NATO LOGISTICS REFORM: CENTRAL TO NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF) SUCCESS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The period after the end of the Cold War marked significant changes for NATO, as formally recognized by both the 1999 NATO Strategic Alliance and the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague. Although the alliance remains primarily a unified defense accord, the current strategic and operational environment has necessitated the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) capability for crisis response expeditionary missions throughout the world. NRF Logistics is the most critical enabler of future NATO operations, and as such, NATO logistics must be reconfigured and NATO logistics organizations reorganized to meet the challenges of the new operating environment. Although NATO has made some progress to improve logistics, significant changes are still needed to ensure logistics doctrine, organization, structure, capabilities and vision can adequately support NRF operations. This document provides background on the NATO Response Force and examines and assesses its current logistics doctrine, vision, and objectives. It concludes with four recommendations for significantly improving NRF logistics.
NATO's new expeditionary role...has had a significant second-order effect on the concept of national logistics. Because nations can no longer draw on their own pre-positioned stocks within their boundaries, they create their own logistics pipelines from Europe or North America to the theater of operations. This arrangement requires parallel supply structures and redundancy of effort...However, the fiscal policy of "cost lie where they fall" means that nations will avoid consolidating requirements unless they can be certain they will recoup any expenses incurred. This policy translates into significant change for the NATO combined-joint logistician (CJ4). 

The period after the end of the Cold War marked significant changes for NATO, as formally recognized by both the 1999 NATO Strategic Alliance and the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague. Although the alliance remains primarily a unified defense accord, the current strategic and operational environment has necessitated the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) capability for crisis response expeditionary missions throughout the world. NRF Logistics is the most critical enabler of future NATO operations, and as such, NATO logistics must be reconfigured and NATO logistics organizations reorganized to meet the challenges of the new operating environment. Although NATO has made some progress to improve logistics, significant changes are still needed to ensure logistics doctrine, organization, structure, capabilities and vision can adequately support NRF operations. This document provides background on the NATO Response Force and examines and assesses its current logistics doctrine, vision, and objectives. It concludes with four recommendations for significantly improving NRF logistics.

Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has become the key military organization within NATO to execute non-Article 5 missions - or crisis response operations - that foster stability, preserve peace and promote Alliance security
interests throughout the world. Recently, General John Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe stated, “The NATO Response Force is a ready, agile and flexible force crucial to the health and success of our alliance in the coming years. As a key element of our NATO military culture, the NRF can enable the alliance to better meet threats to security and stability in the 21st century.” Both the 1999 Strategic Concept and the 2002 Prague Summit focused on the vision of the NRF and its importance to overall NATO operations. Nonetheless, NATO must continue to develop and implement a comprehensive approach to ensure NRF Logistics, the key enabler of the force, can adequately sustain operations in the future. Yet despite NATO leaders’ declaration of the need for change, NATO logistics has remained relatively unchanged over the last ten years. There have only been marginal adjustments in logistics concepts used in both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and NRF support to Pakistan in 2005. NATO has continued to treat logistics as an exclusively national responsibility. NATO Logistics framework continues to exhibit unnecessary redundancy, lack of responsiveness, and inefficiencies associated with both cost and resources. General (Ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, admitted in a 2006 speech to the NATO Defense College the need for what he described as “focused logistics” as a replacement for the “sacred cow” of national logistics in order “to tailor the tail component of deployed forces to the need in the theatre and, most importantly, to abandon eventually the still-observed NATO principle of logistics being a national responsibility.” General Naumann then cited the examples of the International Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) support to Bosnia in 1996, during which experts estimated that multinational logistics could have reduced the
logistics footprint by almost 50% in both manpower and stocks. Before real change can occur with regard to logistics, NATO culture must change. Leaders must recognize the fact that logistics can no longer be based on a European Cold War scenario where nations defended their territorial sovereignty and drew sustenance from their own stocks. Beginning with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Military Committee (MC), and continuing throughout NATO, significant evolutionary changes must be initiated to ensure the success of future non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

**Background**

The 1990s saw NATO institute a myriad of command and control structural changes dictated by the post-Cold War environment, including NATO's transformation to an emergency response organization. It was during this period of time when NATO also reduced its military structure significantly – from a 4-tiered, 65-headquarter organization to a more flexible 3-tiered 20-headquarter structure. During that decade, NATO military operations were almost totally focused on the stability of Eastern Europe, with missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia serving as the major catalysts for change.

The Washington and Prague Summits of 1999 and 2002, respectively, were significant milestones in developing the future vision of NATO, following the end of the Cold War. Both forums spearheaded the impetus for transformation in NATO. Heads of state began transforming the alliance from a mutual defense network to a world-wide non-Article 5 crisis response organization. To be sure, NATO quickly recognized that the world had changed since the end of the Cold War. However, during the 1996
Washington Summit, NATO leaders began to consider the alliance’s role in the emerging post-Cold War global security environment.

Figure 1 – NATO Command Structure (2004)  

During the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO leaders approved a new Strategic Alliance Concept, which focused on identifying the purpose and tasks of the alliance, understanding the strategic perspectives associated with the evolving environment, outlining NATO’s approach to security in the 21st Century, and implementing new guidelines for the alliance’s forces. The new concept (which had not been updated since 1991) provided for three key evolutionary changes for the Alliance:

First, the NATO revalidated its charter to perform its fundamental security tasks: Security, Consultation, and Deterrence and Defense. Second, the new Strategic Alliance Concept now focused more NATO responsibilities for crisis management and partnership throughout the world. Third, the Concept addressed the criticality of NATO being able to contribute to global stability through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

So this new strategic concept shaped the NATO vision for the future decade and served as the cornerstone for the 2002 Prague Summit.
The NATO Summit at Prague in 2002 then provided the impetus for transforming the NATO Command and Control Structure to meet the challenging operational environment of the 21st century. As Charles L. Barry, an expert in transatlantic relations and transformation strategies, observed: “[The Summit] was a major milestone in the evolution of alliance command structure and future military posture.” As a result of this summit, Allied Command Operations (ACO) replaced Allied Command Europe (ACE). Allied Command Transformation (ACT) was formerly established, SHAPE was restructured, and formation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) was introduced. Later in 2003, NATO leaders approved the new NATO Military Command Structure and eventually reduced its number of commands and redefined organizational responsibilities. Today, ACO is responsible for all current NATO operations, while ACT is responsible for long-term transformation of the Alliance to ensure success in any mission, whether it is NATO defense-related or in support of non-Article 5 crisis response operations, throughout the world.

As NATO has become a global entity, ACT contributes to preserving the peace, security and territorial integrity of Alliance member states by leading the military transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities, focusing on areas such as training and education, concept development, experimentation, and research and technology and using NATO's ongoing operations and work with the NATO Response Force (NRF) to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance.

The NATO Response Force (NRF)

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is the centerpiece for NATO operations in support of non-Article 5 missions; this organization remains at the forefront of NATO transformation. The NRF is a joint, multinational force (consisting of up to 25,000 personnel). This highly ready and technologically advanced unit includes land, air, sea,
and special forces components that the Alliance can quickly deploy wherever needed.\textsuperscript{18}

Once deployed, this agile, flexible response force can sustain itself for 30 days (longer, if resupplied) and can serve as the initial elements for follow-on forces in support of a larger deployment of NATO forces.\textsuperscript{19} The NRF, which became fully operational in late 2006, is subordinate to a deployable Combined, Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQ.\textsuperscript{20} As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO reports, “The NRF will…give us a highly capable quick-reaction force that is ready for operational deployment whenever required.”\textsuperscript{21} The mission of the NRF is to deploy on short-notice (with 5-30 days notice to move) in support of NATO expeditionary operations across a spectrum of seven potential missions, depicted in Figure 2.

![Potential NRF Missions](image)

**Potential NRF Missions**

1. Initial Entry Force into a hostile environment, with or without host nation support.
2. Support to counterterrorism operations
3. Crisis response operations
4. Embargo operations
5. Non-combat evacuation
6. Support to consequence management operations, including Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) events and humanitarian crisis situations
7. Demonstrative force package for diplomatic package for diplomatic and/or deterrence purposes

Figure 2 – Potential NRF Missions \textsuperscript{22}

**NRF Logistics**

According to the 2007 NATO Logistics Handbook, Logistics is defined as “the science and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition or construction,
maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health support.\textsuperscript{23} NATO policy and doctrine are hierarchical, so the Military Committee policy documents drive doctrine, which in turn generates the concepts for techniques, tactics, and procedures, including logistics directives. Several interconnected NATO Military Committee policy documents have governed the creation of the NRF. The key MC logistics documents\textsuperscript{24} are listed below:

- **MC 055/4** - NATO Logistics Readiness and Sustainable Policy
- **MC 319/2** - NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
- **MC 477** - NATO NRF Concept
- **MC 526** - Logistics Support Concept for NATO Response Force Operations
- **MC 551** - Medical Support concept for NRF Operations

![Structure of Logistics Policy and Guidance](image)

**Figure 3 – Structure of Logistics Policy and Guidance\textsuperscript{25}**

NATO Logistics Vision and Objectives (V&O), approved by the Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference in March 2007, provide direction and focus for internal NATO organizations over the next ten years.\textsuperscript{26} Soon after approval of the V&O, NATO HQ and Strategic Command logistics staffs developed specific requirements to support the
objectives. The 2005 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), MC 550 (MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the CPG), the Ministerial guidance 2006, NATO Military Authorities (NMA) Strategic Priorities and Objectives (SPO) 2008-2012, and the 1999 Strategic Alliance Concept all influenced and shaped the NATO Logistics vision, objective, and requirements for the future (2007-2016). Upon examination, it is clear that the transformed logistics construct builds on current support concepts, structure, and capabilities to achieve the vision outlined in the 1999 Strategic Alliance Concept. Overall, the vision aimed at a collective responsibility for logistics support to NATO operations; a robust logistics command and control structure to ensure unity of effort; institution of multinational approaches to improve efficiencies; maximization of joint, multinational interoperability; and coordination and cooperation in logistics planning in order to ensure synchronized logistics operations.

![NATO Logistics Objectives, 2007-2016](image)

**Figure 4 – NATO Logistics Objectives, 2007-2016**

NRF Logistics is based on the comprehensive NATO principles and polices outlined in MC 319 (Overall NRF Policies and Principles). Basic NATO logistics doctrine has been developed according to 10 principles and NATO logistics policies focus on
specific details associated with logistics C2, authority for redistribution of logistics assets within the JOA, and the concept of multinational logistics.

NATO Logistics Principles

- **Collective Responsibility** - Encourages nations and NATO to co-operatively share the provision and use logistic capabilities and resources to support the force effectively and efficiently.
- **Authority** - The NATO Commander at the appropriate level must be given sufficient authority over logistics resources necessary to enable him to receive, employ, sustain, and re-deploy forces assigned to his nations in the most effective manner.
- **Primer of Operational Requirements** - All logistic support efforts from both military and civil sectors should be focused to satisfy operational requirements.
- **Co-operation** - Across full spectrum operations of logistics will contribute to the best use of limited resources.
- **Coordination** - Logistics support must be coordinated among nations and between NATO and nations at all levels.
- **Assured Provision** - Nations and NATO must ensure the provision of logistics resources to support forces allocated to NATO and should be coordinated as a matter of routine.
- **Sufficiency** - Must be available in the appropriate quantity and quality when and where it is required throughout the full spectrum of the Alliance’s possible missions.
- **Efficiency** - Needs must be identified in a timely manner to optimize the efficient provision and effective use of such resources.
- **Flexibility** - Logistics support must be proactive, adaptive, and responsive to achieve the objective.
- **Visibility and Transparency** - NATO Commanders require timely and accurate exchange of information among nations and NATO to prioritize consignment movement into and within the Joint Operating Area to allow for redirection and to effectively employ logistics within the JOA.

Figure 5 – NATO Logistics Principles

The 2007 NATO Handbook describes multinational logistics as “a tool which depending on the operational requirements and the specific situation, can enhance efficiency and effectiveness.” The document goes on to address the advantages of multinational logistics as opposed to the old paradigm of national logistics responsibilities within NATO. “More specifically, the benefits of multinational logistics can be the reduction of the overall cost of the logistics footprint, the ability of nations to contribute their fair share of support, the improvement of the force’s flexibility, the conservation of scarce resources and a better use of specific national expertise.”

NATO doctrine specifies three ways of achieving multinational logistics solutions:

1) pre-planned mutual support, HNS, and contract support are arranged bilaterally or multilaterally by NATO and/or nations, 2) a nation formally agrees to provide support or services to all or part of the multinational
force, 3) one or more nations serves all or part of the multinational under the control of the multinational commander.\textsuperscript{34}

Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 4.9, \textit{Modes of Multinational Logistics Doctrine}, then identifies six modes of multinational logistics: lead nation logistics support, role specialist nation, mutual support, common-funded logistics resources, multinational integrated logistics support (includes aircraft cross-serving), and contracting support.\textsuperscript{35}

Regardless of the modes or concepts considered in achieving multinational logistics solutions, the \textit{doctrine} remains clear: Nations retain control of their logistics resources and units. As such, nations may voluntarily offer to participate in the new logistics solutions outlined in AJP 4.0, \textit{Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine}; however, logistics fundamentally remains a national responsibility.

Within the construct, the logistics concept for NRF operations builds on NATO principles and policies and utilizes the Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) as the key logistics organization within the NRF structure. The purpose of the JLSG is to plan, synchronize, and execute theater-level logistics to support NRF units in their conduct of NATO multinational, expeditionary operations.\textsuperscript{36} The JLSG serves as the key logistics enabler for NRF units. It is not a standing organization within NATO, but rather is sourced on a rotational basis (on the same rotational timeline as the other NRF units) through national offers. The source document for soliciting national contributions is the combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR). The JLSG consists of subordinate organizations across the spectrum of logistics functions. The success of the JLSG hinges on its ability to achieve integrated logistics, cited in NRF Logistics Policy (MC 526) \textit{Integrated logistics consists of three pillars: unity of logistics command, joint interoperability, and multinational logistics solutions}.\textsuperscript{37} Although portions of the JLSG
have deployed in support of NRF operations and exercises over the past three years, it has not achieved true unity of command. Since logistics remains a national responsibility in NATO operations, lack of unified multinational command remains an obstacle in violation of the NATO logistics principles outlined in both MC 526 and AJP 4.0. Interestingly enough, AJP 4.0 has not been updated to address the concept, roles, and functions of a JLSG, despite its importance to non-Article 5 crisis response missions undertaken by the NRF. The latest version of the NATO Handbook does acknowledge the JLSG as part of NRF operations; however, the concept of a unified logistics command and multinational logistics solutions remain a vision, unrealized in current doctrine and operations.

Recent Historical Examples of NATO Logistics

In Afghanistan over the last four years, the NATO-sponsored International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) achieved only marginal logistics success based on current NATO principles. The JLSG construct was not utilized, national stovepipes created significant inefficiencies, and theater distribution of resources lacked assured provision, flexibility, and sufficiency. Yet despite these shortfalls, NATO has made some progress in achieving some logistics milestones through the establishment of forward support bases (FSBs)\textsuperscript{38} or logistics hubs through which several nations provided specified classes of supply.\textsuperscript{39} Through funding initiatives and use of NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), NATO has been able to improve logistics infrastructure and establish bulk fuel installation sites at several locations throughout the AOR.\textsuperscript{40} However, the challenges associated with the old NATO paradigm that logistics is a national
responsibility remains generally constant. As B.H Liddell Hart once stated, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.”

Exercise STEADFAST JAGUAR, a 2006 training exercise in the Cape Verde Islands designed to certify NRF’s operating capability, also yielded only limited successes in the area of logistics. Although the JLSG successfully deployed, it failed to demonstrate significant progress in compliance with NATO logistics principles. The JLSG itself estimated that as much as 40% of the support assets deployed were considered excess due to common funding constraints and flawed logistics command and control.\(^{42}\) In addition, strategic air flow was sub-optimal and could have been reduced by over 50% and over 2004 (40%) of the host nation vehicle pool was consumed due to intra-theater ground transportation shortages.\(^{43}\) Major General (USA) Gary Harrell, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at Joint Forces Command Brunssum and Commander of the Deployable Joint Task Force for the NRF during STEADFAST JAGUAR, concluded that although the JLSG worked well, lack of control over the national support element assets unnecessarily increased the logistics footprint by almost 50%.\(^{44}\) Robert Bell, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, offered a more detailed assessment:

Most observers agree that one of the most significant weak links in the NRF to date has been with its multinational Joint Logistics Support Group. This is due principally to the fact that most NATO Allies are simply too small to have theatre-level assets in the logistics field, and others much prefer to rely upon their own national logistics support elements for crisis response operations and expeditionary missions. The result too often has been the need to paste together disparate national elements, rather than achieve a more efficient and effective integrated logistics structure to support the NRF.\(^{45}\)
Therefore, based on NATO’s own assessments, although the exercise successfully deployed and utilized the JLSG, the current NATO logistics framework again proved insufficient to truly achieve the logistics progress envisioned by NATO senior leaders.

Recommendations

Based on the 1999 Strategic Alliance Concept and the recent NATO Summits (2002, 2004, and 2006), the NRF will continue to be the key military means by which NATO conducts initial operations. However, NRF will achieve only marginal success, at best, unless NATO logistics undergoes a comprehensive revision, with changes synchronized and integrated within NATO policies, doctrine, and structure. A needed NATO “transformation in logistics”, although evolutionary in nature, must be implemented along several lines of operations: Vision, Doctrine/Policy, Organization, and Capabilities. These widespread changes are critical for improving NATO logistics. They must be implemented through a strategy and vision that gives real authority to NATO leaders at the theater strategic and operational levels to synchronize

![Proposed Campaign Plan for NATO Logistics Reform](image-url)

Figure 6 – Proposed Plan for NATO Logistics Reform
and redistribute logistics assets and implement multinational solutions in the Joint Operating Area (JOA).

Recommendation 1: Refine NATO Logistics Vision and Objectives

As a start point, NATO Logistics Vision & Objectives (V&O) must be refined to reflect the importance of the NRF. The currently promulgated vision does not mention the NRF, although it does address the concept of providing responsive and usable logistics in support of NATO operations. This vision should be nested with the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), the Ministerial Guidance, the Strategic Alliance Concept, and the NATO Summit meetings. The NATO Logistics V&O must reflect the new operating environment as well as NATO’s intent to deploy this military organization globally to respond to certain kinds of crises.\(^\text{46}\) The NATO Logistics V&O was approved by the Senior NATO Logisticians’ Conference (SNLC) in 2006.\(^\text{47}\) Although it contains eight relevant and logical objectives for NATO logistics over the next 10 years, the document falls short of focusing a prioritized effort directly on the NRF. To be fair, there are several logistics objectives which support NRF objectives within the construct. However, NRF is not explicitly cited as supporting these objectives. NATO Logistics Objectives 3, 4, and 5 do address NRF concepts, but overall the objectives focus on full-spectrum operations, rather than crisis response operations. The SNLC’s current focus seems to be on the inevitability of graduated response in defense of the alliance, but not on NRF operations. This is an out-dated paradigm.

The NATO Logistics Requirements developed by the NATO HQ and Strategic Command (SC) logistics staffs must be revised to better reflect future NRF logistics posture to support crisis response operations in the upcoming years. Again, these
requirements do provide solid performance measures associated with NATO Logistics; however, NRF logistics does not get the required focus. Of the 50 requirements listed in support of the NATO Logistics V&O, only 6 (just 12%) are linked directly to the NRF. This mismatch confirms the fact that the vision for NRF and its enablers is not synchronized with overall NATO guidance.

Refined NATO Logistics Vision & Objectives will set the conditions for achieving unity of logistics effort and command. New Logistics V&O will also enhance the NRF concept and facilitate building logistics capabilities throughout the entire NATO HQ structure. Ultimately, updated NATO Logistics V&O that focus specifically on NRF logistics will increase the synergy between NATO leaders and the Logistics & Resources Division (L&R) as well as the other four divisions of the IMS staff. Equally important, the four subordinate bodies of the SNLC – Logistics Staff Meeting (LSM), Movement and Transportation Group (M&TG), Standing Group of Partner Logistics Experts (SG PLE), and Logistics Information Management Group (LOG IMG) – will focus on the same areas and exhibit unity of effort in their logistics vision and initiatives.

The most effective method for refining the NATO Logistics V&O would be to specify this primary objective: Develop NATO NRF Logistics to ensure no shortfalls in support to crisis response operations. In turn, the ACO/ACT requirements should specify NRF Logistics performance measures across the DOTLMPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities) functions – in essence providing a campaign plan for achieving NRF Logistics objectives. This synchronization methodology will not only prove successful for NRF
logistics, but could provide the foundation for improvement of overall NATO logistics in the post-Cold War era.

Recommendation 2: Revise Military Committee Policy and NATO Logistics Doctrine

The Military Committee policy on NATO Logistics must be streamlined and revised to direct a synchronized, comprehensive approach to conducting expeditionary, multinational military missions in support of world-wide NATO non-Article 5 crisis responses. Currently, there are at least ten active Military Committee (MC) Policies which either directly or indirectly govern NRF Logistics policies. As written and published, these MC publications not only cause some uncertainty regarding the key overarching logistics principles and policies within NATO, but also fail to identify the NATO Response Force logistics as the single, most critical function within the organization. For example, MC 319 identifies logistics principles while MC 526 (Logistics Support Concept for NATO Response Force Operations) discusses multinational logistics solutions. Additionally, MC 551 (Medical Support for NRF Operations) discusses medical policy for NRF – a concept which should have been merged with MC 526 in accordance with the definition of NATO logistics. In order to provide NATO with focused, comprehensive logistics policies, MCs must be rewritten or updated to accurately reflect NATO’s synchronized approach to logistics principles and policies.

After MC documents and the NATO Logistics Vision & Objective for the next 10 years have been revised, NATO must focus on revising its logistics doctrine so that it is consistent with doctrine in Allied Joint and Logistics Publications (AJP and ALP). Currently, the primary Objective of the NATO Logistics Vision & Objectives is to develop
NATO Logistics Concepts, Policies, and Doctrine. This objective, however, focuses mostly on the ability of NATO logistics posture to support the full spectrum operations, not specifically the NRF.\textsuperscript{51}

Currently, approximately ten AJPs and ALPs are incorporated into NATO logistics.\textsuperscript{52} These publications form the foundation for logistics techniques, tactics, and procedures at the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels.\textsuperscript{53} Since the creation of the NRF and its key logistics organization, the Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG), AJP 4.6, \textit{Multinational Joint Logistics Centre}, at the very least, must be significantly revised, if not totally rescinded. NATO Principles for Logistics have changed in part due to the Strategic Alliance Concept as well as emerging filed doctrine based on the development of the JLSG for NRF operations. Incorporating both Multinational Joint Logistics Centers and JLSGs into NATO structure only causes confusion and violates the principle of simplicity. NATO Logistics doctrine, given NATO’s new focus on joint, expeditionary, deployable logistics to support global requirements, now more closely mirrors United States logistics doctrine. So NATO must commit to key logistics characteristics and imperatives such as integration (synchronization and efficiency thru economies of scale)\textsuperscript{54}, unity of effort\textsuperscript{55}, and responsiveness (anticipating requirements and executing rapid and precise response).\textsuperscript{56} Given the nature of the multinational NRF, NATO must adopt the logistics principle of command authority to ensure that logistics commanders have the flexibility to allocate and commit and potentially reposition logistics resources on the battlefield, in accordance with agreed-upon multinational solutions. Multinational solutions are currently the exception, not the norm in NATO. In order for NRF operations to be truly effective, NATO must build an executive logistics
command, not an agency or center, to serve as the single joint command for the 
execution and synchronization of strategic and theater-level logistics within NATO. As 
Major William Farmen (USA Ret.) has pointed out in a *Joint Forces Quarterly* article:

> As new roles surface for NATO, so too do shortfalls in its ability to execute 
> them. Initial efforts have proven inadequate in terms of logistics, reflecting 
> a lack of doctrine to enable the Alliance to react flexibly and sustain 
> deployments outside its operational area. This flaw is exacerbated by the 
> absence of an organization to integrate logistics from planning through 
> execution.”

Recommendation 3: Create a NATO Logistics Headquarters 

Currently there is no standing logistics organization within NATO. A new NATO 
Logistics Headquarters would not only serve as the standing joint logistics HQ for NATO 
but would be staffed and structured to conduct split-based operations and serve as the 
theater-strategic/operational level HQ to support NRF operations within a Joint 
Operating Area (JOA). This NATO joint logistics command would achieve both unity of 
command and effort for the planning, synchronization, and execution of logistics in 
support of both Article 5 defense and non-Article 5 crisis response operations within 
NATO. This new organization would facilitate development of long-term multinational 
logistics solutions – a goal that has not been fully accomplished, partly due to current 
rotational design of the current JLSG and the marginal successes of the Multinational 
Logistics Centers currently at the NATO Joint Forces Command level. The roles and 
responsibilities of this HQ must focus on ensuring synchronized support of NATO forces 
from national stocks, host nation support, and NAMSA resources. It is absolutely 
imperative that this organization form the cornerstone for NATO logistics reform. It is 
this organization that will assume the responsibility for developing all six modes of 
multinational solutions. In developing and ensuring long-term continuity in multinational
logistics, this command will not only optimize resource allocation and efficiencies, reduce aggregate cost, and reinforce the NATO logistics principles (as discussed earlier), but will also set the conditions for ensuring successful logistics support for potential NRF operations.

The Joint Logistics Command HQ must be resourced to execute appropriate joint staff functions and must be comprised of three subordinate HQ: a supply and distribution management HQ responsible for logistics stocks, sustainment, and ground and rotary wing transportation/distribution; a support command responsible for theater Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI); a contracting HQ responsible for current operations (common funding contracting initiatives) and for third party logistics support services (TPLSS). A NAMSA cell would play a critical role in ensuring that standing contracts fill potential national logistics gaps which would affect NATO operations both in defense of the alliance or as part of NRF operations. National Logistics Support Teams (NLST) will be part of this organization, charged with facilitating multinational agreements for potential NATO military operations. These NLSTs must have the authority to negotiate logistics resources on behalf of their nations. Using this robust construct, the Military Committee and SNLC will continue to set logistics policy within NATO, while the NATO Logistics Command would plan, synchronize, and execute logistical support to NATO military organizations.

This proposed NATO logistics command must also be capable of executing split-based operations by deploying forward into a JOA and conducting both JRSOI and theater sustainment of a NATO Response Force. This forward deployable HQ will have similar roles and responsibilities to a U.S. Theater Support Command (TSC), which is
the primary U.S. organization responsible for theater-level logistics and RSOI in an AOR. The major difference between this forward NATO logistics command and the JLSG is that it will be a standing organization not sourced sporadically through a force generation process involving a CJSOR. Thus, multinational logistics solutions will have already been established in the planning phases, thereby determining contributions, synchronizing logistics resources, and reducing the logistics tail before the NRF deployment. Additionally, based on the lessons learned from recent NATO operations and exercises, the Joint Logistics Support Group, although a great concept, is under-resourced, undermanned, insufficiently trained, and unable to deploy quickly. With each NRF rotation, CJTF HQ and JLSG HQ leadership must re-negotiate bilateral and multinational arrangements to achieve multinational logistics solutions. This lack of continuity and expertise in the current NRF construct is not only counterproductive, but is a detriment to NRF readiness and operations. By contrast, the standing logistics command becomes not only a key enabler for NRF operations but corrects the current problems of the JLSG and better enables continuous multinational solutions.

The question then becomes how NATO can gain consensus among nations to create this headquarters. First, NATO partners must understand that the Manning “billpayers” for this standing logistics organization will be the MJLCs within each JFC HQ (Brunssum, Naples, and Lisbon) and the Rear Support Commands within each NATO Corps-level HQ structure. In addition, some studies of previous NATO military operations show that logistics footprints revealed over 50% excess supplies due to national stove-piping. Not only did this produce an unnecessarily large logistics footprint, but these additional requirements placed a significant burden on both strategic
and intra-theater lift. For some classes of supply, such as maintenance repair parts or individual equipment, multinational logistics solutions are difficult to achieve. However, for other classes of supply (specifically fuel, rations, construction materiel, consumable supplies, etc.), bilateral and multinational agreements can easily achieve economies of scale and significantly reduce the logistics footprint in the JOA. It is also important that this new NATO Logistics Command be adequately funded to execute efficient logistics processes and implement multinational solutions which provide for long-term cost savings. Common funding policy must also be revised in order to ensure flexible, responsive logistics support to NATO units. In the end, NATO partners must realize that this HQ will not significantly increase the size of the NATO structure, will provide long-term cost savings for both NATO and the partner nations, and will ensure successful support of any NATO crisis response operations.

Recommendation 4: Focus on Developing Logistics Enablers

Finally, NATO must focus on developing five enablers which are essential for providing the best logistics support to NRF operations. The logistics enablers associated with strategic lift, intra-theatre movement and distribution (air, ground), logistics common operating picture software systems, and operations logistics chain management (OLCM) systems\textsuperscript{60} are critical to continued NATO logistics development. Several of these enablers are already being explored, developed, or implemented within NATO; however, these systems and assets must be given the highest priority. The enablers noted above will not only improve core logistics capabilities and facilitate principles and doctrine, but will also prove successful to supporting crisis response operations. These enablers will facilitate NRF deployment to a JOA within the
established timelines of 5-30 days, will allow for flexible logistics response to NATO commanders, will optimize logistics efficiency and agility, and will ultimately reduce the logistics footprint in theater. These enablers provide focus for the international military staff – specifically for NAMSO, Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), and SNLC – which represent the three life cycle domains of NATO Logistics.\(^6\) CNAD is responsible for production logistics (research, design, development, manufacture, and acceptance of materiel) and includes representation from the International Staff Defense Investment Division and the Armaments Branch of the Logistics and Resource Division.\(^6\) NAMSO is the primary NATO organization responsible for those functions that deal with procurement receiving, storing, distributing, and disposing of materiel.\(^6\) SNLC remains the primary authority for consumer logistics. It is important for the NATO Logistics Vision and Objective to address these five logistics enablers in order to ensure the all three components of the logistics life cycle are synchronized and focused on the correct logistics capabilities – those which enhance the NRF readiness posture. With regard to the integration and synchronization of NATO’s logistics life cycle, it is important for NAMSA, a component of NAMSO, to have a representative cell in the newly formed NATO Joint Logistics HQ to facilitate the execution of consumer logistics during current and planned NATO military operations, in particular those involving deployments of the NRF.
In conclusion, NATO leadership has continued to stress the importance of operating in new environments. So although NATO remains primarily a mutual defense consortium, it must be able to execute NRF crisis response operations as either a stand-alone expeditionary unit or as an initial entry force for graduated response. That said, NRF logistics is absolutely essential to NATO military mission success. During the upcoming years, NATO must comprehensively reform its logistics construct. NATO logistics reform must include C2 restructure, doctrine revision, and process transformation. Over the last five years, NATO has made marginally progress in its logistics posture. However, NATO’s changes must embrace adjustments in policy, process, and organization. These changes are essential for building the joint, expeditionary, rapidly deployable, and flexible response force required in the post-Cold War era. NATO can no longer embrace a logistics doctrine and organization reliant on large logistics tails with extreme redundancy, given the scarcity of strategic lift and characteristics of the current strategic environment. As General (Ret.) Eric Shinseki, former Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army, once stated, “If you don’t like change, you’re
going to like irrelevance even less.\textsuperscript{65} NATO logistics must undergo comprehensive reform and change.

\textbf{Endnotes}


6 Ibid.

7 Toczek, 61.

8 Barry, 3.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 4.


12 Ibid.

13 U.S. Department of State, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,”

14 Barry, 1.

15 Ibid., 4.
16 Ibid.


19 Ibid.

20 Barry, 7.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 4.

24 Ibid., 80-81, 97.

25 Ibid., 80.


28 Ibid., 1-1.

29 Del Pozo, 1-2.

30 Vanesse.


32 Ibid., 93.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 98.

36 Ibid., 95.

37 Ibid., 96.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.


46 Vanesse, 1-1.

47 Ibid., 1.

48 Ibid.


50 Ibid., 97.

51 Vanesse, 2-1, 2-2.


53 Ibid.


56 Ibid., 1-7.


59 Naumann, “NATO – An Alliance in Permanent Transformation”.

60 Vanesse, 2-3.


62 Ibid., 4.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 5.
