TRANSFORMING THE ARMY’S WARTIME REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

BY

COLONEL PATRICK M. RICE
United States Army

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Colonel Patrick M. Rice
United States Army

Colonel Julie T. Manta
Project Adviser

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The United States has arguably the most technically advanced Army in the world; the best equipped, the best trained and, in peacetime, the best manned. Yet when it comes to providing trained, ready and cohesive units in combat, it is not as good as it could be because of the Army’s reliance on an Individual Replacement System. The Army has not developed or implemented a comprehensive manning strategy for sustaining the personnel readiness of its units during combat operations. While the Army has recently made significant improvements in stabilizing the force and maximizing the peacetime manning of its forces, in the 60-years since World War II, the Army has not responded to improve one of the most significant lessons of the war and every other conflict the U.S. has been engaged in since the Civil War. The Army must develop and execute a replacement system that provides trained and ready small units to the wartime commander. In so doing, the Army will be able to maximize and sustain the personnel and combat readiness of its units, ensure the enduring viability of its professional, All-Volunteer Force, and remain true to its training strategy.
Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana observed that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Despite an extensive history that demonstrates replacing combat losses with individual Soldiers undermines the training, readiness, cohesiveness, and effectiveness of units, the U.S. Army still uses an individual replacement system (IRS). This research paper proposes why the Army should eliminate the IRS as its primary method of replacing combat losses, and provides recommendations for how the Army can provide trained, ready, and cohesive units.

The U.S. Army’s history and lessons from nearly every war identifies shortcomings of replacing combat losses with individual Soldiers. Yet, for the last 140 years, the Army continued to use an individual replacement system (IRS) during wartime. This is not to say the Army ignored past lessons. There are many examples where the Army researched, tested, and implemented solutions aimed at eliminating, or mitigating, the need for an IRS. As Lieutenant General (LTG) (Retired) Richard Trefry stated:

A fundamental strategic leadership challenge is how to replace losses while maintaining individual and unit effectiveness. The cohesive elements that emerge during training and preparation for combat are almost impossible to replicate once the units are committed to combat and losses occur.

As the Army transforms from an Industrial Age force to an Information Age force capable of responding across the full spectrum of conflict from conventional war to counterinsurgency operations, the Army must examine and revise its personnel manning systems to support transformation. Many personnel management systems are evolving with the support of Information Age technology, but the replacement operations
function of filling Army units in combat remains unchanged. The U.S. Army is better poised today to overcome most, if not all, of the obstacles that 140 years of trying could not. With the application of its enormous Information Age technologies (computer modeling, simulation, information sharing, and asset visibility), the Army has the means to eliminate the IRS as its primary method of replacing Soldier losses in combat. This paper will establish why it must.

Notable leaders voiced their concerns about relying on an IRS during combat operations. For example, an Army warrior, General Donn Starry, remarked in 1999 that:

The individual replacement system is at the heart of most of the Army’s unreadiness (and) readiness problems. By its very design it foredooms virtually every attempt to (1) achieve unit readiness before the battle begins, and (2) sustain unit effectiveness after battle’s onset.

Comments like these from a senior Army leader are cause for concern and stand as strong testimony to the assertion the Army should change its wartime replacement system. Similar comments from historian Dr. Stephen Ambrose, offer a strong indictment against the use of an IRS in World War II:

The replacements paid the price for a criminally wasteful replacement system that chose to put quantity ahead of quality. Its criteria (were) the flow of bodies. The problem (was) that the replacement system was guilty of the worst sin of all in war, inefficiency. It was paying lives but getting no return. It was just pure waste and commanders should have done something about it.

The strategic importance of eliminating the IRS is that it, first, directly links to the Army’s ability to sustain its professional, All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Second, it fulfills the Army’s charge to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders. Third, it fulfills the Army’s commitment to the American people to provide the best possible care of their sons and daughters. Fourth, it fulfills the Army’s moral obligation
to every Soldier who joins the Army, to ensure that they, and their units, are fully prepared before entering combat. Fifth, it is a matter of the Army remaining true to its training imperatives and standards, which are the core of its readiness and success.

Donald Rumsfeld’s quote, "... you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have," touches a deeper philosophical construct regarding the responsibility of the nation’s leaders towards the structure, development, and use of its military. The Army goes to war with the force it plans and develops, and national leaders’ resource. As such, the Army needs to develop an executable, viable plan to sustain combat forces before the next major combat operation. “The Army must solve the riddle of individual versus unit replacements during combat.” The solution must focus on preserving the Army’s greatest asset, its Soldiers, and maximizing the training and cohesion of its units, in order to sustain the Army at peak readiness.

**Focus on the Soldier.** With the Soldier as its cornerstone, the Army builds and sustains itself one Soldier at a time. A former Army Chief of Staff said, “The magnificence of our moments as an Army will continue to be delivered by our people. They are the engine behind our capabilities, and the Soldier remains the centerpiece of our formation.” Each Soldier’s value cannot be overstated. Every policy the Army establishes and executes impacts Soldiers and their families, who decide whether to stay or leave the Army. Since “the Army’s success in recruiting, training, and retaining its Soldiers ultimately determines the success of the Army’s AVF and its transformation,” this mission is critical. The Army’s 2008 Posture Statement reflects its commitment to the AVF, “To sustain our Soldiers, Families, and Army Civilians in an era
of persistent conflict we must maintain the quality and viability of the All-Volunteer Force and the many capabilities it provides to the Nation.”

There is a direct reciprocal relationship between how well the Army takes care of Soldiers and a Soldier’s desire to stay in the Army. A wartime IRS conflicts with the Army’s investment in each Soldier. The Army’s “reliance upon the IRS to maintain the staffing levels required by changing operational requirements does not facilitate the active Army’s return on investment regarding personnel management.” The IRS also contradicts the Army’s training imperative of producing trained, ready, and cohesive units. “The steady flow of personnel into and out of units limits the Army’s ability to foster cohesion and group solidarity in combat units.”

Unit Training and Cohesion. Army training provides commanders trained and ready forces using a system of progressive training. Training builds individual confidence and competence while providing individuals with essential skills and knowledge. The result of the Army’s deliberate, battle-focused training strategy is a trained and cohesive unit; wherein unit members know each other’s strengths and weaknesses and build a bond of trust and interdependence. “Training also builds psychological readiness for combat; achieving the five dimensions of horizontal cohesion, vertical cohesion, individual morale, confidence in group combat capability, and confidence in leaders.”

The U.S. Army achieves a trained and ready posture in its Soldiers and units by design. Training is what the Army does. The Army challenges its leaders and Soldiers on the importance of training:

Every soldier, noncommissioned officer (NCO), warrant officer, and officer has one primary mission—to be trained and ready to fight and win our
Nation’s wars. Success in battle does not happen by accident; it is a direct result of tough, realistic, and challenging training. Training is the process that melds human and materiel resources into these required capabilities. The Army has an obligation to the American people to ensure its soldiers go into battle with the assurance of success and survival.\textsuperscript{17}

The Army meets this “obligation” by establishing a highly sophisticated training model, using institutional, unit, and self-development training, which over time builds the skills Soldiers require in combat.\textsuperscript{18} The first phase of training is initial military training (IMT); which transitions a civilian into a Soldier, imbues them with the Warrior Ethos, and provides the basic skills required in their military occupational specialty (MOS).\textsuperscript{19} IMT does not certify a Soldier as ready for combat; unit commanders have that responsibility.

After IMT, Soldiers report to their first unit and integrate into a unit’s on-going training plan. During unit training, Soldiers learn to master their MOS and learn how their skills work within the collective unit. This is how the Army builds and progressively trains its units to become combat ready forces.\textsuperscript{20} Normally, this training takes a year and culminates in a capstone training event, usually at one of the combat training centers. After completing a successful CTC rotation, the unit is trained and ready for combat. A natural by-product of this training is unit cohesion, and its importance cannot be overemphasized. On unit cohesion, LTG Trefry wrote:

Professional Soldiers know that unit cohesion is one the most important factors in creating and sustaining an army...(and) cohesion is always built at the level of the infantry or engineer squad, the task or artillery crew, or at the platoon level in any of the combat arms.\textsuperscript{21}

Soldiers who miss this unit train-up are significantly disadvantaged. They must make up the training to diminish the risk they represent to the unit and themselves. “It takes time to assemble the people, and train each first for an individual job, then for a
role in a small team, and finally to teach the team to cooperate with other teams under conditions approximating the stress of combat.” First term Soldiers, who have never been in a permanent unit and do not fully know their MOS, greatly elevate this risk. These Soldiers should not deploy with that unit, nor should they deploy to join that unit in combat. The Army’s training manual states why this is important:

Our forces today use a train, alert, deploy sequence. We cannot count on the time or opportunity to correct or make up training deficiencies after deployment. Maintaining forces that are ready now, places increased emphasis on training and the priority of training.

Therefore, by allowing a Soldier to deploy to combat with a unit they did not train with, the Army contradicts its training doctrine, its desire to attain unit cohesion, and “the obligation it makes with the American people to ensure Soldiers go into battle with the best possible assurance of success and survival.”

The Army’s Historical Manning and Replacement Systems

The case for eliminating the IRS is compelling. A review of the Army’s historical manning and replacement practices will assist in understanding the historical context of why the Army retains the IRS. This review will also offer possible solutions and alternatives about how the Army can transform its wartime replacement process for the future.

The Civil War (1861-1865). During the Civil War, both sides of the conflict raised considerable armies for the conflict, normally organized as regiments. Soldiers received basic military training, and then deployed to combat. When losses occurred due to casualties, illness, injury, and desertions, units remained intact and reorganized internally. Even after heavy losses, units remained intact and as the war continued finding regiments at 30% manning was not uncommon.
To maintain the required strength of its army, the Union mainly relied on raising new regiments. Volunteers comprised the bulk of each force; however, both instituted a form of conscription, or draft, to sustain their armies; even though the draft was unpopular. Due to the high number of casualties, both sides were unable to maintain their force by raising new regiments alone, and implemented some form of an IRS. The Union fashioned their IRS after the French “depot” system.

Pre-World War I (1866-1913). After the Civil War, the U.S. Army shrank to 57,000 Soldiers. To maintain the strengths of its units, the Army continued using a depot-style IRS. Units received replacements and NCOs would integrate the new Soldiers at the lowest level possible.

In response to force requirements for the Spanish American War and the Philippine Insurrection, the Army instituted a unit rotation program to sustain its forces in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Each regiment had three battalions with two forward deployed for two years, and one in the U.S. recruiting and training to deploy. “One of the forward deployed battalions contained the unfit and ill Soldiers and would rotate back to the U.S. and serve as the depot battalion.”

This first attempt by the Army to achieve a unit replacement system (URS) failed, in part, because the Army did not synchronize its personnel policies with the requirements for the deployments. The inability to align enlistment contracts with the deployment timelines meant that Soldiers with insufficient time remaining on their contracts left the unit before the unit deployed. This produced significant unit turbulence, diminished training and cohesion, and degraded overall combat
readiness. These manning issues and an emerging “rule of three,” would repeat themselves. The Army abandoned this URS and, in 1912, re-established an IRS.

**World War I (1914-1919).** The force requirements for World War I (WWI) demanded the Army expand into a much larger force; growing from less than 300,000 Soldiers to over 3,700,000 Soldiers by the end of the war. To meet the Soldier demand, the U.S. mobilized, generated new units, and instituted a draft.

The Army’s initial plan to sustain the force was a mix of unit and individual replacements. The Army planned a unit replacement and rotation system in which it formed one replacement division for every two divisions in combat. The goal was to replace combat-depleted units with freshly trained, ready, and cohesive units. When removed from the battle, a unit would receive individual replacements from the IRS depot system, reconstitute, and retrain for return to the battle. However, the plan did not account for the enormous losses the Army would suffer. These losses compelled the Army to abandon its unit rotation and replacement plan and rely exclusively on individual replacements. The Army then left engaged units in contact with the enemy, stripped newly arriving divisions of their Soldiers, and pushed these individuals forward. This practice “severely damaged Soldier morale and unit readiness because it sent many poorly trained individuals into battle with units, which they had not trained or bonded.”

The Army simply could not execute a coherent URS on the scale needed to sustain the massive, rapidly mobilized Army required for WWI; and defaulted to the IRS. The Army garnered many lessons but would not produce a viable unit replacement plan to preclude relearning those lessons in the next war.
World War II (1941-1945). Following WWI, the active Army downsized to nearly 200,000 Soldiers. In the inter-war years, the nation’s leaders decided to maintain a small regular Army. In 1940, as WWII began, the U.S. mobilized reserve units and implemented a draft to generate the army it might need. The Army’s plan was to expand to over 200 divisions and the required support forces. It was an enormous undertaking, as the Army grew to over 8,000,000 Soldiers by war’s end.

LTG Leslie McNair developed a complex plan to train and prepare Soldiers and units for this massive force. His focus was output; with 17 weeks of training, civilians became Soldiers. Unit training took much longer; divisions averaged 22-29 months to be ready for combat. General Paul Gorman wrote, “(LTG) McNair’s training plan faltered under the strain of battle losses largely sustained because, against determined and skillful foes, the Army deployed infantrymen inadequately trained in teamwork for close combat.” In fact, as the demand for replacements escalated, draftees bypassed IMT, and went from reception centers directly to units.

The Army’s initial plan to sustain units was similar to WWI. Divisions and regiments would rotate in and out of battle, and individuals would replace unit losses using the IRS. The Army also experimented with techniques to preserve the combat advantage intense training and unit cohesion offered. One plan prepositioned 2,500 over-strength Soldiers into the initial assault units for D-Day. Leaders trained these additional Soldiers in their units to capitalize on the benefits of collective training and unit cohesion. Although the replacements were to follow the main force, most units took them on the assault, but the over-fill was insufficient for the first two weeks of battle.
By all accounts, the day before D-Day was the highpoint for the IRS in WWII. Despite the best of intentions, the replacement plan did not survive first contact and began to unravel before the Army broke out from the Normandy coast. Casualties greatly exceeded worst-case projections, with some divisions experiencing nearly 250% casualties in eleven months of combat in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). Casualties were so high, that Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, capped the number of Army divisions at 90. This decision significantly affected the Army’s overall Manning plan as the Army disbanded entire divisions and used the Soldiers as individual replacements, not as trained and cohesive units.

The Army also experimented with packaging replacements into small units. Each package contained 250 men organized into squads and platoons and commanded by replacement NCOs and officers. Commanders liked the concept and wanted more, but the Army could not keep up with the demand. A differing account says the concept failed because the leaders broke the packages down and distributed individuals among their units. Either way, the concept was innovative and well received.

“Units that carefully integrated their individual replacements tended to be more combat effective, and typically distinguished themselves in battle to a greater degree than units that carelessly integrated their new men.” One division commander pulled combat veteran officers and NCOs from forward units to the division’s rear, where they trained the replacements before sending them forward. This commander exchanged a temporary quantity gap in his frontline forces in order to improve the overall readiness, quality, and sustainability of his force.
Despite its plan for unit replacements, the WWII Army eventually relied on an IRS that worked poorly in part because it was hastily formed and staffed, and because estimates of combat losses were too low. Dr. Ambrose depicts many accounts of Soldiers arriving in the ETO not trained on their individual rifle or their assigned weapon’s system (e.g., tank). Dr. Ambrose’s assessment was “In this the Army failed to look after its own … and replacements paid the cost. Often more than half became casualties within the first three days on the line.” General W. E. Depuy reflected about WWII:

The Army…set up a lot of training centers…and trained a lot of people before they went overseas just enough so that the Army would not be tarred and feathered by the populace. And we trained a lot of lieutenants just to the point where it isn’t a national disgrace to put them on the battlefield. I was one of them, I know that, and we kind of went to war and let survival of the fittest [prevail]...Now; we don't have that [recourse] anymore.

Dr. Ambrose also suggested “that had the Germans been given a free hand to devise a replacement system for the U.S. Army in the (ETO), one that would do the Americans the most harm and least good, they could not have done a better job than the IRS.” Other historians offered, “The system of individual replacements severely damaged morale, discipline, and training … replacements were lost orphans, and they personified a tremendous waste of combat power.” “The Army’s handling of personnel matters was perhaps its greatest institutional blunder in WWII.” Veterans’ opinions of the IRS indicated that it adversely impacted combat effectiveness. Stories by replacements who survived the IRS during WWII are “heart wrenching and portray an IRS that was hard on morale and pervasively cruel.”

In fairness, there are many who point out that the Army did a good job manning and sustaining its forces in WWII. They offer that the Army did what was necessary to
achieve victory. They submit that by maintaining units in contact with the enemy and replacing losses via the IRS, the Army may have saved lives by shortening the war.\textsuperscript{76} Even General Eisenhower stated, “that in war everything is expendable, even generals’ lives, in the pursuit of victory,”\textsuperscript{77} so it follows that many would think the end-result justifies the means. However, victory may have been achievable at a lower price. If one measures effectiveness one Soldier at a time, using the Army’s current training imperatives, one could conclude that Army training was not as good as it could have been; the replacement system was not as effective as it could have been; and casualties probably higher than they should have been.

The Army attempted numerous times to implement and sustain a URS, but did not derive a plan from the lessons of WWI in time to overcome the obstacles presented in WWII. The Army would relearn these lessons when the winds of war blew toward the Korean peninsula five years later.

The Korean War (1950-1953). After WWII, the Army downsized to less than 600,000 Soldiers, with nearly half its force occupying Germany, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Korea.\textsuperscript{78} When the Korean War began, the Army mobilized to meet the force requirements;\textsuperscript{79} swelling to a high of 1,600,000 Soldiers.\textsuperscript{80}

Units deployed and stayed, sustained with mobilized and draftee Soldiers using the IRS. One account characterized these Soldiers as “fresh meat for the war-reservists mustered from the IRR\textsuperscript{81} and draftees just out of basic training.\textsuperscript{82} General Starry observed, “Many commanders would remark that the new replacements would arrive with dinner, and after a night of contact with the Chinese, they would leave in
body bags as breakfast arrived." These are sobering views about the lot of the Army’s replacements in Korea.

By all accounts, the U.S. was not ready for war in Korea. The Army sustained unit strengths by replacing combat losses with individuals. Not only did the Army forget the lessons from WWII, it exacerbated its manning situation by applying a one-year tour for Soldiers in Korea. One could ask why the Army executed a manning strategy that was contrary to its training strategies and the lessons of WWII. Policy decisions by the Truman presidency may shed some light. First, Korea was not the main effort. Second, the Truman administration believed the communist effort in Korea was a diversionary tactic to set the conditions for a larger communist effort against Western Europe or the U.S. Therefore, the Army’s commitment to Korea appeared measured by design.

However, there was a price for such a strategy, paid by the units and Soldiers engaged in combat. Casualties were high, and while it is not clear if there is a direct correlation between the Army’s lack of preparedness and its sustainment plan, it logically follows that casualties may have been fewer if the Army had been ready and had a viable sustainment plan.

The Between the War Years (1954-1962). Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the Army demobilized to 860,000 Soldiers. Recognizing its personnel readiness shortfalls in Korea, the Army set out to preclude a recurrence. The lessons gained traction and the Army tested at least five unit replacement concepts in order to reduce its reliance on the IRS.
Two of the concepts stand out: Operation Gyroscope and the Overseas Unit Replacement (OVUREP) program. The most ambitious, Operation Gyroscope (1955-1959), “rotated divisions to Germany to test unit replacement in case the “cold” war with the Soviet Union heated up.”\textsuperscript{90} While the program worked well, it proved too costly.\textsuperscript{91}

In 1961, the Army implemented the OVUREP program to provide Korea with stabilized, cohesive units. The Army deployed seven battle groups under OVUREP; and, while OVUREP met all expectations, it also proved too costly, inflexible in responding to contingencies, and ended in 1962.\textsuperscript{92} The Army reverted to the IRS and did not have a unit replacement solution when another conflict emerged in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{93}

The Vietnam War (1963-1975). By the mid-1960’s, the U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam escalated. As in the Korean War, the Army deployed units and left them there, placed all Soldiers on one-year tours, and used individual replacements to sustain the force. President Johnson rejected large-scale mobilization for Vietnam, so the Army expanded the draft and its training base to meet the force requirements.\textsuperscript{94} The effect of not mobilizing the reserve components and placing Soldiers on one-year tours produced intolerable turbulence throughout the entire Army.\textsuperscript{95}

As requirements grew, the Army deployed more units from the Continental United States (CONUS). Since policy makers also did not implement “Stop Loss or Stop Move”\textsuperscript{96} procedures to stabilize Soldiers, units lost portions of their trained and cohesive just force prior to deployment. LTG (Retired) Hal Moore wrote about this policy’s impact on his unit preparing to deploy to Vietnam:

The order came down: Any Soldier who had sixty days or less left to serve on his enlistment as of the date of deployment… must be left behind. We
were sick at heart. We were being shipped off to war sadly understrength and crippled by the loss of almost a hundred troopers in my battalion alone. The very men who would be the most useful in combat—those who had trained the longest in the new techniques of helicopter warfare—were by this order taken away from us. It made no sense then; it makes no sense now." 97

The Army also instituted a new sustainment plan, the "infusion program," that tore apart cohesive units. 98 The Army took Soldiers from arriving units, redistributed them into other units, and put combat veterans in to the arriving unit. The intent was to spread Soldiers' rotation dates to preclude a unit’s Soldiers from all rotating out at once. 99 While a solid intent, in practice the program degraded unit readiness and cohesion, and Soldier morale. 100 General Gorman’s assessment was, “In the face of a capable enemy, to fragment a unit among headquarters with which it has not trained is tantamount to fratricide.” 101

The Army relied on the draft and IRS to sustain the force in Vietnam. In practice, “a draftee entered the Army, received eight weeks of basic training, eight to twelve weeks of MOS training, served a year in Vietnam and then, if he survived, returned to CONUS to serve the six months left on his mandatory two-year hitch…usually spent (badly) training new draftees.” 102 One leader suggested that the Army could have trained the draftees for forty or more weeks before sending them to combat. 103 He also suggested that the Army could have formed these individual Soldiers into small units led by dedicated combat-veteran NCOs, but instead relied on the IRS with undesirable results. 104

The overall effect was that “teamwork in squads, if achievable, tended to rapid dissipation because of casualties, rotation rules, and declining experience among leaders, especially non-commissioned officers.” 105 “Toward the end of Vietnam, it was
common for infantry rifle platoons to have only a single sergeant with more than two years of service.” A current Army regulation says it best, “By sustaining forces in this manner, the potential for developing enduring commitment and relationships was severely diminished.” It is safe to suggest that the potential for casualties also increased relative to the decline in unit cohesion.

With U.S. forces committed to combat, the Army owed its Soldiers every advantage for success. In Vietnam, that was not the case. Soldiers knew better and reacted. “By 1972-73, the Army’s morale and discipline were at an all-time low, the drug culture was pervasive, military jails were full to overflowing, and the non-commissioned officer corps had been rendered virtually ineffective.” It would take the Army nearly a decade to recover.

Vietnam was a costly war, both in Army casualties, and in its impact on the Nation’s psyche. The incongruence between national strategy and operational and tactical imperatives elevated the risk to forces in harm’s way. Many seriously questioned the manner in which the Army manned its units and replaced combat losses. The Army would not forget the lessons from Vietnam, as they continue to shape the Army of today.

**Post Vietnam and the All-Volunteer Army (1975-1990).** The public revulsion against the war in Vietnam and the draft reached a feverish pitch during the latter part of the Vietnam conflict. The nation’s leaders ended the draft in 1973 and the military transitioned to an AVF. Set on not relearning the lessons of Vietnam, the Army worked to transform its doctrine, training, and personnel systems.
The Army downsized from nearly 1,600,000, to 780,000 Soldiers. It continued to face the demands of manning forces around the world, with Korea the most problematic manning issue for the Army. While continuing the IRS, the Army looked for new methods to replace combat losses. One concept, Brigade 75 and 76, deployed brigade-sized units to Europe. While discontinued, the Army extracted numerous lessons and continued to look for unit manning solutions. A principal lesson relearned was the “rule of three.”

Additional studies concluded “that a high level of personnel turbulence degraded combat readiness and that the IRS caused the problem.” In 1980, “the Army Cohesion and Stability Study clearly demonstrated the advantages of personnel stabilization to unit cohesion and training readiness.” In 1979-1980, another study, spearheaded by LTG Trefry, reached similar conclusions. As a result, the Army tested Project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training) in 1981.

COHORT successfully tested the concept of stabilized units and the Army adopted the Unit Manning System (UMS). UMS’s goal was to improve the overall combat readiness of combat units. On stabilization and the UMS, General Max Thurman wrote that the Army:

…recognized the need to keep soldiers and leaders together in units for longer periods of time by developing unit life-cycle models to control the movement of personnel into and out of units so as to maximize overlap of Soldiers and leaders consistent with sustainability and manageability constraints. The ultimate goal was to reach a stable unit environment in which higher levels of cohesion and collective proficiency could be attained and retained.

UMS created company and battalion "cohorts" when enlisted Soldiers began basic training. A cadre of NCOs and officers would join these Soldiers to create a unit that would serve together for the next few years. With unit attrition, COHORT units also
required replacements. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) managed the replacement flow in packages at regular intervals, typically every four months. \(^{125}\) “Individual replacements could become a cohesive squad, “buddy-teams” or individuals distributed throughout the company.” \(^{126}\) “In this manner, the Army practiced how it envisioned a wartime replacement system.” \(^{127}\) Despite the readiness benefits of COHORT and the better unit performance, the program proved unworkable and it ended. \(^{128}\) COHORT’s tenets reappeared as the Army transformed for the 21st Century. \(^{129}\)

Another wartime replacement system, the Weapons System Replacement Operations (WSRO), emerged in 1981. \(^{130}\) A comprehensive sustainment concept, WSRO focused on marrying trained Soldiers and equipment to replenish forces with small unit, squads, crews, and teams (SCTs). \(^{131}\) WSRO received its first test during Operation Desert Storm.

**Operation Desert Storm and the End of the Cold War (1990-2000).** In 1990, in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Army mobilized; \(^{132}\) executed “Stop Loss and Stop Move” across the force; moved Soldiers to fill shortages in deploying units; and prepared the casualty shelf requirements to replace projected losses. \(^{133}\)

The Army’s goal was to deploy units at 100% strength. However, with tiered readiness, the Army had many unit personnel shortages to address. \(^{134}\) It was a significant undertaking to meet the “filler” requirement in the deploying units. The Army reassigned Soldiers from non-deploying units to deploying units. It deployed Soldiers, levied against the filler and casualty shelf requirements directly to the theater of operations. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) planned for 12,000 individual
replacements, with another 2,642 projected as WSRO squad, crew, and team (SCT) replacements. To execute WSRO, ARCENT assembled the required personnel and began training small units, SCTs. Fortunately, the SCTs became unnecessary as the ground campaign only lasted 100 hours and casualties were nowhere near projections.

With the swift and decisive nature of the victory in Desert Storm, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the U.S. exacted a “peace dividend” on its armed forces. The Army drew down to 479,000, and began to return units to CONUS. Smaller-scale deployments and contingency operations continued throughout the 1990s, and the Army learned many lessons on building and sustaining ad-hoc headquarters and conducting unit replacement operations. Responding to these “military operations other than war” and manning Korea greatly strained the much smaller Army.

Manning the Force and Army Transformation. In 1999, Army Secretary White and Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki initiated Manning the Force (MTF) in parallel with a larger plan to transform the Army for the 21st Century. MTF’s intent was to posture the Army prior to the next contingency and fill the force Congress resourced. Under the MTF, the first year’s goal was to fill divisional units at 100% of authorized and eliminate tiered-readiness (at least for a couple of years). To execute the plan, the Army pulled many unit strength management authorities to Department of the Army for central control.

To fill its operational units, the Army employed a variety of force management measures: reduced the number of Soldiers assigned to non-warfighting duties,
initiated life-cycle manning, similar to the COHORT concept but applied to entire brigade combat teams (BCTs); and expanded the Buddy Team Assignment Program (BTAP) to other combat MOSs. By October 1, 2000, all major combat units achieved 100% fill. The Army then began filling its strategic weapons systems units, and “early deploying” above-division units to 100% of authorized. The Army was on a clear path to achieve these goals when terrorists attacked the U.S.

The Global War on Terror (2001-present). Following the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001, the Nation prepared for a swift response. Fortunately, MTF postured Army units for Operations Noble Eagle (ONE) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). The Army mobilized myriad units from the Reserve Components to execute security and support missions within CONUS. With action looming in Afghanistan, the Army focused on filling the forces identified to initiate combat operations. The Army executed a series of limited Stop Loss actions targeted at specific specialties, short Army-wide or identified for increased demand. The Army also applied Stop Loss/Stop Move to units identified to deploy.

As preparations for operations in Iraq began, Army Human Resources Command (HRC) adjusted its fill plans to ensure units identified to deploy were at or above 100%. As deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began, the Army executed a casualty-replacement shelf action to replace projected losses. One example of how a unit responded to filling the casualty-shelf requirements illustrates how wartime replacement operations could work. Tasked for 50 individual infantrymen as part of the casualty shelf requirements, 25th Infantry Division (ID) instead provided two trained,
ready, and cohesive 33-man platoons; because the division thought that was how the Army should replace losses.\textsuperscript{151}

Themes Revealed about the Army’s Manning and Replacement Systems

The Army’s history offers many examples of its efforts to find the right solution for manning its forces prior to combat, and replacing losses once combat begins. Six distinctive themes emerge.

\textbf{Inadequate Force Structure.} The Army has never had an adequate force structure to fight the next war. In each sustained major combat operation (vice Desert Storm and, to lesser extent, the GWOT), the Army expanded beyond its pre-war active and reserve structure to meet the war’s requirements. Therefore, it is critical the Army develops the appropriate total force structure to sustain itself in a protracted conflict, or multiple conflicts occurring simultaneously.

\textbf{The Army does not Expand Easily.} It takes time to expand the Army. With sufficient lead-time, the Army can generate a sufficient amount of privates to man its formations, but remains highly challenged to train those Soldiers to the required level in the compressed timelines that a major combat operation demands. It also takes years to train and develop the number of officer and NCO leaders required in an expanded force.

\textbf{Turbulence Destabilizes Units.} The Army requires predictable stability-enhancing policies in order to reduce turbulence and maximize the readiness of units before combat. The Army must overhaul its many personnel policies to support the transformation of its operational requirements.\textsuperscript{152} One policy, “Stop Loss and Stop
Move,” is so vital to unit readiness that the Army should incorporate it as an automatic step in every deployment sequence.

Inaccurate Loss Estimates. Accurately predicting losses is part science and part art. Loss estimates were historically wrong, usually too low, except in Desert Storm and the GWOT. However, what is predictable is that most losses (90%+) will occur in the combat arms units—predominantly in their squads, crews, and teams (SCTs) and platoons. From WWII to the GWOT, most casualties occurred in infantry units. The Army should develop a viable force management solution to address predictive losses.

The Army Wants a Unit Replacement System. Fully recognizing the importance of trained and cohesive units, the Army tried to implement a unit replacement system (URS) before, during, and after nearly every conflict. However, the Army’s plans to replace or rotate units usually unraveled due to a combination of poor planning, turbulence in the force, the inability to predict losses, and the volume of losses. URS plans focused too exclusively on the large formations, divisions and regiments, and not on the SCTs in which most losses occur. When those plans faltered, the Army relied upon the IRS as a matter of efficiency. History is replete with examples of an URS, using SCT, platoon, and company replacement packages, as workable alternatives.

The Draft is not a Solution. The Nation’s experience with the draft is not good and the Army’s leadership remains adamant never to return to it. However, the draft may be the only option the Army may have if it does not design the necessary force structure and a viable sustainment plan before the next conflict. The Army is committed to the AVF; it is a proven combat multiplier, and properly managed, can sustain the Army in combat.
Today's Manning and Replacement Systems. So why does the Army still use the IRS today and can it eliminate the system? First, before answering these two fundamental questions, it is important to understand the challenges of manning the Army. For brevity's sake, this review will only cover the active component (AC); understanding that the issues are similar in the reserve components (RC). With a viable AC system, the Army could replicate that system across the total force.

Today's Manning. The AC Army is an accumulation of over 500,000 individuals, in over 200 MOSs and officer specialties, with 19 various grades/ranks. Each Soldier has their own contract, timeline, and unique personal and professional wants and desires. However, the Army has to take away some of each Soldier’s individuality in order to build and train cohesive units to accomplish the Army's missions. That is the charge of the Army’s leaders and the personnel system - to focus on unit readiness, but also take care of the individual Soldier, and the Army’s investment in that Soldier. The five main obstacles to keeping a unit fully manned before it deploys are unit instability, attrition, non-deployables, Army-wide personnel shortages, and recruiting and retention.

Unit Instability. Prior to the force stabilization initiative, turbulence in the force, caused by the individual replacement system, adversely affected unit combat readiness. Historically, each year, 80,000 Soldiers (16%) leave the Army, and another 80,000 (16%) enter the Army. With another 110,000 Soldiers conducting some type of move each year, nearly half of the Army was annually in motion.

To achieve trained, ready, and cohesive units, the Army needs to keep the unit intact as long as possible. This paper demonstrated numerous examples of the issues surrounding unit stabilization. The Army conducted studies to define the problem and
identify solutions.\textsuperscript{160} “These studies concluded that force-stabilization could increase the combat readiness and cohesion of Army units by reducing turbulence.”\textsuperscript{161}

In parallel, and complementary to the force stabilization initiative, the Army expedited its transformation efforts and established a programmatic system to provide trained and ready BCTs to OIF and OEF- the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.\textsuperscript{162} ARFORGEN programs BCTs into three pools: Reset/Train, Ready, and Available. The intent is to manage the force in these pools and allocate resources in a prioritized, scheduled manner.\textsuperscript{163}

The alignment of the Army’s force stabilization system with ARFORGEN is significant. When fully implemented, “it will give leaders, Soldiers, and their families, stability and predictability.”\textsuperscript{164} While it tiers readiness, it does so in a prioritized, scheduled manner that gives precise guidance to the Army’s personnel, equipment, resource, and training managers.\textsuperscript{165} It also provides the Army with a predictive surge capability.\textsuperscript{166}

While ARFORGEN and force stabilization are significant advances, neither encompasses the entire force. The most noteworthy exclusion is the Army’s 225 support brigades.\textsuperscript{167} As history shows, the primary reason that previous unit replacement and stability initiatives failed (COHORT is the best example) is that the Army did not implement them across the force. Support units comprise over half of the force, deploy at a rate equal to or higher than BCTs,\textsuperscript{168} and possess a majority of the Army’s shortage MOSs.\textsuperscript{169} By not including these units in ARFORGEN or force stabilization, the Army assumes significant risk to its overall ability to fill and sustain its force. The Army needs a total force generation and stabilization system.
**Unit Attrition.** Unit attrition is a fact in the Army. Despite efforts to minimize attrition, units will lose Soldiers to disciplinary, medical, or administrative reasons each month. Historically, unit attrition averaged seven to ten percent each quarter, and about 33% per year. Army-wide first-term Soldier attrition is at ten percent; down from 16% in 2002. The Army has predictive tools it uses to minimize the effect on the overall force, but attrition in units will always be a phenomenon that leaders and personnel specialists must aggressively manage in order to mitigate its effect on units.

**Non-deployable Soldiers.** Non-deployables are in the same management category as unit attrition - hard to predict and detrimental to unit readiness. Normal non-deployable rates in Army units average three to five percent, but BCTs recently experienced rates in excess of ten percent (e.g., 400 Soldiers in a Stryker BCT). It is impossible to predict which Soldiers, in which MOSs, will become non-deployable; how long they will remain in that status; or if they will deploy. Additionally, when Soldiers become non-deployable just before deploying, they are past the point where Army HRC can replace them before the deployment.

There is always a significant information gap between what the unit knows and what it reports to Army HRC via its automated personnel systems. Soldier readiness requires daily input and the Army needs to re-institute the “morning report” to expedite information sharing among commands. Soldier readiness should be part of every commander’s training plan, and the Army should conduct a comprehensive review of the non-deployable issue.

**Army-Wide MOS Shortages.** The Army perennially struggles to balance its Soldier inventory. As of December 2007, of the Army’s 182 enlisted MOSs, 70 (38%) are less
than 100% of authorized, and 29 (16%) are less than 90%. Additionally, 106 MOSs (58%) were above 100%. The officer inventory is similarly out of balance, with an excess of lieutenants, and a shortage of majors, especially in the support specialties. However, even if the Army had every Soldier assigned to an authorized position, units would still have shortages.

**Recruiting and Retention.** The Army recruits and loses 80,000 Soldiers each year. As the Army grows by an additional 65,000 (from 482,000 to 547,000) by 2010, the recruiting mission will increase and become more difficult, given today’s recruiting market, and the Army remains challenged in meeting its recruiting quality goals. The Army met its yearly retention goals since 2002, however, some of the success may be attributed to incentives; forty-five percent of the enlisted MOSs (82 of 182) have reenlistment bonuses, and the Army now offers retention incentives to officers. Retaining the force is critical, but difficult and costly. Recruiting and retention need to be precise in order to help balance the Soldier/MOS inventory.

**Current Wartime Replacement Operations.** The key to successful wartime unit manning is setting the force before it deploys. Settling in for a protracted conflict, the Army established a unit rotation/replacement plan (focused mainly on large BCTs, but in some cases down to small teams), and procedures for filling shortages as units entered the deployment window. Now, the Army executes Stop Loss and Stop Move ninety days before the unit’s earliest-arrival-date (EAD) in theater. The Army’s goals are to have BCTs at 90% strength forty-five days prior to the mission readiness exercise (MRE); at 100% ninety-days prior to latest-arrival-date (LAD) in theater; and to sustain the BCT at 95% or higher for the duration of the deployment.
As the GWOT matured, Army HRC anticipated combat losses and began prepositioning replacements within the unit. Combining known shortages and anticipated losses, projected to be four to five percent of the unit’s strength for a deployment, HRC developed replacement push packages. HRC either reassigns Soldiers from other Army units or sends Soldiers directly from IMT. HRC pushes these replacements to the BCT’s rear detachments (RDs). Currently, replacements are still arriving into the RD more than 60 days after the unit deployed.

The RD cadre provides theater-specific training, to increase the survivability of the Soldier, and then pushes the Soldiers to the deployed unit. Using the same process, the RDs push forward formerly non-deployable Soldiers once their situation improves and they can deploy. (Note: Despite the RD’s critical sets of tasks supporting rear and replacement operations, the composition of the RDs is non-standard across the Army, and RDs are undocumented in the Army’s force structure). Additional losses not covered by the “pushed” overfill, requires the unit to “pull” a replacement from HRC.

Summary. Today’s Army needs to complete its personnel transformation and implement a URS. The Army continues to use the IRS, despite its many drawbacks, because it does not have a suitable alternative plan. The Army’s force stabilization regulation frames the quandary well:

The IRS ...is flexible and efficient. It eases management and places Soldiers where the Army needs them, quickly and equitably. However, reliance upon the IRS...does not facilitate the Active Army’s return on investment regarding personnel management. The steady flow of personnel into and out of units limits the... ability to foster cohesion and group solidarity in combat units.
Even with a URS, the Army will continue to rely on an IRS to replace low-density MOS and unforecasted shortages. However, the Army can effectively replace the vast majority of combat losses with a URS that provides trained, ready, and cohesive small units. The Army must develop a dynamic plan that engenders its commitment to its training principles, to its Soldiers and their families, to the American people to give Soldiers every advantage, and to combatant commanders to provide them trained and ready forces. The Army needs to plan and implement such a system now, because the Army is at war, and will go to war again.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are possible courses of action for implementing a URS today and for the future.

Immediately Revise the IRS into a URS. With a few policy changes, the current IRS system could transform into a URS that would meet the lessons outlined and fill units for the GWOT. The changes should apply Stop Loss/Move to deploying units at least 180 days prior to the EAD to stabilize the force for the training ramp and accelerate the fill plan goals to ensure unit fill is near 105% at least 45-days before the unit’s MRE/X. This overfill should be more precise and account for the projected casualty losses to ensure a viable sustainment plan and employ the Replacement Imperatives outlined below for those Soldiers who miss their unit’s training ramp.

Build Cadre Replacement Platoons. The Army should develop a force management solution to put structure into the replacement process. The Army should build and document authorizations for replacement platoons using a cadre-type structure; in which the officers and NCOs are the only Soldiers authorized until a unit
prepares to deploy. For an infantry rifle company, this platoon would include a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, squad leaders, and fire team leaders.

In this concept, the officer and NCOs would train replacements in teams, squads, and platoons until they reach collective task proficiency at each level. The platoon, as a whole, or individual squads could then deploy. In addition to infantry, this concept should apply units with standard, modular platoon structures. Field artillery, armor, combat engineer, aviation, scout, cavalry, transportation, and medical platoons also lend themselves well to this concept. It is not essential the replacement SCTs or platoons remain intact after they deploy. The advantages are clear, but unit commanders make that call. The experience the Soldiers receive in the train-up and deployment process will better prepare them for surviving in combat. Also, by documenting the cadre requirements, the Army places demand in those MOSs it anticipates sustaining losses in.

**Where to Locate the Replacement Platoon.** The structure could reside within a company or battalion at home-station, or within a training brigade at a Training and Doctrine Command school, one that trains the predominate MOS. A company commander at either location would certify the unit’s training proficiency.

**Integrate the Replacement Platoon under the Rear Detachment.** The Army must decide on the structure and scope of its RDs. As part of this consideration, the Army should address the replacement regulating function that most RDs now perform. A battalion or brigade RD commander, with the replacement mission, could train and certify the replacement platoons in their individual and collective tasks.
**WSRO.** The Army should relook WSRO for in-theater replacement and reconstitution operations. The concept was sound, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) detailed how to sustain units in high-intensity combat. The Army invested a lot in the concept, and should not forget the TTPs learned.

**Replacement Imperatives.** Wartime replacements should be unit replacements as a rule, but, as an exception because of the turbulent nature of manning units, the Army will need to provide individual replacements to units just before or after it deploys. In such instances, an individual replacement should not be a Soldier in their first term and never assigned to a permanent unit, a second lieutenant never assigned to a permanent unit, an aviator who has not completed the required flight progressions to fly in a combat area, or a reclassified Soldier never assigned to a permanent unit in the new MOS.

**Codify the Process and Procedures in Doctrine and Regulations.** The Army’s current doctrine, regulations, and the GWOT personnel planning guidance are woefully void of a coherent depiction of today’s AC replacement system. These documents contain no real policy, procedures, or techniques to guide units and personnel managers. The best document is in the Army’s annual manning guidance. The logistics and human resource communities need to develop a comprehensive doctrinal and regulatory solution set for wartime replacement operations.

**Conclusion**

The Army must not forget its history. To transform the Army into the 21st Century and the Information Age, the Army today is better postured to eliminate the IRS as its primary means of replacing combat losses. The Army should establish a Unit Replacement System, and provide small unit replacements (squads, crews, teams, and

30
platoons) to the fighting force. While unable to completely divest itself of the IRS, the Army should only use the IRS as an exception, and then consistent within the suggested Replacement Imperatives. This solution preserves the Army’s greatest asset, its Soldiers, while maximizing the training and cohesion of its units, in order to sustain the Army at peak combat readiness. In so doing, the Army stays true to its doctrine, its training imperatives, its values, and its commitment to Soldiers, their families, and the American people.

Endnotes

1George Santayana, quoted in Reader’s Digest, June 1962, and published in Reader’s Digest Treasury of Modern Quotations (New York: The Reader’s Digest Press, 1975) 283.


3General Donn Starry commanded U.S. Readiness Command and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.


6Donald Rumsfeld, quoted by William Kristol, “The Defense Secretary We Have,” Washington Post, 15 December 2004, p. A33. The quote was in response to a question from a Soldier, during a Town Hall meeting at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, 8 December 2004, pertaining to the Army’s progress in placing armor on all of its vehicles.

7Trefry, 134.

8GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, quoted from a speech at the Eisenhower Luncheon of the 45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, 12 October 1999.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Field Manual 7-0, 1-1.

Ibid., 1-1 through 1-14.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Teams, squads/crews, sections, platoons, companies/batteries/troops, battalions/squadrons, and brigades

Trefry, 131.


Field Manual 7-0, 1-3.

Field Manual 7-0, 1-1.

Civil War era regiments were comprised of approximately 1,000 Soldiers and typically generated from within a state or region. The Union Army peaked at nearly 1,000,000 Soldiers and the Confederacy peaked at nearly 600,000. Source *American Military History*, available from http://www.history.army.mil/books/amh/AMH-09.htm; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

For example: basic rifle marksmanship, physical training, drill, and movement techniques.

28 A notable exception was Wisconsin, which maintained the fighting strength of its regiments by sending individual replacements direct to its units.

29 Riots broke out in New York City in opposition to the draft, see http://www.multied.com/CivilWar/Draft.html; Internet; accessed 28 December 2007.


31 In a depot system, the army pushed replacements forward on the battlefield, staged, and then fed directly into the regiments. The term depot comes from the logistics field and identifies a storage or trans-shipment site. Replacement depots, or another namesake performing the same function, would be a part of every major combat operation in which the U.S. Army engaged in. Also referred to as “Repo-Depots” or “repple depples” by Soldiers over the years, the terms were not endearing.


34 Ibid.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Trefry, 134. In the “rule of three,” as Lieutenant General Trefry observed, it takes three units to create one deployable unit of the same size. One deployed, one present for duty at the home base (less personnel transferred to the deployed unit), and one recovering from the effects of its deployment. LTG Trefry validated this “rule” in every operational deployment between 1989 and 1998.

40 Vandergriff, 56.

The draft established by the Selective Service Act of 1917, legislated mandatory conscription, a draft, for all able body males between prescribed ages.

Brinkerhoff, 27.

Fischer, et al, 2. Overall casualties for the Army in WWI were 106,378 died and 193,663 wounded.

During WWI, forces sustained combat losses at rates unfathomable before the war. The combined losses in single battles exceeded 100,000 Soldiers on numerous occasions; larger than the pre-war U.S. Army.

Macdonald, 404.


There was considerable debate on how to structure the Army for the next war. Both sides wanted a small standing Army to meet the initial requirements for any potential conflict. However, the two sides differed on how to mobilize and generate the force if the Army needed to expand. One side wanted a “cadre” force, partially manned with NCOs and officers, which the Army would fill with recruits if it needed to expand quickly, and a smaller National Guard. The other side wanted a larger National Guard, to mobilize, train, and then deploy. The latter argument won the debate.


Gorman.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.
56 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 273-289.

57 Ibid., 280-283.

58 Fischer et al., 2. By war’s end, the Army sustained 318,274 deaths and 565,861 wounded

59 Trefry, 132.

60 Ruppenthal, 304. Based on statistical data from the North African campaign.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Brinkerhoff, 27.


65 Vandergriff, 66. The Commanding General of the 79th Infantry Division at the time was Major General Ira T. Wyche.

66 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 280-281. The 79th ID was involved in some of the heaviest action in the ETO, spent 248 days in combat (arriving shortly after D-Day in Normandy, 19 June 1944), and incurred the second fewest percent of casualties (165.5%) for all Infantry Divisions that spent as long or longer in combat. (Note: It would be impossible to draw any conclusions or inferences from these statistics; they are only data points.) The Soldier’s stories in Ambrose’s work are worth reading to put the data into its true context.

67 Brinkerhoff, 28.

68 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 284-289.

69 Ibid., 277.


71 Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 277. The Germans used a unit replacement system and would rotate units from the line to undergo reconstitution operations.


74 Ibid, 30-32. Extracted from the Army War College’s World War II Survey Collection.

75 Trefry, 135.

76 Trefry, 135.


79 The Army mobilized four National Guard Divisions; sent two to reinforce Army Europe and two to Korea. It also mobilized 400 Reserve units and over 240,000 Army Reserve Soldiers. Available from http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/army grd.shtml; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007; and from http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/army_reserve.shtml; Internet; accessed 29 December 2007.


81 Individual ready reserve (IRR) is a Soldier’s status when they are not on active duty and not in a troop unit in the reserve components. IRR Soldiers mobilize onto active duty using certain authorities for specific durations.


83 Vandergriff, 87.

84 While this is the author’s professional opinion, it is also what has been taught in the Army’s professional military education for, at least, the last 23-years. The initial Army force to engage the North Korean invaders was a Task Force under the command of LTC Charles B. Smith, and it failed at multiple levels. In common “Army-speak,” if someone says “no more Task Force Smith’s” it is understood that it is a rallying cry against unpreparedness.

85 Weigley, 393-395

86 Ibid.

87 Fischer, et al, 3. Army casualties were 29,856 deaths and 77,596 wounded.

89 Brinkerhoff, 28.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid., citing a briefing by LTG Trefry on the Unit Manning Study.

93 Army Regulation 600-35, 30.


95 Ibid.

96 In Stop Loss/Stop Move action, the Army stops the loss of Soldiers from the Army by extending Soldiers’ contractual enlistment (called their expiration term of service (ETS) date) so they are available to the Army for the duration of the deployment. The Army stops the loss of other Soldiers by revoking Soldiers’ orders to execute a permanent change of station (PCS), or move.)


98 Trefry, 134.


100 Ibid.

101 Gorman.


103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Gorman.

106 Ibid.

107 Army Regulation 600-35, 30.

Fischer, et al, 3. The U.S. Army casualties in Vietnam were 38,218 deaths and 96,802 wounded.

Trefry, Vandergiff, Hackworth, and Gorman questioned the overall plan of the Army for replacing losses in Vietnam.


Troop levels in Korea have fluctuated over the years. However, the order of magnitude of the problem is that in order to maintain, say, 20,000 Soldiers in Korea year-round, the Army has to not only have 20,000 Soldiers there; it needs nearly 30,000 Soldiers on orders to Korea and en route, or preparing to move to replace those 20,000, and 20,000 Soldiers returning. Orders for a short tour to Korea were a primary reason Soldiers submitted deletions, deferments, and declinations of assignments within the Army for the past 50+ years. This movement created significant turbulence in a 780,000 force, and proved nearly devastating to sustain in a 480,000 Soldier AVF. The author was the chief command strength manager for U.S. Army forces; to include Korea, while assigned to Army Personnel Command (now Human Resources Command) for two years, June 2000 through June 2002.

Trefry, 134.

Brinkerhoff, 28.

Trefry, 134. In the “rule of three,” as Lieutenant General Trefry observed, it takes three units to create one deployable unit of the same size: one deployed, one present for duty at the home base (less personnel transferred to the deployed unit), and one recovering from the effects of its last deployment.

Brinkerhoff, 28.

Ibid.; from an interview with Don Weber, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel, Headquarters Department of the Army, on 7 June 2001.

Ibid.

Trefry, 134-135.

Brinkerhoff, 28-29. The initial concept used 20 infantry, armor, and field artillery COHORT companies, but later expanded to battalions.


Brinkerhoff, 28.
Attrition, as used by the author and in normal Army vernacular, is a reduction in numbers. Unit attrition happens as Soldiers depart the unit due to resignation, expiration of service, movement to another unit, separation from the Army due to myriad disciplinary, medical, or administrative issues.

Brinkerhoff, 32.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Trefry, 134.

The Army established force stabilization policies, along the lines of COHORT, beginning in 2000 and expanded the policies to a majority of the Army’s BCTs over the next six years. The current plan is to expand to all BCTs; except those in Europe and Korea.


Ibid.

The U.S. Army Reserve mobilized 650 units, 60,000 ready reserve Soldiers, and 20,000 individual ready reserve Soldier for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. James R. Helmly, “Profound Change While Fighting the War,” Army, October 2004.

The Army’s primary tool for projecting combat losses was U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 101-10-1/2, Staff Officer’s Field Manual: Organization, Technical, and Logistical Planning Factors, Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 1987). A Filler Shelf fills unit shortages based on the unit’s required wartime organizational structure. A Casualty Replacement Shelf is designed to fill projected personnel shortages due to losses; casualties, disease, injury, etc. This FM provided historical WWII loss data that served as a good start point for estimating requirements.

In tiered readiness, the Army established three readiness tiers for manning it units. Contingency force package one (CFP1) units, the highest priority, were manned at 100%+ of their authorizations; while the lower priority units (CFP2 and 3) were manned in the mid-90% fill range. Most of the force, and nearly all of the support units were in the mid-90% fill range.

Reider, 17.

Ibid., 19-24.

Fischer, et al, 3. The Army suffered 224 deaths and 354 wounded in the conflict. The projected casualties were over 10,000.


The Army deployed forces to Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.


The author, while assigned to Army Personnel Command (now Human Resources Command), was responsible for managing the strengths and readiness of Army units from June 2000 through June 2002.

The Army converted thousands of non-deployable military spaces into civilian spaces; and contracted out many functions previously performed by Soldiers or Army civilians.

Life-cycle manning stabilizes the Soldiers within the unit for a three-year life-cycle. Army PERSCOM directly managed the unit and implemented control measures to ensure compliance with the lifecycle.

Available from http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA408486; Internet; accessed 6 January 2008. BTAP joined two or more Soldiers at IMT and, as designed, assigned the Soldiers to the same small unit after completing training. The program aimed to lower attrition rates. These “buddies,” offered a familiar face to each other to lessen the stress associated with making the transition, first, into the Army, and, then, into the first permanently assigned unit.

Major combat reporting units (MCRUs) include all divisional units, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, Special Forces groups, and the Ranger Regiment.

Patriot and multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalions.

The Army identified “early deployers” as those units that had a deployment timelines within an established cut line using data, classified deployment timelines, derived from approved contingency plans in the Joint Strategic Capability Plan.

The U.S. initial responses were Operations Noble Eagle, responding at home to the terrorist attacks and defending the homeland, and Enduring Freedom, taking the fight to the terrorists abroad.

The Army supported an expanded Headquarters (HQ), U.S. Central Command via individual augmentation; increased the authorized level of organization and fill of HQ Army
Forces central Command (ARRCENT); and provided enhanced the manning levels of Army Special Operations Command units; to sustain those units which led the initial fight in OEF.

The author, the G1 of the 25th Infantry Division (ID) at the time, recalled receiving the details of the casualty replacement shelf requisition that his higher command, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), was tasked to fill. The Army’s total number was less than one thousand, and USARPAC had 90. 25ID volunteered to take them all in order to implement unit replacements, and provided 106. The largest set of this group was 50 infantrymen of various grades- mostly privates. This vignette between him, the G3, LTC Burdette (Burt) Thompson, and the Commanding General, 25th ID, MG Eric T. Olson, is precise to the best of the author’s memory. The Division G3 and G1 briefed the 25th ID’s Commanding General (CG), Major General Eric T. Olson, on the particulars of the tasking, and the CG immediately shot back “We don’t do it that way anymore!” The ensuing discussion centered on the CG’s objection to providing individual replacements in wartime. The crux of his argument was that he thought the Army discarded the practice (IRS) years ago. He wanted to know what other options he had in filling the requirement. The G1 thought same since his time as a replacement company commander and had options readily available*.

In short, instead of providing 50 individual infantrymen, 25th ID decided to send two, 33-Soldier infantry platoons: fully manned, trained, ready, and cohesive. 25th ID packaged together and deployed the two platoons with 40 other Soldiers to Kuwait. Instead of labeling these Soldiers as “casualty replacements,” the 25th ID called them “reinforcements” and deployed the group as the Southwest Asia Operational Reinforcement Detachment (SWAORD.) The two platoons stayed intact throughout the deployment, and, after OIF-I ended four months later, they redeployed together. This is one example of how one command thought the Army’s replacement system could and should work.

*The author commanded the 525th Replacement Company, under I Corps at Fort Lewis, WA, from October 1992 through December 2003. Personnel doctrine at the time stressed the IRS, unit replacements, and WSRO. During his time in command, while engaged in numerous “warfighter” exercises, he fought to change replacement procedures used in the simulations models (the “game”) to replicate unit replacement operations and WSRO- as opposed to a simple supply transaction where replacements moved in an IRS manner. He also tried to change the relative combat value of a replacement in the “game” to ensure that commanders fully understood that a replacement was not as trained or combat ready as a veteran Soldier in the unit. The Army never updated the simulations to reflect reality and replacements processing proceeded in the same manner as replacing a part on a vehicle.

Julie Trego Manta, Enlisted Assignment System for a Transformed Army, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2001) 22. LTC Manta’s paper provides an in depth analysis of the Army’s myriad personnel polices that the Army should address in order to align with its transformation initiative.

Trefry, 133. In WWII, Infantry units suffered 93% of all losses; at the division level casualties were seven times that of any other element. 86% of all casualties occurred in the infantry battalion, and within the battalion the preponderance were in the Infantry Platoon at the squad level.

Ibid. Per multiple phone conversations and emails with COL David Tighe, Chief Readiness Division, Army HRC, the last occurring on 31 January 2008, GWOT data indicates
91% to 95% of all casualties in BCTs (variances depend on the type of BCT) are in combat arms MOSs. The next largest group is the medics at 3-5% of total casualties.


156 COL David Tighe, USA, Chief Readiness Division, Army Human Resources Command, via multiple emails and telephone conversations with author; last email dated 31 January 2008.

157 Ibid.


159 For example, deploying regiments to the Philippines, deploying COL Moore’s battalion to Vietnam, the “infusion program,” and LTG Trefry’s “rule of three” discussion related to operational deployments to Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo.

160 Army Regulation 600-35, 30

161 Ibid.

162 Harvey and Schoomaker, A-1 through A-4.

163 Ibid. The ARFORGEN model programs the Army’s 71 (76 planned), 43 active component (48 planned) and 28 Reserve Component (RC) National Guard, BCTs into three pools: Available (18 AC and 5 RC); Ready (18/5); and Reset/Train (18/18). The Army’s intent is to manage the force in these pools and allocate resources in a tiered manner to ensure the readiness of the Available, Ready, and Reset/Train pools, in priority, to meet the requirement to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders. AC BCTs progress from one pool to another in one-year increments. RC pools are four years in Reset/Train, one year in Ready, and one year in Available. With the model, an AC BCT could expect to deploy once every three years, and an RC BCT once every six years. The three pools are very similar to the “rule of three” lessons depicted by LTG Trefry.


166 Harvey and Schoomaker, A-1 through A-4.

167 Combat Support and Combat Service Support brigades- field artillery, aviation, sustainment, engineer, military police, intelligence, air defense artillery, et cetera.
Combat heavy engineer battalions are the best example. The Army does not have enough in the AC or RC, and the GWOT demand is high, so within the AC these units deploy at a higher rate and the Soldiers typically do not receive the full “one year at homestation;” an Army goal for all units.

High demand/low density MOSs, such as any of the signal, intelligence, logistics MOSs; are typically in high demand, but are short across the Army. In general, these MOSs tend to be hard to recruit and retain at the right level. Also, a typical combat unit only has few of each authorized. Therefore, any shortage can have an immediate impact on a unit’s capability. The majority MOS in a support units may be a high demand, low density MOS; therefore a shortage typically has a direct impact on the unit’s overall readiness level.

\[168\text{Army Campaign Plan – FAQs, available from http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/acpfaqs/forcestabilization.html; Internet; accessed 28 December 2007. Losses normally peak in the summer months. This is an historical average. Life-cycle management, unit focused stability, “Stop Loss/Stop Move” procedures skewed these averages since the GWOT began.}\]

\[169\text{First term attrition refers to those Soldiers on their first enlistment who leave the Army before their contractual obligation expires (e.g., before their three-year enlistment is complete). Available from http://www.armyg1.army.mil/docs/public; Internet; accessed 13 January 2008.}\]

\[170\text{Non-deployable Soldiers are those who have temporary or permanent situations (pending surgery, pregnant, pending administrative separation or courts-martial, sole surviving son, etc) that precludes a unit from deploying the Soldier.}\]

\[171\text{COL David Tighe, e-mail message to author, 31 January 2008.}\]

\[172\text{The “morning report” dates back to pre-automation and before Personnel Action Centers (PACs) at the battalion-level. Then, units submitted a personnel accountability report and by-name disposition of their Soldiers to their higher headquarters every day. With automation, it is infinitely easier to submit this report daily, however, units tend not to and their higher HQs do not force compliance. The end result is that the personnel managers who make strength decisions end up with less than accurate data upon which to make those decisions. The Army needs to re-institute the “morning report” and implement compliance mechanisms so that personnel system has nearly 100% accuracy and strength decisions are the best possible.}\]

\[173\text{Units should conduct Soldier Personnel Readiness Checks (SRPCs) at least monthly, and a complete deployment screening (Level 1), to include medical, at least six months prior to a deployment. In this manner, units train to sustain their personnel readiness, and Army HRC can better support their mans.}\]

\[174\text{COL David Tighe, e-mail message to author, 31 January 2008.}\]

\[175\text{With existing shortages and deployment requirements above unit authorizations, the Army is seriously short majors in the force. The shortages will last a few more years.}\]
Today, only 29% the Army’s primary recruiting population, 17-24 year-old males, are fully qualified to become Soldiers; and only 45% are fully qualified with waivers. Also available from http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatitis/articles/20080108.aspx; Internet; accessed 13 January 2008.

Potential recruits would require waivers for medical, physical, moral, or dependency issues. Quality is also measured by the recruits score on the aptitude tests taken at the processing station.


Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 2, and e-mails and phone conversations with COL David Tighe. Army HRC conducts detailed analysis of GWOT loss data by unit-type, MOS, and grade. Human resource managers use these statistics to anticipate losses and pre-position the projected replacement prior to loss. The data reveals that losses in GWOT are consistent with loss data from WWII (and every conflict since then), and resemble templates of infantry squads and platoons; armor crews and platoons; scout squads and platoons; artillery crews and platoons; mortar crews and platoons; and combat engineer squads and platoons. Properly configured and trained, SCTs and platoons could replace over 90% of the losses in BCTs.

COL David Tighe, e-mail message to author, 31 January 2008

Individual Replacement Training (IRT), while critical training to ensuring the survivability of all Soldiers in OIF or OEF, does not provide the MOS specific skills required for combat arms Soldiers to operate in collective SCTs.

COL David Tighe, phone conversation with and e-mail message to author, 31 January 2008. These procedures are still in place. Additionally, the author, while commanding the 556th Personnel Services Battalion under 25th ID, also commanded the rear detachments of 18 combat and combat support battalions deployed in combat for a 15-month period (March 2004 through June 2005). In all, the rear detachments pushed over 500 replacements forward to their units in combat. Most Soldiers were right out of IMT, warrant officers right out of flight school (who arrive in theater not fully progressed in their flight training to fly in a combat area), and second lieutenants right out of their IMT- the basic officer leader’s course.

COL David Tighe, phone conversation with and e-mail message to author, 31 January 2008.
Infantry units could form and train at Fort Benning; armor at Fort Knox; field artillery at Fort Sill; combat engineers at Fort Leonard Wood; and aviators at Fort Rucker.

The author reviewed many current Army regulations and doctrine for the Army’s definitive “how to” on replacement operations. Army Regulation 614-1, *U.S. Army Replacement System*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2 Sep 69), is obsolete and inaccurate. Army Field Manual 1-0, *Human Resources Support* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2007), does little more than assign missions and generic duty responsibilities. It does not provide the detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for manning the force or conducting replacement operations - neither IRS nor URS. This FM must be overhauled to provide the details required to guide units and HR Soldiers “how to” conduct an IRS and URS. Army Field Manual 4-0, *Combat Service Support*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 29 August 2003), is also woefully short on specifics; except, “Unit strengths normally will be sustained by provision of individual replacements (rather than by unit replacements).” The Army’s logistics and HR community can do better than this.
