STRENGTHENING U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE (API)

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This SRP tracks a significant shift in U.S. attention toward Africa, given the continent’s heightened strategic importance. It analyzes NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and provides recommendations for future direction and implementation of a similar partnering program in Africa. It also provides a detailed list of recommended principles or considerations that should be taken into account when implementing this critical new program. The current African Union (AU) Peace and Security Architecture and the Theater Security Cooperation Plan of the newly established combatant command, AFRICOM, should be integrated into the proposed hybrid partnering program.

African leaders’ reservations about aligning with one hegemon and the reluctance of some European allies to establish a NATO presence in Africa, warrant on-going collaboration with existing regional African organizations. Accordingly, this SRP proposes a hybrid partnering program for Africa, designated the African Partnering Initiative (API). The API should include the African Union, select African partner countries, and the European Union (EU). The United Nations (UN) should participate by means of the accepted NATO/PfP capacity building model. The API should allay
concerns of European allies and African leaders. Moreover, it should partner U.S. interests on the continent.
STRENGTHENING U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE (API)

We are working in partnership with Africans and their friends throughout the international community to hasten the day when all Africans can have hope in their hearts, food on their tables, and a bright future for their children.

—Colin L. Powell
Former Secretary of State

We live in a volatile and uncertain global environment shrouded by the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Globalization and transnational actors have fostered the spread of extremist ideologies to many parts of the world, including the African continent. In response, the United States has begun to re-think its strategic interests as they relate to Africa. These interests include energy, where 22% of its crude oil imports come from Africa (surpassing what we currently import from the Middle East). This percentage is expected to increase to 25% by 2015. Given the proliferation of terrorism to more susceptible regions and the incessant challenges of poverty, disease, and instability, U.S. policy-makers must include Africa in an overall plan to counter this threatening strategic environment. The increased strategic importance of Africa has prompted the President to approve the activation of the sixth Geographic Combatant Command, Africa Command (AFRICOM).

In order to succeed in meeting objectives that support U.S. national interests on the African continent, the U.S., in concert with NATO and EU members, should capitalize on the fundamental principles of one of NATO’s most successful partnering initiatives, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Implemented in 1994, PfP was designed to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. It provides a mechanism for civil and military cooperation and opens the way for other NATO partnering initiatives
through bilateral cooperative agreements between NATO and partner countries. In 1994, there were 16 members of NATO. Today there are 26 countries in the Alliance, 10 of which were formerly Partnership countries. Further, there are 23 current Partnership for Peace (PfP) members, and 3 countries in the Membership Action Plan (a program that prepares aspiring countries for NATO membership). Since its inception, the PfP program has grown exponentially in the European theater.

Regardless of NATO’s marked success with PfP and the pressing demands in Africa, NATO cannot blindly march into the African continent with the same strategy that has thrived in Europe. U.S. and NATO policy makers must scrutinize their partnering approach with the African countries; otherwise, they will not realize the successes gained in Europe. What must be changed in the current fundamental PfP principles in order to achieve success in Africa?

Given its tumultuous history and its inherent need for stability and security, the African continent is a prime candidate for partnering initiatives offered by NATO, similar to a PfP program. There are, however, unique considerations that must be taken into account before building partnerships in Africa. First, it must be clear that the African Partnership Initiative (API) is a distinct and separate program from the PfP. Bear in mind that one of the incentives for joining the PfP was the eventual prospect of joining NATO. The basic framework of the API will not include NATO membership or a seat at the Euro-Atlantic Partnering Council (EAPC) in Brussels. Rather, the “alliance” that the API will build upon is the multilayered, regional security architecture of the African Union security plan. The capacity for expansion within this framework provides the greatest incentive to African leaders to embrace the API. Second, certain European Union (EU)
countries are very hesitant about initiating or supporting programs on the African continent that are strictly NATO-centric. Third, the African Union (AU) must be a key player in any partnering initiative in order for the program to be viewed as credible and accepted by African leaders. Lastly, both NATO and the United States, especially the Department of Defense (DoD), given their extensive commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, are currently reluctant to enter other challenging engagements. Thus, the overall NATO/US commitment of resources must be minimized, with the prospect of maximum return on investment. Acknowledging the difficulties of launching an API, this SRP contends that by observing the fundamental principles of the European PfP program and making appropriate adjustments, the United States can take the lead in an API that will allay concerns of European allies and African leaders and that will further U.S. interests.

This SRP reviews and encapsulates the history of the PfP program, highlighting its achievements to date. Next, it analyzes the strategic importance of Africa and identifies the major U.S. strategic interests on the continent. It proposes modifications in the NATO PfP program to adapt it into a hybrid partnering program called the African Partnering Initiative (API). The API is designed to establish a stable and secure Africa, building on the current African Peace and Security Architecture. Lastly, given the increased strategic importance of Africa, this SRP discusses the role of the newest U.S. Combatant Command, Africa Command (AFRICOM). The European PfP program, properly adjusted for Africa, can achieve the goals of increased security and regional stability, continued economic development, and reduced disease and strife on the continent. For these reasons, the United States should leverage the NATO-based
capacity building framework and NATO’s documented success as a working model for an African Partnering Initiative (API).

**Success of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program**

Following the Cold War, NATO established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to increase defense cooperation with former Warsaw Pact members, the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and Albania. PfP continues to play a key role in developing those state’s military capabilities and reforming their defense establishments. It also helps prepare aspirant countries for NATO membership.\(^1\) Over the past several years, the PfP program has expanded to offer 24 areas of cooperation, which include democratic control of the armed forces, the struggle against terrorism, civil-emergency planning, and interoperability. Partners may choose from more than 1,400 specific partnering activities, including expert team visits, workshops, courses and exercises.\(^2\) NATO’s focus on specific areas of cooperation that are supported through specific cooperative activities are arguably the very key to the success of the European PfP program.

The PfP program was initiated by the U.S. and adopted at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels. The Partnership Framing Document stipulated the following objectives:

- facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- ensure democratic control of defense forces;
- maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to crisis response operations under the United Nations and other international organizations;
• develop cooperative military relations with NATO for the purposes of joint planning, training, and exercises for peacekeeping; search and rescue; and humanitarian operations; and

• develop forces that are better able to operate with NATO members (NATO also uses PfP to support countries interested in NATO membership.)

Upon signing the membership document, subscribing states draft their proposed partnership framework in what is called a Presentation Document and submit it to NATO. The Presentation Document consists of individual activities based on the applicant’s objectives and abilities as they enter the program. An Individual Partnership Action Program (IPAP) is then jointly developed and agreed upon between NATO and each partner country. The IPAP thus lays the foundation for cooperation between individual partners and NATO.

PfP’s successes are well-documented. For example, consider the July 2001 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congress entitled, “NATO: U.S. Assistance to the Partnership for Peace (PfP).” This report clearly cites the benefits of PfP and Warsaw Initiatives Programs:

• U.S. and NATO military commanders and other international officials have concluded that the Warsaw Initiative and PfP programs have enhanced the capabilities of partner countries to participate effectively in NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans and have improved their ability to operate with NATO, thus making them better candidates for membership in the alliance;

• Warsaw Initiative funding has directly supported the creation of seven multinational peacekeeping units composed of NATO and partner state troops,
some of which can or have been deployed to NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans;

- According to representatives of the (then) three newest NATO member states (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), the partnering has provided immeasurable capacity building for indigenous forces to provide for their own security, as well as assistance in regional peacekeeping operations, an imperative for developing a partnering program with the Africans.  

U.S. officials in fact claim that the growing contribution of partner states’ troops and other assistance to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans are the most significant indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO PfP programs. Specific examples of PfP’s “return on investment” are recorded by Dr. Jeffrey Simon, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. In June 2004, he reported that in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S.-led military operation in Afghanistan, many NATO allies —including two of the then newest — Poland and the Czech Republic — and six PfP partners rendered substantial assistance. As of February 2008, ten countries that joined the NATO Alliance after 1999 were participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Mr. Robert Weaver, head of the Country Relations and Political Affairs section in NATO’s Political Affairs Division, puts it best: “The Alliance's evolving policy of Partnership has been enormously successful in helping to alter the strategic environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. By promoting political and military interoperability, partnership has helped to create a true Euro-Atlantic security culture - a
strong determination to work together in tackling critical security challenges, within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic community of nations.”

By nearly all accounts and measurements of achievement, the PfP has been a resounding success in the former U.S.S.R. and Eastern European region. It restored stability as the Cold War ended. There was a huge return on investment when partner states joined NATO-led peace keeping operations, which validates the decision to expand the Alliance following the Cold War. NATO enlargement in 1999, with acceptance of former Warsaw Pact members (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic), and seven others in 2004 (see figure 1 for current NATO members), is a momentous historical event.

These demonstrated successes could serve as the foundation for a stable, partner-supported African continent. Capacity building within the AU could also serve to build a
stronger regionally based African Standby Force (ASF), capable of consequence management and peace and stability operations throughout the continent.

Strategic Importance of the African Continent

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and competition for resources has dramatically altered the U.S. strategic approach toward Africa. In fact, the 1998 U.S. National Security Strategy listed Africa last among the world’s regions. A 1995 report by the Department of Defense noted, “America’s security interests are very limited….the tendency is thus to relegate Africa to the periphery of American strategy, to accord it our second-best efforts, or to ignore it entirely.” In 2008, Africa is no longer “the forgotten Continent” worthy only of our second-best efforts. A 2004 advisory panel of African experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives identified five factors that have shaped increased U.S. interest in Africa in the past decade: HIV/AIDS, oil, global trade, armed conflicts, and terror. According to the panel, these factors led to a “conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa.”

The March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) documents this dramatic change in U.S. policy:

Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration. It is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.

The United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.

Overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, not paternalism. Our strategy is to promote economic development and the expansion of effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges. We are committed to
working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and the regional capacity of the AU to support post-conflict transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, and improve peacekeeping and disaster responses.\textsuperscript{11}

As noted by Dr. Steven Metz of the United States Army War College (USAWC), the United States seeks an Africa where Americans can conduct business and cooperate in resolving shared problems, but where the need for direct U.S. military involvement is minimal. For years, the U.S. has provided strong support for humanitarian relief efforts and promotion of U.S. values of respect for human liberties, transparent democratic societies, and open global markets. The U.S. must pursue the objectives highlighted in the 2006 NSS with particular emphasis on working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and the regional capacity of the AU to support post-conflict transformations, to consolidate democratic transitions, and to improve peacekeeping and disaster responses.

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer articulated the matter nicely in her testimony on Capital Hill (August 2007): “Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved, a continent of failed states, faltering economies, regional conflicts, and corrupt leadership. This image, though, is a far cry from the Africa of today. With the support of international partners, Africans are slowly but surely instituting democracy and good governance across the continent.”\textsuperscript{12}

In this context, the African militaries are typically a direct reflection of the “state of the state,” so weakness in the military is reflective of the status of the government. Most militaries are constrained by the budgets that support them. Under funded, the militaries are under-equipped, undermanned, and often untrained. The equipment that they do possess is often old and non-mission capable due to either a lack of trained
maintenance personnel or the inability to acquire/purchase parts. Of the 54 countries on the African Continent, only a few are capable of sustained, intense military operations: South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Angola, and Zimbabwe make up this small list of developed and matured militaries (by Western standards). The challenges facing the implementation of partnering initiatives to increase African military capacity building are immense. But great strides are underway, and opportunities to address the existing threats are limitless.

**Key Players in the African Partnering Initiative (API)**

Given the current condition of Africa’s economies and militaries, along with inherent instability, what is the best approach to secure U.S. interests? To answer this question, we must first look at the history of Africa, most of which had been colonized by Europeans. Colonization ended in 1994 when South Africa established majority rule for the first time. Africans believe that colonization was predominantly exploitative, leaving the region economically drained and marginalized. So Africans are now extremely skeptical about “offers of assistance” from European and other Western countries. Understanding this mindset of the African people is essential for establishing a strategy that seeks to achieve U.S. interests without being perceived as an intruder or resource-hungry power broker.

Although the U.S. has a number of bilateral initiatives with African countries, recent foreign policy actions have weakened U.S. influence in the international community, and among African leaders. The current and growing strategic import of Africa requires increased partnering with not only Africans but also with other international players.
The most notable international body capable of promoting legitimacy of action is the United Nations (UN). Another significant body that must be included in partnering discussions is the European Union (EU). Given Africa’s proximity to Europe and possible spillovers from African instability, Europe is keen to support peace and prosperity in Africa. Additionally, as the EU builds security institutions (European Security and Defense Policy-ESDP) and pursues global ambitions, it has sought to carve out a role for itself as a capacity building partner on security issues with Africa. To that end, the EU has leveraged its members’ post-colonial African relationships, particularly those of France and the UK. It has also provided significant funding for development to build relationships on the continent. As a result of these efforts, the EU and some of its key members (ironically also NATO members) are hesitant to concede any leverage or positioning they have already established in Africa to a NATO-centric organization (with its accompanying U.S. influence).\textsuperscript{13} However, some of our European allies, such as Great Britain, are experiencing difficulty in financing African capacity-building initiatives. In spite of this, EU leaders have proven their willingness to deploy troops to Africa in support of peacekeeping initiatives. A prime example of this is recent support to the Congo and Darfur. As a result, the AU has grown increasingly comfortable working with the UN and the EU, especially in coordination with the UN.\textsuperscript{14} Given these factors, the U.S. should propose an African Partnering Initiative (API), adapted from the model of the current NATO PfP.

If NATO’s partnership mechanisms are adapted to address the security challenges faced in Africa, it is logical to base the new program on the features of the NATO program which have been responsible for its success. It is equally important to maintain
situational awareness of the concerns of African leaders to insure that they provide
input and thus support the proposed initiatives and solutions. This being said, what must
be adapted from the European program, and what must be changed, deleted, or added
for successful implementation in Africa? The African Partnership Initiative (API) should
be designed to achieve the following goals:

- **Self-differentiation:** The same criteria of the European construct for self-
  differentiation is crucial. Each state must craft a partnership that meets both the
  needs and capabilities of the aspiring African country. Partnership activities
  should be in the mutual interest of allies and partners, undertaken in the spirit of
  joint ownership, and demand-driven. They should also build on existing
  structures and programs, add value to existing bilateral and multilateral
  programs, and avoid duplication.¹⁵

- **Open dialogue:** Dialogue has been a key component of any partnering success.
  First, open dialogue can prevent armed conflicts. Finally, it can end conflicts
  and contribute to post-conflict stability. It is imperative for the program to
  provide a forum for grievances and for dialogue to resolve outstanding issues.

- **Partnering with the AU and other African regional organizations:** The growing
  depth and reach of the African Union (AU) and various other African regional
  organizations demonstrates a renewed commitment to breaking free of the
  continent’s history of violence and poverty. The nascent African Standby Force,
  with its five Regional Economic Community (REC)-affiliated brigades, offers a
  promising instrument for achieving “African solutions to African problems” in the
  security realm.¹⁶ So, the API will work directly to support the sixth AU objective
(as noted in the May 2004, Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission): to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.

- **Engage international organizations (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO):** Reaching out to IOs and NGOs can facilitate relationships and partnerships and increase situational awareness prior to embarking on NATO and U.S. objectives. For example, the U.N. Development Program’s (UNDP) global knowledge network provides developmental capacity and policy support across every country in Africa in activities ranging from democratic governance and peace-building to private sector development and integration into world trade. These programs reflect the African countries’ own priorities and are carried out through a wide range of partnerships with government leaders, civil society, and the private sector.

- **Inclusiveness:** Previous experiences have led African leaders to believe that they are often treated as second-class soldiers. They are not afforded leadership roles with security partners; they are often viewed merely as a provider of forces with little influence regarding the deployment of the forces. In order to obtain and maintain the commitment of African leaders, they must be included in all aspects of planning and implementation. Also, as noted earlier, the EU should likewise be involved in order to ensure their support of the initiative.

- **Focused selectivity:** In order to maximize the chances for success of the API, it should focus initially on partnerships with a small number of more advanced
African militaries, such as South Africa, Senegal, Rwanda, Ghana, Angola, Ethiopia, and possibly Nigeria.

- Minimal cultural or value pre-conditions: Central and Eastern European nations were required to sign formal documents imposing a commitment to democratization and good governance for admission to NATO. The cultural and trust gap between most African countries and Western nations is simply too wide for such demands to be placed on African countries at this time. The countries of the region will choose different paths toward democracy and modernization, and they will move at different speeds. They will resent anything that appears condescending or culturally imperialistic. That being said, the partnership should demand a basic level of good governance that provides its citizens with protection from human rights violations and other oppressive conditions. Efforts to increase or influence cultural values will require collaboration and measured cultural sensitivity. Only after the API has taken root and started to mature and following a detailed analysis of the potential for success, should additional conditions be broached. If at all feasible, such issues will most likely be country-dependent: --that is, not applicable across the spectrum of partners.

- Coordination mechanism: One of the lessons learned from the PfP is the imperative to establish a coordinating mechanism which is responsible for centrally coordinating efforts, thereby ensuring synchronization of activities, resources and plans. In order to leverage cooperation and assure unity of effort, the coordination mechanism should include representatives from NATO,
the EU, the AU, and participating partner states. The physical location of this mechanism should be negotiated.

- Regional capacity building: A key objective is to help interested countries make their military forces more capable and interoperable with other peacekeeping forces, based on NATO, UN and/or API-proposed standards. Investments in these programs can yield a long-term payoff of enhanced African conflict management capabilities, increased stability, and an effective means to safeguard the growing number of U.S. national interests on the continent.

- Incremental training program: African leaders have expressed their desire for assistance in training staffs. More specifically, they have an urgent need for training in the areas of logistics management and planning, personnel management and planning, and joint staff planning. In fact, the AU headquarters has already received some staff training from the NATO Allied Joint Command Lisbon. Although the AU leaders welcome staff training, they are quite reluctant at this time to request operational advice and mentoring. Given the current high OPTEMPO of NATO and U.S. forces and the desires of African leaders, staff training, mobile training teams (MTTs) in Africa (similar to Joint Combined Exchange Training [JCET]), and attendance at U.S./NATO military professional institutions should be the primary focus of initial partnering initiatives. Once the API has begun to solidify and its structure takes form, other training opportunities can be introduced.

Efforts to complement rather than supplant indigenous initiatives may not only help to avoid the impression of neo-colonialism but may also prove important in helping the
United States to compete with China and other countries for access to African resources and influence in the region. Partnering with African countries via the AU (under the API), arguably, is the best way to gain and maintain legitimacy, and then to leverage the proven successes of the NATO PfP program.

**African Peace and Security Architecture**

As discussed earlier, in order for the API to take root and be accepted and adopted by African leaders, the initiatives should include African organizations and leverage their capabilities and current assets. Hence, it is not only prudent, but necessary, to review and join collaboratively with the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture. At the heart of Africa’s attempts to assume responsibility for its collective security is the African Union (AU). The AU consists of 53 participating countries (all nations of the African continent except Morocco). The AU Peace and Security Architecture is modeled after the European Archetype; it relies on a Peace and Security Council (PSC) as its standing decision-making organ. The architecture includes “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” An African Standby Force (ASF) and Panel of the Wise (PW) respond to crises (see figure 2). Using this architecture, the API will link partnering initiatives to the goals of AU leaders. The PSC, the ASF, and the PW should be thoroughly integrated into the API.
Perhaps one of the most promising features of the architecture is its multi-layered and symbiotic approach to security cooperation. The continental security plan relies on tiered regional security mechanisms. Regional security plans and capabilities serve collectively to contribute to an overarching continental plan, while maintaining regional autonomy. This allows the Peace and Security Council to capitalize on regional strengths and rely on established capabilities of the more highly developed militaries of Africa (e.g. South Africa). Under this system of decentralized collective security, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the regional organizations, while the AU serves as the clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives, thereby filling the conceptual and institutional gap between global organization (the United Nations) and regional organization.22

The African Standby Force (ASF) is a critical feature of the African security architecture. At the center of the AU’s Peace and Security Structure, the ASF can be directed by the Peace and Security Council to intervene in conflict areas. The ASF’s
conflict management approach and capabilities are quite similar to NATO’s Response Force and the EU Battle Groups. In current plans, each of Africa’s five regions (North, East, South, West, and Central) will set up a brigade of about 3,000-5,000 troops, thereby providing the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15,000-25,000 troops trained and equipped according to common standards and operating to common doctrine. The development and implementation of the ASF provides two specific advantages: First, it is rooted in an overarching security framework; second, the decentralized structure of the ASF uses the regional organizations’ military and institutional capabilities rather than attempting to supplant or duplicate them. These promising characteristics of the ASF, as well as the ensuing institutional prospects for a continental peace and security architecture, provide the context for NATO/EU (and U.S.) military capacity building for peace operations in Africa today.

Current U.S. military capacity building in Western Africa takes two forms: bilateral capacity building through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, and multilateral capacity building through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). ACOTA trains military trainers and equips African national militaries to conduct peace support operations and provide humanitarian relief.

On the bilateral level, the program aims at enhancing the individual partner’s peace operations capabilities. On the multilateral level, the United States aims to enhance the regions’ collective capacity for peace operations. Building on years of experience in developing institutional capacities to field more efficient and well-led peacekeeping units through the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, GPOI provides multi-national training in common peacekeeping doctrine, supports the
development of regional headquarters and enhances command and control interoperability at the battalion and higher levels. GPOI’s development offers a framework and direction proposed in the API. By supporting the development of strong planning and organizational units (both military and civilian), along with transportation and logistics support arrangements (TLSA) designed to address the current gap in Africa’s deployment and logistics capacity, GPOI directly supports establishment of the ASF and its regional brigades. Executed concurrently, existing U.S. bilateral initiatives, along with the integration of current U.S. multilateral initiatives and the proposed African Partnering Initiative (API), will further persuade the European and African leaders to accept strengthening African militaries to enhance sustainable African peace and security operations.

**Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)**

Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. Theater security cooperation is part of the combatant commander’s theater strategy to link military activities of other countries to support U.S. national strategic objectives. Rear Admiral Tallent of EUCOM, testifying before a House International Relations Committee, supported this concept: “Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs are the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and stability by building and strengthening relationships with our allies and regional partners.” He went on to testify that “Well trained, disciplined, allied and friendly forces reduce the conditions that lead to conflict, prepare the way for warfighting success, and ultimately mitigate the burden on U.S. forces, and they lay the foundations for future “coalitions of the willing” to assist in extending our country’s security perimeter.”
The names of current theater security cooperation initiatives in Africa are a veritable alphabet soup. To mention a few, the U.S. currently has the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI-subsuming the previous African Crisis Response Initiative-ACRI), the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA), the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), and the State Partnership Program (SPP).

In 2004, DoD created a multinational forum, the Africa Clearinghouse, to aid in managing these initiatives. The Africa Clearinghouse, modeled after EUCOM Clearinghouses for Southeast Europe and the South Caucasus, provides a venue for the United States to coordinate its actions with other nations involved in security cooperation in Africa to effectively allocate limited resources, synchronize security assistance, and avoid duplication of efforts. In 2004, a Rand Corporation study, “U.S. Army Security Cooperation: Toward Improved Planning and Management,” provided a comprehensive analysis of all Army TSC funding. It reveals inefficiencies resulting from the various incentive systems. Establishment of a combatant command dedicated to the continent provides an excellent opportunity to review these divergent TSC initiatives and align many of them within the proposed API framework.

Role of AFRICOM

Given the increasing strategic significance of Africa, U.S. policy toward the region is changing. U.S. security programs and regional initiatives in Africa should be carefully managed. We need dedicated leadership, synchronization of efforts, and unity of command. Competing requirements and global nature of the threats to U.S. and NATO interests have led to the creation of a unified combatant command focused on the
African Continent. On 1 October 2007, President Bush announced the launching of Africa Command (AFRICOM), now the sole command responsible for 53 of the 54 countries on the continent. Egypt, because of its traditional relationship with the Central Command (CENTCOM) region, will remain under the CENTCOM umbrella of responsibility. President Bush emphasized that this new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and helps to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. AFRICOM will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.\textsuperscript{28}

Intended to function differently than traditional unified combatant commands, AFRICOM will place capacity building in Africa at the center of its mandate. By integrating interagency contributions from the onset, AFRICOM will focus on war prevention rather than warfighting. AFRICOM will better enable the Department of Defense and other agencies of the U.S. government to work in concert and with partners to achieve a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place.\textsuperscript{29} AFRICOM will work with African states and regional organizations to:

- Build partnership capacity;
- Support USG agencies in implementing security policies;
- Conduct Theater Security Cooperation activities;
- Increase partner counter-terrorism skills;
- Enhance humanitarian assistance, disaster mitigation, and response activities;
- Foster respect for human rights;
- Support African regional organizations; and
• As directed, conduct military operations.\textsuperscript{30}

Designed to facilitate interagency coordination and cooperation, AFRICOM has a unique opportunity to support members of the API in their cooperative endeavors, thereby synchronizing and leveraging its existing TSCP resources. Reciprocally, the API program will help ensure the successful achievement of AFRICOM’s goals.

Conclusion

Historically, America’s interest in Africa has been limited. The African continent was given scant strategic value, and for years U.S. relations in Africa lingered merely as an afterthought when developing a national security policy. However, in the March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, the continent took on a new and heightened significance. U.S. leaders now recognize that Africa will continue to play an ever-increasing role in meeting our demands for natural resources. They also acknowledge that stability remains elusive in Africa, which has suffered from deprivation and separation from the rest of the world. Fraught with violence unleashed by unstable governments and the onset of globalization, the continent has become increasingly appealing to those seeking to carry out acts of terrorism and wield power over the poor and weak. Along with the need to secure U.S. interests in the region is the need for America to build strong international partnerships in order to bolster U.S. influence and credibility in the world. It is in U.S. interests to assist the international community in creating a stable and secure Africa.

Emerging and often unstable governments existed in Central and Eastern Europe in the mid-1990s. The Partnership for Peace program was launched in January 1994 in order to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. The PfP has truly been a
demonstrated triumph of cooperative and collaborative partnering with these European countries. Since its inception, a total of thirty-three nations have participated in the PfP. This proven record of building stability and security in relatively weak, divided, and unstable nations is one that should be emulated as we seek to engage on the African continent.

If a decision is reached to move forward with an African Partnership Initiative, there are a number of imperatives that should be included in the API framework. Some of these imperatives include: self-differentiation, open dialogue, partnering with the AU and other African regional organizations, inclusiveness, focused selectivity, and a focus on regional capacity building. Careful consideration of these imperatives will greatly enhance the chances for a successful API.

African leaders have proven that they are seriously addressing the security and stability situation on their continent. By establishing the African Peace and Security Architecture, which is based on the European Union model, they have demonstrated that they are capable of formulating “African solutions to African problems.” African militaries have successfully participated in peacekeeping exercises, and African leaders are seeking continued opportunities for self-actualization. Likewise, they have voiced support for partnering through international organizations, such as NATO, the UN, and the EU, as well their own AU. These factors alone strongly strengthen the case for a partner-based solution among NATO, the EU, the AU, the UN, and select African partners.

The U.S. has demonstrated its interest in the African continent by establishing a new combatant command, AFRICOM, focused solely on this continent. The U.S. also
has recognized the need for AFRICOM to be designed to foster interagency coordination and collaboration. The U.S. cannot “go it alone” in Africa. In spite of its many bilateral agreements with African countries, the AFRICOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan should be carefully integrated into this new African Partnering Initiative (API). Otherwise, AFRICOM may be perceived as a U.S. initiative to militarize the continent.

Paramount to acceptance of the API is a clear understanding of concerns of both the Europeans and African leaders. The imperatives discussed throughout this paper will require dialogue that focuses on the collective and shared advantages for all participants in such an initiative. As long as the API focuses on the greater goals of capacity building, and supporting regional stability and security, and as long as it is based on helping Africans to maintain their autonomy, the program could pave the way for a stable, secure Africa. Measurements of the API’s success will be different from the PfP in that the “alliance building” is not NATO-centric; it is multilayered and regionally based in Africa. The promise of this proposed program leaves us not only optimistic about the future of the African continent; it also strengthens the feasibility of achieving U.S. interests in this new “continent of strategic significance.”

Endnotes


3 U.S. General Accounting Office, 3.

5 U.S. General Accounting Office, 12.

6 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


18 Carland.

19 Carland.

21 For further explanation of the remaining facets of the African Peace and Security Architecture, see Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


30 DefenseLink, 6.