AFRICA COMMAND AND THE MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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Africa is worthy of increased attention and U.S. national policy is adjusting to meet the continent’s rising strategic value. Rife with disease, war, and desperate poverty, Africa presents unique security challenges that threaten both the U.S. core value of preserving human dignity and America’s strategic priority of combating global terror. The President’s African policy establishes a goal of ensuring an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity. In pursuit of this goal, the U.S. finds itself in the unique position to leverage a momentous shift in military focus which aims to mitigate conditions that lead to conflict by working with allies and partners to shape the international environment by promoting stability and security. USAFRICOM is the embodiment of this opportunity. However, there are those who argue USAFRICOM represents the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Here perception is trumping reality as U.S. efforts do little to alleviate the perception of policy militarization. Yet, the U.S. can recover by implementing an integrated 3D security engagement policy. To do less would not only ensure the U.S. wastes an opportunity to realize what is arguably a genuine revolution in military affairs; it would also fall short of its stated national objectives.
AFRICA COMMAND AND THE MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The end of the Cold War brought about a new era of remarkable change within the United States Government (USG). Within this confluence of change, two independent threads emerged, evolved, and eventually started to converge. The first thread deals with the continent of Africa and its rise in strategic value vis-à-vis United States (U.S.) national interests. Once relegated to the dustbin it suddenly roared to the top of the heap—it was suddenly very important. The March 2006 National Security Strategy states that, “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration...our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.” The genesis of America’s renewed commitment to Africa is rooted in large part to its value as an important source of “energy supplies, a possible safe haven for terrorist groups, a transit node of illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people, and a growing voice in multilateral institutions.”

The second thread relates to a momentous shift in military focus. Whereas the military at one time focused almost exclusively on waging war, it now began a conscious shift towards preventing war—this out of the realization that it is more cost effective to prevent war than it was to wage it. The U.S. military adjusted, and continues to adjust, its policy, doctrine, and strategies to include an emphasis on proactive peacetime engagement as a way to achieving national strategy objectives.

The two threads first come together at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) headquartered in Stuttgart Germany. A Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), USEUCOM’s area of responsibility includes all of Europe, Russia, Israel, and most of Africa. Through its efforts in the global war on terror, USEUCOM pioneered a new
approach to theater security cooperation (TSC) and traditional warfighting—a new kind of campaign it called Phase Zero. The command “operationalized” their TSC and capacity-building efforts by collaborating with regional allies and focusing on terrorism’s long-term, underlying conditions. With an emphasis on interagency cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, Phase Zero represents a natural outgrowth of or evolution in the concept of proactive peacetime engagement.

In recognition of the need for a unified response to Africa’s growing “military, strategic, and economic importance,” the current administration established a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) on February 6, 2007. USAFRICOM is not like other traditional Unified Commands in that its focus is first and foremost on war prevention rather than warfighting. Taken in large part from within USEUCOM itself, the new GCC retains the pioneering TSC and capacity-building focus begun under the auspices of its parent organization. In addition, USAFRICOM is also pioneering interagency interaction with one of its two deputies a senior State Department official and an unprecedented number of interagency civilians in key leadership roles. The arrival of USAFRICOM suggests these once divergent threads will inextricably link and share a common path—however, will this prove to be the case?

Not surprisingly, not everyone thinks USAFRICOM’s approach to proactive peacetime engagement is a good idea. Some in Africa worry the new command signals the “reintroduction of Cold War-era arms sales” and “support for repressive regimes.” There are also those who cite “years of colonial subjugation” and accuse the U.S. of “neo-imperialism and resource exploitation.” Furthermore, Africans are not the only ones expressing concern. There are elements within the State Department and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) who voice concern that the military may “overestimate” its capabilities as well as its “diplomatic role” in Africa. The foreign press, never shy about voicing their opinions, print denouncements such as, “It is therefore disturbing to note that democracy, health, education, economic growth and development are being tied to military interests.” Still others contend the GCCs are examples of American Proconsuls plying foreign policy. The implication for the new command being, USAFRICOM as a GCC represents the next step in the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

Does USAFRICOM signal a militarization of U.S. foreign policy? The author posits that it very well may. Whether or not the U.S. is intentionally militarizing its foreign policy is relatively unimportant--what is important, however, is that many perceive it to be the case. Here perception trumps reality and in the case of USAFRICOM, perceptions are shaping how the command represents and shapes itself. If left unchecked, the problem of perception management may cause the aforementioned threads to separate and diverge. If this were to occur we would not only waste an opportunity to realize the full potential of what is arguably a genuine revolution in military affairs, we would also fall short of our stated national objectives. The author submits that lacking bold reform to ensure the two convergent threads remain so wound they may just unravel. Over the long-term, this would have deleterious effects on U.S. – African relations and may spur African states to turn to others, like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for assistance and partnership.

While all efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, the author submits they are overly reliant on the military for implementation. Consequently, our efforts only
serve to underscore and highlight the appearance of policy militarization—ultimately this weakens rather than strengthens the link between the two threads. It is therefore ironic that the harder the military tries to implement proactive peacetime engagement the weaker and more distant the bond grows between those the military is trying to help and the military itself. However, if the proactive peacetime engagement thread were to reflect a non-military lead and include diverse USG participation, the bond between threads might actually strengthen. To some degree, the USG is striving to do just this. However, USG efforts to date fall short of the scale of change required and they do not adequately address the perceptions of militarizing our foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. The bold steps this paper recommends could prove to be the level of change required to shift the balance in favor of strengthening the two threads. These steps must be permanent, come with the appropriate resources, and address transformational change starting at the strategic level. To do less will likely mean the U.S., at best, maintains the status quo, and as a direct consequence, it will fall short of meeting its goal of “an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.”

**Africa Rising**

Africa is a continent growing in strategic importance. Among the reasons for Africa’s rise in strategic value is the continent’s fine natural resources; in some cases, Africa will be as important a source for U.S. energy imports as is the Middle East. U.S. interests in Africa also reflect marked concern over issues such as: potential terrorist safe havens; transit nodes for illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people; Africa’s growing stature in multilateral institutions; armed conflict and humanitarian crises, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the growing influence of peer competitors such as the PRC.
Equally important, as the atrocities in Darfur bear witness, certain elements within Africa continue to “test the resolve of the international community and the U.S. to prevent mass killings and genocide.” Moreover, other nations are also expressing increased interest in Africa; the world’s major powers are working aggressively to seek out investments, win contracts, peddle influence, and build political support on the African continent. With respect to access to Africa’s oil, natural gas, and other natural resources, the U.S. is in direct competition with numerous nations to include India, Europe, and the PRC. Clearly, Africa demands, and is now getting, long wanted, and much deserved attention.

U.S. National policy edicts in recent years reflect Africa’s rise in strategic import. In July 2003, The President’s African Policy states that “promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty” and that this “threatens both a core value of the U.S.--preserving human dignity--and our strategic priority--combating global terror.” In July 2005, President Bush garnered G-8 partner commitment for initiatives that advance U.S. priorities in Africa to include: forgiving debt; fighting malaria; addressing urgent humanitarian needs; improving education; boosting development assistance; increasing trade and investment; and broadening support for peace and stability. The March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy states, “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration,” and “the U.S. recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.” Then, on February 6, 2007, the administration announced its decision to establish a new unified GCC, USAFRICOM.
The formation of USAFRICOM represents an internal reorganization of the military command structure, creating one administrative headquarters focused solely on Africa and designed to help to coordinate USG contributions across the continent. Unlike traditional Unified Commands, USAFRICOM will concentrate its efforts on war prevention rather than warfighting. The new command supports two primary missions: (1) strengthening security cooperation by creating new opportunities to bolster capabilities; and, (2) enhancing efforts to help bring peace and security by promoting development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth. USAFRICOM will work in close partnership with not only other USG elements, but also with African states, regional security organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and a variety of international partners. At full operational capability, USAFRICOM’s innovative interagency structure will pursue non-kinetic missions across Africa. USAFRICOM will conduct traditional military operations only when directed. As one expert in defense policy and foreign affairs accurately opines, “In many ways, USAFRICOM is a post-Cold War experiment that radically rethinks security in the early 21st century based on peace-building lessons learned since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”

To meet its goals and objectives, USAFRICOM must leverage all the instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)--through a coordinated interagency effort. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between not only the military and the other instruments of national power, but also with NGOs and international organizations. For interagency efforts to be successful, they must be fully integrated and synchronized, achieving unity of effort across the whole-of-government and beyond. This is no small task and though the USG has largely come
to grips with the critical importance of interagency coordination, and is prioritizing it at all levels, it has to date, done poorly at developing and implementing interagency solutions. To avoid repeating previous U.S. interagency missteps, USAFRICOM’s architects are pioneering a unique approach to interagency coordination within a GCC, this by placing a senior State Department official as one of two deputy commanders and including an unprecedented number of interagency civilians in key leadership roles throughout the command. By itself, the infusion of civilians into the command structure will not guarantee success; USAFRICOM must also be able to identify commonly understood objectives and translate those objectives into demonstrable action in a coherent and efficient collective operation. Achieving this unity of effort and purpose will require a momentous shift in national strategy, policy, and doctrine.

A Revolution in Policy, Doctrine, and Strategy

In what must certainly be a genuine Revolution in Military Affairs, the U.S. military has fundamentally adjusted its policy, doctrine, and strategies over the last decade and a half to include an emphasis on proactive peacetime engagement as a way to achieving national strategy objectives. Proactive peacetime engagement is based on the principle that it is “much more cost effective to prevent conflict than it is to stop one once it has started” and its efforts are designed to “reassure allies and partners, promote stability and mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict.” Evolving to meet the emerging challenges of an uncertain and complex security environment, the philosophy of proactive peacetime engagement aims to shape the international milieu to meet national interests by creating partnerships and building the capacity of allies and partners. While some may argue that the military has always performed this function,
the military’s role in conflict prevention did not take root in policy until the fall of the Soviet Empire—the post-Cold War era. This philosophical shift away from a focus on fighting wars is at the core of USAFRICOM’s mission.

In the next important step in evolutionary design, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) published in August 2005 reintroduces the proactive peacetime engagement philosophy via two new joint doctrine concepts designed to “minimize the use of armed force” and integrate interagency and multinational partners across the full range of military operations. With respect to the first, shaping operations, the ability to maintain peace and prevent conflict or crises is as important as the ability to wage major combat operations. The primary focus of peacetime shaping operations is to spread democracy by “creating an environment of peace, stability, and goodwill.” Concerning the second, stability operations, achieving desired political aims by winning war “requires resolving crises, winning conventional combat operations, and ensuring stability in affected areas.” This may require the military to help provide a secure environment, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and similar types of assistance. The doctrinal emphasis on shaping and stability operations represents the first step in codifying the military’s new mission focus; that is, do everything you can to prevent war when you can, and then, if you must wage war, do everything you can to quickly end the conflict and reintroduce stability.

Shaping operations fall under the Joint Doctrine rubric of Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. In shaping operations, the military collaborates with numerous foreign and domestic agencies and organizations across a wide range of activities “to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict.”
Combatant commanders complement and reinforce the other instruments of national power and regional allies to shape their areas of responsibility through security cooperation activities. Through its efforts to prosecute the global war on terror in Africa, USEUCOM “operationalized” TSC and capacity-building efforts in a new kind of campaign it called, Phase Zero. Also known as the Shape Phase, these operations are continuous and adaptive non-kinetic shaping activities that encompass “everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.”

The ultimate goal of Phase Zero operations is to “promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.” In addition, these operations also aim “to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives.” With respect to counter-terrorism activities, Phase Zero operations address the underlying conditions that fuel and enable terrorism. Of note, during typical Phase Zero operations, the military will likely play a supporting role rather than a supported role and the military’s programs will be only one part of the larger USG effort. Because these operations are an open-ended, long-term approach to preventing conflict, some consider it “more appropriate to describe Phase Zero as a campaign in and of itself—a new kind of campaign that must be fought continuously by U.S. joint forces in concert with the interagency community and in cooperation with allies and partner nations.”

The publication of Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 codifies and clarifies the military’s role in stability operations. The landmark directive defines stability operations as joint military and civilian efforts to establish or
maintain order and stability across the full spectrum of a campaign--peace through conflict. More notably, DOD Directive 3000.05 establishes stability operations as a core military mission that “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”

In keeping with the ideals outlined in the CCJO, the new directive shifts the military’s focus from “enemy-centric” to “population-centric” effects, emphasizing activities that benefit the “indigenous peaceful population” over traditional activities that direct action against enemy forces. Successful stability operations require fully integrated and synchronized civil-military efforts.

To this end, DOD Directive 3000.05 tasks the military, be it in a leading or supporting role during an operation, to work in close coordination with its interagency counterparts to include other U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations, foreign and domestic NGOs, and the private sector.

The introduction and inculcation of shaping and stability operations into military strategy, policy, and doctrine since 2005 signals senior leadership’s categorical support for the concept of war prevention. Therefore, given the additional emphasis in joint doctrine, it should then come as no surprise that the military’s take charge, “can do” attitude coupled with its large resource pool has literally catapulted the military out in front of other government agencies in its ability to implement and support stability operations. As is the case with USAFRICOM, the military is now taking the lead across USG efforts in implementing the concept. However, the question is--should the military take the lead? Both policy and doctrine describe successful shaping and stability operations as closely integrated interagency efforts where the military often plays a supporting vice a supported role. To address the lack of a definitive community-wide
lead and to achieve maximum effect, the Bush administration issued a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) in December 2005 assigning a focal point for leading reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related efforts across the USG departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{67}

NSPD-44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” assigns the DOS with the responsibility to “coordinate, lead, and strengthen USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization missions and to harmonize efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.”\textsuperscript{68} The directive also establishes a framework to integrate Civilian-Military coordination and planning activities citing that, when relevant and appropriate, the Secretaries of State and Defense are to integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, NSPD-44 charges the DOS with two added functions. First, the DOS is responsible for coordinating stability and reconstruction activities and preventive strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, NGO, and other private sector entities.\textsuperscript{70} Second, the DOS is also responsible for developing strategies to build partnership capacity abroad and for leveraging NGO and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization activities.\textsuperscript{71} Therefore, in light of the above, it is clear that the DOS is the central lead in pre-crisis and preventive security cooperation efforts.

Problems With Perception Management

USAFRICOM’s unique approach to proactive peacetime engagement reflects the very evolution in national strategy described above.\textsuperscript{72} In keeping with the precepts of emerging policy and doctrine, USAFRICOM planners are “organizing along highly
nontraditional lines,” designing the command to “build both indigenous African security capacities and U.S. interagency collaboration” capabilities.\textsuperscript{73} To underscore its departure from the norm, USAFRICOM has dropped the traditional “J-code” organizational structure normally associated with combatant command staffs.\textsuperscript{74} In another demonstration of its uniqueness, the new command employs a senior State Department official as one of its two deputies and has an unprecedented number of interagency civilians throughout the organization to include in key leadership positions.\textsuperscript{75} USAFRICOM’s nontraditional “emphasis on development and war-prevention in lieu of warfighting” is garnering “widespread praise” throughout the USG.\textsuperscript{76}

However, the less than traditional military focus is also engendering “mixed feelings” within certain quarters of the government.\textsuperscript{77} Some elements within the DOS and USAID express concern that the military may “overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role in Africa, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate.”\textsuperscript{78} These concerns are, to a certain extent, justifiable. Though the authority for international engagement belongs to the DOS, the department has no more than 4,000 to 5,000 Foreign Service Officers in the field—far less than what DOD can leverage through its TSC efforts.\textsuperscript{79} The DOS also lacks comparable resources required to conduct extensive partner engagement activities such as schools, visits, exercises, equipment, and other cooperation activities.\textsuperscript{80} As if there were not enough, Congress affected deep cuts into the DOS and other civilian agencies during the 1990s, significantly reducing foreign aid budget authorizations while simultaneously enhancing military capability.\textsuperscript{81} In a concerted effort to assuage concerns over its role in the foreign policy arena, DOD press releases are emphatic in pointing out that USAFRICOM is not
to assuming “a leadership role, rather it will be one in support of efforts of leading
countries through our binational and bilateral relationships and then African Union and
other multinational organizations.”

Yet, despite DOD’s statements to the contrary, there are those who believe that
USAFRICOM--like the other GCCs--is another prime example of American Proconsuls
plying foreign policy. In ancient Rome, proconsuls were provincial governors
responsible for overseeing the army, justice, and administration within their province.
Later, the title referenced colonial governors with similar far-reaching powers. Today,
pundits note that American GCCs have “evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the
Roman Empire’s proconsuls--well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of
U.S. foreign policy.” The GCC’s rise in preeminence reflects not only the void left by a
weakening DOS, it more notably also reflects the government’s ever increasing
dependency on its military to carry out its foreign affairs.

The historic 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
represents the first discernable effort to expand GCC powers with the legislation
increasing GCC responsibilities and influence as war fighters. As the Goldwater-
Nichols Act took root and started to flourish, the Clinton administration started
expanding the role of the GCCs by tasking the commands with the mission to shape
their regions using multilateral approaches in ways that exceeded the traditional role of
the military. The Clinton administration also learned during this period that “they could
shove more and more duties onto the Defense Department” to include jobs formerly
spread out among the civilian agencies and that “the military would accept it and carry
on.” Moreover, in addition to executive and legislative efforts to expand the military’s
mission, the DOD’s self-driven shift in emphasis towards proactive peacetime engagement also pushed the military further into expanded diplomatic and political roles.\textsuperscript{91} By the end of the 1990’s, the GCCs had become far more that war fighters.\textsuperscript{92} The GCCs had grown to “transcend military matters and encroach into all the elements of national power.”\textsuperscript{93}

The apparent “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy, though transparent to most of the domestic American audience, is glaringly obvious to a foreign audience acutely aware of shifts in U.S. policy--particularly in Africa where USAFRICOM is being met with “less than euphoria” in many states.\textsuperscript{94} The Africans, fearing both the “reintroduction of Cold War-era arms sales” and “U.S. support for repressive regimes,” are quick to cite “hundreds of years of colonial subjugation” and “accuse the U.S. of neo-imperialism and resource exploitation.”\textsuperscript{95} African nations are also concerned that USAFRICOM “will incite, not preclude, terrorist attacks.”\textsuperscript{96} To exacerbate African fears, poorly conceived references to USAFRICOM as a combatant command “plus” only serve to call greater attention to the command’s military mission. Again, concerns such as these are not without foundation. Despite USAFRICOM’s focus on a broader ‘soft power’ mandate designed to build a stable security environment, it is still a military command and as such, it has “all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations.”\textsuperscript{97}

Touted as being unique amongst its peers, USAFRICOM’s mission is a genuine attempt to establish security through a blend of soft and hard power.\textsuperscript{98} To alleviate concerns and offset strategic communication gaffs, both USAFRICOM and the Bush administration are continuously emphasizing and reiterating the “command’s benevolent
intentions and nonmilitary character." Strategic communications aim to reassure external audiences, particularly the African nations, that the U.S. is not pursuing colonial or imperial aspirations on the continent. In an environment where overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, it is an imperative that the multinational partners do not see the American efforts as predatory or paternalistic.

Despite an aggressive strategic communications campaign, actions do speak louder than words and, as a result, there are fundamental questions which have yet to be addressed--questions that serve to undermine both the command’s and the USG’s credibility in the USAFRICOM endeavor. The critical question being, why is the military leading an organization whose stated mission is, by definition, largely the responsibility of the DOS? Correspondingly, what message is the USG trying to impart on its foreign partners and those it professes to be helping, when it intentionally places a military commander in a position of authority over his State counterpart? Intentional or not, the USG is, via its implementation of USAFRICOM, feeding the perception of a militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Here perception trumps reality and, in the case of USAFRICOM, perceptions are shaping how the command represents and shapes itself.

While efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, they are overly reliant on the military to implement and as such persist in portraying an appearance of policy militarization and thus weaken the link between the two threads. Lacking bold reform to ensure the two, convergent threads remain so wound they may well unravel. If the threads do in fact diverge, the U.S. would not only waste an opportunity to realize the full potential of what is arguably a genuine revolution in military affairs; it would also fall short of its stated national objectives. In the end, Africa may turn elsewhere for aid and
assistance—countries like the PRC would like nothing more than to increase its already growing status in Africa.101 Ironically, as the military increases its proactive peacetime engagement efforts the weaker the bond grows between the two threads.

However, if the proactive peacetime engagement thread were to reflect a non-military lead coupled with a still greater diversity in USG participation, the bond between threads may actually strengthen rather than weaken. Today the USG is striving to do just this, but the efforts fall short of the scale of change required and do not adequately address the perceptions of militarizing our foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. The bold steps recommended below, if adopted, might prove to be the level of change required to shift the balance in favor of strengthening the two threads and ensuring success. These steps must be permanent, come with the appropriate resources, address transformational change starting at the strategic level, and take the next evolutionary leap started in the revolution in military affairs noted above—establishing a genuinely integrated and proactive security engagement framework.

Making It Right

According to a senior USAID official, “It is clearly in the U.S. government’s interest to utilize our toolkit of diplomacy, defense, and development to counter the destabilizing effects that poor governance, corruption, and weak rule of law have on political and economic systems…and the threats they pose to vital American interests.”102 Similarly, in a statement regarding the military’s role in Africa, the USAFRICOM commander refers to a ‘three-pronged’ USG approach, with DOD taking the lead on security issues, but “playing a supporting role to the Department of State, which conducts diplomacy, and USAID, which implements development programs.”103 Together, these two
statements provide a brief glimpse of a potential solution for the demilitarization of U.S. foreign policy—a concept referred to as 3D security engagement. The 3D concept supports three equal pillars of engagement: diplomacy, development, and defense all working in unison to address threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, health pandemics, etc. By including development and diplomacy as an equal part of the security strategy equation, the 3D security engagement concept de-emphasizes the militaristic aspect of security engagement. The 3D concept also advances the views reflected in edicts such as the CCJO, NSPD-44 and DODD 3000.05—that focusing on the root causes of insecurity and preventing conflict leads to stable and sustainable peace.

Within the USG today, the departments and agencies whose mission sets most closely represent the 3D security engagement concept are the DOS, the DOD, and the USAID. These organizations have the responsibilities, authorities, resources, and capabilities needed to reassure allies and partners, promote stability, and mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict. Other elements of the USG, international and regional organizations, NGOs, et cetera matrix into and out of the 3D security engagement process as required. In this way, the 3D security engagement concept is not a substitution or a replacement for integrated interagency interaction; rather it is a way to better organize and implement the interagency activities. The “Interagency” is not a person, place or thing. It is not part of the government, it has no leader, nor does it have a workforce. The interagency is the intersection where the DOD, DOS, and the other formal agencies of the USG coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate to achieve some objective. It is a process. Similarly, the three Ds do not specifically refer to a
given department or agency. For instance, Development does not refer exclusively to USAID. Instead, it refers more appropriately to the activity of Development for which USAID plays a leading role and which DOD or a NGO might be a large participant.

To implement the 3D security engagement concept, and mitigate concerns over the militarization of foreign power, the USG must address key obstacles through bold reform and policy driven by national-level strategic leadership. To this end, isolated here are, in the author’s opinion, the four fundamental impediments blocking a practicable implementation of the 3D security engagement concept as it affects and relates to the demilitarization of foreign policy. Also presented here are recommendations for overcoming each obstacle. While the recommendations proffered are not individually novel in and of themselves, they do however, represent an unique amalgamation of popular opinion presented within the context of the 3D security engagement concept as the next step in the revolution in military affairs that started with proactive peacetime engagement. These solutions, though likely to be contentious within certain USG circles, are nonetheless easily achievable, and if implemented, they would certainly address perceptions of foreign policy militarization.

First, there is no one common regional system for viewing the world within the USG—today each department or agency assigns regions differently. To ensure all USG departments and agencies view the world using the same template, realign the regions of the world under one common system applicable to the whole of government. Today, all of the key national security elements of the USG define global regions differently, creating policy seams and overlaps that often lead to poor coordination. In addition, the complete absence of economic and information regions further undermines national
strategic direction at the regional level. Therefore, this rather simple but critical initiative reduces complications of interagency coordination that multiply as seams and overlaps occur across the departments and agencies.

Second, there is no senior USG functional lead to oversee security engagement efforts in region. To improve unity of effort, reduce peer competition, and mitigate perceptions of the militarization of foreign policy, establish a forward-deployed National Security Council (NSC)-level representative to oversee and lead 3D efforts in each region. The NSC is the “President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with the administration’s senior national security advisors and cabinet officials,” advising and assisting the President with integrating all aspects of domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic national security policy. Given the high degree of insight into national strategic objectives inherent within the NSC, placing a senior NSC representative to oversee 3D efforts within each region will ensure the principal 3D elements—DOD, DOS, and USAID—all work within the same national-level guidance and towards the same national-level objectives.

Third, there are currently no physical constructs in region to host combined 3D security engagement efforts apart from the Combatant Commands. To provide a shared environment for coordination, cooperation, and collaboration as well as to diminish perceptions of a militarized foreign policy, the USG must establish 3D Centers in each region separate and apart from the existing Combatant Commands. Though it may be the most costly to implement, this initiative is essential if the USG is to eliminate all vestiges of a militarized foreign policy. A key element in resolving where to place 3D
Centers sits with foreign allies and friends; potential partners who may find value and prestige in having such centers located in their nation.

Fourth, there are insufficient State and USAID resources to implement proactive security engagement activities worldwide. To offset the unequal distribution of resources between the DOD, DOS, and USAID, and to mitigate the perception and potential for a militarization of foreign policy, increase civilian capacity for both the State Department and the USAID. Forced by circumstance and by direction, the U.S. military has taken on many of burdens that in the past were the purview of civilian agencies; yet, despite its gallant efforts, the military is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.¹¹⁵ Much like the DOS initiative to build a civilian response corps, the USG needs to develop a permanent, sizeable cadre of immediately deployable civilian experts with disparate skills to supplement or replace existing DOD efforts.¹¹⁶ A robust civilian capability cannot but help to reduce the military footprint in certain shaping and stability operations.¹¹⁷ Not only would an enhanced civilian capability reduce the temptation to use the military as a first choice, it would also have a positive impact on perceptions abroad.

The Cost of Missed Opportunities

Africa is a continent worthy of increased U.S. attention. The March 2006 National Security Strategy states, “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration…our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.”¹¹⁸ The President’s African Policy reminds us that “promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty” and that this “threatens both a core value of the U.S.--preserving human dignity--and our
strategic priority--combating global terror.” With these two pronouncements, the President of the United States challenged the nation to come to the aid of those less fortunate while also opposing those who would threaten or inflict their will upon these peoples. As luck or divine providence would ascribe, the USG is in the unique position to leverage a momentous and historic shift in military focus--that it is possible to mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict by working with allies and partners to shape the international environment and thus promote stability and security. USAFRICOM is the embodiment of this opportunity.

However, as one might expect there are those who oppose USAFRICOM’s role in meeting and overcoming the challenge. Chief among those expressing concerns and fears are some of the African nations themselves who, after the many years of colonial rule, are justifiably cautious and dubious of American interests. They, and others, argue that the U.S. is militarizing its foreign policy. Whether or not the U.S. is intentionally militarizing its foreign policy is unimportant--what is important, however, is that many perceive it to be the case. While U.S. efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, they are however overly reliant on the military and, as such, do little to alleviate the perception of policy militarization. The USG can, however, mitigate and reverse the perception problem by implementing an integrated 3D security engagement policy. The recommendations presented in this paper offer a course of action that might prove to be the level of change required to establish a viable 3D policy. To do less would not only ensure the U.S. wastes its opportunity to realize the full potential of what is arguably a genuine revolution in military affairs; it would also fall short of its stated national objectives.
Endnotes


5 Ibid., 72.

6 Ibid., 73.


9 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


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19 Lake, 5.
20 Ibid., 9-10.
21 Ibid., 9.
24 McFate, 15.
26 Ward.
27 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 McFate, 10.
35 Ibid., xi.
37 McFate, 17.

38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, IV-1.

39 Dyekman, 1.


41 Dyekman, 1.

42 McFate, 16.

43 Ibid., 16-17.


46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

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50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Wald, 73.

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55 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, IV-27.

56 Wald, 73.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 75.

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100 Bush, 37.

101 McFate, 13.


103 Ploch, 5.


105 Ibid.

106 Jones, 12.


108 Ibid.


110 Flournoy, 36-39.


112 Bouchat, 6.


116 Ibid., 7.

117 Ibid., 8.

118 Bush, 37.

120 Jones, 12.