Suits Against Terrorist States
By Victims of Terrorism

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**Report Documentation Page**

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Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism

Summary

In 1996 Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to allow U.S. victims of terrorism to sue the states responsible for terrorist acts. That politically popular initiative has subsequently become very complex. The terrorist state defendants have refused to appear in court, the courts have handed down large default judgments, the Clinton and Bush Administrations have intervened to block various steps to collect on those judgments, and Congress has repeatedly enacted measures intended to facilitate payment. Further complexity has been added by attempts in one suit to abrogate an international agreement, the enactment of retaliatory legislation in some of the terrorist states, the second Gulf War, and a recent proposal to compensate victims through an administrative process.

There have been a number of recent developments. First, in November, 2002, the 107th Congress enacted as part of the “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002” (P.L. 107-297) a provision which overrides long-standing Administration objections and allows the blocked assets of terrorist states to be used to pay the compensatory damages portions of court judgments against such states. Second, the same statute also added several additional judgments against Iran to the ten that had previously been designated as compensable out of U.S. funds under §2002 of the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000” (P.L. 106-386). Third, in the 108th Congress the Senate has twice adopted riders to appropriations bills to abrogate the provision in the Algiers Accords barring the Iranian hostages from bringing suit in the Roeder case, but in both cases the riders have been dropped in conference. Fourth, an Iranian court earlier this year awarded an Iranian businessman $500 million in damages against the U.S. for his allegedly unlawful abduction by American agents. Fifth, on March 20, 2003, President Bush ordered that title to Iraq’s frozen assets in this country be vested in the U.S. and that most of the proceeds be used for Iraq’s reconstruction rather than to compensate victims of Iraqi terrorism. Sixth, the Administration subsequently intervened in a case against Iraq by a number of POWs from the first Gulf War to ensure that Iraq’s frozen assets were not used to satisfy the judgment. Finally, on July 17, 2002, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on a long-awaited Administration proposal (S. 1275) that would create an administrative scheme to compensate the victims of terrorism as an alternative to litigation.

This report provides an overview of this complex issue; gives background on the doctrine of state immunity and the FSIA; details the evolution of the terrorist state exception enacted in 1996 and the judicial decisions that have followed; describes the proposals subsequently made and statutes enacted to help claimants obtain satisfaction of their judgments; sets forth the legal and policy arguments that have been made for and against those legislative initiatives; describes the decision in the hostages’ suit against Iran and Congress’ efforts to vitiate the Algiers Accords; summarizes what has happened with Iraq’s assets; and describes S. 1275. The report also contains two appendices: Appendix I lists the cases covered by §2002 as amended, the amount of compensation that has been paid in each case, and the source of the compensation. Appendix II lists the amount of the assets of each terrorist state currently blocked by the United States. The report will be updated as events warrant.
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Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism

Overview

In 1996 Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)\(^1\) to allow civil suits by U.S. victims of terrorism against the states responsible for, or complicit in, such terrorist acts as torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking.\(^2\) That amendment was enacted with broad support in both Congress and the Executive Branch and has led to numerous court judgments awarding plaintiffs substantial compensatory and punitive damages.\(^3\) But this seemingly simple initiative has led to a judicial, legislative, and administrative tangle of remarkable complexity.

A primary cause of this complexity has been the difficulty plaintiffs have had in collecting on their judgments. Most of the states that have been sued under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA have refused to recognize the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in such case. As a consequence, they have not appeared in court to defend themselves. This has not prevented the courts from adjudicating the cases, because the FSIA allows judgments by default to be entered if "the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court."\(^4\) But it has meant that the states in question have felt no obligation to pay the judgments that have been rendered against them.

As a consequence, the plaintiffs who have obtained such default judgments have tried to attach a variety of assets allegedly belonging to the terrorist states and their agencies and instrumentalities; and this has precipitated opposition by both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations. When the claimants in the initial suits against Cuba and Iran in 1997 and 1998 sought to satisfy their judgments by attaching the states’ diplomatic and consular property as well as their assets in the United States that had been blocked pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)\(^5\) or the

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\(^1\) 28 U.S.C.A. 1602 \textit{et seq}. The exception allows suit to be brought against the agencies and instrumentalities of such states as well.


\(^3\) The FSIA provides that states are not liable for punitive damages but that such damages may be awarded against their agencies and instrumentalities. See 28 U.S.C.A. 1606 (West. Supp. 2003).

\(^4\) \textit{See} 28 U.S.C.A. 1608(e).

International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), the Clinton Administration intervened to oppose the attachments. The Administration argued that the U.S. has international treaty obligations to protect all countries' diplomatic and consular properties, that the blocked assets of these and other countries provide useful diplomatic leverage in negotiating with the countries in question and should remain available for future use, that the attachment of the blocked assets by early claimants under the FSIA exception would mean that nothing would be left to compensate future claimants, and that the attachment of both kinds of assets would expose U.S. assets to reciprocal action in certain foreign states. The courts agreed.

The plaintiffs and their attorneys then sought Congress' help in collecting on their judgments; and Congress has repeatedly responded. In §117 of the “Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999,” the 105th Congress provided that victims who obtained judgments against terrorist states could attach both the terrorist states' frozen assets and their diplomatic and consular property. But because of the Administration's continuing objections, §117 also gave the President authority to waive these provisions in the interest of national security; and President Clinton exercised this authority when he signed the bill into law.

In response to the President's waiver of §117, efforts were made in the 106th Congress to eliminate or modify his waiver authority and, thus, to make the frozen assets available to the claimants with judgments against terrorist states; but these efforts were unsuccessful. However, an alternative procedure providing for the payment of portions of selected judgments largely out of U.S. funds was added in conference to an unrelated bill and enacted into law. Section 2002 of the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000” directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the compensatory damages portion of one judgment against Cuba out of Cuba's frozen assets. Section 2002 further directed that the compensatory damages portions of ten judgments against Iran — identified in the Act only by the suits' filing dates — be made out of appropriated funds (up to a maximum of about $400 million) and that the U.S. then be entitled to seek reimbursement for those payments from Iran. As a consequence, $96.7 million of the Cuban assets frozen in this country — nearly half of the amount then available — was paid to the claimants in the one judgment against Cuba; and more than $380 million in U.S. funds was paid out with respect to the ten judgments against Iran.

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8 50 U.S.C.A. 1701 et seq.
8 Section 117 stated that the President could "waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security."
10 In 1996 the Cuban Air Force shot down two "Brothers to the Rescue" planes notwithstanding that the planes were outside Cuba's air space. In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997), a federal district court awarded the families of three of the four occupants of the planes a total of $187.7 million in damages against Cuba.
11 See Appendix I for a list of the cases and the payments that have been made.
Although providing substantial compensation to a number of claimants, Section 2002 also raised new problems. First, its coverage was ad hoc. It applied only to the judgments in the eleven designated suits; it provided no compensation to other claimants who had obtained, or might obtain, judgments under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA. Second, some noted that nearly six thousand claims against Cuba for death, injury, and expropriation during and after Castro’s takeover were determined to be legitimate by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in the late 1960s, but that no compensation has ever been paid in those cases. Thus, they questioned the fairness of using nearly half of Cuba’s frozen assets to provide compensation for a single, later terrorist act. Third, the payment of the ten judgments against Iran out of U.S. funds seemed to some observers to contradict one of the major justifications for enacting the terrorist state exception to the FSIA in the first place, namely, to force terrorist states to pay a price for their actions and to deter them from engaging in such acts in the future.

Recognizing these difficulties, the 107th Congress in November, 2001, directed the Administration to submit a legislative proposal to establish “a comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States victims of international terrorism” by the time it submitted its proposed budget for fiscal 2003 (meaning by February, 2002). 12

No such Administration proposal was forthcoming by that deadline, however. As a consequence, various Members sought in the second session of the 107th Congress to add more suits to those listed as compensable under §2002 and, once again, to allow judgments against terrorist states to be satisfied out of the states’ frozen assets. Both kinds of initiative were enacted into law. On September 30, 2002, President Bush signed a bill (the “Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal 2003”) that added cases filed against Iran on June 6, 2000, and on January 16, 2002, to the list of those compensable under §2002. 13 On November 26, 2002, although opposing the initiative, he also signed into law a measure (the “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002”) that includes a section generally allowing the blocked assets of terrorist states, organizations, and persons to be used to satisfy the compensatory damages portions of judgments rendered against such states, organizations, and persons. 14 The latter statute also provided that all suits against Iran filed before October 28, 2000 — not just the cases previously designated by their individual filing dates — are compensable out of the fund established under §2002.


13 P.L. 107-228, §686 (Sept. 30, 2002). As was true with §2002 originally, P.L. 107-228 identified the suits not by name but by the dates on which they were filed, namely, June 6, 2000, and January 16, 2002. The suit filed on June 6, 2000, was Carlson v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002), which resulted in an award of $8 million in compensatory damages to six servicemen who were on board a TWA airliner that was hijacked in 1985 and who were subsequently imprisoned and tortured by Lebanese Shiite terrorists. The House on May 16, 2002, had adopted an amendment to the State Department Authorization Act by voice vote to add the June 6 suit. The January 16, 2002, suit was added in conference and apparently is the case of Kapar v. Islamic Republic of Iran.

14 P.L. 107-297, Title II, §201 (Nov. 26, 2002).
Because the amount then remaining in that fund likely would not be sufficient to pay these newly added judgments in full, the statute provided that payments should be made in these suits on a proportional basis.\(^{15}\)

A further complication arose in connection with a suit against Iran by those who were held hostage from 1979-81. In late 2000 the 52 persons who were held hostage and their families initiated a suit against Iran under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA — *Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran*.\(^{16}\) After a federal district court held Iran to be liable but before it assessed damages in 2001, the U.S. government intervened and argued that the case should be dismissed because Iran had not been designated a terrorist state at the time of the hostage incident — one of the requirements of the FSIA exception allowing suits against terrorist states — and one part of the Algiers Accords that led to the hostages' release in 1981 required the U.S. to bar any suits from being brought for the incident. The plaintiffs again sought Congress' assistance, and Congress quickly enacted riders to pending appropriations bills providing that the suit could proceed even though Iran had not been designated a terrorist state at the time of the incident. Nonetheless, the federal district court in 2002 dismissed the suit on the grounds the Algiers Accords, although entered into as executive agreements, are binding on the U.S. and Congress had not acted with sufficient clarity to abrogate the provision precluding suit.\(^{17}\)

In response to that decision, the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 24, 2002, included a provision in the fiscal 2003 appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State (S. 2778) to specifically abrogate the part of the Algiers Accords said by the court to preclude the hostages' suit. But that measure received no further action prior to the 107\(^{th}\) Congress' adjournment. Similar efforts have been made in the 108\(^{th}\) Congress. The same or a similar amendment has been part of omnibus managers' amendments adopted by the Senate to both the "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2003" (H.J.Res. 2) and the "Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003" (S. 762). But the amendments have been deleted in conference and have not been part of the measures as enacted into law (P.L. 108-7 and P.L. 108-11). (The *Roeder* case, it might be noted, remains pending on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court heard oral argument on May 12, 2003.)

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\(^{15}\) On July 10, 2003, the Senate by voice vote added an amendment to S. 925, the State Department Authorization Act for FY 2004-05, to clarify that the terrorist state assets that should be available to claimants under §201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act include not only those that are "blocked" but also those that are "regulated." See 149 CONG. REC. S 9171-72 (daily ed. July 10, 2003). The clarification was needed, according to Senators Allen and Harkin, because the State Department had construed §201 not to apply to regulated assets. The Senate has not yet completed action on S. 925.

\(^{16}\) *Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, Case Number 1:00CV03110 (EGS) (D.D.C., filed December 29, 2000).

\(^{17}\) *Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 195 F.Supp.2d 140 (D. D.C., decided April 18, 2002). The court also questioned whether the cause of action Congress enacted in 1996 actually allows suits against terrorist states.
Still more complications arose on March 20, 2003, when President Bush issued an executive order at the outset of the second Gulf War providing for the confiscation and vesting of Iraq’s $1.7 billion in frozen assets in the U.S. government and directing that they be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq and used for the reconstruction of that country.\(^{18}\) The order excepted from that confiscation assets already ordered attached pursuant to two existing judgments against Iraq (which amounted to about $300 million) as well as Iraq’s diplomatic and consular property. But it otherwise vested title to Iraq’s frozen assets in the U.S. and, consequently, seemed to make them unavailable to those who, after March 20, 2003, might obtain judgments against Iraq under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA. Subsequently, on the basis of a provision in the “Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal 2003,”\(^{19}\) President Bush reinforced this action by declaring a number of provisions concerning terrorist states, including the FSIA exception and the pertinent section of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, inapplicable to Iraq.\(^{20}\) He also issued another executive order providing that the Development Fund of Iraq cannot be attached or made subject to any other kind of judicial process.\(^{21}\)

Whether the President has the legal authority to make Iraq’s assets unavailable to victims of terrorism who obtain judgments against that country was briefly contested in *Acree v. Republic of Iraq*.\(^{22}\) On July 7, 2003, a federal district court in that case awarded nearly $1 billion in damages to 17 Americans who were held captive and brutally tortured by Iraq during the first Gulf War and to their families. Notwithstanding that the decision came after the date of President Bush’s executive order, Judge Roberts on July 18, 2003, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the government to retain at least $653 million of Iraq’s assets vested in the U.S. – the amount of the compensatory damages award – pending further decision by the court. But after an expedited hearing on the matter, the court on July 30, 2003, held that Iraq’s blocked assets were not subject to attachment by the plaintiffs and dissolved the TRO.

On June 17, 2003, Sen. Lugar (R-IN) introduced an Administration proposal that would establish an administrative procedure to provide compensation to victims of international terrorism. S. 1275 would amend §201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act to provide that claimants who obtain judgments against terrorist states after the date of the bill’s introduction can no longer collect on the compensatory damages portions of those judgments out of the states’ blocked assets. As an alternative, the bill would create a new compensation scheme called the “Benefits for Victims of International Terrorism Program.” Administered by the State Department, the program would authorize the payment of up to $262,000 to those who have been killed, injured, or held hostage by an act of international terrorism. A person who accepted benefits under the program would be barred from bringing or maintaining


\(^{20}\) See Memorandum for the Secretary of State (Presidential Determination No. 2003-23) (May 7, 2003).


a suit against a terrorist state for the same act. The bill was the subject of a hearing by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 17, 2003.

Finally, it should be noted that at least two of the states affected by the FSIA exception have enacted legislation allowing their citizens to file suit against the U.S. for violations of human rights or interference in the countries' internal affairs. Both Cuba and Iran have reportedly enacted such statutes, and judgments have reportedly been handed down in both countries imposing substantial awards in damages against the United States.23

This report provides background on the international law doctrine of state immunity and the FSIA; summarizes the 1996 amendments creating an exception to state immunity under the FSIA for suits against terrorist states; details the subsequent cases and the legislative initiatives made and/or enacted to help claimants collect on their judgments; sets forth the legal and policy arguments that were made for and against those efforts; summarizes the decision in Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran and efforts in the 107th and 108th Congresses to help the plaintiffs and override the Algiers Accords; describes the Administration’s actions vesting title to Iraq’s frozen assets in the United States and making them unavailable to those who obtain judgments against that state; notes the laws in certain terrorist states that allow suits against the U.S. for similar acts; and details the Administration’s proposal to create an administrative scheme to provide compensation to victims of terrorism (S. 1275).

The report also contains two appendices: Appendix I lists the cases covered by §2002, the amount of compensation that has been paid in each case, and the source of the compensation. Appendix II lists the amount of the assets of each terrorist state currently blocked by the United States. The report will be updated as events warrant.

Background on State Immunity

Customary international law historically afforded states complete immunity from being sued in the courts of other states. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, this immunity was rooted in the “perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns” and the need to maintain friendly relations. Although each nation has “full and absolute” jurisdiction within its own territory, the Chief Justice stated, that jurisdiction, by common consent, does not extend to other sovereign states:

One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to this independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.

This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.\textsuperscript{24}

During the last century, however, this principle of absolute state immunity gradually came to be limited after a number of states began engaging directly in commercial activities. To allow states to maintain their immunity in the courts of other states even while engaged in ordinary commerce, it was said, “gave states an unfair advantage in competition with private commercial enterprise” and denied the private parties in other nations with whom they dealt their normal recourse to the courts to settle disputes.\textsuperscript{25} As a consequence, numerous states immediately before and after World War II adopted a restrictive principle of state immunity which preserved state immunity for most cases but allowed domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits against foreign states for claims arising out of their commercial activities.

For the United States this restrictive principle was first adopted by administrative action in 1952\textsuperscript{26} and then was generally accepted by the courts. In 1978 Congress codified the principle in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).\textsuperscript{27} The FSIA states the general principle that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States”\textsuperscript{28} and then sets forth several exceptions. The primary exceptions are for cases in which “the foreign state has waived its immunity either expressly or by implication,” cases in which “the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state,” and suits against a foreign state for personal injury or death or damage to property occurring in the United States as a result of the tortious act of an official or employee of that state acting within the scope of his office or employment.\textsuperscript{29} For most claims the Act also provides that the commercial property of a foreign state in the U.S. may be attached in satisfaction of a judgment against

\textsuperscript{24} The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (holding a French warship to be immune from the jurisdiction of a U.S. court). In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), the Court held this principle of immunity to apply as well to state-owned commercial ships.


\textsuperscript{26} The Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Jack B. Tate, stated in a letter to the Acting Attorney General that in future cases the Department would follow the restrictive principle. 26 Department of State Bulletin 984 (1952). Previously, when a case against a foreign state arose, the State Department routinely asked the Department of Justice to inform the court that the government favored the principle of absolute immunity; and the courts usually acceded to this advice. The Tate letter meant that the government would no longer make this suggestion in cases against foreign states involving commercial activity.

\textsuperscript{27} 28 U.S.C.A. 1602 et seq.

\textsuperscript{28} Id. §1604.

\textsuperscript{29} Id. §1605.
that state regardless of whether the property was used for the activity on which the claim was based.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Civil Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism}

In 1996 Congress added another exception to the FSIA which allows the federal and state courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities in civil suits by U.S. victims of terrorism.\textsuperscript{31} More specifically, one part of the "Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" (AEDPA) amended the FSIA to provide that a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts in cases in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources ... for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency ....\textsuperscript{32}

As predicates for such suits, the AEDPA amendment required that the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department at the time the act occurred,\textsuperscript{33} that either the claimant or the victim of the act of terrorism be a U.S. national,\textsuperscript{34} and that the state which is sued be given a prior opportunity to arbitrate the claim if the act on which the claim is based occurred in that state. The Act also provided that the terrorist states and their agencies and instrumentalities would be liable for compensatory damages and their agencies and instrumentalities for punitive damages as well; and it stated that the exception to immunity applied to pertinent

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id.} §1610.


\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{33} The State Department identifies state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to §6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 App. U.S.C.A. 2405(j)), §620A of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C.A. 2371), and §40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.A. 2780(d)). The list, which is published annually, currently includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (although Administration actions in the wake of the second Gulf War suggests that Iraq is no longer to be considered a terrorist state). \textit{See} 22 CFR Part 126(1)(a) (2002).

\textsuperscript{34} As initially enacted, the statute provided that a terrorist state could not be sued if "either the claimant or victim was not a U.S. national." Because of concern that the provision could be read to require that both the claimant and victim be U.S. nationals and that, as a consequence, some of the families who were victimized by the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, would be excluded, Congress amended the language in 1997 to bar such suits only if "neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the United States ...." \textit{See} P.L. 105-11, 105\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} Sess. (April 25, 1997) and H.Rept. 105-48 (April 10, 1997).
causes of action that arose before, on, or after its date of enactment. The Act further allowed the commercial property of a foreign state in the U.S. to be attached in satisfaction of a judgment against that state under this amendment regardless of whether the property was involved in the act on which the claim was based. After previously opposing similar proposals, the Clinton Administration supported these changes in the FSIA.


36 Id. §1610(b)(2). These amendments to the FSIA did not receive much debate or explanation during the AEDPA’s consideration by the Senate and the House. Provisions similar to what was enacted were included in both the Senate and the House measures as introduced (S. 735, §221 and H.R. 2703, §803, respectively). But no committee report was filed on either bill; and the only change that appears to have been made during floor debate was a slight amendment by Rep. Hyde in a manager’s amendment in the House imposing a 10-year statute of limitations on such suits and slightly modifying the provision concerning pre-trial arbitration. See 142 CONG. REC. H2166 (daily ed., March 13, 1996). The report of the conference committee simply stated as follows:

Section 221 — House section 803 recedes to Senate section 206, with modifications. This subtitle provides that nations designated as state sponsors of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 will be amenable to suit in U.S. courts for terrorist acts. It permits U.S. federal courts to hear claims seeking money damages for personal injury or death against such nations and arising from terrorist acts they commit, or direct to be committed, against American citizens or nationals outside of the foreign state’s territory, and for such acts within the state’s territory if the state involved has refused to arbitrate the claim.

However, it might be noted that the House had adopted a similar measure during the second session of the previous Congress (H.R. 934). The Department of State and the Department of Justice had opposed the legislation at that time. But the report of the House Judiciary Committee explained the rationale of the bill as follows:

The difficulty U.S. citizens have had in obtaining remedies for torture and other injuries suffered abroad illustrates the need for remedial legislation. A foreign sovereign violates international law if it practices torture, summary execution, or genocide. Yet under current law a U.S. citizen who is tortured or killed abroad cannot sue the foreign sovereign in U.S. courts, even when the foreign country wrongly refuses to hear the citizen’s case. Therefore, in some instances a U.S. citizen who was tortured (or the family of one who was murdered) will be without a remedy.

H.R. 934 stands for the principle that U.S. citizens who are grievously mistreated abroad should have an effective remedy for damages in some tribunal, either in the country where the mistreatment occurred or in the United States. To this end, the bill would add a new exception to the FSIA that would allow suits against foreign sovereigns that subject U.S. citizens to torture, extrajudicial killings or genocide and do not provide adequate remedies for those harms.
This amendment to the FSIA gave U.S. courts jurisdiction over suits against terrorist states, but it did not in itself give claimants a cause of action to initiate such suits. As a consequence, Congress later in 1996 enacted such a statute. That statute gives parties injured or killed by a terrorist act covered by the FSIA exception or their legal representatives a cause of action for suits against "an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism" who commits the terrorist act "while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency ...." This measure was adopted as part of the "Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal 1997" without apparent debate. As will be discussed in connection with the Roeder suit (see infra at pp. 21-27), the efficacy of this cause of action with respect to suits against terrorist states has been called into question in one case but has otherwise been accepted as sufficient by the courts.

105th Congress — Enactment of Section 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999

Several suits were quickly filed against Cuba and Iran pursuant to these provisions. Neither state recognized the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in such suits, however; and, thus, both refused to appear in court and mount a defense. The FSIA, however, specifically provides that a court may enter a judgment by default in such a situation if "the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." Thus, after hearing such evidence, several federal trial courts entered default judgments holding Iran and Cuba to be culpable for particular acts of terrorism and awarding the plaintiffs substantial amounts in compensatory and punitive damages.

Neither Iran nor Cuba had any inclination to pay the damages that had been assessed in these cases. As a consequence, the plaintiffs and their attorneys sought to attach certain properties and other assets owned by the states in question which were within the jurisdiction of the United States to satisfy the judgments.


38 The provision appears to have first arisen in the House-Senate conference committee on H.R. 3610. See H.Rept. 104-863, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (September 28, 1996).


40 See Alejandro v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ($50 million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of three of the four persons who were killed when Cuban aircraft shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) ($27 million in compensatory damages and $225 million in punitive damages awarded to the father of Alisa Flatow, who was killed in 1995 by a car bombing in the Gaza Strip by Islamic Jihad, an organization which the court found to be funded by Iran); and Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F.Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) ($65 million awarded in compensatory damages to three persons (and two of their spouses) who were kidnapped, held hostage, and tortured in Lebanon in the mid-1980s by Hezbollah, an organization which the court found to be funded by Iran).
In the case of Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, attempts were made to attach the embassy and several diplomatic properties of Iran located in Washington, D.C., the proceeds that had accrued from the rental of those properties after diplomatic relations had been broken in 1979, and an award that had been rendered by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in favor of Iran and against the U.S. government but which had not yet been paid.41 The Clinton Administration, however, opposed these efforts. It argued that the diplomatic properties and the rental proceeds were essentially sovereign and not commercial in nature and that, therefore, they could not be attached pursuant to the FSIA. In addition, the Administration argued that it was obligated to protect Iran’s diplomatic and consular properties by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations42 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations43 and that using such properties to satisfy court judgments would expose U.S. diplomatic and consular properties to similar treatment by other countries. The Administration further argued that the funds which might be used to pay the award given to Iran by the decision of the Claims Tribunal were still U.S. property and not yet Iranian property and, thus, were also immune from attachment. The court agreed and quashed the writs of attachment that had been filed.44

Efforts were also mounted in both the Flatow case and in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, supra (the Brothers to the Rescue case), to obtain the assets of Iran and Cuba in the U.S. that had been blocked by the U.S. government.45 Iran’s assets in the U.S. had been frozen under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)46 at the time of the hostage crisis in 1979.47 But under the

41 The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at the Hague was created pursuant to provisions in the Algiers Accords of 1981 that led to the release of the U.S. hostages. Claims by U.S. nationals against Iran that were outstanding at the time of the release of the hostages as well as claims by Iranian nationals against the U.S. and contractual claims between the two governments were made subject to case-by-case arbitration by the Tribunal. Most Iranian assets held by U.S. persons or entities at that time were transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and were either returned to Iran or were forwarded to an escrow account for use in satisfying judgments rendered against Iran by this Tribunal. See the various agreements between the U.S. and Iran relating to the release of the hostages (known as the Algiers Accords), 20 ILM 223-240 (Jan. 1981); Executive Orders 12276-12284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913 (Jan. 19, 1981); and 31 CFR Part 535.

42 23 UST 3227 (1972).


45 See Appendix II for a list of the amounts of the assets of each state on the terrorist list that are blocked in the U.S.

46 50 U.S.C.A. 1701 et seq. IEEPA gives the President substantial authority to regulate economic transactions with foreign countries and nationals to deal with “any unusual and (continued...)
Algiers Accords that resolved the crisis, most of those assets had either been returned to Iran or placed in an escrow account in England subject to the decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal that had been created by the Accords.\textsuperscript{46} Cuba’s assets in the U.S., in turn, had been blocked since the early 1960s under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).\textsuperscript{46} The Clinton Administration opposed the efforts to obtain these blocked assets as well. It argued that such assets are useful, and historically have been used, as leverage in working out foreign policy disputes with other countries (as in the Iranian hostage situation) and that they will be useful in negotiating the possible future re-establishment of normal relations with Iran and Cuba. The Administration also contended that numerous other U.S. nationals had legitimate (and prior) claims against these countries that would be frustrated if the assets were used solely to compensate the recent victims of terrorism.\textsuperscript{50} The Administration also argued that using frozen assets to compensate victims of state-sponsored terrorism exposes the United States to the risk of reciprocal actions against U.S. assets by other states.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46} (..continued) extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such a threat.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{48} See n. 38.

\textsuperscript{49} 50 U.S.C.A. App. 5. TWEA, originally enacted in 1917, gives the President powers similar to those of IEEPA to regulate economic transactions with foreign countries and nationals in time of war. At the time it was used to freeze Cuba’s assets in 1962, it also applied in times of national emergency; but that authority was eliminated when IEEPA was enacted in 1977. Sanctions previously imposed under that authority, however, were grandfathered. See 50 U.S.C.A. 1708.

\textsuperscript{50} In the 1960s, for instance, Congress directed the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to determine the number and amount of legitimate claims against Cuba resulting from Fidel Castro’s takeover of the government and subsequent expropriation of property from January 1, 1959, and October 16, 1964. P.L. 88-666, Title V (Oct. 16, 1964); 73 Stat. 1110; 22 U.S.C.A. 1643. The program was completed in 1972 and found 5,911 claims totaling $1,851,057,358 (in 1972 valuations) to be valid. Those claims remain pending.

In the Iran Claims Settlement Act of 1985, Congress directed the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to determine the validity and amount of small claims against Iran (those for less than $250,000) pending at the time of the hostage crisis and to distribute to such claimants the proceeds of any en bloc settlement concluded by the U.S. and Iran. See P.L. 99-93, Title V, §§505-505 (Aug. 16, 1985); 99 Stat. 437; 50 U.S.C.A. 1701 note. In 1990 the U.S. and Iran concluded such an agreement. See State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1981-1988 (Book III) (1995), at 3201. All other pre-1981 claims against Iran (and against the U.S. by Iran and Iranian nationals) remained subject to case-by-case arbitration by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.

\textsuperscript{51} Both Cuba and Iran have reportedly enacted statutes allowing suits against the United States for acts of terrorism or “interference,” and substantial judgments against the U.S. have been handed down pursuant to those statutes. See Law Library of Congress, Suits (continued...)}
In an attempt to override these objections, the 105th Congress in 1998 further amended the FSIA to provide that any property of a terrorist state frozen pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA and any diplomatic property of such a state could be subject to execution or attachment in aid of a judgment against that state under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA.\(^{52}\) Section 117 of the Treasury Department Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 also mandated that the State and Treasury Departments “shall fully, promptly, and effectively assist” any judgment creditor or court issuing a judgment against a terrorist state “in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of that foreign state ....”\(^{53}\) Because of the Administration’s continuing objections, however, §117 also gave the President authority to “waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national security.” On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed the legislation into law and immediately executed the

\(^{51}\) (...continued)


\(^{52}\) P.L. 105-277, Div. A, Title I, §117 (Oct. 21, 1998); 112 Stat. 2681-491; 28 U.S.C.A. 1610(f)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003). This section was added to the FSIA by §117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, P.L. 105-277 (1998); 112 Stat. 2681. The provision, without the waiver authority, had originated in the Senate version of the Treasury appropriations bill; but the Senate Appropriations Committee had offered no explanation. See S. 2312 and S.Rept. 105-251 (July 15, 1998). It had also been offered during House floor debate on the House version of the Treasury appropriations bill by Rep. Saxton but had been subject to a point of order as legislation on an appropriations bill. 144 CONG. REC. H5710 (July 16, 1998). In conference with the House, the provision was retained, but waiver authority for the President was added. The conference reports offered no further explanation. See H.R. 4104, H. Conf. Rept. 105-560 (Oct. 1, 1998), and H. Conf. Rept. 105-789 (Oct. 7, 1998). H.R. 4104 was not enacted but its provisions were folded into the omnibus act. Both immediately prior and after the enactment of the omnibus act, several members of the House and Senate expressed the view that the waiver authority of §117 should be read to apply only to the requirement that the State and Justice Departments assist judgment creditors in locating the assets of terrorist states. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12696, 12705-06 (daily ed. October 29, 1998) and E 2314 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998). But a couple of House members also expressed the view that the waiver authority applied to the whole of §117. See 144 CONG. REC. H11647 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1998).

\(^{53}\) *Id.*
waiver. The President subsequently explained his reasons in the signing statement for the bill as follows:

I am concerned about section 117 of the Treasury/General Government appropriations section of the act, which amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. If this section were to result in attachment and execution against foreign embassy properties, it would encroach on my authority under the Constitution to "receive Ambassadors and other public ministers." Moreover, if applied to foreign diplomatic or consular property, section 117 would place the United States in breach of its international treaty obligations. It would put at risk the protection we enjoy at every embassy and consulate throughout the world by eroding the principle that diplomatic property must be protected regardless of bilateral relations. Absent my authority to waive section 117's attachment provision, it would also effectively eliminate use of blocked assets of terrorist states in the national security interests of the United States, including denying an important source of leverage. In addition, section 117 could seriously impair our ability to enter into global claims settlements that are fair to all U.S. claimants, and could result in U.S. taxpayer liability in the event of a contrary claims tribunal judgment. To the extent possible, I shall construe section 117 in a manner consistent with my constitutional authority and with U.S. international legal obligations, and for the above reasons, I have exercised the waiver authority in the national security interest of the United States.55

106th Congress — Enactment of Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000

President Clinton's exercise of the waiver authority conferred by §117 blocked those with default judgments against Cuba and Iran from attaching the diplomatic

54 Presidential Determination 99-1 (Oct. 21, 1998), reprinted in 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2088 (Oct. 26, 1998). On the day the President exercised the waiver authority, the White House Office of the Press Secretary issued the following explanatory statement:

...[T]he struggle to defeat terrorism would be weakened, not strengthened, by putting into effect a provision of the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY 1999. It would permit individuals who win court judgments against nations on the State Department's terrorist list to attach embassies and certain other properties of foreign nations, despite U.S. laws and treaty obligations barring such attachment.

The new law allows the President to waive the provision in the national security interest of the United States. President Clinton has signed the bill and, in the interests of protecting America’s security, has exercised the waiver authority. If the U.S. permitted attachment of diplomatic properties, then other countries could retaliate, placing our embassies and citizens overseas at grave risk. Our ability to use foreign properties as leverage in foreign policy disputes would also be undermined.

Statement by the Press Secretary (October 21, 1998).

property and frozen assets of those states to satisfy the judgments. In response, various Members during the 106th Congress pressed for additional amendments to the FSIA that would override the President’s waiver of §117 and allow the judgments against terrorist states to be satisfied out of the states’ frozen assets. More specifically, a measure entitled the “Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act” was introduced in both the House (by Rep. McCollum) and the Senate (by Senators Lautenberg and Mack). Hearings were held on the proposal in both bodies; and a slightly revised version of the bill was adopted by the House and reported in the Senate. But the Clinton Administration opposed the measure, and it was not enacted into law. Instead, negotiations with the Administration led by Senators Lautenberg and Mack resulted in the enactment of §2002 of the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Against Women Act of 2000.” Section 2002, as noted above, created an alternative compensation system. It mandated the payment of a portion of the damages awarded in the Alejandro judgment out of Cuba’s frozen assets and a portion of ten designated judgments against Iran out of U.S. appropriated funds “not otherwise obligated.” In the meantime, additional and substantial default judgments continued to be handed down in other suits against Iran; and a number of new suits against terrorist states were filed.

56 The parties in both the Alejandro and the Flatow suits sought to persuade the courts that the President’s waiver authority did not extend to the diplomatic properties and blocked assets of Cuba and Iran, but those efforts ultimately proved availing. See Alejandro v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F.Supp.2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (Presidential waiver authority held to apply only to the requirement that the Departments of State and Treasury assist judgment creditors and not to the provision subjecting blocked assets, including diplomatic property, to attachment). This decision was eventually reversed on other grounds by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit — Alejandro v. Telefónica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999). A decision by a federal district court in the Flatow litigation construed the President’s waiver authority broadly. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).


60 See Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F.Supp.2d 107 (D.D.C. March 24, 2000) ($41.2 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to a journalist who was kidnapped and held in deplorable conditions for seven years by Hezbollah, which the court found to be funded by Iran) and Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. July 11, 2000) ($24.7 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the families of two young Americans who were killed when a bomb placed by Hamas operatives exploded on the bus on which they were riding in Israel).

Like §117 of the Fiscal 1999 Appropriations Act for the Treasury Department, the “Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act” would have amended the FSIA to allow the attachment of all of the assets of a terrorist state, including its blocked assets, its diplomatic and consular properties, and moneys due from or payable by the United States. To that end it would have repealed the waiver authority granted in §117 and allowed the President to waive the authorization to attach assets only with respect to the premises of a foreign diplomatic or consular mission.

In hearings on the measure, the Clinton Administration was repeatedly pilloried for its opposition to the efforts of victims of terrorism to collect on the judgments they had obtained. Senator Mack, cosponsor of the “Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act” in the Senate, stated:

...Mr. Chairman, the President made promises to the families, encouraged them to seek justice, calling their efforts brave and courageous. He pledged to fight terrorism and signed several laws supporting the rights of victims to take terrorists to court. But ultimately, he has chosen to protect terrorist assets over the rights of American citizens seeking justice. This is simply not what America stands for. Victims’ families must know that the U.S. Government stands with them in actions, as well as words.62

Stephen Flatow, awarded $247.5 million in a suit against Iran for the terrorist murder of his daughter, asserted:

The memory of Americans killed by terrorists requires us to continue to protest against administration attempts to stifle our efforts to collect that which has been awarded to us. If the administration will not help us, then, at least, let it get out of our way and stop sending lawyers to court at taxpayer expense to defend the interests of state sponsors of terrorism.63

The sister of one of the “Brothers to the Rescue” pilots shot down by Cuba declaimed:

No words can possibly explain our shock when we went to court and found U.S. attorneys sitting down at the same table as Cuba’s attorneys. How can you explain to a mother who has lost her son, to a wife who has lost her husband, to a daughter who has lost her father, that their own government is taking the murderers’ side? How can one understand the claim by the U.S. that the frozen funds are needed to promote civil society and democracy in Cuba, and then have our country not take into account basic human rights and justice? What message are we, the United States, sending the Cuban people and its government when we allow a violation of the right to life to remain unpunished? The Clinton Administration has shut its doors to us.64

63 Id. (statement of Stephen Flatow).
64 Id. (statement of Maggie Alejandre Khuly).
Rep. McCollum, sponsor of the House bill, said:

Today, the subcommittee seeks to answer why the President said one thing and his administration insists upon doing another. It is my hope that our panel of witnesses will help us understand why the President and administration officials encourage victims to take terrorists to court under the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act yet now, in contradiction to the President’s words, the administration refuses to allow compensation out of the frozen assets of terrorist states against whom judgments have been rendered. Rather than waging a war on terrorism, it appears the administration is fighting the victims of terrorism.

... I am concerned that the President has exercised what was intended to be a narrow national security waiver too broadly, and as a consequence, those who have committed acts of terror resulting in the death of American citizens are effectively going unpunished, and Americans are not receiving just compensation after favorable court verdicts. This is contrary to the clear intention of Congress both in the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act and in the fiscal year 1999 Treasury Department appropriations bill.  

Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, Defense Department Under Secretary for Policy Walter Slocombe, and State Department Under Secretary for Policy Thomas Pickering responded for the Administration in a joint statement.

While expressing support for the goal of “finding fair and just compensation for [the] grievous losses and unimaginable experiences” of the victims of terrorism, they said that the Victims of Terrorism Act was “fundamentally flawed” and had “five principal negative effects,” as follows:

First, blocking of assets of terrorist states is one of the most significant economic sanctions tools available to the President. The proposed legislation would undermine the President’s ability to combat international terrorism and other threats to national security by permitting the wholesale attachment of blocked property, thereby depleting the pool of blocked assets and depriving the U.S. of a source of leverage in ongoing and office (sic) sanctions programs, such as was used to gain the release of our citizens held hostage in Iran in 1981 or in gaining information about POW’s and MIA’s as part of the normalization process with Vietnam.

Second, it would cause the U.S. to violate its international treaty obligations to protect and respect the immunity of diplomatic and consular property of other nations, and would put our own diplomatic and consular property around the world at risk of copycat attachment, with all that such implies for the ability of the United States to conduct diplomatic and consular relations and protect personnel and facilities.

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66 Id. (statement submitted by Treasury Deputy Secretary Eizenstat, Defense Under Secretary for Policy Slocombe, and State Under Secretary Pickering). Deputy Secretary Eizenstat had given similar testimony in the Senate hearing as well.
Third, it would create a race to the courthouse benefiting one small, though deserving, group of Americans over a far larger group of deserving Americans. For example, in the case of Cuba, many Americans have waited decades to be compensated for both the loss of property and the loss of the lives of their loved ones. This would leave no assets for their claims and others that may follow. Even with regard to current judgment holders, it would result in their competing for the same limited pool of assets, which would be exhausted very quickly and might not be sufficient to satisfy all judgments.

Fourth, it would breach the long-standing principle that the United States Government has sovereign immunity from attachment, thereby preventing the U.S. Government from making good on its debts and international obligations and potentially causing the U.S. taxpayer to incur substantial financial liability, rather than achieving the stated goal of forcing Iran to bear the burden of paying these judgments. The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") has recognized this by scoring the legislation at $420 million, the bulk of which is associated with the Foreign Military Sales ("FMS") Trust Fund. Such a waiver of sovereign immunity would expose the Trust Fund to writs of attachment, which would inject an unprecedented and major element of uncertainty and unreliability into the FMS program by creating an exception to the processes and principles under which the program operates.

Fifth, it would direct courts to ignore the separate legal status of states and their agencies and instrumentalities, overturning Supreme Court precedent and basic principles of corporate law and international practice by making state majority-owned corporations liable for the debts of the state and establishing a dangerous precedent for government owned enterprises like the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC").

Notwithstanding these contentions, the Senate and House Judiciary Committees reported, and the House passed, a slightly amended version of the "Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act." The bill in the Senate was reported without a committee report. In the House the report of the House Judiciary Committee stated:

The President's continued use of his waiver power has frustrated the legitimate rights of victims of terrorism, and thus this legislation is required. While still allowing the President to block the attachment of embassies and necessary operating assets, H.R. 3485 would amend the law to specifically deny blockage of attachment of proceeds from any property which has been used for any non-diplomatic purpose or proceeds from any asset which is sold or transferred for value to a third party.67

67 H.Rept. 106-733, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 13, 2000), at 4. As initially reported, H.R. 3485 also amended the "PayGo" provision of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C.A. 902(d)) to bar the Office of Management and Budget from estimating any changes in direct spending outlays and receipts that would result from enactment of the bill. Because this provision apparently had not been discussed in committee, the committee subsequently deleted it before the bill went to the floor. See H.Rept. 106-733 (Part 2), 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 18, 2000).
The House passed the bill by voice vote under a suspension of the rules.\footnote{145 CONG. REC. H6938 (daily ed. July 25, 2000).}

The Clinton Administration persisted in opposing the bill, however; and that led to extensive negotiations between the Administration and interested Members of Congress. Ultimately, these negotiations led to the addition to an unrelated bill pending in conference of a limited alternative compensation scheme, which was signed into law by President Clinton on October 28, 2000.\footnote{P.L. 106-386, §2002(f)(1) (Oct. 28, 2000); 114 Stat. 1543. The statute primarily addresses the issue of international trafficking in women and children.} Section 2002 of the “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000” directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay portions of any judgments against Cuba and Iran that had been handed down by July 20, 2002, or that would be handed down in any suits which had been filed on one of five named dates on or before July 27, 2000. The judgments that had been handed down by July 20, 2000, were the \textit{Alejandre}, \textit{Flatow}, \textit{Cicippio}, \textit{Anderson} and \textit{Eisenfeld} cases.\footnote{See summaries of these cases in n. 37 and n. 57.} Six suits had been filed against Iran on the five dates specified in the statute — February 17, 1999; June 7, 1999; January 28, 2000; March
15, 2000; and July 27, 2000 — and all have subsequently been decided.\textsuperscript{71} (See Appendix I for a full list of the cases.)

Section 2002 gave the claimants in these eleven suits three options:

- First, they could obtain from the Treasury Department 110 percent of the compensatory damages awarded in their judgments, plus interest, if they agreed to relinquish all rights to further compensatory and punitive damages;

\textsuperscript{71} These six cases are as follows:

- Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:99CV00377 (D.D.C. 2000) ($55.4 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the wife of a Marine colonel who was kidnapped and subsequently hung by Hezbollah while serving as part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Lebanon);
- Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001) ($46.5 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to a professor (and his family) who was kidnapped while teaching at the American University in Beirut and subsequently imprisoned in “horrific and inhumane conditions” for six and a half years by Hezbollah);
- Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001) ($14.6 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the estate and family of a priest who was kidnapped while working in Beirut as the Director of Catholic Relief Services and imprisoned in terrible conditions for a year and a half by Hezbollah);
- Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2001 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 15322 (D.D.C. 2001) ($31.5 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the family of an American citizen who was kidnapped while working as a professor in Beirut and held in “deplorable” conditions for more than three years by Hezbollah);
- Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.Supp.2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001) ($16.3 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the estate and family of a petty officer in the U.S. Navy who was killed by a car bomb driven by a Hezbollah suicide bomber); and
- Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002) ($21.2 million in compensatory damages awarded to the family of a serviceman who was tortured and killed during the hijacking of a TWA plane in 1985, $8 million awarded in compensatory damages to six servicemen and their families for their torture and detention during and after the same hijacking, and $300 million in punitive damages awarded against Iran for its recruitment, training, and financing of Hezbollah, the terrorist group the court found to be responsible for the hijacking).

It might be noted that in \textit{Stethem} only the award to the Stethem family was originally covered by \textsection 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking Act; the second suit filed by the six servicemen and their families — Carlson v. Islamic Republic of Iran — which was consolidated with \textit{Stethem} was not covered by \textsection 2002 but was recently added to the list of compensable suits by P.L. 107-228 (Sept. 30, 2002).
Second, they could receive 100 percent of the compensatory damages awarded in their judgments, plus interest, if they agreed to relinquish (a) all rights to further compensatory damages awarded by U.S. courts and (b) all rights to attach certain categories of property in satisfaction of their judgments for punitive damages, including Iran’s diplomatic and consular property as well as property that is at issue in claims against the United States before an international tribunal. The property in the latter category included Iran’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) trust fund, which remains at issue in a case before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.

Third, claimants could decline to obtain any payments from the Treasury Department and continue to pursue satisfaction of their judgments as best they can.\textsuperscript{72}

To pay a portion of the judgment against Cuba in the Alejandro case, the statute directed that the President vest and liquidate Cuban government properties that have been frozen under TWEA. For the ten designated cases against Iran, §2002 provided for payment out of U.S. funds, as follows:

- The statute directed the Secretary of the Treasury to use any proceeds that have accrued from the rental of Iranian diplomatic and consular property in the U.S. plus appropriated funds not otherwise obligated (meaning U.S. funds) up to the amount contained in Iran’s Foreign Military Sales account. (That account contains slightly more than $400 million paid in advance by Iran for military equipment that, because of the takeover of Iran by Khomeini and the hostage crisis, has never been delivered. In a claim filed with the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, Iran contends that it is entitled to the return of this money; but no judgment has yet been rendered by the arbitral tribunal.)

- If payments are paid out of U.S. funds, §2002 stated that the U.S. would become subrogated to the rights of the persons paid (meaning that the U.S. would be entitled to pursue their right to payment of the damage awards from Iran).

- Section 2002 further provided that the U.S. “shall pursue” these subrogated rights as claims or offsets to any claims or awards that Iran may have against the United States; and it bars the payment or release of any funds to Iran from frozen assets or from the Foreign Military Sales Fund until these subrogated claims have been satisfied.

Section 2002 further expressed the “sense of the Congress” that relations between the U.S. and Iran should not be normalized until these subrogated claims

have been “dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States.” It also “reaffirmed the President’s statutory authority to manage and ... vest foreign assets located in the United States for the purpose[... of assisting and, where appropriate, making payments to victims of terrorism.” In addition, §2002 modified one provision of §117 of the Treasury Department appropriations act for fiscal 1999 by changing the mandate that the State and Treasury Departments “shall” assist those who have obtained judgments against terrorist states in locating the assets of those states to the more permissive “should make every effort” to assist such judgment creditors.

Finally, §2002 modified the waiver authority that the President had been given in §117. It repealed that subsection and instead provided that “[t]he President may waive any provision of paragraph (1) in the interest of national security.” (Paragraph (1) was the subsection that allowed the frozen assets of a terrorist state, including its diplomatic property, to be attached in satisfaction of a judgment against that state.)

Immediately after signing the legislation into law on October 28, 2000, President Clinton exercised the substitute waiver authority granted by §2002 and waived “subsection (f)(1) of section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, in the interest of national security.” Thus, except to the extent §2002 allowed the blocked assets of Cuba to be used to satisfy a portion of the Alejandre judgment, it did not eliminate the bar to the attachment of the diplomatic property and the blocked assets of terrorist states to satisfy judgments against those states.

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75 In contrast to the general waiver exercised by President Clinton, the report of the House-Senate conference committee on the “Victims of Trafficking” bill expressed an intent that the waiver authority of §2002 be exercised only on a case-by-case basis, as follows:

Subsection 1(f) of this bill repeals the waiver authority granted in Section 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999, replacing it with a clearer but narrower waiver authority in the underlying statute. The Committee hopes clarity in the legislative history and intent of subsection 1(f), in the context of the section as a whole, will ensure appropriate application of the new waiver authority.

This is a key issue for American victims of state-sponsored terrorism who have sued or who will in the future sue the responsible terrorism-list state, as they are entitled to do under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996. Victims who already hold U.S. court judgements, and a few whose related cases will soon be decided, will receive their compensatory damages as a result of this legislation. The Committee intends that this legislation will similarly help other pending and future Antiterrorism Act plaintiffs as and when U.S. courts issue judgments against the foreign state sponsors of specific terrorist acts ....

In replacing the waiver, the conferees accept that the President should have the authority to waive the court’s authority to attach blocked assets. But to understand the view of the committee with respect to the use of the waiver, it (continued...)
In November and December, 2000, the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the Department of the Treasury issued a notice detailing the procedures governing application for payment by those in the eleven designated cases who might want to obtain the partial payment of their judgments afforded by §2002.\textsuperscript{75} All of the claimants in the designated suits chose to obtain such compensation.

In early 2001 the federal government liquidated $96.7 million of the $193.5 million of Cuban assets that had previously been blocked and paid that amount to the claimants in the Alejandre suit and their attorneys.\textsuperscript{77} The claimants in the ten designated cases against Iran variously chose to receive either 100 percent or 110 percent of their compensatory damages awards; and they ultimately received more

\textsuperscript{75} (...continued)

must be read within the context of other provisions of the legislation.

A waiver of the attachment provision would seem appropriate for final and pending Anti-Terrorism Act cases identified in subsection (a)(2) of this bill. In these cases, judicial attachment is not necessary because the executive branch will appropriately pay compensatory damages to the victims and use blocked assets to collect the funds from terrorist states.

Of particular significance, this section reaffirms the President's statutory authority, inter alia, to vest blocked foreign government assets and where appropriate make payments to victims of terrorism. The President has the authority to assist victims with pending and future cases.

The Committee's intent is that the President will review each case when the court issues a final judgment to determine whether to use the national security waiver, whether to help the plaintiffs collect from a foreign state's non-blocked assets in the United States, whether to allow the courts to attach and execute against blocked assets, or whether to use existing authorities to vest and pay those assets as damages to the victims of terrorism.

When a future President does make a decision whether to invoke the waiver, he should consider seriously whether the national security standard for a waiver has been met. In enacting this legislation, Congress is expressing the view that the attachment and execution of frozen assets to enforce judgments in cases under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 is not by itself contrary to the national security interest. Indeed, in the view of the Committee, it is generally in the national security interest of the United States to make foreign state sponsors of terrorism pay court-awarded damages to American victims, so neither the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act nor any other law will stand in the way of justice. Thus, in the view of the committee the waiver authority should not be exercised in a routine or blanket manner, but only where U.S. national security interests would be implicated in taking action against particular blocked assets or where alternative recourse — such as vesting and paying those assets — may be preferable to court attachment.


\textsuperscript{77} The original judgment had been rendered in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
than $380 million in compensation out of U.S. funds. (See Appendix I for a listing of the cases, the payments made, and the option chosen.)

107th Congress — Additional Cases Added to §2002 and Attachment of Assets Allowed in Other Cases

Subsequent to the enactment of §2002 of the Victims of Trafficking statute in late 2000, the courts handed down additional default judgments in suits against terrorist states under the FSIA exception. As noted above, six of these additional judgments were covered by the compensation scheme set forth in §2002 because the suits had been filed on one of the five dates on or prior to July 27, 2000 specified in the statute. But other default judgments, as well as additional cases that were filed

78 This information has been provided by the Office of Foreign Assets Control and is current as of July 29, 2003.

79 See the six cases summarized in n. 68.

80 Other default judgments against Iran that were handed down after the enactment of §2002 on October 28, 2000, and prior to the adjournment of the 107th Congress in late 2002 but that were not covered by §2002 included:

- Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.D.C. 2000) ($11.7 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the administrator of the estate of an Iranian dissident and naturalized U.S. citizen killed by gunshot in Paris by the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security);
- Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) ($12 million in compensatory damages and $120 million in punitive damages awarded to woman who suffered severe and long-lasting injuries from a suicide bombing of a bus in Jerusalem carried out at the instigation of Hamas, an entity the court found to be supported by Iran);
- Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (D.D.C. 2002) ($42 million in damages awarded to the family of a U.S. Agency for International Development officer who was killed by Hezbollah militants during a hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airlines flight in 1984);
- Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002) ($33 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in punitive damages awarded to the family and estate of a person who was severely injured in a bus bombing in Jerusalem carried out by Hamas, which the court found to be funded by Iran, and who subsequently died from those injuries);
- Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F.Supp.2d 222 (D.D.C. 2002) ($1.2 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to an individual who, while he was a graduate student in Lebanon in 1984, was kidnapped and tortured for four days by Hezbollah and two other paramilitary groups which the court found to have been organized, funded, trained, and controlled by Iran); and
- Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.D.C. 2002) ($18.96 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages awarded to the widow and sister of CIA agent William Buckley who was kidnapped in Beirut and tortured for 14 months by the Islamic (continued...)}
and remained pending, were not covered by §2002. As a consequence, pressure for finding some means to compensate the additional claimants continued to grow.\textsuperscript{81} The 107\textsuperscript{th} Congress enacted several pieces of legislation, as follows:

\textbf{(1) Directive to develop a comprehensive compensation scheme (P.L. 107-77).} In the "Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2002,"\textsuperscript{82} Congress in November, 2001, directed President Bush to submit, no later than the time he submitted the proposed budget for fiscal 2003,

a legislative proposal to establish a comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States victims of international terrorism (or relatives of deceased United States victims of international terrorism) that occurred or occurs on or after November 1, 1979.\textsuperscript{83}

That directive had not been part of either the House or Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2500. But it was added in lieu of an amendment sponsored by Sen. Hollings that the Senate had adopted, without debate, which would have authorized partial payment of the judgments in five additional cases (including the \textit{Roeder} case, \textit{infra}).\textsuperscript{84} In explaining the conference substitute for that provision, the conference report stated:

\textsuperscript{83} (...continued)

Jihad, an entity the court found to be organized and funded by Iran, and who ultimately died while in captivity.

In addition, two default judgments were handed down against Iraq — Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F.Supp.2d 19 (D.D.C. 2001) ($12.8 million in compensatory damages awarded to four U.S. citizens who were detained and tortured for varying periods of time between 1992 and 1995 by Iraq and $6 million awarded to their spouses) and Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001) ($9 million in compensatory damages against Iraq and Saddam Hussein and $300 million in punitive damages against Saddam Hussein personally awarded to twelve U.S. citizens who were held hostage by Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990). In the latter case, it might be noted, the court subsequently found that an additional 168 plaintiffs had established their right to relief for being held hostage by Iraq; and the court awarded them approximately $85 million in compensatory damages. \textit{See} Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3725 (D.D.C. 2003).


\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.} §626, reprinted at 147 CONG. REC. H8001.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{See} 147 CONG. REC. S9365 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2001). The Hollings amendment generally followed the scheme of §2002 by specifying the filing dates of four of the five additional cases rather than identifying them by name. The specified dates were May 17, 1996; May 7, 1997; October 22, 1999; and December 15, 1999. It identified the Roeder case only by its filing number in the federal district court in the District of Columbia — Case Number 1:00CV03110 (ESG). For the text of the amendment, \textit{see} 147 CONG. REC. S9398-9400 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2001).
Objections from all quarters have been repeatedly raised against the current ad hoc approach to compensation for victims of international terrorism. Objections and concerns, however, will no longer suffice. It is imperative that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Departments of Justice and Treasury and other relevant agencies, develop a legislative proposal that will provide fair and prompt compensation to all U.S. victims of international terrorism. A compensation system already is in place for the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks; a similar system should be available to victims of international terrorism.\textsuperscript{83}

In signing the measure into law, President Bush cited the directive regarding submission of a comprehensive plan and stated that “I will apply this provision consistent with my constitutional responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{86} No such plan was put forward in the second session of the 107\textsuperscript{th} Congress.

(2) Coverage of additional cases under §2002 (P.L. 107-228). On September 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law a measure — the “Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal 2003” — that added cases filed against Iran on June 6, 2000, and January 16, 2002 to those that can be compensated under §2002.\textsuperscript{87} The first case — Carlson v. The Islamic Republic of Iran\textsuperscript{88} — was by six Navy divers who were on board a TWA airliner that was hijacked in 1985 and who were subsequently imprisoned and tortured by Lebanese Shiite terrorists. That suit had been filed separately from a suit by the family of Robert Stethem, who was murdered in the course of the same hijacking — Stethem v. The Islamic Republic of Iran.\textsuperscript{89} But the two suits had been consolidated for trial, and the court decided the cases together.\textsuperscript{90} Stethem’s suit had been included as one of the cases that was compensable under §2002 as originally enacted, but the companion suit by the Navy divers had not been included. The amendment enacted into law as part of the foreign relations authorization bill had been adopted by the House on May 16, 2001, by voice vote to rectify what its sponsor termed this “inadvertent error.”\textsuperscript{91} The second case, specified by its filing date of January 16, 2002, was added to the measure by the

\textsuperscript{83} H.Rept. 107-278, 107\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} Sess. (Nov. 9, 2001), \textit{reprinted at} 147 CONG. REC. H 8033 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 2001).

\textsuperscript{86} Office of the White House Press Secretary, “President Signs Commerce Appropriations Bill: Statement by the President on H.R. 2500” (November 28, 2001), available on the White House web site.

\textsuperscript{87} P.L. 107-228, §686 (September 30, 2002). Various members of Congress had previously introduced bills to add additional suits to the list compensable under §2002. \textit{See, e.g.,} H.R. 4647.

\textsuperscript{88} Civil Action No. 00-1309 (D.D.C., filed June 6, 2000).

\textsuperscript{89} Civil Action No. 00-0159 (D.D.C. filed January 28, 2000).

\textsuperscript{90} Stethem v. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Carlson v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002).

\textsuperscript{91} As with the other suits included within §2002, the Carlson suit is not specified by name but merely by its filing date of June 6, 2000. The amendment, sponsored by Rep. Manzullo, was part of a group of amendments adopted by voice vote on May 16, 2001. \textit{See} 147 CONG. REC. H2224-H2239 (daily ed. May 16, 2001).
conference committee and has been identified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control as the case of *Kapar v. Islamic Republic of Iran*.

(3) Attachment of frozen assets authorized (P.L. 107-297). On November 26, 2002, President Bush signed the “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act” (TRIA) into law.\(^2\) Section 201 of TRIA overrode long-standing objections by the Clinton and Bush Administrations and makes the frozen assets of terrorist states available to satisfy judgments for compensatory damages against such states (and organizations and persons) as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.

Subsection (b) of §201, in turn, narrowed the waiver authority previously afforded the President on this subject and permits the President to waive this provision “in the national security interest” only with respect to “property subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”\(^3\)

In addition, §201 of P.L. 107-297 amended §2002 of the Victims of Trafficking Act in several respects:

- It added to the list of suits against Iran that are compensable under §2002, without further identification, all those that were filed before October 28, 2000 (previously the suits covered were those that had been decided by July 20, 2000, or that had been filed on February 17, 1999; June 7, 1999; January 28, 2000; March 15, 2000; June 6, 2000, July 27, 2000; or January 16, 2002).
- It made 90 percent of the amount remaining in the §2002 fund (about $15.7 million) available to pay the compensatory damages awarded in any judgment rendered in the cases previously added by P.L. 107-228 and by this statute which had been entered as of the date of this statute’s enactment (November 26, 2002) and provided

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\(^2\) P.L. 107-297 (Nov. 26, 2002).

\(^3\) It might be noted that on July 10, 2003, the Senate by voice vote added an amendment to S. 925, the State Department Authorization Act for FY 2004-05, to clarify that the terrorist state assets that should be available to claimants under §201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act include those that are “subject to any prohibition, restriction, regulation, or license pursuant to chapter V of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations ....” See 149 CONG. REC. S 9171-72 (daily ed. July 10, 2003). The clarification was needed, according to Senators Allen and Harkin, the sponsors of the amendment, because the State Department had construed §201 to apply only to blocked assets and not to those that were otherwise regulated.
that, if the total amount of damages awarded exceeded the amount available, each claimant is to receive a proportionate amount.

- It set aside the remaining 10 percent of the §2002 fund for compensation under the same formula of whatever judgment is ultimately entered in the case filed against Iran on January 16, 2002 (Kapar v. Islamic Republic of Iran).
- It provided that persons who receive less than 100 percent of the compensatory damages awarded in their judgments against Iran under the foregoing scheme do not have to relinquish their right to obtain additional compensatory damages, as was required of those previously compensated under §2002, but only to relinquish their right to obtain punitive damages.

These amendments derived from provisions that had been added to the terrorism risk insurance bill in both the House and the Senate. On November 7, 2001, the House Committee on Financial Services by voice vote adopted an amendment by Rep. Watt to its terrorism risk insurance bill (H.R. 3210) that would have allowed the frozen assets of terrorists or terrorist organizations to be used in satisfaction of judgments against them.\(^{94}\) That amendment was substantially modified in a floor substitute to apply to terrorist states, organizations, and individuals and to allow the President to waive the requirement with respect to diplomatic and consular property (but only if the property had not been rented or sold to a third party), which was adopted by the House on November 29, 2001.\(^{95}\) On June 18, 2002, the Senate by a vote of 81-3 adopted a broader rider proposed by Sen. Allen to S. 2600, the “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.”\(^{96}\) Like the House provision, the Senate rider authorized the use of frozen assets to satisfy judgments against terrorist states, organizations, and individuals and allowed the President to waive that authorization only with respect to diplomatic and consular property. But it also added all suits against Iran filed by October 28, 2000, to the list of those compensable under §2002 and set forth a proportional payment scheme for the added suits. On September 10, 2002, the House by a vote of 373-0 adopted a motion instructing its conferees on the terrorism risk insurance bills to accept the Senate rider.\(^{97}\)

**Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran**

**Judicial proceedings.** In late 2000 a suit was filed in federal district court on behalf of the 52 embassy staffers who had been held hostage by Iran from 1979-81 and on behalf of their families. *Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran*\(^{98}\) sought both compensatory and punitive damages from Iran. In August, 2001, the trial court

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94 H.Rept. 107-300, Part I (Nov. 19, 2001), at 17.
95 147 CONG. REC. H8596, 8629 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2001).
96 147 CONG. REC. S5509-S5513 (daily ed. June 13, 2002) and S5575 (daily ed. June 14, 2002). The rider replicated a bill the Senate Judiciary Committee had reported on June 27, 2002 (S. 2134, the “Terrorism Victim’s Access to Compensation Act of 2002”). With the enactment of the rider into law, the Senate took no further action on S. 2134.
98 Case Number 1:00CV03110 (ESG) (D.D.C., filed December 29, 2000).
granted a default judgment to the plaintiffs and scheduled a hearing on the damages to be awarded. But in October, 2001, a few days before the scheduled hearing, the U.S. government intervened in the proceeding and moved that the judgment be vacated and the case dismissed. The government contended that the suit did not meet all of the requirements of the terrorist state exception to the FSIA (notably, that Iran had not been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the U.S. personnel were held hostage) and that the suit was barred by the explicit provisions of the 1981 Algiers Accords that led to the release of the hostages.²⁹

While that motion was pending before the court, the Senate approved as part of the Hollings amendment to the FY2002 Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State noted in #1 of the preceding section a provision specifying that Roeder should be deemed to be included within the terrorist state exception to the FSIA; and the conference agreement on that bill retained that portion of the Hollings amendment. Thus, as amended, the pertinent section of the FSIA excludes suits against terrorist states from the immunity generally accorded foreign states but directs the courts to decline to hear such a case (with the amendment in italics)

if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism ... at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such act or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110 (ESG) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.¹⁰⁰

The conference report on the bill explained the provision as follows:

Subsection (c) quashes the State Department's motion to vacate the judgment obtained by plaintiffs in Case Number 1:00CV03110 (ESG) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Consistent with current law, subsection (c) does not require the United States government to make any payments to satisfy the judgment.¹⁰¹

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²⁹ The Algiers Accords contain the following provision:

...[T]he United States ... will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future claim of the United States or a United States national arising out of events occurring before the date of this declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to United States property or property of the United States nationals within the United States embassy compound in Tehran after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States nationals or their property as a result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran. The United States will also bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran in the courts of the United States of any pending or future claims asserted by persons other than the United States nationals arising out of the events specified in the preceding sentence. 20 ILM 227 (1981).


¹⁰¹ H.Rept. 107-278, supra n. 75.
In signing the appropriations act into law on November 28, 2001, however, President Bush took note of this provision and commented as follows:

"Subsection (c) ... purports to remove Iran's immunity from suit in a case brought by the 1979 Tehran hostages in the District Court for the District of Columbia. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, the executive branch will act, and will encourage the courts to act, with regard to subsection 626(c) of the Act in a manner consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Algiers Accord that achieved the release of U.S. hostages in 1981."\(^{102}\)

Subsequently on December 13, 2001, the judge in Roeder (Judge Emmet G. Sullivan) heard arguments on the government's earlier motion to dismiss. The government continued to argue, inter alia, that the suit is barred by the Algiers Accords and ought to be dismissed; and during the course of the proceeding Judge Sullivan expressed concern regarding the lack of clarity of the recent Congressional enactment with respect to that contention. A week later in the fiscal 2002 appropriations act for the Department of Defense, the 107th Congress included a provision making a minor technical correction in the reference to the Roeder case.\(^{103}\) But the conference report also elaborated on what it said was the effect and intent of the earlier amendment of the FSIA with respect to Roeder, seemingly in response to Judge Sullivan's expression of concern. The conference report stated as follows:

Sec. 208. — The conference agreement includes Section 208, proposed as Section 105 of Division D of the Senate bill, making a technical correction to Section 626 of Public Law 107-77. The language included in Section 626(c) of Public Law 107-77 quashed the Department of State's motion to vacate the judgment obtained by plaintiffs in Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) and reaffirmed the validity of this claim and its retroactive application. Nevertheless, the Department of State continued to argue that the judgment obtained in Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) should be vacated after Public Law 107-77 was enacted. The provision included in Section 626(c) of Public Law 107-77 acknowledges that, notwithstanding any other authority, the American citizens who were taken hostage by the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 have a claim against Iran under the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 and the provision specifically allows the judgment to stand for purposes of award damages consistent with Section 2002 of the Victims of Terrorism Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-386, 114 Stat. 1541).\(^{104}\)

Nonetheless, in signing the Department of Defense appropriations measure into law on January 10, 2002, President Bush continued to insist as follows:

\(^{102}\) The President's signing statement is available on the White House web site.

\(^{103}\) The amendment inverted two letters in the case reference to Roeder that had been contained in P.L. 107-17, changing "1:00CV03110 (EGS)" to "1:00CV03110 (ESG)." See P.L. 107-117, Title II, §208 (Jan. 10, 2002). This technical correction had originally been included in the DOD appropriations bill as reported and adopted by the Senate but without explanation. See H.R. 3388 as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 107-109 (Dec. 5, 2001) and Senate floor debate at 147 CONG. REC. S12476-12529 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2001), S12586-12676 and S12779-12812 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2001).

Section 208 of Division B makes a technical correction to subsection 626(c) of Public Law 107-77 (the FY2002 Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act), but does nothing to alter the effect of that provision or any other provision of law.

Since the enactment of sub-section 626(c) and consistent with it, the executive branch has encouraged the courts to act, and will continue to encourage the courts to act, in a manner consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Algiers Accords that achieved the release of U.S. hostages in 1981.\textsuperscript{105}

After two additional hearings, Judge Sullivan on April 18, 2002, granted the government’s motion to vacate the default judgment against Iran and to dismiss the suit.\textsuperscript{106} In a lengthy opinion the court concluded that:

- at the time it entered a default judgment for plaintiffs on August 17, 2001, it did not, in fact, have jurisdiction over the case and, thus, should not have entered a judgment\textsuperscript{107};
- the cause of action which Congress had adopted in late 1996 did not, in fact, authorize suits against terrorist states but only against the officials, employees, and agents of those states who perpetrate terrorist acts\textsuperscript{108}; and
- the provision of the Algiers Accords committing the United States to bar suits against Iran for the incident constitutes the substantive law of the case, and Congress’ two enactments specifically concerning the case were too ambiguous to conclude that it specifically intended to override this international commitment.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} The President’s signing statement is available on the White House web site.

\textsuperscript{106} Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140 (D. D.C., decided April 18, 2002).

\textsuperscript{107} The court said that it did not have jurisdiction over the suit until Congress amended the FSIA by means of §626(c) of the FY2002 appropriations act for the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and State, which was signed into law on November 28, 2001. Prior to that amendment, it said, the suit did not fall within the terrorist state exception to the FSIA because Iran had not been declared to be a terrorist state at the time it seized and held the American personnel hostage. The court said also that, absent an “express statement of intent by Congress,” it could not apply §626(c) retroactively.

\textsuperscript{108} The court stressed that the terrorist state exception which Congress had added to the FSIA in 1996 meant only that U.S. courts could exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Traditional state immunity, in other words, was eliminated as a jurisdictional barrier. But that amendment to the FSIA did not in itself, the court said, provide a cause of action for such suits. The specific statute providing for such a cause of action which Congress enacted later in 1996, it said, provided only for a cause of action against an official, employee, or agent of a terrorist state, not against the terrorist state itself. (See P.L. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, §101(c) (Sept. 30, 1996); 110 Stat. 3009-172; 28 U.S.C.A. 1605 note.)

\textsuperscript{109} The court stressed that an act of Congress “ought never to be considered to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.” None of the statutes Congress had adopted relating to a cause of action generally or to Roeder itself, the court said, unambiguously declared an intent to override the Algiers Accords. Nor, it said, did they unambiguously declare an intent not to override the Accords. They, and their “scant” (continued...)
In addition, the court in *dicta* suggested that Congress’ enactments on the *Roeder* case might have interfered with its adjudication of the case in a manner that raised constitutional separations of powers concerns.\footnote{110} It also blistered the plaintiffs’ attorneys for what it said were serious breaches of their professional and ethical responsibilities.\footnote{111}

The case is now on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where oral argument was heard on May 12, 2003.\footnote{112}

**Efforts To Abrogate the Algiers Accords by the 107\textsuperscript{th} and 108\textsuperscript{th} Congresses.** Subsequent to the trial court’s decision in *Roeder*, efforts have been made in both the 107\textsuperscript{th} and the 108\textsuperscript{th} Congresses to enact legislation that would explicitly abrogate the provision of the Algiers Accords barring the hostages’ suit. On July 24, 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported the “Fiscal 2003

\footnote{109} (...)continued\footnote{109} legislative history, were ambiguous on the question, it held, and, consequently, must be construed not to conflict with the Accords:

Neither the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Flatow Amendment, Subsection 626(c), or Section 208 contain the type of express statutory mandate sufficient to abrogate an international executive agreement. Furthermore ..., the legislative histories of these statutes contain no clear statements of Congressional intent to specifically abrogate the Algiers Accords. Therefore, ..., unless and until Congress expresses its clear intent to overturn the provisions of a binding agreement between two nations that has been in effect for over twenty years, this Court can not interpret these statutes to abrogate that agreement. *Roeder* v. Islamic Republic of Iran, *supra*, at 177.

The court also rejected the argument that because the U.S. entered into the Algiers Accords under duress, the Accords constituted “an unenforceable illegal contract.” “Whatever emotional appeal and rhetorical flourish this argument contains,” the court said, “it is absolutely without basis in law.” *Id.* at 168.

\footnote{110} The court did not base its decision on any separation of powers considerations. But it did say that if it had construed §626(c) to apply retroactively, Congress’ “post-judgment retroactive imposition of jurisdiction [would raise] serious separations of powers concerns” and might be “an impermissible encroachment by Congress into the sphere of the federal courts ....” *Id.* at 161. “By expressly directing legislation at pending litigation, Congress has arguably attempted to determine the outcome of this litigation,” it said. *Id.* at 163. The court also suggested that the narrowness of Congress’ enactments, *i.e.*, their application only to this one case and not to any others, raised possible Article III concerns. *Id.* at 165–66.

\footnote{111} In commenting on what it called the “repeated ethical failures by class counsel,” the court stated that “[p]laintiffs’ counsel in this case repeatedly presented meritless arguments to this Court, repeatedly failed to substantiate their arguments by reference to any supporting authority, and repeatedly failed to bring to the Court’s attention the existence of controlling authority that conflicted with those arguments.” *Id.* at 185.

\footnote{112} *Roeder* v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Docket # 02-5145 (D.C. Cir., filed April 30, 2002).
Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State” (S. 2778). Section 616 of that bill proposed to amend the FSIA as follows:

SEC. 616. Section 1605 of title 28, United States Code is amended by adding a new subsection (h) as follows:

(h) CAUSE OF ACTION FOR IRANIAN HOSTAGES—Notwithstanding any provision of the Algiers Accords, or any other international agreement, any United States citizen held hostage in Iran after November 1, 1979, and their spouses and children at the time, shall have a claim for money damages against the government of Iran. Any provision in an international agreement, including the Algiers Accords that purports to bar such suit is abrogated. This subsection shall apply retroactively to any cause of action cited in 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7)(A).

In explaining the provision, the report of the Committee simply stated that “Section 616 clarifies section 626 of Public Law 107-77 that the Algiers Accord is abrogated for the purposes of providing a cause of action for the Iranian hostages.” The measure received no further action prior to the adjournment of the 107th Congress, however.

In the 108th Congress the Senate has added the same or a similar amendment to two appropriations bills, but in both cases the amendment has been deleted in conference. On January 15, 2003, the same amendment was included in a managers’ amendment offered by Sen. Stevens to the House-passed version of the consolidated appropriations resolution for fiscal 2003, H.J.Res. 2. The Senate adopted the amendment by voice vote without comment on the provision. But the provision was deleted in conference and, thus, was not part of the bill as enacted into law. Similarly, the Senate on April 3, 2003, adopted without debate a managers’ amendment offered by Sen. Stevens to the “Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003” (S. 762, H.R. 1559) which included a similar provision. The bill primarily provided substantial additional funding for the military action against Iraq and for the Department of Homeland Security. But §606 of the managers’ amendment provided as follows:

Sec. 606. Section 1605 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

(h) CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES FOR DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY — (1) Any United States citizen who dies or suffers injury caused by a foreign state’s act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking committed on or after November 2, 1979, and any member of the immediate family of such citizen, shall have a claim for money damages

117 The managers’ amendment was adopted by voice vote with no debate on this particular provision. See 149 CONG. REC. S4866-08 (daily ed. April 3, 2003). The text of the amendment can be found at Id. S4866-67.
against such foreign state, as authorized by subsection (a)(7), for
death or personal injury (including economic damages, solatium,
pain and suffering). (2) A claim under paragraph (1) shall not be
barred or precluded by the Algiers Accords.

The amendment was deleted in conference, however, and was not part of the measure
as enacted into law (P.L. 108-11). Thus, no legislation has been enacted as yet
specifically abrogating the Algiers Accords.

Confiscation of Iraq's Blocked Assets for Use in the
Reconstruction of Iraq

On March 20, 2003, immediately after the U.S. and its coalition partners initiated
military action against Iraq, President Bush issued an executive order providing for
the confiscation and vesting of Iraq's frozen assets in the U.S. government and
placing them in the Development Fund for Iraq for use in the post-war reconstruction
of Iraq. According to the Terrorist Assets Report 2002 published by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Iraq's blocked assets totaled approximately $1.73 billion at
the end of 2002 (see Appendix II). However, the President's order excluded from
confiscation and vesting Iraq's diplomatic and consular property as well as assets that
had, prior to March 20, 2003, been ordered attached in satisfaction of judgments
against Iraq rendered pursuant to the terrorist suit provision of the FSIA and §201 of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (which reportedly total about $300 million). The
President stated that the remaining assets "should be used to assist the Iraqi people
..." Thus, notwithstanding the enactment of §201 of TRIA, the President's action
appears to make Iraq's frozen assets unavailable to those who, after March 20, 2003,
obtain judgments against that state for its sponsorship of, or complicity in, acts of
terrorism.

Subsequently, the President took several additional actions complementing and
reinforcing this executive order. In the “Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal
2003,” Congress provided that “the President may make inapplicable with respect to
Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of
law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism.” On the basis of that
authority, President Bush on May 7, 2003, declared a number of provisions
concerning terrorist states, including the FSIA exception and the section of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act making their blocked assets available to victims of

118 See P.L. 108-011 (April 16, 2003). Neither the conference report nor the House or Senate
debates on acceptance of the conference agreement made any mention of the deletion of this
H3357 et seq. (daily ed. April 12, 2003), id. H3385-3404 (House debate), and id. S 5392
(daily ed. April 11, 2003) (unanimous consent agreement in the Senate providing for
automatic approval of the conference report when received from the House).


terrorism, inapplicable to Iraq. On May 22, 2003, he issued another executive order providing that the Development Fund of Iraq cannot be attached or made subject to any other kind of judicial process.

Whether the President has the legal authority to make Iraq's assets unavailable to victims of terrorism who obtain judgments against Iraq was briefly contested in Acree v. Republic of Iraq. In that case a federal district court on July 7, 2003 — two and half months after the President's order -- handed down a default judgment against Iraq for its imprisonment and brutal torture of 17 American prisoners of war (POWs) during the first Gulf War in 1991. After detailing the gruesome treatment given the POWs, the court awarded them and their families $653 million in compensatory damages and added a punitive damages award of $306 million for the benefit of the POWs against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Upon request by the plaintiffs, Judge Roberts on July 18, 2003, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the government to retain at least $653 million of Iraq's assets vested in the U.S. by President Bush's executive order pending further decision by the court. But after an expedited hearing on the matter, the court on July 30, 2003, held that none of the assets in question could be attached by the plaintiffs; and the court dissolved the TRO. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied primarily on the Supplemental Appropriations Act provision noted above and the subsequent actions by President Bush rather than on his March 20, 2003, executive order. The court concluded:

The Act is Congressional authorization for the President to make TRIA prospectively inapplicable to Iraq, and the President exercised that authority when he issued the Determination on May 7, 2003. As a result, at the time the plaintiffs obtained their judgment against Iraq on July 7, 2003, TRIA was no longer an available mechanism for plaintiffs to use to satisfy their judgment.

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121 See Memorandum for the Secretary of State (Presidential Determination No. 2003-23) (May 7, 2003). This Determination simply replicated the general language of the Supplemental Appropriations Act provision. But in a subsequent message to Congress, President Bush stated:

... [B]y my memorandum to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce of May 7, 2003, (Presidential Determination 2003-23), I made inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-195, as amended, and any other provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism. Such provisions of law that apply to countries that have supported terrorism include, but are not limited to, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7), 28 U.S.C. 1610, and section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.

President George Bush, Message to the Congress of the United States (May 22, 2003), available on the White House web site.


Bush Administration’s Proposed Compensation Alternative

On June 17, 2003, Sen. Lugar (R-IN) introduced an Administration proposal that would establish an administrative procedure to provide compensation to victims of international terrorism as an alternative to suits under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA. S. 1275 would amend §201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act to provide that claimants who obtain judgments against terrorist states after the date of the bill’s introduction can no longer collect on the compensatory damages portions of those judgments out of the states’ blocked assets. As an alternative, the bill would create a new compensation scheme called the “Benefits for Victims of International Terrorism Program.” Administered by the State Department, the program would authorize the payment of up to $262,000 to those who have been killed, injured, or held hostage by an act of international terrorism. (The proposal uses as its standard the amount available to the families of public safety officers who are killed in the line of duty under subpart 1 of part L of title I of the “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.”) A person who accepted benefits under the program would be barred from bringing or maintaining a suit against a terrorist state for the same act.

In a hearing on the bill by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 17, 2003, William Taft, the State Department Legal Adviser, asserted that “[t]he current litigation-based system of compensation is inequitable, unpredictable, occasionally costly to the U.S. taxpayer, and damaging to foreign policy and national security goals of this country.” Stuart Eizenstat, now in private practice but formerly the Clinton Administration’s point man on this issue, claimed that the amount of compensation that would be provided under the bill was insufficient to make the scheme a viable alternative to litigation. Allan Gerson, a professor and trial lawyer involved in suits under the FSIA exception, charged that the proposal would deny plaintiffs their day in court and do nothing to hold terrorist states accountable for their actions.

Suits Against the United States for “Terrorist” Acts

At least two of the states affected by the FSIA exception appear to have enacted legislation allowing their citizens to file suit against the U.S. for violations of human rights or interference in the countries’ internal affairs. Cuba reportedly allows such suits for violations of human rights; and two judgments assessing billions of dollars in damages against the U.S. have apparently been handed down. Iran reportedly has authorized suits against foreign states for intervention in the internal affairs of the country and for terrorist activities resulting in the death, injury, or financial loss of

125 42 U.S.C.A. 3796 et seq. (West Supp. 2003). The Act originally set the death benefit at $50,000; in 2001 Congress increased the death benefit to $250,000, adjusted annually for inflation. See P.L. 107-56, §613(a) (Oct. 26, 2001); 115 Stat. 369. As adjusted, the amount of the benefit now is about $262,000.

126 Hearing on Benefits for U.S. Victims of International Terrorism Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (July 17, 2003) (unprinted).

127 Law Library of Congress, Suits Against Terrorist States: Cuba (Feb. 2002) (Rept No. 2002-11904);
Iranian nationals; and at least one judgment for half a billion dollars in damages has been handed down against the U.S.\textsuperscript{128}

**Conclusion**

The 1996 amendments to the FSIA allowing victims of terrorism to sue the state(s) responsible for damages in U.S. courts were enacted with broad political support. But subsequent difficulties in obtaining payment of the substantial damages assessed in default judgments by the courts and subsequent efforts in Congress to facilitate or allow such payment out of the assets of such states located in the U.S. have raised issues fraught with both emotion and complexity. Matters of effectiveness, fairness, diplomacy, and possible reciprocal action against U.S. assets abroad have all entered the debate. In addition, the issue has pitted the compensation of victims of terrorism against U.S. compliance with a specific international obligation and, most recently, against the use of funds for the reconstruction of Iraq.

As the situation stands now, claimants in a first tier of cases designated under §2002 of the Victims of Trafficking Act have been able to obtain either 100 percent or 110 percent of their compensatory damages awards – nearly $100 million in one case against Cuba out of Cuba’s blocked assets, more than $380 million in ten cases against Iran out of U.S. funds. Claimants in a second tier of cases designated under §2002 have been able to obtain a smaller percentage of their compensatory damages awards – about 20 percent. Under §201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, claimants in other cases not covered by §2002 can now lay claim to the blocked assets of terrorist states, organizations, and individuals to satisfy the compensatory damages portions of their judgments. But in the case of Iran – the defendant in the largest number of suits filed, those blocked assets are virtually non-existent; and Presidential Determination 2003-23 has made Iraq’s blocked assets unavailable as well. Thus, notwithstanding Congress’ enactments, the compensation of victims of terrorism who have brought suit, or will bring suit, under the terrorist state exception to the FSIA seems likely to continue in an ad hoc fashion, with substantial benefits for some and little or none for others. S. 1275 is the Bush Administration’s initial effort to create a more certain, albeit less generous, compensation scheme. But the proposal seems to have drawn substantial criticism, and its enactment may be in doubt.

This issue, in short, seems certain to continue to draw Congressional attention.

# APPENDIX I

Judgments Against Terrorist States Covered By, and Payments Made Pursuant to, §2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgment</th>
<th>Compensatory Damages Awarded</th>
<th>Punitive Damages Awarded</th>
<th>Amount Paid Pursuant to § 2002 (Including Interest)</th>
<th>Procedure Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Alejandro v. Republic of Cuba</em>, 996 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)</td>
<td>$50 million</td>
<td>$137.7 million</td>
<td>$96,708,652.03</td>
<td>Liquidation of blocked Cuban assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran</em>, 999 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998)</td>
<td>$22.5 million</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
<td>$26,002,690.15</td>
<td>100% option (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran</em>, 90 F.Supp.2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000)</td>
<td>$41.2 million</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>$47,315,791.80</td>
<td>110% option (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran</em>, 151 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001)</td>
<td>$53.4 million</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>$56,084,467.27</td>
<td>One claimant chose the 110% option, the others the 100% option (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>Compensatory Damages Awarded</td>
<td>Punitive Damages Awarded</td>
<td>Amount Paid Pursuant to § 2002 (Including Interest)</td>
<td>Procedure Used</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322 (D.D.C. 2001)</strong></td>
<td>$31.5 million</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>$35,041,877.36</td>
<td>110% option (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001)</strong></td>
<td>$14.64 million</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>$14,865,685.76</td>
<td>100% option chosen (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F.Supp.2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001)</strong></td>
<td>$16.28 million</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>$18,032,569.00</td>
<td>110% option chosen (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stethen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002)</strong></td>
<td>$21.2 million</td>
<td>$300 million (jointly with Carlson)</td>
<td>$21,579,737.64</td>
<td>100% option chosen (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carlson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002)</strong></td>
<td>$7.8 million</td>
<td>$300 million (jointly with Stethen)</td>
<td>$8,784,584.90</td>
<td>110% option chosen (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cases added by P.L. 107-228 and TRIA:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.C. 2000)</strong></td>
<td>$11.7 million</td>
<td>$300 million</td>
<td>$2,342,729.89</td>
<td>Pro rata payment (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24316 (D.D.C. 2001)</strong></td>
<td>$12 million</td>
<td>$120 million</td>
<td>$2,394,606.04</td>
<td>Pro rata payment (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002)</strong></td>
<td>$33 million</td>
<td>$150 million</td>
<td>$6,634,687.87</td>
<td>Pro rata payment (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (D.D.C. 2002)</strong></td>
<td>$42 million</td>
<td></td>
<td>$8,387,121.10</td>
<td>Pro rata payment (appropriated funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kapar v. Islamic Republic of Iran</strong></td>
<td>Not yet decided</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: Information on the amounts paid under §2002 has been provided by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is current as of July 29, 2003. Claimants in the first tier (Fatah through Carlson) choosing the 100 percent option were entitled to receive 100 percent of the compensatory damages awarded plus post-judgment interest on condition that they relinquish any further right to compensatory damages and any right to satisfy their punitive damages award out of the blocked assets of the terrorist state (including diplomatic property), debts owed by the United States to the terrorist state as the result of judgments by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, and any property that is at issue in claims against the United States before that and other international tribunals (such as Iran's Foreign Military Sales account). Claimants choosing the 110 percent option were entitled to receive 110 percent of the compensatory damages awarded plus post-judgment interest on condition they relinquish any further right to obtain compensatory and punitive damages. The claimants in the second tier (added by P.L. 107-228 and TRIA) are to divide the amount remaining in the fund on a pro rata basis and need not give up their right to recover additional compensatory damages. In addition to the cases listed, OFAC reports that it has determined that a $7.1 million judgment against Cuba rendered by a Florida court is eligible for compensation under §2002. That decision—Martinez v. Republic of Cuba—held Cuba liable in early 2001 for the sexual battery of a Miami woman who was lured into marriage under false pretenses by a Cuban spy.
APPENDIX II
Amount of Assets of Terrorist States Blocked by the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Amount of Blocked Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>$146.5 million (after the payment in the Alejandro case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$237.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>$1221.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>$31.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>$27.4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>$0.6\textsuperscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1.664 billion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This information is from the Calendar Year 2002 Annual Report to the Congress on Assets in the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees (January, 2003), which was prepared by the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the Department of the Treasury. That report found Iraq to have $1.73 billion in frozen assets in the U.S. But most of that has now been vested in the U.S. for use in Iraq's reconstruction, and the rest has been paid out in two judgments against Iraq rendered prior to President Bush's seizure of the assets.

\textsuperscript{a} Syria's assets in the U.S., or held elsewhere by U.S. entities, are not currently blocked and, according to the OFAC report, total $133 million.