Defense Contracting in Iraq:
Issues and Options for Congress

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Summary

This report will examine logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq primarily administered through the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP is an initiative to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations. It was established on December 6, 1985 with the publication of Army Regulation 700-137.

LOGCAP has been used in a variety of military contingency operations and provides for the awarding of contingency, or bridging contracts, or for the inclusion of contingency clauses in peacetime contracts. The Army’s Sustainment Command (ASC) has awarded contracts to three companies under LOGCAP IV. Media reports state that several companies not selected have filed protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). According to media reports, an ACS spokesperson reported that KBR’s current LOGCAP contract will be extended while the Army makes a decision.

There has been a substantial shift in the types of contracts for troop support services, the size of the contracts, and the apparent lack of effective management control over the administration of the contracts and the oversight of the contractors. Some observers have noted that costs-plus contracts have characteristics that can make oversight difficult. Others note that the very nature of the types of contracts employed in Iraq, combined with the challenges in contract administration, serve as major factors which make contract administration difficult. Given the size and scope of the contracts in Iraq, and the challenge of managing billions of DOD-appropriated dollars, many have suggested it appropriate to inquire whether these types of contracts can be managed better.

The second session of the 110th Congress may examine several bills (bills enacted into law and bills introduced during the first session of the 110th Congress) to ensure proper accountability and oversight in federal contracting, particularly for DOD contracts in Iraq. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181) contains provisions that focus on allegations and instances of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement in DOD contracts; require the Secretary of Defense to provide a plan for addressing skill shortfalls in the DOD acquisition workforce; provide for periodic, independent management review of DOD contracts; prohibit the awarding of no-bid contracts and non-competitive grants; and establish a commission on wartime contracting that would investigate contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another legislative initiative, the proposed Accountability in Government Contracting Act of 2007 (S. 680), would provide greater oversight and accountability for federal contracting. Also, Congress may examine the Gansler Commission report, which recommended operational and structural changes in Army contracting policies.

This report will be updated as warranted.
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Defense Contracting in Iraq: Issues and Options for Congress

Introduction

Purpose and Scope

This report will examine logistical support contracts for troop support services (also known as service contracts\(^1\)) in Iraq, primarily administered through a smaller program, the United States Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) and a larger program, the United States Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).\(^2\) This report will focus primarily on contracts involving Department of Defense (DOD) appropriated funds, although some projects involve a blending of funds from other agencies.\(^3\)

Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

The U.S. Air Force has a smaller contingency contracting support program for services in Iraq. The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) administers logistical support service contracts in Iraq. AFCAP is the largest contingency support contract awarded by the Air Force. AFCAP is an “umbrella” contract, similar to the U.S. Army’s LOGCAP. It was designed to provide an on-call capability for troop sustainment and support. The program was established in 1997 for a wide-range of non-combatant, civil engineering services during wartime, contingency operation, and humanitarian efforts. AFCAP provides for contractor support to relieve active duty and air reserve personnel in the areas of food service,

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\(^1\) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 37, Subpart 37.1 defines “service contracts” as contracts that directly engage the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.


lodging, carpentry, plumbing, electrical, mechanical, air conditioning, laundry plant operations, fire protection emergency management, project and program management.

Initially, AFCAP began as a five-year, $475 million program; now it is a 10-year, $10 billion program. AFCAP is managed by the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency at Tyndall Air Force Base and the Air Force Services Agency in San Antonio, Texas. The contract consists of administrative task orders awarded to six companies: Washington Group International, CH2M Hill Global Services, URS/Berger JV, Bechtel National, DynCorp International and Readiness Management Support. The AFCAP contractor maintains a core staff in theater to plan, organize, and acquire resources on an as-needed basis.4

**Logistics Civil Augmentation Program**

LOGCAP was established by the U.S. Army on December 6, 1985 with the publication of Army Regulation 700-137. LOGCAP is an initiative to manage the use of civilian contractors who perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations. The use of LOGCAP contracts augments combat support and combat service support to military forces.5

On October 1, 1996, LOGCAP management was transferred to the U.S. Army Material Command. In September 2006 the ASC was created to serve as the “logistics integrator” for the contingency contracting and sustainment needs of the military worldwide. ASC oversees about 65,000 contractors and manages about $25 billion in contracts.6

**LOGCAP Contracts (1992-2007)**

The first LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP I) was awarded on August 3, 1992 to Brown and Root Services of Houston, Texas (also know as KBR). Reportedly, the contract was competitively awarded and consisted of a cost-plus-award-fee contract for one year followed by four option years. The Army Corp of Engineers reportedly held a competition to award the second LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP II). The contract, a cost-plus award fee contract for one base year followed by four option

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5 LOGCAP contracts have been previously awarded for work in Rwanda, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Kosovo, Ecuador, Qatar, Italy, southeastern Europe, Bosnia, South Korea, Iraq, and Kuwait. Under LOGCAP, private sector contractors are used to provide a broad range of logistical and other support services to U.S. and allied forces during combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian and training operations.

6 [http://www.aschq.army.mil/home/missionvision.htm].
years was awarded to Dyncorp on January 1, 1997. The third LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP III) was awarded in 2001 to Halliburton/KBR.  

LOGCAP III, a ten-year contract (one base year followed by nine option years), was awarded to Halliburton/KBR to perform a variety of tasks. Initial press reports indicated that the 2001 LOGCAP III contract would be for the development of a contingency plan for extinguishing oil well fires in Iraq; however, subsequent press reports indicate that the contract included such tasks as providing housing for troops, preparing food, supplying water, and collecting trash. This contract was awarded under a cost-plus-award-fee, Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity (ID/IQ) contract. The 2001 contract was based on specific task orders which are issued individually and only for those services that DOD felt were necessary to support the mission in the near term. During 2003, LOGCAP III contract rose to more than $3.5 billion. According to one press account, Halliburton/KBR reportedly earned a fixed 1% profit above costs on LOGCAP III, with the possibility of an additional 2% incentive bonus, while another press account reported that the Halliburton/KBR LOGCAP III contract was a cost-plus, award fee contract that earned a 2% fixed fee with the potential for an extra 5% incentive fee.

The fourth LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP IV) was executed with a different acquisition strategy. Instead of using a single contractor, the contract called for multiple contractors. Competitions were held and the contracts were awarded based on what represented the best value to the government. In best value source selections, the government may make trade offs to make awards based on factors other than costs or technical superiority. The use of multiple LOGCAP contractors is reportedly intended to reduce the government’s risk. Under the new strategy, the three performance contractors may compete for individual LOGCAP task orders, creating a competitive environment meant to control costs and enhance quality.

**LOGCAP IV Contract Award**

The planning contract was awarded to Serco. In August 2006 the Army held a competition to select a logistical planning and program support contractor for LOGCAP IV. Two proposals were received and in February 2007 the ASC selected Serco, Inc., of Vienna, VA. This contract will have a minimum value of $613,677 with a contract period of one base year followed by up to four one-year  

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7 KBR was formerly known as Brown and Root Services. Brown & Root Services was the original LOGCAP contractor.

8 Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, also known as ID/IQ contracts, supply an indefinite quantity of supplies, goods, or materials for an indefinite period of time. See FAR, Part 16, Types of Contracts.


10 See the Center for Public Integrity’s website at [http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/] under the section for Windfalls of War, U.S. Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq.

11 FAR, Part 15. Contracting by Negotiation.
options with a maximum annual contract value of $45 million and a maximum contract value of $225 million.\(^\text{12}\)

The ASC news release announcing the award selection described the range of logistical and program services provided under the contract, as described on the ASC website.

- Augmenting the Army’s capability to develop and update worldwide management and staffing plans for contingencies;
- working with LOGCAP IV performance contractors to assure that they understand these plans;
- helping theater planners integrate LOGCAP into their plans;
- assisting planners in incorporating a broad range of contracted logistics support;
- developing scopes of work officially referred to as procurement work statements;
- preparing independent government cost estimates which are compared against the contractor’s bids to assure valid costs for task orders;
- conducting analysis of how performance contractors will do the work outlined in the task orders’ scopes of work;
- analyzing performance contractors’ costs;
- working with the Army to measure LOGCAP IV contractor performance; and
- recommending process improvements in the above actions.\(^\text{13}\)

ASC selected the performance contractors. The Army conducted a competition to select up to three performance contractors for services similar to those rendered under LOGCAP III.\(^\text{14}\) Solicitations were issued in October 2006 and six


\(^{13}\) Ibid, p. 1.

\(^{14}\) From the Army’s FY2008 Budget Estimates for the Global War on Terrorism: LOGCAP augments combat support and combat service support force structure by reinforcing military assets with civilian contract support. The program provides primarily base life support services to the forces in theater. Base life support services provide a full spectrum of services, including food service, power generation, electrical distribution, facilities management, dining facility operations, pest management, hazardous and non-hazardous waste management, latrines, water systems, billeting management, fire fighting and fire protection services, and laundry service operations. In Iraq, the program provides for the Multi-National Force — Iraq base logistics support, base camp reorganization, the International Zone, Camp Bucca Prisoner of War base operations support, and contractor support management in theater. In Afghanistan, the program manages base operations support for the Coalition Joint Operations Area — Afghanistan, and the Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar, and Salerno airfields. In Kuwait, the program manages Camps Spearhead, Udari, Arifjan; theater Retrograde operations; the theater-wide transportation mission; theater oil analysis and test facilities; management and diagnostic equipment, and bulk fuel operations. Army Operations and Maintenance, Volume 1, February 2007, p. 13, at (continued...)
Congressional Interest

During the first session of the 110th Congress, Congress held a series of hearings on Iraq contracting activities. Policymakers were concerned about Iraq contracts for several reasons including the expense and difficulty of managing logistical support contracts; allegations and reported instances of contract waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement; and questions regarding DOD’s capacity to manage such contracts. Some policymakers have raised questions as to whether DOD has the right mix of acquisition workforce personnel trained and equipped to oversee these large-scale contracts. As a result of these concerns, Congress has extended the tenure of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) through passage of the Iraq Reconstruction and Accountability Act. Legislative initiatives in P.L. 110-181, the FY2008 Defense

14 (...continued)


16 Kelley, Matt. GAO Challenges $150B Contract Awarded By Army: Urges Review of 10-year Deal to Support Troops. USA Today, October 31, 2007, p. 5A. According to the article, the ASC spokesperson identified was Daniel Carlson. According to Dan Gordon, a GAO official identified in the article, the ruling was issued under seal. Also, see GAO Upholds Protests to Army’s Award of $50 Billion for LOGCAP 4. Engineering News-Record, November 5, 2007, Construction Week; pg. 9, Vol. 259, No. 16.

17 The SIGIR replaced the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG). As provided for in P.L. 108-106, the SIGIR provides an independent and objective audit, analysis, and investigation into the use of U.S.-appropriated resources for Iraq relief and reconstruction. The SIGIR, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., was appointed as CPA-IG on January 20, 2004. He reports to both the Department of State and the Department of Defense, provides quarterly reports and semi-annual reports to Congress, and has offices in Baghdad and Arlington, VA. For a summary of the history of U.S. reconstruction assistance in Iraq, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.

18 P.L. 109-440 directs that the Office of the Inspector General shall terminate 10 months after 80 percent of the funds appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction funds have been spent.
Authorization Act, would provide additional oversight and accountability for DOD contracting during combat operations.

Background

Awarding of Defense Contracts

In most cases, federal government contracts are awarded under “full and open competition.” However, there are exceptions, particularly during times of war.

Full and Open Competition. In general, authorities that govern the awarding of most federal government contracts can be found in the United States Code (U.S.C.) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984\textsuperscript{19} explicitly states that the federal government “shall obtain full and open competition through use of the competitive procedures in accordance with the requirements of this title and the FAR.”\textsuperscript{20} The FAR and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) give DOD at least seven exceptions to the use of other than full and open competition in the awarding of contracts.\textsuperscript{21}

Two of the seven circumstances are (1) when the Secretary of Defense determines that DOD’s need for a property or service is of such an “unusual and compelling urgency” that the United States would be seriously injured unless DOD is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals; and (2) when the use of full and open competition would compromise national security.

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\textsuperscript{19} 41 U.S.C. 253. CICA can also be found in Title 10 U.S.C., Chapter 137, and was included in Section 805 of the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136).

\textsuperscript{20} 41 U.S.C. 253 (a)(1)(A).

\textsuperscript{21} The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation and AIDAR are supplements to the FAR. See DFARS, Subpart 206.3, and AIDAR, Subpart 706.3, Other Than Full and Open Competition. The exceptions are: (1) There is only one responsible source available to fulfill the contract requirements; (2) the federal agency’s need for these goods or services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the federal government would be seriously injured if this contract were not awarded; (3) the federal government needs to ensure that suppliers are maintained in the event of a national emergency, or to achieve industrial mobilization, to establish or maintain an engineering, development, or research capability; (4) The federal government has an international agreement to make this acquisition through means other than through full and open competition; (5) a statute specifically authorizes or requires that the contract be made through a specific source; (6) The use of full and open competition may compromise national security; (7) The public interest would be better served by use of other than full and open competition. The procedures for submitting written justifications to use other than full and open competition, including review requirements and delegation of authority, are outlined in DFARS, Subparts 206.303-1 and 206.304, and AIDAR 706.3. For a more detailed discussion on the seven exceptions to the use of full and open competition, refer to CRS Report RS21555, *Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Application of Federal Procurement Statutes*, by John R. Luckey.
**Emergency Contracting Authorities.** Title 41 USC Section 428a grants special emergency procurement authority to heads of executive agencies where it is determined that a procurement is to be used in support of a contingency operation, or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack.

**Contingency Contracting.** Contingency contracting differs from emergency contracting - the first usually describes situations where urgent requirements are necessitated by disasters, while the second usually describes military, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operations. DOD has developed initiatives to strengthen DOD contracting operations, particularly in contingency contracting situations. Section 817 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a joint policy for contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations no later than one year from the bill’s enactment. Sections 815 and 854 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 required DOD to report to Congress on contingency contracting requirements and program management, and to develop instructions to implement a contingency contracting program. The report was issued in October 2007.

**Rapid Acquisition Methods.** Section 811 of the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act grants the Secretary of Defense limited rapid acquisition authority to acquire goods and services during combat emergencies. Also, Title 10, Section 2304 outlines the use of ID/IQ task orders, sealed bidding, certain contract actions, and set-aside procurement under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act as examples of ways to expedite the delivery of goods and services during combat operations or post-conflict operations.

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24 P.L. 109-16.


Audits, Investigations, and Reports

Role of Federal Agencies. No one federal agency has the sole mission to audit, investigate, or oversee DOD-appropriated funds for troop support services under LOGCAP. Multiple agencies share responsibility, among them the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the Army Audit Agency (AAA), and the DOD Inspector General.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). Media reports suggest that a perceived lack of transparency in the earliest Iraq contracts led to the appointment of the Special Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (now SIGIR). SIGIR Stuart Bowen has audited and investigated contracts for Iraq reconstruction and relief funds, although some projects have involved a blending of IRRF funds with DOD appropriated funds. The SIGIR’s additional investigations into LOGCAP contracts have largely described LOGCAP contracts as lacking transparency, oversight, and financial accountability, and his investigations have documented some cases of waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the SIGIR has produced more than 150 reports, audits, or investigations of reconstruction-related activities. Estimates have been made that the SIGIR’s work has resulted in significant benefits to the federal government.

In June 2007 the SIGIR released a report based on its partial audit of Task Order 130, awarded to KBR on April 27, 2006 to provide support services to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq as well as other Iraq sites. This report found substantial deficiencies in both KBR’s ability to provide enough data for the SIGIR to perform an adequate audit and investigation of (what appeared to be) gross overcharges for fuel and food services. Additionally, the report found that the government’s oversight and management of the contract was inadequate and contributed to the SIGIR’s inability to completely audit and investigate the contract - including an evaluation of the government’s ability to provide oversight and management.

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30 Senator Collins Works To Extend The Term of the Office that Oversees Billions in Iraqi Reconstruction Dollars. Press Release of the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 13, 2006. Also, see SIGIR website [http://www.sigr.mil/] for audits reports.

Overall, the SIGIR has recommended that the federal government “generally avoid the use of sole-source and limited-competition contracting actions.” The report concludes that the use of sole-source and limited competition contracting in Iraq should have ended sooner, and that contracts issued previously under limited or sole-source competition should have been subject to re-competition.

**Latest SIGIR Review**

The latest LOGCAP review is a continuation of a past review of LOGCAP Task Order 130 (awarded on April 27, 2006 with an estimated value of $283 million) and a new review of LOGCAP Task Order 151 (awarded on June 6, 2007 with an estimated value of $200 million). Both task orders were awarded to KBR for support services to the Chief of Mission and Multi-National Force-Iraq staffs (located at the U.S. Embassy-Iraq) and for services at other Chief of Mission sites within Iraq (located in Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah and Kirkuk.) SIGIR conducted its review at KBR sites in Baghdad and involved interviews with personnel responsible for the administration and oversight from DCMA, DCAA, and DOS; personnel with the Joint Area Support Group-Central appointed as the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTRs); the LOGCAP Task Order 151 Support Officer; personnel at the Army’s Logistic and Budget Offices, and KBR managers and operational personnel. From the report, here is an excerpt which described the costs.

Because these task orders provided support to both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) missions in Iraq, DOD and DOS agreed that the reimbursement of costs associated with these task orders would be shared 60% by DOS and 40% by DOD. The total cost of these four task orders is approximately $1.5 billion.

Overall, the SIGIR’s audit and investigation found that the federal government and KBR had improved its oversight and management of Task Orders 130 and 151. However, the report identified areas where the government should make specific improvements in both oversight and management.

**DOD Inspector General.** Thomas F. Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector General for the Department of Defense, testified at the September 20, 2007 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on “Accountability During Contingency Operations: Preventing and Fighting Corruption in Contracting and

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32 Lessons in Contracting from Iraq Reconstruction. Lessons Learned and Recommendations from the SIGIR, July 2006.


Establishing and Maintaining Appropriate Controls on Materiel.”36 In his testimony he described DOD’s past and present efforts to provide oversight for contracting during contingency operations.

To date, over $550 billion has been appropriated to the Department of Defense in support of the men and women of our Armed Forces in Southwest Asia and the fight against terrorism. To provide oversight, we have over 225 personnel working on 29 audits and 90 investigations that address a wide variety of matters to include contracting, accountability, and required documentation. Additionally, we are working with other DoD organizations, such as the Army Audit Agency, the Army Criminal Investigation Command, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, to evaluate and provide recommendations for actions addressing these critical mission support areas.37

He also described the formation of a new partnership to combine the efforts of multiple federal agencies to combat both waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of Iraq reconstruction contracts.

More recently, as a result of the magnitude of alleged criminal activities within the Iraqi theater, a group of Federal agencies has formalized a partnership to combine resources to investigate and prosecute cases of contract fraud and public corruption related to U.S. Government spending for Iraq reconstruction. The participating agencies in the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF) are DCIS; Army CIDs Major Procurement Fraud Unit; the Office of the Inspector General, Department of State; the FBI; the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; and the Office of the Inspector General, Agency for International Development.

The ICCTF has established a Joint Operations Center which is a case coordination cell and criminal intelligence element aimed at achieving maximum interagency cooperation to successfully prosecute fraud and corruption cases in support of the war effort in Iraq. The mission and objectives of the ICCTF are a shared responsibility of the participating agencies. Case information and criminal intelligence are shared without reservation and statistical accomplishments will be reported jointly.

As a result of closed and ongoing investigations, five Federal criminal indictments and ten Federal criminal information have been issued, and two Article 32 hearings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice have been conducted. As a result of the investigations, nine U.S. persons and one foreign person have been convicted of felonies, resulting in a total of approximately fifteen years of confinement and eleven years of probation. Four individuals and one company were debarred from contracting with the U.S. Government; nineteen companies and persons were suspended from contracting; and two contractors signed settlement agreements with the U.S. Government. In all, $9.84

36 Statement of Mr. Thomas F. Gimble, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense, before the House Armed Services Committee, September 20, 2007.
million was paid to the U.S. in restitution; $323,525 was levied in fines and penalties; $3,500 was forfeited; and $61,953 was seized.\(^{38}\)

**Government Accountability Office (GAO).** GAO has identified DOD contract management as a high risk area and monitors DOD’s performance with periodic progress updates.\(^{39}\) GAO has conducted numerous studies of Iraq contracting including several studies of logistical support contracts.\(^{40}\) Since 2003 GAO has issued a number of Iraq-related reports and testimonies to Congress.

The Comptroller General David Walker appeared in July 2007 before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to discuss four specific challenges facing federal agencies in the oversight and management of contracts. There he made several important observations:

Managing risks when requirements are in transition requires effective oversight. DOD lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. The challenges faced in Iraq are a symbol of systematic challenges facing DOD. DOD cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which it relies on contractors to support its operations. Information on the number of contractor employees, and the services they provide, is not aggregated within DOD or its components. DOD recently established an office to address contractor support issues, but the office’s specific roles and responsibilities are under study. DOD and its contractors need to clearly understand DOD’s objectives and needs. To produce desired outcomes with available funding and within required time frames, they need to know the goods or services required, the level of performance or quality desired, the schedule, and the cost.\(^{41}\)

**Potential Oversight Issues**

Potential contract oversight issues that Congress may choose to examine include various aspects of contract administration such as contract costs, development of contract requirements, costs-reimbursement and sole-source contracts; transparency and the size, shape, and skill diversity of the acquisition workforce.

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\(^{38}\) Ibid, pp. 11-13.


Contract Oversight. One rationale often cited for the outsourcing of program management to industry is that DOD no longer has the in-house expertise needed to manage such complicated acquisition programs. Some Members of Congress may want DOD to develop a long-term plan to restore in-house expertise to make the government a smarter customer. Because of several cases in which high profile weapons acquisition programs have been affected by escalating costs and technical shortcomings, Congress may choose to review the management of individual programs and the evolution of DOD’s acquisition management processes with an eye toward using the FY2008 funding bills to strengthen the government’s hand in dealing with industry. As an example, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael G. Mullen have reported that the Navy intends to reclaim some of the authority over ship design it has ceded to industry. Congress may also choose to study the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) and may question the amount of managerial discretion the Army has vested in the Lead System Integrator (LSI).42

Contract administration. Contract administration includes contract management and contract oversight. FAR Part 37 states that “agencies shall ensure that sufficiently trained and experienced professionals are available to manage contracts.”43 The burden rests with the federal government to ensure that enough appropriately-trained professionals are available to manage contracts. This is essential, particularly before the requirements generation process, when the government determines the scope of work to be completed. Contract management is also described in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s (OFPP) “Guide To Best Practices for Contract Administration” where it states that “The technical administration of government contracts is an essential activity...absolutely essential that those entrusted with the duty ensure that the government gets all that it bargains for...and they must be competent in the practice of contractor administration.”44

Over the past few years the size, shape, and complexity of logistical support service contracts have grown with the technical requirements. However, the size of the federal contractor workforce has decreased. There is now an imbalance - there are fewer federal contracting officials to manage the large-scale contracts and in some cases the government has sought to hire contractors to do the job that federal employees use to perform. For example, GAO reported that military officials utilizing LOGCAP had little understanding of LOGCAP or their contract

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42 For a discussion of the LSI concept, see CRS Report RS22631, Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators (LSIs) — Background, Oversight Issuers, and Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso; CRS Report RL33753, Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Report RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat System (FSC): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

43 FAR Part 37.

management responsibilities. Additionally, some logistical support units intended to assist military commanders had no prior LOGCAP or contracting experience.\(^{45}\)

Two former OFPP administrators, Steven Kelman and Allan Burman, stated that the current contracting situation creates a crisis. Here they offer their assessment.

Hiring contracting officials is hardly the way to dress for political success - who wants to bring in more “bureaucrats?” — but there can’t be well-managed contracts without people to manage them. The current situation creates a vicious circle: Overstretched people make mistakes, producing demands for more rules, creating additional burdens, giving people even less time to plan effective procurement and manage performance.\(^{46}\)

It is important that both civilian and military procurement sectors have qualified and experienced contract professionals. In the case of service contracts, having professionally trained contracting personnel could be even more critical than contracts for tangible goods. With tangible goods, there is an identifiable product. In the absence of a product, it becomes even more important that DOD and the contractor both exercise good stewardship of federally appropriated dollars.

**DOD Contracting Officials.** Contracting officials are expected to make tough decisions. As an example, Ms. Bunnatine Greenhouse, formerly the highest ranking civilian at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), raised important questions on the rationale for awarding KBR contracts without competition. She objected to the awarding of one contract award as well as the five-year contract term.\(^ {47}\) The basis for her refusal to approve the proposed five-year, sole-source contract between KBR and the U.S. Army [for the Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract] was because: (1) KBR had been paid $1.9 million to draft a contingency plan to design the “guts” of the contract, including the process, budget, and other details; and (2) selecting KBR for the five-year contract would violate procurement protocol, as (reportedly, Ms. Greenhouse stated) contractors who draw up a contingency plan cannot be allowed to bid on the job to execute the same plan.\(^ {48}\) She stated that bidding on the contract would give KBR an unfair advantage over any competitors. When pressured to sign the KBR contract, Ms. Greenhouse added the following contract language: “I caution that extending this sole source effort beyond a one-year period could convey an invalid perception that there is not strong intent for a limited

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\(^{48}\) For additional information, see CRS Report RL32229, *Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions About Contracting*, by Valerie Bailey Grasso (Coordinator).
Another senior DOD civilian testified that he made a decision to award KBR a task order under the LOGCAP contract without conducting any competition. Michael Mobbs, then-Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, testified that he made the decision to award KBR the contingency planning contract over the objections of an attorney with the Army Materiel Command. The attorney had determined that the oil-related task order was outside of the scope of the LOGCAP troop support contract. Later, GAO concluded that the lawyer’s position was the correct one and that the work “should have been awarded using competitive procedures.”

**Development of Contract Requirements.** LOGCAP contracts have often by-passed the process to define realistic funding, appropriate time frames, and other important requirements through the use of “undefinitized” contract actions. Undefinitized contract actions do not require that the DOD contracting official write a completed performance work statement before the work is performed. Some proponents of undefinitized task orders have stated that they give the contractor more flexibility in getting work started sooner. However, recent DCAA audits have found that these undefinitized task orders have given KBR a significant cost advantage. Auditors have found that DOD contracting officials were more willing to rely on KBR’s costs estimates, estimates later found to be greatly inflated. According to DCAA auditors, DOD contracting officials rarely challenged these cost estimates. The estimates became the baseline from which KBR established their costs upon which to bill the government, which later increased their overall profit.

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49 Vanity Fair, p. 149.

50 It should be noted here that the KBR sole-source contract, according to the SIGIR, complied with applicable federal regulations for sole-source contracts, according to the SIGIR. The SIGIR concluded that “the justification used was that KBR had drafted the Contingency Support Plan (CSP), had complete familiarity with it, had the security clearances necessary to implement it, and the contract needed to be immediately available to implement.” Lessons In Contracting and Procurement. Iraq Reconstruction. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. July 2006, p. 20.

51 Witte, Griff. Halliburton Contract Critic Loses Her Job. Washington Post, August 29, 200, p. A11. For additional information, see the following documents: Letter to Tom Davis, Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House of Representatives, November 10, 2004; Testimony of Bunnatine Greenhouse before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, June 27, 2005; and Letter to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, from Senators Byron L. Dorgan and Frank Lautenberg, and Representative Henry A. Waxman, August 29, 2005.


53 Also referred to as undefinitized task orders.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the SIGIR stated that contracting personnel must be provided with an adequate description of a customer’s needs. The inability to properly define and prepare requirements appeared to be a significant oversight challenge in the Iraq contracting process.54

**Use of Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts.** FAR Subpart 16.5 defines ID/IQ contracts.55 In the case of ID/IQ contracts, task and delivery orders are issued; these orders do not define a firm quantity of goods or services.56 Task orders are the “to do” portion of the contract, the contractor’s action list. LOGCAP contracts allow task orders to be approved as needed without being subject to competition among multiple contractors. Each task and delivery order acts like a single contract, potentially allowing costly amounts of work to be performed on a non-competitive basis. Task Order 59 was one of the largest single task orders on the LOGCAP III contract. It was issued in May 2003 and includes various discrete functions, supporting up to 130,000 U.S. troops, and has reportedly resulted in estimates of charges to the government of about $5.2 billion dollars from June 2003 through June 2004.

**Costs and the Use of No-Bid and Sole-Source Contracts.** Much has been written in the media about the use of sole-source contracting in Iraq.57 In general, most authorities believe that government contract costs are influenced significantly by the degree of competition; that having several competitors will reduce overall cost. However, questions have been raised as to whether contract costs in a war zone are inherently uncontrollable. DOD has argued that Iraq contracting costs are expensive because of the uncertainty of war-related requirements for goods and services. Government contingency contracting in times of war has often favored using programs such as LOGCAP because it enables contracting officials to move quickly to secure contractors, who in turn can be deployed quickly into the combat theater.

While full and open competition is the standard for government contracting, full and open competition has not been the standard for contracting for troop support services under LOGCAP. One report stated that of the $145 billion in non-

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54 Testimony of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 7, 2006.

55 FAR Subpart 16.5 Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, also known as IDIQ contracts, supply an indefinite quantity of supplies, goods, or materials, for an indefinite period of time. See FAR, Part 16, Types of Contracts. There are three types of indefinite-delivery contracts: definite-quantity contracts, requirements contracts, and indefinite-quantity contracts. The appropriate type of indefinite-delivery contract may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of contract award. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304d and section 303K of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, requirements contracts and indefinite-quantity contracts are also known as delivery order contracts or task order contracts.

56 Indefinite-quantity contracts are also known as delivery order contracts or task order contracts.

57 Sole-source contracts are contracts which are not subject to competition.
competitive contracts awarded by the federal government in 2005, $97.8 billion was awarded in “no-bid” contracts. Of that $97.8 billion in contracts, $63.4 billion was awarded under the rationale that only one contractor could supply the needed goods or services. The remaining $34.4 billion was awarded in no-bid contracts under a variety of other exceptions to full and open competition. $8.7 billion was awarded for emergency situations, and $2.9 billion was awarded for circumstances where a statute authorizes or requires restricted competition. Finally, $47.2 billion in contracts was awarded in cases where the competitive range was limited to a small group of companies (referred to as a “limited” competition).

The Special Investigations Division of the House Government Reform Committee has issued a report titled “Dollars, not Sense: Government Contracting Under the Bush Administration.” According to this report, in 2000 the federal government awarded $67.5 billion in non-competitive contracts; that figure rose to $145 billion in 2005, an increase of 115%. While the contracts awarded were larger, the value of contracts overseen by the average government procurement official rose by 83% (between 2000-2005).

Cost-reimbursement Contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts can be: (1) cost-plus award fee; (2) cost-plus incentive fee; or (3) cost-plus fixed fee. In 2000, the federal government spent $62 billion on cost-plus contracts; in 2005, that figure increased to $110 billion. Nearly half of all costs-plus contracts ($52 billion) were costs-plus award fee contracts. LOGCAP was the single largest cost-plus award fee contract, and at one time was valued at about $16.4 billion. In costs-plus contracts, contractor’s fees rise with contract costs. Increased costs means increased fees to the contractor. There is no incentive for the contractor to limit the government’s costs.

Use of Overhead Fees. The SIGIR’s past investigations into reconstruction contracts revealed that, in some contracts, overhead expenses accounted for more than half of the costs that Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) billed the federal government. A recent audit report, “Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” found that relatively high overhead costs were charged, and that these costs were significantly higher than work performed by other companies in Iraq. For these contracts, overhead costs ranged from 11% to 55% of projected contract budgets. For example, the SIGIR found that in five KBR projects, administrative costs outdistanced the costs of the projects alone. For example, the report cites a project where administrative costs totaled about $52.7 million, while the actual project costs were about $13.4 million. In another case, the combined administrative costs for five contractors totaled about $62 million, while the direct

58 Dollars, Not Sense: Government Contracting Under the Bush Administration. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform - Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division, p. 7-9.

59 Cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts establish an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the approval of the contracting officer.

60 Army Field Support Command, Media Obligation Spreadsheet, April 20, 2006.
construction costs totaled $26.7 million.\textsuperscript{61} The SIGIR found that overhead expenses accounted for more than half of the costs KBR billed the federal government.

Overhead fees can also result as a part of fees passed from one contractor to another. One such example is the case of Blackwater Security Firm’s contract for private security services in Iraq. Blackwater’s contract paid workers who guarded food trucks a salary of $600 a day. The company added overhead costs and a 36\% markup to its bill, then forwarded the bill to a Kuwaiti company. The Kuwaiti company then added costs and profit, then sent the bill to the food company. The food company did the same, and finally sent the bill to KBR. KBR passed its cost to DOD. Yet the U.S. Army stated in a congressional committee hearing that it had never authorized KBR to enter into a subcontracting relationship with Blackwater. The matter remains pending.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Transparency.} Transparency allows the federal government to better administer contracts and oversee contractors. For example, the federal government has had difficulty getting certain contractors to provide important information on their invoices and billing statements. The SIGIR released a series of audit and investigative reports which drew attention to barriers that hampered the government’s efforts. In one report, SIGIR Bowen reported that it was difficult to complete the investigation into the KBR contracts because KBR “routinely and inappropriately marked their data as proprietary.”\textsuperscript{63}

Another problem with a lack of transparency is the relationship between the federal government, the prime contractor, and the subcontractors. The federal government has a contractual relationship with the prime contractor, not with subcontractors. Thus the government may be somewhat limited in providing full accountability for tax-payer dollars. While the prime contractor-subcontractor relationship is between private sector companies, the monies are from public funds.\textsuperscript{64}

\textbf{Acquisition Workforce.} According to DOD, its acquisition workforce has been reduced by more than 50 percent between 1994-2005.\textsuperscript{65} In future years, between


\textsuperscript{65} In 1998, the House National Security Committee asked GAO to review DOD’s progress in achieving a 25-percent reduction in the acquisition organizations’ workforce, examine the potential savings associated with such reductions, determine the status of DOD efforts to redefine the acquisition workforce, and examine DOD’s efforts to restructure acquisition organizations. GAO concluded that “DOD has been reducing its acquisition workforce at a faster rate than its overall workforce and is on schedule to accomplish a 25-percent (continued...)
2006-2010, half of the federal acquisition workforce will be eligible to retire.\textsuperscript{66} It has been reported that DOD does not have sufficient numbers of contractor oversight personnel, particularly at deployed locations. This limits DOD’s ability to assure that taxpayer dollars are being used in a judicious manner. For example, in recent testimony before Congress, a GAO official reported that if adequate staffing had been in place, the Army could have realized substantial savings on LOGCAP contracts in Iraq.\textsuperscript{67} The GAO official also stated that one DCMA official, who is responsible for overseeing the LOGCAP contractor’s performance at 27 locations, reported that he was “unable to visit all of those locations during his six-month tour to determine the extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract’s requirements.”\textsuperscript{68}

Earlier mandates to reduce the size of the DOD acquisition workforce reflected Congress’ view that the workforce had not been downsized enough — that reductions continued to lag in proportion to the decline in the size of the overall defense budget, in general, and to the acquisition portion of the defense budget, in particular. At that time, Congress and DOD were at odds over the need for further reductions in the defense acquisition workforce. Reducing the defense acquisition workforce had been viewed by the Congress, in the past, as a necessary requirement for eliminating wasteful spending, and providing DOD with increased funding for other priorities.

Staffing shortages in the defense contracting personnel to oversee Iraq contracts have become part of a larger, systemic problem within DOD.\textsuperscript{69} In reducing the size

\textsuperscript{65}(...continued) reduction by the fiscal year 2000. However, potential savings from these reductions cannot be precisely tracked in DOD’s budget. In addition, some of the potential savings from acquisition workforce reductions may be offset by other anticipated costs. Such costs include those for contracting with private entities for some services previously performed by government personnel (i.e., substituting one workforce for another).” U.S. Congress. General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisition Organizations: Status of Workforce Reductions. Report to the Chairman, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives. GAO/NSIAD-98-161. June 1998. 20 pages. For another source of data on the federal acquisition, see Report on the Federal Acquisition Workforce, FY2003-2004, Federal Acquisition Institute Report, Executive Summary, p. vii.


\textsuperscript{67} GAO-07-359T. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Exert Management and Oversight to Better Control Acquisition of Services. Statement of Katherine V. Schinas, Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, January 17, 2007.

\textsuperscript{68} GAO-07-359T, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{69} The same observations were made about the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater contract. According to Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant, the issue concerns “the capacity of our acquisition staffs to deal with the myriad definitization of task orders, particular line items, the ability to interact with the extensive amount of nodes that you have in Integrated Coast (continued...
and shape of the federal acquisition workforce, an unanticipated result has been the increase in the growth of the private sector service contracts. With the growth in service contracting; the increase in the number of complex, billion dollar contracts; and the decline in the number of federal acquisition workforce employees, some officials have asserted that there are not enough DOD contracting officials, onsite in Iraq, who are available and experienced enough to manage the complexities of the new acquisition programs, or oversee private sector contractors.

It appears to some that DOD has downsized the federal acquisition workforce, particularly those that oversee large-scale contracts like LOGCAP, to dangerously low levels. They note that the past downsizing of the defense acquisition workforce has resulted in the loss of technical personnel and a talent drain on DOD’s ability to meet its mission and objectives. There are concerns over potential deficits and imbalances in the skills and experience levels of personnel who manage large-scale weapon acquisition programs and defense contracts.

The Gansler Commission. The Secretary of the Army commissioned a study headed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler to analyze “structural weaknesses and organizational deficiencies in the Army’s acquisition and contracting system used to support expeditionary operations.” Dr. Gansler has recently presented the Commission’s findings and recommendations before Congress. Here is an excerpt of the Commission’s analysis of the acquisition workforce.

The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Yet, only 3 percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer (GO) positions. The Army’s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, trained, structured, or empowered to meet the Army needs of the 21st Century deployed warfighters. Only 56 percent of the military officers and 53 percent of the civilians in the contracting career field are certified for their current positions. Notwithstanding a seven-fold workload increase and greater complexity of contracting, the Institutional Army is not supporting this key capability. Notwithstanding there being almost as many contractor personnel in the Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan theater as there are U.S. military, the Operational Army does not yet recognize the impact of contracting and contractors in expeditionary operations and on mission success. What should be a core competence — contracting (from requirements definition, through

69 (...continued)
Guard Systems...I’m not sure that we understood going how much we had to be prepared to handle the work load in terms of capacity and competency in human capital, and that’s one of the main things I’m focusing on.” Cavas, Christopher P. Millions for Deepwater, No One to Spend It. U.S. Coast Guard Adds Acquisition Experts for Modernization. Defense News, Vol. 22, No. 2, January 8, 2007, p. 1.

70 Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support on December 6, 2007. [http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=3048].
contract management, to contract closeout) — is treated as an operational and institutional side issue.\textsuperscript{71}

The Commission’s report recommends that the Army makes systemic and fundamental changes in the way it conducts business, and has divided its recommendations into four major areas as described here.

- Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations);
- Restructure the organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS operations;
- Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations; and
- Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations.\textsuperscript{72}

### Potential Options for Congress

Congress may choose to consider the following options when examining DOD contracts for troop support: (1) implementing of the Gansler Commission’s recommendations; (2) broadening of the jurisdiction of the SIGIR to include DOD contracts for troop support services (like LOGCAP contracts); (3) convening of a study of the federal employee and contractor workforce; (4) requiring more detail to give Congress better information to perform its oversight role; and (5) establishing a dedicated office to conduct audits and investigation of DOD contracts.

#### Option 1: Implementing the Gansler Commission Recommendations

Perhaps the most significant recommendation of the Gansler Commission is that the Army address some institutional and cultural issues that may provide an obstacle to moving forward. The Commission interviewed a number of knowledgeable Army officials and concluded with the following observations about the challenges that the Army will face in making significant improvements in its business operations, as described here in the report:

Those charged with getting the job done have provided valuable insight into the doctrine, policies, tools, and resources needed for success. Clearly, the Army must address the repeated and alarming testimony that detailed the failure of the institution (both the Institutional Army and the Department of Defense) to anticipate, plan for, adapt, and adjust acquisition and program management to the


\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, p. 13.
needs of the Operational Army as it has been transformed, since the end of the Cold War, into an expeditionary force. The Institutional Army has not adjusted to the challenges of providing timely, efficient, and effective contracting support to the force in Operation Iraqi Freedom (more than half of which is contractor personnel). Essentially, the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our warfighters. The personnel placed in that untenable position focused on getting the job done, as best they could under the circumstances — where support is needed in a matter of hours, or, at best, days. They used their knowledge, skill, limited resources, and extraordinary dedication to get contracts awarded. Alarmingly, most of the institutional deficiencies remain four-and-a-half-years after the world’s best Army rolled triumphantly into Baghdad.73

Option 2: Expanding the SIGIR’s Jurisdiction

Another option is to give the SIGIR the authority to audit and investigate DOD logistical support contracts in Iraq. The SIGIR has already established a presence in Iraq, and has issued more than 150 reports, including audits and investigations. His efforts have largely resulted in the arrest of five people, and the convictions of four of them, with more than $17 million in assets seized.74 The SIGIR has made several recommendations related to his audit and investigation of contracts under his jurisdiction. His observations and insights may be relevant and appropriate for the contract administration and oversight of DOD contracts for troop support services.75

Option 3: Convening a Study of the Federal Employee and Contractor Workforce

Congress may want to convene a study of the federal employee and contractor workforce. The study could examine three important questions: (1) Is there an appropriate balance of federal employee and contractor roles? (2) Is there an appropriate federal role and presence in the oversight area? and (3) Is the federal government attracting the right types of acquisition professionals?

Congress could require a separate report, from each military service, on the size, scope, costs, and structure of its acquisition workforce (including military, civilian, and contractor personnel).

Option 4: Requiring More Detail for Better Oversight

Congress could require DOD to provide more details for better congressional oversight. There are five questions that Congress could consider: (1) Should DOD

73 Ibid, p. 16.

74 Senator Collins Works To Extend The Term of the Office that Oversees Billions in Iraqi Reconstruction Dollars. Press Release of the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, November 13, 2006.

75 As an example, the SIGIR recommends the creation of an “enhanced contingency FAR” to simplify the rules governing contingency contracting. SIGIR, Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, July 2006, p. 97.
move to limit sole-source or limited competition for Iraq contracts? (2) Should DOD use more fixed-priced contracting in Iraq? (3) Should task and delivery orders have certain dollar constraints? (4) Should task orders be subject to public notice? and (5) Should larger contracts be divided into smaller contracts, with better-defined, discrete tasks?

To create more transparency and openness in defense acquisitions regarding contract administration, costs, and performance, Congress could require a separate report from each military service. Each report could include data on the size, scope, costs, and structure of all contracts, particularly no-bid, sole-source, and cost-reimbursement contracts.

Congress also could require that specific criteria be met before certain contract arrangements can be approved by DOD or by Congress. In addition, Congress could require a periodic re-competition of certain types of contracts, like LOGCAP, that have the potential of spanning for many years. Congress could also require, for example, that task orders beyond a certain size be treated as a separate contract, and thus subject to competition among multiple contractors.

And finally, Congress could require that large defense contracts be subject to competition, and that a minimum of three contractors should be selected for contractors beyond a certain size. It appears, from available press accounts, that some contracts for services in Iraq could have been segregated and opened for competitive bidding. By administering smaller contracts, financial oversight might be easier. This may give small businesses more of an opportunity to compete for contracts in Iraq.

**Option 5: Establishing a Dedicated Office to Conduct Audits and Investigation of DOD Contracts**

One of the recommendations of the SIGIR is to “designate a single, unified contracting entity to coordinate all contracting in theater.”76 One way to accomplish this is to establish a Contingency Contracting Corp (a DOD initiative currently underway is studying the issue) that will deploy to Iraq and establish a standing presence. However, what additional resources might be necessary in order to provide better contract management and oversight of DOD-appropriated funds?

Given that the mission of the DOD Inspector General’s office is to promote “integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department’s mission and to serve the public interest”,77 should the DOD Inspector General have a stronger presence in Iraq? Given the many problems associated with LOGCAP contracts, oversight agencies like the DOD IG could have a pivotal role in preventing future contractor waste, fraud, or mismanagement.

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76 Lessons in Contracting and Procurement, SIGIR, July 2006, p. 95.

77 From the DOD Inspector General’s website at [http://www.dodig.osd.mil/mission.htm].
Congress may want to consider creating a singularly dedicated office for the audit and investigation of DOD contracts for troop support services.
Appendix A. Selected Reports

During the last four years, the Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, Army Audit Agency, Air Force Audit Agency, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction have issued many reports on contracting issues in Iraq, including those that appear below. A selected number of relevant reports have been listed here.

Congress


Congressional Research Service


CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff.


Government Accountability Office


Department of Defense Inspector General


Semi-Annual Report to Congress. October 1, 2005-March 31, 2006


Army Audit Agency

(The website is restricted to military domains (.mil) and to the Government Accountability Office)


Gansler Commission

Appendix B. Current Legislative Initiatives on Iraq Contracting

Legislation in the Second Session of the 110th Congress


- Section 802, which would prohibit future contracts for the use of new Lead System Integrators;
- Section 813, which would require the Comptroller General to report to Congress on potential modifications to the organization and structure of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Programs;
- Section 816, which would direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct an annual review on the systematic deficiencies in Major Defense Acquisition Programs;
- Section 830, which would direct the Comptroller General to report to Congress on DOD’s use of noncompetitive awards;
- Section 841, which would establish a commission to study federal contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, called the “Commission on Wartime Contracting;”
- Section 842, which would require the DOD Inspector General, the SIGIR for Iraq Reconstruction, and the SIGIR for Afghanistan Reconstruction to collaborate on the development of comprehensive plans to perform a series of audits on DOD contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for the performance of logistical support activities of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as audits for federal agency contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders.

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78 Excerpts from H.R. 1585 discuss the rationale for legislative initiatives focused on the oversight and accountability for contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: “The committee remains concerned about the level of oversight for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries present uniquely complex challenges for contracting and contract oversight, but U.S. efforts in these countries will continue to require significant contractor support. The committee believes that government responsibilities for a range of issues involving contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan are unclear. The committee believes that clarification of roles and responsibilities for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased oversight will enhance the effectiveness of U.S. Government efforts in both countries.

79 For a brief discussion on the role of the Lead System Integrator, see CRS Report RS22631, Defense Acquisition: Use of Lead System Integrators (LSIs) — Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by Valerie Bailey Grasso.
delivery orders for the performance of security and reconstruction functions in Iraq and Afghanistan;

- Section 851, which would require that the Secretary of Defense (as part of the Strategic Human Capital Plan for 2008) include a separate section of the report focused on the military and civilian acquisition workforce;

- Section 852, which would establish a Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund;

- Section 861, which would require coordination between the DOD, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development through the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding between the three agency heads on matters relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan;

- Section 862, which would require that the Secretary of Defense prescribe, within 120 days of enactment, regulations on the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract or covered subcontract in a combat area. These regulations would include processes for registering, processing, and accounting for such personnel; and authorizing and accounting for weapons, and investigating the death and injury of such personnel, their discharge of weapons, and incidents of alleged misconduct. The regulations would also provide guidance to combatant commanders on orders, directives, and instructions to contractors and subcontractors performing private security functions relating to force protection, security, health, safety, relations and interaction with locals, and rules of engagement;

- Section 863, which would require the Comptroller General to review annually all contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan and report to Congress on the total number of contracts and task orders, total number of active contracts and task orders, total value of all contracts and task orders, the degree to which DOD has awarded noncompetitive contracts, the total number of contractor personnel (including the total number of contractor personnel performing security functions and the total number of contractor personnel killed or wounded); also, Section 863 would require the Secretaries of Defense and State to provide the Comptroller General full access to the database as described in Section 861(for purposes of reviews carried out under this section);

- Section 871, which would establish a Defense Materiel Readiness Board;

- Section 872, which would grant authority to the Secretary of Defense to designate critical readiness shortfalls; and
Section 941, which would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the military forces, known as a quadrennial roles and missions review.

A select number of additional legislative initiatives, proposed during the 110th Congress, that may impact defense contracting will follow.

- The Stop Outsourcing Security Act (H.R. 4102) would require that only U.S. federal government personnel provide security to all personnel at any U.S. diplomatic or consular mission in Iraq by six months after enactment. It also would require that the President report to specified congressional committees on “the status of planning for the transition away from the use of private contractors for mission critical or emergency essential functions by January 1, 2009, in all conflict zones in which Congress has authorized the use of force.” Contracts with the federal government requiring personnel to perform mission critical or emergency essential functions may be renewed after that date only if the President reports to those committees that the relevant agency does not have adequate personnel to perform the duties stipulated in the contract. The President must also certify that all contract employees meet set standards, including having undergone background checks to ensure they do not have criminal records and have not been accused of human rights abuses, and that they would remain in the custody of the United States if they are accused of crimes by the host country. It also would provide for Congressional access to contracts under certain conditions and reports to Congress on Iraq and Afghanistan contracts.

- The Security Contractor Accountability Act of 2007 (S. 2147) would expand the coverage of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to include all persons “while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in a region outside the United States in which the Armed Forces are conducting a contingency operation.” The bill would mandate that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) establish a “Theater Investigative Unit” for each contingency operation in which covered contract personnel are working to investigate suspected misconduct. The FBI and other agencies or departments affected by the bill would have 90 days to implement the provision, and the Department of Justice’ Inspector General would be required to report to Congress within 30 days of enactment on the investigation of abuses alleged to have been committed by contract personnel.

- The Iraq Contracting Fraud Review of 2007 (H.R. 528) would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Defense Contract Audit Agency, to review all defense contracts relating to reconstruction or troop support in Iraq involving any contractors,
subcontractors, or federal officers or employees that have been indicted or convicted for contracting improprieties.

- The New Direction for Iraq Act of 2007 (H.R. 663) contains provisions regarding Iraq contracts on war profiteering, the recovery of funds from terminated contracts, and congressional oversight.

- The Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine Act (H.R. 897) would require the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development to provide Congress with copies and descriptions of contracts and task orders over $5 million.