T. MILLER MAGUIRE AND THE LOST ESSENCE OF STRATEGY

BY

MR. GEOFFREY DEMAREST
Department of Army Civilian

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**Report Documentation Page**

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Mr. Geoffrey Demarest
Department of Army Civilian

Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
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T. Miller Maguire was a prolific British instructor, author, and commentator on military subjects. (A Summary of Modern Military History (1887); Outlines of Military Geography (1899); Guerilla or Partisan Warfare (1904); General Von Clausewitz On War (1909); etc.) Well read among British students of strategy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, his name and writings all but disappeared from the active literature after his death in 1920. His matter-of-fact encapsulations regarding the marshalling and application of land power, couched always in History and Geography, remain relevant today. In several writings, Maguire offers a brief synthesis of what he accepts as timeless principles of military strategy. This paper reintroduces Maguire and his work, focusing on his succinct understanding of military strategy. Maguire’s integrated assertions offer a new old way to explain operational art and perhaps to improve today’s military doctrine. On the larger scale of national strategy, Maguire’s accusatorial but insightful outlook at a time of great technological and geopolitical change provokes doubt about American military readiness to meet challenges of the not too distant future.
This research project is inspired by a paragraph written in 1899, in the introduction to a book on military geography, to arm its readers with a working concept of strategy. That summarization, perhaps unique in military literature, is singularly useful to understanding the practical inter-relationship of strategic principles. The general work of the paragraph's author, Thomas Miller Maguire, may be as interesting to the military historian and pedant as it is to the strategist. Nevertheless, although dragged dusty from the back of the vault, such a clear synthesis of principles is a detail missing in current guides to strategic thinking, and may be worthy of consideration for inclusion in today's doctrine. The original paragraph is as follows:

Once the reader understands that soldiering and fighting are far from synonymous—that in a campaign combats are occasional while marching is constant—that before entering into battle a general must be most careful to secure his line or lines of retreat; he understands the leading principles of strategy, whether he can define the phrase to his satisfaction or not. He sees that a general whose road homeward or to his base is threatened or cut by a superior force must, if he loses a decisive battle, be ruined as well as defeated; while a general who has secured his line of communication will not be ruined even if defeated, but can fall back, procure recruits, replenish his wagons, and begin to fight again with a fair prospect of success.¹

Maguire’s summation of military strategy, as well as the general course of his teachings in military history and geography, can toss us a lost key to improve American military doctrine in the 21st century.

Who was T. Miller Maguire and how did he arrive at his matter-of-fact assertions? By what logic does Maguire’s shorthand explain timeless strategic principles? How might his encapsulations be relevant and important to us now? With the paper thus divided, the answers are abbreviated as follows: 1. Maguire was an educated,
somewhat eccentric advocate of British military power who compiled and competently synthesized the lessons of other strategists and past wars. His syntheses are the product of avocation, study, legalistic logic and economy; 2. Maguire’s statements weave together traditional considerations of battle, movement, concentration, surprise, speed, risk management, position, and morale in a manner that considers their interrelated effect in competitive time and space; 3. If we compare his briefs on operational strategy to current United States doctrine, we might conclude that the essence of strategy has endured, but that its expression lost some of its integrating logic. If we use Maguire’s synthesis of principles to cross-examine current American doctrine, the latter appears less efficient. For instance, Maguire’s syntheses give prominence to the observation that physically weaker contenders must secure their movement between places of tactical events and places of sanctuary, an idea that seems to have been underweighted in recent doctrine. That observation is as relevant in 2008 as it was in 1808, and the imperative as obvious to Mao as it was to Marlborough. Today, it seems as though we are intrigued by the condition of force asymmetry, but to Maguire disproportionate strength was the normal engine of strategy. Additionally, if we indulge Maguire’s preaching on national preparedness (on the failure of institutions and nations to absorb the lessons of errant campaigns), then his professional frustration flashes a larger warning about the readiness of the United States to face future challenges.

Who Was T. Miller Maguire and How Did He Arrive At His Matter-Of-Fact Assertions?

Little record of Maguire’s childhood is available; we pick up the track of his life with his first significant published work, a survey of military history published in 1887. Many
of Maguire’s later titles are compilations of articles previously published in one of the 
service journals, usually the *United Services Magazine*.⁴ From about 1890, the 
frequency of his published titles increased in response to market demand for his brief, 
clear, and historically supported explanations. There remain available today at least 
sixty of his titles, although most are short pamphlets, lecture summaries, narratives, and 
editorials. Among his longer works are *A Summary of Modern Military History* (1887), 
*The Campaigns in Virginia* (1891), *Outlines of Military Geography* (1899), *Guerilla or 
Partisan Warfare* (1904), *Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges* (1904), and *General 
Von Clausewitz On War* (1909). Maguire is praised as or accused of having been a 
‘crammer,’ a categorization that he publicly rejected as an insult, but perhaps admitted 
at home. He described himself as a mere ‘compiler’ and on occasion extolled the 
virtues of being able to simplify what he termed the metaphysical density of other, 
famous students of strategy.⁵

Maguire never announced a theoretical device or coined a phrase. Perhaps as a 
result, and unlike geographer and parliamentarian Halford McKinder or naval historian 
Julian Corbett, Maguire’s influence dissipated soon after his training aids ceased active 
publishation. His work may nevertheless be taken as representative of British corporate 
understanding of the principles of strategy. That school of strategy had no popularizers 
as did 19th century continental strategic thought (Rüstow, Jomini, Clausewitz, etc.). Not 
until Basil Liddle Hart did Britain produce a pop-strategist. Liddle Hart’s writing did little 
justice to the studied, comprehensive, and usefully summarized teachings of the British 
crammers.⁶
Maguire was in his teens and early twenties when the American Civil War and the
great German campaigns of 1866 and 1870 were the talk of Europe, and these are
among the historical elements that most immediately influenced Maguire’s writing. In
his later works, the Second Boer War, ominous military escalations on the Continent,
early 20th century wars in the Far East, and the Balkan Wars all occupied Maguire’s
attention.⁷

Of the influences on Maguire’s synthetic understanding of strategy, Jomini may be
the greatest, although indirectly. He occasionally cites Jomini’s *Summary of the Art of
War* (1837) and mentions with admiration the works of William Napier, another
prominent early English translator, reviewer, and proponent of Jomini’s work.⁸ Maguire
admired and took from those whom he considered the best teachers at the British Army
professional schools.⁹ These teachers were in turn notably Jominian in the execution of
their didactic responsibilities.¹⁰ He is also indebted to Wilhelm Rüstow (1821-1878),
whom he cites more than Jomini. As Azar Gat points out, Rüstow drew on Jomini’s
*Summary*, but his creative work should not be attributed too narrowly to an intellectual
behest from earlier writers.¹¹ Jomini’s influence thus admitted, the British had previous
centuries of their own military traditions and writing from which to draw. Maguire’s 1887
book of modern military history begins with a lengthy description of the campaigns of
Marlboro, which in themselves provided historical material sufficient to complete the
strategic logic at which Maguire ultimately arrived.¹²

Although Maguire studied *On War* and admitted Clausewitz’ genius, he rarely cited
Clausewitz in his summaries. In his heavily annotated translation of *On War*, Maguire
rolled past Clausewitzian staples as being interesting but obvious.¹³ Clausewitz scholar
Christopher Bassford treats Maguire roughly due to Maguire’s impassive and haphazard handling of the beloved Prussian. Bassford quibbles that Maguire was neither a soldier nor an historian. As to the former, commission as a lieutenant in the Inns of Court Rifle Volunteers in 1892 (in his mid forties) might support scorn at his being a military wannabe or dilettante, but more complete facts of his early life or service are unavailable. As for not being an historian, he was a fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and judging from the number of his published titles, his military analyses were widely accepted. For that matter, he was not a geographer either, yet he authored one of the most recognized books on military geography at the turn of the century. As befit the age, Maguire’s intellectual enterprise was more eclectic than a categorization as Jominian vice Clausewitzian conveys. His writings directly dealing with strategy include Notes on the Outlines of Strategy, a liberal editing of a textbook by a regarded military instructor, the heavily annotated translation of On War, and various commentaries on military resources and policies.

At the peak of his writing energies, when the barrister was in his mid 50’s, Britain was entering and then coming out of the Second Boer War. British military failings in that war, as well as a curiously self-congratulatory attitude of some senior British leaders, became a nearly constant sub-theme in Maguire’s commentaries. One of Maguire’s more interesting pieces is a 59-page booklet titled Our Art of War as Made in Germany. The pamphlet is an expression of frustration and accusation within the immediate historical context of British inefficiency in southern Africa. It begins with a trademark scolding on the importance of the study of military history and on the decadence and priggishness of the officer class, but then settles into a reasoned
complaint about the unwarranted influence of German ideas and expressions in British military doctrine and educational materials. In several other works, including *Partisan and Guerrilla Warfare* and *Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges*, Maguire criticizes what he calls the “One War” theorists (referring to the War of 1870).

Maguire was an avid proponent of sea power and dabbled in maritime strategy, inserting sections or chapters on the subject in his writings (as in *Military Geography*), but he often deferred to Alfred Thayer Mahan. That Mahan was popular with British hawks is understandable in that he praised Britain and naval might, and he witnessed to the need for greater military preparations. Maguire, citing Mahan or reaching back to the thoughts of Francis Bacon, underlined the inability of sea power to ever win a war or an insular country’s land power to go anywhere in the absence of sea power. In 1909 he pointed with admiration to President Roosevelt’s parading of the American Navy around the world.

On the subject of small or guerrilla war, Maguire was influenced by descriptions (especially Napier’s) of the Peninsular Wars. He also learned from personal acquaintances returned from Victorian imperial engagements of his day, especially C. E. Callwell. The first edition of Callwell’s historical survey *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* came out in 1896, with enlarged reprints in 1899 and 1906. In 1902, Maguire published a 23-page “analysis” of Callwell’s 1899 version. Maguire’s *Analysis* is part of his organized course materials using Callwell’s book as a backbone reference.

Maguire lamented that the officers schooled on the eve of the Second Boer War had not been made aware in official training of earlier engagements with the Boers. He
pointed as a special example to the battle of Majuba Hill. That battle, lost to the
Transvaalers in 1881, had followed two other Afrikaner victories over the forces of the
Empire at Bronkhorst Spruit and Laing’s Nek. Together these blunders lost Britain the
Transvaal, at least temporarily. Maguire’s 1887 history included an introductory
section titled “Leading Epochs in Modern War.” From the war of 1866 (presented as
the beginning of one of the epochs) was included the following unlearned lesson:

To quote Colonel Clery, “Still another point of great importance seems not
to have been fully recognized, and this was that rapidity of loading, with
increased accuracy and range, would no longer permit infantry in masses
approach as heretofore a position defended by troops using breach
loading arms. …the attempt to move in masses under fire had to be
absolutely abandoned.”

British military theorists had intellectually terminated an epoch of war and opened
another in which the movement of infantry in formation against prepared positions was
unacceptable and no longer to be attempted. That is nevertheless what British General
Colley did at Majuba Hill to have his command wiped out, himself ignominiously killed,
and the war lost. The same error would be repeated at the outset of the Second Boer
War in 1899. It was this indifference to military history and preparedness that angered
Maguire and apparently set the tenor of his commentaries after 1900. Repeated British
failures to appreciate lessons that might be derived from a study of military history were
a source of frustration for Maguire. Still, in his estimation, technological innovation in
weaponry did not change the principles of strategy -- or their relationship in the creation
of military advantage. A statement in A Summary of Modern Military History may be
attributable to Maguire or Rüstow, to whom he refers at length.

The fundamental laws of the art of commanding armies appear clearly
from all the facts of military history, and they will always be the same
provided that the nature of the instruments of war be not entirely
transformed.
Confronted with all the ensuing advances of his era, Maguire never admitted that such a transformation had occurred. He did observe that weapons and especially transport technologies changed the application of strategic principles as the variables of time and distance changed.\textsuperscript{35}

Maguire commented matter-of-factly on thought processes in strategy above operational or theater considerations. The selection of generals and unity of command; need for national intelligence; significance of environmental appreciation; imperative of advanced planning and flexibility; the overriding importance of logistical security; care of soldiers health; and problems of recruitment and training are all noted in \textit{Military Geography} and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{36} On the reconciliation of objectives with resources, he states, “It is as foolish to begin a war as to build a house without counting cost, and the preliminary enquiries must be recondite and far-reaching.”\textsuperscript{37} Maguire assigned these more expansive observations to logic and maturity, rather than to doctrine. Regarding operational strategy, on the other hand, he held that the keys to understanding are less intuitive and subject to a need of explanation and shared vocabulary.

Maguire’s unique personality, as well as his political colors, are rarely hidden in his writing, and influence his interpretations of historical events and national issues. Always jingoistic, he was secretary of the London Branch of the Irish Unionist Alliance, an organization dedicated to British incorporation and opposed to Irish “Home Rule.”\textsuperscript{38} Maguire infused his military writing with poetry from Chaucer, Keats, Byron, Tennyson and Rudyard Kipling. In 1902, \textit{The Times} printed a batch of letters to the editor, including one by Maguire, that were sent in response to the publication by \textit{The Times} of Kipling’s controversial poem “The Islanders.”\textsuperscript{39} That poem laments the treatment of
recent veterans and the indecent inadequacy of preparations, a pair of constant themes in Maguire’s often vituperative essays.

Although politically liberal in many ways, much of Maguire’s writing seems quirky and prudish, including near constant harping that “commercialism, luxury, sport, gambling, loafing, have ruined and are ruining nations.” His views of the United States were ambivalent. He seems to have correctly pegged the strategic importance of American actions at the end of the century. “…[T]he United States, having laid Spain prostrate with regard to the remnants of her colonial empire, while proving their power to conquer a neighbor in one short campaign, have also shattered their own traditional policy and involved themselves in responsibilities of the gravest character beyond the seas.”

His understandings were at first the product of vocation and enthusiasm. Then a hobby turned profitable as his speaking and writing met a demand among aspirants seeking to pass military exams, in addition to other enthusiasts. His syntheses of strategic principles were not derived from experience, but from the application of legal logic, careful study of campaigns, disinterested consideration of other strategists’ writings and a need to encapsulate and impart lessons economically.

By What Logic Does Maguire’s Shorthand Explain Timeless Strategic Principles?

Maguire’s synthesis of the operational problem is an expression of military algebra. It doesn’t artificially advocate or diminish any one variable, create perspective from only one side of a competitive ledger, or presuppose moral advantage.

The object of the strategist in drawing up his plan is so to arrange his marches and his lines of operations that, on the one hand, if he wins the battle he will not only defeat the enemy on the field but place him in a situation of much perplexity as to his future action, his line of retreat, and
his supplies; and, on the other hand, if the battle be lost, he will have secured for himself a safe line of retreat, and an opportunity of recuperating his strength.  

In his formulations, Maguire did not emphasize security of the lines of communication (LOC), battle, deception, or anything else. On many occasions he did assert the primacy of the battle (for many military theorists no less than the event around which strategic contemplation builds), but battles are not inevitable events in Maguire’s formulations. The problematic is about the outlooks of opposing generals regarding their prospects of success in relation to potential battle. The theory is not just about geometry or geography, distance and time, firepower or tactical expertise—even while these things are critical environmental elements. The teacher, in love with History and Geography, a voracious reader, and arm-chair general, was first a lawyer. His thought process was about argument and argumentation. The argument calculated and organized knowledge of the myriad factors affecting military success. These factors (mass, surprise, economy of force, etc.) were just raw concepts until they placed in the context of a relational logic. Only then did the considerations fulfill their status as principles of war, with their relative weight determined by circumstances. The argumentation part was about what the mix did in the minds of contending generals. The ultimate question for this barrister-turned-strategist was the decision state of the judges (in the case of strategy, generals). Geography and history are about actual places and events; Maguire’s formulas are not metaphysical. They are about time, placement, strength and speed, but ultimately Maguire’s strategy is about decisions, not numbers.

Maguire groused in a 1912 pamphlet that Napoleon’s Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805 should have filled more attention space than Borodino in terms of its military
lessons, and cited von Clausewitz as support. Maguire presented Ulm and Austerlitz together, and in his pamphlet on the subject introduced the story as a consummation of strategy by sea and land. As for the land portion, Maguire provided battle avoidance, indirect approach, strategic and tactical surprise, initiative, speed, genius -- seemingly every notion of every strategist mentioned in the US Army War College’s Theory of War and Strategy course.

One might say that battle was central to the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign. Alternatively, one could assert that calculated avoidance of battle was a central feature, or that flanking and indirect attack was the key, or that celerity, deception, and resolve were…or…etc. After two unsuccessful attempts to break out, Mack could see no safe withdrawal and no possibility of victory in battle. Mack’s army was trapped physically, but moreover, Mack himself was trapped psychologically. If there had been a great battle at Ulm, a French victory might have left Napoleon with a less promising set of options for advance; time and distance having perhaps favored the concentration of the remaining Austro-Hungarian/Russian armies. Also, had Napoleon gained victory in an active, decisive battle at Ulm, it would still not have delivered a political resolution any more than did the decisive non-battle that occurred. Accordingly, Ulm, though spectacular, is relegated by most historians to being a companion-piece to Austerlitz.

For Maguire, the pivot point of strategic design is the potential fact of decisive battle -- the threat of being drawn into one that is likely to be lost, the promise of luring the enemy into one that is likely to be won, or it might be engaging in a battle the results of which will leave a resolvable overall condition even if lost. Without all the ‘if’s and ‘or’s the calculus of strategic principles is incomplete. Without the conjoining logic, any
list of ‘principles’ is a dull mnemonic device. Ultimately, operational strategy according to Maguire’s formulations is about the positioning of force to cause victory, fail safe, perplex the opponent, or lead him to commit some fatal disobedience to the same principles. The strategy is about geographic mechanics combined with the psychology of leadership – how one might create or change the environment so as to overcome or create resolve, enforce hope or impose hopelessness. Instructive as to Maguire’s synthesis, perhaps, is the detail of incompleteness of Napoleon’s victory. The Russians retreated in relatively good order. In the aftermath of the French sacking of Moscow, the reward for Kutuzov’s competent generalship in losses at Austerlitz and Borodino materialized. The potential correlations of force having changed, Kutuzov could finally force Napoleon to withdraw because the latter had to avoid decisive battle.49

Maguire did not tie his lessons exclusively to the campaigns of Napoleon.50 Among Maguire’s favorite historical examples was the siege of Plevna in 1877.51 There Turkish general Osman Pasha chose to fight behind highly developed fortifications and in so doing held up a Russian offensive against the Turks for almost five months. Maguire used the battle not only to reinforce the strategic algebra, but to explain a complex argument regarding the proper use of fortifications.52

Returning to the primacy of the battle in Maguire’s conception, note another of his comments:

Some wars are decided at once by great victories. Sadowa practically disposed of the issues of 1866, and Marengo of the Austrians in the northwest of Italy in 1800, while Austria yielded after Austerlitz in 1805, but frequently the defeated troops avoid tactics and resort to strategy.53

What is interesting about the above quote is the syntactical demotion of strategy in relation to tactics. Strategy is what the weaker contender is obliged to do well, while the
A stronger party would prefer major tactical events if they could be arranged. A contender with relative overall deficiency in physical power resorts to strategy in order to successfully prosecute tactical events while managing the risk inherent in decisive engagement with a superior force. A physically advantaged contender has less necessity of strategy, and often therefore seeks battle or tactical opportunity with less creativity or sense of urgency. The essence of strategy remains the same. If a weaker party is brought to battle without having sufficiently secured his route of withdrawal, he risks being ruined as well as defeated. Explained in the above manner, does the Maguire synthesis fit all forms of war?54

How Might Maguire’s Encapsulations Be Relevant and Important To Us Now?

The answer is best divided into two parts. The first part addresses a number of broad teachings that Maguire stressed in light of Britain’s security challenge at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The second part is more specifically about the Maguire synthesis of the principles of operational strategy and how it might apply in low-intensity conflicts.

Maguire seems never to have written anything without attaching, usually at the beginning as well as the end, some harangue about the necessity of military education, the failings of the national leadership to better prepare Britain for war, or some other related sermon. Among Maguire’s favorite teaching points, the need for more dedication to the study of geography may be the easiest to extend to American strategic studies today. Jomini’s definition of strategy as “art of making war upon the map” was a significant determinant in Maguire’s insistence regarding the consequential link between
knowledge of geography and the calculus of competent generalship. In his *Military Geography* Maguire quoted General Sherman, noting,

Sherman felt so keenly the necessity for a knowledge of geography that he wrote to his friend Ewing in 1844:—"Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, as the knowledge of geography in its minutest details is essential to a true military education."55

Maguire’s definitional aid regarding strategy in the introduction to *Military Geography* is not enough help for a reader to successfully negotiate that book. Realistically, to finish *Military Geography* a reader needs both an atlas and encyclopedia of military history at hand. Maguire expected the reader to put the theoretical mix of traditional principles of war into the physical world of time and place before contemplating the effects of good and bad decisions. Maguire actually never claimed to define the essence of strategy, but only suggested that if the reader understood a general’s problematic, the reader understood the principles of military strategy, whether he could define the word or not. Maguire posed knowledge of geography as a precondition of that understanding.

While geographic knowledge was indispensable, the study of history was the single most emphasized preparation. In this obsession our crammer called on testimony from seemingly every successful general in every age. Caesar and Napoleon, any American officer whose surname was at hand, Marlborough, Moltke, Wellington -- everyone militarily worthy was, according to Maguire, a devourer of history, and a better leader for it. Maguire at times turned directly to the question of whether a commander could be successful on the basis of genius and courage—or if something else was necessary. His answer was that the great commanders of genius, of which there have been few, all studied their art.
Another of Maguire’s constants was that preparation for war is the first business of strategy. In this vein he was a proponent of otherwise unpopular conscription. He argued early in the run-up to WWI that a service draft should not be out of the question and was necessary. As much as anyone he foresaw the coming of the Great War, citing troubles in Balkans as a central exhibit of his argument.

Other themes recurrent in Maguire’s writing that might support similar arguments in this century include a distaste for dependence on international organizations (Maguire was enthusiastically disrespectful of the League of Nations), maintenance of some level of militarily-useful training in public schools, significant defense expenditure levels, etc. While interesting and well argued, none of these regular themes are as intriguing or important as Maguire’s simple propositions regarding the interrelationship of the principles of strategy.

Explaining the utility of the Maguire strategic synthesis in the context of today’s military operational challenge requires a brief preparatory detour into the nature of that challenge. American forces (like the British forces of the late 19th century) may face numerous enemies whose support bases are broadly dispersed. More important than dispersion is the commonly encountered fact that the bases, and lines of movement to and from them, are difficult to detect. Consider that wide differential in the strength of the contenders is not the definitive characteristic of insurgent warfare, but rather that the weaker opponent is more obliged maintain anonymity and secrecy. Devotion to the preservation of anonymity is a response to intuitive or educated understanding of the strategic principles as Maguire expressed them. The weaker opponent must seek whatever battles (even to the level of single explosive detonations) he can win without
assuming foolish risk. Since he has insufficient physical force to protect overt routes, his movement is heavily dependent on obscurity. In light of this necessity, the wealthy insurgent especially finds the innovations of globalization (electronic funds transfers, Internet communications, franchise business models, etc.) helpful. With these aids, the need for physical movement from sanctuary is greatly reduced, as is the need for creating long-term resolve on the part of individual insurgent foot soldiers. Some insurgent leaders need only motivate the latter for the duration of single missions; by so doing they maintain anonymity between these tactical perpetrators and themselves.

Does the latest American strategic doctrine give due weight to an enemies’ LOC, especially the geography of movement between tactical events and sanctuaries? The field manual *Counterinsurgency* is a doctrinal response to American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The document does address enemy LOC and sanctuary, but it does not make them a focus of effort. The manual barely mentions the terms or conditions of classic strategy, and therewith implicitly rejects classic lessons and the notion of universal principles. There are at least two assumptions regarding insurgent war that the authors of *Counterinsurgency* apparently internalized and that contribute to the above-noted rejection. One is the idea that insurgent wars are inherently prolonged. That interpretation of the conflict environment may be prejudicial to understanding. An insurgent’s care to avoid poor-prospect engagements prolongs a war, but the insurgent general would win quickly if he thought he could. The weaker contender prolongs in the active tense; insurgent war is not desultory by nature. It does not logically follow that the stronger side should expect and prepare for a long war unless it despairs of being able to find insurgent leaders and movement routes. If the counterinsurgent cannot
anticipate insurgent whereabouts and movement, then of course the insurgent will be able to protract the conflict so that he might build comparative physical or moral advantage. The classic strategists unanimously recognized the purpose of generalship attending the question of correlation of force in time and space. Avoiding defeat is hardly a new idea.

A second assumption heavily present in *Counterinsurgency* is that the center of gravity of insurgent war is the people. This may be another fundamental conceptual mistake, confusing the enemy base with the enemy itself. If the relevant population maintains secrecy regarding routes of movement, safe houses, financial sources, and the identity of insurgent leaders, then, yes, it is appropriate to consider the population a central entity for attention. However, by despairing of finding the enemy lines of communication to sanctuary, American strategists may have denied what nevertheless remains universal military truth. It may be crucial to take measures to convince a population to deny anonymity to the insurgent. At the same time, an insurgent who remains obedient to the classic calculus of military principles will use whatever time is given him to maintain his LOC and seek battle where it suits him. To counter, the United States should revisit ways by which anonymity can be defeated and reset the question of enemy LOC at the center of strategic planning. After all, there exists a fundamental difference between a strategy intent on convincing a population to rise up against a violent organization and a strategy that seeks help from within the population to expose that organization.  

What the US Army and Marine Corps may have done in their counterinsurgent doctrine is to turn despair of finding the enemy's LOC into a doctrinal rejection of the
strategic principles that focus on LOC. The new doctrine may display a sort of psychological displacement behavior in the face of failure. Conversely, Maguire’s formula implies that the counterinsurgent should do everything possible to bring the insurgent foe to decisive battles as soon as possible. Doing so depends inevitably on ending insurgent anonymity and the obscurity of insurgent movement routes. Accordingly, the calculation of resources should be heavily weighted toward that end from the outset of strategic planning. To the extent enemy LOC and sanctuaries are made transparent, the insurgent will, by imposition of the timeless principles of strategy, be put at risk. Even if insurgent operational movement is “net-centric,” it leaves a trail, beginning and ending at points of physical geography. However virtual an insurgent’s communications, his success depends on resource concentration to put foot soldiers, weapons, targets, training and resolve in the right place at the right time.

Maguire had no experience, example, concept, or vision aimed specifically at revolutionary war outside of its Napoleonic meaning, but reading Mao would likely have reconfirmed him in his statements on the essence of strategy. Mao’s teachings are in no way inconsistent or irreconcilable with Maguire’s syntheses. While it is true that Mao distinguished guerrilla warfare from conventional warfare, his advice was one of balance in hybrid situations, and in all cases was supremely cognizant of lines of communication. The idea was to do battle, but to avoid defeat, to retreat as necessary, and to attack whenever possible within manageable risk. Mao observed the essence of strategy as proposed by the 19th century masters. He cited Russian success against Napoleon. He taught the requirement of movement, and of creating a broad accessible base that is resistant to government maneuver.
Maguire’s syntheses of strategy are simple, but not simplistic. He backed his summaries with an ever-expanding set of historical references, exceptions, disclaimers, counters, and cross-examinations as would befit a careful barrister. The two paragraphs quoted in this paper as exemplary of late 19th century British strategic thought are integral only if we interpret them generously, look into the whole logic and at all corners of the language. Maguire nowhere suggested that competent leaders might not assume risk by tempting the calculus of strategic principles, perhaps by temporarily extending or abandoning supply lines or routes of withdrawal, or even confronting a more powerful force in battle. Maguire barely contemplated the slower and more subtle technique of warfare that seeks small battles while servicing the psychological conditions of a population base from which to recruit adherents or draw supplies. Nevertheless, this latter insurgent formula still observes the essence of strategy when it seeks to attack piecemeal while retaining the anonymity of insurgent lines of communication.

Maguire’s operational synthesis implies the critical requirement that a general find where his enemies’ lines of communication are physically located. If the assumption prevails unchallenged that an irregular enemy has no such lines, or that they are so short or invisible that no amount of effort can efficiently expose them, then there can be no interposing on or constricting them. Then the classic lessons of 19th century strategy are indeed confounded. We will do better to relinquish that assumption; experience with low-intensity war is not one in which the insurgent, partisan or revolutionary forces have been without physical form or the need to protect their movements and sanctuaries. In their own doctrine, insurgents almost universally express the need to strike at their
enemy, but in a way that avoids negatively decisive engagements. It is lamentable in
the face of near universal doctrinal observance by insurgents of the calculus inherent in
Maguire’s late 19th century synthesis that American doctrine would so easily discard it.
An update of the Maguire formula might read as follows: As the broadest common
fundamental for winning, our object should be to so arrange our movement and
placement of force that, on the one hand, if we win an engagement we will not only
defeat our enemy, but we will confound him as to his future action, his line of retreat and
his supplies; on the other hand, if we lose an engagement, we will have a safe line of
withdrawal and a valid probability of recuperating our strength.

The statement offered immediately above is neither Clausewitzian nor Jominian. It
applies to military contests irrespective of force symmetry and is valid for all contenders.
It applies alike to conflicts in which detonation of a single explosive in a marketplace
constitutes battle or to wars in which army corps might be usefully deployed in depth.
As a unifying statement of strategic principles, it tells us that physical geography is
always important and that knowledge of the enemy lines of communication and
sanctuary is an overarching concern.67 It does not meanwhile diminish the need to
correctly calculate the correlations of force in prospective battle. The statement does
not deny the timeless advantage of decisive victory in battle or the opportunity for
victory through battle avoidance, but it admits that many little battles can displace the
decisiveness of a few large ones. Perhaps most importantly, it is a statement of
operational strategic purpose unlikely to endanger tactical success or misguide higher
levels of strategic preparation and direction. Applied to counterinsurgency, doctrinal
contemplations of the late 19th century have a new currency. Maguire arrived at his
strategic logic before the age of human flight. In today’s counterinsurgent contexts, indirect fires are so often unsuitable that much of aviation’s influence on strategic thinking is obviated. The old logic of land power should be reconsidered for inclusion in basic American military doctrinal literature.

Endnotes


2In current strategic parlance, the principles can be stated as “objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.” Peter Pace, *Joint Publication 3-0* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), II-2. In the aforementioned doctrinal publication, however, these principles are not woven together in any expressed relational logic or calculus. They are variables proffered to the wise, but a reader must infer a sense of their interdependent consequence from a full reading of the manual. The manual does not attempt a single synthesizing statement.


5Thomas Miller Maguire, *The Campaign of 1805, Ulm and Austerlitz* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1912). “This pamphlet repudiates the idea of “Cram,” which preposterous term only sums up the silly jealousy of teachers in embryo and of pedants, who read little and can neither write nor instruct.” Ibid., v.; See also, T. Miller Maguire, “The Preliminary Education of Officers,” *The Times*, 15 January 1901; col. C, issue 36352, p. 5. In this letter to the editor, Miller defends the contribution of private tutoring schools (“crammers”), of which his was apparently the most prominent.

6See B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Penguin Group, 1967). Throughout Liddell Hart’s book, those decisions that work he calls application of the indirect approach. At least as concerns operational strategy, nowhere does Liddell Hart propose a synthesis of the generals’ problematic as does Maguire. A list of Maguire's contemporaries in the business and profession of military and strategic instruction at the ‘fin de siècle’ can be pieced together from Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: the reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). These include Frederick Maude, Stewart Murray, Herbert Wilkinson, C.E. Callwell and others. Of the bunch, it appears Maguire was the only lawyer and only member that did not have a military career.

7See, for instance, T. Miller Maguire, *The new Pacific in 1899 and 1909: a study in international strategy* (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution Printing House, 1910); *The strategic features of the operations in Manchuria as illustrated by European and American campaigns* (London: E. Stanford, 1986); *Strategical questions in connection with India, further India, and China* (London: E. Stanford, 1896). Maguire’s intellectual pleasure appears to have been
greatest when studying and commenting on the American Civil War, a hobby that garnered speaking invitations. See, for instance, T. Miller Maguire, “Synopsis of Lecture on the Importance of the American War of 1861-65 as a Strategical Study,” in Lecture at the Aldershot Military Society, Tuesday November 1, 1892 (London: Gale & Polden, 1892), 1. He was especially drawn to the Confederate campaigns in Virginia. See, for instance, Jackson’s campaigns in Virginia, 1861-62 (London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1913).

See William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814 (Philadelphia, Carey and Hart, 1842). The intellectual relationship of Napier to Jomini is briefly explained in Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992), 6-10. Napier was well versed in the military strategic principles of the day by the time he began to translate and review Jomini’s work. The intellectual transmission from Napier to Maguire seems as much another line of admiration from Bacon and Wellington of Lord Marlborough’s 18th century exploits as it is of Jominian admiration of Napoleon’s exploits.

On Jomini’s Summary, see J.D. Hittle, ed., Jomini and his Summary of the Art of War (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service, 1947).

Among his favorite instructors was General Sir Edward Hamley. Edward Bruce Hamley, The Operations of War (London: n.p., 1866). Typical as precursor to Maguire’s syntheses: “…the reader may accept Hamley’s definitions that “the theatre of war is the province of Strategy, the field of battle is the province of Tactics. The object of Strategy is so to direct the movements on an army that, when decisive collisions occur, it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage.” Maguire, Military Geography, 28.

Gat, 44. “Writing in 1857, Rüstow maintained that the principles of the art of war were eternal, varying only in the forms they took, and that the rifle would make no fundamental change in tactics and certainly not in strategy, where Napoleonic principles could not be superseded.” Ibid., 45. Maguire fed off Rüstow for confidence in asserting strategic principles. Rüstow was an outsider politically, militarily and academically, and this no doubt appealed to Maguire. Gat describes Rüstow (1821-78) as “the most prolific and diverse military scholar after 1850….” Ibid., 43.

It is worth noting, however, that in his 1887 work Maguire did not deliver the final comprehensive paragraphs that summed his lessons on land strategy. That would not occur for another decade.

Carl von Clausewitz, General Carl Von Clausewitz On War, translation by A. M. E. Maguire and notes by T. Miller Maguire (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1909). The now famous “culminating points” Maguire translates as “the ultimate limit of the offense” and “the limit point of victory: when to stop.” He offers numerous historical examples and agrees to the importance of the concept, but as to some of Clausewitz he professes to be unimpressed. Ibid., 108, 109. In another entry Maguire notes, “The mere word ‘Clausewitz’ seems to have fascination for some authors, but I confess that I find nothing that would justify me in adding to the bulk and expense of this treatise by translating or even making a précis of the chapters of our author on ‘Summary of Instruction for the Crown Prince 1810-12’….” Ibid., 148.

Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: the reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 82.
15 His pamphlet bylines list at least some his degrees and titles, as was customary. See *Lecture at the Aldershot Military Society, Tuesday November 1, 1892* (London: Gale & Polden, 1892), cover. “By T. Miller Maguire, Esq., M.A., LL.D., F.R. Hist. Soc.,…” Ibid.

16 See note 1. A separate observation should be made about Maguire’s *Military Geography*, an observation supported by comments of a military book review from 1900. “Setting the widest possible definition to the term ‘Military Geography’ Mr. Maguire’s book deals with the relations that exist between the geography of the World at large—the form and disposition of its seas and continents—to those strategical developments which have shaped the World’s history in the past, and may shape it again in the future. Consequently, it is rather an epitome of historical examples to illustrate various phases of continental strategy than a geographical treatise.” Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, “Military Geography,” *The Geographical Journal* 15, no. 3 (March 1900): 239-243. In 1900, Maguire could not yet have been a Geopolitician *per se*, but his work and its similars can be seen as precursors to Geopolitics in that they extended the principles and observations of Geography beyond tactical and operational considerations to the grand strategic/international political level.


19 Typical of Maguire’s editorial comments regarding the Boer War experience is the following: “One of the principle doctrines of political and military wisdom is that no possible enemy can ever be safely ignored or despised, yet we despised the Boers almost as much as they despised us. I fear from recent comments on foreign manoevers, that we are beginning to affect airs of military superiority simply because our Regular Army of 1899 has been practically annihilated by our few South African foes.” Maguire, *Notes on the Outlines of Strategy*, 1.

20 T. Miller Maguire, *Our Art of War as Made in Germany* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1900). Maguire begins by quoting part of an editorial published in *The Times* that derided book education and formal preparation of officers. Of that editorial Maguire includes, “How many corps have the Boers? Have they any corps artillery? How many of their commandants and field cornets have passed through a Staff College course? Does anyone in his senses believe that if they had had all those aids to pedantry they would have done as well as they have done?” Ibid., 5. Maguire agrees with the editorialist that the Boers did too well against the British Army, but is bemused by the editorialist’s derision of formal military education.

21 For a brief description of that blunder, see Judd, 135-165.

22 “We are overwhelmed with translations of the literary labours of German generals; our tables groan beneath the ponderous and dreadfully dull tomes of a generation of writers who seem to thrive on a knowledge of the minutest details of two campaigns--1866 and 1870-1--and of these only.” Ibid., 2.
23 T. Miller Maguire, *Guerrilla or Partisan Warfare* (London: Hugh Rees, 1904), 46. “In many respects, servile attention to the details of the Franco-German War, 1870-1, led to false ideas being promulgated. We were dosed to death with this war, 1875 to 1984, when I ventured to begin publishing essays to show that there were other wars in very different zones of operations, and requiring different methods. So we are in great danger of another “one war” set of theorists, in spite of the fact that the conditions of the South African War can scarcely be repeated, and are not now being repeated in the East.” Ibid.

24 Thomas Miller Maguire, *The Campaign of 1805, Ulm and Austerlitz* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1912), 2. “Napoleon’s plan to keep the British Navy away, while the French gathered together to convoy his army, is well described by my friend, and England’s monitor,—if our party charlatans would only learn,—Admiral Mahan of the United States Navy in his ‘Naval Strategy,’ and in his ‘Life of Nelson.’” Ibid.

25 Maguire, *Summary of a Lecture on Our Military Resources*. “Sea power alone never finished any war, nor did it ever save a State, nor did it ever capture one good or well defended maritime fortress, e.g., Sebastopol, Charleston, Port Arthur, and Santiago. On the other hand, loss of command of the sea would ruin us.” Ibid. For ancient wisdom and pith, Maguire often evokes Sir Francis Bacon. For instance, three quotations on the cover of Maguire, *Notes on the Outlines of Strategy* come from Francis Bacon’s *Essays* and can be found in, Francis Bacon, “Essay XXIX -- Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” as reprinted in Charles W. Eliot, ed., *The Harvard Classics*, vol. 3. (New York: The Collier Press, 1909) 76-84.


27 C. E. Callwell was already considered somewhat of an expert on the subject of “small wars” when a Captain, being invited to give a public lecture on the subject in 1895. Callwell, C.E. “Lessons to be Learnt from Small Wars Since 1870” in *Lecture given at the Aldershot Military Society*, Tuesday, March 26, 1895 (London: Gale & Polden, 1895), 1.

28 Callwell, C. E. (Charles Edward) *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1996). This edition is a reprint of the original Third Edition printed in 1906 by His Majesty’s Stationery Office. It includes a forward by Douglas Porch, professor at the US Naval War College. Professor Porch asserts that “Callwell was one of those colonial soldiers who knew instinctively what modern historians by dint of diligent research took some time to conclude--that trade did not follow the flag, that scant interest in the commercial exploitation or political advantages of imperial expansion existed in Europe. Imperialism moved forward, not as the result of political pressure from London, Paris, St. Petersburg, or even Washington, but mainly because men on the periphery, many of whom were soldiers, pressed to enlarge the boundaries of empire, often without orders. Imperialism, therefore, was essentially a military phenomenon.” Ibid., v. This appears to be a perfectly misplaced assertion. Callwell nowhere in his work suggests anything of the sort. In fact, among Callwell’s most emphatic pieces of analysis (or simple observation) is that the small wars of which he writes are those fought by regular against non-regular forces, and that the regular (“imperial”?) forces are almost always dependent on long lines of supply to base and on great financing. Callwell, “Lessons to be Learnt....”, 2. These long lines of supply and finance are almost never the product or purview of the military man alone. When one says that military decisions must be subordinate to the political, it is as saying that the General has no checkbook. Professor Porch’s notion may find help elsewhere, but not here.
T. Miller Maguire, *Analysis of Callwell’s Small Wars* (London: Harmsworth, 1902). The analysis is given in the form of an annotated concept index, showing its obvious use as a shortcut for readers facing exams. For instance, it contains lines such as “Write a short essay on Bush Warfare, with historical illustrations, how it resembles hill fighting, 304.” Ibid., 46. Note that the page numbers in this *Analysis* do not match the pagination in the 2006 University of Nebraska Press reprint of the 1906 version of *Small Wars*.

Apparently it was not a common read among British military students generally. In a book published in 1904, Maguire observes, “It appeared to me very strange, before the late war in South Africa, that the operations of guerillas were not part of the curriculum for the education of military officers in England: because, from the very nature of our Empire, British officers are more frequently engaged, in what might be called guerilla wars—small wars, savage wars, irregular wars—than any other officers. Indeed, I pointed out, a year before the war, the value of this branch of study; and yet in January, 1900, there was not one work on the subject in any London shop. Maguire, *Guerrilla or Partisan Warfare*, 1.

See Judd, 117-134. By the time of the Second Boer War, the British did not have to look to defeats for the same lesson, however. In late 1898, less than a year before initiation of British actions in South Africa, Major-General Horatio Herbert Kitchener won a battle at Omdurman, Sudan against a Mahadist enemy force numbering more than 50,000. Perhaps 11,000 Mahadists died, while the British sustained fewer than fifty causalities. Omdurman is considered one of the most decisive battles in history and the high-water mark of British imperialism. The battle was won and lost as result of a frontal charge against modern firepower positioned behind field fortifications. David G. Chandler and Ian Beckett, eds., *The Oxford History of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 206-209.


Ibid., 27.

Ibid., 29. Maguire offers a translation of Rüstow’s twenty-seven fundamental laws of strategy. Ibid., 29-38.

T. Miller Maguire, *The Gates of Our Empire I: British Colombia* (London: The Anglo-British Columbian Agency, 1910), 54. Of the shrinking world, Maguire mused: “Railways and steamships have almost annihilated distance. Napoleon’s men had to walk or ride from France or Spain to Moscow. Today it takes less time to reach Washington from the most distant nations than it took senators from their respective States seventy years ago, and less time to reach Vancouver than it used to take to get to Galway, and for Dr. Johnson to get to Scotland was a more troublesome task than for a Canadian contingent to get to Africa.” Ibid.


Ibid., 53. “The plan of every enterprise ought to be settled in advance. This is an indispensable condition for arriving at a determined end, but besides the end to be attained, the plan should have regard for the nature of the means and to existing circumstances.” Ibid., 24. In a later work, Maguire repeats the foregoing, and adds, “There have been either no plans at all or too many in South Africa for eighteen months.” Maguire, *Notes on the outlines of strategy*, 22; T. Miller Maguire, “The Preliminary Education of Officers,” *The Times*, 15 January 1901; col. C, issue 36352, p. 5.
38 He stated in a letter to the editor of The Times that he would “not be accused of being a separatist.” T. Miller Maguire, “Irish Unionists and the Premier,” The Times, 27 December 1905, col. D, issue 37901, p. 5. In another letter he argues with a British major who is lamenting the immorality of British decisions made in Africa to corral Boer families. Maguire combines his barrister talents with his facility for calling up relevant supporting examples from military history. For better or worse, he makes a doggedly loyalist argument to justify activities that history and the march of ethics has since deemed atrocious. T. Miller Maguire, “Strategic Devastation,” The Times, 26 June 1901, col. C, issue 36495, p. 15 and “Strategic Devastation”, The Times, 2 July, 1901, col. E, issue 36496, p. 3.


40 T. Miller Maguire, “Summary of a Lecture on Our Military Resources and How to use them.” Also typical: “I have no hesitation in repeating that we are on the verge of national degradation by reason of games, sport, luxuries, and the basest worship of the lowest type of plutocrats recorded in history.” T. Miller Maguire, Strategy And Tactics in Mountain Ranges (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1904), vi. At the same time, he promoted women’s suffrage and outwardly admired the history and capacity of females to fight. Maguire, Guerrilla or Partisan Warfare, 3.

41 Maguire, Military Geography, 55. That there was much about the United States he did not like leaks out in his sidebar comments. “But what shall we say of all Western Canada as the future home of the really competent and worthy rising generations of our race? It is better in every way than the United States…,” The Gates of Our Empire I.: British Columbia (London: The Anglo-British Colombiam Agency, 1910), 8. In one work, Maguire outlines a notional military takeover of the Pacific by Japan that begins with the taking of the Philippines followed by occupations of Hawaii and Alaska, then an invasion of California by “a first installment of troops numbering 170,000 men, to be followed a couple of months later by a second installment of the same strength.” Maguire describes how this would then be successful. “I have not the slightest hostility to Japan, and I quite admit that its rulers deserve success…,” Ibid., 53.

42 Maguire, Military Geography, 30.

43 There is no space for doubt in Maguire’s writing about the importance of battle. “Whatever the plans and preparations for any military enterprise, the result depends on THE BATTLE; our own success, or at least the diminution of the enemy’s success in a campaign are determined by the battle,” 22. [Emphasis in original].

44 Although this point needs no citation, see as sufficient argument the introduction to Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), xi-xvii. A general’s search for decisive victory in battle should not be confused with the political consequence of the battle as an historical event. As Weigley points out, even in the age of battles that brought Maguire the
historical fodder for his strategic formulae, the political consequences of the events themselves were generally ephemeral.

45 Maguire, *The Campaign of 1805, Ulm and Austerlitz*, 39. The battle of Borodino, during Napoleon’s Russian campaign in 1812, was a popular battle for consideration early in the 20th century, a result of the Napoleonic events’ centennial character and probably of Tolstoy’s immortalizations in *War and Peace*, new translations into English becoming available in 1904. On Borodino see Vincent J. Esposito and John R. Elting, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), maps 115-118. The authors assert that “Borodino has been magnified—largely through Tolstoy’s fiction—into an apocalyptic struggle….but actually Wagram was a greater and more sternly contested battle.” Ibid., map 118.


47 To summarize briefly the plot of the 1805 campaign: Napoleon marched a huge army from the coast of France to the upper Danube, trapping a smaller Austrian army outside the town of Ulm. Mass surrender of an Austrian army at Ulm reset the possible correlations of forces as operations moved down the Danube and then northeast toward Austerlitz. There, Napoleon, through a series of brilliant tactical moves, defeated a larger Russian-Austrian force. The defeat left the Austrians with no strong ally, a dispersed and weakened army, and an occupied capital. As a single campaign of two major pieces, this six month event from the Napoleonic wars provides many of the ingredients for, or at least vivid testimony in favor of Maguire’s single synthetic statement regarding the principles of military strategy.

48 However, see also Maude, F. N., *The Ulm Campaign* (London: George Allen, 1912) for a similar but more Ulm-emphasizing analysis from one of Maguire’s contemporary crammers and acquaintances; Weigley is generous with Mack, arguing that he did as well as could be expected given the situation and the position he had been put in by his own leaders. See *The Age of Battles*, 378-382;

49 This interpretation of Kutuzov’s generalship is at least allowed by Tolstoy’s treatment of events in *War and Peace*. We could say that this 2008 paper observes a strategist’s complaint made in 1912 (calling on the testimony of another strategist who died in 1831) about the popularity (due to a novelist’s glorifications which had been written in the 1860s but appeared in English in 1904) of an 1812 battle over that of an 1805 battle, but that the loser of the 1805 battle (also the loser of the 1812 battle) ultimately bested Napoleon in 1813 by obeying the strategic principles as expressed in 1899 by the complaining strategist.

50 Maguire’s instructions do underline and reiterate Napoleon’s focus on the protection of lines of communication and lines of retreat. See, for instance, Maguire, *Strategy And Tactics in Mountain Ranges*, 11. “Napoleon says that a general who allowed his lines of communication to be surprised ought to be shot.” Maguire, *Notes on the outlines of strategy*, 22.

Although tangential to the main argument of this paper, Maguire’s balanced consideration of the military utility of fortifications suggests their use as an element in effective offensive operations. On this point see Geoffrey Demarest and Lester Grau, “Maginot Line or Fort Apache? Using forts to Shape the Counterinsurgency Battlefield” Military Review, December 2005; available from http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/february_2006/2_06_4_pf.html; Internet; accessed 5 January 2008.

Maguire, Military Geography, 29.

The following quote from Maguire’s 1902 Outlines of Strategy causes doubt: “The principles of strategy, as relating to bases and lines of communication, cannot apply to savage warfare or to the operations of guerrillas. These cannot have a regular base or a regular methodical system of supply; but the value of surprise and the direction and security of marches and effective combinations and concentrations apply to this kind of warfare to the fullest extent—indeed surprise, ambuscades, raids, are its principle features.” Maguire, Notes on the outlines of strategy, 30. This quote is a confusing retreat by Maguire from his own insistence of enduring principles of war. The damaging effect of Maguire’s doubt on a central argument of this paper (that Maguire’s synthesis of strategic principles indeed applies universally) can be contained. Maguire wrote Outlines of Strategy in 1902. In his 1904 books Partisan and Guerrilla Warfare and Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges, he does not repeat the same uncertainty. We can attribute some of Maguire’s own education on the subject matter to careful reading of the work of someone who probably studied Maguire, C.E. Callwell.

Maguire, Military Geography, 9. Curiously and lamentably, Geography as an academic discipline, while alive at West Point (which Maguire greatly praised) is absent from the United States Army War College.

Maguire, “Summary of a Lecture on Our Military Resources and How to use them,” 16. After WWI, when Britain and most of Europe was desperate to demobilize, Maguire remained constant in his call for a national military conscription. See “Our Military and Obligatory Service—A Retrospect,” The United Service Magazine Vol. LXI. New Series April to June 1920, 137-203.

Ibid., 8.


A speaker at the Army War College who was an author of FM 3-24 did not address insurgent LOC or sanctuary, and was generally dismissive of classic strategy as it might apply.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, ‘Insurgencies are protracted by nature.’ Ibid, para. 1-134. As typical of this supposed fundamental see Daniel Moran, “Geography and Strategy” in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen, Strategy in the Contemporary World, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. “Revolutionary insurgency is an unusual form of land warfare in that it does not seek to win quickly, but rather by slowly eroding the moral and political resolve of the enemy.” Ibid., 128. It is unfortunate, especially in a text intended to infuse strategy with an appreciation of geography, that it misguides regarding the insurgent’s aim. An insurgent leader seeks to wear down the resolve of the enemy because of his inability to engage decisively with the government’s forces. The
insurgent general strategizes because he must. He would of course win quickly if he thought he
could. Every leader who cannot count on the force necessary to confront force must count on a
trick or delay. Furthermore, as proof by extremes, an insurgent leader whose strategy is to
wear down the morale of his enemy, but who never uses or threatens to use force in any sort of
battle -- who never attacks a target of value to his opponent -- could hardly be feared as a
warrior or general, and should be included and accepted as a democrat. To accept as complete
the notion that the insurgent’s goals is about morale and willpower is merely to accept his
arguments for legitimacy. This is an especially wonderful denial of logic given the insistence of
so many revolutionary leaders, beginning at least with Lenin, that victory must be torn from the
oppressor, that it cannot be a gift. The observation that an insurgent aim’s at the morale of his
enemy often births the false concomitant that insurgent war is inherently desultory. The effect
may be a counterinsurgent strategy that, assuming the war must be long, overlooks by
assumption what should be a central characteristic of counterinsurgent design--that the war
should be short and violent. The insurgent must be desultory; the counterinsurgent can rarely
afford it, because more time is rarely awarded to the counterinsurgent’s use of fewer resources.

61Nothing in this argument suggests it is not a good idea to convince a local population to
fight its own fight, or that psychological operations aimed at reversing or lessening a tendency
toward enlistment in the insurgent cause are not inherently good measures. The argument is
about not losing sight of the need to find, fix and destroy the organizational elements that give
lethal effect to an insurgent leadership’s will.

62By displacement I allude to the illogical behaviors that often accompany stress and
dilemma.

63Maguire’s writings do not offer the advice of Sun Tzu, although he frequently professes to
admire Asian cultures and accomplishments. At least by 1909, Maguire adds, “Member of the
Order of the Rising Sun of Japan” to his publication byline. See Summary of a Lecture on Our
Military Resources, cover.

64Beyond the contribution of Mao, Chinese strategic thought is both ancient and complex.
If there is a best test of the validity of the proposition in this paper regarding the Maguire
synthesis, it would be in light of the angles and nuances of Chinese strategic theory. See
Timothy Thomas, “The Chinese Military’s Strategic Mindset,” Military Review, November-
December 2007, pp. 47-55.

65See, on this point, Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare (New York:

66Che Guevara, who died in a short-lived counterinsurgency because he failed to protect his
LOC, should probably not be cited for anything. He, too, however, wrote in terms of creating
internal lines of communication and the need to maintain their anonymity. Harries-Clichy

67From Iraq comes a formula of insurgent success in which the insurgent leadership is able
to effect violent action by appealing to any of thousands of potential perpetrators with the
offering of modest quantities of money, which can be delivered secretly. To this is added an
ability to identify persons in third countries pre-prepared psychologically to commit violent
crimes (even including homicidal suicide). Moving these individuals into Iraq and linking them at
safe locations to appropriate explosives or other weaponry has evidently been economical in
financial, political and personal terms for the insurgent hierarchy. While such a situation argues
for a counter-strategy that includes broad psychological encouragement that the population opposes the insurgent, it still speaks on its face of insurgent dependence on the movement of resources, even if in some cases mostly financial. Moreover the definition of insurgent comes into question when what can reasonably be considered an occupation army is so heavily engaged.