A CENTURY IN RESERVE AND BEYOND

BY

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
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USAWC CLASS OF 2008

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
### 1. REPORT DATE
15 MAR 2008

### 2. REPORT TYPE
Strategy Research Project

### 3. DATES COVERED
00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008

### 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
A Century in Reserve and Beyond

### 6. AUTHOR(S)
James Monagle

### 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220

### 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

### 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

### 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

### 14. ABSTRACT
See attached

### 15. SUBJECT TERMS

### 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
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### 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Same as Report (SAR)

### 18. NUMBER OF PAGES
30

### 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prepared by ANSI Std Z39-18
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A CENTURY IN RESERVE AND BEYOND

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel James P. Monagle
TITLE: A Century in Reserve and Beyond
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 10 April 2008 WORD COUNT: 5,882 PAGES: 29
KEY TERMS: USAR, ARFORGEN, Strategy Reserve, Readiness
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Tracing the concept of the reserve from the early days of the nation, from the Constitutional debates of the 18th and 19th centuries, and from the legislation leading to the establishment of the Army Reserve, this Strategy Research Project (SRP) describes the role of the Army Reserve from its beginning as a reserve corps of medical doctors to that of a strategic reserve force, and then to its current operational role. It briefly discusses some of the implications of this evolution on current readiness. Finally, this SRP envisions a future of the Army Reserve to include its role as a strategic reserve in addition to the operational role it is currently fulfilling.
A CENTURY IN RESERVE AND BEYOND

On 23 April 1908 Congress passed legislation creating a reserve corps of medical officers.¹ Over the past century that initial cadre of physicians has evolved into a mission critical operational force employing over 190,000 Soldiers in support of domestic and expeditionary operations. Today the Army Reserve is part of the operational force, best described in the current vision for the Army Reserve:

The Army Reserve is a community-based federal operational force of skill-rich warrior-citizens providing complementary capabilities for joint expeditionary and domestic operations.²

Its role as an operational force places new demands on the Army Reserve, its Soldiers, Families, employers, and the defense budget. How did this evolution take place? The recent final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve asserts the reserve component assumed its operational posture without the benefit of a national debate, a decision they find is not sustainable over time.³ More importantly, by transforming the Army Reserve into an operational force, the Army is left without a strategic reserve, a supplementary force to address a national emergency that is beyond the scope of the existing force structure.⁴

This Strategy Research Project (SRP) explores this evolution. By tracing the concept of the reserve from the early days of the Republic, from the Constitutional debates of the 18th and 19th centuries, and from the legislation leading to the establishment of the Army Reserve, it describes the role of the Army Reserve from its beginning as a reserve corps of medical doctors to that of a strategic reserve force, and then to its current operational role. It briefly discusses some of the implications of this evolution on current readiness. Finally, this SRP envisions a future of the Army Reserve
to include its role as a strategic reserve in addition to the operational role it is currently fulfilling.

This SRP does not take a position on whether the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard should coexist, or should be combined into a single organization. That debate has continued since the beginnings of the republic; it has been settled by Congress in favor of the current structure. So this SRP addresses this issue only to clarify how the Army Reserve developed.

The concept of a federally controlled reserve force for the United States of America was introduced in a 1783 document by George Washington which stressed the need for a small standing army and a well organized and federally regulated national militia. Washington clearly advised that the militia must be uniformly organized, well-disciplined, and responsive to the country as a whole. His proposal was rejected. We should recall that our founding fathers favored a weak central government with power distributed among the various states and their militias. When the Continental Congress disbanded the Continental Army in June 1784, only eighty officers and men were retained. Control of the militias then reverted directly to the states.

Shortly following his inauguration, President Washington, with the aid of his Secretary of War, Henry Knox, again submitted his proposals to Congress in 1790. This plan was eventually replaced with a weaker version, the Militia Act of 1972, in which Congress established the nation’s reliance on the independent state-controlled militias with no federal oversight as the nation’s permanent military policy.

In June 1812, when the United States went to war with the British, the United States depended upon the militia for its defense. The response to a call-up of the militia
was mixed, as some states failed to comply and others restricted their forces to defense of the homeland. While there were instances of exceptional performance, the overall performance of the militia reflected poorly on the institutional policies and politics of the system. In the aftermath of the war Secretary of War John C. Calhoun suggested the “Expansible Army Plan”, which proposed for a professional force of 6,000 in peacetime that would serve as a cadre for rapid expansion to double or triple that strength in war. The standing force would be composed of half-strength units with full complements of officers. In times of crisis, these units would be filled by individual volunteers and draftees. This plan was also rejected because it placed too much power in the hands of the federal government. Since reform of the militia system seemed to be futile, the nation had little choice but to rely on it and whatever standing army the Congress was willing to fund.

For the remainder of the 19th century—a period that included the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish American War, and numerous Indian Wars—the nation generally overlooked the militia, relying instead on the use of volunteer Soldiers and units for fighting its wars. There were four basic reasons the nation took this approach. First, by law militia Soldiers were required to serve actively under federal control no more than ninety days per year. Legal challenges to the use of militia outside the boundaries of the nation further limited the availability of the militia. Militia troops generally lacked standardized, interchangeable basic equipment, training, and discipline, since the Constitutional granted full authority to the states for military requirements, with no provision for federal oversight. Finally, the militia lacked properly trained officers, which resulted in the perception among the Army’s senior leaders that there was, “a
social-club atmosphere prevailing in so many of its units [that] would render it worthless as a ready reserve".  

However, a nineteenth century military reformer named Brig Gen Emory Upton contended that the nation’s continued dependence on the militia could lead to national disaster. He thus proposed federal support of a skeleton army, similar to Calhoun’s expansible army proposal, and a federally controlled militia, similar to Washington’s and Knox’s proposals. But Upton’s proposals went nowhere until after the Spanish American War, during which weaknesses in America’s military system were glaringly exposed.  

Strongly influenced by Upton’s work, President Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Elihu Root, worked with Congressman Charles W. Dick to strengthen the militia—renamed the National Guard—into a standardized force with federal funding and oversight, but one that retained its state functions. Passed on 21 January 1903, the Dick Act was a vast improvement over the Militia Act of 1792 which it replaced. The bill also provided for a pool of potential officers eligible for service in any future volunteer force, a provision that opened the door for the creation of the Army Reserve.  

The Spanish American War likewise revealed that the Army Medical Department had wartime shortages of medical professionals. So Root proposed establishing a small corps of physicians who could be called upon in time of need. This initiative served as the genesis from which the federally controlled Medical Reserve Corps was established by Senate Bill 1424, on 23 April 1908. This date was subsequently designated the official birthday of the U.S. Army Reserve. Following passage of this act, the term “Reserve Officer” first appeared in official Army language.
By 1916, the character of the debate on the organization of the Army had changed. Prompted by events along the Mexican border and the war in Europe, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916. Among its provisions was the establishment of the Officers Reserve Corps (ORC), the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The 1916 legislation also contained a training camp provision based on earlier experiments championed by Maj Gen Leonard Wood. This provision authorized 16,000 civilians to participate in military training at Plattsburg, N.Y. during the summer of 1916.18

When the nation entered World War I (WW I) in April 1917, the provisions to build the Army contained in the National Defense Act of 1916 were enacted too late to have much effect. In all, the Army Reserve provided approximately 80,000 enlisted and 89,476 officers to America’s war effort. Most of the enlisted Soldiers had no prior military training, and most of the officers were graduates of ninety-day Officer Training Camps.19

Following WW I, under pressure to reduce defense spending, Congress enacted the National Defense Act of 1920. Among the provisions drafted by Col John McAuley Palmer, this legislation reorganized the Army into the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. The Organized Reserve between the World Wars was essentially limited to the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC). With an initial influx of officers who served in WW I, it grew and sustained its ranks with officers from the ROTC and Citizens Military Training Camp (CMTC) programs, which were based on the model from the Plattsburg camps. Organized into divisions, these officers formed the cadre for additional combat units that would be formed during a large scale war.
Members of the ORC were not paid for participating in drills, as training opportunities were rare. Attrition rates were higher than expected.  

One of the most valuable leadership training programs for the ORC during the years leading to our involvement in WW II was the Army’s task of administering the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps, from 1933 through 1939. Over 30,000 members of the ORC participated in organizing and commanding these camps, an experience that tested and developed essential leadership skills. This program engaged ORC members and enhanced retention rates, especially since it offered employment opportunities during the Depression years.

The other significant event that affected the Army Reserve during this period was the establishment of the Executive of Reserve Affairs, the antecedent of today’s Chief of the Army Reserve. Established by Gen John Pershing, this position provided a general officer with full-time responsibility to monitor the interest of Reservists and offer counsel on these matters to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

When World War II (WW II) erupted in 1939, the strength of the Regular Army was increased, and officers had to be found. The only available pool of trained officers was the ORC, which had 104,228 officers eligible for active duty—not nearly enough to meet the Army’s needs. By the end of 1941, with subsequent increases in strength, over 80,000 ORC officers were serving on active duty. Later that year, when 26 Organized Reserve divisions were ordered to active duty, they were led by only a few of the Reserve officers originally assigned to them. In reality, they were no longer Reserve divisions.
Following WW II, the Soviet Union emerged as a threat to world peace and stability. Concerned about the prohibitive cost of maintaining a large standing Army during the Cold War with the Soviets, the nation came to rely more heavily on the Reserve Components to ensure national security. The Soviet threat played an important part in the decision not to mobilize many Army Reserve units during the Korean War, although over 240,000 individual Reservists were individually mobilized.25

To rectify some of the problems experienced during the Korean War, Secretary of Defense George Marshall implemented several actions, including the establishment of a new recall policy. This policy aligned each service’s reserves into: a Selected Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve—combined they comprise the Ready Reserve. This new organization, with a new official name—The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)—was codified in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.26

But this was not the final reorganization of the Army Reserve during the Cold War. When a 1965 proposed merger of USAR units into the National Guard was soundly rejected by Congress, the Army Reserve was restructured in 1967. This new organization created 16 geographic Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs), and realigned forces so that the assigned USAR units primarily had combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles27. In separate legislation, the position of Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) was created to advise the Chief of Staff on Army Reserve matters.28 This structure would remain until the early 1990s, when the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) was established and 10 Regional Support Commands (RSCs) replaced the ARCOMs.29 Subsequently, the RSCs would reorganize as
Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) and assume additional responsibilities for training and readiness.

Ironically, President Johnson’s decision to mobilize only a limited number of reserve units during the Vietnam War also contributed to the expanded role of today’s reserves. As a consequence of this decision, the ensuing Total Force Policy assigned reserve units significant “round-out” roles in support of active Army units, thereby facilitating maintenance of a smaller all-volunteer active Army. Although the primary purpose of the Total Force Policy was to achieve the maximum combat power for the funding available, Army Chief of Staff Gen Creighton Abrams allegedly placed certain essential military capabilities exclusively in the Army Reserve and National Guard to assure that the Army would never again be called upon to fight without mobilizing the reserves—this would become known as the “Abram’s Doctrine.”

With the implementation of the Total Force Policy, the Army Reserve began a long process of transforming, from a purely strategic force that would be called upon only during a major crisis to one that was more of an operational reserve. Almost any conflict would require their participation, both as individuals and units. Increased emphasis was placed on training and readiness, and closer relationships were developed through programs like CAPSTONE, which formalized training affiliations between active component headquarters and Army Reserve units. Under a strict training policy, units were required to increase their level of mission-related training and field exercises, while reducing emphasis on administrative tasks that were devouring available training time. Continued pressure from active component commanders and evaluators helped the
Army Reserve significantly increased unit and individual readiness during the 1970s and 1980s.\(^{32}\)

Throughout this period the Army Reserve participated in numerous overseas training and operational missions, including combat operations in Grenada and Panama. However, the Army Reserve’s ability to support the Army in combat was not put to the test until Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Operation DESERT SHEILD/DESERT STORM proved that the reserves, particularly the Army Reserve, were ready for their role as a partner in the Total Force. More than 88,000\(^{33}\) Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized and deployed, some deploying before active forces. They proved ready and able to perform their missions.\(^{34}\)

Following the Gulf War, the operational tempo for the Army Reserve continued to increase. Reserve units constantly deployed in small numbers to places like: Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. However, something had changed. The Reserve was no longer deployed only during crisis, they were routinely deployed. But they were not yet fully integrated into the operational force. They were still primarily a strategic reserve operating at an increased tempo.

Since 11 September 2001, the Army Reserve has evolved from a strategic reserve into a complementary component of the operational Army. It is no longer a back-up force called only to meet the needs of a major conflict—the so-called “big war.”\(^{35}\) This change was driven by necessity, a necessity created some thirty years prior with the adoption of the Total Force Policy. The decision concentrated critical combat support and combat service support assets into the Army Reserve, which now has approximately 54 percent of the Army’s combat service support structure.\(^{36}\) Since
September 2001, over 188,000 USAR Soldiers have been mobilized, with 12 percent of the Selected Reserve force mobilized and deployed at all times. In their final report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves found that, “it is clear that no feasible alternative to a continued reliance on the reserves exists.”

This transition from a strategic reserve to an operational force was unplanned. The Army Reserve was designed for infrequent use. Traditionally, the Army Reserve was granted months to prepare once mobilized—to fill vacant positions, to train, to upgrade equipment—then deploy. This is no longer the case. This change transpired with little public debate or Congressional authorization. In the words of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, “The notion of an operational reserve occurred almost by default, in response to the current and projected need for forces greater than were available from the active component.” Unlike during the first century of the nation’s history the reserve forces, both Army Reserve and National Guard, have proven to be competent, capable forces that are ready and relevant to the nation’s security.

To correct current issues resulting from this unplanned change and to provide ready and relevant forces on a sustained basis during persistent conflict, implementing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is essential. In his 2007 Posture Statement, Lt Gen Stultz emphasized that implementation of ARFORGEN may take up to five years, but the model will eventually provide stability and predictability for Army Reserve forces. Then Reserve forces will deploy only one year out of every five. To achieve this reasonable ratio, structural changes, increased personnel, new kinds of training, new equipment, and appropriate policies will be needed.
As the Reserve mission has evolved, the need for structural change has become more evident. The Army Reserve forces of 11 September 2001 were generally configured and aligned under the strategic reserve paradigm of the Cold War. The Army Reserve has since undertaken its most comprehensive restructuring since the period immediately following World War II to optimize the contributions it can make to the overall effort. Non-deploying force structure, primarily command and control over-structure, and low demand forces are being converted into more relevant forces in demand. As a result of this transformation these forces—and the skills they represent—are becoming more accessible and more readily deployable, thereby enhancing our ability to meet current and future needs.\textsuperscript{41}

Similarly, the luxury of taking months to train following mobilization no longer exists. At the onset of recent operations, some Army Reserve units have been required to deploy with the first elements.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the twelve-month mobilization limit imposed by the January 2007 Department of Defense mobilization policy allows minimal time for post-mobilization training. This policy establishes a goal of no more than 30 to 60 days of post mobilization training.\textsuperscript{43} To ensure units are ready when called upon, the Army Reserve is changing its approach to training from one of Alert-Mobilize-Train-Deploy to one of Train-Alert-Deploy.\textsuperscript{44} With increased training tempo in the year prior to mobilization units will incorporate collective events, warfighting skills, and theater-specific training requirements—training formerly provided at the mobilization station—into pre-mobilization training.\textsuperscript{45} This requires thorough individual readiness to be developed in the first years of the training cycle, with the goal of providing a full array of capable ready units available when needed.\textsuperscript{46}
To meet more stringent deployment criteria, the Army Reserve has extensively cross-leveled Soldiers and equipment from units that were not identified for call-up. At the time of the Chief of the Army Reserve’s 2005 annual report to Congress on the posture of the Army Reserve, approximately thirty-five percent of the personnel in deploying units were provided through cross-leveling. Reserve leaders have managed readiness so that adequate forces are available for immediate use, and that sufficient personnel are available to fill the donating unit (also called the donor unit) when it is selected for subsequent deployment. Of course, many of the donor units were already short of personnel, so the effects of cross-leveling had a severe cumulative effect.\textsuperscript{47}

Current mobilization policy allows Reserve Soldiers to be mobilized for no more than twelve consecutive months; it also authorizes subsequent involuntary mobilizations. This policy, along with on-going transformation actions, has provided significant relief from the effects of cross-leveling, but has not resolved the issue altogether.\textsuperscript{48} In addition, increases in Army Reserve troop unit strength from 187,331 in 2005\textsuperscript{49} to over 192,000 in 2008,\textsuperscript{50} and increased availability of operational forces due to transformation actions are providing some relief. This growth must continue until the authorized manning level of 205,000 personnel is achieved. To accomplish this, the Army Reserve must continue to exceed recruiting and retention rates, which means robust funding for recruiting and retention bonuses, along with continuation of other current incentives. But as Lt Gen Stultz pointed out in recent testimony to the House Appropriations Committee, we have not yet fully implemented the ARFORGEN process, which will provide a predictable cycle of four years for training and one year deployed.\textsuperscript{51}
A particular area of concern is the on-going shortage of mid-level officers. Redressing this shortfall is critical to sustaining relevant and ready units, because these officers fill essential leadership and staff positions. This shortage is greatest among captains, with only fifty-nine percent on-hand, but it is also critical among majors, with only seventy-two percent available. To reverse this trend, increased emphasis on recruiting officers is required, including more attractive incentive programs to encourage officers leaving active duty to join Army Reserve units. Reversing this trend will take time, especially in view of current and projected shortages in the Army Active Component.

Equipment shortages also plague the Army Reserve. As an operational force, the Army Reserve can no longer afford to be equipped below authorized levels, or with outdated equipment. To contribute effectively to current operations, Reserve Soldiers must be able to train with the same equipment they will use during operations. But the Army Reserve is short approximately $10.8 billion in equipment. This shortage is exacerbated by the impact of increased operating tempo and requirements for returning units to leave equipment in theater. As with personnel, we cannot expect a quick fix, despite increased funding levels for this purpose. To compensate for these shortages, the Army Reserve has developed a bridging strategy to concentrate equipment at selected sites to optimize availability for training opportunities as units progress through the training cycle. Units will maintain minimal equipment at home station to support required training, but collective training events will be supported by concentrations of equipment at major training sites. An additional benefit of this strategy is the reduced
transportation costs gained by not shipping as much equipment; freeing funding that can be reprogrammed to meet other priorities.\textsuperscript{56}

To successfully implement ARFORGEN, the Army Reserve must continue to receive programmed equipment and funding to procure additional equipment to fill shortages. Additional equipment is needed as units are converted and as structure grows. But eventually all units should be equipped to 100 percent of authorized levels. Finally, funding increases are required to sustain equipment readiness as operating tempo steadily increases.\textsuperscript{57} Availability of equipment is critical to the Army Reserve’s mission as the Title 10 first responder to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in the event of a domestic emergency. Having critical operational equipment on-hand is essential to a relevant and ready Army Reserve. Only predictable and sustained funding levels can assure that the Army Reserve remains fully equipped.\textsuperscript{58}

The Army Reserve is performing its role as an operational force out of necessity. At the same time, it is transforming from its Cold War structure in order to efficiently sustain a force that is ready and relevant during persistent conflicts. Uncertainty is taking its toll on Reserve Soldiers, their Families, and employers—threatening readiness. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve,\textsuperscript{59} and the Chief of the Army Reserve\textsuperscript{60} have acknowledged the people problem and proposed workable solutions. In the meantime, the Citizen Soldiers of the Army Reserve are doing what it takes to get the job done and to support the Army in the persistent conflict, and to meet future Army needs.

The final report the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves acknowledges the Army Reserve’s expanded role: “The range of threats posed to
national security in the current strategic environment and the uncertain outcome of this period of global change point to the need to use the reserve components in the future as an operational force, while preserving their strategic capability to respond to future challenges.\textsuperscript{61} This was indeed the intent of the framers of our Constitution, as described by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 8. Hamilton declared that citizen-Soldiers would serve as the bastion of the nation’s defense and security in order to avoid an increase in the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature.\textsuperscript{62} With this in mind, it is clear that using these forces in ongoing operations, in addition to the necessity cited above, is appropriate to their purpose under the Constitution. Once the Army Reserve has completed the transition to serving as an operational force, we need then to focus on what we have given up to become an integral part of the operational Army—the strategic reserve.

In her testimony to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Christine Wormuth, a well-known defense analyst, pointed out that reliance on the National Guard and Reserves in their operational role is likely to remain high, with emphasis on things like DSCA and homeland defense, in addition to continued support for contingency operations. She cautiously mentioned of, “unforeseen events that might happen overseas that might require U.S. action.”\textsuperscript{63} It is these “unforeseen events” that dramatize the need for a strategic reserve. In fact, one study asserts that, “The \textit{raison d’être} of a strategic reserve is to have some extra combat power available if our planning assumptions turn out to be wrong and something unanticipated happens.”\textsuperscript{64} Although the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) did not address the need for a strategic reserve, the Army deemed it appropriate to include the requirement in the
2009 Total Army Analysis (TAA09); finding our current reserve “substantially under-supported.” \(^{65}\) Likewise, the 2006 QDR lacks guidance on establishing a strategic reserve, and TAA13 did not consider a requirement for a strategic reserve. \(^{66}\) But the QDR clearly identifies China as our greatest potential threat, making note of a potential threat from Russia as well. \(^{67}\) It then goes on to affirm, “the importance of maintaining capabilities and forces to wage multiple capabilities in an overlapping time frame—for which there may be little or no warning of attack.” \(^{68}\)

So the question becomes how can we meet the needs of at least one, and possibly two major conventional campaigns while engaged in persistent conflict, while our reserve forces are fully engaged in operational missions? First of all, we must acknowledge that our forces, while heavily engaged under the terms of the current Partial Mobilization, maintain considerable capacity in the event of a national crisis that would result in full mobilization. All Selected Reserve members who are not actively engaged are available. Assuming a steady state of 35,000 Soldiers deploying annually \(^{69}\) and using the anticipated fiscal year 2013 force structure, approximately 115,500 Soldiers remain available in the Army Reserve operating force. \(^{70}\) Likewise, the National Guard will normally have a percentage of its 305,000 \(^{71}\) Soldier operating force that is not deployed—making approximately 250,000 Soldiers and 23 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) available. Assuming a continued 23 BCT rotational demand, 19 of the Active Army’s 48 BCTs and a similar percentage of their manpower provides an available force of 140,500 Soldiers including 29 available BCTs. \(^{72}\) In total, that provides an available force pool of 52 BCTs without reducing ongoing operations—or an equivalent of between 13 and 16 divisions, a portion of which will be required for homeland defense
and DSCA mission requirements. Others will require reset as part of the ARFORGEN process. But the operating force is fully committed, leaving only two options for personnel with prior military training: either reduce the commitment to ongoing operations, or use the 860,500\textsuperscript{73} in the Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR), Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve to expand the force above existing levels. Of course, by this stage our challenged nation would have mounted a full mobilization and reinstituted the draft, so the first of these new Soldiers would arrive in their units about six months later.

While continuing ongoing operations, if North Korea invades South Korea, the existing force may be all we need. So we may not need to expand the force to respond to a Korean crisis. After all, the South Korean Army is a capable force, and other allies would probably join the fight. But what if something bigger happens and the existing force is insufficient? How do we expand the force? Something on the scale of World War II could also be possible. We needed 89 American Divisions to win that conflict.

Consider this 2016 scenario. Russian and Chinese assertiveness has continued to develop over the past seven years. Through intense diplomatic efforts, including international engagements, we have been able to ward off any overt belligerence on their part. During this time they have used the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to develop a close military relationship. Early in September, our intelligence agencies observe signs of military mobilization along the Kazakhstan-Russian border. At the same time, forces and supplies are being massed in eastern China. Military activity is also increasing in North Korea and in eastern Iran. Serbian rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo reemerge after years of relative quiet. All signs are pointing
toward massive military activity on the scale of World War II—not with a peer nation-state, but with a loose confederation of nations with a variety interests. Unless diplomatic solutions can be reached, major combat operations could start within six to nine months.

This scenario seems extreme. But in 1931 we felt the same way about the threat of the Axis Powers, which materialized eight years later. In 1931 we had an Army of just over 16,500 members, but by the end of World War II the Army consisted of eight-million men and over 89 divisions. Much of that expansion was possible because of an available officer corps and some enlisted personnel who had served in cadre units during the 1920s and 1930s. They were graduates of ROTC, the Plattsburg Camps and the CMTC programs. While privates can be drafted and trained in a matter of months, leaders take years to develop, and must be trained before they are needed. The Army Reserve provides a cost-effective means of providing that training, with reserve units estimated to cost only 23 percent of similar active component units.

In view of Army Reserve history, the evolution of the Army Reserve to its role in the Army’s current operational force, and the need for a strategic reserve to hedge against future uncertainty, consider the following proposed course of action to satisfy the nation’s current and future needs.

First, the existing Selected Reserve Troop Program Unit structure must continue on its path to provide a sustainable operational force, serving as a complementary partner with the National Guard and the Active Army. Renamed the Operational Reserve, and resourced accordingly, it integrally supports current and future operational missions on a predictable rotational basis through the full implementation of the
ARFORGEN process. During the reset-train and available years of this process, they should be resourced for an increased operating tempo of up to 66 unit training days per annum—72 Individual Duty for Training (IDT) periods and 30 days of Active Duty for Training (ADT). Additional individual training and support days may also be required for development of specialty skills and unit support functions. These units must be equipped with modernized equipment, which must be maintained at the highest level of readiness, so Soldiers can train with the same type equipment they use when they deploy. In addition to the increased resources required to support this structure, numerous policies and some laws must be changed to accomplish this transition. Most of these changes have already been forwarded to Congress by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and by the Chief of the Army Reserve. At considerable expense, the Army Reserve nonetheless offers a cost-effective alternative to placing the additional force structure in the active component, even at this increased level.

Secondly, a new category of the Select Reserve should be established. Designated the Strategic Reserve, it would consist of cadre units at the battalion and higher level. Staffed primarily by officers, with some key non-commissioned officers and a limited number of junior enlisted support personnel, the cadre would concentrate their training on battle staff procedures. The training model for these units would be limited to the traditional 39 day per annum training cycle—48 IDT periods and 14 days of ADT. They should make maximum use of remote simulation exercises to rehearse their planning. For their Active Duty Training, they would participate in a Warfighter type exercise—either as a stand-alone unit or on the staff of a National Guard or Active Army headquarters similar to their own unit. Strategic Reserve units would be provided with a
significantly reduced level of equipment as well. To conduct effective Active Duty Training, they would draw upon equipment sets maintained at centrally located storage sites. The Strategic Reserve would provide a capability to expand the force structure beyond the currently authorized force structure during times of national emergency. The Strategic Reserve would be available for activation only upon full mobilization.

This proposal does not consider finer details, such as the number and structure of Strategic Reserve units. During the period leading to World War II, that structure included 26 divisions, and the Army eventually expanded to 89 total divisions. These determinations can be made only subsequent to thorough analysis in the context of a specific crisis.

Since the nation’s immediate need is for an Army capable of sustaining the high tempo of current and projected future missions, the obvious priority in this context is the continued transition of the Army Reserve into a fully operational partner that provides skill-rich citizen-warriors who help maintain the connection between the Army and the communities of this nation. Once this immediate need is accomplished, we must move on to the next step—building a strategic reserve to respond to the unanticipated needs of the nation in this volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world.

Endnotes


3 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force: Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 31 January


8 Currie and Crossland, 7.

9 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 12-16.

10 Ibid., 17-18.


12 Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War, 2d ed. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1994), 42.

13 Ibid., 38-39.

14 Currie and Crossland, 13-14.

15 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 41.

16 Currie and Crossland, 14-17.

17 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 43.

18 Currie and Crossland, 28-29.

19 Ibid., 31.

20 Ibid., 33-42.

21 Ibid., 44-45.

22 Ibid., 35-36.
23 Ibid., 64.

24 Ibid., 67.


26 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, 82-83.

27 Currie and Crossland, 177.

28 Ibid., 182.

29 Ibid., 540-544.

30 Heller, 2.

31 Weitz, 13.

32 Curie and Crossland, 254-263.

33 Ibid., 370.

34 Heller, 3.

35 Weitz, 1.


38 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 51.

39 Ibid., 55.


42 Richard Weitz, 12. In 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed rebalancing to end the dependence no reserve mobilizations during the initial phase of any rapid military operation. See The Army currently identified 116,000 positions to rebalance before 2013, and completed rebalance actions of over 55,000 positions. See U.S. Department of the Army, *2007 Army*


45 Ibid.


47 Ibid., 8.


49 Helmly, 11.


51 Stultz, “Word form the Top: Lt Gen Stultz’ Opening Statement to the House Armed Services Committee”


53 Ibid. Also see Joseph E. Whitlock, How to Make Army Force Generation Work for the Army’s Reserve Components (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2006), 13.

54 Stultz, “The Army Reserve: No longer a Strategic Reserve”, 146. While only four percent of the Army Reserve’s equipment is retained in theater, this represents: one-third of their Heavy Equipment Transporters, 25 percent of their medium non-tactical tractors, and 15 percent of their HMMWVs. Equipment in future years has been programmed at $5.68 billion. The FY 2008 supplemental budget includes a $1.8 billion increase in National Guard and Army Reserve equipment.

56 Stultz, “The Army Reserve: No longer a Strategic Reserve”, 146.

57 Ibid.

58 Stultz, “Word form the Top: Lt Gen Stultz’ Opening Statement to the House Armed Services Committee”

59 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, passim.


61 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 61.


65 Ibid., 18.


70 Ibid., 29. The Army Reserve Operating force is 145,500 of its FY 2013 increased authorized strength of 206,000. Of the Remainder, 48,500 are designated as Generating Force, and 12,000 are programmed to be in the Trainee, Transient, Holding and Student force.

71 U.S. Department of the Army, “POM 08-13 Army Structure Message (ARSTRUC)”, 9 of 185. National Guard authorized strength is 350,000, with 305,000 in the operational force.
Ibid. Active Army FY2013 authorized strength is 482,000, with 355,000 in the operational force.

Lt Col Vincent Withehurst, “Army Reserve Strength: July 2007,” briefing slide, Arlington VA, Army Reserve G1, August 2007. Recent history tells us that approximately 20 percent of the members of the IRR qualified for reentry into the military in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, or about 15,800 of 79,000. Very few of the members of the 5,000 person Standby Reserve will be mobilized, even under Full Mobilization, because of their critical civilian positions. The Retired Reserve has approximately 776,700 members, categorized according to age and physical restrictions, but it is difficult to predict how many of this group would qualify for recall to duty.

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 410. Officer strength was capped at 17,726 and authorized enlisted strength was 150,000.

Ibid., 540.

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 67.

Currie and Crossland, 67.