THE STATE JFHQ-GETTING IT RIGHT WITH NORTHCOM

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USAWC CLASS OF 2008

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
**1. REPORT DATE**  
15 MAR 2008

**2. REPORT TYPE**  
Strategy Research Project

**3. DATES COVERED**  
00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**  
The State JFHQ- Getting It Right with NORTHCOM

**6. AUTHOR(S)**  
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**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**  
U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220

**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

**9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**

**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**  
See attached

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
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**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

Same as Report (SAR)

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**

30

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
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THE STATE JFHQ- GETTING IT RIGHT WITH NORTHCOM

by

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What is the State Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) role and its interaction with NORTHCOM? Each of the 50 states has its own JFHQ. The state JFHQ provides the Governor and The Adjutant General (TAG) with a planning and staffing cell for contingencies. This is the first line of defense in a state emergency. What are the challenges for the state JFHQ? How does NORTHCOM effectively assist with this process after the governor has requested federal support? The well being of the people of every state in this nation depend on these professional relationships. Establishing roles and a common understanding is essential to good operating practice for any business. The business of homeland defense and crisis management necessitates correctly establishing this relationship before these crises occur.
The State JFHQ—Getting it Right with NORTHCOM

Defense support of civilian authorities is a critical National Guard responsibility. However, no doctrinal template or one size fits all plan will fully prepare civilian or military responders for the next major disaster. It will take constant training together and unyielding respect for the American System (that is, local, state, and national governments coexisting) to establish genuine domestic operational preparedness.

—LTG Charles G. Rodriguez
Adjutant General Texas

This paper will focus on the roles, challenges and relationships the Joint Force Headquarters of each state/territory and District of Columbia has with NORTHCOM. It will address how the states perceive their roles and missions with their commander in chief (the governor of the state), and also its relationship to NORTHCOM.

The recent transformation of each state’s National Guard State Area Commands to the Joint Force Headquarters was initiated by LTG Blum, Chief of National Guard Bureau (NGB). The basic model of Air and Army National Guard Headquarters had not changed for years. Changes in the active component occurred regularly and the National Guard reacted to these changes by changing force structure in small units but seldom adjusted the Command Structure or the State Headquarters structure. The National Guard has transformed from a less organized and ill funded group towards a well trained, well funded and well equipped military. In its current state, the National Guard is a much better force and the state headquarters are more capable but even more needs to be done. However, with the “new” missions of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security and the wars in Iraq (OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF) the time is right to develop an effective State Joint Force headquarters and a more effective relationship between the National Guard and NORTHCOM.
Recent efforts to transform the NGB and organize the state level Joint Forces Headquarters may be the most significant changes since 1901 when Secretary Root presented to Congress a program to reform the National Guard into a functional and standardized organization. Root’s idea of patterning the Guard's organization and equipment after that of the Regular Army, along with a five year funding program, established the National Guard on firm ground for years to come.

On firm ground with a common operating picture is where the JFHQ of tomorrow needs to be to react to the nation’s needs. Crisis events are often volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). In contrast, military operations at times are rigid and follow a step by step approach toward an established objective. Developing the state joint staff and the system to merge the military structure with the modern day VUCA world will be necessary in today’s demanding environment. The JFHQ spans both the military and the domestic realm and refers to the National Guard Headquarters of the Army and Air National Guard. It is the Joint Force Headquarters that are in each state and the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia.

Background

The National Guard has transformed over the past 341 years toward a complex and well organized force. There were three significant changes that have brought the National Guard to the organization represented today.

The Militia Act of 1792 gave the state Adjutant General command authority over state forces within the state. In some states like Kentucky the first thing a governor is required to do is appoint an Adjutant General to command the state forces. The governors are the “commander in chief” for the state forces within his/her state. With
this civilian to military relationship established the state military forces act in the best interests of the state and nation. The 20th century brought more transformation and standardization to the National Guard.

The Militia Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act, enacted Secretary Elihu Root’s idea of patterning the National Guard's organization and equipment after that of the Regular Army and served to establish the reserve component on firm ground. To help accomplish these changes in the National Guard, the Dick Act made available federal funds; prescribed drill at least twice a month, supplemented with short annual training periods; permitted detailing of Regular officers to Guard units; and directed holding of joint maneuvers each year. In 1920 the National Guard Bureau (NGB) was created to serve as a communications and funding channel between each state Army Guard and the Department of Army. In 1947 the Air Guard was established and used a similar link with the Department of Air Force. Coordination between the Army and Air Guard, however, was minimal.

As the turn of the century began, after a tumultuous decade of small military conflicts, followed by the attack on the World Trade Center, another change occurred. Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, announced that the role of the National Guard would transform to meet the new challenges facing our world today. “The Air and Army National Guard would transform to be a joint team with the five other services- the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corp and the Coast Guard- and the seven reserve components, so that the citizens of our great nation get the best of all of their capabilities and the effects that a joint team can produce.”
Over the past 60 years, since the Air Guard came into existence, the army units in the National Guard were under a State Area Command and the Air Force units were under a separate Air Guard command. The Army Guard command, referred to as the State Area Commands (STARC), have transformed to a Joint Force headquarters with the Air Guard command.

In the past the STARC (Army Guard pure) and the Air Guard commands (Air Guard pure) worked all issues independently much like their active counterparts. Their mission was mainly as a command and control headquarters and very administrative in nature. The headquarters rarely conducted capstone exercises or went “to the field.” There was not much need for joint coordination. The Army Guard funded training, maintenance, pay and allowances for soldiers and the Air Guard did the same for airmen. Their issues were single service and the need for combining headquarters was never required.

In many respects the single service needs have not changed. Most issues faced by the state in peace time and in preparation for their federal mission are service centric. However, there were some state needs separate from the federal level that necessitated a joint effort. State emergencies created needs that made service lines irrelevant. If sand bags had to be filled in a flood, it made no difference if it was a soldier or an airman that filled the bags. There were also some subordinate organizations that consisted of both Air and Army guardsman, such as the state Counter Drug Department. The Civil Support Teams (CST) consist of both Army and Air Guard members also. The State National Guard organization had some purple hues before the change to the State Joint Forces Headquarters.
The term “joint” is defined by Joint Publication 1-02, as “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.”

The "Joint Force Headquarters" was established (provisionally) in October, 2003 in each of the 50 states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the two U.S. Territories of Guam and Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. It reorganizes the previously separate Army National Guard and Air National Guard headquarters into a joint "Command and Control" activity that forges closer relationships between the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to improve Department of Defense access to National Guard capabilities.

These relationships are improved through joint briefings, joint exercises, joint assignments and cross taskings. These changes were in step with changes in the active services and with the creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM (also referred to as NORTHCOM) falls under the Department of Defense and was created with both a joint and interagency focus in mind.

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM consolidates under a single unified command existing missions that were previously executed by other DoD organizations. This provides unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment.

USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the President and
Secretary of Defense. USNORTHCOM is organized in a very adaptive style. Civil
government employees and uniformed members representing all service branches work at
USNORTHCOM headquarters located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs,
Colorado.

USNORTHCOM provides assistance to a Lead Agency when tasked by DoD. One
of the limitations of NORTHCOM is the use of federal troops. In accordance with the
Posse Comitatus Act, military forces can provide civil support, but cannot become
directly involved in law enforcement.¹² In providing civil support, USNORTHCOM
generally operates through established Joint Task Forces subordinate to the command.
The crisis situation must exceed the capabilities of local, state and federal agencies
before USNORTHCOM becomes involved. This is the most important point in
determining when NORTHCOM shall become involved in a crisis. In most cases,
support will be limited, localized and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced
to the point that the Lead Agency can again assume full control and management
without military assistance, USNORTHCOM will exit, leaving the on-scene experts to
finish the job. ¹³ There have been several examples of these operations that
NORTHCOM participated in: the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster in February 2002;
NIFC (the National Interagency Firefighting Center) in Boise, Idaho in October 2003;
and several National Security Special Events, including the G8 Summit, and the funeral
of former U.S. president Ronald Reagan during the summer of 2004.¹⁴

The establishment of NORTHCOM and the creation of the JFHQ have brought
about several issues in domestic support to civil authorities. There remain many
challenges to both of these organizations. The challenges fall into four separate categories.

- JFHQ Mission and Resource Limitations
- Command and Control within the State
- Differences between States
- The JFHQ and NORTHCOM Relationship

**JFHQ Mission and Resource Limitations**

The JFHQ mission statement for Nebraska is: “command and control all National Guard units assigned to the state and to provide trained, equipped and ready forces capable of mobilizing and deploying in support of their federal and state mission and, when required, conduct missions authorized by the national command authority and/or the governor.”

This is a rather broad mission statement. It does allow for training and missions to be conducted under the direction of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of the state of Nebraska. However, funding for training and unit equipment almost exclusively comes from the federal government. The Nebraska Army National Guard does not have two mission statements. There is this one mission statement that suffices to cover both the state and federal mission.

The JFHQ mission statement gives equal credence to both the federal and state mission. The federal mission, however, is and always has been the most important and more importantly the most funded mission. The federal mission and the efforts to support the federal mission have primarily been the main effort. This is because the federal mission is in greater and more constant demand. There are many more National Guard units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan than are mobilizing for a state
emergency. There are also many more training opportunities to accomplish the federal mission than the elusive and sometimes less defined state mission. It is not until a state crisis occurs that the JFHQ efforts turn inward, concentrating on a state interest. This is because there are not enough training days in the year to robustly focus on both the federal and state missions.

The JFHQ role to train, equip and mobilize subordinate units for their federal mission is the underlying strength for the state mission. It is those forces trained in their “go to war” federal mission that the states rely on for capabilities and equipment. However, there are several conflicting demands for the JFHQ and its pool of resources.

Soldiers deployed to federal missions will not be available for state missions. Demands of overseas missions deplete National Guard inventories of vehicles, weapons and communications gear. “With the National Guard's dual missions, a lack of equipment impacts Americans at home when disasters strike and the Guard is activated.” The JFHQ is not spared this limitation. Often the JFHQ contributes to the pool which the units in the state draw from to fill their ranks for a federal mobilization. An example is the Afghanistan Embedded Training Team (ETT) which is a team of 18 higher ranking soldiers that are often pulled from the ranks of the JFHQ. A recent deployment of an ETT from Nebraska required the J1, the Facilities Management Officer, the Environmental Officer, the J6, and several other senior enlisted from the JFHQ. This is done because other soldiers are in tactical units that are deployed, have deployed or are going to deploy. The conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan is deemed a more critical need so soldiers are not pulled from these tactical units. The JFHQ often times becomes the bill payer for some positions.
Maintenance and support for armories is also focused on the federal mission and aimed at war fighting units. It is a state responsibility to pay for repair, maintenance, fuel and utility expenses for armories across the state.\textsuperscript{18} The JFHQ is a large organization of 190 authorized soldiers and training for it’s state mission is not a funding priority.\textsuperscript{19} The soldiers primarily complete the federal mission and individual level training during the training year. Currently, the JFHQ staff focuses most of it’s time deploying and redeploying soldiers for OIF and OEF. This current demand leaves little time for sufficient collective training to accomplish interagency type missions. At the current high operational tempo additional training time would be needed for the state mission of disaster preparedness to be fully developed.

There are four different pay statuses soldiers could be in to conduct JFHQ collective training that would enhance the state and federal mission. The first is Active Duty Special Work (ADSW). Currently there are few funds allocated from NGB to accomplish JFHQ collective training to improve the state mission. Any training done now is focused on the federal mission and state homeland defense type training is done on drill weekends to maximize training dollars. Title 32 U.S. Code does allow for this training to occur but there are not enough funds allocated from NGB specifically for this purpose.\textsuperscript{20}

Individual Training (IDT) is the soldier's weekend drill. This is a time when Soldiers usually accomplish required Army training. The list of requirements is numerous but includes: Individual Weapons qualification, Soldier Readiness Processing, Warrior Task Training consisting of 28 skill levels with numerous tasks to be performed annually.\textsuperscript{21}
These tasks may also be completed during annual training (AT). However, the AT period should be used for collective training tasks and not individual training.

Annual Training (AT) funds are sent to states to complete collective training. Each soldier in the JFHQ is allowed to do 15 days of annual training as per the JFHQ commanders training plan. Additional days need to be requested from NGB with a statement of requirement. Additional funds are not scheduled for more than the 15 days of annual training. Unfortunately these AT days are needed to support deploying troops and are usually used one or two at a time to complete the JFHQ federal role. This AT budget is the biggest pool of funds to draw from and should be used to schedule JFHQ staff collective training.

A much smaller pool of funds is the State Active Duty (SAD) funding. This is money that is directly approved by the governor from the state budget and usually is used in response to a natural disaster or crisis. These funds are very limited and utilization of soldiers and equipment to train is seldom paid for with this fund. Some states, like California, that have recurring natural disasters may have a SAD budget to conduct training and man a continuous staff.

Funding is not the only resource limitation. As mentioned earlier there are many tasks to complete and little time to complete them. A traditional National Guard member has 39 days of funded training during the year. In these 39 days the unit works to complete all federal training requirements. These tasks range from individual weapons qualification to operating an Emergency Operation Center (EOC). The JFHQ staff takes part in Joint Operations Center (JOC) Staff Training Exercises (STX) during drill weekends to fill the void but it all has to fit within these 39 days. JFHQ training
requirements exceed the 39 days available and the JFHQ commander must accept risk to train only on the most essential tasks. Often the tasks associated with the state mission and disaster response do not make the cut.

Although some of the JFHQ staff are full time Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers, many soldiers are performing a different role during the week than they are during the weekend drill period. Some officers can accept a command leadership waiver for a “part-time” command position for two years while fulfilling the “full-time” duty of another JFHQ position. This officer would work Monday through Friday fulfilling the role of a JFHQ position and then conduct weekend duties and more as a commander of a tactical unit. Although somewhat complicated this flexibility is necessary to fill the ranks with quality leadership and allow officers to perform critical roles outside of the JFHQ. The JFHQ cannot afford to fully train on both the Federal and state missions while fighting for funding and equipment. But the reality is neither of these missions can be ignored. Crises will occur regardless of funding levels and if the National Guard is not prepared they will let down their nation and their state.

The solution is prioritization and funding. The Guard has to lobby for better funding but then has to do the best with what they are given. The JFHQ needs to train as a staff to fulfill its essential role to include developing its relationship with the NORTHCOM and the Interagency. According to LTG Rodriguez, “Through training and exercises, the translation of doctrine into practice and habitual behavior becomes reality.” 24 This is allowed for in U.S. Code Title 32 Chapter 5, section 503 (2) Paragraph (1) which includes “authority to provide for participation of the National Guard in conjunction with the Army or the Air Force, or both, in joint exercises for instruction to prepare the
National Guard for response to civil emergencies and disasters.” By performing frequent integrated exercises like NORTHERN EDGE with NORTHCOM and rehearsing key elements of disaster response the JFHQ can prepare for this critical mission. The purpose of NORTHERN EDGE is to provide local, state, federal, Department of Defense (DOD), and non-governmental organizations and agencies involved in homeland security emergency management the opportunity to participate in a full range of training scenarios that will better prepare participants to respond to a national crisis. The participating organizations will conduct a multi-layered, civilian-led response to a national crisis. The state leadership should make this training with NORTHCOM part of the training plan to legitimize it at the NGB level and request additional training funds aimed at this collective training.

The state adjutants general should direct more interagency or NORTHCOM coordinated training in their annual training guidance. The state publishes an annual training guidance similar to Army Regulation 350-1 that identifies training priorities for the commander. This should be one of the tools for clarifying expectations to train and establish goals for coordination with NORTHCOM. Given this guidance the JFHQ Annual Training Calendar can be crafted to include highlighted events. Requests to NGB to fund this additional training will also be required. Coordination between the TAG and NORTHCOM Commander should be the next step.

If the military commanders have a personal relationship the odds of a plan surviving first contact have a greater chance of success. This relationship needs to be developed before a crisis occurs. According to General Renuart, the NORTHCOM commander, “the last place in the world to make new friends is at the scene of a
disaster.” Once a dialogue about how NORTHCOM and the JFHQ can specifically work together is fostered by frequent training events, this cross fertilization needs to continue at the state level. The TAG should communicate this progress with NORTHCOM and continue coordination with the governor and other state entities as well. A mutual element of trust is vital to any relationship.

Command and Control within the State

Command and Control of operations inside a state are the responsibility of the governor and the TAG. For most situations this will be the case. Although this issue is currently being debated, under the Insurrection Act the President can send in federal troops or federalize National Guard troops in the case of “lawlessness, insurrection and rebellion.” Further amendments to the Insurrection Act allow for increased interaction during a natural disaster, epidemic, serious public health emergency, terrorist attack, or other condition, when the President determines that domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order. The President has always had the power to step in if civil unrest was present or law and order were lost. The recent changes to the Insurrection Act may give the President a little more flexibility to bring in federal troops. However, viewing it optimistically, the President only wants what is best for the people. If the state is capable of handling the situation, the TAG and the JFHQ staff will be the command and control element and coordinate federal support. A federal agency should not take command.

“The key is support-not to come in and command, but to support” These words spoken by GEN Renuart echo what the role of the JFHQ is as well as the role of
NORTHCOM. Each state has an Adjutant General that is in charge of their Army and Air National Guard forces and operations within the state. The National Guard conducts some local emergency response exercises with their state and local partners in disaster preparedness. The TAG and his local partners may have most of the crisis under control. As GEN Renuart stated the role of NORTHCOM may be support but not necessary to command. This relationship is already referenced through the National Response Framework (NRF) and will best be served in a catastrophic event to leave that relationship in place rather than infuse NORTHCOM or another agency. This tiered approach dictates levels of responsibilities beginning at the first responder up through local and state levels as the first measures before federal response. This preserves the in state cooperation and interagency efforts that the local command has fostered. According to title V of the Stafford Act, the governor may request the Secretary of Defense to utilize resources of the DoD through NORTHCOM after the FRM deems necessary.

In 22 states the TAG also has day to day responsibility for emergency operations as well as his military responsibilities. In this case, the JFHQ and state emergency management agencies work under the TAG. The opportunity to streamline efforts between military and civil agencies is much greater. This shared responsibility greatly facilitates unity of command and unity of effort.

Differences between States

Roles and responsibilities as well as resources differ between the states. General Renuart recently addressed this issue. “We work with each of the 54 states and territories, because their roles and responsibilities differ from state to state, and yet our
ability to respond, whether it’s a bridge collapse in Minnesota or preparation for a hurricane in Texas…each of those are different, and yet NORTHCOM brings a capability to bear in each one of those.”  

All states have a different Adjutant General (TAG) and JFHQ staff with different experience and abilities. As mentioned before, some TAG’s are dual hated as the State Emergency Manager and depending on the size and makeup of the state there may be other agencies under the TAG. In Texas for example, the TAG controls the voluntary Texas State Guard. This is a unique organization that is exclusive to Texas. It is up to the governor of each state to make things work in their state. The point is not that one state does it better or worse, just that they do it differently.

All states have needs and capabilities to address those needs. A competent JFHQ staff should realize the difference in those needs and fill the voids. Likewise, the NORTHCOM staff should also understand these differences in each state. “The point is that the federal military must understand the nuances of each state in order to be able to respond effectively in a catastrophic event.” It is also the responsibility of the JFHQ staff to clearly communicate the capabilities and limitations of their state to NORTHCOM.

Another JFHQ problem that needs to be addressed is the common organization and utilization of the JFHQ in each state. NORTHCOM should be able to see a common organizational staff in every state. This will enhance understanding and continuity when NORTHCOM is called in to support. NGB does not have command authority over the JFHQ. Each TAG can direct his JFHQ toward whatever focus is desired. Efforts to finalize the true JFHQ organizations are ongoing. Certain flexibility is required due to
operational federal missions; however, a base document is needed to truly join Air and Army Guard personnel and equipment.

Tools and equipment are another limitation for each state and their JFHQ. Each state differs in their Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The TDA is a list of personnel and equipment the unit is authorized for its federal mission. 37 There is not a “joint” TDA that is funded by both the Air and Army guard to this date. The personnel list exists but the equipment roster is still being developed. Another problem is that there is not a state needs specific TDA that would pointedly authorize (and fund) equipment for the individual JFHQ needs. There are Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) but they fall short of a true joint solution. 38 Special equipment shortfalls are unique to nonfederal missions. 39 The dynamics between coordinating relief efforts for hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires, blizzards and floods demand different types of equipment. Often the individual states will fund state specific equipment through state funds.

Although differences exist there are some common threads for all states. All states have some types of military band radios. The civilian community does not have military band radio communication and the military does not have civilian band radios. If the JFHQ staff in each state is to be the main effort in coordinating disaster relief efforts for the governor they will need special equipment. This equipment should be part of the TDA. Civil Support Teams (CST) in almost all states do have this type of equipment or MTOE.

Civil Support Teams have filled the void in some recent events. 40 The mission of the CST is to quickly respond to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) event, assess
the situation and request follow on assets. When the JFHQ utilizes the CST equipment temporarily or tasks them to assist they jeopardize the CST mission. The CST should be focused on their WMD mission and not tasked to respond to a natural disaster mission.

The JFHQ and NORTHCOM Relationship

The relationship between NORTHCOM and the JFHQ is just the start of the coordination requirement. If the JFHQ needs assistance from the active military, it most likely will need to coordinate with other agencies as well. These organizations left to their own planning and individual mission focus will only be utilizing a fraction of the synergy that could be realized when they come together at a national crisis. During a natural disaster help will come in the form of the Red Cross, local emergency responders and more. It takes a village to raise a child and it takes more than the military to solve a major homeland crisis such as a natural disaster.

Many organizations come to the scene of a natural disaster bringing their own special capabilities and skill sets. The major focus of this paper is the relationship between NORTHCOM and the JFHQ. However, to ignore these other agencies would be counterproductive. In fact to ignore them in the planning process would be disastrous.

The United States has immense resources to assist with natural disasters. There are numerous governmental organizations and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). The numbers of world wide NGOs are estimated to be over 40,000. With that great number of entities it is best to stick with the ones you know. With the creation of NORTHCOM the United States can now streamline major government efforts while
still incorporating NGOs. The role of the JFHQ in a major natural disaster should be to first focus on coordination with NORTHCOM and then work a few NGOs into the practice scenarios to get a feel for the environment. This limited NGO involvement will allow the JFHQ staff to count on reliable partners in the operation while still considering future agencies they may have to associate with. This coordination with NORTHCOM will also facilitate work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as NORTHCOM has officers assigned to it from these staffs.\textsuperscript{43}

Knowing what an organization brings to the fight is crucial. One possible way to accomplish that would be the utilization of a Security Cooperation Plan (SCP). An SCP could spell out common interests, exchange valuable information, harmonize probable levels of support, share infrastructure details and voice expected contributions of each member. An SCP should link regional activities with national strategic objectives.

There are currently no SCPs between NORTHCOM and the states. These have traditionally been used by geographic combatant commanders and other nations. The NORTHCOM commander has personally visited many states and has established a dialogue between the state government and NORTHCOM but no formal SCP document has been crafted. NORTHCOM, however, does have an SCP with Canada and Mexico.\textsuperscript{44} An SCP would link planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives and focus those involved with what support can most likely be expected should a need arise. Adapting regional strategies to national strategies would ensure that the plans of all involved organizations have minimal conflicts. For example, if all rotary wing forces are to be deployed from Ft. Carson in 2009 the NORTHCOM
commander can communicate a possible lack of support to the governor of Colorado. In this example, should a wildfire approach Denver in 2009 the Ft. Carson units will not be able to respond and rotary wing support if needed will have to be allocated from another base. Although not supported locally in this case the national strategy is still to support this regional crisis. Although not magic the SCP is a tool for cooperation.

States may need to cooperate with another state’s JFHQ if they are overwhelmed beyond their capabilities. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a congressionally ratified organization that allows states to assist each other in times of emergency. The EMAC not only allows states to increase their assets temporarily, it also serves to make them coordinate with other organizations and increase communication skills outside their organization. This is a talent they will need when overwhelmed by a catastrophic event.

The staffs of the JFHQ and of NORTHCOM need to increase their interagency knowledge. They should be adaptive in nature as they learn other interagency roles. The JFHQ staff should attend training in National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS) and JOC operations online or in house training. The Texas National Guard has had a great deal of success by educating their JFHQ staff on the interagency. Texas has also had its share of hurricanes and natural disasters. However, as an indicator of its success, Texas is rarely brought up in Hurricane Katrina or other hurricane horror stories citing poor government cooperation. Division of Labor is critical when planning interagency events. This non-linear thinking should assist the staff in planning and cooperating with entities outside its organization.
JFHQ planners should think and plan up and down from local to federal and laterally, state to state using similar coordination exercises. The JFHQ should not only coordinate at city, county and state levels but toward federal levels and perhaps internationally too. Partnerships for Peace is one example of Joint Interagency International Multinational (JIIM) events that states participate in. Each state is partnered with another country from NATO. They conduct limited exchanges of Officers or Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) every year and conduct limited joint training exercises together. These exercises are funded through the NGB. The JFHQ staff benefit without having to search for additional funding. It is through exercises like these a staff can see international solutions to problems faced by other countries. Bonds are made for future federal missions and staffs can observe how other countries may handle their crisis with much less resources available.

Conclusion

The staffs of both the JFHQ and USNORTHCOM need to increase their staff education, training opportunities and joint cooperation. The National Guard state JFHQ should get it right with NORTHCOM by committing to four key areas. 1) Make the most of their available training time. Annual Training is the best opportunity to accomplish this training within the current funding picture. Building block training events should also be scheduled each quarter during drill periods. The leadership of each state should write NORTHCOM synergistic training requirements into their training plans for the JFHQ staff. 2) Make the most of joint training opportunities. JFHQ staff should look for joint or interagency events to train their staff similar to the Partnership for Peace Program. There are other events like NORTHERN EDGE that present training
opportunities with the NORTHCOM staff. 3) Increase staff education in critical areas. The TAG of each state should manage his staff to increase NORTHCOM and interagency education either online or as a part of their professional development. Training in areas such as the National Incident Management System would serve to enhance the staff. 4) Increase one on one, face to face coordination with NORTHCOM. The staff of the state JFHQ and NORTHCOM should not be strangers. Reaching out to each other to force cooperation may be the key.

Finally, the DOD and the Army can get it right by fully funding the JFHQ training and equipment requirements. In 2005 thousands of National Guardsmen responded to both the war in Iraq and Hurricane Katrina in the best way they knew how. They came well trained and with the equipment they had on hand. Both of these events would have been much more successful if the National Guard had been appropriately funded. If an organization is to be fully capable it must be fully funded. The empty rhetoric of trying to do more with less was exposed long ago. Appropriately resourcing the JFHQ will result in a better trained and equipped unit that will benefit the federal and state mission. NORTHCOM should encourage the Army to fully endorse and resource the JFHQ.

Getting it right with NORTHCOM can benefit each state in their domestic and federal efforts. NORTHCOM has come a long way in their coordination with many of the individual states. They are defining their role and establishing an adaptive learning approach to their organization. It will benefit each JFHQ to continue with this line of adaptive learning and leadership as they continue to train and build their JFHQ staff.
Endnotes


5 Center for Military History, 351.

6 Doubler, 60.

7 Ibid.

8 The Counter Drug Department in each state works with local and federal Law Enforcement Officials in the fight against illegal narcotics. It is an organization consisting of army and air guard members on title 32 status who are also in National Guard units during the weekend and work in the Counter Drug department during the week.


11 The information detailed before this quote is entirely from the USNORTHCOM homepage available from http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html; Internet; accessed 27 November 2007.

12 "Posse Comitatus Act" (18 U.S. Code 1385): A Reconstruction Era Criminal law proscribing use of Army (later, Air Force) to "execute the laws" except where expressly authorized by Constitution or Congress. Limit on use of military for civilian law enforcement also applies to Navy by regulation. Dec ’81 additional laws were enacted (codified 10 USC 371-78) clarifying permissible military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies--including the Coast Guard--especially in combating drug smuggling into the United States. Posse Comitatus clarifications emphasize supportive and technical assistance (e.g., use of facilities, vessels, aircraft, intelligence, tech aid, surveillance, etc.) while generally prohibiting direct participation of DoD personnel in law enforcement (e.g., search, seizure, and arrests).

13 The information detailed before this quote is entirely from the USNORTHCOM homepage available from http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html; Internet; accessed 27 November 2007.
Ibid.

Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for Nebraska Army National Guard Element of the Joint Forces Headquarters; Unit Identification Code W8ANAA EDATE 02-OCT-2007, Document Number NGW8ANAA.


Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for Nebraska Army National Guard Element of the Joint Forces Headquarters. There is a non-add remark code “87-reserved for future use (other pers)” was used in the ETTs so the authorizations will not to be counted against the NG force structure per concept plan approval.

Federal Defense Facilities Act of 1950, Once the Federal Government assists in building an armory the upkeep is the responsibility of the state.

Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for Nebraska Army National Guard Element of the Joint Forces Headquarters; Unit Identification Code W8ANAA EDATE 02-OCT-2007, Document Number NGW8ANAA.

Title 32 U.S. Code. Even if funding was achieved it would be totally voluntary and not mandatory for soldiers to come in for additional training beyond the 39 days annually.


Title 32 U.S. Code.


LTG Charles G. Rodriguez, “The Science and Art of Disaster Response by the National Guard,” JFQ, no. 48 (1st Quarter):77.


Pentathletes are professionally educated, and dedicated to lifelong learning; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and achieve the Army’s over-arching strategic goals, while engendering loyalty and trust.


These states include Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

Renuart, 43.

Rodriguez, 78.


Ibid.

Ibid., 41.

Statement of LTG Russell C. Davis, USAF Chief, National Guard Bureau before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities. May 1, 2001.


Ibid.

Rodriguez, 80. Rodriguez details how the Texas TAG requires members of the JFHQ-TX to complete similar FEMA online course.

Sajer, 8.

Partnership for Peace, formed in 1994. Twenty-three countries now belong to the partnership, which engages in joint military exercises with NATO. NATO is not required to defend Partnership for Peace nations from attack.
