THE ROAD TO A NATIONAL POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

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Strategy

by

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One of the best ways to prevent the impact of a weapon of mass destruction is to prevent its delivery. Ballistic missile delivery of a weapon of mass destruction remains one of the most difficult threats to counter. This is partly due to technology and partly due to politics and economics. The ground based anti-ballistic missile system being prepared for installation in Europe is the most promising technology for a durable, reliable counter to a WMD tipped ballistic missile launched at Western Europe. Typically a defensive system has few detractors, but in the case of ballistic missile defense (BMD), there is much more at work than designing and building a weapons system. To implement a ground based anti-ballistic missile system for Europe, the United States has to develop a political strategy that will emphasize the cooperative, NATO, character of the program; the sharing of responsibility for the system; and the merits of basing interceptors permanently in Europe.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE ROAD TO A NATIONAL POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR MISSILE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, by Timothy P. Reidy, Jr., LCDR, USN, 76 pages.

One of the best ways to prevent the impact of a weapon of mass destruction is to prevent its delivery. Ballistic missile delivery of a weapon of mass destruction remains one of the most difficult threats to counter. This is partly due to technology and partly due to politics and economics. The ground based anti-ballistic missile system being prepared for installation in Europe is the most promising technology for a durable, reliable counter to a WMD tipped ballistic missile launched at Western Europe. Typically a defensive system has few detractors, but in the case of ballistic missile defense (BMD), there is much more at work than designing and building a weapons system. To implement a ground based anti-ballistic missile system for Europe, the United States has to develop a political strategy that will emphasize the cooperative, NATO, character of the program; the sharing of responsibility for the system; and the merits of basing interceptors permanently in Europe.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The goal of the military of any country is to keep its citizens safe. Whatever the threat is or will be, the men and women dedicated to the preservation and safety of their society strive to anticipate and counter threats to their homeland. One of the best known difficulties facing the modern Western militaries is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The asymmetric potential of weapons of mass destruction makes them the ultimate weapon for any entity wanting to cause destruction in any Western state. With one strike, the damage done could exceed any impact that could be attempted through conventional forces.

While the destructive elements of these weapons, be they chemical, nuclear, or biological, are well known, the common component, the delivery system, is not as well understood. Every weapon needs a delivery system. For states or non-state actors trying to possess a tool that can hurt western powers enough to create a position of power from which to barter, the ballistic missile is the Holy Grail. Like the German V2 rocket in World War II, the modern ballistic missile is a weapon of fear. Due to its extremely high speed, a ballistic missile is very difficult to stop once it is launched. Its range and durability allow it to be launched from a large distance to deliver its payload with remarkable reliability. In the world of weapons of mass destruction, precision is not necessary. All that is needed is a system that can hit in the vicinity of the target. The weapon’s destructive potential is flexible enough to achieve the desired mass effects.

The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy all speak at length of the need to counter weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and the activities of terrorists and rogue states. The little-publicized partner to countering the proliferation of WMD is countering the threat and proliferation of the ballistic missile delivery systems for those WMD. Countering this aspect of the WMD threat is the area in which the United States and its allies can achieve real success.

The United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. The United States is spending 8.7 billion dollars annually developing several parallel missile defense technologies. The U.S is also pursuing the construction of radar sites and deployment of missile interceptors in former Warsaw pact countries. All this activity is costing the United States vast sums of money and much political capital internationally, amongst allies and competitors alike, as well as in the House of Representatives and Senate as those bodies grapple with this controversial initiative.

The essence of the problem is how to create a political strategy to implement a ballistic missile defense system that will protect the United States and its allies from the action of rogue states or non-state actors who have or could take control of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. While this goal is outlined in the aforementioned national strategies, it must be achieved by the departments and agencies of the U.S. government. The creation of a coherent political strategy is one of the requirements for this implementation. This political strategy provides the background for talking points of State Department and Defense Department personnel as they travel and work toward the President’s goal of implementing a missile defense system in Europe. A political strategy also sets a framework for collaboration for political strategies of friends and allies.
The United States must have the capacity to protect its homeland, deployed troops, and allies from ballistic missile delivery of weapons of mass destruction. What the United States needs to analyze is what shape a political strategy to implement that defense should take. The Bush Administration has focused on bilateral agreements and American determination to forge a shield that can cover multiple countries. Current interceptor and radar sites are a start, but in order to create an effective umbrella to protect Europe and the United States from a limited ballistic missile threat, these Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) and associated radar sites must be expanded. In a complicated world of shifting public opinion and complex political and economic interconnections between states, multinational blocs, and non-state actors, the U.S. must forge a credible and executable strategy to gain political consensus and get an effective missile defense system in place.

To make the situation more difficult, the political ramifications of the current strategy of ballistic missile defense employment has already caused, and may exacerbate, a deterioration in Russian-American relations and the buildup of Russian nuclear and tactical forces. The Russian Federation has reacted strongly to the expansion of a capability that it depicts as directly threatening the Russian deterrent capability. The Russian leadership, emboldened by energy wealth and looking for a vehicle by which to reassert Russia’s international power and influence, has embraced opposition to U.S. ballistic missile defense as its rallying point. The Russians viewed the first step toward achieving a ballistic missile shield, withdrawal from of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as the beginning of the unraveling of all the arms control treaties and other arrangements set up over the preceding 35 years. Some analysts believe that the Russian reaction is
deliberately overplayed to allow a wholesale realignment of arms control treaties, enabling Russia to the freedom to realign its armed forces to best meet it current perceived needs. “The Putin government emboldened by a flood of oil dollars and seeking to re-establish its status in the world could pick and choose among its treaty obligations,” (Kramer 2007, under Critics of the United States’). Strategic Arms reduction Treaty (START) II is set to expire in 2012. If Russia pulls out of START II ballistic missile limitation provisions or even allows them to expire without replacement, they can redeploy their deterrent forces. If that comes to pass, it will take years for the current arms limitation programs and understandings to be restored, if they ever are.

Witness the situation vis-à-vis the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) of 1990, wherein Russia has tried to create a mechanism for approved non-compliance (even if Russia termed its action a “suspension”). Russia is dragging its feet on reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles and has threatened to pull out of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Quamme 2007, under As disagreements over).

The impact of Russian belligerence on forming a strategy to implement ballistic missile defense in Europe can not be overemphasized. The hesitation and outright opposition by some European allies, whose support and cooperation are indispensable to the creation of missile defenses based in Europe, are largely based on the perceived threat from Russia. Into what should be a relatively straight-forward process towards a cooperative agreement for mutual defense from rogue entities and threats, Russia has injected significant distrust and fear using the bellicose tenor of Cold War rhetoric.
The United States’ current development of ballistic missile defense is based on a 2002 National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-23. In this directive the President outlined his intentions for ballistic missile defense (Bush 2002). It will be incumbent upon the next administration to formulate their own direction for missile defense and rescind, reissue, or modify this presidential directive based on their own assessments of policy implications and system effectiveness. They must do this from a sound logical base that will take into account the different constituencies with vested interests in missile defense.

The American people overwhelmingly view missile defense as a good idea that is only limited by its feasibility and cost. It is in Europe where the key undecided constituencies reside. The governments of Europe that must agree to have a missile defense system placed within their borders, or within an ally’s borders, and the people of Europe, upon whose wishes these governments act must be made cooperative partners if a missile defense system is to be successfully deployed.

This thesis will answer the fundamental question, “What political strategy allows the best chance of success for a ground based missile defense system in Europe?” The secondary question upon which the answer rests is “What are the key stumbling blocks to a successful political strategy?” The answer to this question is critical to an understanding of the main sources of concern that motivate the key constituencies’ views on the issues that must be addressed and challenges overcome by any successful political strategy. The tertiary question is “What are possible alternative elements of the strategy?” The answer to this question is important to the development of alternate components that can be inputted to adjust the political strategy and create a workable agreement to implement a
ground-based missile defense system in Europe. For example, if an obstacle is discord resulting from the conclusion of bilateral agreements to establish basing rights for the missile defense system, an adjustment of the strategy to emphasize the mutual interdependence created by a shared defense umbrella is an alternative.

As this is an ongoing subject, I will limit my research on opinion polls to those that were released prior to January 1, 2008. This will allow me to set a firm end point to my analysis and create a coherent set of data to analyze. I will assume that there are three contenders for the next United States presidential administration. Based on the polling data after February 5, 2008 only Senators John McCain, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s positions will be considered in the analysis of potential views. For three reasons, the discussion of a political strategy to implement a ground based anti-ballistic missile system in Europe will not directly include American public opinion. The first is that, even though some interest groups have followed the missile defense debate, judging by the lack of debate during the current presidential campaign season, the American electorate is not particularly interested in the development of a system. Aside from the cost of the anti-missile system, the American public is not concerned about the Ballistic Missile Defense System’s (BMDS) development. Second, the political strategy to convince the American public of the need for BMDS in Europe may differ from the political strategy directed toward foreign constituencies. Third, the attitudes of the Congress and the presidential candidates will, assumably, reflect American public opinion.

In the same vein, this paper will not address the technical performance or cost limitations of any missile defense systems, except as they are reflected in an established
position of a presidential candidate. The intent of this thesis is to analyze the mechanism by which such a system can be implemented politically. The future capability and cost, in as much as it is not a deciding factor politically, is not germane to the development of an implementation strategy.

To achieve a workable political strategy for ground based ballistic missile defense requires an analytical framework within which to conduct a focused review of the critical factors that inform a political strategy. The key constituencies must be analyzed in depth with regard to their reaction to alternative elements to be included in the political strategy. The U.S. Army and joint military community use the concept of Logical Lines of Operation, which is grounded in Jominian thought, to visualize paths toward the achievement of a specific objective when developing campaign plans. While a political strategy for implementing a ground based ballistic missile defense system in Europe is not a traditional military campaign, this construct is particularly suitable for use in analyzing the reaction of selected constituencies to such a strategy. In addition, since this work is being performed at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, it is fitting to use a familiar Army tool in a new manner to develop a political strategy.

This thesis will approach the question of a workable political strategy by analyzing how three constituencies view three key aspects of missile defense. The three constituencies are the European populace, key European governments, and the most likely candidates for the American presidency. The key points for analysis are: 1) reaction of the constituencies to the reorganization of the framework for arms control because of the creation of the ballistic missile defense forces; 2) attitude of the
constituencies toward the stationing of missile defense components - radars and ground based interceptors - in their own countries and in Europe in general; and 3) the cooperative, multinational European/NATO nature of the program. The reaction of the most engaged parties, those whose agreement is necessary to deploy a missile defense system, to these key points of the system are most germane to the creation of a viable policy.

A challenge to this analysis is that it must be performed within the limitations of the available literature. European views about what type system would be agreeable to them are not evident from the polling data for the pollsters did not ask about perceived threats to the constructs of arms control in Europe. This analysis will take the available data and examine the wording of the questions, results, and how the results were analyzed by the original requestors of the surveys in order to strip away bias and reach unbiased conclusions about what the European populace was thinking. The available data on European government opinion is likewise often slanted to suit authors’ premises. Most of the articles on European government positions reflect a somewhat emotional reaction to the actions or proposals of the U.S. or Russia. These reactions are difficult to analyze without in depth knowledge of the motivations of the politicians and the mood of the subject country. By using a large sampling of articles from the entire spectrum of views, as well as available foreign policy journals, this analysis will discern the actual views of the governments in question. This will allow the development of a political strategy to address the concerns of the governments under analysis.

Finally, the paucity of discussion on missile defense in the U.S. presidential campaign presents a challenge to the discovery of the candidates’ stances on this issue.
The topic is not central to most Americans. It is simple to find the position of the Republican candidate on his website and in the Republican Party platform. The Democratic Party candidates’ positions are more difficult to deduce. According to Sam Black of the Center for Defense Information, “Clinton’s stance toward missile defense is the most ambiguous of the [at the time] four candidates,” and Obama “has very little on the public record on defense issues,” (Black 2007). Neither Clinton nor Obama has clearly articulated a policy on missile defense. Neither has a voting record on the subject and the Democratic Party platform does not mention missile defense. However, Barack Obama has posted a speech wherein he mentions missile defense as one of three programs to cut as a way to save money in the federal budget (Obama 2008). In an effort to extrapolate the Democratic candidates’ positions, this thesis will consider not only the stated positions of the Democratic candidates, but also the positions of the Democratic Congress and past Democratic administrations regarding a ground based ballistic missile system. This thesis will also use the positions presented by Rep. Ellen Tauscher, a Democrat chair House of Representatives Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee which is responsible for funding missile defense systems, past actions of Democratic administrations, and recent actions taken by the Congress to deduce the likely direction of the Democratic Congress and a Democratic presidential administration.

The intent of this thesis is to perform an analysis that will support the formulation of a workable political strategy for ground based missile defense in Europe. While the Bush administration has spent billions of dollars to develop a ground based ballistic missile defense system and revised the structure upon which arms control in Europe is
built, there is surprisingly little discourse or analysis on how to build a successful political strategy. According to F. Stephen Larrabee of the RAND Corporation and Andrzej Karkoszka, former Polish State Secretary for Defense, the U.S. has been guilty of four errors in their political strategy to promote missile defense in Europe: “U.S officials did not lay the political groundwork and psychological groundwork for deployment,” “American officials tended to view missile defense as a technical issue divorced from its political context,” “the U.S. underestimated the role of public opinion in Poland and the Czech republic,” and “American officials have tended to assume that the countries of Eastern Europe will remain staunchly pro-American and automatically support U.S. policy,” (Larrabee and Karkoszka 2007).

What is required is a political framework that can set the groundwork for missile defense in Europe and that will take into account the shifting dynamics of alliances, state politics, and public opinion. Most of the existing writing on this subject analyzes a specific system of missile defense. It assumes a final construct and attempts to gauge the support for implementation. This thesis takes a different tack. Instead of asking, “Do you agree with this system?” the framework created by this thesis asks “What system, if any, would you be amenable to?” This approach supports the selection of a strategy to implement an important facet of U.S. defense policy.
CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this thesis is to answer, “What political strategy allows the best chance of success for a ground based missile defense system in Europe?” The questions upon which the answer rests are “What are the key stumbling blocks to a successful strategy?” and “What are the alternative components of the strategy?” The documentation used for this thesis can be separated into several categories. The first is articles that draw on opinion polls to characterize the thought of large portions of the European populace. The second is articles that focus on the reaction of a European government, either to an overture or proposal from the United States or to a perceived threat or reaction from Russia. The third category of documentation consists of analyses of the views of the various presidential contenders, as expressed in their own words, their votes, and others’ interpretations of their words and votes.

Articles that use opinion polls are troublesome in that poll results, like all statistics, require interpretation. Interpreting poll results for use in an article introduces the author’s bias. While most authors attempt to appear non-biased, they, and their interpretation of poll results, usually have a definite point of view. Despite the desire to use poll results without spin or interpretation, the ambiguities of results required analysis to use interpretive methods to relate the data to their thesis. Access to raw data and the original questions is difficult, but required for a credible analysis and use of the data. Poll data reported both positive and negative opinions about missile defense depending on how the questions were asked, which in turn depended on who commissioned the study. When polls included set-up questions about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or questions
about unilateral or bilateral actions of the United States, the results tended to be very much against BMDS. This outcome is apparent in oft-quoted polling results from Poland and the Czech Republic, wherein a series of polls by the CBOS agency, a Polish polling firm, of Polish public opinion and a March 2007 Czech poll by the Center for Public Research (CVVM) found little support for a U.S. missile system or for a bilateral agreement with the U.S. to develop a missile defense system (CBOS 2007b) (CVVM 2007). When the set-up questions centered on the threats to Europe, narrowed to ballistic missile threats and then asked about the role of transnational alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in protecting Europe, the responses were much more in favor of missile defense (AmericanPublic.us 2005). The problem with most of the articles that drew on this polling data is that they did not address this discrepancy, i.e. the variety of contexts within which pollsters posed their questions. Advocates on each side of the issue depicted the data in a contextual vacuum to support either a favorable or an unfavorable attitude toward missile defense. This paper will address this discrepancy and attempt to interpret what kind of political strategy on missile defense will be agreeable to the bulk of Europeans in key countries.

The literature that drew on polling data about ballistic missile defense also addressed the impact of the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems on strategic deterrence and arms control. The linkage between missile defense, START II extension, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty, or Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty are difficult topics to cover in a poll because the public generally lacks an understanding of the nuances of arms control and the technicalities of the treaties. The hazards of set-up questions and built-in biases apply to these polls, as well. For example,
an assessment of public opinion about the impact of missile defense on arms control and proliferation issues conducted during the debate over the Fylingdales, U.K. radar station and the existing ballistic missile defense system, was conducted through a Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) poll conducted on behalf of arms control organizations. This poll started with questions to the respondent about his or her view on the U.S. system and the foreign policy of President Bush, and then moved to nuclear disarmament and a U.S. missile defense system (Ipsos-Mori 2001).

A final limitation on drawing conclusions based on a narrow interpretation of polling data is the lack of consensus within the larger Europe, i.e. there is much difference in opinion between countries. Using data from Spain, Italy, France, Germany, or Britain interchangeably does not adequately address differences in those nations’ perceived threats, foreign policies and attitudes toward American initiatives. While one can use country data to interpolate across like countries and a sample of several countries to attempt to describe a general European view, the perception in Slovakia of the threat from Iranian missiles will be very different from that in France or the United Kingdom. This requires the use of polling samples from the countries most involved (or likely to be involved) in the missile defense system, i.e. the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

The second broad category of literature consists of sources that analyze the positions of European governments on ground based ballistic missile defense in Europe. The countries the United States relied on for cooperation on missile defense have no more coherent viewpoint across the political spectrum within their own governments than the United States itself. A prime example is Poland, where policy can change
dramatically after an election. Ideally, the researcher looks to the official statements of policy rendered by government officials and other entities within the target countries. Especially in the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic, however, language limits the researcher’s ability to analyze these sources directly. Absent primary analysis of the target countries’ government pronouncements, the next best source of information on government policy is the analysis of experts who have developed a perspective from close study of the nuances of a country’s political currents. There are two risks, however, to using this information. The first is the challenge of identifying and removing bias from experts who analyze foreign governments. The second is the establishment of an end point for the sample set. To mitigate these risks, in this thesis, the sample set for the views of European governments is restricted to a period ending on or about May 01, 2008. The research also includes sufficient sources to mitigate the bias across the sample set and glean a balanced impression of the position of the government or governments in question. To do so requires reading many articles and recording contradictions and innuendo to try to cross reference truth, a difficult proposition. For example, articles with divergent viewpoints consulted for this analysis are “Missile Malfunction: Why the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work” by Phillip Coyle and Victoria Sampson, dealing with the failings of the proposed ground-based missile defense system, (Coyle and Sampson 2008) and “The Case for European Missile Defense” by Peter Brookes, dealing with why ground based missile defense in Europe is necessary and why Russian reticence should not block deployment of a missile defense system (Brookes 2008).
There are many sources for the views of the U.S. presidential candidates. The most credible are primary sources, i.e. the published positions and voting records of the candidates themselves, followed by speeches, responses to questions or comments in debates. Another, secondary set of sources are the assertions and analyses offered by commentators or interpolated from the positions taken by the candidates’ political party or advisors. A final source of the candidates’ approaches to ballistic missile defense is what the candidates leave unsaid, the gaps in between assertions and positions.

In the cases of two of the candidates there is very little information on missile defense policy to go on. The short record of Barack Obama offers very little information on his views on missile defense. Accordingly, much has to be deduced from little. The absence of missile defense from the Democratic presidential debates, from Obama’s or Clinton’s “Foreign Affairs” articles (July/August and November/December 2007 issues, respectively), in which the candidates set out their foreign policy views (Obama 2007a) (Clinton 2007a), and from either Democrat’s campaign website (Clinton 2007b) (Obama 2007b), along with the fact that Clinton has voted for and against missile defense while Obama has not yet voted on missile defense (Black 2007), required an interpolation of the candidates’ general attitudes toward Russia and security, rather than an analysis of a concrete record on missile defense.

What is available is a variety of analyses of the candidates’ leanings performed by commentators. This leads the researcher to documentation and opinion sites that claim to capture Clinton’s or Obama’s anticipated attitude or positions on Russia and missile defense. The only concrete source for Obama’s position on missile defense is a speech that Obama posted on YouTube on February 28, 2008 about his initiatives to save money
from defense spending (Obama 2008). The case of Hillary Clinton is much the same. An analysis of the Democratic Party’s position on missile defense, based on the position and actions of the Democrat-led Congress, and the speeches and writings of Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif), who chairs the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, can serve as a basis for discerning the policy of a Democratic president. Rep. Tauscher’s statements include an Arms Control Association event titled “Avoiding Renewed U.S.-Russian Strategic Competition” from June 2007, an article in Arms Control Today entitled European Missile Defense: A Congressional Perspective from October 2007, and comments from Rep. Tauscher about the 2009 Defense Appropriations bill. In all of these Rep. Tauscher attempted to represent the views of the Democrat controlled Congress.

Senator John McCain, in contrast to the Democratic presidential candidates, has posted a clear position in support of missile defense on his campaign website (McCain 2007b). This support remains a consistent cornerstone in his positions on building military forces. He has been a consistent proponent of BMDS. Furthermore, as a Republican, he could be expected to maintain key planks in the Republican platform such as missile defense. This plank, much as the testimony of Representative Tauscher informs us of the Democratic position, will inform us of the Republican position. Due to his extensive voting record and his delineated support for missile defense, the analysis of McCain’s position on missile defense has served as a benchmark for clarity against which to compare other candidates’ positions.

Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Eck of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in their report “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe” from February 19, 2008
describe the history, technology and the political (both foreign and domestic) challenges that face the deployment of a ground based ballistic missile defense system in Europe. This CRS report includes conclusions drawn from the aforementioned polls on missile defense conducted in the Czech Republic and Poland. In so doing, the report’s authors do not analyze the base data, but instead rely on conclusions found in newspaper articles and wire service reports. These results note a strong desire for NATO cooperation in both the Czech Republic and Poland, but see public opposition stemming from sovereignty concerns about U.S. bases, vice fear of Russian reprisals. They also present a myriad of arguments for and against basing missile defense system components in Eastern Europe without attempting to decide what has merit and what does not. The CRS report ends with a discussion of Congressional actions. The intent of the article is to present facts to Congress to help inform debate on missile defense issues. It does not contain any conclusions or recommendations (Hildreth and Eck 2008).

A number of sources from the 2000-2002 timeframe address the missile defense issue before the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty. These source set the groundwork for later articles and, in fact, posit most of the arguments, for and against missile defense, that are analyzed in articles in 2008. Wilton Park of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research wrote “Missile Defense, Deterrence and Arms Control: Contradictory Aims or Compatible Goals” in 2002, in which he addressed the feasibility of missile defense, as well as the possible impact on international relations and arms control treaties and arrangements (Park 2002). This study appeared prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty and the subsequent debate that action generated. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
hosted a briefing in June 2001 entitled “U.S.-NATO Relations Regarding Missile
Defenses: Concepts, Architectures, and Perspectives,” wherein the possible architectures
of a European missile defense system as well as possible European reaction to possible
unilateral/bilateral U.S. actions were presented. The most significant limitation of these
pre-ABM withdrawal sources is that they analyze an international context that is different
from the one that has existed since the U.S. withdrew from the ABM treaty. They also do
not address the rise of the Iranian threat as it is perceived today. The relevancy of much
of the analysis developed prior to 2003 is, therefore, increasingly questionable. More
contemporary literature offers a variety of views on the missile defense debate. F.
Stephen Larrabee and Andrzej Karkoszka, in their April 27, 2007 Rand article “How Not
to Promote American Missile Defense in Europe”, present a point-by-point synopsis of
American missteps as the U.S. has attempted to deploy a ground based ballistic missile
defense system in Europe. They believe that the deployment of a missile defense system
is achievable, but that the U.S. must stop making key mistakes in order to achieve it
(Larrabee and Karkoszka 2007). In “The Case for European Missile Defense” from the
Heritage Foundation, dated March 14, 2008, Peter Brookes presents the threat posed to
Europe by ballistic missile delivery systems and the state of the debate on
implementation. While his presentation is thorough, he makes no recommendations to
assist in implementing a missile defense system (Brookes 2008). Phillip Coyle and
Victoria Sampson, writing their article “Missile Defense Malfunction: Why the Proposed
Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work” for the Spring 2008 issue of Ethics and
International Affairs, present the views of the opposition to ground based ballistic missile
defense in Europe. They present, as basis to decline to participate in a U.S. missile
defense system, the argument for a perceived lack of an Iranian threat to Europe and the many complicated international diplomatic relations challenges that missile defense creates. They cite Canada and South Korea as models of logical opposition to the U.S. plan (Coyle and Sampson 2008). The most comprehensive overview of missile defense is found in the Journal WMD Insights sponsored by the Defense threat reduction Agency, which offered a two-part series written by Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute entitled “Special Report: The European Ballistic Defense Dispute.” Part one focuses on perspectives from Eastern Europe, mostly Poland and the Czech Republic, in order to present a full review of the challenges faced in the proposed host nations and the reaction of the government and populace. The second installment offers the view from Western Europe. It includes a discussion of the reservations held by western European nations, including their reactions to Russian belligerence and the threat perceived to European unity and arms control. While the WMD Insights series offers no recommendations, the conclusions to both sections raise questions that should be addressed to achieve successful implementation of a missile defense system (Weitz 2007).

For as many sources that have been created on the topic of missile defense, the truly interesting thing is that no one has attempted to describe a workable defense regime. Most of the analysis has been oriented toward whether people, governments and politicians are for or against a possible description of the author’s impression of the current system. What is needed is articles that lay out a set of options and then attempt to describe the most useful and agreeable option. This then becomes a catalyst for development of a system, vice a talking point for argument. The greatest impression that can be gleaned from the information at hand is that the literature is divided between
partisans, who are trying to confirm or deny support for their system, and non-partisans, who stick to the technical details of the available missile defense regimes. This thesis is attempting, in a small way, to be a non-partisan and describe a logical method to choose a missile defense regime rather than sell a system that has been chosen.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The challenge when trying to formulate a sound political strategy is to try to take into account the various viewpoints and inputs of the key constituencies whose support will be required to successfully implement a policy. To create a viable political strategy three questions must be addressed: 1) “What strategy allows the best chance of success for a ground based missile defense system in Europe?” 2) “What are the key stumbling blocks to a successful strategy?” 3) “What are the alternative components of the strategy?” The framework within which to answer these questions must break the key constituencies down into discrete groups, create key alternative components of the political strategy and analyze them in relation to the key constituencies, and, at the end of the day, generate a viable, feasible political strategy. A tool the U.S. Army and joint military planners employ during the planning of operations to visualize a complicated strategy and synchronize it across a variety of disparate elements is the construct of logical lines of operation. This element of operational design serves well as an analytical framework within which to develop a political strategy for the deployment of a ground based missile defense system in Europe. For this reason, logical lines of operation form the core of this thesis’ research methodology.

To understand logical lines of operation, one must first grasp the concept of physical lines of operation. According to Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning released December 26, 2006, a physical line of operation “connects a series of decisive points over time that lead to control of a geographical objective or defeat of an enemy force,” (JP 5-0 2006, IV-21 – IV-23). An example is a river crossing. In order for a
brigade to advance to an objective they have to successfully perform a river crossing. This crossing becomes a decisive point. How the brigade handles this decisive point on the way to the objective will govern the success or failure of the mission. If there were a series of points that, like the river crossing, were critical to the success of the operation the line of operation would have several decisive points leading to its goal. If the brigade were split into several groups moving to the same objective there could be several lines of operation with common or differing decisive points all of which would be supporting the common goal. This construct can be taken out of the physical world and into the conceptual world by applying the bridge crossing metaphor to any endeavor to move from the current status of events to a desired end state. For example, a decisive point to writing a successful paper could be writing and brainstorming an outline on a creativity logical line of operation. A supporting line could be finding a quiet space to write and ensuring the availability of coffee. These are two logical lines of operation going from the state of an idea for a paper to a completed paper – the desired end state. Applying this construct to developing a successful political strategy to implement a ground based ballistic missile defense system in Europe requires that the task be broken into an objective, lines of operation, and decisive points.

The objective, within this methodology, is a political strategy that will lead to the deployment of a missile defense system that has the best opportunity to protect the United States from rogue states or non-state actors that will develop or could control a limited number of weapons of mass destruction mated to long- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The major lines of operation that lead to the aforementioned objective are the main groups of actors who make up the landscape within which any political strategy will
be accepted or rejected. There are three major constituencies to an amenable political strategy to implement a ground based ballistic missile defense system. The first constituency is the people of Europe. Popular support for a new system deployed in Europe is a key for the success of a long-term program. If the United States is going to deploy a viable missile defense system based on ground based interceptors (GBI) and radars, the people of Europe have to be either favorable toward the development of such a system or at least unopposed to its implementation. The second key constituency is the leaders of the governments in Europe, the policy and dealmakers in both national governments and intergovernmental organizations such as NATO. The final constituency is the potential next U.S. presidential administration. The reaction to difficulties and general direction of the administration that comes to office in 2009 will play a critical role in determining whether to devote the effort to craft a durable political strategy to implement missile defense in Europe.
Along with the three lines of operation, the analytical methodology of this thesis posits three decisive points which are vital to moving the key constituencies toward the desired missile defense political strategy. The first is the reaction of the constituencies to the effects of the creation of the ballistic missile defense system on the framework for arms control. Key examples of this impact are the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty and the Russian “suspension” of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, as well as threats to the prospective follow-on
treaty to START and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. The reactions to these effects vary across Europe and influence each constituency’s support for the program. The second decisive point is the attitude of the constituencies toward the stationing of missile defense components, i.e. radars and ground based interceptors, in their own countries and in Europe in general. This is indicator of the ability of the United States to implement a political strategy for missile defense in Europe. The final decisive point is the cooperative, multinational/NATO nature of the program. There are two facets to the cooperative nature of the program. The first is the tension between a unilateral/bi-lateral system built and controlled wholly by the United States and a system that is administered and controlled by the NATO. The European opinion about these two options is critical in deciding which option the U.S. should pursue. The second facet of the cooperative nature of the program is the possibility of cooperation between the United States or NATO and Russia in the activation and use of BMDS. These three decisive points are the major factors or decisions that will influence a missile defense strategy for Europe. Any successful strategy will have to tackle these decisive points.

This thesis will build on this framework to conduct a meta-analysis of available opinion polls and articles on the deployment of a ground based ballistic missile defense system in Europe. As a student at the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, using a joint operations mission analysis tool to provide a framework within which to perform an analysis of the projected success or failure of a strategic policy seems particularly apt to the thesis author.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This thesis will answer the fundamental question, “What political strategy allows the best chance of success for a ground based missile defense system in Europe?” and the supporting questions “What are the key stumbling blocks to a successful political strategy?” and “What are the alternative components of the political strategy that will address these challenges?” Developing alternate components is critical to creating a political strategy that can be successful in a dynamic international community. If, for example, the issue or stumbling block is the discord caused by the negotiation of bilateral agreements to establish basing rights for the system, then emphasizing the interdependence created by a shared defense umbrella is an alternative component for the strategy.

For the purposes of analysis, the components of a ground based anti-ballistic missile defense system in Europe are the extent to which it is developed and deployed in a cooperative, i.e. multilateral/NATO, manner; the system’s impact on arms control; and the actual requirement to place components of the system on the territory of European states. These components are the decisive points in the lines of operation analytical model of this thesis. The respective alternative components of the strategy are taken from several sources: current U.S. actions, debates in the U.S. Congress, recommendations from international observers, and commentary from international and U.S. leaders. The potential alternatives for each of these components, respectively, are:

- follow a cooperative multinational path to the deployment through NATO or use bilateral arrangements with selected states;
- proceed without regard to the arms control impact of the deployment or exercise more restrain until the impact on arms control can be mitigated through diplomacy; and
- base ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles in fixed sites on the territory of European states or employ mobile systems, such as Aegis or Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).

Figure 2. European Public Logical Line of Operation

Source: Figure created by author from Joint Publication 5.0.

This thesis will analyze these three sets of alternatives in three sections, each section corresponding to one of the three critical constituencies that should agree to deploy the system: the European populace, the European governments, and the next American administration.

**European Populace**

What is the definition of this first constituency with an interest in the deployment of a ground based interceptor system in Europe? Is it the people of Europe? There are several competing theories about the general attitudes of the European populace in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While this thesis will not delve into theories about regional federations, nationalism, ethnic sectarianism, or the divisions between “new” and “old” Europe, it is useful to understand the general characteristics of the people that are deemed “European” for this thesis. “European” includes the people comprising the collection of nations north of the Mediterranean Sea and west of a line running from the
western edge of the Black Sea to the Baltic States. This will take in the member states of NATO, with the exception of Turkey, Canada and the United States, as well as the Balkans and all of the European Union members. As any student of history or international politics will attest, this is not a homogeneous group. An analysis of every sub-grouping in the “European” area would prove unmanageable, given the parameters of this thesis. The analysis will therefore focus on mix of sampling representative areas, such as the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic and polls taken across Europe that attempt to present European positions:

Polling results offer insights into European attitudes toward security issues. According to a Eurobarometer poll published in November 2007, fighting terrorism, defense and foreign policy are the three areas that most Europeans would like to see covered by a collective policy. Over seventy percent of the European voting public favors a common defense and security policy in Europe (European Commission Public Opinion Analysis sector, 2007). Separate polling results indicate approximately the same percentage of the people of Europe are in favor of a ground based anti-ballistic missile interceptor system in Europe (AmericanPublic.us, 2005). However, when asked about a U.S. missile defense system, i.e. a system installed and controlled by the United States through a series of bilateral agreements with individual European nations, even the people of the states involved with the U.S. in the ground based interceptor project do not favor an American interceptor system (CVVM 2007) (CBOS 2007c). There are several reasons for this view.

The first has to do with the reaction of the Russians to a ground based ballistic missile defense system. The impact of the Russian reaction is difficult to gauge because it
works on the European psyche on two levels. The first level is the most basic reaction to Russian threats that BMDS in Eastern Europe would require the Russians to revert to a policy of actively targeting Europe with strategic forces on a daily basis. This includes shifting short range nuclear weapons into Kaliningrad as well as maintaining Europe target packages active in long range delivery systems (Hildreth and Eck 2008). General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces warned Poland and the Czech Republic that if they went ahead with the plans to allow the rockets and radars of an American anti-missile system to be installed on their territory, Russian forces would be “capable of having these as their targets,” (Agliolo 2007). These direct threats to potential host nations appeal to public opinion in a very direct, visceral way. Nonetheless, their impact is less clear, as a 2007 poll of Czech citizens suggests. “The MDAA[Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance]-commissioned poll shows that the people in the Czech Republic are well aware of Russia’s opposition -- 81 percent of respondents know about it, although 65 percent say they did not feel [emphasis added] influenced by Moscow’s stance.” (Nikleva 2007).

The second way that Russian reaction to deployment of a ground based interceptor system in Europe impacts public opinion is through the more complex and indirect impact on arms control and specific treaties. The Russian “suspension” of implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the threat of withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty as a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and proposed deployment of ground based interceptor missiles, which Russian sources contend could be easily converted into intermediate-range nuclear missiles (Russia: Leading academician claims, 2007), in
Eastern Europe appeals to European fears about the future of arms control agreements in Europe. They fear that the Russian inheritors of the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces will not be amenable to continuing or replacing the arms control agreements that may have kept the Cold War from going hot. With the START treaty set to expire in 2009 and the Treaty Between the United States of America and Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction (SORT) having no requirement for verification or enforcement, there is a fear that a more robust Russia under a nationalist leader might initiate a new arms race unfettered by the transparency of existing arms control agreements (Ifft 2007). Some opponents of a ground based interceptor system base their objection on the fear that the ground based interceptor system will force the Russians away from international arms agreements and pressure Russia to upgrade its deterrent forces as a hedge against the future expansion of the missile defense system’s capabilities. According to a poll conducted in 2001 by MORI on behalf of arms control advocacy organizations, seventy percent of people in the United Kingdom believe that ballistic missile defense will spur more advanced missile development. Sixty three percent of those polled believe that international arms control will be more difficult to achieve because of the creation of a ballistic missile defense system (Ipsos-MORI 2001). The themes echoed in the preponderance of articles written for public consumption in Europe and the arguments presented by anti-missile defense opponents point to a belief on the part of the European populace that missile defense systems are bad for arms control.

The impact of these threats is evident in the attitude of the people of the countries considering hosting ground based ballistic missile defense system components, Poland
and the Czech Republic. In a poll released on 24 April 2007, CBOS reported that fifty-seven percent of Poles opposed the proposed U.S. plan to station interceptors in Poland, up two percent from February 2007. Only twenty-five percent of Poles supported the plan, down three percent from February (CBOS 2007b). This same trend was evident in the Czech Republic. According to a poll by CVVM, sixty-eight percent of Czechs opposed the basing of an American-controlled ground based interceptor system radar in the Czech Republic, while only twenty-six percent approved of it (CVVM 2007).

Clearly there is a debate over the value and impact that a ground based anti-missile system will have on Europe. The European populace is concerned about the direct threat of an enhanced Russian nuclear posture and the impact of the system on arms limitation agreements. The Russians have publicized their reaction well. The Russian armed forces chief of the general staff’s warning that Russia might actively target elements of the system, saying “If we see that the facilities pose a threat to Russia’s security, the facilities will be objects for plans of our forces,” (Burns 2007), was widely reported and Europeans took him at his word.

When pollsters pose questions about missile defense and threats are discussed in general, however, without the associated stigma of American control, the results are very different. In an AmericanPublic.us poll conducted for the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, various European voting constituencies were questioned about their views of threats to Europe and of a NATO or host nation missile defense system. The poll, taken from August 25 to September 1, 2005, found that fifty-six percent of those polled believed that their country should have a missile defense system with the ability to protect the population and economy from an attack by missiles that might contain
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, versus twenty-five percent who believed they should not have such a system. Seventy-one percent believed that NATO should have such a system, versus only sixteen percent who believed that NATO should not. This poll included populations in Spain, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom. Sixty-seven percent responded “yes, probably” or “yes, definitely” when asked if they would accept the deployment, or placement, of NATO missile defense assets in their country (AmericanPublic.us 2005). In a CBOS poll taken in Poland in April 2007, forty-one percent of respondents indicated that a NATO missile defense system would be preferable to an American system. Fifty-four percent of respondents either saw no difference or could not decide between the two. Only five percent of Poles polled responded that an American system was preferable to a NATO system (CBOS 2007b).

Although there might be some confusion as to what a NATO missile defense system would look like, nevertheless it seems as though there is broad agreement that NATO should have such a system and that most Europeans would be amenable to hosting components of the system. The fact that NATO primarily works as an organization of donor nations who develop capabilities and allocate the use of those capabilities to the alliance may well have escaped those answering the poll about NATO control of a missile defense system. In the same way the NATO Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defense Program (ALTBMD) plans to integrate national missile defense systems into a connected umbrella, the U.S. would develop a ground-based anti-ballistic missile interceptor system and then allocate and integrate the system into a NATO command and control network, possibly integrating it into ALTBMD itself.
The conclusion to be drawn from this data is that in general there are two reasons for European popular opposition to an American ground-based ballistic missile defense system. The fear of Russian reprisals against Europe in the form of direct targeting of nations that host components of the system and in the form of the perceived destabilizing impact of anti-ballistic missile systems on the structure of arms control in Europe leave the general populace in fear of an American system based in Europe. In this form of opposition, the benefits of anti-ballistic missile defense of Europe are ignored. The general perception is of a system that the Americans would use for their own purpose and that does nothing but make Europe less safe. Europeans do not perceive their greatest threat to be ballistic missile-delivered weapons. “On issues like Afghanistan or missile defense, for example, many Europeans do not see why they should lend their support to President Bush,” (Gordon n.d.).

However, in the context of questions about perceived international threats to Europe, the perceptions of ballistic missile defense systems change. As a key facet of European security under the aegis of NATO, a ground based ballistic missile defense system is seen a guarantor of European security. Sixty two percent of respondents in 2001 responded to Special Eurobarometer Poll 54.1 that they feared the spread of NBC weapons. Fifty-five percent responded that they feared the accidental launch of a nuclear missile (Manigart 2001). When questioned in a 2005 MDAA poll, are about threats to European security, absent the Russian bogeyman, seventy-five percent of Europeans agreed that “Ballistic missiles, particularly those with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, can be used as an instrument of blackmail or coercion against each of the countries of NATO or all of NATO,” (AmericanPublic.us 2005). Against this backdrop, a
missile defense system can be seen as necessary to prevent the threat of a ballistic missile strike from impacting the foreign policy or safety of Europe. The battle to define the question set is being played out in the media, where American politicians emphasize the ballistic missile defense system as the basis of a necessary NATO defensive system while Russians continue to protest and emphasize possible repercussions of a system based in Eastern Europe. This emphasis can be seen in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s statement in Bucharest, “we have a breakthrough document on missile defense for the Alliance. Again, I remember going to that first summit, when I think the President talked about missile defense, and perhaps only two allies gave even lukewarm support for the notion of missile defense. But now it is clearly understood in the Alliance that the challenges of the 21st century, the threats of the 21st century make it necessary to have missile defense that can defend the countries of Europe; that this is important to NATO, and we will take that work ahead,” (Rice 2008).

Within the framework of this thesis, the line of operation of European public support can have success through all three decisive points. While the European populace is concerned that ballistic missile defense systems will destabilize the arms control agreements in place in Europe, they only feel this way in the context of Russian belligerence. Most Europeans believe that ballistic missile defense will be necessary in the future and should be built. Therefore, European public support can be maintained even in the face of Russian threats if the European public remains more afraid of weapons of mass destruction from unstable states, such as Iran, than from Russia. In a similar vein, the placement of interceptors in Europe, generally, or specifically in their
home nation has broader appeal if the system is perceived as a European or NATO system and not an American one.

Distrust of the Bush administration’s perceived unilateral actions, led fifty-five percent of respondents to a UK poll to disagree that the approach of President Bush to world affairs makes the world a safer place (Ipsos-MORI 2001), i.e., they do not trust American motives. If the system has a European face, it will serve European purposes to augment European security, not just American security.

Finally, the decisive point of the cooperative nature of the program is key to European public support of a European ground-based anti-ballistic missile defense. The European public is concerned about weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles. They believe that missile defense is needed and worthwhile, but they do not trust American motives. There attitude goes something like this: America can build a system, but if it is to protect us all then we will all run it. That way the Americans can not disregard our wishes after we let them build on our soil. Thus the question of a NATO system has very broad appeal, while an American system has very little support

**European Government**

The second line of operation to be analyzed is the European government reaction to BMDS. The reason for separate analyses of the views of European governments and the European voting populace is that the two groups have somewhat different motivations for their opinion on an American ground based missile defense system. The motivation for European popular opinion is illustrated by a Czech official’s comments about a July 27, 2007 public debate at Misov, Czech Republic, on the outskirts of the Brdy military training grounds, the leading contender for the site of the U.S. radar. Tomas Klvana, the
Czech government coordinator for communication on missile defense, discussed area residents’ very local concerns about the proposed installation. “People in the Brdy vicinity complain about a lack of information on the planned installation…People also said they mind the radar being designed to protect the USA, expressed fear real estate prices would go down in the area, which, in addition, they said might be a target of terrorist attack.” (BBC Monitoring European 2007, under The choice had nothing). European governments, however, tend to take a broader view. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier illustrated this motivation when he said “The core issue is to prevent a spiral of mistrust between Russia and the U.S. [a]nd this is what is in our immediate European interest,” (Shanker and Landler 2007, under Yet speaking).

Few European government leaders have discussed specific concerns about the impact of an American ground based ballistic missile defense system on arms control. Some leaders such as Luxemburg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn have expressed opposition. Minister Asselborn has “characterized the U.S. deployment plan as ‘incomprehensible’ stating that “We will have no stability in Europe if we push the Russians into a corner,” (Weitz 2007). The Russian suspension of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty was met with admonishment and regret by most European leaders. NATO released a statement on the Russian “suspension” of the CFE treaty saying, “NATO Allies deeply regret that the Russian Federation has proceeded with its intention to unilaterally ‘suspend’ implementation of CFE Treaty obligations as of 12 December 2007,” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2007). As Russia was not complying with all provisions of the treaty, and NATO allies demurred from ratifying the successor agreement to the original treaty without full
Russian fulfillment of political commitments it undertook at the 1999 Istanbul Summit of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, the loss of the CFE treaty did not have immediate operational impact on the status of conventional forces in Europe. While European governments placed diplomatic pressure on Russia to negotiate instead of withdrawing from the CFE treaty, European governments also voiced concerns focused on the reduction in treaty durability, transparency, and communications symbolized by the continuing withdrawals from arms control treaties (Kouchner and Steinmeier 2007).

There is fear in some parts of Europe about Russian reluctance to supply Europe with energy. “Europeans fear that missile defense will provoke Moscow on other thorny issues, such as Europe’s energy security, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, or on the question of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, which the Kremlin opposes, and on future NATO expansion” (Brookes 2008, under While NATO is actively). According to the German Institute for Economic Research, “the EU imports 29 percent of its oil and one-third of its gas from Russia,” (Mityayev 2007, under They say that Russia). According to Spiegel, “countries fear being pushed into a situation where they have to decide between siding with the Americans and their partnership with Russia -- and the important energy resources it provides,” (Spiegel 2007, under The most controversial defense project).

In some cases, especially in Eastern Europe, governments see the placement of components of an American ballistic missile defense system on their territory as a means to secure a deeper defense relationship with the United States. “Although Czechs and Poles want to avoid further worsening their relations with Moscow, they also want to
strengthen their ties with the United States against potential military threats from Russia and other sources. The Czech and Polish defense communities appear to value the prospective American bases primarily because they would supplement NATO security guarantees,” (Weitz 2008, under Strengthening Security ties). Furthermore, both Poland and the Czech Republic have used ballistic missile defense talks to press the United States on issues ranging from re-equipment of their national armies with modern Western gear to implementing a visa exchange system that will greatly ease the completion of business agreements with American companies. As President Bush announced that the U.S. and Czech governments were very near a compromise on missile defense he also announced, “I hope the people of the Czech Republic understand that your government and your country is ahead of the line of anybody else when it comes to a visa waiver program,” (Fox News 2008, under Bush said). The impact of the system on the arms control framework in Europe is perceived as being offset by the increase in security to be offered by becoming closer to the American military and American security interests. To some in Eastern European governments, the idea is that America will not allow a country with a large strategic asset, such as ground based ballistic missile system components, to be swallowed by a rival. They see hosting a radar or interceptor base as guaranteeing that America will always intervene, diplomatically, economically or militarily, to keep their country safe and stable. “The Czech and Polish defense communities appear to value the prospective American bases primarily because they would supplement NATO security guarantees,” (Weitz 2008). At the end of the day, deployment of the system might prove unavoidable. As Alexandr Vondra, the Czech foreign minister, said “In the future, the North Atlantic Alliance and European States will not be able to avoid the construction of
this system, and it is in the interest of Europe to build such systems in cooperation with America,” (Sieff 2007).

Long-term plans for European integration and a European foreign policy identity independent of the U.S. influence European governmental opposition to placing American ground based ballistic missile defense components in Europe. The positions of former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and former French President Jacques Chirac, champions of European independence in foreign policy, who both voiced strong reservations about American foreign policy with regard to Russia, continue to be reflected in some official European thinking. Neither France nor Germany under these leaders was willing to risk isolating Russia. Instead they favored splitting from American foreign policy and taking a new European path between the Russian and American positions. This served the dual purpose of creating separation and identity for the European Union in opposition to American hegemony, as well as allowing them to improve relations with Russia. In some European quarters, the missile defense issue has exacerbated transatlantic policy differences. “Politically, missile defense is likely seen to be seen by European governments mainly as an additional source of political irritation in the transatlantic relationship at a time of accumulating, partially value-based conflicts over trade and a widespread desire among European politicians to assert Europe’s own identity vis-à-vis Washington, New York and Hollywood as a matter of principle,” (Becher and Schmidt 2001, under For boost-phase intercepts). In addition, the American policy of negotiating basing agreements with individual European countries, vice using NATO or the European Union, contributes to divisions within the European bloc. According to the Dutch newspaper Trouw in February 2007, “Poland and the Czech
republic would have been better off choosing a European security policy” through the EU or NATO (Weitz 2008).

The current leaders of Germany and France, Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy are much more comfortable with ground based missile defense. Chancellor Merkel has stated that BMDS “are purely defensive weapons that in no way are directed against Russia,” adding that she hopes that the BMD issue will not disrupt German relations with Moscow or become entwined with energy supply questions, (Weitz 2008, under Germany). However, President Sarkozy has said that he does not “see how one can say that it is simply a problem of the Czech Republic or Poland and that it’s not a problem for all of Europe, unless that is, we give up all ambition for a European defense policy,” (Weitz 2008, under France). As President Sarkozy matures in his term he may expect a return on some of his overtures to the U.S., such as a greater role for a European foreign policy, in the decisions of NATO and defense agreements with America.

Commenting on the EU position with regard to divergent member state views on the missile defense system, Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign and security policy chief stated, “European Union nations are free to decide if they want to participate in the U.S. anti-missile system, but the EU as a bloc has no plans to join ‘We are not as Europeans concerned to establish a mechanism of that type. This is for every country to decide,’” (AP 2007, under Solana: Nations free to join).

While a cooperative approach to the development of BMDS is not required to gain the support of European governments, it simplifies the negotiations on deployment. While there is a significant divide between the views of center-right governments and more left leaning governments as to the trustworthiness of American motives, most know
that NATO primarily works through the contribution of sovereign nations to the alliance.

There is little to no enthusiasm in any European government to build a competing anti-ballistic missile system to the American system, nor is there any discussion in Europe about assisting the United States by helping pay for such a system to be constructed. The Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stating in a May 5, 2008 speech that, “Victor Hugo once said that nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come. Perhaps that is why neither a sometime erratic debate nor Cold War-style threats could ultimately, or should ultimately undermine the project” (Scheffer 2008, under As the countries). He has called for a comprehensive BMD architecture so that, “When it comes to missile defense, there shouldn’t be an A-league and a B-league within NATO.” (Dombey 2007, under NATO officials say). The mechanism to integrate the American BMDS into NATO that most European governments seem to favor is full scale co-opting of the system. German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung, has argued NATO should have the lead role in developing any BMD system stating, “I think the development of such a system should be integrated into the NATO military alliance,” (New Europe 2008, under German defense Minister). Junior coalition partners in the governments of the Czech Republic and Poland have advocated a referendum on missile defense, seeking to head off development of a bilateral system and force members into conversation exclusively on a NATO anti-ballistic missile system. (Economist 2007, under A third challenge). The cooperative nature of the program is taken for granted at the governmental level. Most European leaders either believe that the American program is aimed at enhancing the security of Europe or believe that it can be integrated into a European ballistic missile defense system.
The line of operation dealing with the European governmental support for a ground based ballistic missile defense system has three decisive points. The first is the arms control impact of the system. While the governments of Europe were concerned about the impact of the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and extremely concerned about the Russian suspension of compliance with the CFE Treaty, as was discussed earlier, most European governments are more worried about the destabilizing affect these withdrawals will have on the disarmament structures in Europe than about the loss of the treaties themselves. Given that an attack on Europe by Russia is not, at present, an over riding threat, the governments of Europe are more concerned with the fallout spreading to energy politics, the redeployment of Russian conventional forces from fragile states in the Caucasus or Black Sea regions as required by the political commitments the Russians made in Istanbul in 1999, or the fate of Kosovo than of a missile defense system reigniting the Cold War. The decisive point of gaining European government support with consideration to the impact of BMDS on arms control is achievable. Whether or not to physically deploy interceptors in Europe in general or their home territory is a much trickier subject, not so much because of governments’ fears of Russian threats as because of questions about popular support of interceptor hosting. However, at least one government, that of the Czech Republic has proven willing to face down poor polling numbers. Tomas Pojar, the Czech deputy minister of foreign affairs, “said he takes little stock in public opinion polls that show a majority of Czechs oppose having a U.S. missile defense site on their territory,” (Burns 2007, under Pojar said). European governments’ resistance has as much to do with the mechanisms of intra-European politics and conflicting views of the role of the United States in European
institutions as with popular support or concern about destabilization of the system of arms control. Those governments and political parties that favor an independent European foreign policy and establishment free of American interference, such as France under Chirac or Germany under Schroeder, saw the bilateral deployment of a permanent system in Europe as a threat to pan-European unity. In Chirac’s view, “…the plans [for the missile defense system] threatened to sow divisions in the European Union and stir tensions with Russia,” (International Herald Tribune 2007, under Other European Leaders). Like-minded Europeans believe that the American presence will serve to split European unity and offer an alternative mechanism to stability that will stunt the growth of European institutions. They typically point to American unilateralism, the friction with Russia, and the current lack of a threat from rogue states to Europe as justifications for their views. On the other hand, some current leaders of Europe, Merkel (Germany), Sarkozy (France), Brown (United Kingdom), and Tusk (Poland) acknowledge that an American missile defense system in Europe would be a stabilizing influence. They see American bases as a stabilizing force in new democracies and, through military and economic cooperation as well as concessions for basing rights, contributors to the integration of new eastern European democracies into western society.

The last decisive point in this line of operation is the cooperative nature of the program. Again, it is in a cooperative and multi-national context that BMDS gets most of its support from European governments. It is taken for granted by most of the current leaders of Europe that a missile defense system is or will be needed shortly for Europe. The real question is how to achieve it. There is no discussion of Europe creating a missile defense umbrella without the U.S., therefore the likely candidate is a cooperative system
with the U.S. Through NATO, European governments have a mechanism to leverage American money and technology to protect Europe by supporting the integration of the U.S. missile defense system into NATO. The largest problem remaining is how to force America to always act in Europe’s interest, not its own. Therein lays the allure of a cooperative, multinational program. The European non-host governments use their NATO, the European Union, and other international mechanisms, such as trade agreements, to pressure the host nations to include pan-European guarantees to ensure that the ground based missile defense system serves the interests of all Europe. The language of the April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration that deals specifically with missile defense exemplifies this approach,

“…We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the [North Atlantic] Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2008, under 37. Ballistic Missile Proliferation).

**US Administration**

The last line of operation through which a policy for BMDS will be analyzed is the next United States presidential administration. The President of the United States plays a key role in formulating, negotiating, and implementing military strategy. The current Bush administration has been a dedicated proponent of missile defense. This
administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and has entered negotiations with multiple states to create the proposed system. The successor administration will have the discretion to abandon missile defense, change the direction of the program, or continue with the current plan. There are no statutory requirements or binding agreements that would limit the discretion of the next president with regard to missile defense systems. The positions of each of the remaining presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and John McCain will be analyzed in brief.

Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican candidate, is the most straightforward of the three candidates on missile defense. Missile defense was a plank in the 2004 Republican Party platform and remains a centerpiece of Republican military requirements. As a long-serving senator who has been active in international politics, McCain has the most established track record of the three candidates. His campaign website includes his position on a ground based missile defense system under “Issues” and “National Defense.” In it he states:

**Effective Missile Defense**
John McCain strongly supports the development and deployment of theater and national missile defenses. Effective missile defenses are critical to protect America from rogue regimes like North Korea that possess the capability to target America with intercontinental ballistic missiles, from outlaw states like Iran that threaten American forces and American allies with ballistic missiles, and to hedge against potential threats from possible strategic competitors like Russia and China. Effective missile defenses are also necessary to allow American military forces to operate overseas without being deterred by the threat of missile attack from a regional adversary.

John McCain is committed to deploying effective missile defenses to reduce the possibility of strategic blackmail by rogue regimes and to secure our homeland from the very real prospect of missile attack by present or future adversaries. America should never again have to live in the shadow of missile and nuclear attack. As President, John McCain will not trust in the "balance of terror" to protect America, but will work to deploy effective missile defenses to safeguard our people and our homeland. (McCain 2007b, under Effective Missile Defense)
His position on missile defense matches the current administration’s position almost exactly. The only possible changes to the current plan under a McCain administration might be more stringent control on cost and contractor discretion. John McCain is a dogged proponent of fiscal conservatism and has a history of closely monitoring defense contracts. Should the currently-proposed missile defense system not produce the advertised results, a McCain administration might be more likely than the Bush administration to alter or cut components of the system to get a better product for the dollars spent. Senator McCain also promises more cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and his proposed “League of Democratic Nations,” (McCain 2008).

Under a McCain administration, the framework of European security might be strikingly different than the current framework, which is mostly a cold war legacy. In all a McCain administration may be more flexible toward Europe. Given the interest in Europe in sharing control of a ballistic missile defense system, a McCain administration might have an easier time implementing the system than the current administration.

Senator Hillary Clinton’s approach to security is more nuanced than John McCain’s. In her November 2007 *Foreign Affairs* article she wrote, “Ongoing military innovation is essential, but the Bush administration has undermined this goal by focusing obsessively on expensive and unproven missile defense technology while making the tragically misguided assumption that light invasion forces could not only conquer the Taliban and Saddam Hussein but also stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq,” (Clinton 2007a).

Senator Clinton seemed to be echoing general Congressional reservations about the European based missile defense system. Mobile sea-based Aegis and land-based Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)/Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile defense system, as a derivative program of existing technology, require little in research and development money to deploy and is considered by some in Congress more proven than the ground based missile defense system designed around the proposed new two stage rocket to be used at the Polish site. The House Armed Services Committee, for example, “expressed concern over the testing plan and risk reduction strategy for the proposed GMD [ground-based midcourse defense] interceptor for Europe,” (Hildreth and Eck 2008).

However, Senator Clinton’s own record on ballistic missile defense systems is ambiguous. She has stated that she favored funding for research on anti-ballistic missile technology, and was one of six Democratic senators to oppose blocking the deployment of the ground based ballistic missile defense system in 2005. (Nichols 2008). However, according to the Center for Defense Information she has voted against funding for missile defense four times, including voting for an amendment to shift fifty million dollars from ballistic missile defense to nuclear non-proliferation programs, (Black 2007). Taking into consideration her views on foreign policy as enumerated in her *Foreign Affairs* article, her voting record, and her calls for a foreign policy that encourages more cooperation with European Allies, a new Clinton administration might well be more opposed to a bilateral approach to missile defense that has a high cost in both dollars and in political capital. Based on available evidence, e.g. Senate votes, speeches and her campaign platform, it is likely that a Hillary Clinton administration’s approach to missile defense would be to fund research at a reduced level while looking for more NATO participation in the cost of a missile defense system and attempting to leverage Aegis and PAC-
THAAD to protect Europe against a perceived ballistic missile threat. Ultimately little action on missile defense, for or against, would be expected in a Clinton presidency.

Barack Obama has the briefest record on BMDS. His only substantive position on the subject can be found in a campaign speech posted on the website YouTube on February 28, 2008. In this speech Sen. Obama presented some of his positions on defense. He said, “I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems,” (Obama 2008). To date Senator Obama has not voted on funding missile defense projects. His campaign does not address missile defense, but does call nuclear proliferation “the most urgent threat to the security of America and the world,” (Obama 2007b). In the candidate section of the Council on Foreign Relations web site, Barack Obama’s only contribution to the ground based missile defense debate is to call for the continuation of the American-Israeli cooperative Arrow missile defense system, (Council on Foreign Relations n.d. under Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Writing in Foreign Affairs in July 2007, Senator Obama appeared to be focused on cooperation and conciliation rather than confrontation writing, “Although we must not shy away from pushing for more democracy and accountability in Russia, we must work with the country in areas of common interest,” (Obama 2007a, under Halting the Spread). Under an Obama administration, the urge to work to reconcile with Russia may well undercut progress on a ground based missile defense system. Taking into consideration his YouTube speech and his views on foreign policy as enumerated in his Foreign Affairs article, one could conclude that an Obama administration would be skeptical of a ground-based missile defense system in Europe. On the other hand, given his strong statements on renewing American leadership in the world such as “I intend to
rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security,” (Obama 2007a), Obama might press for continuation of the project if he could get European agreement on a framework for missile defense. However, in light of his previously cited statement on cutting wasteful spending from the defense budget, there seems to be little prospect of progress without strong European pressure for a ground based missile defense system.

The lack of discourse on BMDS among the Democratic candidates reveals that it is not seen as a critical issue. As of March 15, 2008, the democratic candidates have not had to field any questions about missile defense in any of their numerous debates. There has, likewise, been no mention of BMDS in any speech; save the one posted directly to YouTube by Sen. Obama. Finally, neither of the democratic candidates’ campaigns deigned to respond to this researcher’s specific requests for the candidates’ missile defense positions.

Given the dearth of information on the Democratic candidates’ positions, an analysis of the position taken by the Democratic Congress toward BMDS can illuminate the candidates’ possible positions. Additionally, this analysis will reveal the challenge that John McCain would have to face in Congress should he become president. The Democratic Party’s position is best articulated by Representative Ellen Tauscher of California. She heads the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee and has been vocal about the Democratic-led House Armed Services Committee position on missile defense. Based on the actions taken by Congress, Representative Tauscher’s position is consistent with the Democratic Party position on BMDS and is evident in the little information that is available on the positions of the Democratic presidential
candidates. Representative Tauscher has led the push to significantly curtail spending on a ground based anti-ballistic missile system. In fact $85 million was cut from the $310 million requested for European sites while $549 million was appropriated for the Airborne Laser program which is far less mature, but less opposed internationally. (Wolfe 2007).

The Democratic position has been to fund and rely on mobile systems, like the Aegis and PAC-3/THAAD. In June 2007, Representative Tauscher wrote, “[that]I was not going to support the European sites, that I was not going to support funding them, that I was not really interested in a non-NATO endorsed shield that I wanted to deal with the short-term threats for Europe and cover all of Europe and that I believe we needed to do all that inside of NATO with a cooperative co-pay, so to speak, and that we had to deal with short-term threats not long-term threats,” (Tauscher 2007a). In October 2007, Representative Tauscher revised her position somewhat, writing that Iranian missiles present a threat to Europe and that, “NATO should accelerate its efforts to protect its territory and populations centers against this current threat. This includes ensuring that the NATO ALTBMD (Active Layered Theater ballistic Missile Defense) system can be fully integrated into the proposed U.S. system and encouraging individual allies to acquire and deploy missile defense capabilities such as Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which are designed to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate range ballistic missiles,” (Tauscher 2007b). Most recently, the House Armed Services Committee voted down an attempt by Republicans to restore, to the 2009 House defense appropriations bill, $200 million requested by the Bush administration for European missile defense, (United Press International 2008). While now willing to
continue toward deploying a ground based missile defense system in Europe, it is evident that Democrats want significant NATO involvement, politically and monetarily. The Democratic Congress sees a mobile Aegis/THAAD system as a potential alternative to ground based missile defense in Europe. The House Armed Services Committee directed “the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State are to submit a report to Congress by January 31, 2008, to include how the Administration will obtain NATO support for the European GMD proposal, and how other missile defense capabilities such as Aegis and THAAD could contribute to the missile defense protection of Europe,” (Hildreth and Eck 2008). (This report was not available from either the Department of State, Department of Defense, or Missile Defense Agency websites).

No matter who wins the presidential election, the Democratic Congress will impose conditions on the funding of BMDS that will be difficult to satisfy. They will require a thorough study of all possible missile defense options for Europe, significant NATO involvement, approval by the Polish and Czech governments, and a certification from the Secretary of Defense that the two-stage interceptor to be placed in Poland “‘has demonstrated, through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner’ before funds can be authorized for the acquisition or deployment of operational missiles for the European site” (Hildreth and Eck 2008).

The line of operation of the next American presidential administration is the most complicated of the three lines to analyze. Given opposition to funding an expensive fixed ground based ballistic missile defense system by Congressional Democrats, a strong executive branch push and extensive European cooperation will be required to complete
the planned system. Based on the established Republican position and the candidate’s stated position on missile defense, a McCain administration would make that executive branch push. An Obama or Clinton administration would probably not spend the time or political capital to push funding through a Democratic congress opposed to BMDS. Instead, expect a Democratic administration to try to shift some cost and political burden to Europe. If that is not possible then, without a change of direction in Congress, the ballistic missile defense system would be allowed to atrophy. The only winning strategy to continue a ground based anti-missile system in Europe under a Democratic administration is to frame the threat succinctly, secure the consent of the proposed host nations, the Czech Republic and Poland, and ensure that the cooperative/NATO nature of the program is clear. Under these conditions there may be enough political pull from NATO to continue some level of funding under all possible administrations. In the best conditions under any administration the scale and pace of a ground based missile defense system in Europe will depend to a great extent on the challenges presented by the Democratic Congress and the presidential response to it.

The analysis of all three lines of operation points to a general political strategy for the deployment of BMDS. The most important decisive point is the cooperative nature of the program. The single most persuasive argument to gain the approval of the people and government leaders in Europe is that the missile defense system planned for Poland and the Czech Republic is envisioned as a NATO coordinated system that is being developed by the United States. This is doubly important when considering the likely view of the next United States presidential administration and of the Democratic Congress. While there is little to no current debate between the presidential candidates or in Congress over
the arms control impact of a missile defense system in Europe, there is significant
discourse between the Congress and the Defense Department over the need to base
missiles in fixed sites in Europe vice using mobile systems. If the administration is not
vested in BMDS, the only hope for the implementation of the system is to create a
cohesive lobby from Europe that will persuade that administration to enhance the
leadership role of the U.S. in NATO by deploying a missile shield for Europe.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the pursuit of a national political strategy for missile defense in Europe this thesis answered, “What strategy allows the best chance of success for a ground based missile defense system in Europe?” In answering the primary question, it addressed the questions, “What are the key stumbling blocks to a successful strategy?” and “What are the alternative components of the strategy?” By structuring the analysis of political strategy in terms of logical lines of operation, each of the key constituencies were analyzed in terms of the decisive points that must be satisfied to successfully implement BMDS in Europe. The key logical lines were the European public support, European government support, and the next American presidential administration policy. The decisive points were areas where there was a potential for alternative choices to be made that could prevent the successful deployment of BMDS. There were three decisive points, withdrawal from the ABM treaty / arms control impact, placement of interceptor in Europe / home nation, the cooperative / NATO control of the missile defense system.

When analyzing the logical line pertaining to European public support, this study found that there were polls used to show both opposition to and agreement with BMDS. When analyzing the baseline polling questions and the attitudes of representative populations in the Czech Republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom, as well as a polls that attempt to represent the European public at large, this thesis found two direct reasons for popular European opposition to an American ground-based anti-ballistic missile system and an underlying mistrust of U.S. intentions. The first direct reason is fear of Russian reprisals against Europe in the form of direct targeting of nations who host
components of the system. The second direct reason is the perceived destabilizing impact of anti-ballistic missile systems on the structure of arms control in Europe, leaving Europe less secure overall due to an attempt at protection from a single threat, ballistic missiles. Compounding these direct reasons is an underlying mistrust of American intentions. Some Europeans have expressed reservations about helping the “Bush administration”. In this form of opposition, the benefits of ABM protection of Europe are ignored. The general perception is of a system that the Americans use for their own purpose, created through arm twisting of poor European governments, that does nothing but make Europe less safe.

This study, however, found that, in the context of questions about perceived international threats to Europe, the perceptions of BMDS change. As a function of NATO, BMDS is seen as an integral feature of European security. When questioned about threats to European security, without focusing on potential Russian reprisals to BMDS deployment, Europeans tend to cite ballistic missile delivered weapon of mass destruction as a present or future danger. Against this backdrop, BMDS is seen as necessary to prevent the threat of a ballistic missile strike from impacting the foreign policy or safety of Europe. The crux of a political strategy for defense in Europe is the battle to define the question set for Europeans. When the benefits of a NATO system and the threats of ballistic missile delivered weapons of mass destruction are clearly delineated, Europeans are willing to support the development and deployment of BMDS. When Russian threats and an American controlled missile defense system are the subject of debate, BMDS gets little support. The American political strategy for BMDS in Europe must focus on partnering with European sources to educate the European public
on the threats posed by ballistic missile delivered weapons and how NATO is planning to integrate BMDS, including a U.S. built ground based system, to protect Europe.

Within the framework of this thesis, the line of operation of European public support can have success through all three critical points. While concerns exist that anti-ballistic missile defense systems will destabilized the arms control agreements in place in Europe, it is only in the context of Russian belligerence that the European public sees its security threatened. This underscores that European public support can be maintained, even in the face of Russian threats, if the European public remains more afraid of ballistic missile delivered weapons from new threats than those from Russia. The placement of interceptors in Europe or in their home nation faces little opposition if the system is perceived as a European or NATO controlled system and not an American system. Under NATO control BMDS is seen to serve European purposes to augment European security, not just American security. Thus the question of a NATO system has very broad appeal, while an American system has very little support.

This thesis analyzed European governmental support for a ground based anti-ballistic missile defense system with respect to same three critical nodes as European public support. While the governments of Europe are not fully comfortable with the impact of the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the Russian withdrawal from the CFE treaty, preventing a large scale Russian response to the deployment of BMDS in Europe is not the overwhelming factor in European government politics. Given that a nuclear strike originating in Russia is not an overriding threat; the governments of Europe express concerns about the political fallout from BMDS spreading to energy politics or the role of the European Union in international politics.
The critical point of gaining European government support, considering the impact of BMDS on arms control, is dealt with by emphasizing the importance of addressing the modern concern of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the unique status of Russia in cooperation with NATO and European security.

European basing of BMDS components is a much trickier subject. This is less due to Russian threats of targeting host nations, although that can affect public support for the system, than to European politics and conflicting views of the role of the United States in Europe in the post Cold War era. Those governments and political parties that favor a European foreign policy, free of American interference, see the bilateral deployment of a long term system in Europe as a threat to pan-European sovereignty. They believe that the American presence will serve to split European Unity and offer an alternative mechanism to stability that will stunt the growth of European institutions. On the other hand, a U.S. base is seen by some Eastern European countries as an additional guarantor of American protection should the host nation be attacked.

The last critical point is the cooperative / NATO control of the system. It is through its cooperative nature that BMDS gains most of its support from European governments. Many NATO and European government officials feel BMDS is or will be needed shortly for Europe. The question is how to achieve it. NATO has been working on ALTBMD for theater defense of troops. As ballistic missile technology matures in threat countries, the perceived need for ballistic missile defense has spread to European defense as well. Following the model of NATO ALTBMD leads to a cooperative system. The problem is that the European states do not have and have not budgeted to purchase systems that support long range missile defense in the way that they have purchased
systems that can be incorporated into ALTBMD for theater defense. However, European
governments have a mechanism to leverage American money and technology to protect
Europe through NATO. Therein lays the essentiality of the cooperative nature of the
program. The political strategy to ensure European government support for BMDS in
Europe dovetails nicely with the strategy for public support. The U.S. must emphasize
NATO development and coordination as a fundamental feature of an American BMDS in
Europe. Cooperation and diplomacy must be used to reduce the ramifications of BMDS
development on European politics and diplomacy. Finally, the U.S. must help find a
place for BMDS within the architecture of European sovereignty. BMDS can not be seen
as an American interventionist threat that will unravel European relationships and
international bodies, such as EU foreign policy, outside of NATO.

The line of operation of the next American Presidential administration is
arguably, the most complicated of the three logical lines of operation to analyze. Given
opposition to funding an expensive ground based anti-ballistic missile system in
Congress a strong Executive push and cooperation will be required to complete the
planned system. A McCain administration would make that push. A Democratic
administration, however, would probably not spend the time and capital to push funding
through an opposed Democratic congress. Instead, expect a Democratic administration to
try to shift some cost and political burden to Europe; “NATO-ization” is the term used to
express this policy on BMDS. If that is not possible, and based on current European
military budget structure and, at a minimum, ambivalence it may well not be, then the
anti-ballistic missile system would be allowed to atrophy. To deploy BMDS under a
Democratic administration under the current Democratic Congress, the threat must be
framed succinctly, cooperative / NATO nature of the program must be clear, and European allies must be clear that they support and desire BMDS in Europe. Under these conditions there may be enough political pull from Europe and in the U.S. to continue some level of funding under all possible administrations.

The prospects for a ground based anti-ballistic missile system in Europe are fairly good. That said; much depends on the next American administration. The critical issues to address in a strategy for a ground based anti-ballistic missile system in Europe are easily addressed as they pertain to the European populace and governments. While there is a fair amount of polarity among these constituents, by stressing the cooperative nature of the project, working to put a European face on control of missile defense operation, and working through institutions such as NATO to address arms control concerns, the collaboration or acquiescence of Europeans can be assured. A system that is run by NATO for the security and stability of the region, with respect and input from Russia, can win wide support in Europe. However, the next Presidential administration may have steep reservations about the creation of such a system. The impression in U.S political circles is that well over half of the European populace and European politicians do not want the ground based anti-ballistic missile defense system. As has been shown, this is not strictly true. Europeans do not want another American weapons system on their soil doing nothing for them but making them a target and protecting only the U.S. Since there is little interest in missile defense as an election issue and focus has been put on missile defense by the Democratic candidates, there is no realization of the European attitude toward missile defense beyond the superficial. Given that the Democratic Party has reservations about the cost and utility of the proposed BMDS in Europe, a Democratic
President can be expected to minimize funding for the implementation of such a system. Due to the significant difference in view of the European politicians and the European populace depending on how a missile defense system is described, there will continue to be calls in Europe for the U.S to pay a disproportionate price in money and political capitol for the creation of a the system.

**Recommendations**

In order to give the best chance of implementing a ground based anti-ballistic missile system in Europe, the strategy should be emphasize NATO coordination of any U.S. built BMDS in Europe. Paired with the efforts of European partner governments, the European populace could be educated on the benefits and true costs of BMDS in Europe. In addition European partners and NATO country could mobilize pressure to complete and implement a missile defense system in the U.S. Congress and in the halls of European governance. The system would have to be positioned as a NATO system built by the U.S due to the U.S experience in building other segments of the integrated system. All negotiations on the impact of the system on arms control should be between NATO and Russia. The European populace and governments must own the implementation of the system. The perception of U.S. unilateralism must be avoided due to the parallels with Cold War animosity toward Russia and European popular resentment of an unchecked U.S. hegemon. This strategy will require discipline in the military proponents of the system, the European allies of the system, and the American presidential administration. The diplomatic, stability, and power projection benefits of the system must be communicated to the next American administration. A team effort will be required to push the expense of BMDS through a skeptical U.S. Congress.
Further Action

The proponents of the ground based anti-ballistic missile system in Europe must create a coordinated campaign to educate the public and elites on the benefits and structure of the system. Many of the current obstacles are based on inadequate information. The European populace does not understand how NATO BMDS would be designed and implemented by member countries prior to incorporation into NATO. More polling must be done throughout Europe to inform and gauge the level of support that the missile defense system has based on the NATO format of the system. This data must be released to support the proponents of the system and reduce the cost of the system in political capitol and real money transfers to placate the governments that agree to host system components. The cost of the system must be explained in a way that correctly correlates to the benefits that can be expected. In the current climate of misinformation and polarity the cost of building the system seems disproportionate for the U.S, a fact that could kill the program under an administration that is not already committed to missile defense. If all this can be done the future may be safer under the umbrella of durable sustained missile defense for Europe.


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