COMBATING AFRICAN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF AFRICOM

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ABSTRACT

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The creation of a new United States Unified Command for Africa, AFRICOM, symbolizes the strategic importance of Africa for the United States. Yet, the initial response from African leaders, scholars, and the media has been muted or downright hostile. This paper suggests that AFRICOM does not have legitimacy among Africans; it explains why legitimacy matters, and elaborates how to achieve it. Americans must understand Africa’s history and sensitivities regarding the role of outsiders. To win, AFRICOM will want to adopt new principles of engagement and operate differently. AFRICOM must demonstrate the congruence between American and African strategic interests and support African-led agendas where appropriate. This will involve cooperating with new multilateral African institutions. Finally, understanding the complex nature of conflict on the continent is essential to improve prevention and mitigation activities.
COMBATING AFRICAN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF AFRICOM

On February 6 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new combatant command, U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), to focus on Africa.¹ For over a decade Africans and others had proposed that the continent’s strategic importance warranted greater attention and planning than possible when U.S. responsibility for Africa was distributed among three separate commands.² Nonetheless, the African press, academicians, and leaders have all expressed hostility to AFRICOM.³ The United States needs to appreciate why Africans voice such concerns. The success of AFRICOM requires that it gain legitimacy in the eyes of Africans. This requires interacting differently with African leaders and institutions.

“Victory is from God alone.”⁴ This is the motto of the Nigerian Army, according to Abba Mahmood. He continues: “For us in Africa, protection is from God alone and not any superpower.”⁵ How the AFRICOM issue is resolved, he asserts, will determine the continued sovereignty, territorial integrity, and dignity of Africa or otherwise. While it is easy to scoff at these comments of a journalist published on an Internet news site, an important American ally is equally dismissive. Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, was adamant: “No foreign troops are welcomed on African soil, we have not received a formal document on what AFRICOM is all about…We need better and more adequate information from the U.S. government.”⁶

More troubling is the public statement of General Tsadkan Gebretnesae of Ethiopia, former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces, who serves as an advisor on the transformation of liberation forces into legitimate armies. “There is widespread skepticism even in countries where the security policy of those countries is
very much in line with the security thinking in Washington.” 7 Worse yet is the South African and Southern African Development Community (SADC) rejection of AFRICOM. “SADC - has rejected a US request to base its African Command (AFRICOM) force in the region” according to South African Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota. 8

To keep AFRICOM attuned to local issues, planners expected to locate the headquarters (or several headquarters) on the continent, which did not gladden Africans. The row over AFRICOM’s location further confirms the need to understand African sensibilities. 9 Many countries (e.g. Nigeria, Algeria, Zambia) and regional institutions (including SADC and the Arab Maghreb Union) have opposed a physical AFRICOM presence. Only President Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia has invited AFRICOM to establish a headquarters, and even Liberia’s support waned since the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) expressed reservations. 10 In mid-February 2008, General William “Kip” Ward, AFRICOM’s Commander, stated that the headquarters would remain in Stuttgart, Germany for the foreseeable future. 11 While visiting Ghana, President Bush also confirmed that the U.S. had no intention of establishing bases in Africa. 12

This paper analyses why legitimacy matters, and discusses how AFRICOM can attain legitimacy. Americans must understand the colonial and neocolonial legacy and current African sensitivities about outsiders or they will always be baffled by African interpretations of what Americans consider benign behaviors. The paper will not dwell on cross-cultural understanding and linguistic skills needs, but rather articulate how AFRICOM can find legitimacy and influence.
Based on over fifty years of program experience in Africa, legitimacy-enhancing principles, adopted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), merit AFRICOM’s consideration. AFRICOM must emphasize the commonality of U.S. and African strategic interests and demonstrate an appreciation of the complexity of conflict in Africa. With ignorance of the multi-faceted nature of African conflict, there is a high risk that AFRICOM will design simplistic, inappropriate interventions. AFRICOM will need to clearly define its role in support of the Department of State and USAID’s policy and development mandates. Finally, AFRICOM needs to utilize the new institutional arrangements that have evolved since the mid-1990s. Asserting leadership, Africans have defined agendas at the national, sub-regional and continental level. AFRICOM will gain partner trust and effectiveness by listening to these leaders and articulating the commonalities between African agendas and American security interests.

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) illustrates the necessity of implementing multilateral programs and operating at a pace consistent with African priorities and agendas. The COMESA case study recommends that indirect assistance may be as important as direct training of African forces. In order to gain legitimacy, AFRICOM has to function in multiple arenas meaningful to Africans.

Africa’s potential and problems are significant enough to warrant specialized attention and engagement, and justify the creation of a unified geographic command. Structured to support ongoing security, diplomatic and development objectives on the continent, AFRICOM is learning from American military interventions after the Cold War. AFRICOM will have an expanded focus on conflict prevention and capacity building. Improved security in Africa is essential to reduce poverty, raise standards of living,
enhance trade and investment and promote economic growth, all goals of common interest to Africans and Americans.

**Why Legitimacy Matters**

International political disputes frequently invoke the concept of “legitimacy.” Edward Luck states that “in the disparate literature on the meaning and sources of legitimacy, two characteristics stand out: first, that legitimacy is a subjective condition, a product of one's perceptions; second that legitimacy matters.” An action is seen as legitimate when it is in compliance with the law, is authentic or genuine, or is seen as reasonable. For instance, when the United States decided to use its power to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack on the United States, the action was fully endorsed and had legitimacy in the eyes of the global community. But, the decision to invade Iraq lacked legitimacy, because much of the world questioned whether Iraq really had Weapons of Mass Destruction and/or supported international terrorism.

From a review of over three hundred and sixty-eight media articles about AFRICOM, and a Center for Defense Information paper by Valerie Reed, it is evident that Africans express grave reservations about AFRICOM and doubt its legitimacy. Sensing that the main purpose for AFRICOM is to increase control over, or even seize critical resources, including oil and minerals, Africans also fear that more overt assistance by American troops will bring more terrorist attacks to their countries. They worry that the U.S. will intervene unilaterally, preventing African institutions from leading. Africans are concerned that the U.S. and China intend to battle out their rivalries on African soil. Finally, there is anxiety that the U.S. plans to establish sizeable bases and deploy large numbers of troops that will infringe on African sovereignty.
Writing in *Military Review*, Sean McFate succinctly summarizes the many U.S. strategic interests in Africa. These include “the needs to counter terrorism, secure natural resources, contain armed conflict and humanitarian crisis, retard the spread of HIV/AIDS, reduce international crime, and respond to growing Chinese influence.”

Africans have correctly identified the main U.S. strategic interests. Their overwhelmingly negative perceptions of American intent are rooted in past history and current events. To build legitimacy for AFRICOM, the United States must study and address this history.

Ironically the first large AFRICOM activity, the Africa Partnership Station (APS), saw the *USS Fort McHenry* tasked with a six-month mission to West Africa to suppress drug smuggling and maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea, bordering the southern Nigerian oil fields. Here impoverished residents have attacked western oil interests. The Area of Operation also includes the Bakassi oil region, until recently under dispute by Nigeria and Cameroon. The objectives of APS are well intentioned, and supported by many West African nations. Yet with increased U.S. dependence on African oil (soon to be 25% of U.S. imports), this first activity frightens many Africans who read the creation of AFRICOM more as securing U.S. access to natural resources than enhancing security in the region.

**The Colonial Legacy of Extraction and Cold-War Engagement**

Based on the legacy of colonial resource extraction and post-colonial superpower involvement in internal affairs, coupled with poor African leadership over the decades, Africans are deeply suspicious about U.S. intentions. AFRICOM must first absorb this history, and then demonstrate that while the U.S. wants to guarantee access to key
resources, it will not harm African stability and prosperity. Otherwise AFRICOM will not be viewed as a legitimate player on the continent.

From an African perspective, the continent was for centuries a place where outsiders stole valuable natural resources—humans as slaves, ivory, gold, timber, copper, tin, diamonds, exported commodities such as rubber and cotton, and more recently oil and coltan. Outside powers brought new legal and political systems, imported new religions, established arbitrary boundaries, and governed either benevolently or tyrannically. Colonial rule supplanted traditional political systems without developing new effective institutions. Tribal belief systems were displaced, but not necessarily abolished. Relationships and power balances between tribal groups were disrupted. New types of education and cultural systems were imposed over traditional values that were sublimated, but not eliminated.

Following the Second World War, many colonies demanded their freedom. By the late 1950’s, the “winds of change” had swept over Africa. Most countries had been granted independence by 1965, although white rule continued in parts of southern Africa. While many countries remained peaceful, conflicts began almost immediately in others, including the former Belgian Congo. Colonists did little to develop African governance and civil society. In some places fewer than a dozen university-trained individuals managed vast countries. With scarcely any educated citizens, limited or no experience of democracy, poor manufacturing capacity, underdeveloped agriculture, and an absence of government services, newly liberated countries hobbled. Infrastructure was minimal and usually confined to regions near extractable resources.
As African countries gained independence and experimented with socialist and capitalist models of development in the 1960’s, a proxy Cold War started on African soil. Both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) exercised disproportionate influence over all African policies. Aptly described by Linda Thomas-Greenfield “…there were no advantages to Africa in the Cold War; it was the blade of grass caught in the battle between the elephants;” African leaders were in no position to resist.\(^2^4\) The creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was an attempt by early idealistic leaders to control their destiny, but the political immaturity of many heads of state bent on protecting national sovereignty made it impossible for unified actions. Even prior to the OAU, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana suggested the creation of an African High Command because of his concern over how the two rivals—the U.S. and the USSR—were manipulating United Nations peacekeepers in the Congo.\(^2^5\)

Poor leadership, misguided development policies, and Cold War activities had negative and destabilizing consequences.\(^2^6\) A notable trend of the Cold War was superpower support for highly militarized, centralized, and authoritarian regimes which fueled the burgeoning arms trade. Military expenditures frequently outpaced social spending. Production sustained a bloated public service and defense capacity, not basic needs.

Fierce economic decline characterized this period of misplaced priorities. Donors experimented with development theories, but rarely stayed the course long enough to achieve success. Decades of aid to corrupt, purportedly anti-Communist dictatorial regimes, support for apartheid, and inconsistent levels of foreign assistance undermined...
U.S. credibility. Africans determined to liberate southern African countries themselves. Perhaps this explains why SADC members express hostility toward AFRICOM, and accounts partially for South Africa’s desire to exert a regional leadership role.

Post-Cold War Africa

The end of the Cold War coincided with important changes in Africa. Unchecked foreign involvement began encouraging African leaders to explore indigenous solutions to political and economic problems. Limp U.S. and U.N. interventions in Somalia and Rwanda, peaceful transition to majority rule in South Africa, and the end of conflict in Mozambique, were wake-up calls for African leaders.

African leaders have recognized the need to take responsibility for the continent’s future. With their engagement, it becomes imperative that external actors play supporting roles and not impose solutions. In the governmental and non-governmental arenas, the rise of new African actors determined to solve their own problems is highly significant. They merit applause and require enthusiastic, indirect support.

The deepening political maturity of many leaders, coupled with a parallel desire to reduce the continent’s dependence on foreign aid led to this change. Benefiting from a transition in many countries to democratic or quasi-democratic systems, the markedly more open atmosphere encourages public debate about the region's problems and solutions. While national sovereignty remains an obstacle to further integration, most leaders acknowledge multilateral institutional norms and oversight mechanisms. Long-standing traditional, local, and regional knowledge and perspectives are beginning to emerge.
African leaders called for new institutional frameworks and arrangements over a decade ago. Today, these structures, some more advanced than others, form the core of a new “African renaissance.” Improvements in African multilateral institutions began in the early 1990s. A radical step was the 1993 creation of the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism. This marked the first time that conflict -- previously of concern only to individual states -- might be subjected to a regional or continental forum. When African leaders grasped that the OAU was collapsing they created a new institution, the African Union (AU) in 1999.

The African Union’s charter promotes African solidarity, defends state sovereignty, protects people’s rights, advances peace in the region, and furthers good governance and democracy. A number of AU institutions exist including a Peace and Security Council; a Pan African Parliament; an Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and a Court of Justice. The AU Commission is responsible for the day-to day management of the AU. One scholar suggests “that the United States articulate AFRICOM’s purpose in terms of African security priorities,” including support for the AU’s Zone Security and Defense Policy.

Adopted by African leaders in 2001, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal. Key principles include:

- Good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development;
- African ownership and leadership, acceleration of regional and continental integration; and forging a new international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world.
Individual countries assess their progress toward common objectives using an innovative peer review mechanism, and a “Council of the Wise Men” allows elder statesmen to advise heads of state in times of crisis.

While the AU operates across the continent, most daily implementation of decisions by the AU devolves to eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of varying capacity, which also implement their own regional agendas. Francis Crupi persuasively argues that it is in the U.S. national interest to support sub-regional organizations because of their vested interest in establishing peace and security. Mansfield et al demonstrate empirically that participants in the same preferential trade agreement are less likely to become involved in military disputes. This paper proposes that it is important to support all eight RECs’ peace and security priorities and programs. For some RECs, AFRICOM could train the stand-by brigades, a role endorsed by Nigeria’s President Yar’Adua and other ECOWAS members.

Successful Principles of Engagement

Africans perceive Americans as unwilling to listen and learn. “The major stumbling block to such cooperation in the past has been the display of imperial arrogance and unilateral prejudice of the US in its attempts to implement or execute military strategies on the ground in Africa.” In the early 1990s, intensifying food insecurity and conflict in the Horn of Africa, joined with the failure of American interventions in Somalia prompted President Clinton to request a new approach. Over one thousand African stakeholders identified strategic linkages between food security and conflict. They also proposed that development agencies learn to interact differently with the continent.
USAID designed the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) around innovative solutions proposed by Africans. The GHAI implemented new business practices designed to break the cycle of poverty, conflict and despair in the Horn of Africa. Five principles or rules of engagement were adopted by USAID in designing and implementing regional development programs. They are:

- **African Ownership**: seeks widespread consultation by building and responding to the growing evidence of African leadership with the added element of capacity strengthening;
- **Regional Perspective**: involves analysis and response to events within the context of a regional perspective;
- **Promoting Stability**: places a priority on preventive measures, flexibility and promoting positive change in the midst of crisis;
- **Strategic Coordination**: streamlines USG, multilateral and regional coordination to decrease duplication of effort and contradictory action; and
- **Linking Relief and Development**: improves linkages between humanitarian and development assistance through deeper understanding of transitions.

African leaders cite the use of these principles as greatly increasing the acceptance of USAID’s programs. These principles involve Africans in identifying challenges and solutions. Placing Africans in a leadership role requires the U.S. or other donors to support indigenous efforts to bring about economic growth, peace, and stability. Recognizing that change does not take place linearly requires patience. This multidisciplinary approach includes diplomatic, development, and military assistance. These principles continue to influence how USAID designs both its bilateral and regional programs in the region today. That AFRICOM espouses the need to adopt similar principles should reassure Africans.

AFRICOM’s Commander, General William “Kip” Ward, has stated repeatedly he intends to listen. In December 2007, he established a Dialogue Forum on AFRICOM’s website. His welcome stated:

> As we build U.S. Africa Command, we want to talk to people about what the U.S. military is doing in Africa. Just as importantly, I want everyone on
the staff to also listen and learn. AFRICOM will add value and do no harm to the collective and substantial on-going efforts on the Continent. AFRICOM seeks to build partnerships to enable the work of Africans in providing for their own security. Our intent is to build mutual trust, respect, and confidence with our partners on the Continent and our international friends.\textsuperscript{40}

General Ward is correct to emphasize partnerships, on doing no harm and on listening to African voices. If AFRICOM leadership and staff respect these principles, they will reduce negative perceptions and temper African skepticism.

Common U.S. and African Interests

The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) states: “Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.”\textsuperscript{41} The African Union (AU) voices similar objectives: “To promote peace, security and stability on the continent…to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance…and to promote sustainable development.”\textsuperscript{42} Thus, at the most fundamental level, the U.S. and African nations are aligned, yet harbor different ideas on how to achieve their goals.

At a conference in April 2007, Mills et al noted agreement on two key points about AFRICOM:

The first is that AFRICOM is still an enigma. No one is sure what it will do or how, and what it means for Africa. The second is that AFRICOM’s success will ultimately depend on how well the U.S. understands and responds to the security priorities of Africans.\textsuperscript{43}

Five months later, African military leaders confirmed that the Command’s intentions were still not clear. The Defense Minister of Liberia, Brownie Samukai suggested the need for a better communications strategy with Africans to reassure skeptics and to explain AFRICOM. This will involve travel and engaging with various stakeholders:
Policy makers who are helping to bring this concept together will need to get out of Washington and go maybe to Ethiopia and the like...it has to go to Africa to be sold at a continental level; that is, with the AU...and you will need to make sure that those sub-regional bodies are themselves well-informed.  

Greater effort at a working level is required to convince stakeholders that AFRICOM will adopt solutions proposed by the Africans. In January 2008, the Secretary General of COMESA stated that he was not sure what AFRICOM would do and how it would interact with prominent African organizations. African leaders have repeatedly said that improved communication is an imperative for future success.

African ownership and partnership to promote stability is a key. Taking a regional perspective is also important. General Ward has stated that AFRICOM intends to listen and respond to African needs. This is an important first step. Starting now, AFRICOM needs to put major effort into understanding how Africans define Africa’s security concerns, and then as Mills et al suggest: “align AFRICOM’s rhetoric, focus, and resources robustly and publicly to African concerns.” Americans and Africans agree that Africa faces major security challenges that impede development. Rather than determining unilaterally how to assist African leaders in their efforts to address these security challenges, AFRICOM must coordinate with ongoing African processes and approaches.

Minister Samukai identified several possible areas for cooperation including disaster prevention and response, technical support in areas such as mapping and satellite imagery, capacity building for crisis prevention, even assistance in addressing trans-border issues such as terrorism, maritime security and the like.

You have to provide the kind of confidence that this is not a wishy-washy kind of relationship and partnership you are trying to establish, but a partnership that has mutuality of interest, as well as continental-wide
interest, so that it reduces the apprehension and it improves the environment for cooperation.\textsuperscript{48}

AFRICOM also has much to learn from Africans. Military and civilian leaders addressing the US Army War College Class of 2008 reiterated that the nature of warfare has changed. While conventional war is not obsolete, the U.S. can expect to engage extensively in conflicts that involve irregular, asymmetric and terrorist tactics.\textsuperscript{49} African history is replete with unconventional conflicts. Close study of successful and unsuccessful efforts to impose order on the continent can inform US doctrine. Learning from African experience will also improve AFRICOM’s legitimacy.

In September 2007, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that the Department of Defense (DOD) is not eager to send troops into Africa—in fact there is an expressed preference on DOD’s part to support other nations’ peacekeeping roles.\textsuperscript{50} This is consistent with the conflict prevention role that AFRICOM has described. AFRICOM should work closely with the African Union and African nations with strong security forces willing to shoulder the burden, and with states aspiring to play leading roles on the continent such as Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. By focusing on common interests, AFRICOM is more likely to overcome negative perceptions and achieve legitimacy. AFRICOM must highlight that U.S. security interests can benefit both Americans and Africans and must not undermine legitimate African interests. AFRICOM must work hard to allay African suspicions.

Conflict in Africa

A key objective of AFRICOM is to enhance security and prevent conflict. Lacking a deep understanding of the multi-faceted nature of conflict in Africa, outsiders continue to espouse simplistic, one-dimensional reasons for conflict. African leaders now
appreciate that the multi-dimensional nature of conflict destabilizes whole regions. Without a sophisticated comprehension of the nature of African conflict, AFRICOM risks failing to “do no harm”, a key principle espoused by General Ward.  

Traditional analyses of conflict frequently focus on class, race, ethnicity, religion, poor governance and other variables. However, based on case studies in Rwanda (land), Burundi (coffee), the DRC (minerals), Sudan (oil), Ethiopia (Nile waters) and Somalia (pastures), several authors value ecological variables in understanding conflict in Africa.  

Joao Porto’s overview of contemporary conflict analysis emphasizes that there is no single cause of a conflict. Conflict evolves over time based on internal and external variables that come into play once a conflict begins.  

He stresses that sophisticated analysis is needed to understand the complex relationship between ecology and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa that involves multiple internal and external actors and diverging and conflicting interests. Both grievance and greed are usually motivators, although the latter is often masked by other rationales that play better to international audiences. Porto asserts “access to and control of valuable natural resources including minerals, oil, timber, productive pastures and farming land, have been crucial factors in the occurrence of violent conflicts across the continent.”  

Other observers echo Porto:  

Competition is an inevitable part of life for virtually every citizen, whether it is competition over natural resources -- a plot of land, a scrap of pasture, or access to a watering hole -- economic position and access, or political power... combined with a proliferation of small arms, despots who refuse to relinquish power and entrenched corrupt elites, creates a high level of volatility in the region...The costs of these conflicts, ranging from ethnic cleansing to inter-group cattle rustling to genocide and war, can retard or reverse a country's development efforts by years.
Porto concludes that conflict prevention and management practitioners must learn three important lessons:

One, conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is structurally and functionally open. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa operate within broader regional and international systems. Apparently isolated conflicts are in reality intimately linked to broader political and economic contexts involving multiple, and often times, competing individuals and group actors, and interests. The institutions, policies and legal regimes governing these, moreover, are overlapping and mixed. Policy makers, therefore, must explicitly recognize the role of external engagers, and incorporate their involvement in policy formulation and interventions. Two, conflict systems in sub-Saharan Africa are operationally complex. The levels of engagement and the number of variables underlying conflict are many; and more often than not the operation of conflict is uncertain. Tracing the role of different conflict variables, including ecological, demands scrupulous policy attention to such operational vagaries. Three, the ecological variable is clearly an important factor in conflict. Moreover, it is also important that policy research and analysis trace the relationship of ecology to conflict through different pathways. Policies will vary depending in how the ecological variable is linked to conflict. Identifying and assessing linkages is critical to targeting effective policy interventions that have lasting impact.56

Conflict in Africa is always complex. Understanding conflict’s root causes is critical because internal and external players will try to benefit. Additional points about conflict in Africa merit attention. By the early 1990s, African leaders appreciated the complexity of conflict and created new multilateral institutions and approaches. Acknowledging that multiple state and non-state actors factor into solutions to poverty, food insecurity and conflicts led to the decision to expand, strengthen, and revitalize sub-regional organizations.

Outsiders, including AFRICOM, need to perform detailed analyses before conflict prevention or mitigation campaigns. The Joint Doctrine’s standard Political, Military, Economic, Social, Institutional, and Infrastructure (PMESII) analytical construct during theater campaign planning has merit.57 However, it is unlikely to identify the complexity
of any particular conflict without an in-depth and sophisticated sense of history and modern geo-political dynamics.

**The Common Market for Eastern and Central Africa (COMESA)**

To achieve legitimacy, AFRICOM must learn the agendas, strengths and weaknesses of the new African institutions, and engage them appropriately. Never in the post-colonial era has there been a stronger effort on the part of African leaders to address their fundamental challenges. If AFRICOM chooses to ignore or bypass these new institutional arrangements, Africans will interpret this as a lack of genuine interest in promoting a mutual U.S.-African security agenda.

Uniquely, COMESA has successfully promoted regional economic integration and an indirect approach to security. Americans tend to favor direct action to solve problems, but, according to a famous Maasai proverb: “Progress never follows a straight line. It occurs through zigzags.” AFRICOM support for COMESA’s indirect efforts will enhance conflict prevention and mitigation, achieving greater legitimacy than engaging only with RECs possessing stand-by brigades.

Created in 1994, COMESA replaced a Preferential Trade Area established in 1981. With nineteen members and a population of 389 million, COMESA covers a land area of 4.6 million square miles, larger than the United States. The total GDP is $275 billion (less than Belgium), with some of the most resource rich countries and some of the poorest, where millions live on less than $2 per day. Total trade is at $159 billion with $82 billion of exports out of the region (mainly oil and minerals). With tremendous economic potential, the COMESA region also covers some of the most conflict prone zones in Africa.
COMESA envisions achieving economic integration in eastern and southern Africa through regional cooperation in core areas of trade, investment, infrastructure and science and technology development. The Free Trade Area (FTA), established in 1999, has thirteen members. COMESA’s goal is to establish a fully operational Customs Union by December 2008, and a Common Market by 2014. According to COMESA’s Strategic Plan 2007-2010:

Poverty eradication and development are the ultimate goals of our organization. It is therefore crucial to promote the adoption of the appropriate mix of economic and social policies, a process for which we cannot wait for the world. It is our responsibility, in the context of the ‘African Renaissance’. 60

The COMESA Heads of State recognized that their ad-hoc approaches to peace and security neither reduced conflict, nor promoted economic growth. To focus on preventive diplomacy they created the Peace and Security Programme in 1999. Within the framework of the African Union’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, COMESA’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet at least annually to consider modalities for promoting peace, security and stability.

Within the COMESA framework, ministers and the Secretary General engage in quiet diplomacy. Meeting regularly with heads of state, the Secretary General, can encourage peacemaking prior to or during an outbreak of conflict. When violence erupted after the Kenyan elections in December 2007, the Secretary General invited several current and ex-heads of state to mediate between President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga before the United Nations and the AU became involved. 61

The evolution of COMESA’s Peace and Security Programme shows the growing African awareness of the complexity of internal and regional conflict and recognition of
the intersection of conflict prevention, peace building, and economic activities. If AFRICOM bolsters these efforts, Africans will recognize that Americans are willing to play a supporting role, and AFRICOM’s reputation will be enhanced.

COMESA acknowledges the importance of training and equipping the AU’s regional stand-by brigades, a key area where AFRICOM can assist. However, it has chosen a more indirect approach to its involvement in peace and security matters. For instance, in 2001, the Ministers recommended involving private sector and civil society organizations in discussions on peace, security and economic integration because of the important role of non-state actors; in 2002, they noted the role of elected officials. COMESA has now trained over seventy Parliamentarians on conflict prevention and management. Another way to ensure peace is through COMESA’s Court of Justice, established in 1994, to adjudicate trade disputes that could turn into larger, violent conflicts.

In September 2004, COMESA sponsored the workshop “Linking Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa” to present current research, identify gaps, and propose additional studies to help design prevention and mitigation steps and capacity building measures for stakeholders. With much conflict in Africa commencing internally and later migrating to neighbors, a central question was how regional integration can nurture peace and security.

In 2005, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs requested detailed research on the DRC as a guide to devise practical mitigation strategies. Neighboring countries interested in profiting from natural resources abetted internal conflict, and with Congolese instability punishing the entire region, COMESA wanted to learn whether changes in economic
institutions, infrastructure, and behavior could offer relief. Supported by DFID and USAID, the research investigated trade flows from the DRC through the Great Lakes region and into East Africa. COMESA wanted to improve the governance and functioning of local and regional markets through understanding the regional dimension of natural resource exploitation in the DRC.

The study described systemic institutional problems that have inhibited trade and allowed it to be dominated by political elites in a “militarized” economy. The project concluded: “presently in the DRC it is actually easier to do business illegally than legally.” A critical finding was that governments and donors risk inflaming conflict if they rush in without comprehending the nature of the socio-political and economic dynamics involved.

The data from this Trading for Peace project were presented to government and civil society representatives in late 2007 and early 2008. Subsequently, COMESA was asked to design economic, trade and governance activities to diminish variables that exacerbate conflict and promote legal exploitation of resources. Many of the activities proposed can be added to ongoing economic development and good governance projects, thus reinforcing the link between regional integration and conflict mitigation. COMESA is also investigating the cost and effects of conflict on regional integration through a “War Economies” program and participates in the AU’s Conflict Early Warning (CEWS) system.

AFRICOM will naturally concentrate on the RECs which host the AU’s stand-by brigades, and strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of these forces. But this emphasis will detract from the preventive role AFRICOM has assumed. AFRICOM must also
engage with COMESA and other RECs that are actively trying to understand the nexus between economic activity and conflict, and design innovative interventions.  

**Concluding Thoughts**

Many reasons underlie the lack of legitimacy AFRICOM faces in the eyes of Africans. New principles for interacting with Africans were proposed in this paper, assigning Africans the leadership role in defining problems and solutions. A summary of colonial and neocolonial legacies demystified some of the sensitivities surrounding the role of outsiders in Africa. The complex and dynamic nature of conflict and its links to natural resource exploitation and economic variables was elaborated. Preventive activities need to encompass broader variables than those usually assumed as the root causes of the conflict. This paper argues that AFRICOM needs to engage with the different African institutions to surmount the challenges facing the continent. The example of COMESA suggests that detailed consultations with RECs will provide AFRICOM with useful activities to support beyond training of defense forces.

Strategic coordination with other USG agencies is critical. By far, the largest and most constant USG engagement in Africa includes development assistance administered by USAID, the Millennium Challenge Account, the President’s Plan for Emergency AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and other mechanisms. Although the continent has the lowest levels of foreign direct investment, American commercial interests are on the increase. Joint doctrine discusses the importance of “supported” and “supporting” roles in any campaign. To win, AFRICOM must cooperate closely with other agencies in the USG, especially the Department of State and USAID, and articulate clearly when and where it will support their efforts and when and where it will need support by “softer”
elements of national power. AFRICOM needs to explain now how it intends to support and not supplant other USG efforts. Explicit definition of its role will also enhance AFRICOM’s legitimacy with African leaders and the public.

USAID experience over the last several decades shows that insufficient attention to the continuum between humanitarian relief, post-conflict reconstruction, and development assistance leads to failure. Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq confirms this. Working with stakeholders, AFRICOM must confirm what direct humanitarian activities it will undertake, how it will support the lead USG agency (USAID) for humanitarian interventions and how it intends to play only a supporting role in the development arena.

Lieutenant General Daniel Opande, ex-Vice Chief of the Kenyan Army, an experienced peace keeping commander, confirmed the consonance of African and U.S. security interests: “international terrorism; cross-border trafficking of arms, persons, and drugs; environmental degradation; natural and man-made disasters; and conflicts.” But, he also noted, that “there is a need for in-depth discussions…to develop trust and closer cooperation.” The current Chief of Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces, Brigadier General Robert Winful’s measured conclusions about AFRICOM sum the situation up best:

The establishment of AFRICOM presents both opportunities and pitfalls. However, we can overcome these by crafting policies that will lead to a form of cooperation between Africa and the U.S. that is mutual and cordial. Only through such forms of cooperation will AFRICOM become a useful tool in achieving its objectives.
Endnotes


9 Three hundred and sixty-eight articles were reviewed, the vast majority of which raised questions or concerns about AFRICOM’s intentions on the continent. Almost all of the positive articles involved interviews with American officials or scholars. Brian Chigawa, on staff at COMESA’s Headquarters noted “the location of AFRICOM on the continent needs legitimacy
and that legitimacy can only come about through reaching ‘common ground’ by the US government through the African Union.” e-mail message to author, 7 March 2008.


17 Brian Chigawa of COMESA explained: “Given the recent experience of the world with regards to the actions of the US government in defying the United Nations Security Council to go to war in Iraq and experiences of their pre-emptive actions on the African continent like Sudan, Africa has genuine concerns for the location of AFRICOM on the continent.” E-mail communication with author, 7 March 2008.


28 T. A. Imobighe, “An African High Command: The Search for a Feasible Strategy of Continental Defense,” African Affairs 79, No. 315 (1980): 241-254. Recall that the attempt to create an Africa High Command had failed and in its place a much weaker Defense Commission was created by the OAU. Over the years various alternatives had been proposed such as the African Taskforce and the Collective Intervention Force but they were unable to gain much traction due to continuing disagreement over appropriate roles and logistics.

29 The African Union Summit in February 2008 selected a new Chairman, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania and a new Chair, Jean Ping and Deputy Chair, Erastus Mwencha of the Commission. Mr. Ping is the ex-Foreign Minister of Gabon and Mr. Mwencha is the outgoing Secretary General of COMESA; available from http://www.africa-union.org/; Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.


U.S. Agency for International Development, Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) Strategic Plan FY 1998-2002 (Washington, D.C.: USAID, November 1997), 13. The GHAI Principles are described below. African Ownership: This Principle aims to ensure that GHAI efforts continue to build upon and respond to the growing evidence of African leadership in the GHA. Where there is an absence of political will on the part of a government or other actor potentially involved in an activity, efforts should be made to ensure that the resultant U.S. leadership is rooted in local priorities and realities, and that activities are designed on the basis of widespread consultation. Further, it suggests that opportunities to respond to local, national and regional efforts be taken advantage of wherever possible, with an increased focus on capacity strengthening. Regional Perspective: This Principle involves analyzing and responding to events within the context of a regional perspective, and ensuring that GHAI activities achieve optimal regional impact where possible. Further, it aims to promote joint activities (e.g. between GHA countries) where possible. Promoting Stability: This Principle aims to ensure that all programming reflects an awareness of the fact that each of the GHA countries is vulnerable to significant economic and/or political change. As such, one of its purposes is to promote advance planning and preparedness as well as flexible programming to respond should these changes occur. Further, this Principle aims to ensure that programs take advantage of opportunities to promote positive change in the midst of crisis. Strategic Coordination: This
Principle entails not only the more effective coordination of all USAID assets and actions, but also coordination between USAID and other USG agencies and U.S., international and local partners. It aims to ensure that activities are undertaken within the context of a precise framework or set of agreed-upon parameters, that comparative advantage is maximized, that duplication of effort and contradictory actions are minimized, and that gaps are identified and addressed. Linking Relief and Development: This Principle entails providing humanitarian assistance, which reinforces longer-term development goals, and deploying development assistance in such a manner as to prevent or reduce potential crises and the attendant need for humanitarian assistance. It also aims to ensure that transitions are better understood and more effectively supported.


39 Cheryl Anderson, Mission Director, USAID East Africa Mission, e-mail message to author, 26 February 2008.


41 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006), 37. “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority for this Administration. It is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity...The United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies. We are committed to working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and the regional capacity of the African Union to support post-conflict transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, and improve peacekeeping and disaster response.”

42 African Union Home Page, “The African Union in a Nutshell,” available from Http://www.africa-union.org/r6/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm; Internet; accessed 27 December 2007. The objectives of the African Union are: “To achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; To promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; To promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; To establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations; To promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies; To promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples; To coordinate and harmonize the
policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union; To advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology; and, To work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.”


45 Mr. Erastus Mwencha, Secretary General of COMESA, telephone interview by author, 26 January 2008.


58 Mr. Joel Strauss, personal communication, fall 1995.


61 Mr. Erastus Mwencha, Secretary General of COMESA, telephone interview by author, 12 January 2008.

62 Mr. Erastus Mwencha, Secretary General of COMESA, telephone interview by author, 24 October 2007.

63 Paul McDermott, e-mail message to the author, October 23, 2007.


65 Paul McDermott, e-mail message to the author, October 23, 2007.

65 PACT, *Researching Natural Resources and Trade Flows in the Great Lakes Region*, (Washington, D.C.: DFID/USAID/COMESA Study: June 2007,) 8. The report examines the types of resource exploitation, including forestry, and in particular the artisanal nature of the
minerals sector and the variations between regions. Lastly, the report provides a detailed analysis of the way trans-boundary trading corridors work for the export of high-volume and high-value natural resources and other commodities, and also for the more localized import and export of produce and basic livelihoods goods.

66 Stephen Karangizi, Director Peace and Security Programme, COMESA, e-mail message to author, October 26, 2007.

67 Reacting to a draft of this paper, Brian Chigawa, of COMESA reinforced the importance of political as well as military action: “Most conflict situations cannot be addressed by military solutions only as we have seen with the case of Iraq and Somalia. All the eight RECs have specific roles for addressing issues of peace and security within the continental architecture for peace and security, whose main component is political aid, and not the military.” E-mail message to author, 7 March, 2008.

68 Brian Chigawa: “The role of the African stand-by brigades should have synergies with all political initiatives of their member states which are handled by RECS such as COMESA, EAC and IGAD which are not hosting any brigade but can provide the much needed political oversight.” E-mail message to author, 7 March, 2008.


