THE ORIGINAL LONG WAR: SUPPLY-SIDE STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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U.S. Army War College
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For nearly forty years, the United States has waged the “War on Drugs” with a supply-side emphasis in terms of both resources and vision. As the unrelenting demand of this “War” continues its reliance on military and law enforcement assets, a foreseeable future of extremely high global demand for these resources necessitates a national-level review of the sagacity of the supply-side effort. Indeed, with no end in sight, perhaps there exists a fundamental mismatch of strategy to exigency. Regardless, government responsibility for vigilance of America’s precious resources demands a national-level comprehension of its long-term strategy for the “War on Drugs.”
THE ORIGINAL LONG WAR: SUPPLY-SIDE STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON DRUGS

This Strategy Research Project (SRP) analyzes the challenges, expectations, and effectiveness of the supply-side element of the American “Drug War” – production, export, and product arrival on U.S. shores – a long-term strategy built in short-term increments and frequently modified and overhauled in the same manner. Focusing on the United States and foreign military and law enforcement roles and results in stemming the flow of Colombian cocaine, this paper chiefly discusses drug transport in the Caribbean and Mexico, through which most cocaine is trafficked into the United States: nine percent solely via the Caribbean, 38 percent through the Caribbean enroute to Mexico, and a total of 70 to 90 percent through Mexico and the Eastern Pacific transit zone.\(^1\) Colombia produces and exports 75 percent\(^2\) of the world’s supply of cocaine, of which the U.S. consumes more than the rest of the world combined.\(^3\)

This paper weighs the effects of both maritime (sea, air) and land interdiction and seizures, attempting to measure their overall success or failure over the past four decades, in terms of their own performance and against their own evaluations, in relation to government and “official” metrics, and in the holistic context of the overall “Drug War.” It reviews where we are, how we got here, and why we’re likely to stay, from America’s perspective as well as the “enemy’s.”

Illegal drug trafficking bodies are labeled by several different names throughout the text: cartels, networks, organizations, groups, and others. This is not merely because these various titles are in vogue, but also because none of these singularly captures the gist of an extremely complex, diffuse, and diversified production, supply, and transportation system. The term interdiction also appears frequently throughout this
SRP. *Interdiction* encompasses crop eradication, criminal extradition, and cocaine seizures, as well as jettisoned, scuttled, burned, or otherwise non-recoverable events that are measured in the total sum of cocaine that fails to reach the user.⁴

As the world’s leader in illicit drug usage, U.S. responsibility to tackle the illegal drug trade is doubtless, but ascertaining whether the titular “War on Drugs” has been “successful” is both arduous and enigmatic. Even referring to U.S. handling of its drug problem as a “war” is a misuse of the term – for “war” has not been declared in an official capacity by any “side” or “enemy” in this struggle, it does not have “legitimate and acknowledged belligerents,”⁵ it does not have a defined beginning of hostilities or ending peace, and its unlikely conclusion will not be shaped by a truce.⁶ Historically, wars are also not waged indefinitely, which is the long-term outlook of efforts to stifle the drug trade – for as long as there is demand, there will be providers of this commodity for the drug-user. America’s “War on Drugs” was the original “Long War,” a compendium of legislation, funding, social work, law enforcement and military actions commencing several decades prior to the post 9/11 “Long War:” the Global War on Terrorism.

**Supply-Side and the *Origins of Impasse***

Supply-side interdiction programs have existed to fracture the illicit drug market in order to drive the prices *so high* and availability *so low* as to reduce demand. Interdiction also aims to choke the supply of inbound narcotics until America’s drug habit can be curbed via education, treatment, and other demand-side efforts that have yet to gain a solid, widespread footing.⁷ Interdiction has also provided the function of deterrence, the inherent logic being that drug smugglers will take their wares elsewhere or seek legitimate enterprises instead, and that drug consumers will cease their habit
out of fear of legal penalties and societal stigma. The interdiction element of the National Drug Control Strategy aims to “disrupt the flow of drugs to the United States and through other strategic areas.” Post-9/11 global threat awareness has also become far more cognizant of second and third-tier effects of drug trafficking, principally the existence and livelihood of narcotics-funded terrorism, organized crime syndicates, insurgencies, and states around the world.

National-level drug enforcement, restrictions, and management efforts by the U.S. have existed for well over a century, but only have the past thirty-nine years, since President Richard Nixon established the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, and the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, witnessed such a massive expenditure of resources to plug the metaphorical dike.

Liberal, widespread, and clichéd drug usage of the 1960s deserves much credit for ushering in the modern day “Drug War.” September 1969’s Operation Interception, a five-day initiative that enforced inspections on all vehicles entering the U.S., and the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974 were early milestones that marked the once-tentative flight of the fledgling “war” on illegal drugs: “public enemy number one.” President Ronald Reagan’s tenure followed with a massive acceleration of supply-side strategies, when drugs were declared a national security threat in Presidential Directive 221.

The public health domain; narco-terrorism; drug education and drug rehabilitation; drug abuse and addiction; failed states; narco-states; domestic drug laws, penalties, biases, and incarceration rates; the legalization controversy; internal/external
distribution processes and networks; varying political interpretations, rhetoric, approaches and agendas; a sine wave of attention and funding; birth and passing of numerous programs, diverse messages and their corresponding effects; and greatly differing perspectives on the right and wrong of the “war on drugs” are just a few aspects – barely scratching the surface - of an incredibly costly effort that wears a thousand faces.\textsuperscript{15} Of all these widely diverse elements, “the interdiction program has grown faster than any other component of the supply-reduction effort.”\textsuperscript{16} The “Drug War” quickly developed into a policymakers’ narcotic all its own.

To evaluate the wisdom and effectiveness of supply-side interdiction, it is helpful to analyze the U.S. government’s roadmap for current and future policy, the White House’s 2007 National Drug Control Strategy, and the results of interdiction efforts over the past four decades. Nearly half of the National Drug Control Strategy is devoted to “Disrupting the Market for Illicit Drugs,”\textsuperscript{17} a compendium of foreign policy initiatives, market and threat analyses, developing issues, tactical victories, future plans, and optimistic assessments of the administration’s progress in the “War on Drugs.”\textsuperscript{18}

Despite admirable efforts of the Drug Enforcement Agency, United Nations International Narcotics Control Board, Office of National Drug Control Policy,\textsuperscript{19} and countless other agencies, organizations, researchers, and pundits to provide meaningful statistics – a solid evaluation of the effects of interdiction has been impossible.\textsuperscript{20} Resources, data collection, tracking methods, and intelligence capabilities are simply not available or accessible to truly understand what percentage of the product has been intercepted. Although one can more-or-less assess the retail value and “potential” effects of seized shipments on persons and communities, grasping the impact of the
ones that got away, escaped detection entirely, or were deterred and sought markets elsewhere – is another challenge altogether. In 2007, the White House “Drug Interdiction Assessment” noted that “the evaluation for the Drug Interdiction Program is underway…the program will need to address program effectiveness in the context of impacts on illegal drug markets in the U.S.”\footnote{21} A vague grasp of the effectiveness of counter-narcotics operations is not an American phenomenon. Britain’s Ministry of Defence noted that its warships have “kept millions of pounds worth of drugs off the streets,”\footnote{22} but a clear understanding of the second and third order effects, in context of the overall “Drug War,” remains elusive.

The United States’ national-level counter-narcotics policy is guilty of oversimplification of many facets of the issue, not the least of which is a one-size-fits-all mentality from certain elected and appointed officials that fails to grasp that individual “cultures of Latin American countries are distinctive, identifiable, and highly influential in the development of domestic and foreign policies.”\footnote{23} A glaring example is the quick comparison of brutal and rapidly escalating Mexican drug-related violence, particularly in border cities and states (Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Sinaloa, Veracruz, Durango, etc.)\footnote{24} to Colombian bloodshed in the 1980s and 1990s.\footnote{25} This nearsighted comparison ignores the existence of the FARC, whose stated purpose is to overthrow the Colombian government,\footnote{26} the ELN, the AUC, and others.

Policymakers have also attempted to correlate the exponential growth of the Mexican drug trade over the past fifteen years with an imagined withdrawal from the market by Colombia groups. To the contrary, this “adjustment” has since been shown to be an illicit market version of deregulation, as primary producers and exporters have
adjusted their market share to better suit contemporary security risks and economic conditions.  

Attempts to quarantine the drug trade into clearly defined parameters are grossly in error in combating the dynamic cultivated by Colombian insurgents and rebels, not only with respect to the relationships between the insurgent organizations and their parry with the government, police, and military; but also regarding drug networks’ interaction with the populace and its support or resistance. Additionally, the fixation with oversimplified analogies ignores drug cartels’ exploitation of illegal immigration and the expansion of trade with Mexico begotten by the passage of 1994’s North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA has directly facilitated “phenomenal growth in drug trafficking.”  

Over ten thousand trucks cross the U.S.-Mexico border daily.  

The consummate dedication and tactical brilliance demonstrated every day in the “Drug War,” a poster-child of inter-agency coordination, is overshadowed by an unintentionally beguiled approach to an extremely perplexing and misunderstood challenge. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued “that U.S. troops should not be drug cops and that their deployment in an overseas drug war that lacked an explicit military objective – other than a vague injunction to stop the drug traffickers – was unwise.” Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also “had grave doubts about using the military to stop the drug trade; he had once called it ‘nonsense.’ He thought drug abuse was best handled by families, schools, and churches.” Nonetheless, military ship, aircraft, aerostat balloons, and personnel employment in counter-narcotics operations has continued to flourish, despite significant demands for military hardware and personnel in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
The U.S. military has been “training and advising military in Central and Latin America on how to defeat rebel armies and drug cartels for more than five decades.”\textsuperscript{32} Whether the phrase used to refer to the government’s overarching counter-drug policy is “autopilot”\textsuperscript{33} or as critical as “stumbling, fumbling, and bumbling”\textsuperscript{34} the reality is that the $20 billion spent annually on drug control, with “more than two-thirds allocated for domestic enforcement, interdiction, and international initiatives,”\textsuperscript{35} is able to justify its existence because it is simply not known what would happen if all of the interdicted drugs reached their destination instead, and if there were not punitive consequences for dealing and using cocaine. Though interdiction may be the “least-efficient drug control strategy,”\textsuperscript{36} it remains an essential appendage to the “War on Drugs.” But the illicit drug networks consistently stay several steps ahead, for “you constantly see a changing of technique and tactic.”\textsuperscript{37}

Globalization has dramatically increased the challenge of interdicting illegal narcotics, despite the concepts of mutual interdependence and security on which commerce treaties are often developed, signed, and sold to citizens. However, the smuggling of drugs, weapons, illegal immigrants, slaves, and other commodities over centuries illustrates that economic globalization is hardly a recent phenomenon. Just as legitimate enterprises strive to comprehend supply, demand, and market share in modern globalization, law enforcement has similarly struggled to understand its own impact upon the diverse and far-reaching markets and methods served by smugglers over the centuries.

It is realistic to surmise that interdiction efforts short of a relentless, full scale military and law enforcement “major combat operation” – i.e. a “Drug War” truly worthy
of the moniker, that keeps “drug traffickers and guerilla insurgents on the defensive and too busy to concentrate on smuggling operations” – cannot possibly stop free enterprise and capitalism. But even a war ample enough to overwhelm rampant corruption and intimidation inherent in Central and South American allies, beyond token subsidies for foreign navies, air forces, soldiers, and police, and with a national commitment of blood and treasure - would likely yield only temporary success. When risks outweigh entrepreneurial benefits or local demand fades – drug runners simply seek or create new markets (recent years' expansion in Europe and Brazil, for example) in the same manner that legitimate enterprises continually strive for lucrative opportunities.

Many drug cartels have even outsourced their transport mechanisms or switched entirely to wholesale business, leaving retail delivery and sales to others, to reduce risk and simplify their organizations. “Assassination, intimidation and extortion work” has similarly been sub-contracted to other sicarios (hired enforcers).

The U.S. measure of success cannot solely exist in numbers of arrests and seizures, for it is analogous to using body bags and casualty counts as a measure of success in Vietnam. Judging the success of campaign-sized operations by virtue of their scope, jointness, and coalition nature; or assuming that an operation that involves vast sums of funding, personnel, and new acronyms has to be – by definition – viable, is fundamentally flawed.

Representative of its frustration with the challenge to evaluate the effectiveness of supply-side efforts, the White House responded by directing that by 2008, U.S. Coast Guard will “decide on appropriate drug interdiction performance measure targets and data collection methodology.” DHS and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
approval of the methodology is also required. Development of meaningful statistics to measure the effectiveness of drug interdiction and seizures is a worthy endeavor several decades overdue, if in fact, it is even possible. The White House also commanded a “strategic assessment to establish resource requirements” which demonstrates a level of financial responsibility, vice funding the “Drug War” indiscriminately. In 2006, the Coast Guard also began tracking the “rate of cocaine removed per $100 million of program operating expenditures.”

Competing theories regarding the vast increase in illicit drug seizures from a decade ago versus today are completely at odds – from the inference that interdiction efforts have dramatically improved to the more pessimistic perspective that increased seizures simply means that more drugs are being smuggled. U.S. intelligence estimates that the three principal cocaine-cultivating countries (Colombia, Bolivia, Peru), which produced 600 tons annually a decade ago, may have doubled their production to 1200-1400 tons.

Anatomy of an Enemy: Complex, Clever, Committed

Smugglers’ innovation is infinite and the tools of their trade are limitless: small airplanes, larger aircraft (including former Eastern Airlines 727s), expensive speedboats and luxury yachts, low-profile “go fast” boats running well in excess of 40 knots, sailboats, fishing trawlers and vessels of all varieties; cockroach-infested, rotted-hull, barely seaworthy vessels that even the most relentless inspectors loath to search, cruise liners, passenger ferries, bulk cargo and container ships, cars, horseback, buses, trucks and tractor-trailers, and semi-submersibles.
Ships’ registry (Panama, Honduras, U.S.), flag (if any), and name changes may delay receipt of permission to detain, board, or inspect a vessel, but is irrelevant for drawing inspectors’ conclusions, whether the vessel is entirely dedicated to drug trafficking or merely hauling illicit cargo unbeknownst to most or all crewmembers onboard. Drugs may be clearly evident onboard these vessels or hidden within false engine or generator compartments, in existing diesel engine casings that disguise the drugs’ odor, in structures attached to the hull, or stashed behind hidden walls and bulkheads so cleverly disguised that measurements of the vessel must be taken to discover them. Drug runners generally prefer the low-radar-cross-section provided by wood and fiberglass construction. The discovery in 2000 of a 110 feet long submarine under construction in the Colombian jungles may have been a one-time experiment or anomaly, but certainly illustrates the determination, vision, and capital of the cartels.

Human traffickers (“mules”) are a common method of transport for small loads and no more than three to seven percent of Caribbean cocaine traffic. Mules carry illicit drugs in suitcases (double-sided, with small false compartments, or molded into their structure), in clothing, oversized shoes or false heels, and internally (swallowed or inserted into body cavities). These adult and children “body-packers” (as young as 12 years old) risk not only arrest but death from overdose if just one of the dozens of condoms or plastic bags containers bursts.

Traffickers have stored drugs in livestock, stitched packets into the stomachs of purebred puppies, shipped cargo in hollowed-out furniture and other wood products, in “body creams, aerosol cans, pressed into bead shapes, and sewn into the lining of purses,” and hidden drugs inside countless legal commodities, including “fruits,
vegetables, coffee, seafood, soda pop, textiles, clothing, lumber, cut flowers, fence posts, ceramic tiles, toilet paper, exotic birds, industrial equipment, and cans of roofing tar.” Smugglers also mail their wares through the postal service, with varying levels of success.

“When law enforcers discover a particular scheme, traffickers switch to other containerized cargo routes already in operations or develop new ones, sometimes by purchasing legitimate companies that export these commodities.” Even the vast sums of profit are returned to Colombia in legitimate consumer items, such as refrigerators, televisions, and other goods.

Although human drug trafficking is widely publicized due to the frequency of arrests in comparison to more rare bulk seizures, this attention sometimes plays into the hands of the smuggling organizations – which will deliberately sacrifice mules to divert law enforcement from other routes in use. The roles and responsibilities of mules crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. vary significantly from their Caribbean counterparts, differing no less than these two environments.

Typically, multiple methods of transport are seamlessly linked within a drug route, in a strikingly complex orchestration that employs exceptional timing, global positioning system (GPS) drop-offs and pick-ups, underway refueling and cargo transfers, and long or short-term storage on one or more of the 7,000 thousand islands, islets, cays, and reefs that belong to sovereign nations, territories, and protectorates, as well as privately-owned properties that comprise the geography of the Caribbean. Deserted beaches, clandestine airstrips – most often in scarcely populated or virtually uninhabited regions, bustling commercial airports and seaports, shipping channels, bays, the Rio
Grande River, the Intracoastal Waterway, and Padre Island National Seashore – all service the drug trade.\textsuperscript{61}

At least 30 intricate border tunnels have been also discovered by American and Mexican authorities. These elaborate passageways contain railroad systems, may be 20 feet or greater beneath the surface, and have been as long as 1,452 feet.\textsuperscript{62} Although some tunnels were employed exclusively by the cartel responsible for the construction, others were “rented” to other trafficking groups.”\textsuperscript{63}

Drug-rated corruption, bribery, and blackmail – “the first line of defense for smugglers”\textsuperscript{64} - is an essential element of trafficking and as challenging to measure as supply and demand. Although various techniques are rampantly employed by drug networks, even these illicit organizations have standards, as many have opted in favor of cocaine transit through several Eastern Caribbean nations over Haiti, where corruption and bribery has reached a level of chaos from which even the boldest cartels shy away.

Resourcefulness, resilience, adaptability, and cleverness are equally as descriptive of the \textit{production} and \textit{processing} elements of the cocaine trade as the transport arm, and further illustrate the reactionary mode in which the U.S. and its partners have invariably found themselves for decades. Intelligence collection and application has remarkably improved over the past decade, but it has far outpaced the number of resources available to prosecute the targets,\textsuperscript{66} even though military equipment and technical training are now tailored to more effectively to combat the unique mission of drug interdiction than they were twenty years ago.\textsuperscript{66} However, America’s $9 trillion national debt, its dependence upon high-demand low-density
assets, and its inability to police everywhere at once prohibits the prediction and monitoring of forthcoming trafficking routes or upgraded techniques, particularly when smugglers resurrect old routes that were seemingly passé and risky.67

Hundreds of millions of dollars in crop spraying, burning, and other eradication methods has led to broad, ill-informed parades of satellite photos and terrain charts illustrating the disappearing menace, when closer – and far less publicized – analysis reveals that increasingly hardier strains of coca crops are merely replanted, many smaller and widely scattered plots have replaced the requisite three hectare-sized parcel68 that spurs eradication efforts, well-fertilized and tended crops are harvested three to four times per year (versus once or twice a year from just a decade ago), processing chemicals are recycled or substituted to cloud the trail to laboratories and production facilities,69 and farming has moved to the fringes of Colombia's international borders, where law enforcement is reluctant to beckon potential diplomatic issues. Consequently, the enormous amount of coca harvested is inversely proportional to the hectares planted and disavows attempts to use acreage as a measure of crop eradication effectiveness.70 In fact, a 42,000km² demilitarized zone established by former Colombian President Pastrana as a negotiating instrument was quickly and profitably cultivated by the FARC.71

Flexibility and innovation are critical tenets of drug running success, and are often directly counter to the most binding characteristics of the bureaucratic institutions that harass them. Drug networks freely demonstrate a willingness to alter from large to small shipments and back again, patience to store drugs long-term until law enforcement surveillance or presence “cools off,” and the perseverance to deliberately lengthen a
transport route by thousands of miles – traveling to Spain, Portugal, or Italy via chaotic sub-Saharan, West African nations – to avoid the intense scrutiny of direct legs from the Caribbean to Europe.  

As early in the modern-day “Drug War” as 1981, Colombian cocaine traffickers practiced air drops with flour, evaluated watertight wrapping methods, and “studied tides, currents, and water depths” to perfect the technique. GPS devices and homing beacons have further improved this smuggling tactic.  

Many of the networks are as organizationally flexible as their methods and “more likely to be displaced to another country than to be jailed and disbanded,” illustrated “by shifting patterns of drugs production in Latin America.” The demise of traffickers is no more effective than incarceration, as “rival traffickers or those new to the business are only too eager to replace them and move a product for which there continues to be strong demand.” The transit zone is equally flexible, as demonstrated by a three-fold increase in trafficking growth through the Bahamas and St. Lucia in the late 1990s to compensate for successful interdiction efforts elsewhere.  

The Business Case: Pure Capitalism

The illegal drug trade is perhaps the ultimate example of free enterprise. Competition is fierce in an extremely hostile market, and failure to outwit your adversaries is not only financially detrimental but often life-endangering. “Information is the lifeblood of competitive adaptation.” Illicit drug organizations brazenly chase the most lucrative markets. Pursuing European enterprises not merely to broaden trade beyond U.S. consumers and ever-tightening post-9/11 security, drug smugglers also
seek higher retail prices that the market across the Atlantic tolerates, a rapidly growing Old World market-share, and the strong euro.\textsuperscript{78}

Rival trafficking organizations provide additional incentives, in competition for market-share as well as the very survival of the group’s membership. But despite the Wild West-style violence that is so often portrayed in media caricatures of cartels, these organizations often work out business agreements when financially sound. Conversely, Latin American and Caribbean sparks in violence often mark an emergence of a fledgling drug market or a rebalancing of power in established ones. The relatively recent development of corporate-level drug trades in Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucia, and Jamaica were all accompanied by extraordinary murder rates.\textsuperscript{79}

Drug smuggling is big business and adheres to virtually all the principles of entrepreneurship, minus legal legitimacy. Even the lack of legal legitimacy is ignored and tacitly or overtly supported by persons, agencies, financial institutions, and some governments. Cartel access to expensive attorneys and invaluable trial documentation and evidence is invaluable to their improvisation, lessons-learned databases, and brain-storming sessions.

The allure of capitalist riches is irresistible, especially to the largely impoverished source and transit zone countries of the drug trade. This description of capitalism is equally applicable to illegal drug production and trafficking:

\begin{quote}
From transactions between buyers and sellers price systems emerge, and prices serve as a signal as to the urgent and unfilled wants of people. The promise of profits gives entrepreneurs incentive to use their knowledge and resources to satisfy those wants. Thus the activities of millions of people, each seeking his own interest, are coordinated. This decentralized system of coordination is…one of (capitalism’s) greatest strengths…it permits many solutions to be tried, and that real-world competition generally finds a good solution to emerging challenges.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}
Even those of the commercial liberalist economic persuasion can find an element of veracity in the mercantilist and economic nationalist contention that “open commerce can undermine the national security of states.”

The decentralization, diversity, out-sourcing, vast incomes, and extraordinary security procedures practiced in their operations enable most cartels to painlessly weather seizures of their cargo and capture of their personnel. Most employees do not know enough of the overall operation to be truly dangerous and they’re sensible enough to realize that incarceration by the authorities, with a return to lucrative employment once released, is far preferable to execution by the cartel if they provide incriminating evidence.

The cocaine market exemplifies the virtually unstoppable advance of capitalism and the market economy, markedly improving the standard of living in many Latin American regions and countries with precious few other options. The economic dependence on the drug trade in many Latin American and Caribbean countries has directly fueled its resilience. The GNP and GDP indices of Drug-producing and drug transit countries in the region are dependent upon the drug trade, and the “net regional earnings of the Caribbean drug industry…is actually equivalent to the total GDP of seven of the smaller independent states in the region.” The vicious cycle in which drug violence and tales of corruption reduces tourism further increases these states’ dependence on the drug market for their economic well-being or their very survival. For most of America’s southern neighbors, countries with unstable governments and fragile economies, fighting an “unwinnable war…in earnest” has devastating consequences.
The unyielding American sledgehammer approach may “actually be fueling terrorism in (Colombia).”

As violence rages, seemingly unchecked, “Mexico currently appears less stable than at any point since the transition to democracy in 2000.” Additionally, overt ties with “Yanqui imperialists” further erodes confidence and support for the government of this popularly anti-American society, which hasn’t trusted the U.S. since the Texas revolution of the 1830s and the war with the U.S. a decade later.

Employing admirable, industry-standard guidelines for “best hiring practices,” most cartels have many current or former law enforcement, military, special forces (Mexican Zetas, Guatemalan Kaibles), government, and judicial personnel within their payrolls, capitalizing on priceless insider knowledge and connections. Pitifully low salaries and benefits, comparative lawlessness, and substantial risks of not playing by the cartels’ rules within Mexico, Colombia, and several Caribbean states essentially encourages participation on the wrong side of the law. Conflicting messages from the U.S. inflames this issue, for the national resources it expends in curtailing the drug trade are far outweighed by the money its people spends on illegal drugs. The scandals and arrests within the Colombian, Mexican, and many Caribbean governments, agencies, militaries, national police, and politicians numbers in the tens of thousands. “Despite its prestige and professionalism, the Mexican military is not immune to corruption; its secretive nature and lack of external oversight may actually foster corruption while keeping it more hidden from sight.” The U.S. has also experienced drug-traffic-related corruption within the DEA, Customs, Border Patrol, Bureau of Prisons, state departments of
corrections, military, and National Guard, albeit at a negligible level in comparison to the cocaine producing and transit route countries.\textsuperscript{90}

Cartels also hire outside consultants, who “beat a path to their door with new ideas, technologies, techniques, and investment opportunities.”\textsuperscript{91} The employees who handle the profits, money laundering, investing, and provide financial advice often have advanced degrees in international banking, finance, and business – and look the part: well-groomed, well-dressed, and well-spoken.\textsuperscript{92} The FARC uses the drug trade “as its major financing source”\textsuperscript{93} and runs over 60 front companies.\textsuperscript{94}

Illegal drug networks are national and transnational organizations, many of which have morphed significantly throughout their existence. Some share information, cells, security, and profits;\textsuperscript{95} others are “tight-knit family affairs”\textsuperscript{96} or “street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs,”\textsuperscript{97} and some have existed for nearly forty years, beginning their illegal operations running alcohol or cigarettes and later branching into cocaine, marijuana, heroin, or methamphetamines.\textsuperscript{98} Others have been destroyed, have faded into other organizations, or have centralized, decentralized, out-sourced, or diversified their enterprises to meet the operating environment.

Ineffective cartel leadership may be replaced by collusion of lieutenants not unlike a violent board of directors,\textsuperscript{99} but cartels are not immune to internal fragmentation and a multitude of pressures, both external and within, that also haunt legitimate organizations.\textsuperscript{100} Not unlike legitimate enterprises, cartel competition is conspicuously ruthless, and occasionally provides “an intelligence bonanza as the rival factions leak information on their enemies”\textsuperscript{101} – not always intentionally – and sometimes truncates ongoing investigations once the suspects are assassinated.
As law enforcement seeks the biggest bang for its limited bucks by targeting the large cartels, smaller organizations materialize and flourish.\textsuperscript{102} Many cartels employ the “best strategies of major international businesses while maintaining the secrecy and compartmentalization of terrorist organizations.”\textsuperscript{103}

Although the U.S. government largely views its counter-narcotics diligence “as a law enforcement issue rather than one of trade and commerce,”\textsuperscript{104} it is very much a commercial enterprise for the drug cartels, albeit accompanied by absolutely essential militant component(s) (Mexico’s Zetas, Guatemala’s Kaibiles – in Mexico, Sinaloa cartel’s Negros, FARC, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia – AUC, National Liberation Army - ELN).\textsuperscript{105} Over seventy percent of Colombia’s cocaine trade is controlled by the financially flourishing FARC, AUC, ELN, the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Casanare (ACC), and Bloque Centauros, including production and protection taxes, route management, and transportation.\textsuperscript{106} Insurgency, revolution, terrorism – three words commonly associated with these organizations – clearly illustrate why the Colombia government has had its hands so full in controlling its drug problem.

Further highlighting the “business case,” several Caribbean countries “neither process nor consume”\textsuperscript{107} cocaine (Aruba, Haiti, etc.), alternatively providing only essential transportation and storage services to the drug trade. Astonishingly, the wealthiest and most economically driven and financially savvy nation in the world has written in its National Drug Control Strategy that “increased risk of arrest will also deter traffickers from entering the market and encourage others to leave.”\textsuperscript{108} This clearly underestimates the allure of a $400 billion market. The Strategy hails the DEA’s denial of $1.6 billion in revenue from drug trafficking and money laundering organizations in
FY2006, but curbing the drug trade’s bottom line by less than half a percent is hardly incentive to withdraw from one of the “biggest commercial activities in the world.”

The seductiveness of the illegal drug trade is indisputable; no other commodity provides a “gross mark-up, from production to retail sale, of up to 700 to 900 percent.” The unprecedented quality of coca harvested today enables manipulation of its purity at wholesale and/or retail levels with negligible adverse impact, providing tremendous flexibility and further enabling cartels to pass their expenses onto the consumer. Additionally, shrewd drug networks meticulously weigh the risks of incarceration, death, and asset seizure or destruction, as evidenced by mule decoys and aircraft graveyards in Latin American countries and the Bahamas, and the fact that intercepted vessels never return fire.

**Anatomy of Response: Professional, Predictable, and Paradoxical**

Despite the impressive price tag of the “War on Drugs,” the number of military and law enforcement assets involved in drug interdiction is far smaller than the rhetoric, the scope of the operation, and the size of the Area of Responsibility (AOR) or Joint Operations Area (JOA) would suggest.

The size of the Caribbean (2.8 million square km) in comparison to the Persian Gulf (240,000 square km), further illustrates the lack of military attention the area receives. A U.S. Carrier Strike Group and an Expeditionary Strike Group (13 ships and nearly 130 aircraft) are underway in the Persian Gulf today – plus several independent-steaming U.S. warships, a number of coalition or allied ships, and land-based patrol aircraft – a region in which the U.S. has maintained a consistent maritime presence for over 20 years. In the Caribbean, however, there are just a handful of ships and
Although the military’s role in drug interdiction is largely focused on intercepting vehicles dedicated to smuggling, it is noteworthy that the past several years of policymaker concern regarding the risk of terrorists penetrating U.S. borders is at least equally applicable to drug smuggling. The number of commercial and private cars, trucks, aircraft, and ships that cross America’s 12,000 miles of coastal and 7,500 miles of land borders annually totals well over one hundred million. The number of passengers in these vehicles, plus foot traffic, increases the number of potential smugglers to well over half a billion. Tourism and the sheer volume of goods and transport mechanisms that accompany the existence of NAFTA, CAFTA, and Caribbean free trade zone agreements overwhelms existing customs and border control management in the transit zone. The screening challenge is daunting, if not insurmountable.

Ironically, the demands of the “Drug War” have wrought revolutionary changes and progress in international and inter-agency coordination and cooperation, not only in interdiction efforts, extradition, and intelligence-sharing; but also in legal investigations, data-collection, and testimony preparation. The inter-agency complexion of “Drug War” prosecution, well ahead of its time, has existed since the beginning of the modern effort during Richard Nixon’s presidency. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South), Southern Command, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, Customs Border Protection, and the DEA are obvious to even the casual observer, but the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury, the National Security Agency, National Guard, State Department’s Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Matters, Homeland Security’s Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and dozens of law enforcement agencies are but a few of the many others immersed in this effort.\textsuperscript{117} Unfortunately, the inter-agency is also a victim of its own bureaucracy, forcing the recent establishment of twenty-six bilateral agreements to delineate “jurisdictional authorities within the international environment.”\textsuperscript{118} Generally, however, the “stovepiped” organizational model that once plagued prosecution of the “Drug War” rarely exists today.

The lengthy patrols and rapidly accumulating flight hours in arresting the supply side of the drug trade has incurred a recapitalization and “reset the force” requirement not unlike engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft first entered the inventory in 1962 and is operated by the U.S. Navy and Department of Homeland Security (Customs Border Protection agency), averages over 30 years old, is particularly susceptible to fatigue limitations and operates under strict flight-hour management and oversight. Portions of the fleet are frequently grounded for extended periods to complete structural inspections, repairs, and upgrades.\textsuperscript{119} Hardware shortfalls and budgetary commitments elsewhere frequently results in regional surveillance reduction for varying periods, further eroding situational awareness of illegal drug transport operations.\textsuperscript{120}

The Dutch, French, and British also provide intercept aircraft, investigators, law enforcement and intelligence personnel, state-of-the-art surveillance equipment, and thirty percent of the warships, auxiliary vessels, and patrol aircraft engaged in Caribbean interdiction.\textsuperscript{121} The French will also be providing AWACS aircraft within the
upcoming months. These resources, and nearly seamless interagency and intergovernmental operational (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) relationships, have proven indispensable in attacking the supply-side, particularly in Caribbean maritime interdiction. In fact, the Eastern Caribbean theater would be virtually unpatrolled without European assistance. Unfortunately, these nations are also limited by shrinking defense budgets and relentless worldwide commitments.

The interdependency of these assets can be as beneficial as it is detrimental. A ship, for example, is a tremendous platform for on-scene commander, but sans helicopter, it can only cover 15 percent of its surrounding location continuously. A helicopter onboard increases regional coverage to 40-45 percent. A maritime patrol aircraft in the area increases coverage to 75 percent, providing a tremendous footprint in the area. The advent of the Coast Guard’s Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON) package and 2001 policy change that permitted crews to stop intercepted vessels with disabling fire has condensed the Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) process but has not clearly produced measurable reductions in illicit drug supplies to the U.S.

The multifarious interdiction efforts also include representation of twelve countries on the JIATF-South staff; and Theater Security Cooperation efforts such as the U.S. Southern Command’s “Tradewinds” and “Enduring Friendship” training programs and exercises, some of which are more “political stabilization programs” than counter-narcotics efforts, and which persist despite geographic and cultural rivalries and tensions between non-U.S. participants.
Counter-narcotics efforts have also produced extradition treaties with the U.S. and Mexico, which have unfortunately rendered some very tragic consequences. The theory that “extradition is a very powerful weapon in the hands of a weak government,”\textsuperscript{127} is instead another drug war paradox, in which second and third order effects seemingly contradict the intent. It is difficult to assess whether the benefits of conducting legal proceedings and incarceration for drug criminals in the U.S. is worth the ensuing intensification of cartel violence – assassinations, bombings, and the like – that has effectively paralyzed local, regional, and national governing bodies; particularly in Colombia, and more recently in Mexico. “It is impossible to overestimate the level of fear on the Mexican side among government and police officers.”\textsuperscript{128} This provokes denial and self-censorship among the populace and Mexican media as well.\textsuperscript{129} Each new wave of unimaginable violence further erodes the public’s faith that their government (particularly Mexico and Colombia) can control the menace.\textsuperscript{130}

Although policymakers have attempted to assist in prosecution and asset forfeiture of drug organizations with legislative acts such as RICO (Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) and CCE (Continuing Criminal Enterprise),\textsuperscript{131} the American legal system and its protection of defendants’ rights and demands for convincing evidence and motive remains one of the pivotal challenges to defeating the illegal drug networks, often long after shipments have been seized and suspects arrested.

Working within the legal system is infinitely more formidable than operating outside it. Most illegal drug investigations and operations are extremely lengthy (over a decade in some cases), intricate, and \textit{vulnerable}.\textsuperscript{132} Undercover agents, operating in a delicate
and unforgiving environment, are also individually vulnerable to overt or unintentional compromise in an open society and human intelligence-dependent undertaking.\textsuperscript{133}

Finally, incarceration is yet another topic of debate, as arrests of cartel leadership (Osiel Cardenas of the Gulf Cartel, Benjamin Arellano Felix of Sinaloa) do not necessarily “halt the flow of drugs,” but instead shift the organization’s headquarters or “alter the balance of power among cartels and open a Pandora’s Box of violence.”\textsuperscript{134}

**Deadlock: Four Decades of Mire and Treadmill Policy**

The White House argues the logic of a supply-side assault in the “Drug War” “by targeting the economic vulnerabilities of the illegal drug trade, market disruption seeks to create inefficiencies in drug production and distribution, resulting in decreased drug abuse in the United States.”\textsuperscript{135} The report card on the viability of this strategy is glum. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 2008 interagency guidance “concludes that current removal rates have not demonstrated reductions in the estimated flow of cocaine into the U.S.”\textsuperscript{136} and further notes that the “(Drug Interdiction Program) has not provided evidence that it compares favorably to other law enforcement programs or other programs involved in reducing drug abuse in the U.S.”\textsuperscript{137}

Intelligence community and Coast Guard accounts that, “we interdicted 11 percent of the total amount of cocaine”\textsuperscript{138} do not provide meaningful metrics when demand and retail price are virtually unchanged\textsuperscript{139} and evidence of market growth and expansion abounds. Indications that cocaine prices in major American cities may have dropped is further frustrating to law enforcement,\textsuperscript{140} as their exertion is comparable to jogging in place – seemingly devoid of any actual headway.
Military and law enforcement interdiction of the illegal drug supply is analogous to a doughy mass that simply pops up in new area when it’s smashed in another, the arcade “Whack-a-Mole” game, or the squeezing of a partially inflated balloon in which the air rushes into an unpressurized section for an infinite number of squeezes.\(^{141}\) “Reduce it in Colombia, and the traffickers move across the border to Bolivia. Clamp down there, it moves back to Colombia or into Peru.”\(^{142}\) “As (drug trafficking) spreads to new regions, so does the violence, crime, and corruption that accompany it.”\(^{143}\) “Aggressive drug enforcement actually exacerbates drug-related violence”\(^{144}\) as “competition for control of the trade increases after people are displaced from territories or structures.”\(^{145}\) It also “tends to winnow out the weakest criminal organizations and leave the most ruthless, corrupting, and violent ones standing;”\(^{146}\) just one of many ironies inherent in the “Drug War.”

The balloon effect is further evident as U.S. foreign assistance funding rises and falls, for illicit drug source countries are far too impoverished and institutionally weak to combat the drug networks on their own.\(^{147}\) Reduction in U.S. support essentially invites the drug trade back into production areas or transit zones from which it was temporarily purged. Combating rampant poverty, low mortality rates, lawlessness and carnage,\(^{148}\) America’s “would be allies (transit zone and source countries) do not share U.S. interests in fighting the drug war, because their other priorities are simply overwhelming.”\(^{149}\) The magnitude of their challenges are incomprehensible to most Americans. “The cure to what ails…is development.”\(^{150}\)

Permutation is a way of life for trafficking networks, switching transit corridors with more ease than rush-hour commuters:
Since the late 1970s drug-smuggling routes have changed repeatedly in response to government interdiction efforts. When law enforcers discover large quantities of drugs passing along a particular sea-, air-, or land-based corridor, they concentrate their interdiction and surveillance assets in the offending area. Intensified enforcement leads to an immediate and palpable increase in arrests and drug seizures as authorities disrupt established routes. But these interruptions often prove ephemeral, as smuggling groups quickly move their transportation routes to areas where government pressure is less intense.\textsuperscript{151}

The “Non-Commercial Maritime Flow Distribution” measure, one of many tools used by the national Drug Interdiction Program, depicts “how Coast Guard interdiction efforts compel smugglers to change their drug smuggling routes,”\textsuperscript{152} but prudently avoids drawing any particular conclusion(s) from this data to weigh its meaning.

Examples of mobility and resilience abound throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, to the extent that DEA and Customs/Border Patrol charts of drug smuggling routes leave precious little white space, as the lines and arrows encompass virtually all air, land, and sea areas.\textsuperscript{153} “This business will not end, because when you close one door, the drug traffickers open three or four more.”\textsuperscript{154} The drug trade’s robust “Hydra Effect,” in which new routes, new organizations, new mules and transportation mechanisms, and new production initiatives “simply spring up elsewhere” is a consummate source of frustration and awe by interdiction agencies.\textsuperscript{155} Drug producers and smugglers are as malleable as their merchandise. “The persistence of Colombia’s drug trade” is facilitated by the “competitive adaptation” and “organizational learning capacities of drug traffickers…who change their activities in response to information and experience, store their knowledge in practices and institutional memories, and select routines that produce satisfactory results.”\textsuperscript{156}
Nevertheless, administrations and policymakers, seemingly caught in an inescapable bureaucratic momentum, continue to catapult billions of dollars into this endless effort.\textsuperscript{157} Conspiracy theories within the public domain that the CIA is heavily involved in drug smuggling\textsuperscript{158} or that budgets depend upon an existing requirement, therefore successfully curtailing the supply of illegal drugs is not in the interests of the interdiction forces and authorities are extremely careless and ignore the endless potpourri of worldwide demands on law enforcement and military capabilities. But this callowness does help to demonstrate a component of the “self-defeating dynamics of the drug war,”\textsuperscript{159} which is a deficiency of government communication with the public and failure to achieve “buy-in.” Just as uncovering a way in which to fix America’s drug problem is elusive, nationwide recognition and concern that there is a problem may be equally nonexistent.\textsuperscript{160}

The circumlocutory approach to the drug trade is not an American phenomenon. The government of Britain, a rapidly growing consumer of cocaine, funds its Caribbean military and law enforcement interdiction with training dollars, maintaining that the tracking of “go-fasters” is comparable to tracking the periscopes of enemy submarines in a \textit{real war}. Constrained by budgets and refusal to acknowledge the global interconnectedness of the drug trade with a multitude of other evils, Britain will not fund Eastern Pacific drug interdiction efforts for the simple reason that “those drugs aren’t enroute to the U.K.”\textsuperscript{161}

Attempting to find fault with the execution of interdiction and seizure techniques is a vain effort, regardless of the frequency and intensity of the assault on the hierarchy, size, bureaucratic constraints and restraints, and decision-making processes of law
enforcement and military agencies charged with waging the “Drug War.” The real challenge lies in a supply-side strategy that will face an infinite menace for as long as lucrative demand exists. Despite strategic-level entanglement in a purgatory of supply-side interdiction, dwarfed by the shadow of inexhaustible demand, the U.S. and its allies continue to revel in tactical and campaign-level successes.

Over the past century, a prosperous America has developed an innate tendency to broadly and impulsively distribute funding and assets at challenges that alternatively require sophisticated and comprehensive solutions. But “pouring more U.S. money…won’t necessarily solve the problem.” The U.S. counter-narcotics supply-side interdiction effort is, at best, a “Band-aid.” Decades of statistical manipulations, revised versions of The National Drug Control Strategy, policy statements from the Drug Czar, and the White House report on the Drug Interdiction Program reveal that drug use, abuse, and addiction remains problematic – growing in some areas, temporarily shrinking in others. Street prices of heroin and cocaine have remained relatively constant for at least 20 years, despite concurrent and dramatic expansion of law enforcement operations. Short-term pricing spikes in U.S. cities often occur during summer months, when daylight hours are longer and drug running is more risky, school recesses increase demand, and tourists purchase drugs on vacation (compressing traffickers’ routes to the consumer).

More today than ever before, the U.S. strategy is vitally dependent upon cooperation, intelligence, and mutual support of foreign governments, militaries, law enforcement, and communities. The U.S. even shares a small scale cooperative drug enforcement agreement with Cuba. Although “professional rivalries within and across
police agencies have been a persistent...feature of U.S. drug enforcement,”
combined, joint, and inter-agency counter-narcotics operations beyond American shores
have been far more competent and sophisticated. Diplomatic challenges (overflight,
servicing, and landing rights; legal jurisdiction founded in Dutch law vice contemporary
Caribbean reality), \(^\text{170}\) and flaws in information sharing, deconfliction, and application still
exist, but these are not the crux of the failure to curtail the supply of illegal drugs.\(^\text{171}\) The
lack of prosecution assets, both in terms of interdiction platforms, personnel, and the
legal system, is a far more significant Achilles heel than any shortcomings in human
intelligence or digital surveillance mediums.\(^\text{172}\)

Unfortunately, U.S. strategy is also vitally dependent upon an immeasurable sum
of assets and man-hours expended to collect, analyze, categorize, and eventually
present “Drug War” data to policymakers and leadership, to feed the insatiable
bureaucratic appetite for information and confirmation of policy.

The Way Ahead

2009 marks the forty-year anniversary of the modern “War on Drugs,” but the U.S.
remains the world’s largest consumer of cocaine and other illegal narcotics. A long-
term, national-level vision for the “way ahead” may be long overdue, as no other
expenditure of resources so massive, so interagency coordination dependent, and so
foreign policy intensive has ever escaped such scrutiny for two entire generations. The
U.S. supply-side strategy lumbers forward, “designed to cause major disruption to the
flow of (cocaine), money, and chemicals between source zones and the United States
through the execution of joint enforcement operations that attack the main arteries and
support infrastructure nodes of the (cocaine) trade,”\(^\text{173}\) but escaping measurable
progress. Supply-side operations, “comprised of a combination of staggered and simultaneous land, air, maritime, and financial attacks involving synchronized interagency counter drug operations designed to influence illicit trafficking patterns and increase disruptions of drug trafficking organizations,” annually purge hundreds of kilotons of cocaine from the illicit drug market, but incessant demand relentlessly refills the interminable tidal pool. Although generally undisputed that interdicted cocaine is kept off the streets and profits are kept from funding cartels, insurgencies and terrorist organizations, “interdiction may account for only about 8 percent of the total price of cocaine,” and “an inconceivable 50 percent reduction in the Latin American cocaine supply destined for the United States would raise the street price by a paltry 3 percent.”

The U.S. drug war has far outspent the war in Vietnam and “Columbia is now the largest recipient of U.S. military aid outside the Middle East.” But it is not just a money issue. Over “400 members of the Mexican military have been killed in the battle against drug traffickers since 2000,” plus thousands more civilians, drug smugglers, and dealers. The Colombian counterinsurgency has been waged for 43 years. Despite spending over three percent of its GDP on a principally internally-focused military, combined with epic U.S. funding and military support, there is “no end in sight.”

“Growing disappointment and disillusionment in Congress with the ineffectual supply-side emphasis of existing U.S. anti-drug policies” led to a new focus on demand in the late 1980s, and the establishment of the Drug Czar represented another milestone in focus, but both initiatives faded away with little real change. Cursory evaluations of America’s policies, innocuous political wind-shifting, and commonly
applied measures of success and failure are neophytic and misleading. Biennial Congressional terms merely offer a fleeting glance into this forty-year undertaking.

The U.S. faces a nine trillion dollar national debt, and with increasingly austere resources demanded by infinite worldwide commitments, it is financially irresponsible to not evaluate this “Drug War” and its supply-side interdiction. As interagency coordination has improved and the “Drug War” has leveraged capabilities and technologies developed in other theaters, affordability has been its life-support mechanism. Failure to engage in an objective, mutually respectful public health debate will prolong the funding of this “War” and shirks responsibilities for stewardship of America’s resources, particularly in view of epic monetary obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Forty years of “Drug War” deserves policymaker commitment and consideration. If the success of the “Drug War” is measured in the journey, and not in actually reaching the destination, it has not been an abject failure. But if it is to be measured in terms of a win or a loss, then a comprehensive, national-level assessment by the Executive and Legislative Branches is long overdue; particularly as America’s consciousness awakens to rapidly emerging drug threats elsewhere, such as Afghanistan’s opium. There is clearly much more to “winning the War on Drugs” than merely “dispatching more American helicopters to the Andes.” Extricating the military from any action has always been far more challenging than involving them in the first place – and may not actually be a viable solution. But for all the hyperbole that 11 September 2001 invokes, perhaps none is more genuine than the realization that the world is truly interconnected.

Just as proving the impact of non-occurring terrorist attacks induces public skepticism
and apathy, directly correlating the success of illegal drug interdictions to credible, real life effects is impossibly challenging. None of these efforts occur in a vacuum. The illicit worldwide market for drugs, money laundering, and weapons is inescapably interlocked. Anti-“Drug War” rhetoric is just as poorly informed, emotional, and inconsistent as “Drug War” advocates, failing to produce substantive arguments that objectively justify U.S. withdrawal from the effort.

Economics trumps law enforcement, for the drug trade’s bottom line is just too lucrative to forego when risks and potential consequences are so dramatically outweighed by financial rewards. Although America’s “War on Drugs” is a long term problem with a consistently short-sighted strategy, the epiphany of globalization on its consciousness has garnered a resurgence of “Drug War” justification in the post-9/11 era. Irrespective of their influence on societal degradation, illicit drugs are also inextricably linked to several other national security threats, from money-laundering and insurgencies to arms trafficking and terrorist funding.

The daily impacts of the “Drug War” are a nebulous mix of pros and cons; and the legacy results of the “Drug War’s” supply-side interdiction may never be crystal clear. An honest, well-informed debate may reveal that supply-side interdiction is truly beneficial, and superior to any other alternatives. At the least, however, it must be executed in conjunction with a long-range, well-resourced education, treatment and rehabilitation programs. Phoenix House drug therapy, rehab, and vocational placement programs, a nationwide model for enduring effectiveness, provide a glimpse into the strategic investment required. Most are over two-years in length, longer than a Congressional term of office.184
Supply-side interdiction may indeed be a necessary adjunct to a global strategy for combating illicit drugs in a concerted, dual-fronted supply and demand assault, but the vast expenditure of resources and blood, and the widespread influence of perpetually failing states and communities, justifies a fresh, holistic reassessment and development of a realistic, fundable, long-range roadmap. Whether shifting balances of power in the legislature or a new political administration is capable of handling this intimidating perplexity is certainly debatable, but to avoid facing this challenge is reckless, irresponsible, and dangerous. Globalization will not long tolerate wallowing in the status quo.

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