Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution, and Government

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Summary

In 2004 and 2005, Afghanistan adopted a permanent constitution and elected a president and a parliament. The parliament is emerging as a significant force in Afghan politics, as shown in debates over a new cabinet and the 2006 budget. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

Post-Conflict Political Transition

Afghanistan has not previously had a fully elected government, although there were parliamentary elections during the reign of King Zahir Shah, the last of which was in 1969. Presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections, and adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001, after the Taliban had fled Kabul (“Bonn Agreement”). The Bonn meeting formed an interim administration, led by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun. A new constitution was approved at a “constitutional loya jirga” (traditional Afghan assembly) in January 2004. It set up a strong elected presidency, but, at the urging of the minority-dominated “Northern Alliance” faction, it gave substantial powers to an elected parliament, such as veto power over cabinet selections. It also provided for

- Presidential elections (held by June 2004). Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president, and one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death. They serve a five-year term, and presidents are limited to two terms.

1 For text, see [http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm].

2 Text of constitution, see [http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/currentconstitutionenglish.pdf].
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A parliament consisting of a 249-seat lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), to be elected simultaneously, if possible, with presidential elections, and a 102-seat selected upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). For the elected lower house: ten seats are reserved for Afghanistan’s Kuchis (nomads), and, at least 68 of those elected (two per province, with 34 provinces) “should” be women, giving women about 25% of the seats. The top two women vote-getters in each province earn seats.

For the upper house, 34 seats are selected by provincial councils (one from each of 34 provincial councils); another 34 are selected by nearly 400 district councils; and the final 34 are appointed by the President. Half of the president’s 34 appointees are to be women. The provincial and district councils were to be elected, simultaneously, if possible, with the other elections. No major roles are stipulated for the provincial or district councils, although they are likely to gain powers to impose local taxes and provide local services.

The constitution states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” and says that men and women have “equal rights and duties before the law.” Political parties can be established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam,” and they do not have affiliations with other countries.

The constitution does not impose Islamic law but provides for court rulings “in accord with [the Hanafi school of] Islamic law,” when there is no specific provision in the Constitution or other laws on that issue.

The October 2004 Presidential Election

Karzai sought to hold presidential elections by the June 2004 deadline to demonstrate that he did not seek to monopolize power. However, there was an early recognition that parliamentary, provincial, and district elections would be complicated to organize and might be delayed. In July 2003, a joint Afghan-U.N. (U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA) elections management body, the Joint Election Management Body (JEMB), was set up. Even though a population census had never been taken, it was estimated that 10.5 million would be eligible to vote. The voting age is 18. Registration was slowed by violence in early 2004, and holding to the June 2004 schedule was judged not feasible, but a firm presidential election date was set for October 9, 2004. The parliamentary, provincial, and district elections were postponed (initially to April-May 2005). A total of 10.5 million voters registered, of which about 42% were women. On May 25, 2004, Karzai signed an election law providing for district-based (voting for candidates) rather than proportional representation (voting for party slates).

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3 The International Organization of Migration, on behalf of the JEMB, conducted registration of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, who were eligible to vote.

In advance of the vote, Karzai engaged in substantial political bargaining to try to blunt opposition. Northern Alliance leaders, including former President Burhannuddin Rabbani (the Alliance political leader) and Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim, sought but did not reach agreement with Karzai to exchange support for him for a role in a coalition cabinet. Instead, Karzai chose as his running mate Ahmad Zia Masud, brother of legendary slain Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Masud, hoping to attract Tajik support. His second running mate was Hazara community (Shiite Muslims) leader Karim Khalili. The Northern Alliance fielded Education Minister Yunis Qanooni, who instantly became the most serious challenger. Also running was Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who has been part of the Northern Alliance, and 15 other candidates, including Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq and Dr. Masooda Jalal, the only woman who ran.

Security and Funding. To secure the vote, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the 37-nation NATO-led peacekeeping force, was reinforced by 2,500 troops, bringing its total force to 9,000. The U.S.-trained Afghan National Army (ANA), which had 15,000 at election time and now has about 29,000, performed election security missions, along with the Afghan national police (about 50,000 nationwide). Several hundred additional U.S. troops reinforced the 18,000 U.S. forces already there. The vote was observed by about 400 international monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other groups, who mostly rebuffed allegations by 15 challenging candidates that there had been widespread fraud, including alleged failure of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting. International donors provided more than $90 million in aid for the presidential elections, of which about $40 million came from the United States (P.L. 108-106, FY2004 supplemental appropriation).

Results. Partly due to fewer security incidents than predicted, voter turnout was heavy at about 80% (8 million votes cast). Karzai was declared the winner on November 3, 2004. He received about 4.4 million votes (55.4%), more than the 50% needed to avoid a runoff. Qanooni was second with 1.3 million (16.3%); Mohaqiq, 935,000 (11.7%); Dostam, 800,000 (10%); and Masooda Jalal, 91,000 (1.1%). Karzai was sworn into a five-year term on December 7, 2004, with Vice President Cheney in attendance. On December 23, 2004, he announced a 27-seat cabinet that tilted somewhat more than his previous administration toward Pashtuns, particularly in the key security ministries. Most notably, Fahim was replaced as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim Wardak. Qanooni was not given a cabinet seat. Karzai also create a new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qaderi.

Parliamentary and Provincial Elections/New Parliament

On March 21, 2005, the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced that parliamentary and provincial elections would be held on September 18, 2005. District elections were postponed until 2006 (no date is yet scheduled) because of the complexities of drawing district boundaries. The postponement meant that these councils would not select their representatives to the upper house (Meshrano Jirga). In the interim, the 34 provincial councils would select two representatives — one permanent (full four-year term) and one interim. Each interim member is to be replaced by a district council selectee when the district councils are elected.

The election system was the “Single Non-Transferable Vote System” (SNTV) in which candidates stand as individuals, not as members of a party list. Each voter cast
a ballot for only one candidate for the lower house, even though there were multiple representatives per province — the number varying from 2 (Panjsher province) to 33 (Kabul province). Herat province has 17 representatives; Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats each. Each of the 34 provincial councils consists of between 9 and 29 seats (Kabul province is largest with 29). Some experts had urged that the parliamentary election be conducted by proportional representation because there would be less potential for local manipulation. That system was not adopted because of the fears of empowering political parties, which are unpopular in Afghanistan because of the mujahedin parties’ links to foreign governments during the anti-Soviet war. Even though the vote was not party-based, 70 parties are registered with the Ministry of Justice.

There were a total of 2,815 candidates (including 347 women) for the lower house and 3,185 candidates (including 279 women) for the provincial councils. Out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, three (Nangahar, Uruzgan, and Zabol) did not have enough female candidates for the provincial elections to ensure at least 25% female representation; these seats remain vacant until the next election. During June 25-July 21, over 2 million additional voters registered (those who came of age since the presidential election or were not originally counted), bringing the total to about 12.5 million. The OSCE and the European Union sent observer missions. An Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) initially disqualified 208 candidates for alleged ties to illegal militias; some disarmed, others withdrew their candidacies. A final list of candidates was published on July 12, with only 11 disqualified, although another 28 were later disqualified, mostly for alleged links to armed groups. The September 2005 elections cost about $159 million, all of which came from international donors. The United States contributed about $44.9 million (P.L. 109-13, FY2005 supplemental appropriation).

Prior to the election, observers feared that stepped up Taliban insurgent violence in Afghanistan could disrupt the elections, even though Taliban “spokespersons” said polling places would not be targeted. Seven candidates were killed before the election (and one after). Others perceived the main threat to the election as attempts by local militia leaders and narcotics traffickers to influence the voting. Security measures were similar to those put in place for the presidential elections. No major attacks on polling centers were reported during the vote, although about 15 people were killed in election day violence (including a French soldier). Turnout was lower than expected — about 57% (about 6.8 million voters), which was widely attributed to voter confusion over the large numbers of candidates on each ballot and high voter illiteracy. Candidates were identified on the ballot with symbols and photographs. Observers did express concerns about apparent fraud (mostly proxy voting in some districts), and JEMB investigations of balloting complaints delayed publication of final results until November 12, 2005.5

Results and New Parliament.6 The results largely confirmed expectations that many seats would go to prominent national and local personalities and factional groupings. Although Karzai himself did not form a party, observers say that Karzai supporters are about 60% of the parliament. Among the pro-Karzai parliamentarians is his elder brother, Qayyum (Qandahar Province). About 40 parliamentarians are from the

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5 Results are available at [http://www.jemb.org/].

6 Some of the information in this section is taken from author participation in a House Democracy Assistance Commission assessment visit to Afghanistan during February 26-March 2, 2006.
Hizb-e-Islam party of anti-U.S. former mujahedin leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, but they have renounced violence and are said to support Karzai.

An “opposition” bloc is the 14-party, pro-Northern Alliance “National Understanding Front,” led by Yunus Qanooni, who purportedly wants to run again for president, and former president Rabbani. Both say they want to work cooperatively with Karzai’s government, but they appear to have assembled a formidable parliamentary bloc. They engineered Qanooni’s selection as speaker in December 2005, beating back a challenge from Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (Kabul Province), a prominent mujahedin party leader and Islamic conservative who was backed by Karzai for the speakership. Two deputy lower house speakers were selected on December 22: the first deputy is Aref Nurzai (a relative by marriage to the Karzai clan); the other is Kawzia Kofi, a Tajik woman from Rabbani’s home province (Badakshan).

Introducing further texture to the lower house is the presence of reputed militia leaders, former officials of the Soviet occupation-era Communist regime, and Taliban era figures who renounced violence. The feared Soviet-era Interior Minister, Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi, won a seat from Khost Province. Shanawaz Tanai, the Soviet-era Defense Minister, was not elected. Of the former Taliban candidates, Abdul Salam Rocketi (“Mullah Rocketi”), won from Zabol province, and Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, who ran Bamiyan Province during the Taliban rule and who cooperated with the Taliban’s destruction of the large Buddha statues in Bamiyan in early 2001, won from Samangan province. Some accounts say that at least another six elected members were Taliban officials or military commanders. The Taliban-era Foreign Minister Wakil Mutawwakil lost, as did the former enforcer of the Taliban’s puritanical restrictions, Maulvi Qalamuddin. A reputed militia leader who won a seat is Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who had gained fame for directing the Afghan component of the assault on the Al Qaeda redoubt in the Tora Bora mountains during the U.S.-led war. Another elected member is Pacha Khan Zadran, a local leader from Paktia Province who, by some accounts, helped Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora during the U.S. offensive there. However, a prevailing view in Kabul is that all faction leaders are now committed to peaceful debate in parliament rather than violence.

A number of unaffiliated, well-educated Afghans also won, including several prominent women. They include 27-year-old Malalai Joya (Farah Province), an outspoken women’s rights advocate who is emerging as a leading government critic in the new parliament. Another female winner is Fauzia Gailani, who came in first in conservative Herat Province, and Shukria Barekzai, editor of Woman Mirror magazine. One of the few intellectuals elected was Ramazan Bashardost, a male former Karzai government minister who is emerging as a major champion of constitutional procedure and parliamentary prerogatives. The U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) is working to organize and train the estimated 93 lower house “independents; “ the National Democratic Institute (NDI) is assisting the larger, organized factions.

Karzai has fewer critics in the upper house, although that body lacks the powers (appointment and budgetary review) of the lower house. After making his 34 appointments to that body (including the mandated 17 women), he supported an ally, Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (who heads a reconciliation and amnesty commission) as its Speaker. Mojadeddi narrowly defeated university chancellor, Bakhtar Aminzay, for that post. Karzai also appointed Fahim, representing a further effort to coopt the Northern
Alliance leaders; as well as reputed drug trafficker and former Helmand Province governor Sher Mohammad Akhund, and former Taliban religious affairs deputy minister Arsala Rahmani. The deputy speaker is Hamid Gaylani, a generally pro-Karzai family that has five members in the parliament (both houses).

After a one-week training session, both houses were inaugurated on December 19, with Vice President Cheney attending. Assisting the members is a staff of about 275 Afghans, reporting to a parliament “secretariat.” Staff was hired a year before parliament convened, and they and the members are receiving assistance and training from the U.N. Development Program and the State University of New York (SUNY) under an $8 million contract with USAID. It has formed 18 committees to oversee governmental functions; each committee has two staff members. The parliament has a small research group and a relatively small library. The parliament’s budget is controlled by the government (Ministry of Finance).

Parliament-Executive Relations and Implications. The completion of the series of elections (with the exception of the district councils) is considered a major milestone that has given the Afghan government additional strength and legitimacy. On the other hand, the new parliament has already begun to slow government decision-making and cause Karzai to proceed somewhat more cautiously in his close relationship with the United States. Immediately after it was seated, parliament called for the dismantling of (mostly U.S.-run) “security barriers” in Kabul.

In February 2006, the Qanooni/Rabbani grouping achieved a lower house vote to review Karzai’s cabinet individually, rather than en bloc, significantly increasing their leverage over Karzai’s nominees. That perceived defeat prompted some to argue that Karzai needs to develop a party structure to better organize his supporters. However, Karzai rallied his followers in the confirmation process; only five of his 25 cabinet nominees (announced March 22, 2006) were rejected, fewer than expected. (Three ministers were declared confirmed after receiving plurality votes.) Among those confirmed was Dr. Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, a Pashtun who replaced the well known Northern Alliance figure Dr. Abdullah. Karzai’s one female nominee, as well as his proposed culture minister who had allowed distribution of Western-oriented films, were rejected due to opposition from parliament conservatives. The other three rejected were the ministers of economy (a Karzai ally, rejected for perceived poor performance); of commerce; and of transportation.

In May 2006, the parliament began its review of Karzai’s nine appointments to the Supreme Court, the highest judicial body. Karzai reappointed the 73-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice, an appointment made to build support among Islamic hardliners throughout Afghanistan. The reappointment reportedly has incurred substantial opposition from reformists, but the review is continuing. His other eight nominees are generating broader support in parliament. Also in May, the parliament voted down Karzai’s March 2006-March 2007 budget because the proposed spending plan did not raise civil service salaries. About $500 million of Afghanistan’s $900 million operating budget comes from international donors, who reportedly opposed civil service salary increases. Another $1.2 billion in development spending comes solely from international donors, and parliament is attempting to ensure that projects are spread equitably to Afghanistan’s regions and ethnicities.