THE USE OF SECURITY PROFESSIONALS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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THE USE OF SECURITY PROFESSIONALS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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From Vietnam to Panama, Afghanistan to Iraq, history demonstrates an overwhelming need to address security as the primary factor to achieving sustainable stability in the aftermath of conflict. The consequences of not establishing security immediately are televised throughout the world and used to the advantage of those elements that thrive in this environment of lawlessness and plant the seeds of insurgencies. Despite this knowledge, the use of law enforcement organizations to prevent or reduce the impact of insurgency has been greatly ignored by military strategists. Failing to recognize the unique qualities that military and civilian law enforcement bring to bear on the environment of an insurgency lead to over application of maneuver-centric approaches when considering the proper force to apply for restoration of security and order among indigenous populations. This paper explores options and provides recommendations for the use and employment of Police and Security professionals as a strategic alternative to current methodology to counter insurgency operations.
THE USE OF SECURITY PROFESSIONALS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

The use of law enforcement and security organizations to prevent or reduce the impact of insurgency has been greatly ignored by military strategists. Military planners often fail to recognize the unique capabilities and qualities that military and civilian law enforcement offer with regard to eliminating the causes of an insurgency, as opposed to meeting the insurgency head on with a show of force. Planners currently apply a maneuver-centric approach when considering the proper force to ensure restoration of security and order among indigenous populations. Whatever security that is achieved in this manner is one that is imposed on the population and often not sustainable when the occupying force (usually military) departs. To better understand the situation this paper will discuss the lawless environment and the power vacuum created by conflict, shows how this environment fuels an insurgency, and offer options for future military strategies incorporating police capability in countering insurgencies.

Insurgency

Webster defines insurgency “as a condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as belligerency.” Counterinsurgency is then defined by R. Scott Moore is “an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.”
Nations with large armed forces and capable intelligence agencies no longer fear encroachment from their neighbors but rather possible collateral damage from rogue elements who disregard recognized boundaries. Globalization, treaties, and economic well being have fostered a relatively stable and peaceful environment. Inside these borders, fragments of the population feel disenfranchised; they tend to express their dissatisfaction of the status quo through violence and other disruptive acts. Conventional military forces are ill equipped to respond to this problem as it grows throughout the populace. In the twenty-first century insurgencies have and will continue to blend and influence the population of large urban areas globally.

Insurgencies thrive in power vacuums typically left following conflict. Often times social institutions, governments, and political officials have contributed to the chaotic environment by controlling a population through fear, and oppression, fostering a feeling of mistrust. The disillusioned population is vulnerable during this period of general lawlessness and is looking for an institution that will provide for their basic needs; security is paramount to this effort. Current strategies often focus on addressing the insurgency as it evolves instead of preventing the conditions which enable it and which thus feed destabilizing forces. Establishing security in the short run to avert chaos and prevent criminal and or insurgent forces from securing a foothold in society, while concurrently restoring basic services, is key in facilitating a sustainable stability. This time period has been referred to as the “golden hour”

The current situation in Iraq clearly reveals the benefits that could have been realized had the planning efforts included a more comprehensive approach to the establishing of lawful social order following the US invasion. At the end of major combat
operations in Iraq when the U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Division entered the capital city of Baghdad, The Iraqi National Police (INP) had been disbanded and then blended into the populace taking with it weapons, and, more importantly, experience as well as the institutional knowledge of what it takes to keep peace in a city the size of Baghdad. When U.S. forces arrived they initially were greeted as liberators. But it wasn’t long before U.S. soldiers witnessed the jubilant crowd transformation into rioters and looters. Without the control of local and national law enforcement agencies, the populace burned, and destroyed government buildings, stole artifacts, and carried out violent acts on citizens believed to be Baath party members, or sympathetic to the former Regime.

David Galula’s definition of insurgency, although developed in the 1960s, remains applicable in the twenty-first century; “an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order (China, 1927-49; Greece, 1944-50; Indochina, 1945-54; Malaya, 1948-60; Algeria, 1954-62).” Galula asserts that the object of revolutionary war or an insurgency is the population itself. Insurgents are trying to win the population over and the counterinsurgency is trying to sustain the people’s loyalty to the established regime. Galula states that these objectives are political in nature. Insurgencies are protracted wars. As Galula observes, “It takes time for a small group of insurgent leaders to organize a revolutionary movement, to raise and develop armed forces, to a balance with the opponent and to overpower him”.

States countering insurgencies must recognize that defeating the insurgency is not just a military problem. As insurgent groups seek to gain the world’s attention they
sometimes endorse legitimate causes for the purpose of persuading the populace to support them. Over time this strategy may work and then the insurgent group gains legitimacy through the use of policy.\textsuperscript{7} To combat insurgencies, conventional armies must adapt to the challenges of the many elements that feed an insurgency: religion, ethnicity, race, economic, political exclusion, etc. Studies have shown that insurgencies on the average last ten years;\textsuperscript{8} these years are marked with continued internal friction caused by violence and instability. Even in the case of some of the world’s best equipped and resourced militaries, it is difficult to sustain public support and international approval of the counterinsurgency program for an extended period.

American soldiers are well trained and they can survive a variety of harsh conditions. But they are ill prepared to conduct community policing, especially in a highly charged religious or ethnically divided environment. In the current Iraqi environment our soldiers are challenged by their social expectations, because the government is based on the Koran and religion plays a more significant role in political decisions than Americans are accustomed to. Soldiers’ first impressions in this environment form the basis for future relationships; these impressions are difficult to overcome, especially when they are negative. In Iraq, U.S. soldiers who were photographed along side looters and overzealous citizens, ignoring the looting, rioting and violence that occurred, quickly found that gaining the confidence of the average Iraqi citizen proved extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{9} In a United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Robert M. Perito asserts that “Responsibility for law and order fell to coalition military forces that were neither trained nor equipped to perform police functions. U.S. soldiers complained they had not been trained to fight crime and should not be asked to

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make arrests.” The report goes on to conclude that coalition forces developed an insensitivity to the violent Iraqi-on-Iraqi crime that was occurring. The negative impact of this apathetic attitude on Iraqi citizens was immeasurable, but clearly evidenced in the pervading attitudes on the streets, in the neighborhoods, and in the media reports. Since the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) was unable to protect the Iraqi public and the coalition forces seemed indifferent to the welfare of the Iraqi citizen, an ever emerging insurgency was fed.10

The rift between coalition forces and the Iraqi people widened further as U.S combat soldiers searched Iraqi homes and appeared insensitive to Islamic customs such as not entering a house occupied by women without a Muslim male present. This lack of awareness among Coalition Forces contributed to the negative impression already taking root in the minds of many Iraqi citizens. Cultural awareness of an indigenous population is a core principle for providing legitimate security and social order to prevent civil disobedience and illegal activities; Cultural awareness is the very core of professional police and security institutional values.

An integral component of governance is public safety. In Iraq, that responsibility fell to the U.S. and its coalition partners following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. When lawlessness took root it resembled the symptoms of a virus, spreading from neighborhood to neighborhood, feeding on the weak and disenchanted, young and old alike. Criminal elements seeking to intimidate the populace united, using the powerful weapon of fear. Former regime enforcers used their reputations to victimize the public through violence and extortion. What was left of the criminal justice system had been disbanded since it was wrought with government supported corruption. Public
safety was nowhere to be found. Islamic fundamentalists seeking to expel the infidel Americans from their land seized this opportunity to spread death and terror among the average citizens. Iraqi citizens became vulnerable to anyone with a gun and a bomb strapped to their body. (They could choose to support the radical movement and enjoy some level of security, or choose not to support and fall victim to the terrorist tactics.) Thus the insurgency is born.

Countering an Insurgency

R. Scott Moore states “The ultimate objective of counterinsurgency strategy is lasting stability, but not one that is imposed and maintained by force or repression. Stability must provide the structures necessary to peacefully address issues that may continue to arise; those structures must be understood, institutionalized, and fully accepted by the population, who now feel they benefit from them. Moore also points out that “to be successful, counterinsurgencies must be perceived as legitimate. Legitimacy within the conflict zone occurs when populations, and their leaders, understand that the counterinsurgency result benefit them more than the alternative.”

“The government’s legitimacy becomes a center of gravity target during an insurgency, meaning the insurgents will attempt to demonstrate that the state cannot guarantee security within its territory.”

In, The Basics of Counterinsurgency, Moore also identifies six critical tasks of Counterinsurgency Strategy which identify a pathway for overcoming an insurgency. They are:

Establish and Maintain Security: This task is broken into three subcomponents: restoring security; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and maintaining
security. The re-establishment of basic public safety restores the confidence of the populace. Local law enforce must be given the opportunity the gain back the public’s trust. To gain trust and legitimacy local public safety agencies and defense forces must be given training if needed and the opportunity work independent of security forces. Restoring security is manpower-intensive; it requires well trained personnel with situational and cultural awareness.  

Provide Humanitarian and Essential Services: This task entails rebuilding the critical infrastructure, including public transportation, utilities, communication, medical aid, and the other basic quality of life services. This task will often enhance the effectiveness of security forces by minimizing vulnerability of the civilian population and mitigating the destructive effect of military operations. It is often identified as the first step in establishing political and economic development.

Promote Effective Governance: The populace must have confidence in their government from the local level up to the national level. The indigenous people must feel that their political leadership has their interest at heart, and not that of occupying force. Instead of installing so-called “democracies”, however, counterinsurgency strategies most often seek governance that creates a binding “social contract.” Government officials will gain legitimacy if they are viewed as not being propped up by an outside agency.

Sustain Economic Development: A broken economy is often the underlying reason that ignites an insurgency. A strong sustained economy helps maintain stability, effective governance, and long term prosperity. Military forces can be utilized to ensure shops and venders have a safe environment to conduct day-to-day business. They can
also be utilized for the collection of taxes. Economic development supports the creation of jobs. It can also falter because of fraud, corruption and incompetence which contribute to the insurgency.  

**Support Reconciliation:** To overcome an insurgency the underlying issues must be addressed. After the mutual slaughter that has occurred wounds have to be healed and the country put back together. All parties involved in the conflict including the occupying force must agree on how the peace or cessation of violence will be accomplished. A newly established judicial system must address atrocities committed by either side; this kind of justice is an important component for starting the healing process. 

**Foster Social Change.** Successful counterinsurgencies ultimately bring about political and social change. Insurgencies rarely erupt in societies that are effectively governed and have stable economies. Counterinsurgencies that attempt to maintain the status quo rarely succeed. To achieve lasting stability, pre-existing social conditions and attitudes must be addressed. But this did not mean a democratic government should be immediately installed.

Once operating only on the fringes of modernization, insurgent networks now use technological advances like the Internet to spread their propaganda and gain support. Growing economic disparity makes urban areas fertile ground for recruitment of new insurgents. European cities, with large numbers of ethnic and religious refugees, are becoming vital birth places of insurgent groups. “With the mass migration of humanity to cities and the inability of many developing nations to keep abreast of basic city services relative to growth, discontent erupts. Such conditions create conditions ripe for
supporting fundamentalist ideologue recruitment.\textsuperscript{21} Law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies are being stressed every day as new terrorist groups are discovered in their cities.

Moore describes the importance of social institutions and their impact on the fabric of public opinion. As a society emerges from conflict looking for beneficial change and well-being, it searches for a group to provide basic security and services as describe by Moore. Service, not legitimacy, is the primary objective. A populace searching for stability often finds those services within rogue elements who are seeking to gain their own approval through providing basic needs or through intimidation. The struggle for the population’s approval becomes a war of a slightly different nature, where the battle is now for the hearts and minds of the citizens. The victor in this competition gains public trust and confidence, setting the path for a nation’s future development as either a functioning lawful society, or one plagued by continued criminal or illicit activity.

Counterinsurgency warfare theorists in the twenty-first century will no doubt target the insurgents’ use of the media and their ability coordinate their actions with large organized criminal elements located in big cities around the world.\textsuperscript{22} Some insurgent groups are externally sponsored by sovereign states that seek to cause disorder and political instability in a neighboring country. This strategy offers an inexpensive way to avoid conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency forces must identify this threat and seek to neutralize its effects while minimizing the loss of life to their population. In some cases insurgent leaders will compete for the recruitment of new members by carrying out violent acts against innocent non-participants. These
incidents then cause the populace to lose confidence in local enforcement’s ability to protect them, then undermining the established authority.

**Counter Insurgency Capability**

Countering an insurgency requires forces and organizations capable of addressing the tenets described by Moore. Roles, missions, and responsibilities should be clearly outlined and understood by all organizations participating in the effort. Since security provides the basic foundation on which additional institutions and infrastructure can be built, it is logical to address its needs early on in the process. This enables a fledgling society emerging from conflict to take advantage of the “golden hour” and capitalize on emerging opportunities before to criminal and rogue elements gaining support. The composition of this force could vary from situation to situation, but the basic components would endure. As a minimum it must have the core principal of maintaining social order through legitimacy in the eyes of the population it intends to serve. Despite current U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is not necessarily the best tool to achieve long term success in this area.

Counterinsurgency theorist David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice that, “conventional warfare has been thoroughly analyzed in the course of centuries indeed for almost the extent of recorded history and the process of Battle has sliced into distinct phases: march towards the enemy, test of the enemy’s strength, exploitation of success, eventual retreat, etc.” Galula’s point is that in training for conventional warfare, soldiers are not challenged to deal with the issues that are characteristics of an insurgency. Galula asserts that, “in counterinsurgency warfare a soldier’s job is to help win the support of the population. Soldiers must also
learn to engage in practical politics”. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice was written in 1964 and based on Gulula’s experiences in China, Greece, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, and his first hand experience in French counterinsurgency of Algeria.

As Galula points out, there are special skills and considerations that have proven effective in the past contributing in counteracting an insurgency through the use of military forces. These successes come at the hands of more specialized not general purpose forces. Special Operations and Civil Affairs soldiers train for operations in less permissive environments or, more specifically in environments where success is measured by the indigenous populations’ ability to provide for, and self regulate its citizens.

US Special Operations Forces

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite, military units with special training and equipment. SOF train to infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialized training. These units total roughly 34,000 Active and 15,000 Reserve personnel in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, or about 2% of all U.S. active and reserve forces.

Special Operations (SO) deploy small units in direct or indirect military actions focused on strategic or operational objectives. They require units with combinations of trained specialized personnel, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations. Their mission skill sets
include but are not limited to, Unconventional Warfare, and Foreign Internal Defense. This particular skill set is valuable for addressing the lawless environment in the aftermath of conflict, focusing on training and assistance for government agencies trying to overcome subversion and hostile internal activities.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) deployed Liaison Coordination Elements (LCE) alongside Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) soldiers to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The LCE teams and the AFP exchanged subject matter experts, conducted civil affairs projects, and psychological operations. The object of the joint operation was to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which had been terrorizing the Philippine people for almost twenty years since the group’s founding.

Through the use of civil-military assistance programs, the LCE and the AFP have built and repaired roads, built schools and hospitals and began water drilling sites in an effort to improve the lives of the civilian populace. The AFP credit these projects with helping separate the population from the terrorist organizations. Because of the exchange of medical subject matter experts a quarter of a million patients have been treated by AFP personnel and LCE teams since 2002. The Commander of JSOTF-P COL David Maxwell reports that “in addition to these projects, military and information operations have created a paradigm shift within the community, denying sanctuary for terrorist elements and leaders.” The use of psychological operations is also having a measured effect. The PSYOP Reward for Justice program has rewarded informants $10 million for information to AFP about the activities and the location of terrorists. This information has led to the neutralization of two key Abu Sayyaf Group leaders. Vice
Admiral Eric Olson, deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command notes that “Our operation has a Philippine face on them. The people in the local areas are crediting the Philippine government for the goodness that is coming from the activity.” The Philippine government is winning the hearts and minds of the people and the Special Operations Forces are assisting in legitimizing of the government through the use of the LCE teams, who traditionally have the mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations in theater.30

Unfortunately the amount of training and resources required to create these forces make them a valuable yet scarce resource. Deployed globally to hot spots other than current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, these forces are generally used to address the greatest national security threats. So they are unable to work in every situation where their skill set would be beneficial.

The Military Police

US Military Police, though not a special operation force, possess many capabilities essential to undermining insurgent tactics to control populations. These core competencies serve five basic missions; Police Intelligence, Law and Order, Internment, Resettlement Operations, Maneuver, Mobility and Survivability, Operations.31 All five core missions focus on restoring and maintaining public order through establishment of the trust and confidence of the populations they serve. Often for US Military Police this may include US forces as well as indigenous populations.

In both domestic and International operations Military Police have proven essential in response to events such as disaster relief and police training activities. Like their civilian counterparts’ MPs, offer a disciplined and often, calming effect on
distraught citizens. US Military Police, in particular, are flexible and capable of transcending their strictly military role to provide particular services required in emergency situations such as disaster relief, emergency evacuation, and civil crisis. Like civilian law enforcement officers, Military Police are also adept at community policing.\textsuperscript{32} They are comfortable interacting with civilians in both domestic and international settings. This has been the case in Peacekeeping and Stabilization efforts most recently conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo, where Military Police joined cooperative efforts with the United Nations to develop community policing initiatives with local police agencies. With over 52% of the Military Police force structure resident in the Reserve Components, the added benefit for US Forces is that many of these soldiers bring their civilian police skills to the mission.

Civilian Police

Insurgency can also be prevented through the use civilian law enforcement. In a recent RAND Corporation Study commissioned by the US Army War College, Terrance K. Kelly, identifies this organization as Special Police Units (SPU) and Transitional Law Enforcement (TLE).\textsuperscript{33} Kelly says” the transitional period refers to the time during which the control of security is passed to the indigenous government as combat or some lesser form of intervention winds down. The Rand study “Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America” points out that several federal agencies have the law enforcement capabilities to deploy and operate on foreign soil. The U.S. Marshal Service (USMS), vested with the power to deputize other law enforcement personnel has the largest jurisdiction of any federal law enforcement agency.\textsuperscript{34} Under the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP) and the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) program have a vital capability to re-establish and support the rule of law, in a nation building scenario (ICITAP) is responsible for law enforcement training worldwide their website claims this training can custom-made to fit the host nation. ICITAP offers training at all levels of the criminal justice system in a comprehensive manner through employment of a large number of contract personnel who supplement a fairly austere full time ICITAP staff at the Justice Department.

Of course ICITAP training comes from the perspective of law enforcement in a democratic society. ICITAP is currently conducting law enforcement training in 17 countries. Albania, East Timor, Indonesia, Nigeria and Kosovo are representative of type of countries ICITAP tries to aid. Currently in Kosovo, police trained by ICITAP are deployed throughout the newly declared independent state. In partnership with ICITAP, Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) prides training to support the upper tier of a national criminal justice system, the judicial system. OPDAT’s principal mission targets international criminals and terrorist for prosecution before they can launch operations inside of U.S. borders. Through international cooperation OPDAT supports the rule of law by reinforcing a nation’s judicial system. They train prosecutors and judges in order to negate the power of intimidation used by organized criminal groups use against public officials and business leaders to subvert justice.

Any discussion of the use of US personnel for purposes of conducting, training, or advising police in a foreign government must include reference to Title 22 restrictions. Section 2420 of the Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits use of US funding to
support activities of this nature. However; as is often the case with prohibitions, several exceptions to this are sited in the U.S. Code. Specifically, funding for such activities are allowed in accordance with subparagraph (b): “with respect to assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purpose of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provisions of professional public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human rights.” As we develop strategies for successful operations in the aftermath of conflict, this exclusion can prove critical for a reconstruction program. U.S. planners should not limit their plan to the conducting of kinetic combat operations; they should also consider the effects that can achieved less violently through a more precise application of specialized police forces.

Conclusion

In Iraq, the environment that the U.S. military ultimately found themselves in; was not the environment it initially encountered in the spring of 2003. Although Iraq was ruled by a dictator, it was relatively stable. The decision by US and coalition partners to disband the Iraqi public safety institutions without a viable replacement proved harmful to Iraqi and Coalition Forces alike in the aftermath of the initial conflict. Military planners underestimated the importance of basic security and freedom of movement as precursors to maintaining a viable foundation for sustainable security. The Iraqi people quickly began to distrust U.S. forces based on impressions from the early encounters that were widely televised in Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities. Iraqi public safety and service issues appeared to assume a lower priority for U.S. forces than the capture of former members of Iraqi Regime. In the US efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from
power the “liberation” cast average Iraqis into far worse social conditions than they had experienced under Saddam. Where once homes previously had light and electricity, now there was darkness. Water no longer flowed at the turn of a faucet, and citizens struggled to find food to feed their families. Basic quality-of-life needs were not being addressed leaving Iraqi citizens to fend for themselves while combat operations continue to destroy their infrastructure and livelihoods. Many drew on their strong religious values for guidance. Criminal and extremist elements set about controlling the country while it was vulnerable; they attempted to fill the power vacuum left by the conflict with their own versions of social reform and civil institutions. Americans quickly recognized these efforts to influence the populace, but they were slow to react with changes in strategic policy to counter this new threat.

Because they did not acknowledge the magnitude of this threat, our military planners did not provide a means to counter it, leaving the Iraqi populace and Coalition Forces more vulnerable to the influences of radical forces seeking legitimacy and the opportunity to destroy U.S. forces. Crossing the thin line between occupier and partner could have been avoided had military planners understood that the security of the population and the expedient restoration of basic services would enhance and strengthen the perception of legitimacy for all organizations.

Recommendation

As noted at the beginning of this analysis, insurgency is defined as “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to
weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.”

Strategist B. H. Liddell Hart advised that to counter guerrilla warfare regular forces had to abandon the principle of concentration and modify their tactics to frustrate and neutralize the guerrilla force. Recognizing that conventional strategy was not an effective counter-insurgency strategy, Hart identified this principle as fluidity of force. It logically follows that in the current environment U.S. strategist must abandon their exclusive focus on conventional warfare and instead concentrate on the more fluid strategies needed to counter insurgencies.

The benefit of addressing these new environments before allowing conditions to deteriorate to a point that direct kinetic action by conventional forces is necessary and cannot be ignored. Avoiding instability by creating and/or supporting legitimate security institutions that can provide public security early on in a campaign must be addressed during planning, when appropriate stabilizing capabilities must be incorporated into the mission. The security needed for long term stability may initially be “imposed”, which can be brought about through force and Martial Law, but it must be assured through long-term programs focused on sustainable security. Application and enforcement of acceptable social standards and conduct serve to offset the environmental conditions that promote an insurgency. This enforcement is best provided by trained professionals. Professionally trained, equipped and legitimate police provide the foundation for the rule of law. Without rule of law, illicit power structures, criminals, and insurgents will continue to thrive and undermine legitimate efforts to reconstitute and reconstruct countries emerging from conflict.
Military Planners for future engagements such as Iraq should seek to craft strategies that encompass the requirements for safety, security, and restoration of infrastructure. These basic elements collectively guarantee citizens basic social order and civil support. Planners must focus holistically on total social infrastructure requirements in order to form a comprehensive long term strategy that creates a sustainable peace, capable of outlasting the presence of occupation or “liberation” forces. The starting point of this strategy must include stabilizing considerations that establish and promote security and the rule of law. Strategist must consider the formulation of a standing force or capability appropriate to the size of the indigenous population to provide for and later train legitimate indigenous law enforcement professionals.

Equal consideration should be given to parallel strategic efforts to address the need to provide the basic requirements of electricity, water and emergency services to the populace. These elements could be comprised of military personnel and contracted civilians with the special skills that it takes to restore an urban area.

Counterinsurgency warfare theory has found new life in the twenty-first century. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fueled new interest in the old theories of last century. B. H. Liddell Hart and David Galula are acknowledged as relevant today as they were when their books were first published. R. Scott Moore’s “The Basic of Counterinsurgency” offers contemporary insight on counterinsurgency strategy.

Twenty-first century warfare will be triggered by policy driven belligerents who avoid conventional warfare and seek to overthrow governments through violence. LTG David H. Petraeus supports this view in a recent Military Review essay:
The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they clearly are the wars we must master. America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strength—firepower, maneuver technology—and come at us and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative, therefore, that we continue to learn from our experiences in those countries, both to succeed in those endeavors and to prepare for the future.40

State-supported conventional forces are simply unable to defeat insurgencies using military means alone. Insurgents utilize the media and other technology to advance their cause and to network with other insurgent groups. Counterinsurgency warfare must adapt to the use of other than military strategies to influence the populace from sympathizing with the insurgent issues and becoming potential recruits.41 Counterinsurgent forces must possess the skill sets required to set conditions for security in order to provide a foundation for long-term sustainable stability.

Endnotes


5 Galula, 4.

6 Ibid., 8.

7 Moore, 22.

8 Ibid., 15.

10 Ibid., 6.

11 Ibid., 7.

12 Moore, 16.

13 Ibid., 22.


15 Moore, 17.

16 Ibid., 19.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.


22 Ibid.

23 Galula, 84.

24 Ibid., 95


28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 19.

30 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 81.

33 Terrence K. Kelly, Options for transitional Security Capabilities for America (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), xi.

34 Ibid., 24.


36 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?: America’s Search For A Postconflict Stability Force, 190.


41 Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson, 56.