1969) and member of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, believed that the efforts to maintain this perception of the Selective Service System was its undoing. Reedy also argues that the “friends and neighbors” concept was largely a myth as far back as 1940. The concept of “friends and neighbors” was nearest to reality in small town and rural America where draft boards managed much smaller pools of registrants, maybe a few dozen. However, in larger cities and population centers, the registrant most likely knew no one on his draft board and likewise the draft board did not know him; he was possibly one of tens of thousands that the board managed. Reedy, a draftee of World War II, states
that except for the registration and the physical examination, for many the entire process
was carried out courtesy of the U.S. Postal System.39

Who Were the Little Groups of Neighbors?

Local Board members are appointed by the Director of Selective Service in the
name of the President, on recommendations made by their respective state
governors or an equivalent public official.40

Local board members were volunteers, unpaid civilians. When the National Advisory
Commission on Selective Service surveyed local draft boards, it found that the average
age was fifty-eight with one fifth of the members over age seventy. Some board members
were in their eighties and nineties. Over half of these members had served in excess of
ten years, some over twenty years. Local boards were approximately 95 percent
Caucasian and they predominantly held white-collar jobs.41 Two thirds of those sitting on
boards in 1966 were veterans.42 Local draft board demographics had very little in
common with those they were classifying and selecting. An age-old friction, young men
often felt that the boards, which were made up of those so much older than them, were
unable to identify with current problems and issues. In addition to age, race was a real
issue. Very few, and in many cases no, minorities were on local draft boards, despite very
high minority populations in their area of responsibility. This was true for African
Americans in the south as well as Hispanics in the west. With the growing civil rights
movement that overlapped the draft years, this came to be a source of even more friction
than the age issue.
Inconsistencies and Lack of Uniformity

Local boards because they were so decentralized and made up of volunteers, were often free to interpret guidance and directives from the Selective Service System as they saw fit. This freedom resulted in a lack of uniformity in classifying and deferring young men. Often, two young men with the exact same circumstances would be classified differently; depending on which board they were managed by. Draft eligible men increasingly often felt that they were simply un-lucky and low draft calls, as a function of a small military and high numbers in the age eligible cohort, only exacerbated the problem.43

Change and Reform

Change came slow to local draft boards. Following the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service’s recommendation considerable efforts were made to ensure local boards more accurately reflected the demographics of the area they served. Additionally, directives and guidance from the Selective Service System became more stringent and binding.44 President Nixon launched a national program of Youth Advisory Committees to ensure that draft boards were in touch with the young men they were classifying. These changes, however, came only in the last few years of the draft. These measures, and the commission that recommended them, were most likely intended to secure some breathing room for a presidential administration plagued by an increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam. Flynn clearly states in *The Draft* that the Youth Advisory Committees were carefully selected, conservative, middle class youth. He goes on to contend that they had no effect other than to gain some advantage for President Nixon in public opinion, and that is exactly what he had intended.45
Throughout its thirty-three (minus one) year history, the draft either directly or indirectly brought men from all but the highest and lowest income brackets into the ranks. The draft brought men from all but the highest and lowest education levels into the service, again directly or indirectly. Similarly minorities were not greatly under or over represented within the military. It would seem that Califano was correct when he stated that the draft ensured that the middle and upper classes had a vested interest in military actions around the world because they were liable to have to fight them. Even those segments of society that “escaped” the draft with more frequency than most still had to take active measures to ensure that they did not wind up raising their right hand at an induction ceremony. Their avoidance was an active measure that took some effort. Most likely, this effort brought home to them the fact that good education, job opportunities, social and political connections, or the “grace of God” was all that had kept them out of the ranks.

If the military of the draft years (thanks to induction and inducement) was relatively representative of the population along economic, educational, and racial lines, does the AVF compare poorly? Has the military truly become a haven for those who find no hope or opportunity elsewhere? Is America fighting its current War on Global Terrorism at the expense of the poor, uneducated, and minorities? In the late 1960s, a surprising number predicted this is exactly what would occur. Califano was in good company. Reedy, a member of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service and author of *Who Will Do Our Fighting For Us?* and Senator Edward M. Kennedy were both supporters of the draft. They too believed that a volunteer force would attract only the disadvantaged in
America. The answer today to all three questions is “No.” A recent Congressional Budget Office study had the following to say.

The current all-volunteer force is representative of society along many dimensions—although, partly because of the unique demands of military service, it is younger than the population as a whole and has a smaller proportion of women.

Members of the armed forces are racially and ethnically diverse. Black service members represent the largest minority group in the military. Although their percentage has varied during the years of the AVF, they composed 13 percent of active-duty enlisted recruits in 2005 and 19 percent of the entire active-duty enlisted force in 2006, compared with 14 percent of the 17- to 49-year-old U.S. population.

The socioeconomic backgrounds of service members have been less well documented than other characteristics because data on the household income of recruits before they joined the military are sparse. CBO’s [Congressional Budget Office] review of previous studies and some new tabulations suggest that people from all income groups are represented in the armed forces. However, CBO’s analysis of data from 2000 indicate that youths from the very highest and lowest income families may be somewhat less likely to serve in the enlisted ranks than other groups are.46

If these findings sound familiar, it is because they are the same findings arrived at in reference to the draft. The military today represent the society that sent it to war just as much as the military that relied on draftees. The demographic composition of the military today is probably as representative as it has ever been and compares very well with that of the draft, despite the warnings issued as the plans for an AVF were being prepared. But, this has not always been the case.

Not until about 1981 did the education level of the recruits match that of the civilian population, and today it easily exceeds it. In 1981, the percentage of recruits with a high school diploma matched the statistics for civilians age eighteen to twenty-four. Prior to that year, recruits had lagged, at times, as much as twenty percentage points behind the civilian average for holding a high school diploma.47
Similarly, Armed Forces Qualification Test scores have increased with the introduction of the AVF.\textsuperscript{48} This indicates a better-educated force. Like high school diplomas, the scores of recruits on the Armed Forces Qualification Test are significantly better now than they were during the initial years of the AVF.

Overall, the education level of the military took a dip following the end of the draft but they have rebounded fantastically with an estimated 6 percent of the enlisted force being college educated.\textsuperscript{49}

In terms of race, today’s AVF has a higher percentage of African Americans than either the population or the draftee military. Caucasians and Asian/Pacific Islanders are slightly underrepresented. Hispanics are slightly underrepresented as well, with the percentage of Hispanics in the military rising but not as fast as their percentage within the population. Native Americans are proportionally represented in the military. Following the termination of the draft, the percentage of African Americans increased sharply (especially in the Army), as had been predicted. The percentage of African Americans in the military rose from a fairly representative 11 percent to a high of 23 percent in the early 2000s, it is currently at about 19 percent. The approximate current percentage of African American recruits, for the military as a whole, is 14 percent. By comparison, the Vietnam era African American population that was of military age was about 12 percent of the U.S.’ military age population, that figure is currently at 15 percent.\textsuperscript{50} So, while there may have been some truth in the warnings, the racial demographics of the military do not appear to have gone completely awry.
Geographically, the south and midwest have provided more than their fair share of recruits to the AVF, the west roughly their share with only the northeast providing a number significantly below the average.\textsuperscript{51}

Based on 2004 and 2007 data, recruits come predominantly from lower to middle income households. The very poor and the rich were most underrepresented, a trend that is not unlike that of education.\textsuperscript{52} Based on information in the Congressional Budget Office study, this is an improvement over the early years of the AVF when lower income households were over represented.\textsuperscript{53} Data from the Heritage Foundation indicates that the burden of supplying recruits may actually be shifting towards the upper portion of the middle classes with the highest income households increasing their participation since 2003 and the lowest income households decreasing theirs during the same period.\textsuperscript{54}

In summary, the AVF is relatively equal to the draftee military in accurately representing society. Education levels in the military, after a dip at the beginning, are higher than ever. African Americans are over represented to a small degree but even when the trend was at its worst in the late 1990s it was not nearly to the extreme that some in the pro-draft camp of the late 1960s attempted to lead the public to believe it would be. Household income trends of those entering the service are either similar to what they were during the draft or migrating towards the upper middle class income brackets and away from the lowest brackets.

\textsuperscript{1}Congressional Budget Office, 5.

\textsuperscript{2}Anderson, 531-540.

4Ibid., 3.

5Congressional Budget Office, 5.


9Ibid., 140.

10Ibid., 30.

11Ibid., 62.

12Ibid., 77.

13Ibid., 49.

14Ibid., 86.


16Reedy, 95.


19Ibid., 126.

20Ibid., 231.

21Ibid., 194.

22Baskir and Strauss, 21.


27 Ibid., 171.

28 Jehovah’s Witnesses made up one of the largest groups of theology based conscientious objectors


30 Ibid., 141.

31 Ibid., 232.

32 Ibid., 130.

33 *National Advisory Commission on Selective Service*, 17.

34 Ibid.


37 Reedy, 91-92.

38 Davis and Dolbeare, v.

39 Reedy, 89.


41 Reedy, 92-93.

42 Davis and Dolbeare, 57.

43 Baskir and Strauss, 6.


46 Congressional Budget Office, ix.


48 Ibid., 16.

49 Ibid., 15.

50 Ibid., 21-23.

51 Ibid., 28.


53 Congressional Budget Office, 29

CHAPTER 4
ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

The draft was justified in World War II because the life of the people collectively was at stake. Individuals had to fight if the nation was to survive, for the lives of their countrymen and their way of life. Vietnam is no such case. Nor was Korea, an example where, in my opinion, certain military action was justified but the draft was not.¹

William J. Clinton, 1969

Context

The general public, government agencies, and special interest groups were all key stakeholders in the draft. Each had its positions, opinions, and impacts on the draft and they were many and varied. As politicians and officials argued their positions and opinions on the merits or demerits of the draft and the volunteer force, what were the public at large and the military thinking? If, as has been argued, the draft serves as the “greatest inhibition on a President’s decision to wage war” it seems only right to examine the major positions and opinions of the key stakeholders.² After all, in this argument, as put forth by politicians such as lawyer and Former Presidential aide Joseph A. Califano Jr. and Representative Charles B. Rangel (Democrat-New York), it is the opinions and sentiments that the draft induces among voters and decision makers that serve as the real “inhibition to a President’s decision to wage war.” Without a draft, they argued, these opinions and sentiments would not be aroused because the population at large would have no vested interest in foreign military campaigns.
Public

While it had its ups and downs, the downs were never so low that the draft did not retain the approval of a majority of U.S. citizens.⁢ From the end of World War II through 1955, Gallup collected quite a bit of information on Universal Military Training.⁴ While different from the draft, an assumption can be made that opinions on the draft mirror those on Universal Military Training.⁵ In cases where survey data from the same time period are available on both the draft and Universal Military Training, Gallup Poll responses bear out this assumption. An additional assumption can be made that the draft was widely accepted and not a significant issue in America if Gallup was not collecting surveys on it.

Unfortunately, review and analysis of Gallup Public Opinion Poll data reveal that the polls were not entirely uniform in their questions about Universal Military Training or the draft, making direct comparisons from year to year more difficult. Still, examining the data available is informative and in some instances surprising. First, the responses to questions on both the draft and universal military service are uniformly positive from 1945 through 1971. Questions pertaining to either the draft or Universal Military Training received anywhere from 57 percent positive responses on the low end to 77 percent positive responses on the high end. More specific questions reveal a general consensus that young men should serve, they should begin that service at age eighteen, and the term of service should be two years.

On the topic of conscription of women, the opinion has fluctuated. Immediately prior to the Korean War, 30 percent favored drafting women in the event of a third World War.⁶ Immediately following the Korean War, a majority, 55 percent, of those surveyed
by Gallup responded favorably to the notion of drafting women to perform non-combat functions.\(^7\) However, by 1969 a Gallup survey enquiring about one year of mandatory service found 79 percent in favor of it for men but only 44 percent in favor of it for women.\(^8\) More recently, in surveys conducted between 1979 and 2001, around 50 percent of those surveyed felt that if a draft were reintroduced women should also be subject to it. In 1979, those favoring made up 43 percent; their numbers peaked at 54 percent in 1998 and fell off to 46 percent favoring equal treatment of women under a new draft in 2001.\(^9\) Also of note, when Gallup’s responses to questions about the draft or Universal Military Service are broken down by gender, women always registered fewer positive responses by one to nine percentage points. An interesting exception is a 1965 Gallup poll of college students. In this survey, 61 percent of college men and 76 percent of women favored continuation of the draft. Obviously in 1965 college men were at risk of being drafted; even if they were not directly threatened by the draft, they at least felt that they were at risk for induction.

Analysis of questions that divide respondents by age group reveals that even those who were subject to the draft or proposed Universal Military Service were about equally in favor of those programs. In no instance did eligible or soon to be eligible respondents fail to mirror the overall statistic by more than a few points. Gallup reported in 1940 “the first peacetime military draft in U.S. history enjoys overwhelming support, with 89% saying it is “a good thing.”\(^10\) Public opinion of the draft remained high through the duration of World War II.\(^11\) In the period between World War II and the Korean War, opinion of the draft continued to be overwhelmingly positive. In 1946, 65 percent favored continuing the draft.\(^12\) In 1949, 73 percent favored compulsory service for every able
bodied young man.\textsuperscript{13} During the Korean War, a survey revealed that 60 percent felt men working in defense jobs should be drafted, 55 percent felt that eighteen year olds who had graduated should be drafted, 51 percent felt farm workers should be eligible, but only 43 percent felt that young, married fathers who had not served should be drafted. Additionally, 69 percent of those surveyed felt that college students getting good grades should be allowed to graduate before they were drafted. This poll reveals some interesting trends. Americans, according to this information, were biased towards fathers and students. This bias was reflected, as discussed in the previous chapter, in policies that deferred both students and fathers. The end of the Korean War did not mark the end of support for the draft or notion of Universal Military Service. Responses to surveys on continuing the draft conducted in 1955 and 1956 indicated that almost three quarters of those surveyed favored a continuation of the draft.\textsuperscript{14} Strangely, Gallup Polls on the draft and Universal Military Training become virtually nonexistent from 1956 through 1964. Again, it can only be assumed that the draft was such a non-issue that Gallup felt it did not warrant the effort of conducting public opinion surveys. However, when poll data picks up in October of 1964, 63 percent are in favor of retaining a draft. Even the Vietnam War failed to shake the American notion that the draft was necessary. In January 1969, Gallup Polls asked if the U.S. should do away with the draft after the Vietnam War was over. Sixty-two percent favored a continuation of the draft, 31 percent favored transitioning to a strictly volunteer force, and 7 percent had no opinion.\textsuperscript{15}

While the public believed a draft was necessary and supported its continuation from World War II through the Vietnam War, the system for conducting the draft did not retain its popularity. The Selective Service that so many had grown up with was failing to
remain relevant and credible. Along with an increase in population, came an increase in
the awareness of equity as the Civil Rights and social justice movements gained
momentum. As previously discussed, draft board members tended to be Caucasian,
middle to upper class, and middle aged to senior citizen. The youth of America in
particular began to feel that the local draft board, made up of their parents’ and
grandparents’ generations, was unable to identify with the unique issues of their
generation. Perceived fairness dropped from 79 percent at the conclusion of World War II
to 43 percent at the beginning of the Vietnam War in 1966.¹⁶ Anti-war protesters began
to focus on the Selective Service System and attacks against its equity grew as the war in
Vietnam escalated and the number of U.S. casualties grew. Due to the fact that many of
the casualties were perceived to be from the poor and minority sectors of American
society, the credibility of the attacks against the Selective Service System gained ground,
especially with those who were subject to the draft. Eventually the growing protest could
not be ignored.

One of the biggest misperceptions about the draft that influenced public opinions
in the 1960s was the notion that it was intended to be “fair.” The Selective Service
System was never designed to ensure that all eligible men had an equal chance of serving.
The system was designed to ensure the most effective use of the nation’s human
resources, especially during times of war. Unfortunately, this is not a concept that always
sat well with Americans. During World War II the draft calls were so big and such a large
percentage of those eligible were called that the system seemed “fair.” During the period
between wars, people generally did not take notice because almost no one was being
killed in the line of duty, draft calls were small, and deferments were numerous and not
hard to obtain. The Vietnam War seems to have brought these two trends into a head-on collision. While the increase in draft calls made the draft of the Vietnam years more equitable than the draft of the previous years, the draft call when compared to the eligible cohort was still small. The draft of the Vietnam years when compared to the years between Korea and Vietnam experienced high casualty rates among those who were drafted.\(^{17}\) The reality of a poor man’s fight, however, was not born out. The Army’s utilization of draftees was more to blame than any bias in the system of selection. The Army tended to send draftees as replacements to high turnover units like combat outfits in Vietnam. Those that entered the service as volunteers had a much better opportunity to be assigned to a technical field and therefore avoid front line duty.

The notion that the draft unfairly targeted African Americans was also a misperception. This misperception built upon the fact that eligible African Americans had a higher chance of being drafted even though they were not over represented in the service. African Americans tended to volunteer for elite combat units at a higher rate and their reenlistment rate was almost double that of Caucasians. This meant that African Americans had a greater chance of being in combat units and had a greater chance of multiple combat tours of duty; both exposed them to a higher chance of becoming a casualty. All of these factors led to a high percentage of casualties being African American and lower income personnel, a percentage high enough that it was significantly above their representation within the total population. The perception this caused is that the draft was placing an unfair burden on certain demographic groups. Once this idea took hold, largely fostered by those that opposed the war, it began to escalate. As casualty lists grew and the perception of unfairness rose, protest increased. Interestingly enough,
during the Korean War, which like Vietnam was a limited war with limited popularity, opposition had been over use of the reserve component. When reservists, many of whom were veterans of World War II, were mobilized that meant that veterans, husbands, fathers, students, and men in key jobs were mobilized. The outcry was to get a sufficient army drafted and get the World War II veterans, husbands, fathers, and students home quickly. President Kennedy also felt negative public pressure when he mobilized National Guard and Reserve units in 1961 in response to the crisis in Berlin.

**Government**

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a Free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it.19

The President and Congress formulated draft policy. That meant that they also had to live with that policy at election time and when social, economic, and defense polices, which the draft affected, had to be made. Republican and Democrat alike tended to support the draft. Amazingly, it was often a point of unity between the parties.20 Throughout much of the draft period, people of different political affiliations surprisingly found common ground on the draft. For instance, in a public opinion poll conducted in January 1950 the question was asked if Congress should renew the draft law for another three years; Democrats were 60 percent for, 30 percent opposed, and 10 percent no opinion, Republicans were 54 percent for, 37 percent opposed, and 9 percent no opinion, and Independents were 57 percent for, 32 percent opposed, and 11 percent no opinion.21 “By 1956, it was possible to denounce opponents of conscription as irresponsible vote seekers or worse; in 1963, questioning the continued existence of Selective Service was still distinctly unfashionable.”22 However, as the protest over the conduct of the draft
built momentum during the Vietnam War the political friction grew. Not wanting to repeat the mistakes of Truman and Kennedy, President Johnson had refused the Defense Department’s advice and did not utilize the Reserve or National Guard when he decided to escalate the presence in Vietnam. As Eisenhower had predicted, this brought trouble for Johnson. Eisenhower had approved of Johnson’s escalation in 1965 but believed that the use of draftees in Vietnam would be problematic. Unfortunately for President Johnson, the military was too small to do otherwise and still maintain a strategic reserve for possible war in Europe. He had to increase draft calls. The military simply was not large enough to take on the mission without the use of the reserves. Increased call-ups and inductions through the draft were necessary.

During the final years of the draft, the two major parties in the U.S. found themselves on opposite sides of the issue. Regardless of individual sentiments, most national politicians--presidents, senators, and congressmen--considered the draft a necessity. In the 1950s and early 1960s, extensions of the president’s induction authority moved through Congress with little difficulty. Presidents and Congress had simply believed that the nation could not get along without the draft. In order to determine their opinions and positions on the draft, one must look to their actions, since little or no effort was put into polling them on the draft.

President Truman tried several times and for several years to get his universal military training program off the ground. This program would have allowed a smaller standing army, smaller draft calls, and a larger, trained reserve to be mobilized in the event of national emergency. In fact, President Truman actually ended the draft, but only for a very short time in 1947. When volunteers failed to materialize, the draft was
renewed the following year. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy both supported the continuation of the draft. While President Eisenhower moved toward a smaller standing armed force, he simultaneously ensured that the draft was retained in case it was needed. During his short time in office, President Kennedy appointed a Task Force on Manpower Conservation. This task force was not a move to end the draft, which he felt was a necessary fixture in case of emergency, but instead was chartered to examine supposed inequities in the system. There was also a serious eye towards utilization of the system for social initiative programs. President Johnson also saw need for the continuation of the draft. Under the Johnson administration, the system was utilized to its greatest degree since the Korean War. The draft calls of Vietnam were a sharp increase in the trend when compared to the calls of the post-Korean War period. Facing political pressure from the Republicans, namely Senator Goldwater, Johnson ordered a study of the draft to be undertaken. This study was conducted by the Department of Defense. The findings, turned over to the Secretary of Defense, were that the AVF would be too expensive, unable to supply sufficient recruits, and unable to maintain the quality of recruit necessary for the technical military of the day without a drastic reduction in end strength of the military. One significant recommendation made by the board was to drop the oldest first policy of selective service and instead, in accordance with public opinion, draft the youngest available first. Additionally, the study confirmed the apparent bias towards those who could attend college. With the election safely behind the president and amid rising protest and the increased efforts of African American civil rights activists, Secretary of Defense McNamara released the results of the Department of Defense study. When finally released its findings of apparent biases caused further
turmoil, leading to yet another study. This time a National Advisory Commission on Selective Service was tasked with reviewing the draft. Begun in 1966, the report was signed in February 1967 by Burke Marshall of IBM whose name the commission bears. The commission was made up of a diverse group of civilians: businessmen, clergy, journalists, judges, professors, college and labor union presidents, and a retired General Officer. Several members, including Marshall and Secretary McNamara, favored the idea of Universal National Service. All would serve, some in the military and some in humanitarian service. This no doubt had an impact on the direction the commission took, towards significant overhaul of the present Selective Service System.29 Advocating sweeping reform, the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service recommended more centralized control of the system, a policy of inducting the youngest first, abolition of most deferments, and selection for induction by a lottery system. Other significant recommendations of the commission included increasing opportunities for women to serve in the military, rehabilitative training of those who were rejected as volunteers, loss of deferment for National Guard service by those with no other service, filling of National Guard positions with draftees when necessary, and revamping of Selective Service personnel manning to ensure more representative draft boards. Finally, the commission confirmed the racial and class biases that many felt existed in the system.30

As soon as the commission’s results began to become available, an apparent rash of studies was undertaken. General (retired) Mark Clark headed a commission at the request of the Senate Armed Service Committee. Two points of agreement between the Clark study and the Marshall study were the “youngest first” policy and the unfeasibility of an AVF. Colleges and universities joined in the fray, holding conferences and issuing
proposals for reform. At this point, President Johnson was probably more confused than enlightened. While the Clark and Marshall studies had some points of agreement, they had far more points of disagreement.\(^{31}\) The lack of agreement indicates the diversity of opinions of key and influential people of the time.

Senator Edward Kennedy began rocking the boat by conducting hearings on the draft. This prompted Johnson to appoint a task force to review the report of Burke Marshall’s National Advisory Commission on Selective Service. The task force consisted of the Director of Selective Service, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Budget.\(^{32}\) Growing unrest over the draft during the Vietnam War had forced Johnson to undertake numerous studies. However, Johnson’s changes in response to the studies findings were minimal, possibly because the findings were so incongruent. Johnson advocated moving towards a lottery system and the youngest first policy but seemed to leave the door open on many of the other issues when, in 1967, he asked for a four-year extension of the draft.\(^{33}\) Historian James M. Gerhardt eloquently sums this situation up.

Adamant resistance and counterattack by those favoring the status quo probably swayed many who might otherwise have supported reforms. In the event, 1967, the year for quadrennial extension of Selective Service induction authority, did not prove the occasion for reform, much less abandonment, of this central engine of manpower procurement.\(^{34}\)

Johnson’s lack of action is surprising, given the pressure he believed the draft was causing. “By the fall of 1967 Johnson had convinced himself that the draft was causing the antiwar movement.”\(^{35}\) Johnson would not seek reelection.

When elected, President Nixon had promised to bring an end to the Vietnam War; public pressure was mounting and something needed to be done. When President Nixon ran for office, he had no plans to end the draft prior to the end of the Vietnam War.
Unlike Johnson, Nixon succeeded in significant reforms prior to terminating the draft. These reforms were spurred by growing protests from campuses and civil rights leaders. After twenty-eight years as director of Selective Service, Curtis Tarr from the Department of the Air Force replaced General Lewis B. Hershey. President Nixon directed the Department of Defense to examine the feasibility of ending the draft. National youth advisory committees for the draft were established, also at Nixon’s direction. Recruiting by the armed forces received renewed emphasis, deferments were phased out, and most significantly Congress approved a lottery system. The lottery, introduced after the two-year draft renewal in 1971 was meant to bring in alienated youth and quiet protests. It did not go over as well as planned. Much angst resulted from the actual conduct of the drawing and it wound up initially as a source of embarrassment. Eventually Nixon announced that no more draftees would go to Vietnam and subsequently he announced an end to draft calls and the intention of not renewing the authority for induction. Flynn identifies Nixon’s reform and eventual end to the draft as politically motivated. “President Nixon sought to gain time to negotiate his way out of Vietnam by defusing youth unrest, even while polls favored retaining the draft.” Like Johnson and even Kennedy before him, Nixon felt that the draft was enough of a liability that he had to do something about it. Unlike Johnson, Nixon actually followed through with significant actions presumably because he believed that if he did not do so the public, especially young people, would turn against him. Also unlike Johnson, Nixon had the ability to end the draft because he had run for president on a platform of withdrawal from Vietnam. Because of Nixon’s Vietnam policy, draft calls peaked in 1968 and began
to fall sharply after 1969.\textsuperscript{38} Certainly smaller draft calls and a foreseeable end to conscription alleviated some of the pressure Nixon had felt.

Government officials argued both sides of the draft, for and against. Polls were taken, reforms proposed, commissions convened, and reports rendered. The rationale behind their positions, which were often politically motivated, showed some variety. All of the presidents defended the draft, at one time or another, with the argument of necessity. It had to be retained or renewed to ensure sufficient manpower for the present crisis or in case of emergency. Most presidents had also envisioned the draft as a way to channel young men into important fields such as engineering or science. Most senators and congressmen supported these arguments as well, especially the necessity one, at least until the 1960s. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw political parties in the legislative branch begin to reunite on an anti-draft sentiment. Opponents of the draft supported their position with claims of inequities and the un-Americanism of compulsion. Others claimed an AVF would be made up of the poor and African Americans; the draft was the only way to ensure all classes were represented. Draft proponents also argued that the draft guaranteed a military of sufficient size and quality within an affordable budget. Whatever their feelings, if the insight provided by the examination of Johnson and Nixon is any indication, they were all keenly aware of the potential political ramifications of their actions.

\textbf{Military}

The military, Selective Service’s beneficiary, certainly had a vested interest in the draft. The Army was probably the senior member of the military with respect to the draft, being the primary user of draftees by a large margin.\textsuperscript{39} The other services accepted
draftees, especially during wartime, but the Marine Corps and especially the Navy and Air Force were often able to subsist entirely on volunteers. As previously established, the draft induced of volunteer spirit among America’s young men and the other branches relied on this inducement to keep their supply of volunteers. So, while not all direct customers of the draft, all of the services relied on it to one extent or another. “There ain’t no Viet Cong submarines” as one sailor so aptly put it.

The National Guard and Reserve Components were also beneficiaries of draft-induced volunteers. Like their active component counterparts, they relied on the pressure the draft exerted on youth of America to ensure sufficient volunteers. In general, any manpower procurement policy was likely to affect them, either directly or indirectly. So, when manpower policies were on the table, the National Guard and Reserves took interest and took part in the discussions.

The Defense Department and the military services guarded the draft from cradle to grave. Probably based on the drop in volunteers when it was announced that the draft would end in 1947, the military was loath to let go of the security of conscription. In its eyes, as evidenced in the 1966 *Department of Defense Report on Study of the Draft*, the draft provided a reliable source of men to execute national policy. The draft allowed the military to maintain a high standard for entry, ensuring a quality force. The draft also allowed all of this to occur at a relatively low budget, also appealing to the Defense Department. One need only look at the statistics for demographics and education level in the early 1970s discussed in the previous chapter to understand just how high of a standard the draft had allowed the military to enjoy.
The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force had all recruited for years. Relying almost solely on volunteers, they had for some time been in competition with one another for recruits. Even the Army had always stated that its goal was to fill the majority of its manpower needs through volunteers. The draftees were only needed to make up the difference. To their credit, when President Nixon’s intentions to end the draft were clear, the military did a fine job at energizing the recruiting arm of each branch and meeting the challenge head on in a proactive way. During the last official year of the draft, there were no inductions, thanks to the military’s efforts.45

Like the military, the Civil Service also had an interest in this. Its concern was not losing its skilled labor to the draft or a surge of patriotic volunteerism.46 Civil Service also benefited from the channeling effect of the draft. Men who had been the recipients of educational deferments could turn to Civil Service jobs to continue their deferred status. For the mathematician, engineer, physicist, or even the high school graduate that did not relish the idea of service in the military this must have seemed a noble way to contribute without the inconvenience or indignity or military life.

Finally, special interest groups that affected the draft abounded. Examining each one’s position, opinion, and impact on the draft is well beyond the scope of this paper; it could fill volumes. For the purpose of this paper, five general groups will be examined; the education lobby, religious groups, civil rights groups, organized labor, and the anti-war movements.

**Education**

The educators were concerned for the academic welfare of young Americans. They sought to protect the next generation of American scientist and engineers. With the
nuclear conclusion to the war in the Pacific and the inability to match the Soviets man for
man, this idea of grooming the next generation of scientists and engineers held much
sway. Surprisingly, educators showed the draft quite a bit of support. There was generally
some type of tug of war going on over deferments but this did not initially pit educators
against the military. Negative views of the draft by academia do not seem to have really
come to dominate until the Vietnam War timeframe.

For the vast majority of its life, the draft funneled young men into higher
education. Attendance at colleges was high because both the educational years and the
job that it provided access to could at times virtually guarantee avoidance of military
service. The educational lobby succeeded in convincing the government of the pitfalls of
not providing sufficient educational deferments. Unable to match the Soviet Union or
China in numbers, technology, provided by young scientists and engineers, would be the
key to victory. It was this convincing argument that allowed the education lobby to be at
the center of one of the most controversial aspects of the draft, student deferments.

Religion

Religious groups in America are numerous, to say the least. Prior to the passing of
the draft in 1940 most major religious groups in the nation opposed conscription.47
Through negotiations, the Roosevelt administration was able to co-opt the major religious
groups in America and by the time of the official ceremony on 29 October 1940, had
their full support. The President, prior to the drawing of numbers, read statements from
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders endorsing the process. The Roosevelt
administration clearly understood that Americans were church going, religious people
and in order to make the draft acceptable they would have to gain the support of religious
leaders. Throughout the draft period in America, religions continued to have an impact or influence on the draft. One of the primary influences by religious groups was on the deferment policy that was implemented for divinity students and seminarians. Ministers were completely exempted, not just deferred. Inductions were even suspended on religiously significant days.\textsuperscript{48}

Another key influence of religious groups was in the area of conscientious objections. No religious group was officially granted a blanket deferment. However, some groups as much as received them. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Amish, Quakers, Mennonites, and Muslims generally received conscientious objector status with relative ease, especially in areas of the country where they were found in significant numbers.\textsuperscript{49}

At almost every draft renewal or hearing on Universal Military Training, the pacifist religious leaders spoke against its continuation or adoption. They contended that a wartime draft might be justifiable but a peacetime draft was not. Nonetheless, the draft was renewed quite easily each time because religious groups opposing it after 1940 were few.\textsuperscript{50} As protest grew and public opinion turned against the Vietnam War, religious groups formed an alliance of sorts with the anti-war movements. Particularly the traditional pacifist religions but segments of the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish faiths also joined the movement, some with and some without the approval of their denomination.\textsuperscript{51} By their association with the anti-war movement, most if not all became anti-draft as well, especially the more radical movements.

Organized religion in America was involved from the opening debates on the draft in 1940 through the final protests in the 1970s. Throughout the draft years, religion was a significant influencing force. Religious groups succeeded in securing deferments
and exemptions for their members as well as securing public support for the
administrations. In the final years, religious groups succeeded in raising the level of
protest against the draft by their association with anti-war movements.

Civil Rights

Racial groups, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), wanted to ensure fair representation on local boards and fair treatment
of African American registrants. The African American press and many African
Americans in the general population neither held nor expressed an unfavorable opinion of
the draft at the end of World War II. This changed, however, in the following years.
African Americans were expecting more from society. Following World War II, African
American groups opposed a continuation of a “Jim Crow” draft. Support or tolerance
grew with the advances that Selective Service and the military made in ending
discrimination and segregation. The war in Vietnam would reverse this trend. As the war
in Vietnam came to be seen as more and more of a poor and African American man’s
fight, African American support for the draft and the military fell away quickly and
loudly. Prominent figures such as Stokely Carmichael, Floyd McKissick, and Dr. Martin
Luther King all opposed the Vietnam War and the drafting of young African
Americans.\textsuperscript{52} The pressure that prominent and grass roots civil rights activists and groups
brought must have been significant. Efforts by Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all in some
part were directed at correcting racial inequities in the draft. Even under the Truman
administration, civil rights bore on the draft. As previously noted, Selective Service
ceased to classify based on race before much of America integrated.
Organized Labor

Organized labor and business had a vested interest in how the draft was run as well. Like religious groups, they were initially not in favor of the draft but like religious groups they too reversed their stance. Labor and business stood to lose skilled labor that was difficult to replace. Especially during wartime, when defense contracts were lucrative, the last thing industry wanted was to hemorrhage its skilled or even unskilled labor. Maintaining the U.S. economy and during times of war, the industrial base were key presidential concerns that gave organized labor a voice at the draft table. Additionally, the best use of manpower was the premise upon which the Selective Service was supposedly built. No one wanted a physicist scrubbing “the head” (toilet) as a seaman in the Navy or a mechanical engineer changing oil in jeeps for the Army. This is why the service was “selective,” selectively channeling each man to the job that most benefited the country.53

Since the draft served not just to induct men into the military but also to channel young men into the sciences and industries, organized labor should have had a generally high opinion of the institution. Those that received deferments because of their jobs were very unlikely to leave those jobs. However, organized labor often opposed the draft. This was due in large part to the fact that revocation of deferments had been used as leverage against unions. Strike breaking by threat of conscription severely soured the relationship between Selective Service and organized labor.54

The caveat, in regards to labor, is that many employers preferred not to hire draft eligible men. If at all possible, many felt it was best to hire someone after their eligibility was over so as not to lose someone shortly after they were hired and trained.55
Anti-War

The volunteer army, for many generations the darling of military establishments around the world, has recently won the heart of some anti-militarists and liberals in the United States. The love affair has blossomed in the hot season of debate over Vietnam. The most ardent words spoken for the volunteer army come from opponents of our Asian involvement.56

The anti-war movement, always present in some form, grew to be a major factor during the Vietnam War. Pacifist groups, mentioned previously, had registered their dissent since the draft’s inauguration but until the Vietnam War these groups were apparently never large enough or considered mainstream enough to influence the national decision makers.57 Prior to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the major contribution of the pacifist movements was the securing of the conscientious objector status for those who were morally opposed to war. When the war in Vietnam began to seriously lose popularity with the American public, anti-war movements attempted to make the draft synonymous with the war.

The anti-war movement had several angles of attack on the draft. One capitalized on the fact that draftee demographics were out of balance with the general population’s demographics, while conveniently ignoring overall military demographics.58 Equity was more and more on the mind of the public. The civil rights movement, which was increasing in intensity, helped to bring the issue of equity to the nation’s attention. By simply examining the demographics of draftees, the case could be made that the system lacked fairness and equity.

The moral issue was also fundamental in the anti-war argument. The morality of the draft and the obligation to resist service on moral grounds are a common theme of the 1960s and 1970s. By portraying the war as immoral and illegal and the system for
conscription (Selective Service) as unjust, the anti-war activists and protesters sought to cultivate increased support among the draft eligible, especially on college campuses. Articles and editorials in college papers appealed to Saint Augustine’s Just War Theory, legal treatment of draft resisters, as well as gender, economic, and racial inequality by the establishment, and corruption in the Government of South Vietnam as support for the right and even obligation to resist military service in the Vietnam War. In 1971, The Eye chronicled the visit of Jane Fonda to the University of Florida. Fonda appealed strongly to the moral aspect of the anti-war argument. She likened military service in Vietnam to service by German citizens in the extermination of the Jews under the Nazi regime. Presumably, just as those individuals had been held accountable at war crimes trials for their failure to resist so to would Americans who served in Vietnam.

Another angle played on a sentiment that is especially strong among the young; the freedom and individuality Americans pride themselves on. “IF YOU DON’T DIG UNCLE SAM RUNNING LIFE FOR YOU” is the sub-title found in an unofficial 1968 college newspaper titled, A Different Drummer. That article also warned the reader, “YOU ARE BEING PLAYED WITH BY A DEADLY MACHINE. KNOW HOW IT WORKS.” in its closing line. Obviously playing on the fears of young men who had little interest in putting their plans on hold for two years of military service and even less interested in dying in Vietnam; a war they were being told was wrong.

Further solidifying the bond between anti-war and anti-draft sentiments was the punitive reclassification of certain individuals. Hotly debated was the fact that some protestors lost their deferments as a result. Most who were reclassified were deemed to
have interfered with the Selective Service System or had been delinquent in registration in some way.62

Coupled and in sometimes in conjunction with civil rights groups, the anti-war movements brought sufficient pressure to cause the government to react. By leveraging feelings against the compulsion and injustice of the system as well as the illegality and immorality of the war in Vietnam, they were able to increase their supporters significantly. As evidenced above, studies, changes to Selective Service policy and procedure, and ultimately the termination of the draft came about because the anti-draft pressure (an integral part of the anti-war movement) became too great.

Summary

The only significant resistance to the draft came from select religious groups, civil rights groups, and anti-war movements. Religious groups opposing the draft were in the minority, but those that did opposed on a basis of moral aversion to war. Civil rights groups opposed conscription because they felt that the system was unfairly treating minorities, earlier because of a segregated military, and later because of a perception of higher minority service and casualties in Vietnam. Those associated with anti-war movements opposed the draft because they believed that it was their duty to resist service in a war they did not agree with. During the Vietnam years, a loose confederation formed between these three groups that lasted until the draft ended in 1973.

The general population, the government, and the military traditionally supported the draft. The public came to accept it, first as necessary for World War II and after the events of 1949 and 1950 as a necessity of the cold war. The military did not believe that it could maintain authorized strengths without the draft, or at least the threat of the draft,
to spur volunteers to action. The one-year attempt at life without the draft in 1948 remained in the military’s collective memory for years to come. The government supported the draft for the same reasons the public and the military did. It was a system that was prudent and even necessary. It was not costing them any votes and it seemed to make sense. However, as the popularity of the Vietnam War dwindled and anti-war activists made the draft synonymous with the war, the political solidarity that the draft had enjoyed ended.

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2Anderson, 538.


4Universal Military Training (UMT) is described in Chapter Two

5Universal Military Training may have been perceived as more fair, disposing more people to favor it over the draft, however during the time period when Gallup Poll surveyed the public about UMT results indicate that perceived fairness of the draft was not at issue.


8Ibid., 2180.


12 Ibid., 94.


22 Gerhardt, 297.


24 Ibid., 168-169.

25 Ibid., 139.

26 Ibid., 188-189.

27 Ibid., 189.

28 Anderson, 547-563.


30 The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, 1-10.


32 Ibid., 203.
33Ibid., 202.

34Gerhardt, 363.


36Ibid., 224-258.


38Selective Service System, “History and Records.”

39Baskir and Strauss, 55.


41Anderson, 555-556.

42Baskir and Strauss, 55.

43Gerhardt, xx.

44Ibid., 84-85.

45Selective Service System, “History and Records.”


47Ibid., 16.


49Baskir and Strauss, 38.

50Gerhardt, 53, 226.


53 Hershey, 29-30.


55 Baskir and Strauss, 33.


58 Ibid., 205-207.


62 Arant, 147-171.
CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES

I think it’s very important that we have a system that requires every social and economic group in this country and every class to bear their fair share of the dangers of dying in escapades that we think involve our national interest. . . . I think it’s very important to put every inhibition we can on a president sending young men into war. . . . A president that had to explain to the articulate people that know how to call and complain and are skeptical about a problem, has to explain that, will have to explain it up front.¹

Joseph A. Califano Jr., 1999

The 7 December 1941 attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor triggered America’s entry into World War II. America had been attacked. America would have no doubt entered the war given the circumstances, draft or no draft. Prior to American entry into World War II draftees, by law, could not be used outside American territory. The draft law in 1940 almost completely precluded the use of conscripted troops in American military adventurism. Therefore, World War II does not serve as a good case study of the draft as a restraint on Presidential commitment of troops abroad. Korea and Vietnam, on the other hand, do. Both were instances where America was not directly attacked. In Korea, only a small number of advisors were in country when the war broke out. The situation in Vietnam different yet similar; as the French withdrew the U.S. inserted military advisors whose numbers grew until, when in 1965, complete units were deployed to Vietnam. Both wars were undertaken to prevent the spread of communism but both could have been foregone, unlike World War II, without immediate threat to America. Accordingly, this chapter will examine the draft as a deterrent influence on America’s commitment of forces to Korea and Vietnam.
Korea

In late 1948, the Soviet Union had trained and equipped the Army of North Korea and withdrawn its forces. The Soviets urged the Americans to do likewise in the south. With the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, America withdrew its troops when funding expired in June of 1949, despite the wishes of the South Korean Government and the U.S. State Department. The stage was set. The Korean War began a year later when, on 25 June 1950, communist North Korean forces attacked across the 38th parallel. Within twenty-four hours the President Truman was discussing military options for the enforcement of a U.N. resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces. Presidential advisors, and presumably the President himself, believed that the invasion of Korea could not been seen as an isolated incident but rather part of a larger plan of action to spread Communism.

On the eve of the Korean War, the U.S. military was poorly equipped and poorly manned with both active and reserve components below congressionally authorized strengths. There had been no draft calls in 1947, 1948’s had been approximately 20,000 and calls for 1949 totaled just under 10,000. Between June of 1950 and June of 1953, 1,529,539 men were drafted. By the time the Korean War was over, in July of 1953, some 1,789,000 troops had served in the theatre of operations, with maximum troop strength of 325,270 occurring in that final month of the war. Of the nearly 1.8 million Korean War Veterans, nearly half a million were veterans of World War II.
Table 2. Annual Draft Calls 1948-1955

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<td>20,348</td>
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The size of the Army alone had more than doubled from about 590,000 to over one and a half million. In response to increased needs of the Defense Department, the Selective Service would greatly accelerate its operations. The draft calls in response to the Korean War needs were huge in comparison to the years following World War II, but still small when compared to the calls during World War II when as many as three and a half million were drafted in a single year.

Owing to the long lead time, as much as six months, between induction and deployment of the draftee, the vast majority of the active component military was pressed into service for use in the Korean theatre of operations or U.S. commitments in Europe.⁴ About one third of all Army National Guard Units and over three quarters of all Air National Guard units were mobilized for the Korean War. Almost 250,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists were mobilized in the first six months of the fighting alone. Reservists and Guardsman saw service in every capacity from individual replacements to complete divisions.

The three-year period of fighting on the Korean Peninsula resulted in 36,576 U.S. deaths, 103,284 wounded, and 7,140 prisoners of war. The early days of fighting saw dramatic U.S. casualties. According to VFW records, the deadliest week for U.S. forces was 26 November through 2 December of 1950. In that one week alone, 3,567 Americans
were killed, 799 on 30 November alone. The 30th of November was the deadliest day for U.S. forces and November 1950 would go down as the deadliest month. The three deadliest battles of the war occurred in those first months; the Pusan Perimeter, Chosin Reservoir, and Kunu-Ri all occurred between August and December of 1950.

Public Opinion of the Korean War, while initially very high, turned unfavorable in the first year of fighting and failed to make a real recovery for the duration of the war. As seen in the Figure 3, when, in October of 1950, Gallup asked if the U.S. had made a mistake in entering the Korean War 65 percent responded “Not a mistake” and only 20 percent chose the response labeled “Mistake.”

![Figure 3. Public Opinion of the Korean War](source)

In that same month, 64 percent of those surveyed by Gallup said that the U.S. should continue the fight in North Korean territory in order to secure surrender, only 27 percent favored simple restoration of the 38th parallel. Three months later support for the war had taken a drastic turn. A January 1951 Gallup Poll survey asked which course of action America should pursue, now that the Chinese had entered the conflict, “Pull our troops out of Korea as fast as possible, or keep our troops there to fight these larger forces?” Sixty-six percent chose “Pull out.” The breakdown was fairly consistent along many lines. Seventy-one percent of Republicans, 63 percent of Democrats, and 64 percent of Independents chose “Pull out.” Similarly, 65 to 66 percent of those with college, high school, or grade school education chose “Pull out.” Democrats at 28 percent and people with college education at 30 percent had the highest number of those selecting the “Stay there” choice. In November of 1951, 56 percent of those surveyed by Gallup agreed with a U.S. senator that said that the Korean War was an utterly “useless war.” Over the next two years, opinions of the war ebbed and flowed but remained predominantly negative. Toward the end of the war, there were some polls that found significant, nearly 50 percent, but never overwhelming improvement in public opinion. These short term “blips” appear to have been related to current events such as peace talks and prisoner exchanges as opposed to belief in Korea as essential in checking the spread of Communism. Throughout the surveys Gallup conducted, whenever responses are broken down by education or political affiliation Democrats and college educated individuals appear to always respond more favorably to the war. Another trend, common throughout the period of the Korean War is the continued support for the draft. Public opinion remained solidly behind conscription and national service according to Gallup
Poll data available. Even when public opinion was solidly against the war in Korea, support for compulsory military service seems to have remained largely intact.

In the first months of the Korea War, public support for President Truman’s military actions in Korea was very high. Seventy-eight percent of Americans surveyed approved of his decision to send military aid to South Korea, only 15 percent disapproved. As indicated above, three months later, in September of 1950 support for the war still enjoyed an overwhelming majority with only 20 percent disapproving. In the fall of 1950, draft calls had been low but the draft was still fresh in the minds of most Americans. Less than ten years prior to the Korean War, the U.S. had drafted some ten million men for World War II. Just three years prior, the nation had allowed the draft to expire. In 1948 conscription in America was revived and inductions began again.

Signed into law in June 1948, the Selective Service Act authorized conscription for two years. The draft spurred voluntary enlistments, almost doubling the number from the previous year. Army strength climbed. The draft also had a noticeable effect on the reserve components, with the Army National Guard suddenly adding 60,000 men (one fifth of its strength) in the latter half of 1948.5

The national debate over the role of conscription in post war America was not an issue that had been debated long ago, by another generation. After the debate surrounding the expiration and revival of the draft, President Truman signed the Selective Service Act of 1948 on 24 June. On 20 July 1948, President Truman issued a proclamation that called for the registration of men age eighteen to twenty-six to be conducted from 20 August to 18 September of that year. Approximately nine and a half million men were registered. In April of 1950, the Selective Service law was coming due for renewal. Debate was lengthy enough that the President was required to sign a temporary extension on 23 June 1950, just two days prior to the surprise invasion of North Korea, because Congress had failed
to reach agreement and send him a bill. Despite the recent draft debate, Americans supported President Truman’s commitment of troops.

Even with the low draft calls, in 1950 the military had a large percentage of conscripts. The Army would have been made up of at least one-third draftees in June of 1950. This is based on the fact that the Army’s strength was at 593,000 in 1950 and understanding that the vast majority of the 230,000 drafted in 1949 and 1950 had been inducted into the Army and were still serving out their two-year obligations. Certainly, there were also draftees from previous years that had remained in the service past their obligation, and they would have raised the percentage of draftees serving in June 1950 beyond one-third in the Army.⁶

At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, deferments were not nearly as prevalent as they would become in the 1960s. As Selective Service began to draft for the Korean War, there were over nine million men registered. Of that number, less than one and a quarter million, or 14 percent, held deferments. Reservists, ROTC students, agriculture and industry employees, husbands, and fathers held most of these deferments. The now famous educational deferment would, at best, allow men making satisfactory progress to complete the current academic year before being inducted. Exemptions applied to about 2.7 million veterans, 900,000 who were disqualified for various reasons and 870,000 who were already in the military.⁷ With such a small percentage deferred certainly most qualified registrants could expect to be inducted if draft calls were increased.

There was no over representation of minorities leading to an under representation of Caucasians in the military. Racial quotas from prior, segregated, draft calls had ensured that the military remained racially balanced. In June 1950, the military was in the
process of integrating. The percentage of African Americans in the military just prior to
and at the beginning of the Korean War was at or below the percentage in the population
at large due to the system of racial quotas that had been in place since World War II. This meant that African Americans were not overly represented in the ranks at the
outbreak of the Korea War. With increased opportunities and the removal of racial
quotas, African Americans eventually came to represent 13 percent of those that served
and 8.5 percent of those killed during the Korean War. So racially, the military was
approximately representative of the population as a whole, yet Americans supported its
commitment to hostilities in far away Korea.

As a case study, Korea fails to support the position that the draft has the ability to
“deter people from talking about going to war because of concern that their loved ones
would be placed in harm’s way,” as Congressman Rangel claims. The draft debate was
still fresh in the minds of Americans and politicians. Over a quarter of a million men had
recently been drafted under the new Selective Service Act passed in 1948. Deferments
were few; those that were eligible and did not volunteer for the military could reasonably
expect to be inducted even if they were enrolled in college. The impact or potential
impact on the middle and upper class does not appear to have been adequate to dissuade
their support for entry into the Korean War. The reason the war lost support is another
matter all together. Many things happened in the months between September 1950 and
January 1951 when support dropped from 65 to 38 percent. The Chinese entered the war
and drastically changed the outlook for success. America suffered almost fifteen thousand
killed in action, 40 percent of the entire war’s deaths in 1950 alone. Significant changes
to the draft during this period were the increased calls in response to the developing
situation in Korea and the “doctor draft” designed to ensure adequate medical care for the
to ensure adequate medical care for the large number of casualties by encouraging medical professionals to apply for a commission in the military. Both the increased draft calls and the so called, “doctor draft” brought the war closer to home for a broader portion of the public. However, it would be difficult to make the case that the draft and not high casualties or prospects for success was to blame for a shift in public opinion. All these events happened with near simultaneity. Failing to establish a clear linkage between the draft and reluctance on the part of the president or citizens of the U.S. to commit troops to Korea, a similar examination of the Vietnam War is in order.

Vietnam

The first American military advisors entered Vietnam in 1950 when it was clear that the French would soon be leaving. The advisory effort grew in both numbers and involvement over the following years. After a period to increased air and naval actions in and around Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the deployment of ground units in 1965. Like Korea, Vietnam had been partitioned following World War II. The northern half was under the influence of Communist China and the Soviet Union, the south under the French. Prior to World War II, the French had colonized Vietnam and following World War II; the U.S. supported their reestablishment of French Colonial rule. By the time the French left and U.S. advisors arrived in significant numbers, a communist backed insurgency was underway in the south. U.S. involvement began and grew based on the policy of containment of communism. Unlike Korea, communist forces from the north had not launched a massive invasion of the south. Likewise, the
U.S. bombed North Vietnam but never permitted ground forces to cross the border and the Chinese never committed troops to the war.

In 1964 the active duty military stood at a little over 2.6 million. The active component end strength had dropped from over three and a half million in the five years following the Korean War and by 1958 had settled in the neighborhood of two and a half million. Draft calls had been around 100,000 a year, some years lower some slightly higher. The fluctuations in draft calls were largely a product of utilization of the Reserve Component in growing the overall size of the active force. With President Johnson’s commitment of ground troops to Vietnam, draft calls were stepped up significantly for 1965. In 1965 draftees made up about one third of those entering active military service. For the Army, who received almost all of the draftees, the ratio of volunteers to draftees was about one to one.

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<th>Table 3. Annual Draft Calls 1960-1968</th>
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The Department of Defense had recommended mobilization of the reserves to build strength in Vietnam but Johnson ultimately decided against it. Authors such as James Currie and George Flynn believe that this was a decision made more for political than strategic reasons. By deciding against reserve mobilization, Johnson was able to avoid the political backlash that Truman had experienced over their use in Korea and
Kennedy had experienced during the mobilizations during the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Eventually about forty thousand would be mobilized from the reserves, but not until 1968, long after America was fully committed to the war.

Eventually about forty thousand would be mobilized from the reserves, but not until 1968, long after America was fully committed to the war.

Fifty-seven thousand, six hundred twenty Americans were killed in action between 1965 and 1973 in Vietnam. In the nine years preceding, four hundred and seventeen had been lost, a figure that represents less than 1 percent of the total casualties in Vietnam. The three bloodiest years of fighting were 1967 to 1969, after America found its self very much committed to military intervention.

Not unlike Korea, public opinion of military action in Vietnam was initially favorable. In 1965, a Gallup Poll found that about one quarter of those surveyed expressed an unfavorable opinion. At the end of April 1965, Gallup asked, “what would you like to see the United States do next about Vietnam?” Twenty eight percent expressed “No opinion,” 12 and 19 percent selected “Step up military activity” and “Go all out, declare war” respectively. Only 17 percent chose the “Withdraw completely from Vietnam” option. African Americans responding to a poll conducted in the same time frame expressed a similar view, with only 18 percent favoring a withdrawal. These polls were conducted in the weeks and months immediately following the commencement of the Operation Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and the landing of Marines in Vietnam. In 1965 as President Johnson announced the doubling of monthly draft calls and U.S. Army brigades and divisions were arriving in Vietnam, 58 percent approved, 22 percent disapproved, and 20 percent had no opinion of how the Johnson Administration was handling the situation in Vietnam. Public opinion remained favorable through early 1967 but by late in the year it was split nearly even. It would never recover. Polls
conducted in 1968 through 1971 showed a downward trend in positive responses and an upward trend in negative responses. No opinion responses declined significantly from 1965 through 1967 but turned slightly upwards in the following years.

![Graph showing public opinion of the Vietnam War with a downward trend in positive responses and an upward trend in negative responses.](image)

Figure 4. Public Opinion of the Vietnam War


Again, like the Korean War, the public opinion of the draft remained high. Gallup Poll results throughout the Vietnam War show that favorable responses to the draft never fell below 60 percent. Even in early 1969, when only 39 percent held a favorable view of the war, 62 percent of those surveyed by Gallup favored retaining the draft when the war ended.
At the outset of the Vietnam War, the draft was not a dead issue but it had certainly become an accepted part of life. America had been living with conscription for sixteen uninterrupted years by 1964. Most Americans accepted the institution, and looked favorably on it. Following the Korean War, America came to believe that the draft was a necessary part of a responsible national security strategy. By 1964 almost three quarters of the male population age twenty-seven to thirty four (just past their draft eligible years) had served in the military either by enlistment or induction. Many of those that voluntarily enlisted did so because of the presence of the draft. They simply chose not to wait for the system to come to them on its terms but rather to come to the system on their terms.

In the years immediately preceding America’s full military involvement in Vietnam, the draft had been in the news. A recent policy change that brought attention to the draft was President Kennedy’s reversal of the 1953 decision to end paternity deferments. President Kennedy reinstated deferments for men that demonstrated a “bona fide family relationship in their home,” coining the phrase “Kennedy Fathers.” Also calling attention to the draft in America was the report of the Task Force on Manpower Conservation. Initiated by President Kennedy and released by President Johnson, the report revealed that one third of the young men were found unqualified for military service. The reason for the rejection was failure to meet mental and physical standards and poverty was identified as the key factor. The poorest third of the nation was apparently not being given the opportunity to serve in the military. Noteworthy, but probably not garnering a great deal of attention in 1963, was the congress’ extension of
the President’s induction authority for another four years. It had become somewhat routine by that point, congress had renewed it twice since the end of the Korean War.20

In 1964 the draft eligible cohort stood at over sixteen million. This figure represented about a one third increase in the past eight years. Of the 16,835,000 eligible, two million were classified 1-A, or available for service. Two point eight million were already serving, 4.1 million were disqualified largely for mental or physical reasons, and 4.9 million held some type of employment or educational deferment. In contrast to the years preceding the Korean War, a large number of men held educational deferments. Based on available statistics, probably about one quarter of those in the military and one-half of those in the Army in 1964 or 1965 were draftees.21

By January of 1965, 9 percent of the military was African American. Because fewer African Americans were serving as officers their representation among the enlisted ranks was higher, 12 percent. African Americans who were serving in the military represented 7.5 percent of the African American age eligible cohort of 1965. By comparison, slightly more than 8.5 percent of the Caucasian age eligible cohort was serving in the military. In the early 1960s about two thirds of all African Americans were rejected by Selective Service but less than one quarter of the Caucasian males were rejected.22 By the end of the Vietnam War, 10.6 percent of all who served in Vietnam and 12.4 percent of those killed were African American.

As a case study, Vietnam also fails to support the position that the draft has the ability to “deter people from talking about going to war because of concern that their loved ones would be placed in harm’s way.23 America had maintained a relatively large, by historical precedent, peacetime military following the Korean War. Draftees manned
this military along with many draft-induced volunteers. Evidence indicates that the composition of the military was not overly poor, uneducated, or African American. In the late 1950s and early 1960s these groups were, if anything, underrepresented in the ranks. This left the bulk of those serving from the middle classes of American society.

In midst of President Kennedy’s and President Johnson’s increased military actions in Vietnam, there were ample reminders to the American public that the draft was alive and well. Congress had renewed the President’s authority for induction in 1955, 1959, and 1963. Inductions had been running in the neighborhood of one hundred thousand a year and every young man had to register, report for screening in person, and be classified when he turned eighteen. President Kennedy brought back paternity deferments and initiated a study on Selective Service rejections. President Johnson released the results of this study and a short time later doubled monthly draft calls.

Those that were eligible or soon to be eligible were the “baby boomers,” children of the Veterans of World War II and Korea. Their parents had lived with war and conscription. They had seen the draft debated and enacted in 1940 and again in 1948. They remembered the large draft calls to support World War II and Korea.

Despite all of these facts, America supported President Johnson’s actions in Vietnam. They clearly were not envisioning a war fought by some other segment of society (for example: the poor, African American, or uneducated). Continued or increased military involvement would mean that middle class Americans would be serving in Vietnam. Regardless of this fact, public dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam initially decreased and did not outweigh the percentage of those satisfied with the war until late 1967. The draft was present and manning the military directly and
indirectly with young men whose demographics were fairly representative of the American society at large and America still supported military ever-increasing involvement in Vietnam for years.

As in Korea, what turned American public opinion against the war is debatable. In the years prior to 1965, four hundred and seventeen had been killed in Vietnam. One thousand nine hundred and twenty six killed were killed in 1965. The following year was even bloodier. Six thousand three hundred and thirty three were killed in 1966 and 1967 was worse. Over eleven thousand died in Vietnam that year. These casualties reflected an increased military effort by North Vietnam. The enemy in Vietnam had shifted from a guerilla insurgency fought by farmers and peasants to professional soldiers of the People’s Army of Vietnam (also known as the NVA). The public was skeptical about America’s prospects for success and Tet in January of 1968 seemed to line up with the public opinion “tipping point.” With regard to the draft, no major changes took place in the first years of the war outside of a considerable, but predictable, increase in monthly calls and inductions. Minor changes included a change to the priority of call for married men without children, the lowering of induction standards, and resumption of standardized tests to retain educational deferments.²⁴ As mentioned in previous chapters, these changes were made in response to increased need for manpower and increased scrutiny over rejections and the overall equity of the system. While the change to priority of call for married men placed some of the middle class at increased risk, the change was not a dramatic one. Their actual classification did not change; married men were put into priority three of class 1-A instead of priority four. Resumption of the Selective Service College Qualification Test probably did succeed in placing more of the middle class at
risk. Evidence of this is the percentage of men entering the military that had some college experience. Flynn states that the, “annual number of men with college experience who were ‘indirectly pressed’ into the army tripled from 1965 to 1968.” So, between increased draft calls and more stringent standards for inductions more of the middle class was entering the military than previously had been. He goes on to assert that in fiscal year 1965-1966 more men with college experience entered the military than men with no college.25

Eventually the draft would come to be the symbol of the Vietnam War to many anti-war protesters. Most who spoke out against the draft did so on the grounds of perceived inequities in the system. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon would all take action on the draft to one degree or another to combat this perception of inequity. If, however, the draft was truly unfair and only the poor, minorities, and uneducated were serving in Vietnam, then why the unpopularity of the war? Possibly because directly or indirectly all classes were being forced to serve in Vietnam or possibly because casualties were mounting or because the prospects for success looked decidedly less promising. Either way, the fact remains that the draftee military was still fairly representative at the outset of the Vietnam War and public support for the war held for almost two years of significant military operations.

As case studies, the Korean War and the Vietnam War fail to support the idea that the draft is a deterrent influence. In each conflict public opinion was solidly behind the national decision to become involved. The threat of conscription failed to mobilize the population against entry into either of these wars.


6Gerhardt, 123.


10Gerhardt, 254.

11Ibid., 264.

12Ibid.


16 National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, 23.

17 Gerhardt, 291.

18 Selective Service System, “Effects of Marriage and Fatherhood on Draft Eligibility.”


23 Rangel.

24 Gerhardt, 279.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Summary

Research indicates that the draft has posed no clear deterrent to U.S. Presidents. Opinions to the contrary quite possibly are formed by circumstances during the Vietnam War, America’s last period of conscription. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the anti-war movement in America made the draft synonymous with the war. In their manner of thinking to oppose one was to oppose the other, even though most Americans felt the draft should continue after the Vietnam War ended. As the research demonstrates, a broad cross section of America’s population was affected by the draft, either directly or indirectly. The draftee military closely mirrored the population along racial, educational, financial, and social lines. Only the very educated, rich, and the poor were routinely underrepresented. Despite the fair representation, the currency of debate on renewal of induction authority, and the large number of men recently affected during World War II and Korea, Americans were initially very supportive of military action in Korea and Vietnam. Contrary to arguments advanced in favor of the draft as a check against military adventurism, conscription as practiced in America has yet to function in this capacity.

Recommendations for Additional Research

Research on this topic also raises several areas that warrant further research in a detailed and disciplined fashion. As is often the case, in attempting to answer one question others are raised. Some of these areas deal with the influence of the draft on military decisions and others do not.
First, examination of the implication of conscripting women and men equally deserves further research. The impact of conscripted women on public opinion has yet to be studied. As the roles of women and men, in and out of the military, continue to grow less unique the possibility that future conscription would include women is very real.

The deterrent influence of conscription in other nations also warrants increased study. The system of conscription practiced in America must certainly be uniquely American. This raises the question of the possibility of modifications to the American draft affecting its ability to serve as a deterrent influence.

Even with a broad cross section of American men serving in the military during the draft and volunteer years, there is still an apparent under representation of the very rich and educated within the ranks. Presumably many of the wealthy and very educated go on to serve in positions of great influence or power in America. Has their lack of military experience impacted their decisions with respect to the military?

Research also indicates that there is a general trend of African Americans serving in more combat support occupations. This is in contrast to the Vietnam War, when African Americans tended to be over represented in the combat arms branches. In Vietnam the high number of African Americans serving in combat arms led to a racial imbalance in casualty figures. How have the resultant demographics of casualties impacted public opinion or U.S. policies in the past and present conflicts?

Significant work has been devoted to the question of what turns public opinion against a particular war. However, research dedicated to comparing the findings to the present situation might prove informative and useful. The past seven years of America’s
involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has given scholars new material for proving or disproving old theories.

Finally, research for this thesis indicated that mobilization of the reserve component caused more consternation among the public and politicians than increased draft calls. As Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Williams Abrams Jr. implemented a force structure that would ensure the reserves would be included in any significant military operations. This Abrams Doctrine, some believed, would effectively serve as a check on presidential decisions.\(^1\) A thorough study of this phenomenon seems very appropriate considering the fact that present and future military actions would be undertaken without conscription but with reserve mobilizations. Consideration of the impact of partial mobilization of the reserves and the substitution of contractors for reservists is needed. Has this resistance to mobilization of the reserves been circumvented by numerous smaller mobilizations and the use of contractors?

**Relevance to Today**

Thirty years after America’s involvement in the Vietnam War ended, the nation would once again commit troops to a war, like Vietnam, that she had chosen. Again, the demographics of this military, while much smaller, closely mirrored those of American society at large. In March of 2003, amid great public support, U.S. troops invaded Iraq. In Gallup’s Iraq Survey 2003, taken shortly before the invasion revealed that 73 percent of Americans surveyed would support military action, if taken.\(^2\) Barely a year later, Gallup data indicated that more Americans believed it had not been worth going into Iraq than did. Time has hardly improved America’s opinion on the war in Iraq; 63 percent of Americans polled in April 2008 consider the invasion a mistake.\(^3\) The same trend in
public opinion appears to have occurred absent the draft. While talk of the draft is more serious than it has been in since President Carter reinstated registration with Selective Service, the prospects for actual inductions is slim to none. “It’s an idea whose time may never come,” said Charles Moskos.  

Military leadership from the President down seems to be committed to a volunteer military. “‘The president’s position is that the all volunteer military meets the needs of the country and there is no discussion of a draft. General Lute made that point as well,’ National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said.” So with little in the way actual compulsion to serve in Iraq, why have so many Americans lost the will to continue the fight? Despite their lack of personal investment, Americans seem to be making the current U.S. President pay a high political price for his military actions after initial overwhelming support. While the definition and prospects for true success in Iraq are still unclear in the minds of some Americans, casualties by the standards of Korea and Vietnam have been extremely light. That thing or combination of things that causes the American public to lose faith in a war is unclear.

**Conclusion**

What is clear is that present or absent a draft, Americans seem to support the initial decision of their President to use military force. On the eve of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, America used conscription to fill the ranks of its military. The draftee military was much larger than today’s military but both are demographically similar to the American population of their day. Despite this fact, Americans then, as in 2003, supported the commitment of troops abroad. The threat of participation by the middle class has not been sufficient to rally them against entry into a war. Therefore,
conscription has not proven to be a restraint on a President contemplating the use of troops abroad.


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GLOSSARY

All Volunteer Force (AVF): Loosely defined, this is the system that the Department of Defense instituted immediately prior to termination of the draft. It became our sole means of populating the ranks of the military in 1973. As the name would imply, it transitioned the armed forces of America from one comprised of volunteers and draftees to all volunteers.

Conscription: compulsory enrollment of persons especially for military service

Deferment: based on certain criteria, a man’s eligibility for selection could be deferred for a certain time period, until an event was completed, or indefinitely. Receipt of a deferment did not mean that a man was ineligible, only that his eligibility was suspended.

Draft: a system for or act of selecting individuals from a group (as for compulsory military service.)

Draft Board: was a group of local citizens, appointed by the governor of the state, charged with registering young men, determining their eligibility, and, based on quotas pushed down by the selective service, select registered, eligible men for military service.

Eligibility: Various factors including (but not limited to) age, marital status, dependents, civilian occupation, and educational status, were taken into account when a man was classified for eligibility. Based on those factors a man was given a number/letter code, lower number/letter combinations were more likely to be called for service than higher ones.

Enlistment: Voluntary entry into the military. (the opposite of induction)

Hershey, Lewis B.: General Hershey was placed in charge of the Selective Service System upon its inception in 1940 and would remain at his post until retired by President Richard Nixon in 1970. General Hershey probably had more impact on the Selective Service System and conscription in America than any other single person due to his long tenure as Director.

Induction: Compulsory entry into the military due to selection for military service by local Selective Service “Draft” Board. (the opposite of enlistment)

Selective Service System (SS or SSS): “Selective Service would provide manpower to the military by conducting a draft using a list of young men’s names gathered through the Selective Service registration process.” The Selective Service System was the agency created to register young men, determine their eligibility, and, based on needs of the Department of Defense, select registered, eligible men for military service.


5Ibid.