STRENGTHENING MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

BY

COLONEL TRACY R. NORRIS
Texas Army National Guard

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
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Tracy Norris

U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA, 17013-5220

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Colonel Tracy R. Norris
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Colonel Mark Eshelman
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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There have been many discussions of unity of effort and unity of command in regards to domestic civil support operations and the relationship of Title 32 and Title 10 assets. The question of State Adjutants General having operational control of Title 10 military forces and Title 10 active duty officers under USC 32 given operational control of Title 32 National Guard has been at the center of these discussions. Building relationships and understanding between the military forces is part of the solution to move past these discussions. This paper will examine four concepts which will support the building of stronger relationships between Title 32 National Guard forces and Title 10 military forces in domestic civil support operations. These four measures for consideration are the use of the State National Guards’ Joint Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State), the use of Joint Doctrine for planning and command and control relationships, formalizing the exposure and understanding of Title 32 assets in the Professional Military Education (PME) system, and the vital leadership skills required to build this relationship.
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Since Hurricane Katrina, many papers and reports have been written regarding unity of effort versus unity of command for Title 32 National Guard and Title 10 military forces deployed during domestic civil support operations. Lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina response have had Federal and state agencies reassessing their processes, procedures and relationships. Processes and procedures can be analyzed and points of failure determined, corrected and documented. Assessing and building relationships is more challenging when there is a history behind the relationship.

During Hurricane Katrina, the Governor of Louisiana refused President Bush’s offer of a Title 10 active duty military officer in a dual status as a Title 32 officer to command National Guard and Title 10 military forces in the response operations. Governor Blanco declined the offer feeling she would lose control over the National Guard forces. Instead, she offered putting a Title 32 military officer in dual status to control military forces. An agreement was never reached and Title 32 and Title 10 military forces remained under separate commands. These reactions demonstrate the weakness of the relationship and trust between the state National Guard leadership, National Guard Bureau leadership, and the Title 10 military leadership.

Based on historical events, the Louisiana Governor’s reaction and concern are what one might expect. Prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) when state National Guards were called to active duty, Title 10 military leadership usually either questioned the readiness of the unit or removed the National Guard leadership and replaced them with active component officers. During Operation Desert Storm, the
National Guard Brigades’ confidence was eroded because the Brigades were mobilized but were never deployed to theater due to concerns about their readiness and training, despite the fact that the active component certified the National Guard’s Brigades as operationally ready for deployment. During World War II, all but two of the mobilized National Guard Divisions had their National Guard leadership replaced with active component commanders. The relationship between the National Guard and Title 10 military forces during the Global War on Terrorism has grown stronger with each component developing a mutual respect with joint deployments overseas in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Exposure to each other, the experience of working together, and an understanding of each other has made relationship has become stronger between Title 10 military forces and National Guard forces. An example of this is with the mobilization of the National Guard units to Title 10. Active duty human resource personnel have an understanding of the challenges where units have Soldiers that come from different State National Guards. The Soldiers’ mobilization orders come from their state, and their evaluations get sent to their state. The 36th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) from the Texas Army National Guard deployed to Iraq in 2006 and had 22 plus States represented. This situation required the personnel officer of the brigade to deal with each state separately on many personnel issues. This process is very different than for the active component, but the personnel officer at Multi-National Corps-Iraq understood this different National Guard process from having worked with the 36th CAB personnel officer.
The relationship between Title 32 National Guard and Title 10 military forces also needs exposure to each other in regards to domestic civilian support operations. This exposure and coordination needs to take place before response to a real crisis happens so each has an understanding and respect for each other’s roles. The lack of a relationship between the National Guard and Title 10 military forces was very apparent during Hurricane Katrina. There were over 46,500 National Guard troops from various states deployed through Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements with their state and the State of Louisiana to support the hurricane response. There were 22,000 active duty troops deployed with no formal agreement between U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the National Guard, which caused a lack of synchronization of efforts.\(^5\) One example of this was when an active duty Soldier told a National Guard Soldier to take his magazine out of his weapon. Title 32 military forces’ Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) during that period was magazine in the weapon.\(^6\)

This paper will examine four concepts which will support the building of stronger relationships between Title 32 National Guard forces and Title 10 military forces in domestic civil support operations. These four measures for consideration are the use of the State National Guards’ Joint Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State), the use of Joint Doctrine for planning and command and control relationships, formalizing the exposure and understanding of Title 32 assets in the Professional Military Education (PME) system, and the vital leadership skills required to build this relationship.
The National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (JFHQ-State)

The Joint Force Headquarters-State is the best organization to use to bring state and Federal military resources together during planning for and responding to domestic civil support operations on a state and regional level. The JFHQ-State, as the state primary military planner, already has a relationship with the state emergency management agency, the Governor’s office, other state agencies as well as surrounding states’ government agencies and National Guard Bureau. The National Response Framework describes the National Guard as “a crucial state resource during emergencies and disasters.” The JFHQ-State relationship for planning and execution with the active and other reserve components need, to be matured with USNORTHCOM.

The U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, held a symposium in July of 2007 where the focus was on Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crises. One of the four workshops looked at “The potential need to establish an appropriate mechanism for the military to accompany and support civilian components focused on regional response to catastrophe.” The objective of this workshop was to determine a better means of incorporating all elements of military response (active component, the National Guard, and reserve forces) in support of Federal, state, and local authorities during catastrophic events. Participants of the conference included Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security, USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, the Adjutants General of the states of Georgia, Rhode Island, and Texas, the Pennsylvania Director of Homeland Security and other representatives from the public and private sector. All participants agreed that the appropriate organization to provide
the visibility of accessible military forces and know their regional and state public and private capabilities is the state’s National Guard. This agreement was based on the facts that all disasters are local; the civilian designed National Incident Management System (NIMS) is initiated from the bottom-up; and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) was designed by the states to support the states. The JFHQ-State is the state National Guard’s organization that would execute this task.

History of the National Guard JFHQ-State

In May 2003, LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, obtained consensus from The Adjutants General of the 54 states and territories to transform the National Guard State Area Commands (STARC) to a Joint Force Headquarters-State. His vision was to make a joint headquarters for the National Guard in each state where there had been a separate Army and Air Guard Headquarters. This transformation makes the Guard look more like their active component counterparts and “we [the Guard] will be better understood by our active-duty counterparts.” The mission of the JFHQ-State is to provide the Governor command and control of all National Guard assets in the state or territory. The JFHQ-State supports all Joint Task Force(s)-State deployed in support of civil authorities within the state and coordinates any additional support required such as additional forces or other logistical support.

The 54 states and territories have implemented the JFHQ-State in different ways due to challenges in personnel authorizations. Some states, usually the larger states, have broken out different staffs. A joint staff, Army Guard staff (G-Staff), and an Air Guard staff (A-Staff) are established with existing resources. Other states, usually being smaller, have made their positions “dual-hat” with the joint staff and the Army and Air
Guard Staffs. One person will be the J-1 and the G-1 or A-1. The optimal utilization is to be able to have separate staffs, with the J-Staff focusing on state issues such as response to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or security for large state or regional events (i.e. Olympics). The Army and Air Guard staffs would then focus on unit readiness and mobilizing units for their specific service for Federal and state missions. Some smaller states that have to dual-hat their staffs have separated out their Director of Military Support (of Civilian Authorities) which does state planning for state emergencies. These individuals have one mission and intentionally are not dual-hatted due to importance of this mission.¹³

National Guard JFHQ-State Relationships

As already stated, the JFHQ-State has working interagency and cooperative relationships with the state emergency management agency, the Governor’s office, other state agencies as well as surrounding states’ government agencies and National Guard Bureau. Each state, through their emergency planning efforts, has developed interagency relationships within the state and these are usually documented. Responsibility at different levels of the response operations is already worked out before any incident happens. Each agency knows what capabilities others brings to the table.

In 2007, during wildfire support in Texas, the use of empowered and trained liaison officers (LNOs) between state agencies proved invaluable. Texas National Guard JFHQ-State sent three LNOs to work with the Texas Forest Service. The LNOs were predetermined, the Forest Service already knew the individuals, and had trained with them before the incidence occurred.¹⁴ Texas National Guard also has a permanent state employee LNO in the Texas State Operations Center (SOC) from the JFHQ-State
who advises on capabilities and facilities on initial activation and can be augmented with
traditional part time National Guard personnel during major events. Another example is
the New York National Guard which has two designated LNOs that deploy during an
incident to the New York Emergency Operations Center (EOC) – the J-4 and a
Command Group representative.\(^{15}\)

The state and the JFHQ-State have relationships and visibility of surrounding
states resources. These assets are accessible through the interstate Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The EMAC allows for critical assets such
as doctors, law enforcement, firefighting, and public health services to deploy to the
requesting state with the issues of liability, reimbursement, licensure, workmen’s
compensation, etc. already addressed.\(^{16}\) Many EMACs are put in place “pre-disaster.”
An example is a Texas agreement with Louisiana that Texas will deploy the Texas
National Guard immediately in support of Louisiana during an incident, but Texas can
recover their forces after 96 hours if needed.\(^{17}\) This arrangement ensures Louisiana will
have additional National Guard forces quickly for disaster response.

Building the Relationship between the National Guard JFHQ-State and USNORTHCOM

USNORTHCOM, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, is coordinating
directly with the states for domestic support. The USNORTHCOM coordination
framework is based on a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and Defense
Coordinating Element (DCE) who are permanently assigned in a Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) region in order to plan, coordinate, and integrate defense
support of civil authorities with local, state and Federal agencies.\(^{18}\) The DCE is a small
team of personnel that supports the DCO. The DCO framework builds habitual
relationships with the state EOCs and the JFHQ-State. The states’ EOCs have
developed relationships with their FEMA region. With the DCO collocated at the FEMA
region, the environment exists for relationship building between the state EOC and the
FEMA region. The DCO and the JFHQ-State must also build a LNO relationship. This
relationship needs to support contingency planning for the national planning scenarios,
capabilities gap analysis, and pre-determined command and control relationships for
military forces.

Use of Joint Doctrine for Planning and Command and Control Relationships

response effort must begin with a strong foundation based on clear roles and
responsibilities across all levels of government…An effective, coordinated response
begins with sound planning well before an incident occurs. The planning process will
translate policy, strategy, doctrine, and capabilities into specific tasks and courses of
action to be undertaken during a response.”19 Additionally, Secretary Paul McHale, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs,
advocates a robust state planning effort drive the emergency response planning
process.20 Based on the assumption that the state’s National Guard is the appropriate
organization to provide visibility of accessible military forces and know their regional and
state public and private capabilities, the state’s National Guard JFHQ should lead the
planning for military forces in domestic response efforts.21

Each state government has different concerns and faces different hazards and
threats. The coastal states face hurricanes. Other states respond to floods, wild fires,
and tornadoes. All states plan for incidents such as chemical releases (i.e. chlorine or
ammonia) from industrial accidents or terrorists attacks. The states’ National Guards are in the planning process for the response to these threats. The Title 10 military forces must understand the different nuances of different states in order to respond and must be involved in the planning process. The use of joint doctrine can facilitate this requirement.

Use of Joint Doctrine for Planning

Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0), Joint Operations Planning, is “keystone doctrine for joint operation planning throughout the range of military operations.” Chapter 1 of JP 5-0, titled Joint Strategic Planning, describes security cooperation planning and defines security cooperation as, “the means by which Department of Defense (DoD) encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives.” USNORTHCOM has security cooperation plans (SCP) with Mexico and Canada. Additionally, this technique is being applied to the relationship with USNORTHCOM and the individual states. Four of the six SCP categories identified in JP 5-0 would apply to the “State SCP.” These include: military contacts (conferences, senior official visits), multinational training, multinational exercises, and multinational education. The “multinational” events would be instead between local responders, state responders, Title 32 military forces and Title 10 military forces.

A state SCP should be expanded to include each state’s nuances (relevant threats and hazards), responses to the national planning scenarios, identification of capabilities gaps, and proposed command and control relationships worked out pre-disaster. “State SCP” may be a confusing term and not appropriate for implementation of this concept, but will be used for the purposes of this paper. The JFHQ-State and the corresponding
DCO should lead the planning process for the State SCP with the goal of putting the right military resources in the right place as rapidly as possible. The JFHQ-State would have all the state emergency management planning information and add the military resources to the capability gaps identified through the state planning process. These capabilities gaps would be filled through pre-scripted mission assignments (MA) from first, Title 32 military forces, and then, MAs from Title 10 military forces for each national planning scenario. MAs are special purpose capability packages that respond to various domestic scenarios. The MAs would be pre-coordinated with the force-providing component in order to prevent any insertion of unnecessary personnel which would complicate unity of effort. MAs could even be developed with a combination of Title 32 and Title 10 military forces based on the response needs and pre-disaster plans and agreements. If the state SCP identifies local and state resources needed for response to each national planning scenario as well as Title 32 and Title 10 military forces with a proposed command and control relationship, the speed of a response can be reduced.

Planning Command and Control Relationships

A proposed command and control (C2) relationship between Title 32 and Title 10 military forces must be included in the State SCP and approved by the state’s National Guard, USNORTHCOM, and coordinated through the National Guard Bureau. The relationship may differ based on the national planning scenario being addressed. All relationships must be considered in order to achieve unity of effort during the response. Command relationships of operational control, tactical control, and direct support need to be considered and a proposed relationship designated in the state SCP. Title 32 military forces and Title 10 military forces could have these relationships agreed upon,
approved in the state SCP, and then practice the execution of these relationships in programmed exercises also planned in the state SCP. Since all tasking comes from the state emergency agency, the designated relationship between the two military forces creates a unity of effort without necessarily having unity of command.

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in their final report made two observations and recommendations which relate to command and control relationships. USNORTHCOM should, “develop plans for consequence management and support to civil authorities that account for state-level activities and incorporate the use of the National Guard and Reserve forces as first military responders.” 26 The second part is, “DoD needs to overcome its historic reluctance to put the National Guard and Reserves ‘in charge,’ believing that the active component should control everything.” 27

Additionally, two assumptions can be made during the planning process: the state Title 32 military forces will be the first military responders, and the governor of the state will be reluctant to give up control of their National Guard if Title 10 forces are called in to support a domestic civil support operation. By having a written “agreed to” state SCP that has these projected relationships worked out ahead of time then the observations of the commission would cease to be an issue. An approved state SCP could be looked at as a type of EMAC.


Congress has legislated through the 2008 NDAA that the Secretary of Defense, not later then 1 June 2008, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau will prepare a plan for using the National Guard in the national planning scenarios. The plan is to
have two versions - one version using just the National Guard and a second version using the National Guard and Title 10 military forces. Using the joint planning doctrine discussed above, working out proposed command and control relationships within these plans, and then practicing the plans through planned exercises will strengthen the relationship between Title 32 and Title 10 military forces and produce a coordinated response to domestic civil support operations.

**Formalizing Exposure and Understanding of Title 32 Assets in the Professional Military Education (PME) and other Military Organizations**

National Guard and Reserve Soldiers are required to attend Title 10 active Army schools for basic qualification. Furthermore, newly assessed enlisted Soldiers attend basic training and advanced individual training (AIT) while junior officers attend the Army’s Basic Officer Leadership Course. These schools integrate the new Soldiers into the Army system and give all Soldiers, active and reserve, the same common basic warfighting skills. Through the rest of their career, National Guard and reserve enlisted Soldiers and officers attend the resident active component PME courses or accredited PME distance learning courses to meet their military education requirements for qualification and advancement. This PME training focuses almost exclusively on the Army’s homeland defense mission and may conduct a “for your information” brief on the Army’s defense support of civil authorities mission. National Guard and Reserve Soldiers understand the homeland defense mission and the core competencies associated with this mission due to the exposure and training received throughout their career. In order to strengthen the relationship between Title 32 and Title 10 military forces in a domestic civil support operation, exposure and understanding of the Title 32
assets must be inserted in the PME system and other military organizations such as the Active Component/Reserve Component Program and USNORTHCOM.

Formalizing Exposure and Understanding of Title 32 Assets in the Professional Military Education (PME)

The USAWC Symposium, *Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crisis*, identified that the “PME system should be adjusted to ensure the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is infused in the system.”29 The symposium elaborated on the web-based training on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This is a good start, but in order to institutionalize the mission of DSCA and ensure Soldiers at all levels are familiar with the skill sets involved in this mission, they need to be exposed in key levels of their PME.

At a minimum, Title 32 and Title 10 officers should start being exposed to concepts of civil support, Title 32 National Guard forces, and the NIMS at the Captain’s Career Course (CCC). National Guard soldiers attending this course will most likely be company commanders or to be assistant operations officers (generally). Once these officers go on to the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), they are preparing or may have already been assigned as an operations officer or an executive officer in a battalion. The battalion is the lowest level where there is an organized staff executing the planning process. This is also the most likely level where Title 10 military force operations and planning officers will interact with civil authorities and Title 32 military forces during a domestic incident. As of academic year 2007, CGSC has added a lesson on DSCA to the curriculum of approximately six hours. DSCA is also inserted in the scenarios of
exercises that the students participate in as part of full spectrum operations. Due to an increase in emphasis, the curriculum program manager expects more DSCA being added in the future.\textsuperscript{30}

The battalion pre-command courses and the War College level PME should also include exposure to the DSCA mission and Title 32 military forces. The U.S. Army War College presents DSCA several times during the core courses and offers an elective during the second semester. Enlisted Soldiers should have the same exposure starting at the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNOC) level on through the Sergeant Majors’ Academy. All Soldiers, officer and enlisted, in operational and command positions, should understand support of civil authorities and Title 32 military forces. This skill set may also assist during multi-national operations.\textsuperscript{31}

Exposure and Understanding of Title 32 Assets for Defense Coordination Officers

The Defense Coordination Officer (DCO) is permanently assigned to the FEMA region in order to plan, coordinate, and integrate defense support of civil authorities with local, state and Federal agencies. The DCO concept is to build habitual relationships with the FEMA staff, state emergency responders, the Adjutant General of the state, the JFHQ-State staff, and potential base support installations.\textsuperscript{32} The DCO must understand the Incident Command System (ICS) and know that most incidents happen locally. This is contrary to the DOD planning process that officers have had ingrained in their training since the beginning of their career. The DoD planning process was not developed to consider bottom up requirements.\textsuperscript{33}

Attendees of the USAWC Symposium, Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crisis, strongly advocated institutionalizing the DSCA mission as a Joint PME
requirement. This would include the requirement to have the DCO formally trained within the PME system and the assignment credited for a Joint DOD assignment. The formal PME training would award a trained DCO an additional skill identifier (ASI). Besides being a joint assignment, the duty as a DCO should also be considered a career enhancing billet which would have weight on assignment and promotion boards. Institutionalizing the DSCA by formalizing the training and assignment requirements of the DCO will strengthen the understanding and relationship of Title 32 assets for Title 10 military forces during domestic civil support operations.

Active Component/Reserve Component Program (AC/RC)

The reinstatement of the AC/RC Program, with some revisions, would enhance and strengthen the relationship between the Title 32 National Guard forces and the Title 10 active and reserve military forces. The AC/RC program consisted of active component Soldiers, officers and enlisted, being assigned to National Guard and reserve units to enhance the readiness of the reserve component units. The Title 10 Soldier returns to active component assignments with a better understanding of the National Guard and reserve units and their challenges. National Guard and reserve officers were also assigned to active component units in this program. This program has been suspended due to operational tempo and the need for manpower for the global war on terror effort.

Additionally, the Marine Corps Inspector-Instructor (I&I) Program could be used as a model for revising the AC/RC Program. The Marines routinely assign active component Marines as full-time support to their reserve component. Marines assigned to this program are selected by the active duty command screening process to
guarantee “the best possible” are selected for this program. Assignment of a Marine to the reserve component is a career enhancing job, not a “dead-end assignment.” The active component Marine also has a great stake in his/her unit being combat ready. Execution of the I&I Program ensures reserve component experience comes back to the active component and future leadership of the Marine Corps has experience with their reserve component. This exposure is extremely important for the integration and understanding of the Marines' active and reserve component.

Revisions of the AC/RC Program should make these assignments career enhancing jobs. The Soldiers assigned to the National Guard and reserve components should be selected by an active duty command screening board as in the Marine Corps. The assignment would be looked on as an enhancement not career-ending as active duty Soldiers perceive this assignment now. The Soldier should be rated by the reserve chain of command with the option of an active component Soldier being an intermediate rater. The assigned Soldier would then have a stake in the unit being successful and improving readiness indicators. National Guard and reserve leaders benefit from their Soldiers being assigned to the active component, though it is not as critical as it is for the active Soldiers to be assigned. There are a large number of Soldiers who enter the National Guard and reserve component with prior active duty experience.

The commitment of the senior leadership to reinstate and revise the AC/RC Program would show a pledge to the National Guard and reserve components. It would strengthen the relationship and enhance the exposure and understanding between the Title 32 National Guard forces, Title 10 reserve component, and the Title 10 active
component. This understanding would be critical during support operations to civil authorities.

In an essay titled *Toward Cultural Change of the Total Army*, Brigadier General (retired) Raymond E. Bell Jr. commented, “just a casual glance at the active Army general officer ranks shows that practically none of them have ever served with a Reserve Component unit,” yet numerous National Guard and reserve general officers have active component experience. 38 The revisions and change in execution of the AC/RC Program could change this in the future.

Importance of Assignments to USNORTHCOM

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in their final report made several recommendations regarding USNORTHCOM. The mission responsibility of USNORTHCOM as a unified command is for the defense of the homeland and domestic civil support missions. The Commission recommended, due to the consequences of the responsibility of the domestic support missions, the majority of the Soldiers assigned to USNORTHCOM should be filled by leaders and staff with National Guard and reserve experience. 39 Besides Soldiers from the National Guard and Reserve components being assigned to USNORTHCOM, active component Soldiers assigned would ideally have experience with the National Guard such as involvement with the AC/RC Program. Also, the recommendation was made that “job descriptions for senior leaders and other key positions at USNORTHCOM should contain the requirement of significant Reserve of National Guard experience or service.” 40 This requirement would ensure that the Combatant Command, USNORTHCOM, which has responsibility for interacting with the states’ civil authorities, state National Guards, and the National Guard Bureau during
DSCA operations, is staffed with Soldiers having the experience, exposure and understanding of these organizations and could deliver a coordinated response to domestic civil support operations.

**Vital Leadership Skills Required to Build Relationships between Titles 32 and Title 10 Military Forces**

When building relationships necessary for success in a unity of effort as opposed to a unity of command environment, the interpersonal skills of leaders are particularly important. Leaders of Title 32 and Title 10 forces, at all levels, need to possess the interpersonal skills of consensus building, negotiation, and good communication during domestic civil support operations.

Consensus building is “more about what all parties can live with than what any one party would prefer…It requires involving all stakeholders, encouraging input, making problems visible and resolving them, and making decisions collaboratively.”41 As a military leader of Title 32 or Title 10 military forces working with state and local emergency response planners who have the lead in an incident, this is one of the best techniques and skills to bring to the planning meeting. By having all stakeholders involved and making collaborative decisions, the response plan has a better chance of being executed successfully during a crisis. This technique should also apply when Title 32 and Title 10 military forces plan for the State SCP. Without involving all stakeholders, encouraging input, resolving visible problems, and having collaborative decision-making, there will be a lack of unity of effort when there is no unity of command, and response plans will fail.

The interpersonal skill of negotiating compliments consensus building. Good negotiating requires listening, identifying “hidden” or unspoken agendas, and being
objective or detaching oneself from the negotiating process.\textsuperscript{42} When there is no clear superior-subordinate relationship and unity of effort is the goal, communicating an unambiguous position, but demonstrating willingness to compromise is critical to a successful negotiation. Eventually good negotiation will lead to a consensus and result in effective emergency response planning with all stakeholders.

Communicating and engaging effectively and often is essential to consensus building and negotiation. Title 32 and Title 10 military leaders must show competency in communicating by being brief, clear, and persuasive.\textsuperscript{43} Military leaders must also know their audience when communicating with each other. General Renuart, Commander of USNORTHCOM, has stated, “…my first recommendation is to reach out to those agencies that you may have to deal with. You want to understand how they view the world, what their culture is. You need to understand the capabilities they bring…understand the capabilities you bring, so it is a two-way discussion.”\textsuperscript{44} Looking at just military forces during domestic operations, leaders must understand the differences between Title 32 and Title 10 military forces, but also remember that both forces share more in common than they do with other civilian agencies. By recognizing this, leaders can begin to have brief, clear, and persuasive communications and build a mutually supporting relationship quicker.\textsuperscript{45} This will also result in the Title 32 and Title 10 military leaders building a relationship with trust and respect for each other and a better ability to achieve unity of effort. The relationship must be sustained by communicating and engaging effectively and often.

As stated previously, leaders of Title 32 and Title 10 forces, at all levels, need to possess the interpersonal skills of consensus building, negotiation, and good
communication during domestic civil support operations. The military has to recognize that many leaders, but not all, have developed these interpersonal skills and can change from a “direct authority” management style to a consensus building/negotiation management style. This would allow for Leaders suitable for assignments supporting domestic civil support operations where these skills are critical to be identified. One tool has been developed which starts to answer this issue. The Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth has developed a program which has been implemented called the Army Leadership Assessment and Feedback Program. This assessment has become known as the “360 degree Leader Assessment” and involves feedback from superiors, peers, and subordinates. Two of the leadership domains in the assessment that are directly related to measurement of interpersonal skills are influences beyond the chain of command and effective in ambiguous environments. This tool could potentially in the future help identify those leaders with developed interpersonal skills who are accomplished consensus-builders, negotiators and communicators. The Army's policy at this time is not to use the Leader Assessment in this manner. These leaders would be the optimum choices for assignments where successful unity of effort relationships are the priority instead of unity of command.

Conclusion

Tensions in the rapport between Title 32 National Guard forces and Title 10 military forces have existed since the establishment of both organizations. These tensions were demonstrated publicly during the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina. The American people expect their federal, state, and local governments to take care of them and respond when a disaster strikes. This includes Title 32 National Guard
and Title 10 military forces being applied to the response in a mutually supporting role.

To be successful, leaders must develop relationships before the disaster occurs.

General Renuart states that “The last place to make a new friend is at the scene of a

disaster. You have to build a relationship over time.”

General Renuart, current USNORTHCOM Commander, came to his position
understanding the importance of building the relationships with other agencies, state
governments and Title 32 National Guard forces. The previous USNORTHCOM
Commander, Admiral Keating, seems to have come to this realization during his time in
the position. During a Homeland Defense Symposium he stated that military leaders
grow up thinking unity of command is necessary and then he said, “I am not so sure
anymore.”

The realization that unity of effort during a disaster is more important than unity of
command due to the various resources applied to the disaster is becoming more
apparent to military leaders. By implementing the concepts in this paper, Title 32
National Guard and Title 10 military forces relationship would be strengthened by
exposure throughout the Soldier’s career. The military could “grow” leaders who know
unity of command, but could also move and work in assignments that are predominantly
about unity of effort. These assignments would be related to Homeland Security and the
NIMS, but this experience also would be applied to multi-national operations.

Relationships between the forces would strengthen along with understanding and
respect.
Endnotes


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29 U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Achieving Unity of Effort in Responding to Crises. CSL Issue Paper, Sixth Annual USAWC Reserve Component Symposium Workshop #3: Examine the military’s role within the construct of the National Response Plan and their interaction with civilian response and recovery efforts at the Federal, state, and local levels, Volume 6-07 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, August 2007), 3.

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36 Ibid., 328.
37 Ibid., 326.
38 Ibid., 326-327.
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40 Ibid.
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42 Ibid., 42.
43 Ibid., 43.
47 Ibid.
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