NATIONAL GUARD JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS TRANSFORMATION: SHAPING THE FORCE

BY

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United States Army National Guard

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USAWC CLASS OF 2008

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
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SHAPING THE FORCE

by

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United States Army National Guard

Colonel Christine Stark
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
America insists on a reliable and accessible National Guard. Today’s Guard member, the 21st-century Minuteman, must be available at a moment’s notice to defend the Nation, at home or abroad. America expects no less. This can only be done with a properly staffed and effective Joint Force Headquarters capable of meeting the full spectrum of demands. Unfortunately, National Guard state level TDA organizations have been unable to keep pace with transformation initiatives because of outdated policy and regulatory guidance. This paper will review the current imbalances, describe the strategic implications of continued reliance on these documents, and outline recommendations to reconcile these critical shortcomings.
When you call out the Guard, you call out America. Never in the nation’s history has this been more true. From our response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, to our reaction in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one thing stands: America’s National Guard has transformed from a strategic Reserve force into a fully operational force multiplier for the Department of Defense.²

—LTG H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau

The National Guard (NG) celebrated its 371st Birthday on December 13, 2007; however, it does not resemble the NG of the 80s or 90s when mobilizations were rare and training focused on strategic reserve preparedness and occasional state active duty in support of domestic emergencies. From the time of the 1903 Dick Act, until 2001, the National Guard has been a Strategic Reserve.³ The National Guard today, however, is by necessity, an operational force that is amazingly different.

As many senior military leaders have recently stated, including the Chief of National Guard Bureau (CNGB), the National Guard is now an operational force, critical to America’s war fighting capability. According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, over 213,000 National Guard soldiers have been mobilized since 9/11, over 54,000 more than once.⁴ The level of the Guard’s involvement inside this new operational environment has changed significantly and the days of large-scale, single-agency, operations are a thing of the past. The response to September 11th, Hurricane Katrina, and the mission to secure our southern borders are windows into the future of U.S. Military operations at home and abroad, and are all examples of joint, combined, interagency, intergovernmental, and international operations.⁵
During a 2007 lecture at the USAWC regarding civil-military relations, a prominent speaker stated the military, as a whole, resists transformation, consolidation and reorganization. As a career Army officer in the Wisconsin National Guard, I identify with these remarks due in large part to my involvement in the most dramatic transformation of the NG organizational structure and function, since its inception over 371 years ago. Over the past several years, the National Guard has become instrumental in fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and it is no longer the strategic reserve it was preceding and including the Cold War period. From response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to the reaction to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one thing stands: America’s National Guard has transformed to a full partner and operational force multiplier for the Department of Defense. According to LTG H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), and other senior military leaders, the National Guard is now an operational force, supporting domestic and wartime missions throughout the world. On September 11, the National Guard deployed more than 8,500 Soldiers and Airmen to the streets of New York and the Pentagon in less than 24 hours. The Guard provided security to the Nation’s airports within 72 hours and flew over 30,000 incident-free, fully armed combat air patrol missions over the United States. Federalized Guard forces are successfully conducting close quarter combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, international peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, Southwest Border support, and counter drug support, indicating again the citizen solider is an integral part of the total force and strategy. Shoulder to shoulder with the active component, responding to the “Call to Duty”; the National Guard has blossomed into an operational force.
Ready and relevant forces in the 21st century demand expeditionary, joint, rapidly deployable and adaptive units, with enhanced capacity to be successful across the entire range of military operations—from major combat to post-conflict stability. Transforming into a modular force is the most effective way to ensure success. Concurrent with becoming an operational force, the National Guard is undergoing its own sweeping Modular Transformation of units throughout the nation. The Army modular force initiative—the major transformational effort—involves the total redesign of the operational Army from the cold war era, heavy divisional structure into a more powerful, flexible, and rapidly deployable force built around a brigade combat team (BCT). BCTs are designed to be stand-alone, self-sufficient and standardize tactical forces of between 3,500 and 4,000 Soldiers. They are more strategically responsive across the entire range of military operations required by the 21st century security environment. Ultimate success in the GWOT rests on the successful transformation of these capabilities.

Following modularity of war fighting unit structure is the long overdue transformation of the National Guard Headquarters from a State Area Command (STARC) to a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). This has been a critical innovation in every state and territory offering significant change from the days of separate Army and Air Guard state headquarters geared toward administrative peacetime operations. Understandably, a transformation of this magnitude has met with significant challenges and surfaced issues of size and composition for the headquarters elements at both the National Guard Bureau Headquarters in Arlington, VA and the individual states. The most critical issue requiring attention is Table of Distribution and Allowance balancing
the recently created Joint Force Headquarters, to include, authorizations between the states for filling the newly created headquarters positions.

This paper focuses on the transformation, as directed by the CNGB, with emphasis on the Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) authorization imbalance existing between states, and recommendations for resolving the critical imbalance. A review and analysis of current strategy and policy documents will inform and guide efforts to design Organization and Functions of the National Guard Headquarters at the State level. Specifically, this paper discusses the importance of rebalancing TDA authorizations between the 54 states and territories to balance the ratio of authorizations for the JFHQ to the Force Structure Authorizations resulting from transformation to the modular force.

**Strategic Significance of TDA Rebalance**

The JFHQ functions in a unique role, as both a federal entity, and a state agency, with distinct requirements, responsibilities, resources, and functions which must be integrated into a single entity responsive to both state and federal mission.\(^\text{16}\) The JFHQ provides resourcing, enabling National Guard units to successfully develop and sustain personnel, train units, and maintain logistics readiness in order to mobilize and deploy. The nature and scope of the dual role the National Guard plays regarding sustaining a capability to provide forces quickly for state, domestic, or federal missions in support of national interests is absolutely critical. A poorly structured and balanced JFHQ severely hinders a states’ ability to maintain JFHQ functions and operations. This, in turn, has tremendous strategic implications regarding the National Guard’s capability to support its dual mission requirements during domestic crisis. This becomes critical when
considering the current TDA authorizations at the state level. The TDA authorizations drive staffing levels to fill positions within the JFHQ. Increasing operational requirements to support the war on terror, expanding homeland security/homeland defense responsibilities, combined with expanding JFHQ roles, missions and responsibilities, are challenging the capabilities of the JFHQ staffs to sustain them. States lacking adequate TDA authorization struggle to support increasing operational requirements, resulting in federal and state mission shortcomings.

Assessment

National Guard Regulation (NGR) 10-2, dated 19 November 1982, is the most current Organization and Functions document for the Army National Guard. This regulation prescribes mission, functions, and basis for organization of the State Area Command (STARC), the State military headquarters in the 50 States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands. It also identifies mission function and charter of the STARC’s State and Federal mobilization requirements. Size and composition of the STARC was originally determined by the respective States, subject to approval by Headquarters, Department of the Army using guidelines, restrictions, and standards listed within the regulation.

The STARC was organized along standard directorate staff lines or the G-Staff configuration as depicted in FM 101-5 and manned with the appropriate numbers of personnel in correct grades and military specialties to accomplish required pre- and post-mobilization functions. Paragraph five (Organization) of the regulation further defines the STARC Organization, designated as “Headquarters, State Area Command” (STARC), (State) Army National Guard. The required organizational structure was
described as the standard staff elements (G1 through G8), and included non-standard headquarters staff sub-elements such as; Selective Service Section, Human Relations/Equal Opportunity section, and the United States Property and Fiscal Office (USPFO).\textsuperscript{19}

The basic STARC staff structure consisted of approximately eleven primary sections, including; the Command Section, Chief of Staff, Special Staff Group, Directorate of Personnel, Directorate of Security, Directorate of Plans, Operations, Training, and Military Support, Directorate of Logistics, USPFO, Directorate of Maintenance, Directorate of Facilities Engineering, and the Headquarters Detachment. Each Directorate had a variety of subordinate branches to perform specific support tasks.\textsuperscript{20} Individual states had the flexibility to tailor the STARC headquarters by selecting from a menu of over 650 specific TDA positions to accommodate unique state requirements; however, the state could not exceed the total number of authorized TDA allowances for that particular state.

Appendix B of NGR 10-2 contains the ARNG Grading Guide, stating each National Guard STARC may be authorized the number and grades of personnel according to categories established based on authorized strengths. The guide represents estimates of the ARNG Force Programs and Structure Branch based upon existing DA guidance, and ARNG requirements. It breaks each state into one of seven categories (A through G) based on total ARNG Force structure authorizations. The higher the alphabetical category, the progressively lower the force structure authorization is. The figure below reflects the data in table 1, Appendix B, NGR 10-2:
## Table 1.

States initially reference the guide to determine individual applicable category. Once the category is identified, the state refers to table 2, which delineates the total number of TDA authorizations allowed to develop the states STARC TDA HQ manning document.

The chart below reflects the data in table 2, Appendix B, NGR 10-2.²¹

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<td>20,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>15,000 – 19,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>10,000 – 14,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>7,500 – 9,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>4,000 – 7,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2,000 – 3,999</td>
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<td>G</td>
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<td>002</td>
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<td>001</td>
<td>001</td>
<td>001</td>
<td>01</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>002</td>
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<td>014</td>
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<td>250</td>
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For example, a state with a force structure authorization of 8,000 falls into category D in table one. A category D state is allocated 210 TDA authorizations to fill its headquarters in accordance with table two. As mentioned previously, there is some flexibility in how states build their TDA headquarters, provided the state does not exceed its category cap or exceed certain rank and grade restrictions.

National Guard roles and missions, organizational structure, and functions have changed dramatically since 1982; however, the system for authorizing TDA positions to fill structures has remained unchanged and still falls under the 1982 regulation. During the late 1970s through the 1980s, the National Guard emerged as a bulwark against communist expansion to support containment policies and strategies. Shortly after Desert Shield and Desert Storm, President Bush announced the “Base Force,” concept which was the new shape of America’s armed forces and a new strategy for national defense that marked the end of America’s forty-year reliance on the strategy of containment. The plan’s principle architect and advocate was General Collin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He defined the Base Force as the minimum troop level required among all services that still allowed the U.S. to maintain its superpower status and meet worldwide responsibilities. NGR 10-2 did not undergo any revision during this time.

Throughout the National Guard’s history, states have experienced significant change due to evolving global situations and threats. As a result, NGR 10-2 is severely outdated and lacks any type of significant adjustment since its inception over 27 years ago. A time in which the global situation was significantly different, the U.S. faced very
different threats, and the National Guard was used primarily as a strategic reserve and was manned, equipped, and staffed accordingly.

Since the nation’s inception, citizen-soldiers have displayed an innate ability to adapt to constantly changing circumstances while providing meaningful capabilities to America’s defense needs. The National Guard successfully responded to the dynamic social, political, and economic conditions that fashion and shape American society. Generally speaking, the constant evolution of defense policy, advances in technology, and methods of warfare have prompted changes in organizational structure, equipment, weapons, administration and training. From 1972 to 1989, the post-Vietnam “hollow force” was completely rebuilt – its people, equipment, and training underwent significant change. In 1977, the ARNG’s personnel strength fell to 355,721, the lowest level since the end of the Korean War. Post Vietnam era draw-downs and the release of large numbers of soldiers for unsatisfactory performance resulted in ARNG strength bottoming out in 1979 at 346,974. Policy changes and the establishment of the Montgomery G.I. Bill contributed to significant increases and a historic peacetime strength high in 1989 of 456,960 soldiers. This coincides with the publication of NGR 10-2 outlining STARC organizations and functions, including TDA authorization tables. Toward the end of 1990, the Army advised the ARNG to plan for cuts of up to 137,000 troops. By the year 2000, ARNG strength levels were reduced to 353,045, which is approximately where it has remained, regardless of changing operational requirements.

For most of the 54 states and territories these troop cuts translated to reductions in force structure. Advancing technologies, changing doctrine, politics, and efficiencies in
organizational structure and design also contributed to the need to reduce forces over the years. Modular Transformation coupled with NGB strength management policies has had the greatest impact on force structure allocations between states in recent years. During recent discussion on modular transformation implementation, CNGB and NGB-ARF announced that war fighting Manned Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) structure is directly linked to a states ability to sustain end strength. States that demonstrate the ability to sustain or exceed end strength requirements are rewarded with additional force structure. States that consistently fall below required end strength requirements will have force structure diverted to states that show the highest probability of filling vacancies. Transformation to the modular force also caused significant shifts in force structure allocations amongst the individual states. Thus, during the past several years of transformation and strength management practices, force structure levels at the state level fluctuated, and in some cases significantly, to allow NGB to maintain approximately 348,000 end strength for the entire National Guard. As a result, authorization tables contained in NGR 10-2 have become dangerously outdated and in need of complete revision.

The New Global Environment

The DOD Total Force Policy and the changing post-cold war environment significantly increased the use of the reserve components in support of overseas exercises, contingency operations, humanitarian support, peacekeeping operations and combat operations. As previously mentioned the majority of the change focused on the war fighting MTOE structure throughout the army and took place within modular transformation. Operational requirements to support the global war on terror and
expanding homeland security/defense roles have significantly increased the demands on the National Guard. There is a direct correlation to this increase in the staff support requirements. Despite the increased demand, the headquarters organization and levels of fill in each state stayed relatively stagnant and the TDA authorizations for each state remained unchanged, creating significant TDA imbalances between states across the nation.

Joint Transformation

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, initiated major defense reorganization; the most significant since the National Security Act of 1947. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders.  

Since 1986, Goldwater-Nichols has influenced tremendous changes in the way DOD operates, particularly in the case of joint operations, which became the norm, not the exception. Implementation of the act is an on-going project with Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and Joint Vision 2020 (2000). Both documents emphasize the most effective force must be fully joint at the intellectual, operational, organizational, doctrinal, and technical levels. The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future.
Based on recommendations stemming from Goldwater-Nichols, LTG H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, announced on May 16, 2003, the official transformation of the National Guard to a joint organization and emphasized the need for change to start at the top. By October 1, 2003, the National Guard initiated transformation to a single Joint Force Headquarters at National Guard Bureau (NGB) in Arlington, VA and in each of the 54 states and territories. The guidance provided by LTG Blum to each state involved consolidating redundant headquarters (STARC, Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG)), to form single JFHQs and staffs for the purpose of providing a manning document to support the Joint Staff and the Adjutant General’s (TAG) personal staff positions for the state JFHQ. Recognized as the most critical transformation the National Guard has undergone since 2001, is the creation of the Joint Force Headquarters in each state, territory, and the District of Columbia. The former State Area Command and Air Guard State Headquarters, administrative organizations for peacetime control of units, developed into a sophisticated headquarters and communications node capable of assuming command and control of units from all services and components when responding to a domestic emergency. LTG Blum states: “These headquarters must be linked together to provide robust capabilities to share secure and non-secure information within the State or Territory, to deployed incident site(s), and to other DoD and inter-governmental partners engaged in support of Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities.”

Despite this enormous change, the release of an approved document for the formal establishment of the JFHQ TDA/JTD to support critical demands has yet to
emerge. Initial drafts of a document essentially combined all current requirements from the ARNG TDA and the ANG Unit Manning Document (UMD) into a single Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), with new joint position titles in some lines and some additional positions added in parts of the new organization that had not previously existed. The new Organizations and Functions of the Joint Force Headquarters documents are in the developmental stages. Expectations are that it will take many years to finalize and release an approved product. Out of necessity, many states developed interim Organization and Functions Documents bridge the gap and establish a functioning JFHQ.

Using the state of Wisconsin as an example, the Chief of the Joint Staff, released the Wisconsin National Guard (WING) Regulation 10-3 that describes the organizations and functions of each element of the Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs (DMA), Office of the Adjutant General (OTAG), and the Joint Force Headquarters. The document explains JFHQ functions, as both a federal entity, and a state agency, with distinct requirements, responsibilities, resources, and functions integrated in a single operational entity equally responsive to both State and federal missions. The Department of Military Affairs, OTAG and JFHQ form the senior National Guard headquarters and single coordinating element for National Guard elements within the State. I further ensures the soldiers and airmen of a state maintain readiness to respond to natural and man-made emergencies, including Homeland Security events. On order of the Governor, it mobilizes and provides Command and Control to units of the National Guard while deployed in a state status. The JFHQ provides coordination and training oversight for National Guard units in the state, directly aligned with, and
resourced to provide support to Federal Major Commands (MACOMS/MAJCOMS), including Combatant Commands (COCOMS).\(^{39}\)

**Cultural Resistance to Change**

The cultural shock to the National Guard community following LTG Blum’s announcement and directive reverberates to this day as they undertake the transformation of multiple, semi-autonomous headquarters, to a single joint headquarters, takes hold. LTG Blum’s initiative resulted in many states attempting to simply modify older STARC TDAs to form JFHQ structures, but within the confines of outdated authorizations. Unfortunately, the disparity that gradually evolved between TDA authorizations, based on a 27-year-old regulation and today’s current realities, became glaringly apparent, and stifle efforts.

**Significance of the TDA Imbalance**

Since 9/11, the majority of states have asked for modifications to existing TDA regulations, policies, directives, and authorizations to bring them in line with the new operational environment. States are unanimous in their agreement that there must be an across the board increase in JFHQ TDA authorizations to fill critical joint staff requirements as well as adjustments for increasing operational requirements in both domestic and federal missions. The reality remains that any gains in force structure the NG achieves is directed toward war fighting MTOE structure, not the TDAs, according to NGB-ARF (ARNG Force Management Division).\(^{40}\) While understandable, given the National Guard’s expanding roles and engagement in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, it never the less causes a tragic imbalance especially when considering the mandate given by Chief, NGB to transform.
The old saying of “do more with less,” is not acceptable in today’s demanding operational environment. Newly formed state JFHQ staffs continue efforts to mold existing staffs, enhancing efficiencies and capabilities, to support full spectrum state and federal missions. Unfortunately, actual roles and missions exceed original expectations of the STARC design. Demands on the JFHQ of today are fast exceeding capabilities to sustain requirements.

The Chief of Staff of the Army acknowledged publicly, that six years of war have “stretched” and “stressed” soldiers and their families. The strain on troops and equipment due to the current pace of deployments is “unsustainable”. Not only has this affected the soldiers deployed, but also those officers and soldiers in the JFHQs who support the steady increase of requirements. These expanding requirements, left unchecked, are beginning to have long-term, potentially strategic, affects on the National Guard’s ability to support critical Homeland Security and Defense Support to Civil Authority required missions.

Balancing TDA Requirements with Operations

Two challenges exist regarding current TDA structure and staffing levels: First, the current distribution of TDA authorizations between the states is severely out of balance. The organization of the Joint Forces Headquarters, Wisconsin (JFHQ-WI), under the current NGR 10-2 formulas, is 210 ARNG personnel with a force structure allowance of approximately 7767. By comparison, under the same regulation, the State of Georgia has 352 TDA authorizations with a force structure authorization of 8711. This comparison quickly reveals significant disparities in TDA authorizations between states. The table below is a representative comparison of TDA authorizations for the JFHQ vs.
force structure authorizations for five large, five medium, and five small states. The category of state is based on the current force structure for each state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TDA STRENGTH</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED ARNG FSA FY06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>15,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>16,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>11,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>15,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>11,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>8233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>10,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>6558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>8054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
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<td>10,170</td>
</tr>
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<td>7636</td>
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<td>3163</td>
</tr>
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<td>ME</td>
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<td>268</td>
<td>7246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>4802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.

Further comparison demonstrates the significant disparity existing between states with similar force structure. Missouri, for example, has a TDA authorization of 329 personnel against a force structure allowance of 8233. When Missouri is compared with a state such as South Carolina, with a TDA of 288 and a force structure of 8054, it is clear that two states with comparable force structure (8233 vs. 8054), have drastically different TDA authorizations (329 vs. 288). Missouri’s force structure, while close to that of South Carolina; has 41 additional TDA authorizations. Additional comparisons between California and Pennsylvania further illustrate the point. Both states hold force structures close to 15,800; but have a TDA authorization gap (354 vs. 255) of close to 100 authorizations. A review of Wisconsin and Oklahoma reveals that Wisconsin, with 7636 in force structure, has 58 less TDA authorizations (210 vs. 268) than Oklahoma, a state
with less force structure (7256) than Wisconsin. The only way states with comparably low TDA authorizations can feasibly continue to meet mission and support requirements is to shift critical funding “out of hide” and find soldiers willing to perform Full-Time National Guard Duty (FTNGD). This places additional stress on limited NG budgets and it is increasingly difficult for states to maintain due to soldier resource pools already engaged with heavy mobilization demands supporting global mission requirements.

NGB-ARF, the organization charged with directing Force Structure policy change, acknowledges inequities exist in the distribution of JFHQ TDA authorizations of the new JFHQ and that the current state authorizations are based on the size of the States’ force structure in 1982. They also indicate that the implementation of JFHQ transformation is intended to take place without any growth or re-alignment of NGB TDA authorization at this time. These points, taken together, make it unlikely any state can continue to provide the necessary support to its units training and readiness.

NGR 10-2 is outdated and ineffective in determining organization, functions and authorizations for the new JFHQ TDAs/JTDs. For several years, discussions regarding development of a new NGR 10-2 have taken place, however, to date; a viable working document does not exist. This serves to exacerbate the existing problem and complicates the transition to the JFHQ organization and functions, while sustaining current demands placed on the JFHQ to support the National Guard’s role as an operational force. Increased rotational requirements associated with the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, Homeland Security, and its latest Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force preparedness, increases the impact of this dilemma. This increased
Recognizing the Need for Change

During a recent Adjutants General Conference hosted in the state of Wisconsin, The Adjutant General of Wisconsin, requested support from the Chief, NGB to fix identified TDA shortcomings and initiate needed revisions to the NGB level JFHQ TDA Organizations and Functions regulation to meet increased operational demands on the force. The Chief agreed and Wisconsin was selected to head up the review, focusing on the current JFHQ TDA situation and developing strategies for updating processes and procedures for determining TDA structure and authorizations. This relook included TDA authorization rebalancing. Based on poor results and experiences from past attempts to bring all 54 states and territories together to discuss STARC/JFHQ TDA issues, the designated planners chose a representative group as opposed to individuals from all 54 states and territories. This was a deliberate effort to increase chances of successful conflict resolution should one arise. NGB provided a list, categorizing all states by size, based on Total Army Analysis (TAA-13) force structure authorizations and projections. States are categorized as Large (AL, CA, IN, PA, TX), Medium (AR, FL, GA, IL, LA, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NY, OH, PR, SC, TN, VA), and Small (all remaining states). Fifteen representative states participated in the initiative (five from each category based on the states TDA authorization levels, geographic location of the state, and significance of TDA authorization disparity). The states selected became permanent TDA rightsizing committee members to ensure consistency and unity of effort. The desired end state of the committee’s efforts was the development of a standard formula to calculate TDA
structure applied to each state and a re-write proposal for NGR 10-2. Transformation impacts, current formulas in NGR 10-2, and each state’s Force Structure Allowance (FSA), including both MTOE and TDA strength, provided the criteria for planning considerations. 45 Two conferences were then held over a six month period. The first conference generated significant discussion from states with concerns about rebalancing and creating situations where states would stand to lose significant authorizations. Many representative states expressed a desire to focus on the re-write of NGR 10-2 and associated formulas as a starting point to developing a functional JTD, rather than consider any immediate TDA authorization rebalancing. Upon review of the existing disparities between states of equal size and the realization that many states have drastically low TDA authorizations when compared to like size states, all agreed rebalancing needed to be addressed first.

There are currently a fixed number of TDA authorizations nationwide (approximately 12,333) to support staffing the JFHQ for all 54 states and territories. This fact led the committee to agree that reformulating NGR 10-2 requirements, though important in the near future, is not as critical as rebalancing existing authorizations. The committee’s strategy, therefore, would be to conduct parallel planning to re-write the NGR 10-2 while simultaneously initiating a nation-wide TDA authorization rebalancing equalizing TDA authorizations over a phased period of three to five years. This would in turn allow states with excess authorizations to ramp down over a multi-year period through normal attrition rather than loose all positions immediately.

The second conference solidified the committee’s charter, established the Chief of Staff, Pennsylvania ARNG, as the committee Chair, and developed milestones for
development of necessary formulas and re-write of the NGR 10-2. More importantly, the community agreed that acceptance of the initiative by all states and NGB leadership was critical to successful change and subsequent implementation.

The committee established a timeline for presenting critical proposals and decision points through the key advisory committees at the national level, to include; the Plans, Operations and Training Advisory Council (PORTAC), Chief of Staff Advisory Council (COSAC), the Adjutants Generals Association, and ultimately the Chief, NGB. This facilitates acceptance of recommendations by all states prior to gaining approval from the CNGB. Unfortunately, conversations in the spring of 2007 with the Chiefs of Staff from Pennsylvania and Wisconsin indicated the TDA Rightsizing initiative and the JFHQ-S Working Group Steering Committee were postponed indefinitely by NGB with the intent of pursuing other courses of action.

**NGB Weighs In**

Prior to the decision to implement the JFHQ (State) concept, NGB was already working to publish a new NGR 10-2. NGB-ARF initially identified three courses of action (COA) to deal with this disproportionate allocation of TDA force structure. Those were: 1) Do nothing and maintain the status quo; 2) Adopt a national average size for all JFHQs which would be based upon the FSA currently assigned to each state; or 3) Develop a formula to take into consideration multiple factors in determining the relative size of all JFHQ. COA 3 seems to be the favored option among states with the two primary factors; first, the number of units assigned to each particular state FSA, and second, the aggregate FSA considered in the calculation. A multi-factor recommendation was staffed; however, NGB did not favor the results and is currently
working to establish additional factors for potentially basing re-allocation of TDA authorizations. The NGB-J5 currently leads the joint effort for developing a Joint Manning Document (JMD), but to date, no clear resolution to this issue exists. In my opinion, based on experience with the rightsizing committee, re-writing NGR 10-2 and developing multi-factor TDA recommendations is irrelevant at this point while a significant TDA authorization imbalance exists. The reality is that TDA development, approval, and implementation is a multi-year process. At best, if a TDA were approved next month, it will take a minimum of two years beyond that to get an approved document released to the states. Meanwhile, demands on states JFHQ staffs continue to build with no relief in the near term. Further delay on resolution of this issue places greater strain on the state JFHQ staffs responsible for force sustainment and projection. A significant WMD or catastrophic event of national significance, occurring in a region or state with an understaffed JFHQ due to TDA imbalance, could place the National Guard’s capability to respond effectively and efficiently in jeopardy.

Recommendation

NGB should establish a policy reinstating the Rightsizing Committee of fifteen to seventeen states, facilitated by NGB J-5 staff and the NGB-ARF division. This is in accordance with the agreement established during the TAG Conference in Wisconsin between CNGB and participating states. The committee’s focus would remain on developing plans to create a fair and equitable formula for rebalancing current TDA authorizations among all states using relevant criteria, including current and projected operational requirements. Realizing the limitations of approximately 12,333 TDA authorizations nationally; initial rebalancing formulas will remain within the current limit.
Conducting this phased rebalance, implemented over a three year period, postures the states to best support expanding requirements while NGR 10-2 Organizations and Functions are re-written and published. Simultaneously, the Rightsizing Committee should establish a subcommittee for the purpose of planning and coordinating the re-write of NGR 10-2, to include the organizations and functions of the Joint Force Headquarters and staff. A critical component of the re-write is the reformulation of the authorization tables used to determine individual states final authorizations. Significant effort is required to design expanded formulas for the authorization tables to accommodate future TDA growth, when it occurs. Formulas must also include situational planning factors that will allow states to request and obtain additional, permanent and/or temporary, TDA authorizations to support unique state requirements, such as the regional CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), Southwest border operations, or critical infrastructure protection.

Additionally, NGB should pursue national policy changes and legislation to increase TDA authorizations commensurate with requirements. The way ahead, as with the rebalance and growth of ARNG war fighting forces to a level of 358.2K of force structure by 2013, is through a corresponding increase in TDA authorizations to arm JFHQ staffs with critical human resources to sustain current and future state and federal operational requirements. Mission One for the National Guard is Homeland Defense. The President, Governors, Congress, and the Secretary of Defense insist the Guard be fully prepared to engage in Homeland Defense and to support Homeland Security missions while simultaneously engaged in combat overseas. In fact, they demand, the Guard be more accessible now than ever before. The Guard has committed to the
Governors – the state Commanders in Chief – that the National Guard will have sufficient capabilities under their control to meet their needs. Those capabilities include key assets for command, control and immediate response, to include the Joint Force Headquarters.  

National Guard Joint Force Headquarters now exist in 54 states and territories, in compliance with guidance from the Secretary of Defense. Forging new relationships between the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff is key and essential to addressing requirements in the new operational environment. The primary focus is on improving Department of Defense access to the National Guard capabilities. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters in each state and territory, today, each operate a Joint Operations Center functioning 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The Guard stands more ready, reliable, essential and accessible today than at anytime in its 370 years of existence. Since 9/11, the NG has been employed around the world and here at home as an operational force in a variety of contingencies. It is a role that the Guard was not structured to perform before 9/11. The Guard – with the exception of those units mobilized for war – is still under-resourced for many of the missions it now performs. The Joint Force Headquarters commands, controls, trains, and resources this operational force, and requires rebalancing and increased staffing to sustain it - or risk strategic failure.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.


7 Blum, The National Guard: Transforming to an Operational Force, 12.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Blum, The National Guard: Transforming to an Operational Force, 14.

15 Ibid, 14.

16 Wisconsin National Guard, Organization and Functions of the Joint Force Headquarters, WING REG 10-3, (Department of Military Affairs, Office of the Adjutant General, 15 November 2005), Summary.


18 Ibid, 3.
19 Ibid, 3.

20 Ibid, C-1.

21 Ibid, B-1.


23 Ibid, 335.

24 Ibid, 374.

25 Ibid, 374.


27 Doubler, 276.

28 Ibid, 291.

29 Ibid, 344-45.


31 Ibid.

32 LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, stated “The National Guard cannot remain the way it is. The National Guard must transform for future threats and current realities. The world will not sit still, and the National Guard cannot sit still. We must adjust to those realities and those new and emerging threats. So we will transform the National Guard, both the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, to be a joint team. A team with the five other services -- the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard -- and the seven Reserve Components, so that the citizens of our great nation get the best of all of their capabilities and the effects that a joint team can produce.” See, LTG H. Steven Blum, “Transforming Roles of the National Guard,” 16 May 2003; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2613.mil/media/factsheets/2_JTF-State_Fact_Sheet.pdf, Internet; accessed 11 October 2007.


34 Ibid.

COL Scott D. Legwold, e-mail message to author, 11 December 2007.

Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs, *Organization and Functions of the Joint Force Headquarters*, WING REG 10-3, (Madison, WI: Department of Military Affairs, 5 November 2005), Cover.

Ibid, i.

Ibid, 4.


Draft TDA comparison table with formulas, August 2006 Rightsizing Conference, Madison, WI.


Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs, “Wisconsin Army National Guard Force Structure Command Plan” memorandum for Director, Army National Guard, Arlington, VA, 12 September 2005.

Department of the Army, “Rebalance of the Army National Guard (ARNG),” Memorandum of understanding between Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Army National Guard, Washington, D.C., 9 October 2007.


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Blum, 2007 National Guard Posture Statement.