RESERVE JOINT OFFICER QUALIFICATION SYSTEM-
GETTING IT RIGHT

BY

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RESERVE JOINT OFFICER QUALIFICATION SYSTEM – GETTING IT RIGHT

by

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The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a statutory scheme that directed the four services to develop a cadre of officers, on the active duty list, that were proficient in joint matters. The goal was to develop, within the armed forces, a capability to operate on a joint, integrated basis. Military successes over the past several years testify to the effectiveness of the mandates of the Act. In recent years, however, the requirements levied on the Department of Defense to maintain a high operational tempo in support of the current operations, has placed a greater demand on the services to supply an even greater number of officers with joint qualifications. Reserve officers have been filling this need in greater numbers over the years. However, there is no mandatory legislation, effective regulations, or policies that govern reserve joint officer management, education and reserve joint officer qualification. A mandatory comprehensive approach to reserve joint officer management is needed at the strategic level. The reserve components must effectively evolve and be properly educated and managed to allow the Department of Defense to effectively utilize those reserve component assets as the United States faces the new national security challenges today and in the foreseeable future.
To successfully execute the national military strategy in the 21st century, the active and reserve components must increase their military effectiveness by becoming a more integrated total force. It has taken the U.S. armed forces two decades to approach a level of jointness envisioned by the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which did not address the reserve component. Achieving total force integration of the active and reserve components will require changes to the defense establishment of a magnitude comparable to those required by Goldwater-Nichols for the active component.¹

—Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) created a statutory scheme that directed the four services to develop a cadre of officers, on the active duty list, that were proficient in joint matters.² The goal was to develop, within the armed forces, a capability to operate on a joint, integrated basis.³ Military successes over the past several years testify to the effectiveness of the mandates of this Act.⁴ However, for the most part, the Act did not include the Reserve Components (RC). The Act did, however, mandate that the Secretary of Defense establish policies “similar”⁵ to the Active Components (AC) for governing RC joint education and experience. However, the Act did not contain provisions requiring that reserve officers obtain any joint qualification. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) did not establish “similar” policies for the RC for over two decades after receiving Congress’s direction to do so.⁶ Currently, there is still no requirement for RC officers to be joint qualified despite the widespread use of RC officers in Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) billets⁷ on The Joint Staff, Combatant Command Headquarters, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While the Act made fundamental adjustments to the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders, no significant reforms have been undertaken in the key laws affecting the reserve components for over half a century.\(^8\)

Until reasonable legislation, policies and regulations are developed and implemented that would hold RC officers to the same standards as their AC counterparts, which would require them to attain joint experience, education, and qualification to achieve promotion to senior ranks, the nation and the DOD will not be able to take full advantage of the unique skills and experiences that these professionals possess. More importantly, no meaningful AC/RC integration can be achieved to create a seamless Total Force.\(^9\)

**Total Force Integration**

During the Cold War, the RC was organized and resourced to facilitate a rapid expansion of the armed forces for a major war with the former Soviet Union; in this role, they were commonly referred to as the “strategic reserve.”\(^10\) However, as a result of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of multiple regional conflicts and natural disasters that the United States responded to around the globe in the early 1990s, the RC evolved into an essential element of the military’s operational forces.\(^11\) Today, the United States is engaged in a long war against enemies who seek to attack us and harm our interests throughout the world, including in our homeland.\(^12\) The volatile and uncertain security environment of today and the foreseeable future, coupled with the challenging fiscal realities faced by our government, make obvious the need for a more flexible force.\(^13\) This future force must be able to respond rapidly in the homeland, be efficiently increased in times of need, and be pliable enough to be
reduced in a way that economically preserves capability when immediate utilization requirements diminish. To meet these criteria effectively, the manpower pool must be organized to facilitate the required flexibility and ensure that resources can be focused where they are needed with desirable returns on investment.\textsuperscript{14} The unique history and capabilities of the RC makes it a ready force to fulfill this need.

The 2006 National Military Strategy (NMS)\textsuperscript{15} acknowledges that the enhancement of joint war-fighting and achievement of its strategic objectives requires the integration of our AC and RC to create a seamless Total Force that can meet future needs.\textsuperscript{16} The relentless resource demands of the fight against terrorism and the support of contingencies and humanitarian crises worldwide are major factors which have increased the requirement for broad and seamless integration of the Total Force.\textsuperscript{17} The increased demands on the Total Force require new thinking and revolutionary approaches in order to maximize the productivity and benefit of every reserve unit and individual. For the past few years the Armed Forces, with its many global commitments has been stretched thin and has required it’s RC to participate fully in major combat operations in order to provide increased capability and long term sustainment. Indeed, Congress has long recognized the criticality of a positive AC and RC partnership in the Total Force.

Historical Uses

There are several instances in our nation’s history where the RC has been mobilized alongside the AC to fight our nation’s conflicts. Mobilization has usually been conducted in conjunction with a draft from the broader American population. RC forces served honorably and with distinction and then were subsequently de-mobilized
whereupon they returned to civil society. Members of the RC played significant roles in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Gulf War. Today, the RC is providing an indispensable service to the nation in the global war on terror.\textsuperscript{18}

In the cases cited above, the nation called upon and trained the RC, and utilized the forces in combat operations under federal command. Upon the successful termination of the nation’s conflicts in which the RC participated, Congress struggled with the appropriate mission, size, structure, and funding of the RC. In several instances, the nation sought a “peace dividend” in the form of a large postwar reduction in the size of the armed forces. Following the Spanish-American War, which exposed grave weaknesses in the training and readiness of the state militias, Congress created a federal reserve and increased federal oversight of the state militias, today called the National Guard.\textsuperscript{19}

The last major reform to the RC took place after the Korean War, for which the nation was poorly prepared. The RC was postured as a force designed to facilitate rapid expansion of the Armed Forces for a major war with the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War was the last conflict fought with a draft and without a large RC mobilization. It was followed by a significant shift in the mid-1970s to an all-volunteer force. The reserves, however, remained a strategic force to be used only for extraordinary contingencies overseas. The underlying planning assumption was that the RC would have the benefit of a lengthy mobilization period for training. Moreover, threats to the homeland continued to be viewed in the context of a threat from Soviet nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{20}
Since employing the RC in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DOD has increased their operational tempo to sustain global commitments. The RC has fought in two wars that have not relied on a draft or on full mobilization. The RC’s contribution to our nation’s defense efforts has risen to almost five times the level it was before 9/11. Indeed, some units have been drawn on even more heavily to support current operations, which have increased the workload of the RC more than seven times its normal operational tempo. At their peak use in 2004, the RC constituted more than 33 percent of all U.S. military forces in Iraq.\textsuperscript{21}

**Evolution of The Joint Officer Management System**

The DOD created The Officer Management System (OMS) in order to manage, retain and develop its professional military officer corps.\textsuperscript{22} The ostensible purpose of the OMS was to ensure that DOD had the right skill sets and leadership qualities to meet current and future needs of the Armed Forces. The OMS was designed to meet Cold War needs by producing a very large corps of command-oriented generalist officers that could lead a mechanized force that had been mobilized to fight a world war.\textsuperscript{23} Essentially, the OMS created a “one-size-fits-all” system that required the same command skills for each officer, rather than a distribution of skills across the officer corps as a whole.\textsuperscript{24} The result is that most officers follow a career “path” or assignment from one position to the next in order to “check the necessary boxes” for promotion. Not surprisingly, most officers are unable to spend enough time in any one assignment to develop deep expertise. The OMS system favors the command-oriented generalist at the expense of specialists with deep knowledge in narrow areas of expertise.\textsuperscript{25} In today’s security environment there is clearly a need for both types of officers. Sadly, the
OMS only supports one pathway. Despite having over 200 years of developing officers for service to the nation, modernly, the Chiefs of the Military Services have very little flexibility in managing their force. The enactment of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1981, established a rigid promotion system that fixes how long officers can be retained by grade, when they can be promoted, and how much they are paid.26

In response to the requirements under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, DOD created The Joint Officer Management System (JOMS). The JOMS allows the DOD to develop joint war-fighting expertise within the officer corps of the Armed Forces. In order to create a cadre of officers’ proficient in joint matters, the Act, among other things, established joint service as a prerequisite for promotion. Although today’s officer corps is imminently more joint than ever before, problems have persisted with how JOMS was managed.27 There was wide frustration with inequities in the assessment, awarding, and tracking of joint credit. Additionally, assignments to Joint Task Forces (JTF), interagency organizations, and international organizations did not qualify for credit. Further, officers serving less than the required tour length minimums did not necessarily receive pro-rated credit for their service. These and other problems were pervasive. Further, DOD routinely granted waivers to Goldwater-Nichols mandates and granted credit to assignments that did not technically meet the statute’s specifications. Moreover, critical billets on the Joint Duty assignment List (JDAL) consistently went unfilled. JOMS also failed to provide a comprehensive “pathway” for joint officer development. While requirements for joint credit, JDAL and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), have compelled the Services to become more “joint,” they stop short of providing a “joint
pathway” for career development. Moreover, experience and education are not linked with functional expertise. Therefore, officers seek assignments on the JDAL and enrollment in JPME for advancement, even if the experiences are not mutually reinforcing, and are not well aligned with an officer’s subsequent duties. Joint service is often experienced as a disjointed series of requirements pursued for advancement, rather than as a consistent and cumulative building of a deeper knowledge and experience base essential to the long-term career development of the officer and the skills needed in today’s security environment. Congress recognized these persistent problems in the Ronald Reagan Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. The FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress, “…a strategic plan for joint officer management and joint professional military education that links joint officer development to the accomplishment of the overall missions and goals of the DOD, as set forth in the most recent national military strategy…” Although the Act mentioned the need for a Total Force system, it did not mandate the RC joint career path or development.

The Reserve Component Joint Officer

The Total Force concept has been in the lexicon of military planners for much of the Cold War. However, despite the concept of jointness enjoying over two decades of AC implementation, it is still quite new for the RC as a whole. There has been greater demand for RC officers to serve in joint organizations where senior leaders have come to expect the same level of professionalism and readiness in the RC as they demand from their AC officers.
RC use has increased dramatically since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Between 1991 and 2000 RC forces were involved in more than fifty named military operations or contingencies. Since September 11, 2001, over 450,000 RC personnel have been activated to participate in the Global War on Terrorism. These forces do not serve in isolation; they are integrated in joint organizations, from the battlefield to the planning staffs. In the past few years, "the number of RC officers assigned to joint organizations has risen sharply, to the point where approximately 4,400 Reservists and Guardsmen in grades from major/lieutenant commander through colonel/captain are now performing duty in these important units." Indeed, Congress has recognized the need for joint senior RC leaders and has given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority to designate up to 10 general and flag officer positions on the staffs of the combatant commands as positions to be held only by RC officers who are in a general or flag officer grade below lieutenant general or vice admiral. The current and foreseeable security environments necessitate expanding that opportunity beyond the general or flag officers so that reserve officers are given greater access to and subsequent recognition of, joint experience in education, training, exercises and assignments.

RC members who take advantage of advanced joint education and who are able to serve in joint billets are largely self-selected. Other than the fulltime Active Guard and Reserve force, RC members are not involuntarily relocated to fill positions. However, the type and tempo of current operations requires DOD to develop a cadre of officers in the RC who are proficient in joint matters, and who understand and operate efficiently in a joint environment. This logic applies further to properly recognizing joint education
and assignment accomplishments which will ultimately optimize RC integration into joint war-fighting.

New Realities in the Security Environment

The security challenges present in today’s strategic environment are radically different than those of the past. The current security environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Traditional threats posed by nation-state actors remain, but new threats have emerged as well. National security challenges fall into several categories: 1) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that constitute a growing threat across the globe, including to the U.S. homeland, and the potential access to such weapons by individuals or terrorist groups who wish to use them indiscriminately on civilian populations; 2) Violent extremists, Islamist and other, who seek to control populations and geographic areas, attack U.S. soil, and harm U.S. interests throughout the world; 3) Disasters in the homeland such as pandemic disease, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods that can harm populations and cause losses that equal or exceed those incurred by war; 4) Failed states; numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts that can cause humanitarian crises and endanger global stability; and nation-states containing safe havens for uncontrolled forces that threaten us; 5) Traditional nation-state military threats, including the rise of a near-peer competitor.

This modern threat environment requires that the United States bring to bear all instruments of national power to achieve its national security objectives, including using its global leadership or “soft power” to prevent conflicts from occurring and developing partnerships to avert them. Among these instruments is the U.S. military, including the RC, which must be properly organized, trained, equipped, and integrated with other
government agencies to be able to respond, in a timely manner, with the capabilities necessary to meet the many irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats to America, both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{36}

The Total Force constitutes the nation’s war-fighting capability and capacity.\textsuperscript{37} Members of the Total Force serve in thousands of locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical missions.\textsuperscript{38} No, prudent military commander wants a fair fight, seeking instead to “overmatch” adversaries in cunning, capability and commitment. The selfless service and heroism of the men and women of the well-trained all-volunteer Total Force has been a primary source of U.S. strategic overmatch in confronting the wide range of threats that the United States has faced and has been a key contributor to successful military operations over the past several decades. The Total Force must continue to adapt to different operating environments, develop new skills and rebalance its capabilities and people if it is to remain prepared for the new challenges of an uncertain future.\textsuperscript{39}

Recent operational experiences highlight capabilities and capacities that the Department must develop in the Total Force to prevail in a long, irregular war while deterring a broad array of challenges.\textsuperscript{40} The future force must be more finely tailored, more accessible to the joint commander and better configured\textsuperscript{41} to operate with other agencies and international partners in complex operations.\textsuperscript{42} The traditional, visible distinction between war and peace is less clear at the start of the 21st century. In a long war, the United States expects to face large and small contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the RC must be operationalized, so that select RC units are more accessible
and more readily deployable than today. During the Cold War, the RC was used, appropriately, as a “strategic reserve,” to provide support to AC forces during major combat operations. In today’s global context, this concept is less relevant.\textsuperscript{43} The execution of the war on terror will require the use of an operational reserve made up of people who can operate effectively in this environment.\textsuperscript{44} The RC must become joint qualified commensurate with their AC peers.\textsuperscript{45}

**Operational Reserve and the Need for Change**

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established by the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Through its enabling statute, Congress tasked this Commission to report on the roles and missions of the RC; on how their capabilities may be best used to achieve national security objectives, including homeland defense; on their compensation and benefits and on the effects of possible changes in these areas on military careers, readiness, recruitment, and retention; on traditional and alternative career paths; on their policies and funding for training and readiness, including medical and personal readiness; on the adequacy of funding for their equipment and personnel; and on their organization, structure, and overall funding. Finally, Congress has asked this Commission to provide it a road map to a strong, capable, sustainable RC.\textsuperscript{46}

In its final report to Congress, released January 31, 2008, the Commission has recognized the evolution of the RC from a purely strategic force, with lengthy mobilization times designed to meet Cold War threats from large nation-states, to an operational force. This operational reserve must be readily available for emergencies at home and abroad, and more fully integrated with the AC.\textsuperscript{47} Simultaneously, this force
must retain required strategic elements and capabilities.\textsuperscript{48} Further, the Commission has concluded that there is no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance on the RC as part of its operational force for missions at home and abroad. However, the Commission also concludes that this change from their Cold War posture necessitates fundamental reforms to the RCs’ homeland roles and missions, personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, policies affecting families and employers, and the organizations and structures used to manage the reserves.\textsuperscript{49} These reforms are essential to ensure that this operational reserve is feasible in the short term while sustainable over the long term. In fact, the future of the all-volunteer force depends for its success on policymakers’ undertaking needed reforms to ensure that the reserve components are ready, capable, and available for both operational and strategic purposes.\textsuperscript{50}

In reviewing the past several decades of intense use of the RCs, most notably as an integral part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission has found indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for policymakers and the military to break with outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms in these areas.\textsuperscript{51} Many of today’s profound challenges to the RC will persist, notwithstanding force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The need for major reforms is urgent regardless of the outcome of current conflicts or the political turmoil surrounding them.\textsuperscript{52} The nation must look past the immediate and compelling challenges raised by these conflicts and focus on the long-term future of the RC and on the United States’ enduring national security interests.\textsuperscript{53}
The transformation of the RC into an operational reserve would: ostensibly serve the national security interests of the United States by improving the ability of the National Guard and Reserves to meet all threats to the nation as part of a total integrated force;\textsuperscript{54} Improve the nation’s return on its investment in its military;\textsuperscript{55} Build upon the jointness among the military services, developed as a result of the Act, to create an effective operational reserve force whose units and individuals can rapidly integrate with the active component;\textsuperscript{56} Ensure that service plans to employ the RC produce a force that is ready, capable, and available for predictable overseas rotations, responses to emergencies in the homeland, and strategic depth with the ability to surge when required;\textsuperscript{57} and, produce a sustainable RC that is affordable, attracts and retains high quality people, remains relevant and effective in a changing security environment, and that maintains the support of the public.\textsuperscript{58}

DOD leaders have repeatedly stated their expectation that the RC will continue to provide a wide range of capabilities that include war-fighting, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and post-conflict and transitional operations such as democracy building, stability efforts, and peacekeeping. DOD also plans a “focused reliance” on the RC for civil support missions in the homeland.\textsuperscript{59} Each service has developed detailed plans to train, equip, and use the RC for the foreseeable future on a rotational basis in coordination with the AC. This shift—away from a force primarily designed for infrequent federal use against a large nation-state and toward a better manned, trained, and equipped force that is more interdependent with the active duty force, is employed in predictable cyclical rotations overseas, and is more ready and more able to respond
quickly at home—would mark a significant adjustment to how the nation has historically conceived of and used its RC.60

Congress and DOD should explicitly acknowledge the need for, and should create, an operational reserve force.61 Further, in order to place the RC on a sustainable path as part of that force, Congress and DOD must modify existing laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding mechanisms, personnel rules, pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organizational structures, and RC categories. These significant changes to law and policy are required if the RCs are to realize their full potential to serve this nation and if existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities are to be reversed. Moreover, the traditional capabilities of the RCs to serve as a strategic reserve must be expanded and strengthened.62 The imperative to employ the RCs as part of our nation's operational forces is not limited to deploying units but must also include RC leadership serving in integrated joint and service headquarters.63 The Total Force integration required for effective operational employment can best be achieved by ensuring that experts in reserve matters are serving in staff and decision-making positions at all levels.64 It is clear that future RC officers, with both military experience acquired in the operational reserve and civilian skills gained from a variety of experiences that cannot be duplicated in the full-time military force, will be qualified and desirable for senior leadership positions. However, statutes, regulations and policies regarding joint qualifications, joint education, and opportunities for joint experience have been major obstacles to taking advantage of the considerable pool of talent resident in the RCs.65
Recommendations

Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to require RC officers to be designated as “joint qualified” under the new joint qualification system that became effective October 1, 2007. Further, Congress must, after the end of a 10-year transition period, make joint qualification a criterion for promotion to flag and general officer rank. Congress must mandate that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the services, develop an action plan with milestones and report regularly to Congress on progress made to accomplish these goals. In order to provide an incentive for early attainment of joint service qualification, service Secretaries should charge their reserve promotion boards selecting officers for field grade rank and above in the reserves to assign additional promotion weight to those officers who have achieved full joint education, have served in joint duty assignments, or are recognized as joint qualified. Additionally, each service should integrate the management of its AC and RC service members to better administer its military personnel and ensure that all members are afforded the joint duty and educational opportunities necessary for promotion to senior ranks.

DOD should annually increase the number of fully funded slots allocated to RC officers at the National Defense University, service war colleges, and the 10-week Joint Professional Military Education II in-residence course to foster greater interaction between AC and RC students and to increase the number of educationally qualified reserve officers. DOD should direct senior service schools to adjust the curricula and requirements in their distance learning programs to include material that will satisfy JPME II requirements for joint qualifications, as they have done for their in-residence courses. Capitalizing on technology, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education
should be redesigned to provide formats that encourage AC and RC participation from all services in a manner that satisfies course objectives, affords social interaction, and values the individual service members’ time and other obligations. Further, AC officers should be permitted to attend and receive full credit for AJPME, and the course should be viewed as equivalent to the Joint and Combined War-fighting School.

DOD should require that all RC officers selected for general or flag officer rank attend CAPSTONE; the services should provide full funding for this effort, and the school should have sufficient capacity to accommodate these officers without significant delay. DOD should establish programs to provide reserve component enlisted members with joint duty and JPME opportunities comparable to programs available to their active duty counterparts. JPME-related courses offered as part of all levels of service professional military education, including service academies and ROTC programs, should contain significantly more material on RC organizations and capabilities to increase the understanding of, and appreciation for, the skills and background of RC service members. For both AC and RC officers, criteria for granting joint duty experience credit should be flexible enough to allow for a qualitative assessment of proficiency based on knowledge, skills, and abilities in joint matters, not on inflexible time-based requirements. Congress should expand the statutory definitions of joint matters to incorporate service involving armed forces in operations, including support to civil authorities, with state and local agencies.

DOD should list all manpower billets in joint organizations in a single manpower document. As part of this change, DOD should review all positions thoroughly and identify the essential skills or special background qualifications required or desired for
To develop a pool of RC officers with the range of professional and joint experience required for selection to senior ranks, DOD and the military services should develop a program that enables RC members to become fully joint qualified after rotating through the following assignments: serving over a period of years in a drilling status, serving on active duty for training in select joint billets, completing JPME either in residence or by distance learning, and, finally, serving a year on active duty in a joint designated billet. This program would allow reservists acting as individual augmentees to serve in a predictable manner and provide them joint qualification while supporting the operational needs of the Joint Staff and combatant commanders. Congress should amend the Act to require that the level of RC officer representation in service headquarters and joint organizations, including combatant commands and the Joint Staff, be commensurate with the significant role that RCs play in DOD’s overall missions. The Secretary of Defense should require that RC officers on tours of active duty serve as director, deputy director, or division chief within each joint directorate on the Joint Staff and at the combatant commands.

In order to provide an incentive to the services to increase the number of billets available to RC general and flag officers, Congress should allow the services to assign RC general and flag officers to billets currently filled by AC officers by waiving up to 10 percent of the current statutory limitation on the number of active component general and flag officers on a one-for-one basis, and enact expiring legislation for this additional head space at the end of 5 or 10 years. Priority should be given to assignment in joint positions. Congress should require DOD to report annually on the number of RC general and flag officers serving in joint duty positions and in positions of
importance and responsibility. Following the expiration of the legislation, Congress should reconsider the number of Chairman’s exempt positions, taking into account the number of reserve general and flag officers who have successfully served in joint tours during this time.

Conclusion

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created a statutory scheme that directed the four services to develop a cadre of officers, on the active duty list, that were proficient in joint matters. The Act largely ignored the RC. However, today’s national security realities require the DOD develop the capability and capacity of the nation’s Total Force. An integral part of the force is the RC. A mandatory comprehensive approach to reserve joint officer management is needed at the strategic level. An overall assessment of the supply and demand for reserve component officers with joint experience must be undertaken. Congress must adopt mandatory legislation, and DOD must implement effective regulations, and policies to govern reserve joint officer management, education and reserve joint officer qualification. The Reserve Components must effectively evolve and be properly educated and managed to allow the Department of Defense to effectively utilize those reserve component assets in the new national security challenges that the United States faces today and in the foreseeable future.

Endnotes


4 Harry J. Thie et al., *Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 1-8.

5 *Reserve Officers Not on the Active-Duty List.*


8 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 5.


10 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 7.


12 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 7.


14 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 8.


18 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 9.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, 110.

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Ibid.

Booz Allen Hamilton, 20.


Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 11.

Ibid.


Reserve Officers Not on the Active-Duty List.


Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 11.

Ibid, 12.


Ibid.


43 Ibid., 76-77.


46 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 12.


48 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 7.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.


53 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2.

54 Ibid., 6.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

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60 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 13.


62 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 17.

63 Ibid.

65 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 30.


67 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 31.

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71 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 32.

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74 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 33.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.


78 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 34.