REDEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION: NEW LIMITS ON PHASE ZERO AND "SHAPING"

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2008

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
**1. REPORT DATE**
15 MAR 2008

**2. REPORT TYPE**
Strategy Research Project

**3. DATES COVERED**
00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008

**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
Redefining Security Cooperation: New Limits on Phase Zero and 'Shaping'

**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER**

**5b. GRANT NUMBER**

**5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER**

**5d. PROJECT NUMBER**

**5e. TASK NUMBER**

**5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER**

**6. AUTHOR(S)**
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**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220

**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**

**9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**

**10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)**

**11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**
See attached

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
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<th>a. REPORT</th>
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**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
Same as Report (SAR)

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**
38

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Thomas M. Rhatican

TITLE: Redefining Security Cooperation: New Limits on Phase Zero and “Shaping”

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 24 March 2008 WORD COUNT: 7,162 PAGES: 38

KEY TERMS: Engagement, Interagency

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Joint force commanders develop operational plans as well as separate but related Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans—plans that were often referred to as pre-conflict “shaping” and “engagement” activities prior to 2001. “Shaping” evolved into an operational term of art in 2006 as the “shaping phase” (or “phase zero”) in the new joint operations construct. But without doctrinal guidance at the national level, and without coordinated inter-agency control, DoD led “shaping” activities only add to existing TSC activities, and may blur the lines between our broader U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. This paper examines the benefits of retaining active DoD participation in the development of inter-agency security cooperation activities, but limiting military “shaping” or “phase zero” activities to the confines of full spectrum, joint operations. Also examined are the benefits of requiring the National Security Council to exercise authority and operational control over civilian led, interagency Security Cooperation activities, and to better integrate, de-conflict, and synchronize all USG activities in all theaters, regions, and countries.
REDEFINING SECURITY COOPERATION: NEW LIMITS ON PHASE ZERO AND “SHAPING”

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish....the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is foreign to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz

On War

In February 2008, the U.S. Army introduced a new “operational” doctrine to capture and apply recent changes to national security policies and multi-service, joint military doctrine. In U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, senior Army leaders reaffirmed that the “Army has analytically looked into the future” and determined that our nation will continue to be “engaged in an era of persistent conflict—a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.” The new field manual is a self-described “revolutionary departure from past doctrine,” and it anticipates a “complex” and “multidimensional” environment “increasingly fought among the people.”

The new field manual provides what it calls the “intellectual underpinnings” of how the Army will train, equip, and fight in this new environment, and boldly notes that “victory in this changed environment of persistent conflict” will only come if met by military operations that are closely coordinated with “diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts.”

If we are truly facing an era of complex and persistent conflict, an era that will require the “protracted application” of the military as well as civilian agencies and organizations, are civilian and military leaders heading the warning of Carl von
Clausewitz? If chaos, chance, and friction dominate pre- and post-conflict operations as much today as in the time of Clausewitz, are today’s leaders providing the policy guidance and doctrinal clarity necessary for the military to prepare for and conduct a “perpetual war”?

In the five years since the end of the ground war in Iraq, the debate continues about the future use and role of the military against state and non-state actors, and the complexities of military involvement in both pre- and post-conflict operations. Francis Fukayama warns that pre- or post-conflict nation building requires that an early distinction be made between a country that requires “development,” or the complete transformation of the society and its institutions, or a country that requires only “reconstruction.” Reconstruction is possible when the “underlying political and social infrastructure has survived the conflict or crisis,” and the society can be returned to its pre-conflict state. He warns that “failed states are not modern states minus the resources,” and that as evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan suggests, special skills and precautions are required to effectively intervene and then manage such a complex, volatile, and costly undertaking.

In its capstone publication of joint military doctrine, Joint Publication 1, Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) are called to be actively engaged in “shaping” such failed or failing states by “employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.” The question must then be asked: Do military commanders and their staffs understand the complexities and subtleties of nation assistance or nation building? Are they prepared for their new “core” role in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization? More important, and in a pre-conflict
environment, do they understand the complexities and dangers of trying to intervene and possibly stave off the collapse of a failing state?11

It is likely that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) will continue to generate an interest on the part of GCCs to “operationalize” pre-conflict Theater Security Cooperation activities.12 But without the benefit of a unifying strategy and method of inter-agency control, combatant commanders should be wary of such incremental efforts.13 In fact, if not carefully coordinated, even well intended pre-conflict “shaping” activities designed to improve the training and capabilities of the host military or provide urgent humanitarian relief may actually complicate our foreign policy objectives, or worse yet, undermine our overall national security interests.

This paper will therefore examine the benefits of limiting Phase Zero (shaping) activities to full spectrum military operations,14 and distinguishing it from pre-conflict security cooperation activities designed to build the economic and security capabilities of our partners and allies. Also examined will be the benefits of better linking our security cooperation strategy to the direction and control of the National Security Council (NSC) to ensure that our security cooperation activities are integrated and synchronized with an overarching security cooperation strategy.

“Shaping” Evolves Without a Clear Purpose

General Anthony Zinni (Ret.), never one to shy away from international humanitarian assistance missions or nation-building exercises as commander of Central Command in the late 1990s, expressed concern about the increased pressure to use military forces to counter asymmetric threats caused by failing states, terrorists, international drug trafficking, and the general threat of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. As early as September 2003, only months after the conclusion of the ground war in Iraq, General Zinni fortuitously shared concerns about the growing complexity of the U.S. military’s mission in Iraq and Afghanistan in light of the current trend of peacetime and wartime missions. He observed that simply “defeating the enemy in the field” was clearly no longer enough to win wars, but also acknowledged that U.S. forces are not properly configured for operations beyond the “breaking and killing” phase of war, and that “American officers lack the strong mix of non-combat skills needed in order to engage arrays of cultures and organizations at the edge of the empire.”

Drawing on his experiences in Vietnam, General Colin Powell also expressed his general wariness to use troops for anything but decisive military engagements for fear of “endless entanglements,” a position often interpreted to mean his general opposition to the use of troops for peacekeeping or nation-building. Other officers also share concerns about the possible erosion of core military competencies as the number of new missions and new necessary skills squeeze out training time and resources that could have been used for traditional war fighting. Still others cite the possible loss of legitimacy and trust as a profession if the military assumes too many non-traditional roles and is perceived as stepping outside of its expertise and “jurisdiction.”

While current military doctrine is replete with references calling first for the application of non-military resources to resolve potential conflicts, should we be concerned about the emerging role of GCCs in displacing or overshadowing broader U.S. foreign policy objectives? Do GCCs exercise an inordinate amount of influence over the U.S. Department of State and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies
operating within the combatant commander’s “area of responsibility” even during periods of relative stability and peace? Some fear that the commanders may take advantage of vague doctrine governing inter-agency coordination and grant themselves the authority to be “first among equals,” and perhaps otherwise apply military solutions to regional challenges best resolved through diplomatic and economic measures. Critics believe that with “bountiful resources and an open-ended mandate,” GCCs are sometimes engaging with “countries far outside the U.S. sphere of influence or concern,” or acting in many ways like Roman proconsuls.

In fairness to the GCCs, the overall security of the United State depends in part on the USG’s ability to develop viable, long-term security cooperation strategies throughout the world. In an effort to comply with national security strategies, the Department of Defense (DoD) requires GCCs to develop contingency plans and crisis action plans to respond to security threats, and to likewise develop separate but related Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plans to integrate diplomatic, information, and economic sources of national power to prevent crises that may later warrant military intervention. Integrating diplomatic and economic activities is no easy task, so the question needs to be asked: Are the GCCs and their staffs well-suited to take the lead in developing our nation’s security cooperation plans?

**Brief Overview of Security Cooperation Planning and Funding**

Initiated by President Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen in 1997, Security Cooperation Planning evolved during a period of “strategic ambiguity” immediately following the end of the Cold War. It was a time for the United States to take advantage of a “strategic opportunity” to best promote U.S. national interests.
Called Theater Engagement Planning at the time, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced a new planning methodology for a new type of non-kinetic “engagement” process. But many leaders within the DoD had reservations about the relevance of the so-called “engagement” plan. Hadn’t they already been “engaging” with the political and military leaders of the countries within their respective areas of operation (AORs)?

From the time of its inception as an “engagement” strategy, most of the activities were referred to as “shaping” activities. In fact, the word “shaping” was used interchangeably to mean almost any activity taken to prepare for a future contingency. The overuse of the word “shaping” led to real and perceived overlaps with our broader diplomatic and development assistance efforts at the Department of State and at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Adding to the confusion, TSC development in the early years had been purposefully “stovepiped” and not shared outside of DoD until reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Today, overall U.S. Security Cooperation Strategy is derived from the President’s National Security Strategy and a number of other defense related strategies, directives, and plans. But the intent of shaping remains much the same as it did in the late 1990s. It includes taking actions to enhance bonds between possible future coalition partners, using the military to prevent or deter crises from developing, and, if a crisis does occur, taking action to secure the use of facilities to best provide access for follow on troops and equipment.
Today, combatant commanders and service chiefs are tasked by the Secretary of Defense to work with DoD staff to promulgate regional and country specific plans and to align resources and activities. These resources and activities are most easily broken down into two categories: (1) Title 10, U.S. Code, or funds and programs managed and funded within the Army’s resource planning system (PPBES), and (2) Title 22 U.S. Code, or funds and programs controlled by the State Department but administered within the DoD by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Title 22 activities include peacekeeping operations, International Military Education and Training (IMET), foreign military financing, and foreign military sales (the largest security assistance program). The very popular Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program is also included within Security Assistance.

In recent years, two new programs and non-traditional funding mechanisms have come under scrutiny by several leading members of Congress (and have caused some controversy at the Department of State). First, the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1206) granted the DoD the authority and funding to train and equip foreign militaries and police forces at the direction of the President, but without approval by the State Department. “Section 1206” funding was increased from $200M in 2006 to $300M in 2007 for use in up to 14 countries, and due to recent changes, may now be used at the sole discretion of the DoD. Authorization for this type of activity would normally require the coordination and approval of DoS as part of the Title 22, Security Assistance activities.

Second, DoD recently received approval to create a Combatant Commander Initiative Fund to allow combatant commanders to conduct joint military exercises,
military education and training, humanitarian assistance, and civic projects to include medical and veterinary care, and the construction of schools, wells, transportation systems, and sanitation systems. The most evident example of the new Commanders Initiative Fund is the operation in the Horn of Africa (HOA) operating out of Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.

Congressional criticism and concern appears to be leveled at both the method and the cost of the programs. Without clear strategic doctrine, and without a planning process that integrates experts at the Department of State and USAID who perform many of these tasks as part of their profession, some fear that well-meaning commanders may not be taking all of the necessary diplomatic precautions. Local populations rarely see our role as benign or disinterested, and external interventions of any kind invariably provoke resentment or even a nationalist reaction by a determined few. So what is it that we gain by deploying small groups of soldiers on reconstruction, development, or humanitarian assistance missions? As an example, do we lose credibility and acceptance from the Muslim populations in Africa when we overtly link our military with developmental initiatives? And if it is true that “praise for good results is accorded stingily; and blame for problems, freely,” shouldn’t we at least assign responsibility for complex stabilization efforts to an agency or organization in the best position to weigh all of the long-term benefits and risks?

Reconciling NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05

In late 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 to “empower the Secretary of State” to take action to better coordinate reconstruction and stabilization efforts in countries that are “at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil
strife.” NSPD-44 clearly states the primacy of the DoS over all agencies, to include the DoD, for the purpose of coordinating and carrying out all laws and policies related to foreign policy, to include the “harmonization” of such policies with “U.S. military plans and operations.” NSPD-44 also contemplates both pre- and post-conflict operations focused on reconstruction and stabilization.

Within weeks of the President’s announcing NSPD-44, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 describing the DoD’s plan to “support” the Department of State’s new reconstruction and stabilization effort. DoDD 3000.05 directs that the subordinate military services elevate stability operations as a “core” mission on par with combat operations, and directs all services to be prepared to perform a complete array of civilian tasks as part of stability operations “when civilians cannot do so.”

Some would suggest that DoD’s combatant commanders are “not equipped organizationally or culturally” to conduct a wide array of predominantly civilian-type tasks, and that the military may never be able to adequately adapt to duties that are not part of its culture. Echoing similar concerns, it is argued that “civilianizing” the core mission of the military may actually break down the “jurisdiction” of the profession or the very heart of where the military’s expert knowledge is applied. As such, the boundaries of the profession become increasingly unclear to leaders outside the profession as well as to the members of the Army profession itself, perhaps “weakening their professional identity and commitment,” but also making it increasingly harder for the military to say “no” to almost any task.
In the end, did DoD Directive 3000.05 finally resolve any possible disputes over the military’s proper “jurisdiction” and role in nation-building? By directive of the Secretary of Defense, stability operations are now at an equal level of importance as combat operations. As such, it is argued the tasking to develop new required skills, capabilities, and traditions should end the “military’s long-standing cultural aversion to the use of the U.S. military power for nation-building,”\textsuperscript{42} and that we should refocus our energy and resources on improving the capabilities of the military, and not worry so much about integrating the Department of State and the rest of the interagency.\textsuperscript{43}

In the two and a half years since the issuance of NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05, it is evident that DoS has struggled to develop and fund the creation of the civilian response teams needed for civilian led reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Locked in a perceived “zero-sum game” with Congress, many in the State Department believe that increased spending on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the GWOT seriously hinders the reconstruction and stabilization operations at State.

In contrast, and over the same period, and as a result of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Defense budget mushroomed and enabled DoD to shift resources to humanitarian and development aid at a time when State and USAID had their funding limited by the Congress and the White House.\textsuperscript{44} To his credit, the disparity in funding and the limits on operations at DoS have not gone unnoticed by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. He has repeatedly spoken in favor of increased funding and support of the State Department and even testified before Congress in support of the DoS request for 1100 new employees in the FY 09 budget.
In November 2007, Secretary Gates also gave a speech calling for the revival of our “nonmilitary instruments of national power,” and for increased funding of foreign affairs programs that “remain disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities.” He noted that the total foreign affairs budget for DoS was less than what the DoD spends on health care coverage alone, and that the entire number of foreign officers equals the crew size of one aircraft carrier. “What is clear to me,” he said, “is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communication, foreign assistance, civic action, and reconstruction and development.”

Hampered by his role in an administration that will be leaving office in January 2009, Secretary Gates is still calling on national military leaders to change the way in which the military approaches security cooperation and stabilization operations. “If forced by circumstances,” he said, service members must be prepared to step up and perform civilian-related tasks, but he also warned that the preferred method is to always have civilians doing the things that they do best.

In a very practical way, Secretary Gates is also trying to protect and preserve the military’s resources and its profession. “After all, civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress” on our armed services. He then notes that “more robust civilian capabilities” would make it less likely that military forces would need to be used in the first place—where “local problems might be dealt with before they become a crisis.”

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted in 2008 that if the State Department and USAID do not improve their expeditionary capabilities to deploy civilians with
necessary skill sets, that the military will continue to step in to perform many civilian functions and create a situation that she warned will “erode” the core functions of both the DoD and DoS—a point in which she noted that she and Secretary of Gates were in complete agreement. So until the Department of State is adequately funded, and in light of increased pressure to counter non-state actors and terrorists associated with the GWOT, the key question is: should DoD continue to take the lead in creating security cooperation activities and otherwise helping to “shape” or “operationalize” our foreign policy?

**Theater Security Cooperation – Who’s in Charge?**

In December 2006, the GOP-led Senate Committee on Foreign Relations released a bi-partisan report critical of the DoD and its policies and practices with regard to TSC and “shaping.” In a report titled, “Embassies as Command Posts in the War on Terror,” the Committee noted that the demands on U.S. embassies have risen exponentially, and that their vital role in coordinating and supporting a broad, inter-agency effort to fight terrorism lacks people, equipment, and funding. The report included four major points:

First, it noted that the number of DoD personnel in non-combat countries has risen dramatically, and has caused “blurred lines of authority” between DoD and DoS that hamper inter-agency decision-making at the embassy level.

Second, inadequate funding of DoS staff and functions have decreased their relative strength to pursue long term, non-coercive efforts in: diplomacy, strategic information programming, and economic assistance. Perceived “gaps” caused by lack of funding have been filled by a well-funded DoD thus creating a shift to DoD in setting
US foreign policy. For example, the report notes that “just as Defense has ramped up its involvement in humanitarian aid and development aid, State and USAID have had to scale back some operations due to the “Iraq tax” and budget limitations.” The report also noted that budget cuts at USAID affected both personnel and programs, and are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of the world.

Third, the Committee noted that increased funding to DoD for its “self-assigned missions” is creating an overlap of missions and increased friction with non-DoD agencies. As the role of the military continues to expand, DoS and embassy officials are concerned that the DoD will chafe even more at the methods of operation already coordinated and directed by the embassy leadership.

Lastly, the Senate Report cites evidence that host countries are questioning the increased role of the U.S. military in problems seen as not lending themselves to military solutions. While host nation military welcome U.S. military presence, some elements of government and society are “suspicious of U.S. coercion” – and if the trend continues, it could undermine the DoS’s broad bilateral relationship and efforts against the GWOT. For example, in Uganda and then in Ethiopia, military civil affairs teams and humanitarian action teams helped local communities build wells, erect schools, and other small development projects, came under suspicion by local authorities for taking sides. In Ethiopia, they were ordered out of the region to prevent sparking further cross-border hostilities.

During Congressional hearings in the summer of 2007 on the creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM), testimony echoed many of the concerns identified in the Senate
Committee report. The United States was having difficulty convincing the Africans of a shared concern for international terrorism and for the need for an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. Most African countries continued to broadly define terrorism in terms of local unrest and violence—not as an issue to be dealt with militarily as against a foreign threat. Some African leaders reported that the U.S. habitually underestimates the significance of local violence to their security, and that the U.S. believes that the violence is not enough of a “significant” international threat (by U.S. standards) to warrant notice or action.\textsuperscript{54} If true, perhaps the U.S. position is simply a reflection of our military-centric to the overall security concerns of our allies and partners.

During the Vietnam War, Ambassador Robert W. Komer noted that civilian and military leaders in Washington miscalculated and misunderstood the complexities of the political socio-economic factors at play in earliest stages of the conflict, and too quickly committed to a military solution that later significantly “unbalanced our response.”\textsuperscript{55} Today, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley echoes Ambassador Komer’s concerns and argues that the Ambassador and embassy country teams are the “critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and personalities come together,” and that interagency country teams are in the best position to measure an appropriate response.\textsuperscript{56} In an effort to avoid unintended violence, Oakley recommends that a combatant commander’s authority should be limited to the actions of deployed forces only engaged in active hostilities. All other military elements working on “missions” in-country should be under the authority of the ambassador, to include intelligence personnel and special operations forces—with a memorandum of agreement between the ambassador and
the geographic combatant commander making clear the ambassador’s authority relative
to the increased number of special operations forces and SOF missions.\textsuperscript{57} As a small
but important practical matter, and as a way to circumscribe the peacetime “shaping”
activities in-country, he recommends that assigned DoD personnel fall within the
supervisory rating and evaluation scheme of the ambassador, mirroring the rating
scheme of other non-military personnel assigned to the embassy.\textsuperscript{58}

Some of Ambassador Oakley’s contemporaries within the State Department
question whether the DoD has become more robust not only in terms of numbers and
resources, but also “in the ways they think they can operate under this still not terribly
well-defined authority of the chief of mission.”\textsuperscript{59} Other foreign service officers argue that
the war on terrorism may create a steady-state “battlefield,” and worry that if “the
battlefield is everywhere” that even greater guidance will be needed to de-conflict the
traditional roles and responsibilities of foreign officers and the military.\textsuperscript{60} Questions one
senior State Department official: Has the military relegated foreign service officers to
the usefulness of “third rate soldiers as opposed to first-rate diplomats?”\textsuperscript{61}

At a National Press Club event in September, 2007, General David Petraeus
hailed Ambassador Ryan Crocker as “my great diplomatic wingman.”\textsuperscript{62} If war zones
are “military turf,” and diplomats are logically the “wingman” in that type of operational
environment, the question must be asked: when, if ever, under the current doctrine of
full spectrum operations, does the general become the “wingman” to the ambassador?
If the conflict is “persistent,” and requires the “protracted application” of the military,
what are the logical checks on diligent military planners and commanders who feel they
need to “operationalize” Phase Zero to fulfill their role in a new “core” mission?\textsuperscript{63}
Limiting Phase Zero (Shaping) to Full Spectrum Operations

Within eight months of the issuance of DoDD 3000.05 and the elevation of stabilization to a core mission (and core competency), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, and Joint Publication 5-0, Operations Planning. In JP 5-0, security cooperation planning is distinct and separate from joint operations planning.

Joint operations planning includes contingency and crisis action planning for full spectrum military operations, to include stabilization operations; and stabilization operations include Phase Zero (shaping). Unlike joint operations planning, security cooperation plans are promulgated by combatant commanders and service chiefs in accordance with DoD’s Security Cooperation Guidance and in consultation with “U.S. agencies that represent other instruments of power” to include the U.S. chiefs of mission (ambassadors) in the commander’s AOR. Therefore, and consistent with joint doctrine, Phase Zero (shaping) activities and security cooperation activities are the products of two separate plans.

But while joint doctrine defines separate planning processes for Phase Zero (shaping) and security cooperation, it defines the respective activities as much the same: enhancing bonds and increasing capabilities of partners, preventing conflict and crisis, and maintaining operational access for follow on forces. So how does the DoD distinguish the two?

Historically, much of the control and funding of security cooperation activities has fallen under the purview of the State Department, and security cooperation activities have been applied throughout the world in areas in which we wanted to “shape” our national security. In fact, in an effort to differentiate the respective roles of DoS and
DoD with respect to security cooperation planning, JP 3-0 still acknowledges that DoS is always a principal agency (and often the lead agency) responsible for U.S. efforts to “protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict.” DoS controls the funding for many critical Title 22 programs, to include foreign military sales and foreign military financing. DoD therefore encourages combatant commanders and other Joint Force Commanders to maintain “working relationships” with the chiefs of U.S. missions and the State Department, and describes the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan as the framework in which Joint Force Commanders will “continually employ military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power.”

But in recent years, and as noted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, the DoD has willingly assumed a larger role in humanitarian aid, development, and other areas once managed almost exclusively by the State Department and USAID. As a result, the DoD is blurring the line between the historical application of security cooperation activities and the new Phase Zero (shaping) activities.

In order to maximize the full effect of security cooperation and Phase Zero (shaping), and to add some clarity to their doctrinal application, it would be better to limit the application of Phase Zero (shaping) to the following two methods. First, Phase Zero should only be applied in a linear, progressive manner once a military campaign commences. In this case, Phase Zero operations would immediately follow security cooperation activities. For example, if a GCC had already been gathering information and creating tentative plans for “access” to a country’s airfields and ports as part of its contribution to the TSC plan, shaping activities may include the logical follow on tasks. These tasks may include the completion of necessary contracting services for logistics
and support, conducting rehearsals, or completing the final coordination with host nation
or multi-national military and security forces. Consistent with the joint publications,
Phase Zero operations will continue to include actions that prevent conflict but at the
same time best facilitate the possible arrival and onward integration of military forces.

Second, Phase Zero activities should only be applied as part of an on-going
military campaign with forces engaged in full spectrum operations (or a mix of
defensive, offensive, and stability operations). The GCC would be engaged in full
spectrum operations where, by definition, phase zero operations are conducted in areas
of relative peace, and the GCC would try to safeguard the peace while simultaneously
taking action to ensure that military forces would have “access” to the area as needed.

Limiting Phase Zero (shaping) activities to an operational construct, and not
letting it freely overlap with security cooperation activities, is consistent with the
“balance” of operations chart in JP 3-0 that depicts and defines shaping operations not
in isolation, but as part of the continuous application a three-part mix of offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. Phase Zero (shaping) activities should therefore
remain operationally focused, and in concert with host nation and multi-national partners
to preserve peace or prevent conflict but with a heavy emphasis on safeguarding
military access. Security cooperation, reflecting at times the more complicated nature of
a targeted fragile state, focuses on more complex, and long-term interagency solutions
to promote stability and peace and requires a different conceptual framework.

A New Framework for Interagency Security Cooperation

In a study produced by the Atlantic Council of the United States, Colonel Albert
Zaccor provides a helpful analytical framework in support of the creation of a new
interagency security cooperation plan that supports all foreign policy objectives while maintaining our “focus on forward defense.” His analysis includes a review of three important areas in support of an inter-agency security cooperation plan: (1) the creation of broad security cooperation goals (to include political will), (2) the need for more integrated planning, and (3) the removal of likely obstacles to the creation of a fiscally sound, integrated, and effective security cooperation plan.

First, security cooperation goals focus on the creation of sound, long term relationships with civilian and military leaders to secure information (or gain access to the host nation’s sources and data), and to secure access to airports, ports, and possible troop facilities. Relationships are based on trust, mutual interest, and a common understanding of the threat, but most important, security cooperation relies on the creation of adequate capabilities and the political will to use them.

The United States must leverage the capabilities of our allies and partners to fill the “gaps” in our own security shortfalls in a region. One of the true tests for measuring the possible effectiveness of military capabilities does not rest with the military, but rather with the careful assessment of the host nation’s shared security interests, its political interests, and its record of cooperating with the U.S. in other areas of mutual interest. For example, do the current leaders of the country have a history of cooperation with the U.S. government in all matters of mutual interest with regard to trade, commerce, alliances, and treaties? In broader terms, do the country’s leaders
believe that they share a “common fate” with us, or even a shared interdependence in
the international community? If so, they are more likely to see cooperation as
beneficial. 74 Or does the country have a pressing political situation that might make
cooperation with the United States only temporarily undesirable, as with Germany and
Turkey when U.S. diplomats asked for military assistance in Iraq? 75

In the end, this type of assessment and recommendation necessarily relies on
the input of many experts, to include the military. But a final decision on security
coopera on investments and programs will require an inter-agency decision linked to
the broader interests of both the partner country and the United States.

In recent years, the United States met with some success in developing
capabilities in partner countries and then securing the cooperation of their leaders to
apply their new security capabilities against shared threats. The Georgia Train and
Equip Program is widely viewed as a success story because it reflected our ability to
create partner capabilities that were later exercised by the Georgian leadership to
remedy both Georgia’s internal security concerns as well as our international security
concerns in that region. 76 The U.S. pooled $65M from a combination of security
coopera on sources to train 2600 Georgian soldiers who later rooted out terrorists in the
Panski Gorge region—the original objective of the program. Bordering on Turkey and
Russia, Georgia seeks entry into the European Union and NATO and has been a willing
partner in U.S. led coalition operations, to include sending 600 troops for operations in
Iraq. 77

The Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is another example of a
successful (but expensive) security cooperation effort in northwestern Africa. Requiring
$508M per year in FY 2008, TSCTI now includes ten states and a successful program to protect borders, deny safe havens, track movement of terrorists, and improve general cooperation in the region against international terrorism. TSCTI also reflects our ability to improve the military and security capability of select partner countries, as well as generate the political willingness to exercise that capability for mutual gain.

Second, Zaccor identifies the peculiar need for better integrated planning in the current operating environment that includes not only terrorism, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of WMD, but also AIDS epidemics, international organized crime, climate change and population migrations, and the emerging threat of countries like China seeking to secure energy reserves in Africa. As such, the temptation is for the United States to be more fully engaged throughout the world. So the challenge will be one of economizing on our costs in the current counter-terrorism campaign, costs that are already high and “almost certainly not sustainable.”

To be effective, a new security cooperation strategy must reflect a new institutional culture. The strategy must build broad capabilities in much the same way that the Army has adopted DOTLMS-F (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Soldier Systems/Personnel, and Finances) to “capture all of the factors that go into the creation of a truly capable” force. Likewise, and despite our multiplicity of government programs and good intentions, our foreign partners and allies rightfully expect us to speak with one voice.

Lastly, Zaccor identified a number of obstacles to achieving a fiscally sound, integrated, and authoritative security cooperation effort. The current system of security cooperation lacks a “common conceptual understanding, or doctrine,” and the funding
system remains “underfunded, fragmented, and inflexible.” For example, the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits using Foreign Military Assistance funds to support law enforcement organizations in foreign countries, with exceptions only for counter-narcotics and customs. This type of stovepiped funding hinders a broader USG effort to improve host nation law enforcement or gendarmerie, and reflects a lack of organizational structure and lines of authority necessary to best apply our resources.

In his conclusion, Zaccor recommends the elimination of our “hierarchical and program driven approach….controlled by policy ‘fiefdoms’” and for the adoption of an interagency program patterned after the current DoD Security Cooperation model but with national Security Council playing an integral role.

**National Security Council: Providing Clarity and Balance**

In 1947, only two years after the conclusion of WWII, national leaders had quickly identified the need for greater interagency coordination. The National Security Act of 1947 was a seminal decision that created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, and set the stage for the creation of the Department of Defense two years later. Most important, it was an acknowledgement by national leaders that while the war had certainly been successful, there were still significant weaknesses or “gaps” between foreign and military policy, as well as gaps between the military and civilian agencies. Testimony and reports before the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time called for the deliberate “integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies” to keep foreign and military policies “mutually supporting” and in balance. In the end, the 1947 Act captured the consensus of the wartime policy
makers on the need for better interagency coordination in both policy development and execution. 89

Today, re-organizing and re-directing an even larger national security apparatus will be no easy task. But the continued pursuit of uncoordinated strategies in the current security environment may bear serious long-term consequences. The lessons learned from our immediate post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq are well known, but the response has been slow and inadequate. Instead of clarifying and explaining the strategic role of role of security cooperation, shaping operations, and stability operations, the USG permits all three to move incrementally forward in fits and starts.

In July 2004, the Department of State initiated and created a new Office of the Coordinator for the Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with a broad tasking to lead and coordinate inter-agency efforts to “prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations.” With little funding, and little support outside the DoS, S/CRS had minimal impact until December 2005 when President Bush issued NSPD-44 designating the State Department as the lead agency for all stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Patterned after a number of similar programs in other countries, S/CRS has begun to fill three “pools” of civilian experts to assist in civilian-centric stabilization tasks, and to coordinate and de-conflict inter-agency efforts in selected “hot spots” around the world.

But S/CRS lacks the political support and “bureaucratic clout” necessary to garner the necessary funding to fully organize and perform its mission. 90 Its current FY 2009 budget request for $248.6M is for on-going start up costs only. Deployment costs would require additional funding estimated to range in the hundreds of millions of
dollars\textsuperscript{91} making it a target for yet more Congressional scrutiny and likely cutbacks.\textsuperscript{92} As such, it reflects the same general lack of authority, funding, and capabilities of NSPD-44,\textsuperscript{93} limiting it for now as a program with only long term potential.

Is it possible to create an interagency structure that can close the “gaps” and effectively handle day-to-day operations while simultaneously preparing for future challenges and opportunities? Can we fashion a proactive, long term, and sustainable national security strategy that will help us keep a strategic security advantage? While some call for legislation mirroring the scope and significance of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, others recommend that we first revisit the thought process embraced by President Eisenhower as he struggled to reconcile the seemingly unsustainable policies contained in National Security Memorandum 68.\textsuperscript{94} As a military officer, he knew that long term planning was difficult to sustain when daily operations kept the commander and the staff preoccupied,\textsuperscript{95} and he was determined to fix it.

In an effort to capture all of the many divergent theories of how to counter the growing Soviet threat, President Eisenhower gathered a team of experts from outside the mainstream and outside the controlled chaos of day-to-day operations and planning. He called it “Project Solarium” after the afternoon debate he had had with his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in the solarium of the White House; a conversation that the President felt mirrored the great disparity of thought on the subject of the country’s long term national security. The results of the project captured the wide range of opinions and options on how to best deal with the long-term strategic threat presented by the Soviet Union. In the end, the President and the NSC were able to thoughtfully weigh
the benefits and risks of each strategy, and to select the strategies that ultimately formed the core of the security policy directive.\textsuperscript{96}

With only minor exceptions, the NSC has produced little to no long-term strategic thinking and security guidance since Project Solarium.\textsuperscript{97} For over fifty years, the NSC staff system has been marked by an overall trend of “declining ability or willingness….to perform strategic threat assessment and planning.”\textsuperscript{98} As such, calling on the NSC in its present form to take the lead in creating and then managing a long-term, interagency security effort would be unwise. The NSC requires a new mandate, and a new structure capable of providing sound, well-informed, and long term security guidance, as well as a bureaucracy capable of managing and leading the policy within the inter-agency.

Michele Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley propose the creation of a holistic, inter-agency “Quadrennial National Security Review” (QNSR) that would identify an overarching strategy and incorporate all instruments of national power. The QNSR would also produce an authoritative classified planning document directing the National Security Advisor and the Cabinet Secretaries to develop particular courses of action.\textsuperscript{99} Nested within the NSC, Flournoy and Brimely propose to create a staff of strategic planners “insulated from day-to-day demands and crisis management.”\textsuperscript{100} Others recommend the creation of long-term planning cells, perhaps with an executive director reporting to the National Security Advisor, and at all times thoroughly insulated from the existing agencies to avoid creating an “organization of detailers,” serving at the whim of, and still loyal to, their home departments.\textsuperscript{101}

It is within this framework that a new security cooperation effort could flourish. As directed in National Presidential Directive-1, it is already the duty of the NSC and the
NSC System to “coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation” of “domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.” The current DoD theater security cooperation framework offers a suitable starting point from which the NSC could better direct and control the efforts of agencies already engaged in various degrees of security cooperation planning.

Conclusion

The DoD deserves credit for its attempts to gather interagency contributions to its Theater Security Cooperation plans. In an age of “persistent conflict,” DoD is working diligently to create doctrine and planning models that try to integrate all U.S. Government security interests. But the pressure of the current operating environment is causing the DoD to re-evaluate the limits of its core military functions, and to consider the addition of many new “civilian” competencies as part of Phase Zero (shaping) operations as well as Theater Security Cooperation activities. But continued efforts to “operationalize” Phase Zero (shaping) activities will further blur the line with the roles and duties of the State Department and USAID, and may inadvertently create a “surrogate” foreign policy—or at a minimum, create the impression with our partners and allies that the USG is not speaking with one voice. Therefore, and in an effort to add clarity and understanding, Phase Zero (shaping) activities should be developed and applied only within full spectrum military operations. Security cooperation activities, while currently the product of DoD-led planning, should instead be developed and implemented as part of a new National Security Council organization. If given the authority and organizational structure, the NSC system is in best position to manage the complexities of engaging with our allies and partners, and provide the strategic
guidance, authority, and resources necessary to develop and protect our short- and long-term national security interests.

Endnotes


3 Ibid., forward.

4 Ibid., viii.

5 Ibid., vii.

6 Ibid., viii.


9 Ibid., 4-5.


14 For background on joint strategic planning, see Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for specific information on joint strategic planning.

Colin Powell’s overall concerns about the use of military forces, and his specific concerns about the need for an exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement, are often taken together and interpreted to mean that the United States should avoid peacekeeping and nation-building exercises. See also http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19921201faessay5851/colin-l-powell/u-s-forces-challenges-ahead.html


Joint Publication 1, VII-1. JP-1 is the capstone of the joint military doctrine. While it often makes reference to interagency coordination, cooperation, and communication, it does not describe the manner or process in which it will be accomplished. “Military operations must be coordinated, integrated, or de-conflicted with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various HN agencies.”


Dana Priest, The Mission (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 74. In Australia, “extensive military-to-military contacts during the 1990s came under review in 2000. According to Australian defense planners, the review found that, in time, ‘engagement’ activities were being carried out rather ‘promiscuously,’ often times under questionable rationales, with ill-defined objectives and without identifiable ‘payoffs’ to Australian interests.

Ibid., 61-77.


Ibid., iii.

Zinni, 135-136. Today, GCCs are much more inclusive of non-military input in the creation of TSCs and may rely on their Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), Political Advisor (POLAD), and input from each respective Chief of Mission from each country in the GCC’s area of responsibility.

Marquis, 5. In addition to the NSS, other documents from the Department of Defense include the national Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, Strategic Planning Guidance, and the Security Cooperation Guidance.


Marquis, 5. An excellent summary of security cooperation planning (with charts) is provided on pages 5-10.
It is important to distinguish Title 22 activities controlled by DoS from the Title 10 programs administered by the Army. The Army insists that it does not simply divide its security cooperation resources among the combatant commands, “but rather maintains a global capability and makes allocations to best support the overall strategy.” See AR 11-31 (dtd 24 October 2007), p 3. In addition, JP 5-0 lumps all of the security cooperation activities, Title 10 and 22, into six categories described on page I-3.


Ibid., 7-8.

Ibid., 9.


Betts, 74.


Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 2.

Thompson, 66.


Burk, 49.


Roles, ed. Joseph R. Cerani and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 44.

43 Troxell, 26.


46 Ibid., 8.

47 Ibid., 8.

48 Ibid., 8.


50 U.S. Senate Committee Report, 3.

51 Zeller, 25.

52 Ibid., 25.

53 Ibid., 24.


57 Oakley, 152-153.

58 Ibid., 152.


60 Ibid., 28.

61 Ibid., 28.

63 Ibid., 16.

64 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 December), I-4. Additional planning guidelines and procedures are described in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Management of Security Cooperation, as well as in Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations, Volume 1.

65 See JP 3-0, V-3 and JP 5-0, I-3 for a comparison of Phase Zero (shaping) and security cooperation, respectively.

66 JP 3-0, VII-1.

67 JP 3-0, V-1 - V-2.


69 Ibid., 7, footnote 38.

70 Ibid., 6. Zaccor briefly describes the difference between Security Assistance activities such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the International Military Training and Education Program (IMET) and other programs governed under the Foreign Assistance Act (with policy direction provided by the Department of State); and compares it to Security Cooperation, a much broader term that, in addition to Security Assistance, includes categories of activities to include combined exercises, mil-to-mil contacts, combined education, and humanitarian assistance.

71 Ibid., 8-10.

72 Jenifer D. P. Moroney, et. al., Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 2007), xi.


74 Marquis, 42.

75 Ibid., 41.

76 Moroney, et. al., Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations, 55-61.

77 Ibid., 59.

78 Ibid., 72-73.

79 Zaccor, 22.
80 Ibid., 24.

81 Ibid., 25.


83 Zaccor, 38.

84 Ibid., 33.


86 Zaccor, 41.


88 Stevenson, 131.

89 Ibid., 131.


92 Bensahel, 107.

93 Ibid., 107.


95 Ibid., 82.

96 Ibid., 82. The project was named “Project Solarium” after the late-afternoon debate President Eisenhower had with John Foster Dulles on May 8, 1953, in the White House solarium. They discussed and argued about the true nature of the Soviet threat and the necessary long term security strategy to counter it.

97 Ibid., 84.

98 Ibid., 84.

99 Ibid., 85-86.
Proposing to create a cell of permanent employees (not detailed from other agencies) within the NSC that would focus separately on three areas: strategic planning, crisis management, and coalition building (liaison and strategic communication). For more information on a project intending to replace the National Security Act of 1947, see the Project on National Security Reform (PSNR) described by Robert B. Polk, “Interagency Reform: An Idea Whose time Has Come,” in *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, ed. Joseph R. Cerani and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 321.