Intelligence Campaign Planning:
An Opportunity for the Army in Defense Intelligence Synchronization

A Monograph
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**Abstract**

This monograph determines the role and current posture of the United States Army, and specifically its intelligence corps, within the Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Community (IC) implementation and execution of Intelligence Campaign Planning (ICP). ICP is emerging as a new procedure for the DoD IC to centrally plan ISR Synchronization in support of regional combatant commander operation plans. ICP initially emerged out of intelligence reform after September 11, 2001 and operational intelligence challenges evident during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As one of the sixteen agencies in the national IC and eight in the DoD IC, the Army has a role to play to ensure its intelligence requirements and capabilities are integrated into ICP.

**Subject Terms**

Intelligence, Campaign Planning, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Combatant Commander, DOTMLPF, Army Intelligence, Intelligence Community Transformation
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Abstract

Intelligence Campaign Planning: An Opportunity for the Army in Defense Intelligence Synchronization by Major Kevin A. McAninch, United States Army, 88 pages.

This monograph determines the role and current posture of the United States Army, and specifically its intelligence corps, in Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Community (IC) implementation and execution of Intelligence Campaign Planning (ICP). ICP is emerging as a new procedure for the DoD IC to centrally plan ISR Synchronization in support of regional combatant commander operation plans. ICP initially emerged out of intelligence reform after September 11, 2001 and operational intelligence challenges evident during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As one of the sixteen agencies in the national IC and eight in the DoD IC, the Army has a role to play to ensure its intelligence requirements and capabilities are integrated into ICP.

The authors method first proves Army intelligence, during its own transformation, missed a critical link to ICP, and follows with an assessment of progress already underway and how integration into the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) helps solidify ICP. The author concludes by analyzing how ready and relevant current Army intelligence is to institutionalize ICP across doctrine, organization, training and personnel areas of the DOTMLPF.

The monograph includes content relevant to national and defense intelligence transformation to include Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence and Remodeling Defense Intelligence, proposed ICP concepts to include stand up and fielding of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) and Horizontal Integration (HI), the process and details of the Joint Concepts Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) for ICP, and what has been accomplished so far and how long it might take for full ICP implementation based on real world tests. With respect to the Army’s ability to integrate into the ICP process, the author finds severe deficiencies in doctrine, training, and personnel utilization not easily offset by organizational successes achieved through the Army transformation to the modular force. Research for this monograph included classified documents to ensure accuracy of analysis, but in its entirety this monograph is unclassified.

The author recommends updating and revising dilapidated Army intelligence doctrine regarding operational intelligence activities at echelons above corps, authorizing a dedicated plans shop to all Intelligence and Security Command headquarters to facilitate integration of Army intelligence requirements and capabilities into ICP, utilizing emerging and current joint training opportunities to minimize cost to establish ICP expertise resident in the Army, and revamping current Army policy for utilization of intelligence officers with recognized planning skills.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Government passed the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* in response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, and in recognition of the need for vast, sweeping reform of the Intelligence Community (IC). Reform occurred at the cabinet level with the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and separately in the Department of Defense (DoD) with the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence (USD(I)). Increased organizational efficiency in management and allocation of resources promises improved, more effective and actionable intelligence free of interagency competition for credit.

To address specific DoD intelligence operational shortcomings, the USD(I) conducted an analysis called Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence (TSDI), whose results led to recommendations for changes in the DoD IC called the Remodeling Defense Intelligence (RDI) initiative. One of the five recommended focus areas of RDI was the implementation of Intelligence Campaign Planning (ICP) to improve Combatant Commander (COCOM) capability to “plan, synchronize, manage, and execute intelligence operations across the operational spectrum.” ICP thus became one of the focus areas of senior defense leaders desires for “a revolution in military intelligence operations.”

ICP is the centralized planning effort to synchronize DoD IC capabilities in support of priority operations plans (OPLAN). It defines each agency’s intelligence responsibility, synchronizing disparate capabilities on a particular problem. It is fundamentally different than

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1 http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/history.htm
2 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Sec. 1014.
previous intelligence practices because it brings all DoD IC agencies together during the planning phase, focusing their efforts on priority issues, vice those of their own agency. ICP envisions a robust analytical effort characterized by mission centric intelligence, self organizing communities, and information before request capabilities in an environment where discourse and collaboration leads to better situational understanding. ICP is fully nested with priority COCOM OPLANs, and is manifested in the OPLAN as the intelligence plan, made up of three supporting plans, the COCOM Intelligence Support Plan (CISP), the National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP), and the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Support Plan (ISRSP). The semantics of the plan, though important, are not as important as understanding the fundamental paradigm change of eliminating stovepipes in the planning process to synchronize intelligence operations. Coupled with better intelligence integration due to the establishment of another RDI initiative, the Joint Intelligence Operations Command (JIOC), ICP is an important concept to transform the DoD IC.

As one of the sixteen members of the IC under the DNI, the United States Army has an important role to play in ICP institutionalization as part of its own revolution in military intelligence operations. The 2002 Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan (AI-TCP) issued from the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DA DCSINT/G2) described the path ahead for Army intelligence transformation prior to RDI, clearly citing a need for integrating with and leveraging national and joint intelligence capabilities. AI-TCP morphed into the initiatives associated with Chief of Staff of the Army Focus Area 16,

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8 The sixteen members of the IC are: National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of State, Department of Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, United States Coast Guard, and the and the four service intelligence agencies, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Army.
9 Army Intelligence Transformation Campaign Plan.
Actionable Intelligence (AI), but the idea of integrating with joint and national assets carried forward and remains today. Full integration by Army intelligence across all focus areas of the RDI initiative will undoubtedly increase the likelihood of better, actionable intelligence to the Army leaders and decision makers. The Army’s ability to integrate into the ICP process is paramount. Aggressively ensuring Army capabilities are utilized and interests represented in the planning phase of intelligence operations at the highest levels should result in better collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to operational commanders.

Hence, the purpose of this monograph is to determine the role of the United States Army, and specifically its Military Intelligence Corps, in ICP, and the degree to which ICP can be institutionalized. This is vital to the United States Army because intelligence is fundamentally joint, national, and multi-functional, and the Army does not have the resources nor capability to conduct unilateral intelligence operations.\(^{10}\) As the DoD IC comes together in the Defense JIOC (DJIOC) to plan, synchronize, and integrate all agencies together in support of COCOM OPLANs, the Army must be represented or at a minimum participate in the development. It is not the Army’s role to lead the DoD IC in the ICP process, but to participate and be part of the DoD IC transformation. To contribute to solutions to intelligence shortfalls IC wide, the Army must embrace ICP and integrate collection assets and analysis accordingly. Success in doing that requires thorough understanding of our current capabilities and future assessed requirements. How well the Title X responsibilities inherent in the Army staff, and in particular the G2, are executed directly affects the Army’s success in ICP participation and potential institutionalization of the ICP process.

\(^{10}\) By multi-functional the author means what is commonly referred to as “multi-int”. Army doctrinal intelligence disciplines are: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), and Counter Intelligence (CI).
Thus, my hypothesis is that the United States Army missed an opportunity to help shape and utilize a new methodology to better synchronize the intelligence fight, and is not adequately postured to integrate into ICP. It is my intent in writing this monograph to influence the leadership and education of Army intelligence leaders to promote understanding and possible acceptance of the ICP methodology so another opportunity at joining the joint intelligence fight is not missed. Though current commitments and requirements in the GWOT weigh on Army resources, Army intelligence must participate in the establishment of ICP that is a critical RDI initiative to synchronize the DoD IC.

Understanding the problems facing the intelligence community after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is key. Numerous organizational challenges confronted the community, clearly necessitating a need for change and fundamental shifts in how intelligence operations were conducted, especially in support of COCOM OPLANs. Comprehending the background and setting of RDI leads into understanding why ICP is such a critical initiative. To prove that the Army missed an opportunity to participate in ICP first requires analyzing and comparing the relationship between Defense intelligence transformation and Army intelligence transformation, to assess where and why a gap exists between the two. This analysis clearly shows that though the Army was fully nested and integrated with DoD IC and national IC initiatives, it missed a critical link to ICP. Second, the Army must gain an appreciation for the ICP construct so it can accurately assess what capability and experience it already possesses while simultaneously assessing future intelligence transformation requirements. Honing in on the proposed concept attributes and capabilities postured by ICP will show the path ahead in joint intelligence transformation and opportunities for Army integration. Understanding the association between ICP and the joint operations planning process (JOPP) shows the source of the opportunity ICP presents to the IC by creating living, flexible plans born from dynamic intelligence estimates. The Army’s ability to nest its requirements and capabilities within the ICP is critical to ensuring
accurate, timely, and thorough intelligence, synchronized to provide commanders better assessments of threats.

Third, a DOTMLPF analysis of the Army intelligence corps as it pertains to ICP will prove whether or not the current Army is ready for ICP.\textsuperscript{11} This analysis proves that the Army intelligence corps cannot meet the imperatives of the concept in its current state. Failures in doctrine, training, and personnel are not offset by the organizational success achieved through the transformation to the modular force. Materiel and facilities requirements have little bearing on the problem as they are resourced by agencies other than the United States Army.\textsuperscript{12} Finally, this analysis lends itself to conclusions and recommendations offered to adjust the path of Army intelligence transformation so by the time JIOCs are full operations capable (FOC) on December 31, 2007 and ICP is fully implemented in 2015, the Army intelligence corps is postured to fully participate, or even lead the joint community. This is important because intelligence is fundamentally joint, national, and multi-functional, and the Army must participate as appropriate, and take the lead if necessary in new intelligence initiatives. Current initiatives to transform Army intelligence have accurately and adequately addressed intelligence deficiencies in full spectrum operations in the GWOT, but by 2015 the environment will likely change and the Army must be postured, ready and relevant in the increasingly interdependent DoD IC.

\textbf{Intelligence Community Reorganization}

“Our Nation possesses a preeminent advantage: A global intelligence capability composed of the very best people and the finest technology anywhere. Military capability, guided and enabled by intelligence, is a powerful instrument.”\textsuperscript{13} Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, USD(I), April 7, 2004

\textsuperscript{11} See Glossary for a description of DOTMLPF.

\textsuperscript{12} JIOC Exord, 3 April 2006.

\textsuperscript{13} Cambone, April 7, 2004. Dr. Cambone served as the first USD(I) from March 2003 until his resignation in December 2006.
The importance of the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* that created the Office of the DNI is only fully understood by grasping how the national IC organized prior to the Act. The previous IC organization bifurcated command and control and resource allocation between the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense, creating a culture of competitiveness and stove pipes (see figure 1).

![Figure 1: The United States Intelligence Community Prior to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004](image)

Eight of the fifteen members of the national IC were managed, resourced, and operated under the DoD umbrella, receiving an estimated eighty five percent of the national intelligence budget.\(^\text{14}\)

Meanwhile, the DCI maintained limited operational authority over the other IC agencies, but

retained responsibility for IC policy. The DCI’s two jobs, one as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the other as the DCI, the sole individual responsible for integrating intelligence and advising the President, were difficult due to the organizational structure. Thus, a tenuous relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense ensued for over fifty years due to this organizational misalignment. The internal conflicts regarding content of national intelligence resulted in combative bureaucratic fighting for resources and the preeminent voice with the President. The requirement for justifying budgets and the competitive nature of analysis resulted in the IC remaining divided from 1947 until 2004. This contention surfaced in the 9/11 Commission Reports, substantiating the need for the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

The creation of the DNI established a single office charged with administering the vast IC of the United States to ensure timely, objective, and relevant all source intelligence is provided to decision makers and foreign policy advisors at the right place and time. As figure 2 shows, it reorganized the IC and put one office in charge of the national IC. Though the DNI was a new executive branch cabinet position created by the Act, the idea of one responsible party for national intelligence was not new. In 1955, a study commissioned by Congress recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence employ “a deputy to run the CIA so that the director could focus on coordinating the overall intelligence effort.” Five decades of debate over intelligence reform produced little, partly due to the constant operational environment of the Cold War, and partly to bureaucratic infighting and inability to reach consensus in Washington D.C.

15 Ibid.
16 This was established in the National Security Act of 1947.
17 For a full history see www.intelligence.gov/1who.shtml, “The Evolution of the United States Intelligence Community – An Historical Overview.”
18 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 102A.
Forced to acknowledge the need for change, the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* became law, and Ambassador John Negroponte and General Michael V. Hayden assumed responsibilities as the DNI and Principal Deputy DNI, respectively, on April 22, 2005.\(^\text{20}\)

Concurrent to the establishment of the DNI, intelligence reform within the DoD was well underway. With the DNI established to ensure national intelligence unity of effort, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld created the position and office of the Under Secretary of Defense — Intelligence (USD(I)) in the spring of 2003 to serve as his principle advisor on all intelligence matters and representative to the DNI (see figure 2). Confirmed by the United States Senate, Dr. Stephen A. Cambone became the first USD(I) on March 7, 2003. In his testimony during

nomination to be the USD(I) in February 2003, Dr. Cambone outlined his job description, saying he would serve the secretary of defense by:

“serv(ing) as his [SecDef] principal adviser on matters related to intelligence in the conduct of his responsibilities under Title 10 and Title 50 U.S.C. to provide authority, direction and control over intelligence capabilities of the DoD, including those agencies and elements considered part of the national intelligence community.”

Subsequently, DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01, published November 23, 2005, outlined the explicit responsibilities and duties of the USD(I). The USD(I) would serve the secretary by managing the policy, programs, operations and resources of the defense intelligence agencies under one responsible entity. The USD(I) has authority over all intelligence related human capital, education, budgetary functions as part of the DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, acquisition, global Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and control of the service intelligence agencies.

**Problem Identification**

From August to October 2003, Dr. Cambone and his deputy under secretary of defense for intelligence and warfighting support, LTG Jerry Boykin, led TSDI to assess the defense IC. TSDI analysis revealed COCOM planning for intelligence operations was not synchronized or proactive, inadequate for fighting blue ISR, incomplete and focused heavily on targeting, and sometimes joint but rarely combined or interagency. A consistent theme throughout TSDI was that the COCOMs routinely did not engage the Combat Support Agencies (CSA) in the planning.

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21 Cambone, February 27, 2003, and DoDD 5143.01, authorizing the USD(I) to “1. Serve as the senior DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security official below the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and 2. Serve as the primary representative of the secretary of Defense to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and other members of the IC.”

22 DoDD 5143.01, November 23, 2005.

process early enough to ensure timely and adequate support. TSDI revealed problems with the current construct and organization of the defense intelligence system characterized by multiple stovepipes and poor integration. Existing procedures forced agencies to compete for resources and credit, vice producing collaborative, actionable intelligence. The TSDI Executive Summary summed it up best, saying, “DoD intelligence is best described as a federated group of diverse organization’s, with multiple missions, equally diverse and often proprietary business processes, and in direct competition for finite resources.”

Current joint intelligence doctrine and processes were also found to be severely lacking. Intelligence doctrine and processes were assessed as lacking the agility, responsiveness and authorities necessary to meet emerging operational planning requirements, while also failing to unify the efforts of national level intelligence capabilities supporting operational level planning and operations requirements. These deficiencies eventually led to gaping operational inadequacies in ISR operations. ISR was not timely, robust, or agile to emerging threats, and often lacked integration with other capabilities. Subsequent analysis was not thorough, and the operational plan and its intelligence estimates were not dynamic enough to redirect assets accordingly. DoD IC leaders clearly had identified a major problem.

Though the organizational structure of the national IC and DoD IC were restructured to ensure better efficiency, the resulting collection, analysis, and dissemination remained flawed and inadequate. Despite all the capabilities of the IC to acquire the information decision makers required, the analysis was not joint, national, or multi-functional and lacked timeliness. Planning

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26 Ibid.
and analysis appeared to remain at the agency level, vice a joint, integrated, national approach. 29

Unfortunately, the multiple stovepipes and poor integration characteristic of past intelligence
operations remained. TSDI served its purpose to identify the problems internal to DoD IC, and
the roots leading to ICP were now firmly identified.

As a logical follow on, TSDI evolved into the RDI initiative. Coupled with an effort to
reform the defense human intelligence (HUMINT) system, RDI sought to fundamentally change
the way the DoD IC operated; to change the paradigm. As TSDI revealed, previous intelligence
operations were often agency centric, with planning, execution, and analysis stove piped and
compartmentalized. Individual agencies would contribute their analysis to the COCOM, but there
 existed no single, all encompassing intelligence plan, operations, or analysis, and no unity of
effort or command to synchronize these functions for DoD or the COCOMs. Transformation of
the entire DoD IC was required to better support COCOMs in the GWOT and other contingency
OPLANs.

AN OPPORTUNITY LOST: DEFENSE AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE
TRANSFORMATION

The Way Ahead

In early April 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld was briefed on and approved the RDI concept. 30

The RDI initiative called for focused all source analysis, intelligence operationalization,
modification of existing organizational relationships, and synergy among all DoD IC members. 31

RDI signaled a paradigm shift in the DoD IC; from need to know to need to share; actionable

intelligence to action to produce intelligence; intelligence as a staff function to intelligence as a line of operation; risk aversion to risk mitigation, and stove pipes to horizontal integration (HI).³²

To prioritize effort and produce action from the findings of TSDI and the concepts of RDI, DoD IC leaders created five focus areas. These focus areas became the lines of operations the DoD IC would operate on to transform. The five focus areas are; establishing JIOCs to enable more agile intelligence operations; implementing ICP to better anticipate threats, plan for intelligence operations and perform intelligence gap analysis; strengthen department intelligence disciplines to improve tradecraft and capabilities; develop an enhanced intelligence professionalization and sustainment program within the department to strengthen the DoD IC workforce; and improve all source analysis to better anticipate threats and provide warning of impending attacks.³³

Because it fundamentally changes the way DoD intelligence operations are conducted, the creation of the JIOC has received the bulk of attention amongst DoD IC leaders. The creation of an organization to integrate operators and analysts under one responsible, authoritative leader is indeed a paradigm shift towards intelligence as a line of operation and increased HI of DoD IC assets and agencies.³⁴ However promising and vitally important JIOCs become to the DoD IC, operators and analysts cannot operate without a thorough and robust plan that brings all elements of the DoD IC together. Introduction of ICP shows the need for unity of effort and assigning of responsibilities for all DoD IC members to answer DoD and COCOM requirements. This critical change brings all DoD IC members together in one plan that supports one OPLAN. Because of this important stepping off point, ICP holds the greatest promise to rectify the problems of the past. Coupled with the unequalled technical expertise the United States possesses in specific

³³ Hicks, RDI Fact Sheet, March 22, 2006.
intelligence functions (e.g. NSA and SIGINT, from tactical to national level), and the requisite training to produce DoD IC leaders who can perform ICP, ICP promises to deliver the synchronized, proactive, complete, joint, and interagency DoD intelligence operations that TSDI assessed were absent.

Full ICP implementation within the DoD IC should also address the static nature of its intelligence estimates identified in TSDI. Intelligence estimates create the base for all intelligence collection and analytical operations, and are an important predicate of all joint operations planning. They contain all elements of intelligence information; things known, unknown, and assessed. Beginning any intelligence operation with no baseline knowledge adds time and risk to any mission; time not likely available in the face of modern, twenty-first century threats, and a level of risk a combatant commander is unlikely to accept.

ICP Introduction and Strategic Policy Guidance – Forcing Functions

On April 7, 2004, Dr. Cambone testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and introduced the ICP concept publicly for the first time. The reason ICP is required is twofold. First, all the intelligence assessment studies after 9/11 confirmed lack of information sharing caused by separate and unconnected intelligence systems and hierarchical network configurations. Second, the contingency planning process was too slow to adapt to today’s rapidly evolving complex situations. The TSDI revealed that:

“DoD intelligence is still primarily focused on conventional threats. Defense planning scenarios often fail to take into account how potential adversaries will adapt in response to United States capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. The results are ‘flat’ threat descriptions and less than optimum planning assumptions, that fail to adequately address non-traditional or asymmetric threats, or conventional threats adopting asymmetrically to United States capabilities.”

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35 JP 5-0, pg. III-16.
36 TSDI Executive Summary, January 22, 2004.
This is important because it further reinforced the need for a fundamental shift in intelligence operations across the DoD IC. Army intelligence units are supporting ground forces in contact that face multiple, daily asymmetric threats across the full spectrum of operations. As the situation on the ground changes at a rate unimaginable by the Cold War intelligence architecture and procedures designed to detect it, the need for a more agile, adaptive IC is evident. ICP can provide this by synchronizing the DoD IC in one plan, ultimately commanded by DoD IC leaders in the DJIOC, and regionally in COCOM JIOCs.

Following Dr. Cambone’s testimony, the 2004 DoD Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) required COCOMs to write ICPs in support of priority plans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued the JIOC Execution Order (EXORD) on April 3, 2006, tasking COCOM’s to establish JIOC’s no later than (NLT) December 31, 2007, and to institutionalize ICP as a cornerstone of their activities with no additional funding. Also, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was tasked to establish JIOC-X, the transformational JIOC designed to conduct Joint Concepts Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) of ICP with an initial budget of $20.995 million dollars. The Army, along with the other services, was tasked to assign a senior representative to assist in the JIOC stand up process and to synchronize their intelligence activities within the entire DoD IC.

In recognition of the operating environments faced in OIF and OEF, DoDD 3000.05 was issued November 28, 2005 to establish DoD policy that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission, conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values, and that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform them. DoDD 3000.05 also contains

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37 2004 Contingency Planning Guidance, pg. 4.
38 JIOC EXORD, April 3, 2006, para. 3(b)(4).
39 JIOC EXORD, April 3, 2006, para. 3(b)(4), and Garraghty, JFCOM ICP JICD&E, June 29, 2004.
40 JIOC EXORD, April 3, 2006, para. 3(b)(4).
41 DoDD 3000.05, November 28, 2005, para. 4 (Policy), 4.1 – 4.3.
specified tasks to COCOMs to include specific data in their ICP, listing the following content as required;

1. Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic, and political relationships, non-military forces, infrastructure, sanitation and health structure, munitions facilities, border controls, and customs processes.
2. Requirements for the order of battle, open source data, and numbers of personnel with appropriate language and cultural skills and proficiency levels.
3. Means to meet these requirements by specifying particular national and DoD intelligence capabilities

Though specifically referenced for the conduct of stability operations, this required information is no doubt required for the conduct of all six joint operational phases, since stability operations generally encompasses phase four and five, but could occur during any phase in full spectrum operations.

**Integrating Defense Intelligence**

**JIOC: ISR Command and Control**

The RDI focus area receiving the most attention is the JIOC. Creation of JIOCs is tied directly to the ability of the DoD IC to implement ICP. JIOCs fuse analysts and collectors under a single chain of command, integrating analysis, operations, and plans. At the DoD level, the single chain of command will link the DJIOC to the Director, DIA, who works for the USD(I). The DIA director has multiple jobs, but one most notable with respect to the DJIOC is his role as DoD collection manager, responsible for synchronizing DoD intelligence operations. The DJIOC is the organization that executes the required DoD collection, as the JIOC will at the COCOM level. At COCOM level, JIOCs will be led by the J2 who has authority to plan and direct

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42 DoDD 3000.05, November 28, 2005.
43 In accordance with Joint Publication 3-0, the phases are: 0 – Shape; 1 – Deter; 2- Seize Initiative; 3 – Dominate; 4 – Stabilize, 5 - Enable Civilian Authority; and 0/6- Shape
44 JIOC Symposium, JIOC Specified Task discussion, slide 3, 15 August 2006.
intelligence operations within the COCOM AOR. As such, the mission of the JIOC is to “plan, prepare, integrate, direct, synchronize, and manage continuous Defense intelligence operations by integrating DoD and national IC capabilities.” Elimination of service parochialism, agency specific issues, and intelligence sharing caveats creates a single, collaborative intelligence enterprise, more responsive and capable of operationalizing intelligence and horizontally integrating across the network to analyze complex problems.

Defense Intelligence Planning Guidance for FY 07-11 and the JIOC EXORD assigned key tasks to the JIOC. JIOC’s shall; seamlessly integrate all DoD intelligence functions and disciplines; integrate intelligence with traditional operations and plans functions to increase speed, power, and combat effectiveness; institutionalize ICP as a cornerstone of their activities; coordinate and operate with the DNI, national intelligence resources, and all DoD IC members; and unify responsibility for effective DoD IC activities and operations for the department and within the COCOMs.

The scope and responsibilities for the DJIOC and COCOM JIOC differ, even though mission, concepts and key tasks, to include ICP integration, are inherently similar (see figure 3). At each JIOC, the JIOC Plans and Exercises Directors are responsible for ICP development, and work for the senior intelligence officer; the Director of Operations at the DJIOC and J2s at COCOMs. It is in these Plans and Exercises directorates at both the DJIOC and the COCOM level the Army can influence the ICP development process with qualified, trained intelligence leaders. The ICP process precedes intelligence collection operations, driving the intelligence cycle of the respective JIOC while accepting analyst input to the process.

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45 JIOC Symposium, JIOC Specified Task discussion, slide 3, 15 August 2006.

46 Hicks, JIOC Fact Sheet, March 22, 2006.

47 Hicks, JIOC Fact Sheet, March 22, 2006.
However, the major stumbling block to full implementation of this concept is command and control (C2) of national, organizational, and service assets.\textsuperscript{48} It is hard to imagine a pure intelligence collection environment where services would allocate control of their intelligence systems and personnel to a JIOC. Their argument is easy to understand. For example, United States Navy EP-3’s exist to protect the fleet from surface and sub-surface threats just as United States Air Force EC-135 Rivet Joints protect flights from enemy integrated air defense systems (IADS). The contention remains regarding who has mission tasking authority over the asset. The point here is to illuminate a challenge facing full ICP implementation as it relates to JIOC across DoD.

Though the JIOC EXORD directs full integration, bureaucratic cultures embodied in the tension between COCOMs and Title X organizations are potential impediments. The Army

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{JIOC Specified Tasks\textsuperscript{49}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{48} Telephonic interview with Mr. Van Garraghty, Intelligence Concept Developer, GG-14, JFCOM J29, October 23, 2006.
\textsuperscript{49} JIOC Symposium, Specified Task discussion. August 15, 2006.
should not add to this roadblock by not integrating with DoD and COCOM efforts to establish JIOCs and fully implement ICP. The Army is leading the way in this regard, most noticeably at the Coalition Intelligence Operations Centers (CIOC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army must see the intrinsic value of co-locating intelligence planners with intelligence collectors and analysts as critical to ensuring intelligence shaping of future plans and current predictive analysis. Hence, the Army has a vast stake in ICP and JIOC, despite the environment of service parochialism.

As such, the role of the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps and its assets and resources in this initiative are varied, often unclear, and remarkably unstudied. The JIOC EXORD said the Army must provide resources and inform the DoD IC of its activities while subsequent coordinating actions required integration into NISP and CISP planning and production of functional support plans as appropriate. As a service, the Army can’t meet all these requirements, but must contribute to solutions where it can. How the United States Army meets these challenging tasks in light of transformation to the modular force and ongoing GWOT commitments remains to be seen. Army corps and above intelligence commands can manage intelligence operations at their level, but must do so in close coordination with higher intelligence efforts. As such, Army and even Marine combat divisions have an equally important role, for if a division is allocated as a force in support of an OPLAN it must know and understand the ICP and what procedures and stove pipes exist to move that intelligence information to the lowest level; the soldier on the ground.

50 Telephonic interview with Mr. Van Garraghty, Intelligence Concept Developer, GG-14, JFCOM J29, October 23, 2006.
Horizontal Integration

To combat the old paradigm in DoD intelligence operations, Dr. Cambone testified to the need for HI, which is “an integrated approach to acquiring and applying collection assets…that integrates surveillance capabilities across the various human and technical intelligence disciplines and national, theater, tactical, and commercial programs.” HI establishes procedures to seamlessly and transparently acquire, synchronize, and correlate information requirements into collection procedures and deliver intelligence information in the required format to those who require it across DoD and the IC. However, concept is easier than reality. As the assistant DCI, Charles E. Allen, assessed in October 2003, HI is fairly complex, involving “communications, multilevel security and systems engineering as well as upstream tasks such as collection management, collection tasking, cross-platform tasking and automatic cueing. It also includes downstream tasks such as data storage, data fusion, multi-INT all source analysis and us(ing) collaborative tools.” This increased information sharing and fusing, though not certain to produce the degree of certainty offered in recent defense transformation concepts, will surely improve situational awareness and allow for greater knowledge across the battlefield.

The link between HI and ICP is important. HI eliminates the old paradigm of stove piped intelligence, while ICP focuses on the synchronization of DoD IC members at the onset of operations. When HI is fully realized, DoD IC analysts will access and integrate information planned for collection during construct of ICP. The loop of evaluation and feedback in the intelligence cycle will not be broken (see Appendix 1). HI envisions not only integrating various

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52 Cambone, April 7, 2004.
53 Ackerman, October 2003.
forms of intelligence from different databases, but a virtual flattening of the network to fuse national to tactical intelligence.

For the Army intelligence corps to remain a decisive enabler to ground combat success, it must continually invest in this technology and concepts to a greater degree than it already has. At the operational level, ongoing efforts of the Information Dominance Center (IDC) at the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, require replication throughout the force. To its great credit, the Army led the way in HI utilization following the attacks of September 11, 2001, by establishing the IDC. The IDC began the process of HI by fusing DoD IC and some IC databases together to provide increased situational understanding. HI at the strategic and operational level is important, but it is not enough.

Due to the current operating environment and the challenge faced in OIF, the Army led the DoD IC in establishing HI at the operational and tactical level in Iraq. Joint Intelligence Operations Capability – Iraq (JIOC-I), and its successor the Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A), is a suite of software and analytical tools that enable a joint, flat, web-based intelligence architecture that allows soldiers and commanders to access, search, and visualize intelligence across all classification levels. As figure 4 shows, JIOC-I integrates various categories and classifications of intelligence information to create a virtual memory to facilitate intelligence analysis and predictive assessments, and provides an interim capability envisioned for the DCGS-A that will support the Future Combat System (FCS). Currently, JIOC-I is fully operational on two flat analytical networks, SIPR and JWICS, continuously available in theater to every echelon, and provided as part of pre-deployment training and Mission Rehearsal Exercises.

55 Derived from authors’ personnel experience assigned to INSCOM at this time.
56 Zahner, October 2005, and Fast, March 13, 2006. JIOC-I is not to be confused with JIOC. Though the same acronym, JIOC-I is a software suite, and JIOC is an organization and capability to integrate intelligence operations.
57 Figure 3 from DA G2 website www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-zxg/JIOC-I-DCGS-A.doc, information paper regarding JIOC-I/DCGS-A initiative.
This single all source data repository has gone a long way to validate the concept and potential of HI, mostly due to the sound actions and resourcing undertaken by Army intelligence leaders to meet the demands of the field.\textsuperscript{59}

Figure 4: JIOC-I: Single All Source Data Repository

The benefit for the Army will be the degree to which its intelligence corps can not only integrate and utilize HI, but how well it can vertically facilitate the flow of intelligence data to every level, including tactical. To its credit, the Army intelligence corps is doing quite well in two specific areas. First, by establishing top-secret points of presence (POP) in each modular force maneuver brigade, the communications architecture now exists to facilitate data flow.\textsuperscript{60} Second, JIOC-I is fielded to the battalion level in OIF and OEF integrating tactical intelligence

\textsuperscript{58} JIOC-I/DCGS-A Data sheet, retrieved from DA G2
\textsuperscript{59} From Kimmons, March 2007, “the Army transitioned JIOC-I into the DCGS-A Program of Record (POR) in June of 2006.”
\textsuperscript{60} MI Corps Functional Area Assessment (FAA) brief to the DA G3, in the Pentagon, DA G2 Conference Room, March 2005.
into the larger DoD IC fight. The subsequent vertical integration – or flattening of the network – not only facilitates greater situational understanding but it benefits the Army by removing DoD IC stove pipes and firewalls that previously characterized defense intelligence.

**Army Intelligence Transformation**

The 2002 AI-TCP gave way to the efforts of TSDI and the swearing in of General Peter Schoomaker as the thirty-fifth Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in 2003. Immediately, the new CSA accelerated ongoing transformation of the Army, developing seventeen immediate focus areas to steer transformation to the modular force. The need to amend the Army’s intelligence capabilities and organization was recognized, and the CSA approved Focus Area 16 (FA16), Actionable Intelligence (also known as Task Force Actionable Intelligence – TF AI), and designated the DA G2 as the lead. TF AI’s mission was to “rapidly implement a capability that provides situational understanding across the force and instill an Army wide culture and mind set that every soldier is a collector, in learning, adaptive organizations that leverage inherent intelligence capabilities.” Active officers and a cadre of “grey beards” formed TF AI, and began by conducting a thorough DOTMLPF analysis of Army intelligence corps issues, consulting a group of “out of the box thinkers” to review ideas, and using several working groups to address current force and future force requirements.

This internal “Taking Stock of Army Intelligence” as part of TF AI led to the creation of six critical initiatives Army intelligence needed to “fundamentally change the way the Army

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62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
thinks about and performs intelligence” operations.65  The six critical AI initiatives were; tactical overwatch; interim DCGS-A; Pantheon Project; Information Dominance Center (IDC); Project Foundry; and Red Teaming capability (see Appendix 2).66 Throughout the development of TF AI, and the creation of the six critical initiatives, Army intelligence leaders emphasized that TF AI was “nested within our nation’s joint and expeditionary capabilities” and aligned with “the development of inherently joint transformational capabilities.”67

As the situation facing the United States Army during contingency operations changed, so did the AI initiatives. Enclosure 9 to the 2006 Army Game Plan is dedicated to AI, and listed the now eight critical initiatives of AI as; JIOC-I/DCGS-A; Modular MI; HUMINT Revitalization; Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2); Project Foundry; tactical overwatch; Red Teaming; IDC/Rapid Technology Prototyping (RTP) (see Appendix 2).68 What did not change, however, was the Army’s nesting within the DoD IC. LTG John F. Kimmons, DA G2/DCSINT, testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that all the “Army intelligence initiatives are also fully nested with USD(I) Remodeling Defense Intelligence (RDI), DNI National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) objectives, and the 2005 QDR process.”69 Figure 5 shows the accuracy of LTG Kimmons statement, and how over the life of TF AI Army intelligence has nested all its efforts very well within the DoD IC and the larger IC. The success of FA16 was highlighted most recently in an April 2006 decision brief to the CSA who directed migrating the concept into full execution. The eight initiatives became lines of operations with specific decision points executed across the Army intelligence community by

66 Ibid.
68 2006 Game Plan, Accelerating Momentum, Enclosure 9 (Actionalbe Intelligence).
responsible agencies, and tracked monthly with associated tasks, metrics, and milestones in relation to the Army Strategic Management System (SMS).\textsuperscript{70}

But as figure 5 also shows, the Army has not invested in the ICP concept and methodology. Why not? The first and most obvious reason is the Army was not tasked and is in no position to lead the DoD IC. With COCOM’s and JFCOM leading the way, the Army had

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{Defense vs Army Intelligence Transformation}
\end{figure}

little mandate to lead the joint process. Second, the Army intelligence corps was fully engaged supporting OIF and OEF, and monitoring other global situations. Though these reasons are sound, they do not answer the Army’s lack of attention to the ICP methodology. If ISR synchronization remains a training and operational challenge for the Army’s intelligence corps then it must have an interest in the concept and participate aggressively in the experimentation and implementation.\textsuperscript{71} Effective joint ICP requires Army intelligence competence in the joint operations planning process, ICP concepts and elements, and an understanding of tactical ISR

\textsuperscript{70} “Actionable Intelligence” Tasking Directive, April 19, 2006.
\textsuperscript{71} Fast, December 12, 2006.
synchronization and what the Army at all levels brings to the fight. The Army can’t lead ICP for the DoD IC but it must integrate its requirements and capabilities into the process so ground intelligence is not lost during the planning phase. If done as aggressively as Army intelligence leaders have addressed HI through initiatives like the IDC and JIOC-I, another opportunity will not be lost for further integration into the DoD IC fight in the GWOT.

**ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY: ICP IN JOINT OPERATIONS, PLANNING, AND PROGRESS SO FAR**

**The Role of ICP in the Joint Fight**

As the intelligence planning effort, ICP is designed to “synchronize and integrate intelligence into the commander’s joint operations planning process and, when fully developed, will bring together DoD and IC capabilities in a more synergistic effort.” ICP is designed to focus the intelligence community’s capabilities on the commander’s critical decision requirements with the goal to operationalize intelligence. ICP focuses on “the intelligence portion of DoD operational campaign planning” and is “intended to improve COCOM capability to plan, synchronize, manage, and execute intelligence operations across the operational spectrum.” The resulting plan creates centralized intelligence management while retaining the decentralized execution of collection agencies and apparatus. This fundamental shift in the intelligence process requires testing and evaluation to ensure its integration with other joint transformation concepts and methodologies.

United States JFCOM was assigned in an April 2005 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) tasking to “conduct ICP Concept Development and Experimentation to develop capabilities that better support the Intelligence and Planning Communities and the adaptive planning process.”

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72 Cambone, April 7, 2004.
JFCOM J2, and specifically the J29, lead the concept, methodology, and processes determination in conjunction with USD(I), the Joint Staff, COCOM, CSA, the services, and some non-DoD intelligence agency planners. 75 To define the ICP concept and methodology, JFCOM published a Concept White Paper in May 2005. In this paper, JFCOM defined the concept as the process by which the COCOM “focuses all available Operational-Strategic level intelligence capabilities and joint intelligence operations to support the Commander’s adaptive planning and operations requirements.” 76 This new methodology promises to provide COCOM J2’s additional capability to align and synchronize intelligence capabilities and resources to drive planning and operations. Specific additional capability remains to be seen, as does the role the service intelligence agencies play in the process. What does not change, however, is the doctrinal relationship between ICP and the joint operations planning process (JOPP).

Since JFCOM serves as the joint coordinator for doctrine and transformational concepts, it is critical ICP be nested with other joint transformation concepts. As previously discussed, ICP and HI are linked, moving the DoD IC away from a need to know towards a need to share characteristic of a collaborative operating environment. 77 Second, ICP relies on a thorough and predictive Operational Net Assessments (ONA) as a foundation for threat or potential adversary actions and intents. ONA focuses much attention on analyzing links and associations within the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems to establish analytical gaps, intentions, strengths, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities across the totality of potential adversaries. 78 Once these are established, commanders and J2’s have a more refined assessment of an adversary, and a clearer picture of what they know, do not know, and what needs to be collected. Information collected, regardless of whether it confirms or denies any

77 LTG Jerry Boykin, OUSD(I), in Quigley, 2006.
78 http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_ona.htm
priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or planning assumptions, is integrated into the intelligence estimate. These dynamic estimates form the basis of ICP.

Lastly, ICP enables Effects Based Approaches (EBA) through continuous planning and focusing collection assets and assessment tools at required points on a battlefield or area of operations. EBA bring a systems approach to better understand desired and undesired effects from military operations against potential adversary systems.\textsuperscript{79} ICP supports EBA in the planning phase by collecting intelligence that facilitates near real time, dynamic estimates, and assessing effects that may steer both mission analysis and course of action development.\textsuperscript{80} Subsequently, ICP can help assess EBA by collecting intelligence information to confirm or deny the desired effect was achieved or not. As such, the validity of ICP as a concept in joint transformation is reinforced due to its ability to nest with joint doctrine.

**ICP Concept and Elements**

There are three main conceptual elements of ICP that expand intelligence planning: Mission Centric Intelligence, Information Before Request, and Self Organizing Communities. These new concepts acknowledge successful attributes of the current intelligence network, while proposing new processes to take advantage of technological advancements. These concepts require a thorough testing and evaluation in an automated form to fully move the DoD IC to ICP by 2015, but they hold some promise today as well. Specifically, current analyst chat rooms, instant-messaging capabilities, and Intellipedia in web-based portals allow for many of the elements envisioned by information before request and self organizing communities. Analysts at any level, given the right tools and access, can communicate and share data world wide about certain intelligence missions. ICP envisions maintaining this capability while increasing its

\textsuperscript{79} Commander’s Handbook for an Effects Based Approach to Joint Operations, viii  
\textsuperscript{80} Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, page viii.
automated processes so the information can be captured and utilized by the entire DoD IC, where applicable. The benefit becomes concentrated knowledge building in databases available to support any operation by DoD IC members.

First, Mission Centric Intelligence leverages the continuous availability of information within a process of collecting, integrating, analyzing, evaluating and interpreting information to create integrated, customized intelligence.\(^8\) If the IC can create the promised automated intelligence support using customizable templates it will facilitate dynamic, horizontal and vertical information sharing and production. A robust network of databases will flatten the network vertically while integrating all elements of the IC horizontally into an adaptable, scalable, and dynamic database that fosters concentrated knowledge building.\(^8\) This network of sharable intelligence will ultimately produce a more thorough and refined product. Coupled with organizational unity of command in the DJIOC and COCOM JIOCs, the ICP requires DoD IC agencies to work specific OPLANs. So instead of collecting and analyzing all they can, the ICP synchronizes the DoD IC efforts on a required mission. Software applications and database tools make it easier for analysts to wade through the volumes of information to get required, mission focused intelligence. The Army’s efforts to establish the JIOC-I and subsequent evolution to DCGS-A, and link it with DCGS-Joint (DCGS-J), are good examples of how the Army has embraced this concept already.

Second, Information Before Request supports predictive analysis that anticipates and maintains awareness of current and potential operational environment changes that may shape the adaptive planning process and COCOM operations. It fosters competitive analysis and encourages competency based, emergent analysis, vice potentially watered down consensus.\(^8\) A key component of Information Before Request is the creation of intelligence “commons” for

\(^8\) ICP White Paper, USJFCOM J29, May 2005.
\(^8\) ICP White Paper, USJFCOM J29, May 2005, 14.
\(^8\) ICP White Paper, USJFCOM J29, May 2005, 15.
semi-autonomous and emergent intelligence analysis. As the information age revolution continues to sweep the globe, open source, and information that is otherwise readily available, will potentially replace more traditional forms of information repositories. Information Before Request relies on these commons to pull data and emerging ideas or brainstorm. Conceptually, this envisions amplified prediction capabilities, enabling intelligence to shape future plans. A key attribute of this concept is competitive analysis, which fosters differing ideas and concepts about what is really happening. This concept attribute acknowledges that the world the United States military will face in 2015 will be more complex than the challenges presented it in the Cold War or currently in the GWOT, OIF, and OEF. Senior Intelligence Officers at all levels, in any organization, may find this complexity tough since they are responsible to their decision maker for a precise assessment. Organizational and systemic fixes are required to ensure invigorating dialogue at the lower echelons of an intelligence organization do not replace the responsibility at the top to provide focused counsel and advice to decision makers based on a full spectrum analysis. Finding comfort in the complexity will be challenging, but consensus and outputs from limited group think need to be eliminated.

Lastly, Self Organizing Communities takes advantage of spontaneous conversation and analysis enabled by social networking tools within the IC. An extension of attributes associated with the DoD Office of Force Transformation concept Network Centric Warfare (NCW), Self Organizing Communities mimic NCW by enabling vast and increased human interaction in a “network” enabled by advanced automation tools. The result is increased self-awareness, situational understanding, and information dominance. For the IC, that means sharing, timeliness, precision, and potential elimination of the phrase “we don’t know what we don’t know.” Through blogs, websites, and the newly released Intellipedia, intelligence collectors and

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85 Cebrowski, 2005.
analysts can network in a dynamic, collaborative environment any time, anywhere across the
globe to push and pull data. In all three predominant levels of classification, top secret, secret, and unclassified, Intellipedia and like social networking tools allow intelligence
professionals to converge on a problem and collaborate to a solution, and then move elsewhere in the network as required. In essence, though the structure and decision making within DoD remains traditional hierarchical, the three main conceptual elements of ICP allow for HI, ensuring to some degree that the information and intelligence presented is thorough and absent of hierarchical filters and biases.

The resultant outputs, or tangible results, of the nesting of the three aforementioned concepts remain a key to ICP success. Naturally, J2’s are unlikely to apply time and money against the development of this concept if the effort results in little useful intelligence. Conceptually, ICP outputs include multiple refined products that support core joint intelligence operations and deliver integrated and synchronized intelligence into the COCOM JOPP. Inputs including ONA, Systems of Systems Analysis (SOSA), specific warfighting function mission analyses, and EBA are coalesced in the JIOC. Senior intelligence leaders and intelligence campaign planners utilize people, processes, and technology to then derive required dynamic, scalable, and adaptable outputs. The outputs desired include:

- Intelligence Operations Task orders (ICP components)
- Indication & Warnings (I&W) – alert, situational awareness
- Dynamic intelligence assessments
- Predictive analysis
- Joint IPB
- Anticipatory Assessments
- Production tasking
- Effects Assessments
- All Source SOSA
- Communication architecture
- Intel Operations Architecture
- Readiness metrics/gaps

86 *Gov’t unveils a Wikipedia for spies*, October 31, 2006.
87 *Gov’t unveils a Wikipedia for spies*, October 31, 2006.
Resource requirements

This is vastly different from past intelligence operations and outputs because now within the JIOC all DoD IC members come together in the planning, collection, and analysis phases of the intelligence operation. Intelligence operations become more than merely a staff function as DoD IC agencies are tasked to provide certain information pertinent to prioritized COCOM OPLANs. The DJIOC and JIOC will integrate the intelligence collection and analysis requirements synchronized in the ICP. The ramifications of implementing a new intelligence planning methodology within the DoD IC are huge, and ICP will only be as good as the results of aligning and synchronizing intelligence to enable decision superiority vice static assessments of little significance.

**Time and Experimentation**

Despite the need for implementing ICP, it remains unclear how ICP will work at an operational J2, and how long it will take DoD to get the capability institutionalized throughout the force. The process to achieve the desired outputs, and what is included to achieve them, are known, though in their infancy. In support of the COCOMs, JFCOM J29 is conducting experimentations to refine ICP procedures and answer these unknowns. The Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) approved the framework for the ICP Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) which seeks to prove or disprove the following hypothesis:  

If we can replace the hierarchical, center based Defense Intelligence culture with an edge-oriented all source information sharing environment;

Then, we can create an Intelligence Planning framework to employ and conduct intelligence operations and integrate intelligence with adaptive planning in support of combatant commander’s decision making requirements.  

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90 CJCS Memorandum CM-2441-05, April 8, 2005.  
91 JFCOM ICP Plan for Experimentation, August 31, 2005.
The idea of an *edge oriented* all source information environment is indeed revolutionary to the DoD IC, and warrants discussion.

Edge oriented organizations are characterized by command that establishes these conditions; leadership by competence rather than position, all inclusive decision making, shared rather than hoarded information, horizontal information flow, dynamic and concurrent organizational processes and empowered individuals.92 This concept is consistent with DoD IC leaders calls for changing the paradigm in how the DoD IC functions, and is truly a function of organizational leadership as much as it is a new process. That said, the Army must identify how far down this path it wants to go, because “leadership by competence rather than position” and “all inclusive decision making” are not fundamental to the Army intelligence culture nor the Army itself. Every other facet of edge oriented is represented in Army intelligence transformation initiatives, but full ICP implementation still requires time and determination of specific functions.

At the DoD level, the timeline for the full fielding of ICP capability extends to 2015 and includes three transformation change packages (TCP). As figure 6 shows, the process is well under way and JFCOM has addressed joint DOTMLPF issues within ICP institutionalization.93 Though the joint transformation plan is ongoing with experimentation planned and resourced, the DoD IC did not want to wait until 2015 so it tested the concept at an operational headquarters.

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An Initial Test

During TCP 1, and concurrent with concept development within other DoD agencies, United States Forces Korea (USFK) J2 experimented and implemented an “as is” ICP for OPLAN 5027. Over nine months covering 2004-2005, USFK J2 adapted intelligence portions of the OPLAN to meet ICP concepts. USFK, though a sub-unified command, was a good choice to conduct an “as is” test because other United States forces were engaged in combat in Central Command’s area of responsibility, USFK had a “live” enemy to plan and collect against, and because they were also tasked to establish a JIOC NLT December 31, 2007. The choice of USFK alleviated potential frustration due to implementation taking nine years and did not interfere with ongoing contingency operations. Their analysis and hard work helped in

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94 JIOC EXORD, April 3, 2006.
determining how long it takes to transform a static intelligence estimate from a standing OPLAN into a dynamic ICP.

USFK J2 elements initiated the process by conducting a thorough and integrated J2 Mission Analysis. The focus of the mission analysis was establishing ICP tasks for each operational objective. The mission analysis resulted in USFK J2 staff identifying four key intelligence tasks per operational objective. Each intelligence task contained the following requirements for inclusion into the ICP as part of OPLAN 5027; task; who was required to satisfy the task; when was it to be done by; measures of effectiveness – did it answer the required commander’s question, and how would they know; required of other units – did any other unit owe a piece of the answer, what was expected of them, and by what time, and how reported; limitations; and assumptions. The resultant process, which closely resembles current intelligence collection management doctrine, was noteworthy for the ability the J2 now possessed to be operational vice a staff function. The “as is” test and thorough mission analysis allowed USFK to establish intelligence as a line of operation and synchronize the DoD IC on OPLAN 5027. Their efforts resulted in the first complete ICP within the DoD IC.

Additionally, USFK J2 updated and refined their intelligence estimates to make them more dynamic, living documents. Leveraging available technology, they automated many portions of the assessment and collection requirements in accordance with ICP concepts. USFK J2 achieved numerous self organizing communities which could collaborate and share mission centric intelligence. USFK J2 also analyzed and refined intelligence reporting architecture requirements, databasing and information sharing procedures, and staff and section responsibilities across the J2 to ensure everyone knew who was responsible for what. An increased emphasis on command and control relationships with joint and interagency assets, and a robust and thorough reverse analysis of the potential threat among Army Warfighting Function (AWF) disciplines increased analyst and collector understanding of the problem. Advanced
software applications allowed for HI of intelligence information and increased situational understanding.

This first execution of an ICP to validate the concept at a four star headquarters is significant for four reasons. First, it showed changing the paradigm to operationalize intelligence produced more valuable, thorough, and synchronized intelligence to decision makers. It initially validated concept elements of ICP and provided a framework to further refine the JCD&E developed by JFCOM. Second, it was notable for proving the ICP implementation process took time. USFK took nine months to execute the transition and gave DJIOC planners a refined template to work from as they progressed the concept across all the DoD IC. Based on after action reviews from the USFK test, DJIOC planners established a six month timeframe to achieve ICP transformational milestones (see figure 7). As COCOMs implement the ICP methodology, the 6-month process allows the Army intelligence corps ample time to address capabilities and requirements for inclusion into the joint operational planning process and its intelligence component, the ICP.

Third, the USFK test ICP with OPLAN 5027 showed significant shortfalls in national and theater coverage, and a need for persistent national and theater surveillance systems to provide continuous multi-discipline threat estimates. Identifying this not only showed gaps requiring additional ISR coverage, but validated the requirement for dynamic estimates from which to base OPLANs and ICP from. Last, and most significant to the Army, this test ICP with OPLAN 5027 showed the DoD IC could not work the problem set without the contributions of the Army intelligence brigade in Korea. The 501st Military Intelligence Brigade provided key collection

97 Bell, March 7, 2006.
and analytical efforts throughout, supporting the USFK J2 at every stage.98 A key part of the team, especially in a projected ground fight, Army intelligence must be continually integrated into the DoD IC as it was in the ICP test in Korea.

**ICP, the OPLAN, and How Army Intelligence Integrates**

Institutionalizing ICP requires networking into the national and DoD IC and integrating into current COCOM OPLANs in response to worldwide contingencies. As such, the COCOM conducts ICP and nests it with the associated OPLAN. ICP is composed of four dynamic sub-plans requiring coordination across all DoD and national IC agencies (see figure 8).99 First, the

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intelligence plan (IPLAN), lead by the supported COCOM, is the base, dynamic estimate of the potential threat or adversary. Next come the three plans to synchronize the DoD IC and utilize all available resources of the national IC. These three plans, the CISP, NISP, and ISRSP form the nucleus of intelligence collection operations planned and synchronized during the JOPP.

Within the CISP, INSCOM Theater Intelligence Brigades (TIB) can integrate capabilities which can answer COCOM J2 and in the future COCOM JIOC operational requirements. Thus, the TIB has an important role to play in the planning of their capabilities into COCOM intelligence operations and should be resourced accordingly. As the lowest echelon Army

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100 INSCOM TIBs are OPCON to Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) within each COCOM AOR, and include; 513th MI BDE for ARCENT and CENTCOM; 66th MI BDE for USAREUR and EUCOM; 500th MI BDE for USARPAC and PACOM; 470th MI BDE for USASRO and SOUTHCOM; and 501st MI BDE for USFK. NORTHCOM receives intelligence support from Army centers of excellence and domestic intelligence agencies due to limitations of Army intelligence collecting information on United States persons in accordance with Army Regulation 381-10.
intelligence organization with an established regional focus and expertise, the TIB is an invaluable resource to COCOM J2s and the JIOC. J2’s will not get the same tactical and operational level ground intelligence capabilities from other DoD IC members. The Air Force and Navy intelligence operations are predominantly focused on strategic targeting, while the Marine Corps intelligence agency is limited in scope, manpower, and resources and not organized at the theater level. Additionally, other DoD IC members provide certain functional expertise which is not totally focused on ground intelligence operations. The TIBs provide that focus, integrating collection and analysis for ground operations for the ASCC and supported COCOM.

Third, the NISP is led by the Joint Staff J2 and directs Combat Support Agencies, other aspects of service capabilities, and desired non-DoD intelligence capabilities and activities. Its focus is serving the requirements of the COCOM through the application of integrated national intelligence capabilities. Within the NISP, the Army intelligence centers of excellence may play a vital role. 101 If INSCOM has not already allocated resources to support requirements in the CISP, Army intelligence planners can utilize center of excellence brigades who routinely conduct operations in conjunction with national and DoD IC assets. As the Army’s operational intelligence force, INSCOM must plan, integrate, and synchronize the resources and capabilities inherent in its organization into the NISP.

101 Army intelligence centers of excellence, organized under INSCOM, are; 1st Information Operations Command (LIWA), tasked to plan and conduct Information Operations with the purpose of protecting Army Networks / Support Tactical and operational echelons; 2nd MI Center (NGIC), tasked to conduct Ground focused All source analysis & production in support of Ground Component with a purpose of Support S&T development & countermeasures; provide expert knowledge to tactical forces forward; 3rd MI Center (Imagery), tasked to conduct Imagery exploitation from National Systems to Satisfy Army Imagery requirements & directly support deployed forces as required; 902nd MI Gp (CI) which Executes operational and strategic counterintelligence activities, and supports the tactical echelon as required to enable Force protection of Army personnel, installations and technology; and 704th MI GP (SIGINT) which Conducts SIGINT Operations at National Ctrs to Satisfy Army operational and tactical SIGINT intelligence requirements.
Last, the ISRSP is the plan coordinated between COCOMs and United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Joint Forces Component Command – ISR (JFCC-ISR). The Commander, JFCC-ISR, is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), responsible for “coordinating global intelligence collection to address DoD worldwide operations and national intelligence requirements, (and) serve(s) as the epicenter for planning, execution and assessment of the military's global Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations.”

Though the Army may support STRATCOM and JFCC-ISR operations with personnel, the real importance of Army intelligence inclusion into ICP is with the CISP and NISP. INSCOM, as the Army’s operational intelligence force, owns the responsibility to ensure the Army is invested in the process, especially as the Army remains an important stakeholder in the resultant intelligence outcome in support of dominant land warfare.

**Current Status and An Opportunity**

As of early 2007, the DoD IC has completed work on four ICPs and is developing eight other ICPs in support of priority plans. Plans for OIF, OEF, OPLAN 5027, and OPLAN 7500 are complete and in operation. The extent to which they are able to operationalize intelligence remains to be seen, but recognition of the ICP concept as embodied by dedicating resources to complete these plans proves its worth to the DoD IC leadership. Measures of effectiveness for intelligence operations are undoubtedly classified, and not likely to be published so as to not compromise ongoing operations, sources, or methods. Mr. Scott Reynolds, Director of Plans and Exercises, DJIOC, whose main responsibility is to develop, implement, and synchronize ICP

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103 Email exchange between Mr. Scott Reynolds, DJIOC Plans and Exercises Chief, and author, 25 October 2006, reconfirming DJIOC Update Brief regarding RDI, 18 April 2006. Completed plans can be viewed on the SIPRNET by going to DIA, DJIOC, and then Plans and Exercises links.
across the DoD IC, said United States Army intelligence assets have contributed where they can and have the capability.\textsuperscript{104} That is good from the standpoint of ensuring Army assets are utilized, but it may not go far enough. Army intelligence capabilities and professionals should contribute to the process, but must also invest rigorously in the plan development as well.

Challenges remain for the DoD IC and ICP despite successes to date and many promises of better IC cooperation and support to customers in the future. These challenges face not only the professionals in the DJIOC who are responsible for this on a daily basis, but also the entire DoD IC. First, an increase in planning requirements coupled with limited resources and service parochialism regarding control of their assets has created command and control and execution issues. Second, interagency participation is virtually non-existent and when combined with the constantly evolving nature of planning and lack of planners to do it, ICPs lack completeness. Last, planner comfort with a new concept as part of the JOPP, coupled with no joint institutional training and education center to equip the force mentally to meet ICP demands, exacerbates the challenge to full implementation.\textsuperscript{105}

To mitigate the challenges faced during transformation to ICP, the Joint Staff, J2 has published an ICP Procedural guide. The procedural guide establishes a good start point and adequately serves as a base for dynamic intelligence estimates, required intelligence operations to support each phase, and mission analysis for intelligence tasks. For the Army to embrace ICP and its full promise of operationalizing intelligence and synchronizing the DoD IC efforts, the draft implementing instructions provide some insight. In essence, they serve as a checklist for...

\textsuperscript{104} Email exchange with author, 25 October 2006
\textsuperscript{105} Sources for entire paragraph: Defense JIOC Update Brief regarding RDI, 18 April 2006, slide 7, and a brief prepared by Mr. Scott Reynolds, Director, Plans and Exercises, DJIOC, titled \textit{Intelligence Planning – Novel Approaches}
current ICP content, mission analysis for intelligence collection tasks and requirements, and drive the IC towards the desired “revolution in military intelligence operations.”

Despite these challenges, the future of ICP is promising. DJIOC personnel, in conjunction with the rest of the defense IC, have established a way ahead to address challenges they face. Most important to short term remedies are more service, joint, and interagency involvement and staffing. This signal for increased synergy across the defense IC is one the Army intelligence corps should recognize. Though the Army’s role in ICP is not well studied and currently underrepresented, there is inherent benefit to Army intelligence planners assisting in DJIOC ICP efforts and even if in support of COCOM OPLANs. Indeed, another window of opportunity prior to the December 31, 2007 deadline for JIOC FOC exists for the Army to take advantage of. However, if the Army is to accomplish this in support of the DoD IC and DJIOC efforts to synchronize, integrate, and operationalize intelligence, the Army intelligence corps must understand the degree to which it is prepared to institutionalize the concept into its operations, and the degree to which it can fully participate as a member of the IC given current operations. In short, a DOTMLPF analysis is required.

GRASPING THE OPPORTUNITY: ANALYSIS OF THE ARMY’S POSTURE TO SUPPORT ICP

“Army transformation is more than materiel solutions. Adaptive and determined leadership, innovative concept development and experimentation, and lessons learned from recent operations produce corresponding changes to doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current capabilities and managing change. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. Change deliberately executed

106 Joint Staff J2 Procedural Guide to Intelligence Campaign Planning, Working Draft
108 Telephonic interview with Mr. Van Garraghty, Intelligence Concept Developer, GG-14, JFCOM J29, October 23, 2006.
For the United States Army to fully embrace the benefits of ICP and participate more in the DoD IC, it must assess its current capability to do so. Only through understanding the current status can the organization engage in the cycle of adaptation, innovation, and experimentation with new and emerging concepts that envision better intelligence to commanders and decision makers. Emerging concepts regarding ISR Synchronization like ICP require full DoD IC participation, and the Army’s ability to plug into that process is critical if ground intelligence requirements and capabilities are to be addressed. As the Army fights a global war, any efforts to change current Army practices must be analyzed against the Army Plan, and assessed against tenets of the Army Modernization Plan (AMP). The AMP is published annually and serves as a “report on the Army’s efforts to support our Soldiers and maintain current readiness, while developing and fielding improved capabilities for tomorrow.”110 The AMP describes Army modernization across the entire DOTMLPF with an annex for each area. Though no specific criteria are established common to all areas of DOTMLPF, analysis of each DOTMLPF area reveals certain credible criteria useable in an analysis of Army transformation and modernization. Because the criteria are taken from the AMP, which is nested with the Army Plan, and Strategic Management System, they have validity in analyzing the Army’s posture to integrate into the ICP process. These criteria serve as a basis to analyze current capabilities to establish a way forward in modernization and transformation.

For the Army and its supporting role in ICP, doctrine, organization, training, and personnel (DOTP) are critically important. Analysis in these four areas allows the Army to assess

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109 FM 1, June 2005, paragraph 4-11.
110 2006 Army Modernization Plan, Melcher David F., LTG(USA), March 2006.
how it integrates into the DoD IC and prepares the right personnel to execute required missions.\textsuperscript{111} Adding to the analysis, utilizing each AMP DOTP criteria allows for an understanding of the sufficiency and efficiency of Army intelligence DOTP issues with respect to ICP. Sufficiency is accomplishing defined or required objectives, according to the required or defined conditions, and conforming to the right time, place, quantity, quality and cost.\textsuperscript{112} Sufficiency speaks to whether Army intelligence DOTP can meet the requirements of ICP given current conditions.\textsuperscript{113} Efficiency is a term denoting the relationship between outputs and inputs that requires generating higher outputs as related to inputs. The essence of efficiency is enhancing productivity and optimal use of resources.\textsuperscript{114} For the Army and ICP, this means assessing whether the Army is allocating enough resources for the proposed benefits of ICP at the DoD IC level. Analyzing the criteria evident from the AMP, which vary for each DOTP, juxtaposed with current Army intelligence capabilities across DOTP, shows shortcomings in doctrine, training, and personnel not offset by organizational success achieved through transformation to the modular force.

**Doctrine**

The joint and Army definition of doctrine is the same; fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.\textsuperscript{115} Doctrine serves the Army as a repository of

\textsuperscript{111} Materiel, Leadership and education, and Facilities (MLF) are relevant to the overall problem, but the Army is not required to fund or resource any material or facilities to execute DoD IC ICP and as a supporting player its role in leader education is limited to follow and support the DoD IC.

\textsuperscript{112} \url{http://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/Sufficiency-477.htm}

\textsuperscript{113} For the purposes of this analysis the current conditions mean what is published and approved for doctrine and organizational structures, and does not include any new material which may be ongoing.

\textsuperscript{114} \url{http://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/Efficiency-473.htm}

\textsuperscript{115} JP 1.02 and FM 1-02
the abstract knowledge the force uses to conceptualize its mission. To be fair, it is inconceivable Army intelligence doctrine could match the proposed emerging concepts and ideas of ICP because the concept is so fresh.\textsuperscript{116} However, the Army intelligence community should be planning in parallel with our joint partners, ensuring our current and emerging doctrine is nested with joint transformation initiatives.

As such, an evaluation of current Army intelligence doctrine and its ability to guide the role Army intelligence plays in the DoD IC and as part of ICP is pertinent. Since ICP happens at the joint and DoD level, there are three Army intelligence doctrine manuals relevant to the analysis. FM 2-0, \textit{Intelligence}, is the capstone Army intelligence manual that outlines fundamentals of intelligence operations, roles and functions Army intelligence plays in the strategic environment, and the role intelligence plays in the context of Army operations. FM 34-37, \textit{Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Operations} is the manual that describes how Army intelligence is trained, equipped, and organized to fight at the operational level in support of theater commander’s and COCOMs. Finally, FM 34-2, \textit{Collection Management and Synchronization Planning}, describes collection management processes in corps and below units and how ISR is synchronized to support maneuver. If these formally published doctrinal manuals are still valid, they must pass four criteria established in the 2006 AMP; be timely (no more than 5 year shelf life); standardize principles, terms, symbols, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); serve as a basis for training; and be operational, “concisely expressing how Army forces contribute to unified action in joint campaigns.”\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{116} See TRADOC Regulation 25-36, Chapter 3-3(a), pg. 17, and Chapter 3-6, pg. 19. Commonly referred to as “doctrine lag”, this is the time and intellectual "distance" between the point where ideas first appear as "concepts" from Future Concept organizations and Integrated Concept Teams, and the point in time when they appear as part of DOTMLPF products. Though “timely” is listed in TRADOC regulations and the AMP, only the AMP assigns a definitive time stamp to the production; every 5 years.

\textsuperscript{117} 2006 Army Modernization Plan, Annex A, Doctrine, pg A-1. Annex A of the AMP says “to be effective, Doctrine must be well known, accurate, acceptable, and commonly
Based on these criteria, current Army intelligence is ill postured to prepare the Army for inclusion in the ICP process because it is particularly outdated. FM 34-37 is particularly deficient. Published in January 1991, the document is more than sixteen years old and describes many organizational structures and capabilities equally as outdated. An example of its age is most readily seen in its constant references to supporting the old Army doctrine AirLand Battle. Despite this, it remains listed as current doctrine in the Army’s digital doctrine library. FM 34-2, published in 1994, is slightly newer yet still outdated. Though it contains enduring elements associated with requirements, assets, and collection management, and ISR Synchronization techniques, it does not include modern technologies and intelligence collection architectures relevant to today’s force. On the contrary, FM 2-0, Intelligence, published in May 2004, addresses the COE and provides a current snapshot of intelligence capabilities and planning considerations though lacking in the mention of ICP related concepts.\textsuperscript{118}  

Army intelligence doctrine relative to ICP is also severely lacking in ability to standardize principles, terms, symbols, and TTP. Though due to being outdated, FM 34-37 describes terms and employment of IEW assets no longer recognized. It references employing IEW assets in an economy of force role when in today’s COE the Army employs every capability it has to eliminate intelligence gaps.\textsuperscript{119}  FM 34-37 also pays little attention to the role ongoing intelligence estimates play as a predicate to planning. This deficiency is notable because the manual focuses on theater Army intelligence operations that integrate into joint intelligence. It is also especially weak in light of ICP concept requirements for dynamic estimates fed by

\textsuperscript{118} FM 2-0, FM 34-37, and FM 34-2.  
\textsuperscript{119} FM 34-37, Chapter 1.
synchronized DoD IC planning efforts. FM 34-2 does slightly better, especially in the description of the collection management process. Creating priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and their associated specific information requirements (SIR) and special orders and requests (SOR) form the nucleus of planning what information is required, by whom, when, and how reported.\textsuperscript{120} Those principles are enduring, but the manual is particularly weak though in describing how the Army plays into the DoD IC ISR Synchronization schedule, preferring to articulate other joint assets and capabilities vice a descriptive understanding of the joint process.\textsuperscript{121} Last, FM 2-0 is a newer document nested within the joint doctrinal hierarchy with Joint Publication 2-0 and is useful in utilizing modern terms, symbols, and TTP. Written after the onset of OEF and OIF, it recognizes the twenty-first century COE and is more useful.

These formally published, current doctrinal manuals have little value for training in the Army’s role in ICP. Because they are outdated and do not represent current concepts for employing Army intelligence assets, FM 34-37 and FM 34-2 are not relevant to training Army professionals in ICP because they include terminology, organizational structures, and intelligence capabilities not relevant to modern intelligence operations. Because ICP is so new they obviously do not contain references to it or the JIOC, but they do not even contain any elements of how the Army integrates with other DoD IC agencies, synchronizes its requirements and capabilities sin the joint fight, or plans for Army intelligence operations in full spectrum conflict. Statements in Chapter 5 of FM 34-2 reinforce stove piped collection and analysis, lack of HI and the flat nature of modern intelligence networks, and the lack of a standard collection management organization or plan at existing joint commands illustrate its uselessness.\textsuperscript{122} Though newer, FM 2-0 is better

\textsuperscript{120} FM 34-2, Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{121} The Army’s replacement for FM 34-2, FMI 2-01 is scheduled for release in the summer of 2007 in a draft form for comments from the field. It is unknown whether this manual will address how the Army integrates into the DoD IC in ISR Synchronization and specifically ICP processes.

\textsuperscript{122} FM 34-2, Chapter 5.
characterized as a capstone manual that addresses the entire intelligence purpose in support of a force and the associated processes, than a specific manual regarding TTP applicable for modern ISR Synchronization. Its terms, symbols and doctrinal processes are the same as joint terminology and theories of intelligence operations, and in that regard it facilitates a holistic understanding of intelligence. Chapter 2 of FM 2-0 has a solid description of the joint intelligence staff process though it also fails to address processes that synchronize the entire DoD IC.

The three current manuals applicable to the Army’s role in ICP do not concisely express how Army forces contribute to unified action in joint campaigns. Chapter 1 of FM 34-37 only addresses operational Army intelligence and its role in theater missions as being an information conduit and force provider, vice an operational headquarters that can plan, synchronize, and integrate multi-functional assets into the DoD IC and theater plan. Though the enduring quality of the document is resident in statements like “military intelligence brigades must be prepared to provide Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) support to joint and combined commands”, its deficiencies related to modern JIOC organizational structures and lack of attention to planning intelligence operations at that level are noteworthy.123 FM 34-2 is also notably weak, allocating only one paragraph in Chapter 1 to collection management in joint operations and does not include any specifics for how the Army intelligence force contributes to joint efforts. On the contrary, FM 2-0 addresses joint intelligence operations significantly in chapter 2, describing joint intelligence operations architecture and agencies. Though newer and more relevant to today’s COE, FM 2-0 is notably absent of specific ISR Synchronization TTP associated with the ICP concept and its parent headquarters, the JIOC.

Because only FM 2-0 passes the criteria extrapolated from the 2006 AMP to analyze doctrinal sufficiency and efficiency, Army intelligence is doctrinally unprepared to integrate into

123 FM 34-37, Chapters 1 and 3.
the ICP process. Most notable is the Army’s doctrinal void in how it conducts intelligence operations in support of theater and joint requirements, and particularly how it integrates into the DoD IC and ISR Synchronization process. This lack of doctrinal sufficiency is noteworthy and important because doctrine forms the basis for training our intelligence professionals. Failing to train our senior intelligence leaders poorly does not provide them the requisite skills to understand, influence, and participate in the DoD IC fight, and its emerging concepts of JIOC and ICP. The inadequacy of the doctrine is also noteworthy for it begs the question whether the output – a trained Army intelligence professional – is capable of integrating Army intelligence operations and requirements into joint and DoD IC intelligence operations. If not, the efficiency of the doctrine current used is lacking. As intelligence must be joint, inter-agency, and multinational to counter twenty-first century threats, this is a risk we need not take. In the past, the Army has relied extensively on the joint intelligence training community to fill this void, but they are likely not resident experts in the capabilities Army intelligence brings to the DoD IC. Failure to recognize this will result in not allocating appropriate resources in personnel to joint intelligence billets where the requirements and capabilities of the ground force can be articulated and included during the planning phase.

**Organization**

The 2006 AMP is less descriptive with respect to criteria for judging organizational sufficiency and efficiency. It does, however, recognize two fundamental aspects of Army organizations; that they provide the joint force rapid expeditionary capabilities, and that they sustain land campaigns across the spectrum of conflict.\(^{124}\) Though this speaks to a robust tactical force capable of sustained operations, the AMP does elaborate on the requirement to balance expeditionary general-purpose forces with sanctuary operations that support and enable the

\(^{124}\) 2006 AMP, Annex B, Organizations, B-1.
deploying general-purpose forces; “strategic and operational requirements compel the Army to reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with staying power, durability and adaptability.”

The staying power, durability and adaptability for the Army intelligence corps are found in its INSCOM TIBs and center of excellence brigades. These organizations link the strategic to the tactical for Army intelligence, and form the nucleus of the reach capability characteristic of modern, flattened networks.

Based on the organizational goal description listed in the 2006 AMP, there are three aspects to consider with respect to the Army’s operational intelligence force and ICP. First, it is important to determine how well has the Army organized intelligence organizations to support theater commands and COCOMs. Second, analysis of how well has the Army organized its TIBs to provide theater intelligence support speaks to an ability to do the intelligence mission for the supported commander. And last, understanding the resident plans capability in each TIB and center of excellence brigade provides insight into how well Army intelligence is postured to integrate into the ICP process. Analyzing these three pertinent questions with respect to staying power, durability, and adaptability shows the degree to which Army intelligence has successfully structured itself for integration into the ICP process.

Joint and Army doctrine does not list any definitions for staying power, durability, or adaptability but open source definitions exist that are useful for this analysis. Staying power denotes enduring strength and stamina, and in the case of the Army and ICP can be surmised to represent the ability of an organization to permanently entrench itself in a theater of operations and develop expertise pertinent to regional combatant commander’s at any level the TIB supports. Durability denotes an ability to perform over a long period of time without decay.

For the Army and ICP this speaks to whether the organization is structured with multi-functional

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126 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/staying+power
127 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/durability
intelligence that can nest with other theater and national specific capabilities. Last, adaptability can be defined as a degree of flexibility that allows for changing to meet different requirements. For the Army and ICP this is directly related to the ability of an organization to tailor assets to required missions.

The Army’s transformation to the modular force, which resulted in reallocation of intelligence assets across organizations and levels of command, has postured the Army very well organizationally to play a supporting role in ICP. First, the Army intelligence corps provides staying power and durability to regional COCOMs by posturing large organizations to support theater, joint, national, and COCOM operations. TIBs and the other INCOM brigades provide adequate structure to meet existing and emerging warfighter intelligence requirements. They provide the links for tactical and operational warfighting requirements with joint & national intelligence capabilities. Regionally located, TIBs are OPCON to the ASCC and the first echelon with a regional focus, providing sustained global situational awareness to enable rapid force deployment and employment. This speaks very well for their staying power in a regional area of responsibility and to their durability to answer commander’s priority intelligence requirements. Additionally, at the strategic level, Army center of excellence brigades provide Army resources and capabilities to the national intelligence fight, and provide a critical link for the Army’s tactical echelon to interface with national agencies. These organizations provide essential interface between national capabilities and tactical requirements.

Second, the organizational structures of the TIBs were synchronized to ensure the same capabilities were resident in each theater while also tailoring structure to theater needs and available resources. The core components of each TIB were synchronized under transformation to the modular force. Doing so not only placed multi-functional capabilities in each theater, but it

128 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/adaptability
129 TIB design capabilities as briefed to the DA G3 at MI Corps Functional Area Assessment (FAA) brief in the Pentagon, DA G2 Conference Room, March 2005.
increased the staying power and durability of those organizations by nesting it with national capabilities. For example, each regional signals intelligence battalion works in partnership with regional NSA representatives and organizations to ensure cohesion of effort on critical problems. As figure 9 on the next page shows, the objective design ensured like capabilities in each theater, with modifications due to theater specific requirements, resources, and stationing concerns.130

Last, the internal plans shop organizations of each TIB and Army center of excellence brigade are not planned for and resourced with spaces in the force design process that allow for integration into the COCOM ICP process. Where success is evident in aligning the TIBs and EAC Brigades to Army, joint, and national requirements, it is not evident in authorizing these units their requisite plans capability. The internal configuration of the plans shop in each brigade to participate in ICP is severely lacking as no TIB is documented under the objective design of the modular force to have a plans shop or dedicated plans officer.131 Additionally, no TIB or EAC Brigade approved Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) for FY 08 addresses assignment of a plans officer or plans shop, and no Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) adds the functionality to the organizations.132 That said, this functionality is often included in the operations side of the organization vice the command and control headquarters. However, that is not the case here. No INSCOM brigade MTOE or TDA addresses inclusion of a plans officer within its operations hierarchy either.133 This does not suggest INSCOM capabilities are not planned for though. They may be performed at the ASCC staff level, which the TIB is OPCON

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130 Defreitas, December 12, 2006.
131 TIB Objective Table of Equipment (OTOE) the author utilized while serving on FA 16 Task Force January – May 2005.
132 Analysis of available MTOE data in WEBTAADS, retrieved from https:\webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/usafrica.
133 Analysis of available MTOE data in WEBTAADS, retrieved from https:\webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/usafrica.
to, but the lack of personnel spaces dedicated to planning within INSCOM as a whole suggests a lack of readiness to integrate into ICP. It also implies a less than efficient organizational construct, inability to articulate the right skill sets needed to plan intelligence operations, a potentially operations heavy cultural mindset, and a potential inability to understand the Army role in ICP and in particular inclusion into a CISP and NISP. Without a dedicated plans capability the adaptability of each TIB to meet theater requirements and war plans is in question.

134 An example of a modification is most easily seen in the reallocation of Aerial Exploitation (AE) battalions, and proves an element of adaptability in the execution of the organizational design. Some AE battalions moved from corps intelligence brigades to join INSCOM TIBs, while some current TIBs, most notably the 500th MI Brigade in Hawaii, are not allocated an AE battalion. The TIB provides the multi-functional intelligence capability in a regional AOR needed to meet our intelligence requirements despite it lacking of planning capability. This is particularly noteworthy in the stationing decisions to leave the 204th MI BN (AE) at Fort Bliss instead of co-locating it with its parent headquarters, the 470th MI Bde in San Antonio, Texas, the re structuring of 224th MI BN (AE) at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, from XVII Airborne Corps to INSCOM.
Since the intelligence fight must be conducted in the joint, interagency, and multi-national realm this is a significant deficiency in Army intelligence integration into the DoD IC and ICP.

Based on this analysis, Army intelligence TIBs and other INSCOM brigade headquarters are prepared to meet the requirements of ICP. In other words, they have sufficiently organized to meet mission requirements, the exception being the lack of a resourced and planned for plans capability in each organization. Modular force design of Army EAC intelligence assets is also extremely efficient, optimizing limited intelligence resources through allocating like capabilities to each theater while reserving extremely low density capabilities resident in such units like the AE battalions. The only glaring deficiency in the Army’s ability to meet the requirements of ICP is not having a dedicated and resourced plans capability to ensure nesting or Army intelligence requirements and capabilities into each COCOM ICP process.

**Training**

The 2006 AMP does not provide specific criteria from which to assess current Army intelligence capability to train ICP functions. It does, however, provide guidance relative to the Army’s mission common to all elements of the Army force. Specifically, the AMP says the Army “must provide trained and ready land forces to the designated Joint Force commanders to fight and win our nation’s wars.”\(^{135}\) Though this seems an obvious restating of part of title X Army requirements, it goes to the core of the issue with respect to the Army’s ability to train intelligence professionals to support the Joint Force commander.\(^{136}\) The AMP expands upon this,


\(^{136}\) In accordance with U.S.C. 10 (title 10), subtitle B, Part 1, Chapter 307, section 3062, “(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; (2) supporting the national policies; (3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of
stating the end state of Army training is “leaders…fully prepared to effectively and efficiently function within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team wherever required…” This is tremendously difficult to assess, as investigating the joint training level of every intelligence officer in the Army is not a preferred nor efficient method.

What can be assessed, however, is whether the Army currently addresses joint intelligence operations in its training of intelligence leaders, and what resources exist at the joint level for the Army to capitalize on. Currently, all training courses for intelligence officers conducted at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) have joint portions of their curriculum. What they lack, however, is detailed description of how ISR Synchronization comes together at the joint and DoD level, and what role the Army plays in that process. Specifically, the G2/ACE Chief course, a prerequisite for all selected division G2s, and the MI Pre-Command Course for all centrally selected lieutenant colonels, only include broad overviews of systems capabilities. Though it is imperative intelligence professionals know a systems limitations, the real problem is how to synchronize all the assets against required information requirements to support the commander. This is called collection management in current Army doctrine, and ISR Synchronization in joint and future Army doctrine, and it is not trained in these senior level courses. The DoD planning for this is ICP, and fundamental principles that could be expanded to help Army intelligence officers understand ICP and integrate Army capabilities are not taught.

However, there is a solution for the Army in the training arena for ICP that only requires money and time. As already identified, if good doctrine is a requirement to train, the Army is ill


prepared. How to do ICP and the associated training to certify personnel is a joint requirement tasked to the DIA. As one of the DoD IC agencies participating in and integrating capabilities and requirements into ICP, the Army must identify the right personnel to receive the training and fill joint billets as a representative of Army intelligence. Generally, the Army currently does not do very well with intelligence synchronization in its own tactical intelligence operations, let alone planning joint intelligence operations.\textsuperscript{139} As an executor of tactical intelligence operations in support of ground operations, the Army does not have a mandate to establish training on ICP and can leverage joint established courses. Currently, the United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) only teaches collection management as a component of its officer education courses and it is heavily focused on tactical level operations.\textsuperscript{140} That has served generations of tactical intelligence warriors well but fails to provide the critical link to the operational art resident in the ICP concept.

The Army intelligence corps can address ICP training requirements through continued utilization of DIA and Joint establishments. Leveraging the course availability and education infrastructure resident in the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center at DIA, which currently teaches a well-respected Collection Management course and is developing an ICP course currently, or the cadre of professional intelligence trainers at the JFCOM Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility (RJITF) is an appropriate course of action.\textsuperscript{141} JFCOM has addressed the need for ICP with planned experimentation, but they are also leading the way in joint intelligence transformation by establishing the Joint Transformation Command – Intelligence (JTC-I) that has purview over the RJITF.\textsuperscript{142} Recognition of the need to participate in

\textsuperscript{139} Fast, December 12, 2006.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, authors personal experience while serving at USAICS from May 2003 until June 2005, and \url{http://icon.army.mil}, accessed February 15, 2007.
\textsuperscript{141} \url{www.dia.smil.mil}
\textsuperscript{142} \url{http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jtci.htm}
ICP will lead to understanding the value these institutions will provide to intelligence campaign planners.

Despite insufficient training resident within the Army intelligence training system to prepare senior intelligence leaders to integrate into the ICP process, there is a solid joint system to tap into. Though it is inefficient to send intelligence leaders to joint intelligence training facilities because the expertise to teach ICP does not coincide with already prescribed Army training (e.g. MICCC, G2/ACE, Brigade S2, MI PCC), the cost to the Army for investing in this training would only be time away from an operational headquarters, and money to send the right personnel to the training. This potentially small cost could result in tremendous benefits for the Army in building a cadre of intelligence leaders who know how to do ICP.

**Personnel**

The 2006 AMP does not provide any relevant criteria for an analysis of the Army’s current capability to integrate into the ICP process. However, common lexicon exists in the force design and force resourcing processes reticent in today’s Army to facilitate a thorough analysis. The determination of how many personnel, with what required skills for the Army to participate in ICP need focus on two areas; quantity and quality. Quantity can be further refined to include numbers of spaces and faces to fulfill requirements. A space is a common Army force design term that refers to requirements; the allocation of an approved billet to an organization in the design process. A face is different altogether, referring to actual human resources on hand to fulfill the authorized slot. The two rarely align, and are often confused in the force design process and resourcing strategies adopted by organizations. For this analysis, however, identifying numbers of trained personnel by name is not as important as identifying the right skill sets or qualities required to fill those spaces. The faces to assign to potentially authorized spaces can be easily determined because automated personnel databases contain the names of officers who’ll possess the required additional skill identifiers are areas of expertise. Hence, quality can
simply be defined as a distinguishing characteristic or skill required for ICP production and integration.

Because the transformation of the DoD IC is ongoing, the required quantity of spaces is known. The Army is currently authorized 241 times less billets than the United States Navy and 276 times less billets than the United States Air Force in DJIOC and JIOC manning proposals. Additionally, the United States Army does not occupy those billets until the fifth iteration of manning these organizations. To determine whether this is the correct quantity is difficult as roles and responsibilities are not fully known, and personnel manning documents for JIOC and its Plans and Exercises cells who conduct ICP are not fully established. But it does speak to the Army’s lack of understanding and commitment to the DoD IC ICP process. Lack of Army intelligence personnel in key joint and DoD IC billets could mean less emphasis on ground intelligence requirements and integration of ground intelligence capabilities. Based on lessons learned from cultural misunderstandings and lack of thorough ground IPB during OIF, it is highly doubtful this is an acceptable risk to take. Acknowledging the Army intelligence corps is decisively engaged in the GWOT, OIF, and OEF, the lack of dedicated personnel to the DJIOC, JIOC, and ICP production indicate an unwillingness or misunderstanding about ICP and the Army’s role in the DoD IC. Army intelligence owns the tactical fight in these conflicts, but must address its current resource availability and cultural conscience that prohibits it from full DoD IC integration.

The required skills, or qualities, necessary in Army intelligence professionals to conduct ICP, is another challenge altogether. Because the ICP concept is so new, and the Army has not

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143 https://esnet.itiss.osd.smil.mil/ousd_i/rdi.nsf. Actual number of each service billets classified secret. Dividing the authorized Navy and Air Force spaces by the authorized Army spaces to give a number to show relationship derived the numbers in the text.

authorized INSCOM MTOEs or TDAs with plans capabilities and requisite additional skill identifiers, the best evidence for this requirement is gained through traditional Army identification of planners. First, traditionally, and anecdotally, Army campaign planners are usually either graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) or officers assigned to Functional Area 59, Strategic Plans & Policy. This is obviously not always true in every situation, but it provides some insight into requisite qualities Army intelligence should seek in identifying its personnel to serve in roles supporting the ICP process. So as to not wish away the problem, however, it is critical to identify what specifically is required.

With personnel resources at a shortage to implement ICP within the DoD IC, the intelligence establishment is turning to contractors to fill the void. Assessing current contract job openings offer a degree of understanding (see Appendix 3). Generally, the required qualifications mirror that of an experienced field grade officer. Consistent requirements across three current ICP related job openings include; 6-7 years experience in intelligence related field; bachelors or master’s degree; ability to maintain top secret/sensitive compartmentalized intelligence (TS/SCI) clearance; knowledge of the DoD IC, national IC, JIOC, or ICP; military experience; or be a graduate of SAMS.145 This analysis begs the question of whether the Army has the right quantity of personnel to integrate into the ICP process, and if a utilization policy of officers with these skills acknowledges the potential role TIBs and center of excellence brigades could have in ICP.

Unfortunately, none of that exists. The quantity of field grade officers with the required skills is small, and the problem is exacerbated by the annual retirement of over 50 lieutenant colonels as they reach twenty years of service.146 There is no policy regarding employment of Army intelligence officers in joint, CSA, DJIOC, COCOM, or COCOM JIOC assignments.

145 Complied from 3 sources; DIA job posting in December 2006 for a intelligence campaign planner, GG-14, with experience as listed; and 2 sources referenced in Appendix 3, accessed in January 2007.
146 Based on empirical evidence while author served as aide to commanding general, USAICS. Requests for verification from MI Branch, HRC, unanswered.
Generally, joint assignments are not enthusiastically sought after nor filled by Army intelligence. The focus from military intelligence branch remains filling tactical level assignments. Additionally, no specific policy exists for the utilization of military intelligence officers who graduated from SAMS, and never has an Army intelligence officer who graduated from SAMS been assigned to INSCOM for a tier one or tier two utilization tour. This oversight shows a potential misunderstanding at the Army staff level of how INSCOM assets and capabilities need to be planned for and integrated into the joint intelligence fight, linking tactical to national intelligence operations, and also suggests Army intelligence leaders are not getting full utilization from specially trained intelligence officers who complete the SAMS curriculum.

In conclusion, the Army is not well postured with the right quantity and quality of personnel to play a supporting role in ICP. The Army intelligence corps does not have sufficient personnel resources to integrate into ICP nor does it have adequate and efficient utilization policies to meet these requirements. Though resourcing JIOC required spaces with Army intelligence officers trained in ICP is paramount if the DoD IC is to understand the ground force commanders requirements during the planning phase, it appears the available numbers and skill sets are not known, tracked or appreciated.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, ICP has come a long way from its inception in the RDI initiative. Army intelligence has undergone its own transformation yet remains unconnected to the ICP modernization ongoing within the DoD IC. As a member of the DoD IC, Army intelligence must play a supporting role to ensure Army requirements and capabilities are synchronized into the planning for ISR operations. Because intelligence remains a critical enabler of our operational Army, proving its value daily in the GWOT, the Army’s ability to synchronize with the rest of the
DoD IC is paramount. Only through full spectrum, multi-functional intelligence can the DoD gain a true appreciation for threats to our national security.

However, the Army has not adequately participated in current ICP efforts and is not postured to do so in the future to the necessary degree. As joint transformation continues, the Army intelligence corps cannot miss another opportunity to join the fight to synchronize defense intelligence, and could possibly learn new doctrine for its own ISR Synchronization challenges. Full ICP implementation includes amending current COCOM OPLANs to ensure ISR Synchronization, and programmed testing and evaluation at JFCOM. These actions to implement ICP within the DoD IC remain a central element of joint intelligence transformation and the DoD IC revolution in intelligence affairs. To match this paradigm shift by the DoD IC, Army intelligence must embrace its own revolution, changing doctrine, organization, training, and personnel utilization to ensure Army ISR operations are nested with and support the DoD IC, and are planned for utilizing the ICP methodology.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Army intelligence transformation is well underway with approved initiatives, responsible agencies, and lines of operations to track key decision points. Additional initiatives must be integrated within the current construct even as ICP institutionalization will require additional work. For the Army intelligence corps to integrate into the DoD IC ICP effort, posture itself better for the future, and not miss another opportunity to integrate within the joint intelligence community, the following recommendations are germane.

First, two doctrinal fixes are recommended. The first is a complete overhaul of Army intelligence doctrine is required to ensure it adequately addresses how the Army integrates into the larger DoD IC and national IC. Even though its is chartered to perform tactical intelligence, it is imperative Army intelligence professionals know the role of INSCOM TIBs and Army centers
of excellence brigades, and how their efforts to plan operations in support of COCOM OPLANs helps tactical echelon units. FMI 2-01, due to be released for comment in the summer 2007, must include a chapter on how the Army plays a supporting role in DoD IC operations, to include ICP, and how the Army operates at the theater level. FMI 2-01, as the replacement for the outdated FM 34-2, must include more than how ISR Synchronization occurs in our tactical formations, as modern intelligence is joint and passed on a flattened architecture which brings unprecedented access to national information.

Second, force modernization experts at USAICS, in concert with INSCOM, DA G2, and DA G3/5/7 (Force Modernization), need to design an appropriate plans shop for INSCOM Headquarters, each TIB, and each center of excellence brigade. Planning for these spaces should include authorization of a tier 1 AMSP graduate or functional area 59 officers, if they possess an intelligence background, to each TIB (5 spaces). This authorization would facilitate the TIBs planning with higher ASCC and COCOM, and also help link ISR Synchronization with lower, tactical echelon units to ensure no gaps in coverage. Additionally, spaces for tier 2 AMSP graduates should be authorized in INSCOM headquarters and each center of excellence brigade (6 spaces). These strategic assets play critical enabling roles to NSA, NGA, NRO, and DIA, and

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147 From AR 614-100, January 10, 2006, Chapter 5-4(h)(1). “b. A two-tier distribution plan for the AMSP graduating class and former graduates remains in effect. Tier I is the annual distribution of the AMSP graduating class, minus those graduating AMSP students who are lieutenant colonels. Any AMSP graduating lieutenant colonels will be assigned to Tier II position. Tier II is the formalized plan for the reutilization of the graduates of AMSP and AOASF. c. Tier I distribution is the first assignment after graduation for AMSP students and is phase III of their education process. Tier I utilization tours will be as a staff plans officer at UExs, corps/division headquarters (to include EUSA) with priority of fill in order to committed, forward-deployed, contingency, and reinforcing units. Functional Area 59 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Officers’ Tier I assignments should be to corps or Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Headquarters. Special Forces officers are assigned to Special Operations Command (SOC) at forward-deployed units based on the officers’ regional orientation. When applicable, adjustments to distribution will be coordinated through FORSCOM, USAREUR, and EUSA to cover distribution of shortages and SOC positions. d. Subsequent assignments for AMSP graduates (Tier II) will be to operational/strategic planning, joint positions, doctrine writing, or positions that sustain currency/development in the officer’s branch or functional area. HRC will maintain a minimum number of AMSP and AOASF graduates in selected operational or theater level headquarters as directed by CSA policy.”
should be resourced to ensure integration of Army ground intelligence capabilities and requirements. Allocation of trained plans officers who understand not only the Army’s role in tactical intelligence but the larger DoD and national IC can ensure Army capabilities and requirements are addressed in ICP as part of COCOM OPLAN production.

Third, Army intelligence leaders must readdress how they train field grade officers in joint operations, ISR synchronization, and specifically the required training needed to conduct ICP. Current field grade courses offered at Fort Huachuca and the USAICS only address agencies and their capabilities they bring to the fight, and are particularly lacking in addressing how the Army plays a role in DoD IC synchronization. This renewed effort on training intelligence synchronization must be accompanied by the requisite doctrinal recommendations made already since training must be accomplished from relevant doctrine. Current collection management doctrine adequately focuses on tactical intelligence operations to the detriment of how the Army fits into the larger DoD IC collection operations. Though USAICS is the home for all Army intelligence officers, this education should done in concert with currently available courses or projected courses at the DIA JMITC and National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), or JFCOMs RJITF. USAICS should coordinated all joint intelligence training with TRADOC, JFCOM, and DIA and utilize the resources and expertise resident in those organizations.

Fourth, in support of the second recommendation, senior Army intelligence leaders need to adequately publish guidance for the proper utilization of Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) trained intelligence officers and affect a change to AR 614-100 that allows for utilization of AMSP intelligence officers at INSCOM assignments. AMSP trained intelligence officers possess potential for influencing ICP to the Army’s benefit elsewhere than assignment to divisions and corps. As such, Army intelligence leaders should address increasing participation in AMSP by validating its worth to the field Army, and also by changing where AMSP intelligence graduates are utilized both in tier 1 and tier 2 utilization tours. Validating the
requirement for AMSP graduates at each TIB and center of excellence brigade may increase interest in AMSP by intelligence officers and subsequently increase knowledge of ICP and planning in the operational Army and the available pool of personnel to conduct it.

Last, the initiatives undertaken as part of FA 16, Actionable Intelligence, need to be maintained. Efforts by this task force since its inception have contributed enormously to the paradigm and culture shift evident in Army intelligence today. None of the previous recommendations should be done in lieu of resourcing this critical effort. Though they lack strength in integrating into all elements of DoD IC transformation embodied by the RDI initiative, FA 16 adequately addresses current issues facing our tactical echelon fighting forces in the GWOT both in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the lead action officers and integrators of the DA G2’s strategy for transformation, this office should undertake a study to ensure we are transforming in line with the DoD IC priorities, and not solely focused on the tactical fight we face in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Army intelligence remains myopic in its focus by directing all efforts to the current fight, resulting intelligence to COCOM and JTF commanders will resemble past criticisms levied on the DoD IC as stove piped and lacking synchronization, which are challenges addressed through ICP.
GLOSSARY

**analysis**-A process in the production of intelligence in which intelligence information is subjected to systematic examination in order to identify significant facts and derive conclusions. (also see Intelligence Cycle)

**assessment**-Appraisal of the worth of an intelligence activity, source, information, or product in terms of its contribution to a specific goal, or the credibility, reliability, pertinence, accuracy, and usefulness of information in terms of an intelligence need.

**basic intelligence**-Factual, fundamental, and relatively permanent information about all aspects of a nation—physical, social, economic, political, biographical, and cultural—which is used as a base for intelligence products in support of planning, policymaking, and military operations. (also see current intelligence, information, and intelligence)

**Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)**-The intelligence analysis and production component of the Department of State.

**Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**-An Intelligence Community agency established under the National Security Act for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of several US departments and agencies in the interest of national security. The CIA collects, produces, and disseminates foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; conducts counterintelligence activities abroad; collects, produces, and disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking; conducts special activities approved by the President; and conducts research, development, and procurement of technical systems and devices.

**classified information**-Official information that has been determined to require—in the interests of national security—protection against unauthorized disclosure and that has been so designated.

**classification**-The determination that official information requires—in the interest of national security—a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made; the designation is normally termed a security classification and includes CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. (also see declassification)

**COCOM**—a regional combatant command IAW the Unified Command Plan

**collection**-The exploitation of sources by collection agencies, and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. Also, obtaining information or intelligence information in any manner, including direct observations, liaison with official agencies, or solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources, or quantitative data from the test or operation of foreign systems. (also see intelligence cycle)

**collection needs**-An established intelligence need considered in the allocation of intelligence resources to fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs.

**Combat Support Agencies (CSA’s)**-the term “combat support agency” means any of the following Defense Agencies: The Defense Communications Agency; The Defense Intelligence Agency; The Defense Logistics Agency; The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Any other
Defense Agency designated as a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense which includes NSA, NRO as well. (U.S.C. 10(A)(B), Sec. 193).

**communications intelligence (COMINT)**-Information derived from the intercept of foreign communications by other than the intended recipients; it does not include the monitoring of foreign public media or the intercept of communications obtained during the course of counterintelligence investigations within the United States. COMINT includes the fields of traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, and direction finding, and is a part of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

**consumer**-An authorized person who uses intelligence or intelligence information directly in the decision making process or to produce other intelligence.

**coordination**-The process of seeking concurrence from one or more groups, organizations, or agencies regarding a proposal or an activity for which they share some responsibility and that may result in contributions, concurrences, or dissents. In intelligence production, the process by which producers gain the views of other producers on the adequacy of a specific draft assessment, estimate, or report. It is intended to increase a product's factual accuracy, clarify its judgments, and resolve or sharpen statements of disagreement on major contentious issues.

**counterterrorism**-Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a terrorist act, or the documented threat of such an act.

**critical intelligence**-Information of such urgent importance to the security of the United States that it is directly transmitted at the highest priority to the President and other national decision making officials before passing through regular evaluative channels. In the military it is intelligence that requires the immediate attention of the commander. It includes, but is not limited to: (a) strong indications of the imminent outbreak of hostilities of any type (warning of attack); (b) aggression of any nature against a friendly country; (c) indications or use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (targets); and (d) significant events within potential enemy countries that may lead to modifications of nuclear strike plans.

**current intelligence**-Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest to the users of intelligence: it may be disseminated without complete evaluation, interpretation, analysis, or integration.

**DCSINT: Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, also known as the Army G2 or DA G2**-principle staff advisor on all intelligence matters on the Department of the Army staff and Senior Army intelligence officer

**Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)**-An agency in the DoD responsible for satisfying the foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant Commands, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies. It is a provider of military intelligence for national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence products and is responsible for coordinating the intelligence activities of the military services and managing the Defense Attaché System.

**Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)**-Until the appointment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the DCI was the primary adviser to the President and National Security Council on national foreign intelligence. The DCI, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, was the head of the IC and responsible for the development and execution of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The DCI was also head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)- A directive issued by the DCI that outlines general policies and procedures to be followed by intelligence agencies and organizations that are under his direction or overview.

Director of National Intelligence (DNI)- Primary adviser to the President and National Security Council on national foreign intelligence, appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The DNI is head of the IC and responsible for the development and execution of the National Intelligence Program.

dissemination-The timely distribution of intelligence products (in oral, written, or graphic form) to departmental and agency intelligence consumers in a suitable form. (also see intelligence cycle) economic intelligence- Intelligence regarding foreign economic resources, activities, and policies including the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, labor, finance, taxation, commerce, trade, and other aspects of the international economic system.

Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A)- DCGS-A is an emerging MI system that will use IT to consolidate the capabilities found in all our current ground stations. It is the ISR fusion and processing system of systems for the Army's Future Force. (What is "DCGS-A"? Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, July-Sept, 2004 by Stephen J. Bond)

DOTMLPF- Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities – an established methodology to determine the impacts of transformational concepts on the joint force

electronic intelligence (ELINT)- Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign electromagnetic non-communications transmissions by other than the intended recipients.

evaluation-Appraisal of the worth of an intelligence activity, information, or product in terms of its contribution to a specific goal. An appraisal of the credibility, reliability, pertinence, accuracy, or usefulness of information in terms of an intelligence need. Information is appraised at several stages within the intelligence cycle. Also, a process in the production step of the intelligence cycle. (also see assessment, intelligence cycle)

finished intelligence- The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas, or national security issues. The end product of the production step of the intelligence cycle; the intelligence product.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court- The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court implements the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which authorizes electronic surveillance and un-consented physical searches occur inside the United States for the purpose of collecting "foreign intelligence." The Court is comprised of seven U.S. District court judges who are appointed to the FISA Court by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and who serve for seven years. The Court of Review consists of three U.S. District or Appeals court judges.

GEOINT- The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.

GWOT: Global War on Terror- the name given by the United States of America and its allies to an ongoing campaign with the stated goal of "ending international terrorism," launched in
direct response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.

**information assurance**—Information operations (IO) that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

**horizontal integration (HI)**—the processes and capabilities to acquire, synchronize, correlate and deliver National Security Community data with responsiveness to ensure success across all policy and operational missions (JFCOM ICP White Paper page 10). Consistent with USD(I) Policy “Horizontal Integration of Collected Theater Intelligence” dated February 10, 2004, HI is the integration of theater collected airborne, shipboard and ground intelligence data must be posted for discovery and access across the Global Information Grid in a timely manner.

**House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)**—principle subcommittee in the United States House of Representative with oversight responsibilities over the entire national IC.

**human intelligence (HUMINT)**—Intelligence information acquired by human sources through both covert and overt collection techniques.

**imagery intelligence (IMINT)**—The products of imagery and imagery interpretation processed for intelligence use.

**Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), United States Army**—a major Army command, conducts dominant intelligence, security and information operations for military commanders and national decision makers (www.inscom.army.mil/mission)

**ICP: Intelligence Campaign Planning**—one of five focus areas of the Remodeling Defense Intelligence initiative

**Intelligence Community (IC)**—The aggregate of the executive branch organizations and agencies involved in intelligence activities: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements of the military services; the U.S. Coast Guard; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Homeland security; the Department of Energy; and staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

**intelligence cycle**—The process by which information is acquired and converted into intelligence and made available to customers.

**intelligence estimate**—The product of estimative intelligence. (also see estimate) In military usage, an estimate of the situation is an appraisal of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the course of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the probable order of their adoption.

**Intelligence Information Report (IIR)**—Information collected by Department of Defense collectors, including military attaches, is transmitted as IIRs. These reports are used by analysts, usually together with other sources, to produce finished intelligence.

**intelligence needs**—Any subject-general or specific—in which there is a need for the collection of intelligence or the production of intelligence.
intelligence officer-A professional employee of an intelligence organization engaged in intelligence activities.

Intelligence Oversight Board-The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) was established by President Gerald Ford in 1976 as a White House entity with oversight responsibility for the legality and propriety of intelligence activities. The Board, which reports to the President, is charged primarily with preparing reports "of intelligence activities that the IOB believes may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or presidential directive." The Board may refer such reports to the Attorney General. This standard assists the President in ensuring that highly sensitive intelligence activities comply with law and presidential directive. In 1993, the IOB was made a standing committee of the PFIAB.

intelligence producer-A phrase usually used to refer to an organization or agency that participates in the production step of the intelligence cycle.

JIOC: Joint Intelligence Operations Center (also DJIOC)- a Remodeling Defense Intelligence initiative that will create an organization to plan, prepare, integrate, direct, synchronize and manage continuous Defense Intelligence operations by integrating Department of Defense (DoD) and National Intelligence capabilities.

JMITC: Joint Military Intelligence Training Center- a DIA school to prepare intelligence officials in the fields of defense intelligence.

JWICS: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems - DIA operated top secret intelligence communications system; a 24 hour a day network designed to meet the requirements for secure (TS/SCI) multi-media intelligence communications worldwide. JWICS replaces the DDN DSNET3 as the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) component of the Defense Information System Network (DISN). It provides DODIIS users a SCI level high-speed multimedia network using high-capacity communications to handle data, voice, imagery, and graphics (www.fas.org).

measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)-Technically derived intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT. The data result in intelligence that locates, identifies, or describes distinctive characteristics of targets. It employs a broad group of disciplines including nuclear, optical, radiofrequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences.

National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)-The senior Intelligence Community advisory body to the DCI on the substantive aspects of national intelligence. This Board advises the DCI on production, review, and coordination of national foreign intelligence; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; the protection of intelligence sources and methods; activities of common concern; and such other matters as are referred to it by the DCI. It is composed of the DCI (Chairman) and other appropriate officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Representatives of other agencies, including the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation participate as necessary.

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)-Executive Order 12333 defines the NFIP as the programs of the CIA, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, General Defense Intelligence Program, specialized DoD reconnaissance activities, and the activities of staff elements of the DCI, as well as the other programs of agencies within the Intelligence Community designated
jointly by the DCI and the head of the department or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. The NFIP provides funds for the bulk of national-level intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance activities of the CIA, the Defense Department, and all civilian federal agencies and departments, as well as those of the Intelligence Community management structure.

**National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)** - A Department of Defense combat support agency, NGA serves as the focal point for imagery collection, processing, and dissemination. The Director, NGA, is the functional manager for the imagery and geospatial community and serves as an adviser to the DCI on imagery policy and resource matters.

**National Intelligence Council (NIC)** - The NIC is a staff of senior intelligence officers mingled with experts from outside the Intelligence Community under the leadership of the Chairman/NIC and the Assistant Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. The 12 NIOs produce National Intelligence Estimates and other interagency estimative publications, promote improvements in Community production and collection, and advise the DCI on the intelligence needs of policymakers.

**National Intelligence Daily (NID)** - A classified digest of current intelligence published six times a week for use by senior government officials outside of the Washington DC area.

**National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)** - These reports are the DCI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. They deal with capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations and key developments relevant to the vital interests of the United States. NIEs are produced at the national level by the NIC and are issued by the DCI with the approval of the NFIB. NIEs are designed to identify trends of significance to national security and, when relevant, differences of views among the principal intelligence officers of the US Government. Presidential Summaries of NIEs are prepared for the President, Vice President, and other key executive officers.

**National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)** - An indications and warning center that operates 24 hours a day and is responsible for providing time-sensitive intelligence to the National Military Command Center, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commands, and the Military Services.

**National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)** - The NRO is a Department of Defense agency that researches, develops, acquires, and operates the nation's spaceborne intelligence assets. The Director of the NRO is the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space.

**national security** - The territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international freedom of action of the United States. Intelligence activities relating to national security encompass all the military, economic, political, scientific, technological, and other aspects of foreign developments that pose actual or potential threats to US national interests.

**National Security Agency (NSA)** - NSA is responsible for the centralized coordination, direction, and performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of US Government activities to protect US communications and produce foreign intelligence information. The resources of NSA are organized for the accomplishment of two national missions: the information systems security or INFOSEC mission provides leadership, products, and services to protect classified and unclassified national security systems against exploitation through interception, unauthorized access, or related technical intelligence threats; and the foreign signals intelligence or SIGINT
mission allows for an effective, unified organization and control of all the foreign signals collection and processing activities of the United States.

**need**- A general or specific request for intelligence information made by a member of the Intelligence Community.


**OPCON: operational control**- (DOD) Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also assign; combatant command; combatant command (command authority); detachment; operational command; tactical control. See FM 3-0. (source: FM 1-02).

**open source**- Information that is publicly available (for example, any member of the public could lawfully obtain information by request or observation), as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. Open-source information also includes any information that may be used in an unclassified context without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods. If the information is not publicly available, certain legal requirements relating to collection, retention, and dissemination may apply.

**operations plans (OPLANS)**- See Joint Publication 1-02, November 9, 2006, page 396.

**President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board**- The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is maintained within the Executive Office of the President. Its sixteen members serve at the pleasure of the President and are appointed from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside of government on the basis of achievement, experience, and integrity. They serve without compensation. The Board continually reviews the performance of all government agencies engaged in the collection, evaluation, or production of intelligence or in the execution of intelligence policy. It also assesses the adequacy of management, personnel, and organization in intelligence agencies and advises the President concerning the objectives, conduct, and coordination of the activities of these agencies. The Advisory Board is specifically charged to make appropriate recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the performance of the intelligence efforts of the United States.
**production** - The preparation of reports based on analysis of information to meet the needs of intelligence users (consumers) within and outside the Intelligence Community.

**raw intelligence** - A colloquial term meaning collected intelligence information that has not yet been converted into finished intelligence.

**RDI** - Remodeling Defense Intelligence

**SASC** - Senate Armed Services Committee

**scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence** - Intelligence concerning foreign developments in basic and applied scientific and technical research and development including engineering and production techniques, new technology, and weapon systems and their capabilities and characteristics; it also includes intelligence that requires scientific or technical expertise on the part of the analyst in areas such as medicine, physical, health studies, and behavioral analyses.

**Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)** - SIPRNET replaces the DDN DSNET1 as the SECRET portion of Defense Information Switch Network (DISN) (www.fas.org). Also, a system of interconnected computer networks used by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State to transmit classified information (up to and including information classified SECRET) by packet switching over the TCP/IP protocols in a "completely secure" environment. It also provides services such as hypertext documents and electronic mail. In other words, the SIPRNet is the DoD’s classified version of the civilian Internet together with its counterpart, the Top Secret and SCI Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, JWICS. (www.wikipedia.org).

**signals intelligence (SIGINT)** - Intelligence information derived from signals intercept comprising—either individually or in combination—all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.

**Theater Intelligence Brigade (TIB)** - the dedicated theater level intelligence brigade to each Army Service Component Command (ASCC) assigned to US Army INSCOM but OPCON to the theater they reside in and work for.

**top secret** - Security classification applied to information that, if disclosed in an unauthorized manner, could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

**TSDI** - Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence

**Under Secretary of Defense (USD(I)** - a Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters
APPENDIX

Appendix 1: The Intelligence Cycle
Appendix 2: Actionable Intelligence Initiatives

2004: Original Initiatives and Description

**Tactical Overwatch** will formalize a discrete, downward-focused mission task to support designated tactical forces during periods of low situational awareness and high vulnerability, particularly when on the move from fixed intelligence facilities with access to forward area and national collection, shared databases and advanced processing.

Fielding an Interim **Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A)**. DCGS-A is already a Future Force Program of Record (POR) design scheduled for fiscal year 2008. We have begun accelerating DCGS-A to the field in a spiral-development approach. The Army is fielding interim DCGS-A fixed site capabilities to the theater intelligence brigades and groups and we are expanding this effort down to the maneuver battalion level.

**Pantheon Project**. This project's team of 10-12 elite, world-class individuals from business, academia, and government will rapidly develop and field new capabilities that solve our hardest technical problems, creating technological or procedural solutions for the enhancement of tactical through national intelligence echelons. These solutions will then rapidly spiral forward into the intelligence community and tactical units.

**Information Dominance Center (IDC)**. The IDC is a state-of-the-art operational intelligence organization that rapidly leverages national, theater, and tactical reporting to establish threat association and linkages; recognize threshold events, activities patterns, and anomalies; and aid understanding of the significance of information "buried" within large volumes of collected material.

**Project Foundry** places a percentage of our tactical intelligence soldiers into ongoing live-environment intelligence operations that provide better technical and regional expertise. Project Foundry will include soldiers from almost every MI military occupational specialty (MOS). These soldiers will not do so in a deployed environment but will work at INSCOM TIBs and center of excellence brigades doing live environment missions.

**Red Teaming** Capability will integrate an ability to see ourselves as the enemy sees us in order to holistically assess proposed Blue force operations from an adversary perspective, identify weaknesses, and develop mitigating solutions.

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2006: Current Initiatives

**JIOC-I/DCGS-A** is a joint, flat, web based intelligence architecture, allowing soldiers and commanders to access, search and visualize intelligence across all classification levels.

**Modular MI** seeks to increase intelligence soldiers across all components (AC/RC/NG), focusing this growth in HUMINT and analysts at BCT and battalion.

**HUMINT revitalization** proposes significant increases in Army HUMINT personnel at all levels, with enhanced communications and biometrics technology.

**Every Soldier is a Senior (ES2)** is designed to change the culture and mindset of all soldiers and leaders to see intelligence and its reporting as everyone’s responsibility.

**Project Foundry** – no change.

**Tactical Overwatch** – no change.

**Red Teaming** – no change.

**Information Dominance Center/Rapid Technology Prototyping** is Army INSCOM’s IT center, partnering with academia and the private sector, integrating cutting edge technology to solve the toughest intelligence problems, technical or human.

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149 Kimmons, 2006.
Appendix 3: Current ICP Related Jobs


Latest Headlines

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Job Information

Job Title: Intelligence Campaign Planning Instructor, Senior - 01042196
Employer: Booz Allen Hamilton
Job Code: 01042196
Location: Washington, DC
Date: 01-15-2007

Job Description

Key Role: Join a team as a Booz Allen consultant working at our client site. Develop and modify curriculums and deliver classroom instruction within the National Capital Region or at designated world-wide training locations. Provide curriculum development or modification, including migrating new or existing classroom curriculum to the on-line Virtual University or other Web-based teaching methodologies. Qualifications: Basic Qualifications: 7+ years of experience with intelligence at the operational level or above required -BA or BS degree required -TS/SCI clearance required -Experience with military training or adult learning techniques required Additional Qualifications: -Experience with intelligence planning for at least one tour preferred -Knowledge of the US intelligence community and DoD preferred -Experience with developing an Intelligence Campaign Plan (ICP) -Experience in a Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) -Experience with Instructional Systems Design (ISD) Clearance: Applicants selected will be subject to a security investigation and may need to meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. TS/SCI clearance is required. Integrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment; EOE, M/F/D/V.

Profile Job Field: Intelligence Analysis Locations United States - District of Columbia - Washington

Apply

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Principal Intelligence Campaign Planner

Location: OFFSITE

The successful candidate will serve at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Bolling AFB, Washington, DC as a member of the defense planning staff. Employee will perform work associated with the planning, preparation and execution of Agency support to campaign planning.

The successful candidate must have training and experience in intelligence campaign planning, the adaptive planning process and crisis action planning with the US military or DoD related civilian agency. Candidate must possess a Top Secret SCI clearance. Applicants preferred if they have MA or MS in a related field and 4-6 years of experience or be a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) or equivalent.

Submit Resume

Kathy Jones
Director
Human Resources
CAREER@ctc.com

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