MILITARY LEADERSHIP PREPAREDNESS TO MEET COUNTERINSURGENCY REQUIREMENTS

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MILITARY LEADERSHIP PREPAREDNESS TO MEET COUNTERINSURGENCY REQUIREMENTS

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The complex political situation that has formed in Iraq, and is currently ongoing, has again provided a lot of evidence as to the many changes that have occurred in military strategy. However, the current preparedness of modern military leadership has existed in an imperfect system and is slow to adapt to the situation in Iraq. This has dangerous implications. The recent analysis of previous wars and armed conflicts considers them new forms of warfare. Today we are so far removed from the classical form of warfare, such as World War II, that we cannot compare the role of the military leader in those conflicts with the situation leaders face in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, or Sudan. Therefore, the entire system of military education for leaders demands a revolution change. This project examines the different schools currently used in the Armed Forces of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine and the way they prepare their strategic leaders. The research reveals a distinct disconnect in modern military strategy which is taught in schools, and the way that strategy is practiced in current military operations. Recommendations are provided to adjust the modern system of military education in order to prepare those leaders to leading future wars.
MILITARY LEADERSHIP PREPAREDNESS TO MEET COUNTERINSURGENCY REQUIREMENTS

Responsibility for the Army profession resides with each generation of Army strategic leaders. Without their attention, the Army professional ethos wanes, professional purpose and identity become vague or lost, and the service migrates unknowingly toward bureaucracy.

—Michael Steel, Lieutenant General (Ret.) USA
Former Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command and Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

People have always waged different kinds of wars. For hundreds of years the human race has waged thousands of wars, including religious wars, wars of conquest, and wars to dominate new trade markets or to gain control of resources. These wars have always been carried out by men in the uniform - military personnel.

One of the most important aspects of warfare is the obsession of military forces with the preparation of their generals and officers. Military leadership has modified and changed to incorporate changes in society. Even so, the character of tribal chiefs, captains, generals, commanders, and indeed everyone whom we call military leaders plays a very important, and sometimes crucial and decisive role in war.

In addition to the development of particular kinds of weapons, the leadership dimension is a determining factor which has tremendously changed perspectives on warfare. It promotes improvement in the forms and means of warfare, as the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu has written in *The Art of War*. Epaminondas formed up his troops in an unusual shape on the battlefield in the Battle of Leuctra, and won this battle thanks to his tactical innovation. He did not have new kinds of troops or a special knowledge of weapons. He merely applied a new and more perfect way of deploying
troops. Napoleon improved the system of organization, management, and concentration of artillery and strove to achieve results that were previously unachievable in other campaigns and wars. Sun Tzu, Alexander Great, Cesar, Belisarius, Attila the Hun, Genghis Khan, Friedrich II, Suvorov, Patton, and many other great military leaders throughout history have proven the validity and utility of innovation.

Thus, the historical development of the military profession, and the evolution of forms and means of warfare and the art of war, is affected directly by creative leadership. However, at all times in human history, one form of warfare has played a very specific role in the art of war. Military professionals call it “guerrilla war”, “partisan war”, “insurgency war,” or something akin to this. Historians can provide many examples of this type of war.

Over centuries of history, many guerrilla movements appeared in Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, or America to fight foreign occupation forces. The “Fabian Strategy” used by the Roman Republic against Hannibal in the Second Punic War could be considered an early example of guerrilla tactics. William Wallace’s war in the 13th century was an illustration of resistance against the English occupation of Scotland during the Wars of Scottish Independence. Mongol’s invasion ground forces also constantly faced guerrillas composed of armed peasants both in the Kievan Rus and in Eastern Europe after the invasion of these countries during the 13th through the 15th centuries. In the 100 Years War between England and France, Commander Bertrand du Guescllin used insurgency tactics to wear down the English invaders. In the 15th century, Vietnamese leader Le Loi launched a partisan war against Chinese occupiers. Mass resistance in Spain and Russia from 1805 to 1813 was a vivid example of an
insurgency waged against French occupation by a weaker and enslaved country. Other examples include: the Irish War of Independence; a successful campaign in German East Africa in which the German commander Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck fought against numerically superior allied forces; a major guerrilla war was fought by the Arabs against the Ottoman Turks during the Arab Revolt (1916–1918); another partisan war opposing the German Occupation of Ukraine in 1918 and partisan and guerrilla resistance waged by both the Bolsheviks and the Whites during the Russian Civil War; the operations of several strong guerrilla organizations operated in the countries occupied by Nazi Germany; the Vietnam war (1954-1975); the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989; and, the Iraqi war from 2003. This list can be extended, as there are hundreds of examples.

Military researchers and analysts must carefully learn the main principles and the nature of guerrilla wars. They should look into the available information, consider the facts, and closely scrutinize archives containing volumes on this variation of the art of war. Nevertheless, each action provokes its own “equal and opposite reaction”! And in every historical example of the aforementioned resistance movements, it was the military leaders who struggled with these unusual forms of warfare. Unfortunately, we can not always become familiar with the best practices of the commanders of counterinsurgency operations and hostilities. Moreover, history provides many instances where guerrilla wars and resistance movements were defeated by political and military methods.

The entire history of warfare demonstrates that waging combat activities and operations is a most difficult and “dirty” job, and that it must be fulfilled by responsible
and competent military leaders. It is clear that politicians make the decision to initiate warfare, but all missions and tasks, from the first to the last, must be carried out by generals and other officers. It does not matter which empire, alliance, or country is waging combat activities. It does not matter what kind of ideology, religious affiliation, or desired end state motivates the combatants. The military leadership must always successfully accomplish the missions that it is assigned.

How did leaders carry out their tasks historically? How did they defeat their elusive enemy, which was often supported by an indigenous population? What kind of decisions did they make to solve the thousands of problems that emerge in waging any kind of guerrilla war, or confronting resistance movements? What are the main requirements for success on the part of the military leadership? And the last and most decisive question - what are the vital capabilities required of future commanders if they are to be victorious in counterinsurgency wars?

The most important measure of the preparedness of military professionals is their performance in major combat operations or war. Major combat operations are led by the military services. Leadership in the organized use of coercive force on behalf of the state is the special province of military professionals, representing all service branches.

The method in which different military authorities define counterinsurgency war will be important. In preparing for this kind of war, there is unlikely to be only one correct answer.

Professions succeed or fail to the degree that they provide expertise that clients need. Most professions operate in market, consumer-driven environments. The Army profession, even though encompassed within a government-monopolized bureaucracy, is hardly immune to somewhat similar market-driven forces; however, American society is the sole client of the Army. The Army's legitimacy and effectiveness are measured
entirely in relation to meeting American society’s demands for defense and security.

War in the 21st century demands 21st century leaders those who have the ability to incorporate many different lessons as they lead their troops to victory in a counterinsurgency war. They must use all aspects of the art of war to develop political, economic, technical and cultural relations which are acceptable to the populations where they wage combat operations. The military commander indeed must be a unique leader who combines the wisdom, scholarship, erudition, and know-how of the preceding generations of military leaders. But the future military commander cannot become a leader in every dimension without first establishing a collective element within the organizational climate. Leadership on this level will have a complex and decisive role in promoting readiness, learning, training, and the successful execution of assigned tasks.

All these factors compel us to deal with the depth and scope of the many difficulties these developments will have on leadership. The potential military leader in the 21st century should possess a complete understanding of “the tactics, techniques, and procedures” of many completely different areas. Current military leaders increasingly have to understand the depth and scope of ethics, culture, psychology, and economics. They must and artfully lead not only their own subordinates, but also entire communities, political systems, political leaders, national and international non-governmental organizations, interagency organizations, and so on. If we could describe the differences in command style between a corps commander during Napoleonic times and a corps commander in the United Stated Army fighting in Iraq, we can see the enormous differences in their leadership styles.
Based upon the accumulated experience of many counterinsurgency campaigns, there are five broad categories of expertise required of the future leadership to wage counterinsurgency war:

- Military-professional;
- Political-cultural;
- Technical-technological;
- Human development; and
- Moral-ethnical

**Military-Professional**

The duty of every leader is to be competent in the profession of arms. The military profession, as every other profession in the world, demands a broad spectrum of specific knowledge. As long as this profession exists, preparedness in these areas of expertise must simultaneously modernize and improve. Despite the fact that new subjects are constantly being taught, every officer, and eventually the future general, must feel completely at home incorporating those new concepts. He must also interoperates all the “lessons learned” associated with them.

Officers must understand the complete range of all problems. They must be smart, intellectual, and decisive, but must also possess a contemplative personality. However, it is important to identify a discrepancy in professional military preparation. Morris Janowitz, in his classic study *The Professional Soldier* (1960) makes a distinction between what he calls the “military intellectual” and the “intellectual officer”.

By “military intellectual”, he means the snippy, pedantic, professorial officer who can't lead, can't manage, can't make decisions, and relates poorly to people, the type describes by Brian Holden Reid in a wicked spoof as a
“diminutive, blinking, bespectacled swot whose muscles compare with peas and who grows exhausted after lifting a knife and fork.” The “intellectual officer”, by way of contrast, is the solid leader who brings the intellectual dimension to his job, accommodating it to the peculiar needs and demands of the profession: “He sees himself primarily as a soldier, and his intellectuality is part of his belief that he is a whole man.\textsuperscript{3}

The professional preparedness of military leaders is important because their actions affect the destiny of their countries. An unwise decision by a poorly-educated professor of botany, or an engineer’s miscalculation, can lead to problems in their realms of science or activity. The poorly-educated military officer’s decision could lead to a debacle in combat, and, as result, a massive loss of life. Unfortunately, history is replete with such vivid examples.

An assessment of strategic possibilities can be further subdivided into the preparation for war and the actual conduct of war. Preparation for future combat activities means the never ending process of raising, equipping, and training present armed forces. The conduct of war means thoughtful planning for the use of these forces and definitive directing them in combat situation.

As the general officer visualizes the conditions of future combat, he must prepare forces for these conditions of war. The general has to screen and form his troops. To raise military forces properly, he must calculate the quality and the quantity of forces needed in the next war. To arm and equip military forces appropriately, the general must estimate the human demands of future warfare, and replicate those conditions in peacetime drills. Of course, not even the most skilled general can precisely predict how future wars will be waged. According to British military historian and soldier Sir Michael Howard, “In structuring and preparing an army for war, you can be clear that you will not get it precisely right, but the important thing is not to be too far wrong, so that you can
put it right quickly. The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much
reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past.”

In situations where it is difficult to distinguish between friend and foe, the ability of
the military leader to make a quick and correct decision is the vital key to success. Many
historical examples illustrate the problem for us. In 1994, Russian troops entering
Chechen villages very often encountered dangerous situations when insurgents used
civilians, including the elderly, pregnant women, and children, as human shields. The
American Vietnam War and Soviet Afghan War abounded in instances when young
children threw grenades at soldiers in absolutely tranquil conditions. Their tight
connection with the indigenous population allows insurgents to use the forms of
resistance or counteractions that they consider acceptable in struggle against occupying
troops. They do not apply tanks attacks, aviation strikes, airborne landings, or naval
bombardments. However, insurgents will fight everywhere and in every way.

The readiness of the military leader to react adequately in these circumstances will
be defined by accumulated skills, experiences, and willingness to carry out combat
operations in any situation or hardship.

Following World War II, there were ample indicators that America’s
enemies would turn to insurgency to negate our advantages in firepower
and mobility. The French experiences in Indochina and Algeria offered
object lessons to Western armies facing unconventional foes. These
lessons were not lost on the more astute members of America’s political
class. In 1961, President Kennedy warned of “another type of war, new in
its intensity, ancient in its origin – war by guerrillas, subversives,
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration
instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the
enemy instead of engaging him.” In response to these threats, Kennedy
undertook a comprehensive program to prepare America’s armed forces
for counterinsurgency.4
Insurgent forces often lack what would be considered flanks, rear areas, or forward lines of own troops which is familiar to our understanding. Counterinsurgency operations therefore face a unique problem. They require disciplined soldiers, cunning sergeants, quick minded lieutenants, flexible captains, broadly educated lieutenant colonels and wise generals. Their leaders need to possess common sense and an understanding of human nature in order to figure out the best way to win the war by making steady progress, suffering fewer casualties, and keeping unit morale high.

In waging counterinsurgency campaigns this kind of military thinking is a leadership requirement down to at least the platoon level. The crux of this present issue in the Armed Forces (it does not matter whether it is the American, Ukrainian, British, Russian, or Chinese Armed Forces) is that officers are not systematically taught how to cope with unstructured problems. Viable counterinsurgency operational art requires taking an unstructured problem and giving it enough structure so that planning can lead to adequate and successful actions.

The careful synthesis and analysis of past military counterinsurgency operations can illuminate the main problems associated with this phenomenon. History does repeat itself, including the cases of insurgency and partisan resistance. American troops won the long war against Philippine guerrillas in the beginning of the 20th century; the Soviet NKVD troops defeated an insurgency movement in West Ukraine, West Belarus, and in the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) from 1944 to 1955; British troops crushed the rebellion’s opposition in Malaya during 1947 to 1955; and the armed forces of the Russian Federation successfully conducted a counterinsurgency war in Chechnya for almost 15 years. Leaders who have learned from, and practiced, lessons
from these examples will be at least 50 percent closer to victory before starting
hostilities in and other counterinsurgency war. Troops can gain experience by paying for
it with the is sweat and blood, but it is better to learn by practice in exercises before, and
not after, the beginning, of combat operations.

The current era is one of broad missions and uncertain challenges. Both the U.S.
Armed Forces and the former Soviet troops, together with allies, were for a long time
prepared almost exclusively for conventional war as it was understood during the Cold
War era. Presumably, Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was a timely application of
military expertise developed during the latter period of the Cold War. In contrast, the
tactics and strategy employed by the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1979 and, in many peace
and stability operations conducted by U.S. such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, were
conventional in nature and in appropriate to those missions. The soldiers were not
trained and prepared for those missions. However, the U.S. Army had remarkable
success during the first combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless,
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have led in to a confrontation with
unconventional warfare tactics and strategy that greatly complicates the post-conflict
stabilization process. These problems are indicative of a persistent inadequacy in the
Army’s understanding of that kind of expert counterinsurgency knowledge that its
leaders need. The problem also affects force structure, training, and other preparations
for the Army’s future performances in waging counterinsurgency.

Military officers cannot rely on their specialized training for combat operations
without simultaneously being prepared to make a sharp and sober assessment of the
political and cultural environment in their branches of service. Failing to conduct such an assessment might have to be paid for by the blood of thousand of citizens and soldiers.

Military planners must adapt to the particulars of each new conflict, and historical lessons about how force has been used can guide these adaptations. Because training and technology change over time, the tactics used to capture a city in 1943 most likely would not work against that city in 2003. But the strategic value of capturing that city does remain just as valid for strategy planning 60 years later.\(^5\)

**Political-Cultural**

The great Clausewitz once wrote that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. Presumably, a counterinsurgency war is the most political kind of war.

Drawing both from Army history and from the current operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, they make a compelling argument that, as the provider of durable land power for the nation’s security, the Army profession should forcefully claim legitimacy over this expert knowledge and apply it within the jurisdictions of major combat operations and stability operations.\(^6\)

Traditionally, military leaders responsible for counterinsurgency operations have looked skeptically upon supervising political, social, and cultural relations among indigenous political, governmental, public and other organizations. Eventually they had to engage in many unfamiliar tasks, but often they did not have the skills and experiences, or even the will, to undertake them successfully. Unresolved problems with the electricity and water supply, kindergartens and schools, roads, traditional religious celebrations, churches, mosques, flea markets, bazaars and so on in Iraq came as a bolt from the blue to many commanders. The commanders of battalions, brigades, and corps were reluctant to consider many unfamiliar situations for which their professional background had not prepared them.
to clarify the unique and particularly valuable contributions the Army and its profession leaders should make to joint interdependence with other armed services and governmental agencies.\textsuperscript{7}

The political necessities in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Iraq demand more than the defeat of the opposing forces. They also demand the organization of stability operations and assertion of authority in unstable and poorly governed regions. These operational objectives support the strategic purpose to eliminate the conditions that encourage the growth of terrorist groups. The military needs to be aware of the specific management capabilities required for stability operations, in some of which the armed forces will need to take the lead. The military must be aware of the cultural, social, and other indigenous conditions that dominate the foundation of the ungoverned regions. For instance, the generals must understand that the political and social systems in Afghanistan rest upon an authoritarian and tribal foundations. Comprehension of complex political situations is an absolute requirement for future Army leaders.

\textbf{Technical-Technological}

Richard Lacquemont argues that:

it is in the Army profession’s interest to recognize that a new field of joint expert knowledge has emerged, one lying beyond the expertise of America’s war fighting professions, and it will best be maintained and adapted to the future by a new military profession – a joint profession.\textsuperscript{8}

It is clear that the new technological developments in weaponry can only be used properly by highly-educated personnel. No general or leader wants to risk giving orders to poorly-educated, physically weak, and/or professionally unprepared soldiers. The demands on today’s solders require them to thoroughly learn and master everything about their military professions. Soldiers of the 21st century must be in good health,
have nerves of steel, be in perfect physical condition, and have high moral qualities. Moreover, advanced technology calls for well-educated instructors. Current combat systems require professional specialists who are prepared to use them properly. Thus, future leaders must be confident and knowledgeable in these areas.

For example, how can a general make the right military decisions without updated technological information, including the databases from unmanned aircraft systems, the data provided by space intelligence satellites, and the facts provided by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs? The modern skills of leadership are closely related to the proliferation of current technology and technical innovation. Leaders must therefore have commensurate knowledge in engineering, math, information technology, strategic intelligence, and so on.

Human Development

In spite of the amazing advances in technology, however, organizations continue to be plagued by ineffectiveness caused by flawed human (group) processes. Notwithstanding, the human dimension, not technology, remains the decisive element in the most commercial and military activities. Judgment, creativity, and the synergy of teams remain a distinctly human phenomenon.⁹

Despite the modern breakthrough in the world of advanced technology the human factor remains fundamental. The human factor is vital in the case of war, and in particular in counterinsurgency war. The human side of war has been the subject of much philosophical and psychological exploration. The U.S. Army adopted, for example, Maslow’s concept of self-actualization after the Vietnam’s War. The grievous experiences of that conflict compelled the leadership to take the necessary steps to resolve complex tasks, including post-war traumatic stress syndrome. These considerations must also be applied to counterinsurgency warfare. First of all,
embarking in the fight against insurgents is a complex task because military leaders must come to know not only the opponent, but also the indigenous social and cultural environment.

Secondly, the leader in counterinsurgency campaigns must protect the people from the insurgent's coercion. This is difficult because it requires high levels of manpower for extended periods of time, and a good deal of operational savvy and discipline. Events have frequently exposed the myth of a presumed hospitable relationship between occupation troops and a population, but cruelty toward indigenous people is often both an immediate and proximate cause for mass resistance.

The pattern of attack and counterattack looks like classic guerrilla warfare, in which a weaker foe attacks in the place of his choosing, then melts into the population. The harder an occupying force pounds back, the more it alienates the populace, creating communities that accept, if not actively support, armed resistance. The Americans learned that lesson the hard way in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan, the British in Northern Ireland, and now, it seems, the same thing may be unfolding for the Americans in Iraq.

The following observations ultimately helped shape our operational construct:

It is imperative to earn the trust and confidence of the indigenous population in your area of operation. They might never "like" you, but I am convinced you can earn their respect.

To defeat the insurgency, you must convince the silent majority of the population that it is in their best personal and national interest to support Coalition efforts and, conversely, convince them not to support the insurgents.

Being honest in the execution of information operations is highly important. This goes back to developing trust and confidence, especially with target audiences. If you lose your credibility, you cannot conduct
effective IO. Therefore, you should never try to implement any sort of IO “deception” operations.\textsuperscript{10}

The well-educated leader possesses great skills and experience in religious, social, cultural, sociological, and public affairs. A carrots-and-stick policy that is based on a deep understanding of the culture of the operational environment is one of the most powerful leverages in counterinsurgency actions.

**Moral-Ethical**

The ambiguous nature of the operational environment requires Army leaders who are self-aware and adaptive. Self-aware leaders understand their operational environment, can assess their own capabilities, determine their own strengths and weaknesses, and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses. Adaptive leaders must first be self-aware – then have the additional ability to recognize change in their operational environment, identify those changes, and learn how to adapt to succeed in their new environment.\textsuperscript{11}

Supplementary education and additional hard work are compulsory for the professional development of military leaders. Military leaders must think strategically about the future of their profession. Leaders need a clear understanding of the nature of the Army’s roles and functions and the areas within which they can be usefully applied. Strategic leaders must base their interactions with society’s civilian leaders on the firmest possible foundation.

All these skills and abilities demand a high level of moral and ethical awareness. Programs of military education must establish the fundamental baseline of capabilities for the future leader. Society wants to respect its military defenders. And this community must prepare and nurture the environment that is named the officer corps. Creating the proper kind of educational environment may require sacrifices. Nonetheless, if a society wishes to be protected, it has to do it.
Counterinsurgency conflicts test the entire spectrum of human capabilities as they create the extreme circumstances. The challenges of this kind of combat activity can lead to a syndrome of nervous exhaustion. In these conditions the leaders must maintain patience, serenity, and strength of will. Only strong leaders can preserve their troops from panic, loss of dignity, and lack of assertiveness.

Intellectual independence from the society is the essence of professionalism, and not at all evidence of a lack of it. It is the essence of a profession that members possess unique knowledge and the skill to apply that knowledge to a given range of sphere of service. A formulation such as that above, with its exclusive emphasis on obedient service, undercuts the centrality of the “abstract knowledge” aspect of Abbott’s (or any other) model of professionalism. As Friedson puts it, “Professionalism entails commitment to a particular body of knowledge and skill both for its own sake and for use to which it is put.”

The inability to envisage future warfare demonstrates a decline in professorial readiness, but to contemplate and form opinions about these problems and yet remain silent signals an even more serious decline in character. When moral bravery regularly damages the professional reputation of an officer, the armed forces confront serious professional dangers. The history of military improvement includes the broken fortunes of many would-be reformers who were punished for advocating change. A military professional must possess both the physical courage to face the hazards of battle and the moral courage to withstand criticism. On and off the battlefield, courage is the first characteristic of generalship.

Military advice not derived from professional expertise compromises the legitimacy of advice in other contexts.

Conclusion

Our nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win the nation’s wars. Every other task is subordinate to that commitment. To discharge our responsibilities to the Nation, we maintain several core
competencies. These are the essential and enduring capabilities of our service. They encompass the full range of military operations across the spectrum of conflict, from sustained land dominance in wartime to supporting civil authorities during natural disasters and consequence management.14

This quotation from FM 1, the Army’s capstone manual, declares broad and compelling responsibilities for the Army. Aside from the priority for war-fighting, however, it provides an undifferentiated and almost limitless range of operations for which the Army must prepare. This is a noble aspiration reflecting the best can-do spirit of loyal service to the nation. But it is a problematic foundation obscuring significant limitations and trade-offs required to concentrate the Army’s finite resources – personnel, material, and funds – on the most important requirements. Changes in the international security environment and in technology challenge leaders to redefine the Army’s role for the future. Effective strategic leadership of the Army profession will be an essential component of successful transformation. To serve American society effectively, strategic leaders of the profession must redefine, prioritize, and delimit the declared expert knowledge of the profession; clarify the jurisdictions within which this knowledge applies; and then develop professionals who are experts in applying this knowledge.15

The main aspect of counterinsurgency policy is that one cannot expect an easy and swift victory. To successfully resolve partisan resistance movements is a very complex task that demands thoroughly considered and methodologically up-to-date approaches are required. The entire political system of the country should be dedicated to the goal of winning. The insurgents cannot be defeated merely through political or economic sanctions. Indeed, military means, in and of them, are not adequate. The politicians, mass-media, armed forces, and, most importantly, the population of occupational troops must recognize that successful counterinsurgency operations means long-term low intensity confrontation. Victory will be obtained only through the synergy of mutually supportive political and military strategies. If the community is not ready to contend and to sacrifice in such battles, it means they should immediately give up.
The insurgents possess two main pillars of strength: the allegiance of the indigenous population and support from countries overseas. If the resources for the resistance movement can be eliminated, the military can begin to consider the possibility of success. However, victory is impossible without a complex interaction among political, economic and social authorities.

In the light of stabilization operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, the future leaders of the armed forces must think strategically about the prospects of these combat operations and how to prepare officers to wage them successfully. Future counterinsurgency actions will be even more complex, demanding, and uncertain than they are proving to be today. To prepare effective leaders means to adequately educate and train them for carrying out the specific kinds of responsibilities that these operations impose. The Army must map out the required expert knowledge for each particular branch and service, and to insure that individual professionals apply this acquired expertise appropriately and above all in time.

Endnotes


6 Lacquement, 212.

8 Lacquement, 212.


13 Lacquement, 213.

14 U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, 32

15 Lacquement, 213.