TURNING BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES INTO STRATEGIC SUCCESS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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An issue facing the future of the American military is the American way of war and its inability to effectively turn military victory into strategic success. Senior Military leaders must embrace this fact and develop strategies that effectively integrate other agencies and tools of national power into later phases of the battle plan that will ensure overall strategic success.

The recent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of astonishing battlefield victories that illustrate the prowess of American fighting forces. Yet, military operations are still ongoing, casualties continue to climb, and every day the media paints a dismal picture to remind us that we have not yet succeeded. A vivid illustration comes from U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers' conversation with a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Colonel when Colonel Summers reminded the NVA Colonel that the NVA had never beaten the U.S. Forces on the battlefield and the NVA Colonel merely replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant".

Future success lies in a better understanding of war as an extension of policy and specifically the roles and inter-relationships of the people, the military, and the government, to include other departments and agencies outside the military.
TURNING BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES INTO STRATEGIC SUCCESS

Despite repeated and overwhelming successes in combat operations, the United States seems unable to achieve the political objectives that drive her to engage in war. War is not new. Theories and principles of war have been postulated and documented for centuries. Military strategists, diplomats, and even politicians have studied these theories and principles. Yet, wars still continue at great costs. Generally, both the victors and the losers are summarily chastised for not recognizing and applying fundamental theories that might have achieved greater success, more efficiently, and at a lower cost. While critics have the advantage of hindsight and time to analyze actions and subsequent results whereas the battlefield commander is constrained by numerous unknowns, chaos, complexity, fatigue, and the human dynamic that is very unpredictable. But combat operations are not where the American military harbors vulnerability. Conversely, the American military has no current peer who can successfully go “toe-to-toe” on the battlefield.

The challenge to the American military is the American application of war and its inability to effectively turn battlefield victory into strategic success. Historically, the American way of war tended to be more of a way of battle that often falls short of achieving national strategic objectives. Senior military leaders must embrace this fact and develop strategies that effectively integrate other agencies and tools of national power into all phases of the battle and overall war plan that will ensure overall strategic success. This should not be a difficult process. Military operation plans routinely link complex actions between different services and multi-national coalition partners. Operational command and control is often passed from one commander to another.
during certain phases of an operation. For example, during amphibious operations, the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) relinquishes command and control to the Commander Landing Forces (CLF) at a certain point to allow the CLF to continue the mission ashore. Similarly, the Combined Joint Task Force Commander must plan for and eventually turn over control of an operation to civil authority of other departments, agencies, and/or coalition or international organizations and become a supporting commander to their effort.

Our future success lies in a better understanding of war as an “extension of policy”\(^1\) and specifically the roles and inter-relationships of the people, the military, and the government, to include other departments and agencies outside the military. This paper explains why the American way of war falls short in achieving strategic success, what actions have already been taken to correct this problem, and what military professionals still must do to achieve overall success in not just winning battles, but in winning our Nation’s wars.

**Background – Battlefield Victories**

The recent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of astonishing battlefield victories that illustrate the prowess of American fighting forces. Yet, military operations are still on going, significant costs to our human, material, and financial resources continue to climb, and every day the media paints a dismal picture to remind us that we have not yet succeeded. The first Gulf War was considered by most to be an overwhelming success with a crushing military victory over Iraqi forces and liberation to the Kuwaiti people. Although, the political goals were achieved it could be argued that those goals were short sighted and merely bolstered Saddam Hussein’s
ego and set the conditions for the next war. Another vivid illustration comes from U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers’ conversation with a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Colonel when Colonel Summers reminded the NVA Colonel that the NVA had never beaten the U.S. Forces on the battlefield and the NVA Colonel merely replied, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant”.  

### Application of War in Theory

By definition, war is a forceful act to impose one’s will over another, or as Clausewitz states it: war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. As members of a professional military it is easy to get lost at the operational and tactical level where the battle is fought, and forget that war is an instrument of policy by other means. The application of military combat power provides that other means of achieving the political objective that was not achieved through economic, psychological, legal, or other diplomatic means. Therefore, war must serve policy and any military objectives must be directed towards attaining the political goals. While, the application of military means does not put an end to the use of other diplomatic tools, the violent nature of war and the inherent costs associated with suffering, death, and destruction that occur during war demands that war only be pursued after all other peaceful means to reconcile differences have been exhausted. It must be the last resort. According to Sun Tzu “the acme of skill is to subdue the enemy without fighting;” however, once the decision has been made to engage in war every effort must be made to defeat the enemy as thoroughly and as quickly as possible for there are no benefits in a protracted war, especially from the perspective of an impatient America that demands high returns for minimal costs.
Clausewitz refers to the nature of war as a paradoxical trinity inextricably linked to the people, the military, and the government. The challenge is to carefully maintain balance between the three.\textsuperscript{7} To do so, it is critical for the people, the government, and the military to be united and committed as one entity in order to achieve success in war. The government must clearly identify and articulate the political objectives and the end state to be achieved in the overall war strategy. The political objectives must have a direct correlation to national policy and must be vital to national interests in order to establish credibility, gain popular support and garner buy-in from the people. Those objectives and end state give the military boundaries from which they can develop and execute their military strategy in order to support the grand strategy and policy. The government must enable the military to take action with the appropriate resources, to include integration of personnel and capabilities from other governmental agencies and organizations, necessary to accomplish the mission as expeditiously, efficiently, and effectively as possible.

War as seen Through American Eyes

For Americans, the failure to complete military actions in a short time frame raises the cost and diminishes the resolve of the people, especially if vital national interests are not widely understood. This perspective grew in the United States as a consequence of failures in the Vietnam conflict. It became known as the “Vietnam Syndrome,” which is a belief held by civilian policy makers and high-ranking military officers that, short of a direct and lethal threat to US security, the American people would not support the deployment of US forces in combat or stability operations that did not have clear objectives and a short-term exit strategy.\textsuperscript{8}
Even under ideal circumstances where military objectives are met quickly and with minimal casualties, new and ostensibly greater, challenges emerge after the military accomplishes its objectives. The transition from military operations to stability operations, peacekeeping, or nation building is a complicated process that requires professionals with specialized skill sets to perform. This is not a core competency for the military. While the military clearly has a role in these follow-on operations, the real expertise to effectively execute these operations resides in other departments and agencies of the executive branch. Since these other departments and agencies are not generally expeditionary in nature, the military is often the only organization available in the area of operations with resources and logistical support necessary to initiate and carry out further operations. With its can-do attitude, the military embarks on its new mission without the requisite training or skills sets to succeed until follow-on organizations can establish themselves. The ensuing effort, with limited successes attained through trial and error, creates opportunity for the enemy and hampers the attempt to exploit the initial military success. Thus the military finds itself entangled in a quagmire of insurgents and disenchanted non-combatants as it attempts to complete a mission it is has not been trained to perform. While the military is very capable of handling the violence and even recognizes its role in the inter-agency arena, the complex nature and protracted timeline coupled with the shortsighted expectations of an impatient American public, fueled by the press and political party agendas, turns a successful campaign into perceived failure. This has been a recurring theme for the United States and defines the American way of war.
A Way of Battle vice a Way of War

According to Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, a retired US Army Officer, Americans don’t have a successful way of war; instead they have a way of battle that fails to turn military victory into strategic success. In his 2004 piece, “Toward an American Way of War”, that Dr. Echevarria attributes this tendency to the bifurcation in American strategic thinking where military professionals focus on winning battles while policymakers focus on diplomatic issues that influence the battle.⁹ Nothing makes this clearer than the Marine Corps mantra about its mission of “Making Marines and Winning Battles”. Dr. Echevarria cites Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War to illustrate that the American concept of war rarely extended beyond winning of battles and campaigns, and that Americans saw the primary object of war as the destruction of an opponent’s armed might rather than the furtherance of political objectives through violent means.¹⁰ He also cites Max Boot’s Savage Wars of Peace, published in 2002 to illustrate the frequency of American military and political participation in “small wars” such as the Boxer Rebellion, Barbary Wars, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, for reasons of inflicting punishment, achieving pacification, and even profit-making, but not necessarily to protect or defend vital national interests.¹¹

Dr. Echevarria goes on to address the “new” American way of war and identifies the resemblance between Max Boot’s new style of warfare, published in Foreign Affairs in 2003, which emphasizes “precision firepower, special forces, psychological operations, and jointness” with the new model currently sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that promotes “speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision”.¹² Of great concern is that both models clearly lack an emphasis on the end state and the processes necessary to
translate military victory into strategic success. As the outspoken General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret), remarked during a presentation to the U.S. Naval Institute in September 2003, the U.S. military is becoming more efficient at “killing and breaking”, but that only wins battles not wars. Accordingly, it appears that even the new American way of war has the potential to yield the same results as the traditional way in that wars will be fought as battles and we will continue to confuse the winning of campaigns and small-scale actions with the winning of wars. Our senior military leaders must break away from their “operational thinking” comfort zones and pursue strategic solutions that leverage other elements of national power during post-conflict operations.

Despite the concern and supposed short-comings of the American way of war, my personal experiences during the planning process for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM led me to believe that while the focus of planning was on the combat operations, planning for post-conflict Iraq had begun well before our initial deployment even began in January 2003. Those beliefs were shattered when I read recounts of the planning from General Tommy Franks in his book American Soldier. Although General Franks clearly understood and articulated the importance of Phase IV Operations under civilian leadership as key to the American military exit strategy, the President did not establish the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to link teams of specialists and experts from across U.S. government with Commanders on the ground until January 20, 2003. Furthermore, inadequate funding, a lack of personnel, and no clear mission guidance hindered planning and subsequent execution efforts. As a result, the military once again was challenged with a nation-building task.
My subsequent three deployments to Iraq illustrated significant military efforts closely coordinated with other state, governmental, and non-governmental agencies associated with the development and advancement of governance, economics, and public works. I can’t say that no mistakes were made and that everyone agreed on the way ahead or that we always even knew the way ahead, but we clearly understood that our mission had migrated from kinetic offensive operations into defensive enablers to assist the Iraqi people establish a new Iraqi government, military, law enforcement agency, and other public service capabilities to meet the needs of all Iraqi people.

Operation *Iraqi Freedom* demonstrates the American way of war where military professionals focused on combat operations and allowed external agencies and policy makers to plan for follow-on operations independently that didn’t materialize. Though combat operations were won decisively, the United States is still engaged in this war nearly five years later.

**A New Emphasis on Interagency Cooperation**

It appears that lessons learned from *Operation Iraqi Freedom* have had a profound impact on the executive branch of the U.S. government. Significant efforts are underway to ensure all elements of national power are leveraged to achieve national objectives through more effective use of interagency resources.

Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges. *We need to strengthen the capacity of departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-oriented planning.* Agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad.17
Based on publications produced since 2003, it appears that the National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense, the Services, as well as the State Department understand the need for closer interagency planning, cooperation, and integration in order to successfully achieve United States National Security Objectives. Several directives at all levels have been published to shape interagency coordination.

In August 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*. It focuses on achieving military objectives while contributing to broader national objectives through integration with other interagency and multinational partners. It envisions military operations developed within a framework of a National Strategy that incorporates all instruments of national power. This integration of partners combined with the application of all instruments of national power and multinational power is referred to as unified action. The CCJO recognizes that the joint force must be able to fight and win while simultaneously preparing to transition into stability operations under which national interests can be sustained. The military must be postured to enhance other elements of national power. Specifically, the military must be prepared to support other agencies in proactive engagement, theater shaping as well as post-crisis reconstruction operations.

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* established stability operations as a core competency for the military on par with combat operations. It recognized stability operations and the
necessary collaboration with civilian partners as vital to advancing U.S. interests and values. It further charges Department of Defense to lead and support the development of civil-military teams critical to the success of stability operations.\textsuperscript{21}

On December 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2005 the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, the \textit{Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization}. NSPD-44 directed coordination between Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to integrate stabilization and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.\textsuperscript{22}

In September 2006, the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised Joint Publication 3-0, \textit{Joint Operations} with additional changes incorporated in February 2008. Relevant changes to this document include revisions to the range of military operations, terminology change of “battlespace” to “operational environment” (which is occurring in all joint publications), and the establishment of a “stability operations” construct and military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{23} Fundamentally, the President and Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort to ensure the national strategic objective and joint operation termination criteria are clearly defined, understood, and achievable. They also ensure that DOD, allies, coalition partners and other government agencies are fully integrated during planning and subsequent operations.\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Joint Operations} acknowledges that in order to reach the national strategic end state and terminate military operations successfully, the Joint Force Commander must integrate and synchronize stability operations – missions, tasks, and activities to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment as well as provide essential governmental services, emergency
reconstruction, and/or humanitarian relief – with offensive and defensive operations within each phase of an operation. Planning for stability operations must begin when joint operational planning commences not after actual operations are initiated. Of particular importance will be civil-military operations initially conducted to safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect key infrastructure, and restore public services. US military forces should be prepared to lead actions to complete these tasks when local civil, US Government, multinational or international capabilities to not exist or are incapable of assuming responsibility. Once legitimate civil authority has been enabled to conduct operations without military assistance, the JFC may be required to transfer responsibility to another authority and fall back into a supporting role.

Following the CCJO, the Department of Defense published the *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* in December 2006. The *Military Support to SSTR Operations JOC* describes how future Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) will provide military support to stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within the military campaign plan to achieve national strategic objectives. It focuses on a full range of support that a Joint Force may be expected to provide across a spectrum from peace to crisis to conflict to assist a state or region through the crisis, be it natural disaster or man-made. It recognizes SSTR operation as not a solely military effort, but one that requires closely coordinated integration of military and civilian, public and private, U.S. and International resources.

Also published in December 2006 was Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. This document officially brings Interagency and multinational planning and
coordination into joint doctrine. It recognizes the complex security challenges that will require the skills and resources of many organizations throughout the interagency community. Integrating the interagency effectively will be vital military operations, especially during theater shaping, stabilization, and enabling civil authority phases of an operation. It drives JFCs and their staff to consider how they can leverage the capabilities of governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve military objectives and broader national strategic objectives. In addition to the wide range of capabilities the interagency has to offer, some organizations and agencies will have different goals, limitations, standards, and operational philosophies that must be considered. Despite the differences, the interagency process must be able to integrate capabilities of disparate organizations in pursuit of national objectives. Close coordination and cooperation is required for this process to be successful. Since the interagency community is not structured like DOD, command relationships, authority, and planning processes may very greatly between organizations. To assist the JFC, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is established for joint operations to coordinate with other US agencies and departments. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes routine working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. While the JIACG does not make policy, task, or exercise authority over the interagency organizations it represents an important capability and provides significant perspective, insight, and collaboration with those civilian agencies and activities. The Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group provides a detailed guide for Combatant Commanders, their staffs, and
interagency partners to understand and more effectively use the JIACG as an enabling tool as they conduct interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{31}

![INTEGRATING THE INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY](image)

**Figure 1: Integrating the Interagency Community**\textsuperscript{32}

To define the specific roles and missions of respective interagency organizations, the Supported Commanders are responsible for generating Annex V, (Interagency Coordination), for each Operational Plan (OPLAN). Annex V of the OPLAN should identify what the military planners have identified as requirements from their interagency partners. It also shares their understanding of the situation and common objectives to resolve the situation. This should enable interagency partners to plan their efforts
parallel with military planners, make recommendations to bring in other partners, and better determine their own support requirements.\textsuperscript{33}

The Services have followed suit, whether they are embracing the need or merely following directive they have published guidance promoting interagency cooperation. This demonstrates a rapid evolution commencing from the top down that can be used as a model for other interagency reform efforts throughout government. The following examples illustrate the Services attempt to assimilate interagency coordination at all levels of the planning and implementation process, as well as throughout all phases of a military operation.

The 34\textsuperscript{th} Commandant of the Marine Corps used his 2006 Planning Guidance to articulate the need to integrate interagency capabilities and other elements of national power into the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Corps’ fundamental fighting organization, in order to generate the institutional agility that has been the hallmark of Marine Corps success\textsuperscript{34}. For the first time the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard have come together to create a unified maritime strategy.\textsuperscript{35} This strategy integrates seapower with other elements of national power and other friends and allies. Strategy Implementation priorities include efforts to improve integration and interoperability, enhance awareness, and prepare their people. Integration and interoperability are key to our naval forces ability to respond to operational tasks where disparate forces of varying capability must work together seamlessly in support of defense, security, and humanitarian operations. Interagency cooperation is also critical for naval forces effectively advance maritime domain awareness as mandated by \textit{Strategy for Maritime Security}. Enhancing maritime
domain awareness will help reduce dangerous anonymity of sea borne transport and increase our ability to neutralize threats as far from our shores as possible. Lastly, the vision of tomorrow’s operations will find dispersed forces operating under decentralized authority where junior leaders will rely on integrated teams from different services and agencies bringing a wide variety of capabilities and cultures. The strategy calls for professional development and unit training to incorporate interagency teaming throughout training and education, as well as staff assignments to ensure mutual understanding of respective cultures and capabilities.36

Further amplifying how the inter-service joint planning could serve as a model for interagency planning, the US Army has directly linked some of their stability mission tasks to State Department technical sectors (see figure 2). The US Army recognized that success in the future requires the application of all instruments of national power. One of the Army’s capstone doctrine publications, FM 3-0, now equally weighs missions and tasks associated to population, such as stability and civil support, with those related to offensive and defensive operations.37 It recognizes that while winning battles and engagements are important, winning alone is not enough to be successful. Shaping the situation, informing the public, and influencing specific audiences are critical to mission accomplishment. In the 21st century operational environment, stability operations may be even more important than offensive and defensive operations. This is a major shift in Army doctrine.
Stability and civil support operations are assigned tactical tasks applicable at all echelons of the Army. In preparing and training for full spectrum operations it charges its leaders to be broad-minded and agile enough to operate effectively in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments in order to leverage diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to achieve their military objectives. This doctrine identifies examples of joint operations conducted within operational themes that include peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, and peace operations. The operational themes identify the significant differences among various types of operations. The themes correspond broadly to a range across the spectrum of
conflict and provide a useful means to illustrate phases of an operation. Of significance is the notice to leaders that shifting between themes or phases often calls for changes to force structure and/or changes to responsibilities that may include going from a supported to a supporting role under another senior U.S. government official.  

The Department of Defense is not alone in pursuing cooperation and integration of capabilities within the interagency community in order to achieve national security objectives. In August 2007, the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency of International Aide published its Strategic Plan for 2007-2012. That strategic plan identifies the Department of Defense in five of its seven strategic goals as a key U.S. Government partner necessary to achieve those goals.  

In their Strategic Goal 1: Achieving Peace and Security; the DOD is called on to provide security as needed for stabilization and reconstruction activities and to participate in government wide reconstruction planning and operation with other agencies.  

In Strategic Goal 3: Investing in People, DOD is called upon to coordinate health programs in post-conflict situations and provide military-to-military assistance to fight HIV/AIDS in military populations.  

In Strategic Goal 4: Economic Growth and Prosperity; DOD is called upon to help provide stability and security necessary to bolster a growing world economy.  

In Strategic Goal 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance; DOD is relied upon to mobilize large-scale logistical support in humanitarian emergencies, stabilize countries affected by conflict, provide security to organizations providing assistance, and to provide humanitarian assistance when civilian agencies cannot due to hostile environment.  

In Strategic Goal 6: Promote International Understanding; DOD is called upon to provide global support for public diplomacy and assistance activities as a
Clearly the State Department and USAID have vital interests to enhance and improve the interagency process. Without the cooperation of other Governmental and nongovernmental organizations the State Department will fail to meet their strategic goals.

Even prior to the strategic plan publication, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Department of State, published the *Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix* (ETM) in April of 2005. The ETM is a collection of individual tasks that are proposed to support a country in transition from conflict or civil strife to manageable stability. It provides a common language with understandable mission sets that should allow for the assignment of the appropriate agency or activity to perform the mission as well as establishing metrics and identifying expected outcomes.

The S/CRS in conjunction with the National Security Office developed the Interagency Management System (IMS) in an attempt to generate unity of effort among civil-military teams. This new approach is centered on three inter-linked elements designed to integrate civilian-military planning and execution of all phases of an operations across full spectrum of conflict from the strategic to the tactical level. At the strategic-national level is the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG); at the strategic-theater level is the Integration Planning Cell (IPC); and at the operation and tactical levels are Advanced Civilian Teams (ACTs). The CRSG is a civilian planning cell deployed to the relevant Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) or multinational headquarters to harmonize civilian and military planning,
processes, and operations. It will generally consist of civilian planners, and regional and sectoral experts from across the U.S. Government. The ACTs are one or more rapid response teams that deploy to the crisis area to implement the reconstruction and/or stabilization plan.  

Conclusion

While the preponderance of effort to correct the interagency coordination problem have been bourn primarily by the Department of State and the Department of Defense it does appear that the American way of war is on the right path to leverage and integrate other sources of national power to effectively turn battlefield victory into strategic success. The recent changes to policy and doctrine appear to indicate that the US government understands the need to encourage interagency cooperation and incorporate the capabilities of various agencies and organizations to achieve national objectives throughout the world. Though the military may focus on combat operations, which it obviously must master, it understands its important role in supporting inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies to be successful on the battlefield in the end. Obviously there is room for improvement at all levels, but the intent is clearly outlined in Presidential Directives, Department Policies and Strategic Plans, as well as Service Doctrine and Field Manuals.

As military professionals it is incumbent upon us to lead the charge in turning the American way of war from decisive military victory into national strategic success. While the civilian leadership must maintain the responsibility for the diplomacy that integrates military actions with other national resources to translate military victories into national strategic success, we must establish a better working relationship with our other
governmental agencies that play such an immense role after combat operations cease. Knowing what agencies are available, what they bring to the table, and what their limitations are, is no different than getting to know our sister services and coalition partners. They bring unique capabilities that must be integrated into the total process. We need to learn what those capabilities are and how we can leverage them to achieve national objectives as effectively as possible. More importantly, we must continue to update our doctrine and comprehensive plans to identify how we link into those organizations and how we transition from the military operation to the appropriate follow on operation. Our ability to work together will ultimately lead to our future success.

Endnotes


3 Clausewitz, 75.


6 Ibid., 73.

7 Clausewitz, 89.


10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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36 Ibid., 12-15.


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