JUNIOR OFFICER LEADER DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN M. QUINN
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2008

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
## Report Documentation Page

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>15 MAR 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. REPORT TYPE</td>
<td>Strategy Research Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
<td>00-00-2007 to 00-00-2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</td>
<td>Junior Officer Leader Development in an Era of Persistent Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. GRANT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5e. TASK NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Stephen Quinn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>See attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
JUNIOR OFFICER LEADER DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Quinn
United States Army

Dr. Conrad Crane
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Quinn
TITLE: Junior Officer Leader Development in an Era of Persistent Conflict
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 20 March 2008
WORD COUNT: 5,260
PAGES: 26
KEY TERMS: Net-centric Operations, Self Development
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper examines junior officer leader development in an era of persistent conflict dominated by irregular warfare. The three domains of the leader development program; Institutional, Operational, and Self Development are reviewed and the many resources applied to the operational and institutional domains are identified as well as the need to resource self development as the least resourced leader development domain. This paper recommends that the Army resource self development with time and money enabled by Net-centric Operations. The institutional Army faces many challenges while attempting to accelerate Leader Development and requires that the organization and individual members be adaptive and flexible in response to the environment. Our soldiers and leaders must now arrive at the unit prepared to be a functioning member of the organization on day one. This paper has reviewed the leader development process and has made specific recommendations to improve the self-development and specifically address the concerns provided by young officers in the current operational environment. It calls for the power of Net-centric Operations enabled by time and money to be applied to self development to accelerate leader development in this era of persistent conflict.
What we, within the Army, have to do is develop leaders and soldiers that are capable of operating any place along the spectrum without a tremendous amount of training and preparation time. We have learned that leaders have to be pretty agile and be able to move from major combat operations to stability operations to irregular warfare and all across that spectrum, and be prepared for circumstances to change almost continuously.¹

—GEN William Wallace
TRADOC Commanding General

Historically Army leader development programs were grounded in a traditional philosophy which assumed that leadership rested in the hands of a few individuals. These individuals rose to the occasion during times of crisis and were capable of providing the approved solution to subordinates to achieve the desired organizational outcome. This traditional view of “heroic” leadership is based on the assumptions that people are powerless, lack vision, and are unable to master the forces of change.² A new view of leadership in learning organizations is one in which leaders are teachers and stewards of the organization. The members continually develop their capabilities to deal with complex and ambiguous situations and seek to achieve shared understanding and learning.³

The following two personal vignettes demonstrate the complex contemporary operating environment our young officers find themselves in as they seek to achieve shared understanding and take responsibility for individual learning. The vignettes demonstrate the environment in which our young leaders are placed, wherein there is no ‘Heroic Leader’ with the ability to solve all problems. The first, CPT Christopher Foster, reported to Ft Bragg and was informed he would immediately deploy with the
Corps Headquarters in the Fire Support Coordination Section. He went through the required training and exercises to prepare for the deployment as the fires planner in the C5 Plans section. CPT Foster then deployed with the HQs and arrived at Camp Victory. He was told he would work in the C3 section but would be the action officer for the Iraqi Security Force cell of MNC-I. He made the adjustment and continued on with the mission at hand. Four months into the deployment he was told that he would re-deploy to Ft. Bragg and take command of a Field Artillery battery that was currently deployed in Iraq conducting a convoy security mission. CPT Foster redeployed to Ft. Bragg after eight months and reported to the Fires Brigade. Following five months at home station, CPT Foster deployed and took command of Alpha Battery, 3rd Battalion 321st Field Artillery. CPT Foster led the battery for the remaining six months of the battery’s deployment.

CPT Foster and the battery redeployed following a successful deployment to home station where CPT Foster was informed, after fewer than 90 days on the ground, the firing battery would re-deploy to OEF in support of the 82nd Airborne Division, but would first field the MX777A2 howitzer. During the next eight months, CPT Foster and the battery trained with the new MX777 howitzer in preparation for the deployment. This was a major task following two previous non-standard mission deployments within the past three years. Upon arrival in support of OEF and the 82nd ABN DIV the battery emplaced the firing platoons in three separate FOBs. CPT Foster, along with his XO, were directed to detach a platoon of soldiers, and CPT Foster to assume control of a portion of battle space now engaged in counter-insurgency and reconstruction efforts. CPT Foster made the adjustments and prepared his battery for the mission.
The second example, 2LT Brad Jordan, reported to 3rd Battalion 321st Field Artillery Regiment Headquarters following the Chemical Officer Basic Course. He assumed the duties as the Battalion Chemical Officer. LT Jordan performed these duties for the next four months, and then the battalion received a deployment order for Iraq. The battalion mission was to assume the duties as a Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) in support of Abu Grhaib detention facility. He was told by the battalion executive officer that he would perform the duties of FOB Engineer during the deployment. The battalion took the next 5 months preparing the batteries for a non-standard mission as convoy security companies, while the battalion headquarters trained for the BDOC mission. LT Jordan followed the battalion training plan and deployed to Iraq, assuming duties as FOB Engineer. He performed these duties for the next 6 months.

During the deployment he also performed the duties as Platoon Leader of the Combat Engineer Platoon and Rapid Reaction Force in defense of the FOB. While deployed, LT Jordan determined he would seek a branch transfer to Field Artillery and submitted a branch transfer. During the last three months of the deployment the battalion HQs was not only responsible for the defense of the FOB, but also closed the Abu Ghraiib prison, conducted convoy security of all movement of equipment to the Victory base complex and established the defense of Camp Cropper Detention Facility. LT Jordan spent the last three months of the deployment as the FOB Engineer. Upon redeployment LT Jordan assumed duties as battalion chemical officer and HQs battery XO until his branch transfer to Field Artillery was approved. He was then transferred to a firing battery where he performed the duties as firing battery executive officer. As the
XO in an artillery battery, LT Jordan performed duties as maintenance officer, arms room officer and supply officer as well as his responsibilities on the gunline. Once again, Lt Jordan deployed in support of the 4th BCT, 82nd Abn Division where he is responsible for the battery firing position in the absence of the battery commander, who is performing a maneuver mission with organic and attached soldiers to the battery. LT Jordan is currently performing these duties in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

The above examples underscore the complexity of today’s operational environment and tempo in which our young officers demonstrate the capability to handle complex and ambiguous situations while learning along the way. These young leaders seek to solve problems through shared understanding, and much of the time, are responsible for their own learning. The Army leadership has recognized and embraced the requirement for adaptive and agile leaders who can learn together and operate across the full spectrum of operations. The “2007 Posture Statement, a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities,” calls for the Army to “shift our weight” from the traditional focus to one across the full range of operations that includes irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges and requires prudent risk takers who are innovative, adaptive and accountable. The operational environment in which we find our company grade leaders is far different than the environment our strategic leaders grew up in during the Cold War Era. The junior leaders of today operate in a complex environment that may require them to patrol the streets of a town one day and run a town hall meeting the next. It is a delicate environment in which they must adapt to each and every day. Many of the company grade leaders today have experienced
As young officers adapt to today’s complex environment, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Training and Leader Development General Officer Steering Committee (TLGOSC), and the Army Training and Doctrine Command recently announced a plan to accelerate leader development at all levels. The Institutional Army is attempting to accelerate Leader Development due to the operational requirements of today’s force. The current environment requires that our soldiers and leaders come to the unit at a much higher level of proficiency then in the past. Soldiers and leaders in the past came to the unit 65% trained with their job book or leader development checklist in hand and prepared to train on the remaining 35% of the tasks that would make them combat ready. The Army no longer has this luxury and must provide soldiers and leaders ready to deploy upon completion of their initial training. This paper examines Junior Officer Leader Development in an era of persistent conflict by examining the three leader development domains; operational, institutional, and self-development. It will also identify current Army initiatives and provide recommendations to accelerate the Junior Officer Leader development process; specifically recommendations in the area of self-development are provided in an attempt to bring attention and resources to this domain.

The Army G-3 is the staff proponent for the Army Training and Leader Development and is responsible for approval and management of the Army Training and Leader Development Program. One way in which the G-3 accomplishes this is to conduct a Training and Leader Development General Officer Steering Committee
(TLGOSC) semiannually to identify deficiencies and recommend improvement in training policy, strategy and capabilities.\textsuperscript{7} The most recent steering group meeting held in December 07 identified ends, ways, and means to: Adapt Army training and leader development in an era of persistent conflict, prepare units and leaders for Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), and rebuild strategic depth over the short-term and the FY 2010-2015 POM years.\textsuperscript{8} The impact on leader development of persistent conflict in the current operating environment dictates that the three leadership development domains must continuously adapt the outputs of the three domains. The steering group determined that the Army leaders must keep our competencies for FSO in balance, expand leader competencies to include functional competencies for FSO, and broaden leaders’ competencies for non-lethal integration, language and culture and Joint, Interagency, Inter-Governmental, and Multinational (JIIM) integration.\textsuperscript{9} The steering group also determined that the following objectives would impact directly on leader development; develop adaptive and competent leaders, enable adaptation of training and leader development, cultural competencies and language skills.\textsuperscript{10}

**Leader Development Overview**

Leader development is the means for growing competent, confident, self-aware leaders who are prepared for the challenges of the future in combined arms JIIM operations.\textsuperscript{11} Future officers must be multifunctional, capable of supporting operations within the JIIM environment and able to conduct full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{12} It is apparent to the casual observer that the current environment is one of persistent conflict dominated by IW and COIN operations. Leaders must be able to handle ambiguity and information systems, while being capable of intuitive assessment of situations for rapid
conceptualization of actions. Leader development, through progressive, sequential, continuous education and experience throughout one’s career benefits the Army and the leader. The Army’s leader development and education system trains, educates, and grows Army leaders that are the centerpiece of a campaign quality Army with a Joint expeditionary mindset. The Army as an organization has resourced both the operational and institutional domains of leader development and has made significant advances in these domains. This paper will review the initiatives taken by the Army in these domains and will make specific recommendations in the self development domain.

In the operational domain, leader development is accomplished through combat, operational experiences, lessons learned, individual and collective training, assessment and feedback. Operational experiences are the primary source of experiential leader development in which junior officers learn right from wrong in the Army. As the two introductory vignettes have shown, the current operational tempo our young officers find themselves in is ensuring they are adaptive and flexible leaders. This cohort of junior leaders is learning to be adaptable and agile due to the experiences they have been required to endure. These experiences are enabling them to develop the very skills the Chief of Staff of the Army has called for in Army Initiative 5, accelerated leader development.

Training centers have also provided exceptional training opportunities to units providing near real operational experiences prior to deployment. The combat training centers are linked to the current operational environment and have the ability to replicate events that occur in theater within 48 hours of a new enemy tactic, technique
or procedure (TTP) appearing on the battlefield. The Combat Training Centers have throughput issues, but this does not negate the fact that the training centers have adapted to the current operational environment and are providing an exceptional leader development opportunity. Unit training programs have also responded to the current operational demands and have extensive resources at their disposal to assist in preparation for future missions. The training centers and institutions of learning have also provided lessons learned and TTPs to units. These resources are continually updated and provide to units through net-centric capabilities. Units have become the adaptive learning organizations required to operate in the current operational environment.

The Institutional domain provides standards based training and education that develop Army leaders who are grounded in an ideal of service to our nation, instilled with Warrior Ethos, have a common doctrinal foundation, are self-aware, innovative, adaptive, and are capable of taking initiative and successfully operating as part of a joint team in full spectrum operations within the contemporary operational environment. Although numerous initiatives have been implemented to support the institutional domain, an April 2007 survey conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) found inconsistent integration across schools/centers and professional military education levels. Counter-insurgency had no common doctrinal foundation, but due to recent efforts and resources the production of this has occurred over the past year. FM 3-24 was produced for COIN operations at battalion and above. There are now efforts underway to produce a company and below handbook to address the doctrinal gap. The resources applied to the efforts of establishing a doctrinal foundation and
integration of COIN across all levels of Professional Military Education are extensive and will soon overcome initial gaps.

There are also efforts underway to introduce COIN and IW into individual, unit and joint schools. Currently there are several COIN Academies which have filled the institutional gap which was apparent during the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As COIN develops and becomes an integrated part of Professional Military Education at all levels, the COIN academies will push to provide an advanced education to unit leadership. As the institutional Army provides the baseline through its education system the academies will concentrate on the specific operational environment in their Theater of Operations.

At the junior officer level, the improved Basic Officer Leadership Course, known as BOLC, has three levels of education for our junior officers. BOLC I is the pre-commissioning phase, provided by one of the commissioning sources. BOLC I teaches Warrior Tasks, adaptive leadership techniques, team building, and cultural awareness training along with many other tasks. At BOLC II, junior officers participate in a field leadership laboratory at one of the primary training facilities such as Ft. Benning. Upon completion junior officers are trained on 71 leadership tasks. In BOLC III, Lieutenants attend the Leadership Development and Assessment Course, a 33 day course in which combat specific instruction is focused to better prepare the young officers to move directly to deploying units.

Self-development is the third domain of the leader development process and an essential component of lifelong learning. Self-development is a goals-based, feedback driven program of activities and learning that contributes to professional
competences, organizational effectiveness, and professional development. The self-development domain is the least developed aspect of the leader development model. There are no specific requirements established within the process as defined by DA PAM 600-3. Self development is normally addressed as part of a command directed program in preparation for a unit exercise or deployment. The 2007 Army Training and Leader Development Strategy describes the ends, ways, and means required to adapt Army training and leader development programs in an era of persistent conflict. It also describes the many initiatives in the operational and institutional domains of leader development, but very few initiatives in the self development domain.

As further evidence that self development is the least developed of the three domains within the leader development process; it was not addressed during a recent AUSA Symposium held on October of 2007, titled, “Leader Development in the 21st Century Security Environment “Army Initiative 5.” Although one of the stated objectives focused on accelerated Leader Development across all cohorts to meet the challenges of the Long War, there was no reference to self development for junior officers. The symposium brief describes several initiatives in the NCOES strategy for a structured self development aspect of continued education, however it does not make the same recommendations for other cohorts. The NCO strategy developed for accelerating the leader development process is the most developed and attempts to address the self development domain, but does not cover specific themes.

Bridging the Gap in Leader Development in an Era of Persistent Conflict - Self Development Initiatives

As the Army attempts to bridge the gap in leader development in an era of persistent conflict it must question whether its hierarchical structure is conducive to self-
development. The Army bureaucracy may be at cross-purposes with the operational needs and desired results of self-development. The previous individual vignettes provided are an example of how the bureaucracy and current Leader Development system has relied on the innovation and talent of our young officers corps to fill the gap in individual and unit preparedness for the current operational environment. Also, the great variance of missions and duty positions has given the young officer corps the opportunity to experience a wide range of situations; however, it has limited their ability to progress in the traditional sense. These unorthodox missions have limited the opportunity to seek self-development in a broader sense of general officership. Many young officers have not been afforded the opportunity to attend graduate school, military schooling and most damaging, the captain’s career courses. The following recommendations are focused on providing specific recommendations to enable the institutional Army to resource our young officer’s self-development as they attempt to respond to the changing environment and mission set.

Time Availability and Incentives

Time is the most valued resource in today’s operational environment. Young officers are in high demand in the current theaters of operations. The availability of white space on the training calendar during a young officer's pre-deployment schedule is very difficult to find in the current environment. Though many officers acknowledge this, all recommend at least monthly counseling, to includ the review of self-development goals and objectives during the course of the counseling. The Army has useful tools to facilitate counseling, however, with the current operational tempo many officers are not getting the basic counseling that they deserve to assist in self
development. The DA67-9-1a, Junior Officer Developmental Support Form, is a good tool that many leaders don’t take the time to use or don’t have the training to properly implement for our young officer’s developmental counseling.

Time-on-station and the lifecycle unit models may improve the ability for an officer to gain time for self-development. The longer an officer is in a community, and the less time he spends changing duty stations, the more opportunity he may have to pursue formal or informal education in the local area. For example, a four-year assignment guarantee lets an officer know that he has time to complete a night or weekend Masters. Many officers are not afforded that opportunity to seek a graduate degree due to the lack of time. Commanders must afford young officers some time to pursue a graduate degree. Today’s operational environment, which is dominated by irregular warfare, demands that our young officers have a broad base of knowledge and varied experiences. Ensuring that officers seek advanced degrees early in their careers will ensure they have a broad and experienced background.

Self-development is also impacted by unit officer development programs. Although these programs are intended to compliment each other, many times an officer’s ability to pursue individual self development is vulnerable to the direction of unit leader development objectives. These programs tend to be very narrowly focused on unit collective tasks. There is a time-tradeoff between preparing for and participating in command-directed programs and self-directed efforts. If self development was centrally planned, directed and incentivized, with decentralized execution, it would allow junior officers to pursue more diverse and broadened areas of interest and would allow the Army to gain a broader base of knowledge among its junior officer corps.
Money

The Army must allocate money for self development to convince junior leaders that it is serious about accelerating leader development in the current operational environment. In the civilian community education makes an individual marketable for higher pay and promotions. This is not so in the Army; not until an officer achieves more senior rank does the Army invest the kind of resources that many civilian institutions invest early in an employee's career. Our Below the Zone (BZ) promotions are rarely decided by the degrees an officer holds. The institution should provide a financial incentive for earning an advanced degree or professional certificates that are related to the officers' career field. The Army could resource a one time incentive bonus, or even a certain percentage higher pay over those who don't hold the advanced degrees or certificates. This, in general would provide an incentive for our junior officers to seek advanced degrees in those areas the Army deems important to the organization.

Currently only a small percent of junior officers are afforded an opportunity to pursue an advanced degree prior to Intermediate Level Education (ILE) or the Army War College. The most recent AUSA Army Steering Group Committee meeting recommended that the number of advance degree opportunities be doubled over the next few years. This increase still only accounts for a small percentage of the junior officer population. An officer seeking a fully funded advanced degree also commits to additional years of service. In an environment in which the Army can not predict the skills required to meet the next threat, it is far more important to cast a wide net in which the Army gains from all experiences of its officer corps rather than narrowly focusing the resources on a few officers. Each officer should be afforded the opportunity to seek an
advanced degree through the power of the network through reputable universities with a vested interest in providing a service to our nation. A networked environment in which every officer is linked to a self development resource that encourages their pursuit of an advanced degree would greatly benefit the Army.

Today soldiers have many opportunities to seek a degree while serving at home station and during deployments with little or no monetary cost or service obligation. Providing similar opportunities to our junior officers would deliver valuable skills to the forces and assist the Army in retaining junior leaders. Two barriers encountered by young officers during an era of persistent conflict are operational tempo and extended tours, which means that many young officers are at their first duty station for up to 7 years. Due to this extended time on station many young officers are denied the opportunity to seek an advanced degree prior to Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Due to the negative impact of operational tempo and extended tours on institutional Leader Development the Army must provide every young officer the opportunity to seek an advanced degree. This would improve the institution as a whole and provide an incentive for young officers to seek self development across a broad field of study.

The Army could also link ILE attendance to advanced degree completion. There is a significant backlog of officers waiting to attend this important part of Professional Military Education (PME). Establishing the attainment of an advanced degree as a prerequisite for attendance to ILE could reduce the backlog and would assist in establishing an order of merit (OML) for attendance to ILE and other institutional schools. Those young officers with the initiative and command support to complete an advanced degree would be ranked higher on the OML. Ensuring every young officer
pursued an advanced degree would not only professionally develop the officer but would ensure a broad base of knowledge for the institutional Army. The institutional Army must ensure that junior officers in units with the highest operational tempo are not disadvantaged in this process.

Network-centric Operations

The concept of Network-centric Operations has received much attention in the Army and was a capability utilized during the fielding of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). It is widely used on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and Battle Command and Warrior Network. Although the Army has made great strides in this area and has leveraged it in many operational areas it has not made the same advances in leader development and specifically self development. A search of the Army’s AKO and Battle Command produces no specific results or forums on self development for junior officers. They are disappointed in the AKO search capability and now rely on Google and other open source resources for self development. As the Army attempts to utilize Network-centric operations in self development it must improve the AKO search engine so that junior officers can utilize AKO as a primary source.

Network-centric Operations exploit an information advantage and translates that into a competitive warfighting advantage. This networking, when combined with changes in technology, organization, processes, and people, would allow new forms of organizational behavior. Specifically, the theory contains the following four tenets in its hypotheses; a robustly networked force improves information sharing; information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances
sustainability and speed of command; and these, in turn, dramatically increase mission
effectiveness.\textsuperscript{26} The Army has taken this information advantage and translated it into
action across many areas of operation and should utilize NCO in the area of self
development.

The Army has made significant movement towards becoming an adaptive and
learning organization by utilizing Network-centric Operations. The Army has utilized
Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and Battle Command Knowledge Systems (BCKS)
along several lines of operation to include the fielding of the Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams. Individuals within the community taught one another while learning together
and leveraging NCO within the community. This has not been seen in self development
as part of the overall leader development process.

In the absence of Army initiatives in Network-Centric Operations for junior officer
self development, eight graduates from the United States Military Academy’s class of
'90 and '91 established a website dedicated to assisting junior officers to prepare for
command. ‘\textit{CompanyCommand.com}’ serves as an online forum of resources and
mentoring for company-level commanders in the Army. This has proven to be an
excellent example of self development in a community of practice in a peer-to-peer
environment.\textsuperscript{27} The website has been received enthusiastically by officers in the field
and since its founding in February 2000, has logged hundreds of thousands of visits to
the site. The Army finally recognized the goodness of this community of practice and
recently welcomed it onto AKO.

The specific focus of companycommand.com is to assist company grade officers
in meeting the challenges of command, not specifically leader development. The
operational tempo of today’s Army has ensured that there are challenges a young officer faces today that their supervisors may not have experiential knowledge about to provide the answers to subordinates. As young officers face the challenges of leader development within the organizational and institutional domains they will continue to identify gaps in their development and will increasingly look to their peers and others for answers. One way to ensure that they have an Army sponsored community of practice to fill the gap is to create a community of practice in this network-centric environment that specifically addresses leader development with a focus on self-development. The Army has leveraged the community of practice concept in a network-centric environment on several other areas and should now use this power to fill the gap in leader development emphasized by persistent conflict. Many young officers are delayed in going to both the Captain’s Career Course (CCC) and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) due to the current pace of operations. Many young officers are becoming frustrated at the lack of institutional emphasis in this area.

The key to preparing for the future and developing leaders for persistent conflict that can operate across the Full Spectrum of Operations (FSO) is to select and promote intelligent people who are free to experiment and fail. It is essential that we build an organization in which leaders are free to explore, experiment, and share understanding through networking with peers, subordinates and superiors without passing everything through the vertical hierarchy of the Army bureaucracy. The power of the internet is essential to leader development in that each individual can tap the power of the internet to both solve problems and develop themselves and others. The freedom to communicate based on Commander’s intent and coherent vision is the fundamental key
to creating an organization that is flexible, agile, and responsive to the operational environment. There is nothing new about empowering an organization with commander’s intent and vision, but the use of the power of networking as a combat multiplier and taking advantage of the Army’s ability to resource this technological and informational advantage is unprecedented. The Army leadership has embraced network-centric operations and has proved it is a combat multiplier, and now must expand this concept to fully empower our young leaders and the leader development process. Well trained subordinates who have a network of trust, freedom at all levels to take initiative, and the ability to thrive in this environment will unleash the power of the organization.

There is an immediate need to establish a community of practice focused on individual leader development. A community of practice utilizing a Network-centric environment within the Army would require detailed resourcing. To ensure that every junior officer can access the community of practice the Army must issue a laptop computer to each young officer. Every USMA cadet is issued a computer compatible with Army systems but not all ROTC and OCS graduates enter the Army with this same capability. The Army should ensure that every junior officer has the ability to enter the community with proper tools. This asset would not only provide the junior officer with the ability to participate in the leadership development community of practice but would also provide an asset to the unit to which the officer is assigned. There would now be an expectation on the part of the unit for the officer to be fully integrated in the unit’s network. It would also allow each officer the ability and opportunity to participate in a
wide range of developmental opportunities that are currently difficult to accomplish due
to lack of resources.

Conclusion

The institutional Army faces many challenges while attempting to accelerate
Leader Development in an era of persistent conflict dominated by irregular warfare.
This requires that both the organization and the individual members be adaptive and
flexible in response to the operational tempo and environment. Our soldiers and leaders
must arrive at the unit prepared to be a functioning member of the organization on day
one. This paper has reviewed the leader development process and has made specific
recommendations to improve the self-development domain of leader development. The
institutional and operational domains have been heavily resourced in response to the
dramatic change in the operational environment. The self-development domain is the
most under resourced domain of the process and therefore this paper has attempted to
provide some basic recommendations to better resource this component of leader
development. The lines of operation addressed in these recommendations; Network-
centric Operations, time and money, have addressed the concerns provided by young
officers in the current operational environment. The power of Net-centric Operations
has enabled advances in several areas of military operations to include the fielding of
the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and can now be used to accelerate leader
development.
Endnotes


3 Ibid.


6 Harlow.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


12 Schoomaker.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


17 U.S. Department of the Army.


20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.

22 U.S. Department of the Army.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 275

30 Ibid.