REFORMING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

BY

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REFORMING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

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Not since World War II has the U.S. Government adopted a national security strategy where all the elements of national power were directed to support the nation’s national security strategy. Since World War II, many of the conflicts the U.S. has engaged in have not been a coordinated U.S. Government (USG) effort to win these conflicts. In fact, many U.S. departments and agencies seem to play no role or only a minor role in such conflicts. Many of the problems identified with reconstruction and stabilization during the Iraq War can be attributed to the lack of qualified USG personnel with expertise in areas where the military lacks sufficient expertise. Our military has attempted to pick up the shortfall in interagency support, but it lacks the expertise that the U.S. Government could provide to succeed in these peace-making operations. This research provides recommendations to reform the U.S. Government’s interagency process to support contingency operations.
REFORMING THE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESS IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

[W]ar is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means...war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different...war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs...the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.¹

—Carl von Clausewitz

Would an Interagency “Goldwater-Nichols-type” initiative enhance the integration of all U.S. Government elements of power in pursuit of national security objectives?

The United States is currently engaged in a two wars; we live in a dynamic threat environment that is becoming increasingly violent, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA). In his 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush declared:

America is at war. This wartime national security strategy responds to the grave challenge we face--the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our Government’s most solemn obligation to protect the security of the American people.²

Accordingly, Joint Staff Pub 3-08 states that:

Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the US Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies.³

The Joint Staff thus acknowledges this VUCA environment and understands that for the United States to achieve its national security objectives all elements of national power--along with those of allies, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and regional organizations--must operate in unison. So the U.S. Government must collectively
support this effort to attain national security objectives in a coherent manner. This mandate was clearly articulated in the 1947 National Security Act:

Congress created the National Security Council to advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation.  

The United States must now determine the viability of the National Security Act of 1947 for the 21st Century VUCA security environment. In 1947, the primary threat against the United States was Russia and later China, which led to small-scale skirmishes around the globe. Today the threats against the United States are multifaceted and dynamic, not just from nation-states but also from extremist groups and organizations as well. Should the role of the National Security Council (NSC) be only to advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and to facilitate interagency cooperation? The problem with the current NSC is that it is too busy working policy issues, but it has no mechanism to ensure the execution of the President’s policies. No one with any statutory authority besides the President is in charge of the span of control and coordination that goes across agencies, and the President of the United States is too busy to work day-to-day implementation activities to ensure the US Government executes his decisions. Execution of policy has become the responsibility of the President’s staff, but not the President. However, the President’s National Security Advisor is not capable of performing this function because this individual is:

The Presidents National Security Advisor serves as the chief advisor to the President of the United States on national security issues. This person serves on the National Security Council within the Executive Office of the President. The President appoints the National Security Advisor without confirmation by the United States Senate. As such, they are not connected to the bureaucratic politics of the Departments of State and Defense, and are therefore able to offer independent advice. The power
and role of the National Security Advisor varies from administration to administration.\textsuperscript{5}

Additionally the NSC is not a fixed organization, with the exception of key positions mandated in the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. The NSA provided the Presidents the flexibility to organize the NSC in any manner they desire, which may not always provide for the most effective interagency coordination. The current NSC (See Figure 1) is tailored to the desires of the President; it is much different from earliest NSCs of the Truman or Eisenhower Administrations.
To ensure a common understanding of the term interagency coordination, the following two definitions offer a workable start. Joint Publication 3-08 defines interagency coordination as:

... the coordination that occurs between agencies of the U.S. Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DOD), for accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) coordination refer to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve objectives.⁷

Interagency is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as: “Involving or representing two or more agencies, especially government agencies.”⁸ Given these working definitions of the term, we can now discuss why the USG’s interagency coordination is dysfunctional for addressing the VUCA environment of the 21st Century.


The federal government has archaic, vertical, “stove-pipe” organizational structure and processes that severely undermine success in operations and policy implementation. We are unable to achieve unity of effort and a whole-of-government approach to devising solutions to critical problems. Today’s world is extremely complex and requires the horizontal integration of efforts from a variety of departments and agencies in our executive branch. National level reform of the interagency process is urgent, yet we have not even begun. It is unrealistic to expect the executive branch to reform itself. Administrations are too busy with day-to-day operations to see the need for change and presidential directives are insufficient and ineffective for this level of reform. Authorities and appropriations must be properly aligned to create flexibility and enable agile integrated solutions to the complex threats of the new century. Congress must drive reform, in a manner similar to that achieved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 that created horizontal structures and processes in the Department of Defense. While Congress is part of the solution, it is also part of the problem and requires similar reform of its own. Piecemeal independent reform efforts are inadequate. It is vital to our national and homeland security that we produce a new National Security Act, with executive directives, and an interagency mechanism in Congress.”⁹
COL Dahl’s analysis certainly applies to the current USG, which has no common focus. For example, President Bush signed two different documents to support stabilization and enabling phases for our operations in Iraq. The first document was Presidential Directive NSPD 44 (Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization), which states:

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.10

The second document is the Contingency Planning Guidance,11 signed by the President in September 2005. Figure 2 below provides the following instructions to DOD for preparation of contingency plans.

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Figure 2. Contingency Planning Guidance Termination Objective Considerations

This guidance attempts to develop a process to support the interagency shortfall in shaping, deterring, dissuading, stabilizing, and enabling phases of potential conflicts. It is based on lessons learned from Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq operations during which the U.S. has not fared well with organized USG support. The Joint Staff J7 in coordination with DOD and selected interagency departments and agencies developed a Campaign Model (Figure 3), which depicts the six phases of
contingency operations that should be guided by some comprehensive USG plan. This contingency strategy assumes that there is a USG plan that specifies how the USG intends to support and lead this effort in any given phase of the planning effort.

Under the authority of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the President and Secretary of Defense direct the Combatant Commanders through the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) to develop contingency plans to support possible U.S. actions to preserve the nation’s security. Yet no current law directs the rest of the U.S. Government (USG) to develop complementary contingency plans to support such
actions. Ultimately, the planning process should produce unified USG plans to support contingencies; all concerned agencies should be fully involved in the planning process.

During the shape\textsuperscript{13} and deter\textsuperscript{14} phase of a contingency plan (Figure 1 above), the USG must persuade a potential adversary that it is not in its best interest to go to war with the United States. To achieve this deterrence, all elements of national power must work in a coordinated manner to ensure that potential adversaries understand the U.S. interest in this issue. In these two phases, the entire Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) spectrum of USG instruments of national power must produce a coordinated plan with the same objectives. If an adversary fails to heed this message, a USG contingency plan should be implemented to seize the initiative.\textsuperscript{15} During the seize-the-initiative phase, U.S. military and diplomatic powers will assume a greater role, but the other elements of national power must also actively support this effort. As the contingency plan moves into the Dominate\textsuperscript{16} Phase, the DOD assumes the primary role. However, the diplomatic, information, and economic elements of DIME, should work in concert with the military to continue their support during this phase of the operation. When a decision is made to move from the military Dominate Phase to Stabilize\textsuperscript{17} Phase, the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of DIME begin to assume a more proactive role, with the military working in concert with their efforts. During the initial stabilization phase, due to the possibility of ongoing hostile activity, the military may remain in control of all DIME activities. However, the military cannot fulfill all critical obligations without the active physical presence of the other elements of national power, supported by the subject matter expertise the USG departments and agencies. As the Enabling\textsuperscript{18} Phase begins, the USG DIME equally employs all elements of national
power working to support the President’s National Security Objectives. During this phase, the military is no longer in the lead; rather all elements of national power are working in unison to meet the nation’s security objectives.

As stated previously, the USG currently lacks a coherent and coordinated approach to overseas pre- and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization policy. As reported by a series of highly critical reports produced by the Government Accountability Office and other sources, previous initiatives within the federal bureaucracy have failed to produce substantial efficiencies in interagency planning, financial accounting, or measures of performance. To achieve the stated goals of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 (*Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, 7 December 2005), a permanent staff should be created to oversee interagency planning and action with regard to overseas reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Although NSPD 44 assigned this mission to Department of State, the NSC staff should monitor the Reconstruction and Stabilization activity to ensure effective implementation by the USG. Elements of this Strategic Plan supersede specific guidance set forth in NSPD-44 to obtain these goals.

The disconnect between the Department of Defense and the rest of the interagency civil activities is illustrated in Figure 4, which graphically depicts the phasing and sequencing of civil and military operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As indicated in the post-May 2003 “Stabilize” phase, major combat operations did not conclude with an effective hand-off to civilian operations. This failure gave armed insurgents, terrorists, and criminal gangs an opening to seize an operational initiative at the expense of US military operations and post-conflict intentions. Joint Publication 3-08
stipulates that before forces are committed, Joint Force Commander (JFC’s) must know how the President and Secretary of Defense intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure. Once these issues are resolved, JFC’s then determine how to implement their strategic design at the operational level. Improved planning and coordination, orchestrated directly from the National Security Council, will prevent future interdepartmental disconnects, provide the Executive Branch a clearer vision across the full spectrum of engagement, and produce efficiencies in overseas U.S. operations.

Figure 4. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Phasing of Military Operations.

Congressman Ike Skelton has clearly identified a major disconnect in interagency coordination:
There is the matter in how we approach interagency reform. We will only improve our alliances, avoid conflict, and take advantage of opportunities if we are making use of all parts of our American strength—everything that makes this nation great. As incredible as our military is, it cannot do all things, and the other parts of our government need some work. When we look where we are in Iraq today, and where we are in Afghanistan, the root of many of our problems lie in the fact that we are unable to bring much of our national power to bear on the challenges confronting us there. Even now, we need teams of diplomats, development experts, and other specialist in fields such as rule of law, engineering, and agribusiness to accompany our soldiers in the tasks of rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the State Department and other agencies you would expect to play a significant role cannot deliver experts in the number required, and so our soldiers have had to take up the slack.\footnote{21}

It appears that everyone acknowledges that the interagency process requires immediate presidential and congressional attention. However, bureaucratic and political infighting over Iraq and the impending election in November 2008 find the two branches of government focusing on other issues. Indeed problems with interagency coordination appear to be to far down the pecking order of priorities.

What would a Goldwater-Nichols Type Interagency Process look like? Currently the interagency process appears to operate like an orchestra without a conductor. Each department makes its own musical selections and then plays selections they choose, usually independently in a stovepipe fashion. For example, Neylar Arnes, Charles Barry and Robert B. Oakley make the following observation in “Harnessing the Interagency, A Complex Operation”:

The question of who should be in charge of U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) operations is a key facet in accessing the suitability of many models. At the highest level, civilian leadership in the person of the President is readily apparent and universally acknowledged. However, the relationships among other top--level interagency officials are not clear. In particular, the span of control and authority of both the senior civilian representative ambassador or President’s Special Representative (PSR) – and the senior military commander in the field is often hard to define. Past experience, has shown that one cannot be formally subordinate to the other. By law, PSR’s have authority over civilian
agencies and operations in the field. For some operations, it may be possible to appoint an overall civilian leader from the outset, especially for purely humanitarian operations or where ceasefire or peace agreements are in place. With these scenarios, suitable models should provide for civilian-led interagency efforts at the operational level. In other situations, it will be imperative for the military to lead initial reconstruction since combat operations might continue or have to be renewed because of insurgent actions. The military will need interagency support as they restore order, triage post-combat uncertainty, and head off instability or anarchy. In such instances, military leadership of the initial interagency effort is essential. Suitable models should provide for interagency support to Combatant Command (COCOM) – led Stabilization and Reconstruction operations for these situations. 22

The goal of a Goldwater-Nichols Interagency Act would change this paradigm and force the USG departments and military services to support U.S. National Security objectives before, during, and after a crisis or war. Not since World War II has the USG mobilized all elements of national power to support the national security objectives of the United States to support contingencies. USG agencies have operated virtually independently and only peripherally in support of the current war efforts. Sun Tzu tells us that national unity is deemed to be an essential requirement of victorious war. 23 Sun Tzu clearly illustrates my point that the United States Government should work like a symphony orchestra when engaged in national security issues or war: all the elements of national power should play their part as full participants. Consider a symphony orchestra playing a musical selection: Visualize the Boston Pops Orchestra during the nation’s Bicentennial Celebration on July 4, 1976. Conductor Arthur Fielder steps to the rostrum and leads the orchestra in playing Pior Ilyitch Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture in E Flat Major Op. 49, while four hundred thousand people witnessed this Guinness world record event for a classical concert. The orchestra’s performance was outstanding; they played the piece as directed by conductor Fiedler with flawless precision. The Boston Pops’ performance is a perfect example of how the USG’s interagency should
operate. The USG, with its range of instruments of national power, should conduct its activities like an orchestra. A conductor for the USG should direct its activities, and every Executive Department and Agency should play its part as indicated by the conductor and arranger, who is the President of the United States. However, this remains more fantasy than reality.

Consider also the six phases of a war plan that the Joint Staff created to support the National Military Strategy, which supports the President’s National Security Strategy. Figure 5 below illustrates the six phases of the campaign construct: shaping the environment, deterring adversaries, seizing the initiative, dominating a protagonist when war cannot be prevented, stabilizing and reconstructing activities, and enabling civil authorities.

![6 Phase Campaign Plan Construct](Image)

Figure 5. 6 Phase Planning Construct
The orchestra example illustrates the role the USG plays in projecting national power to support our national security strategy. The major question is to identify the individual who acts on the President’s behalf to orchestrate the elements of national power as effectively as Arthur Fiedler conducted his orchestra during the bicentennial celebration. In order for the USG to support Combatant Commanders (CCDR) to achieve their presidential directed contingency plan objectives, all elements of national power must to be integrated into a single coordinated effort. During the shaping, deter and seizing-the-initiative phases of a contingency plan, the USG must mount a single, focused initiative and all USG department and agencies must contribute towards achieving the goals set by the President in his national security strategy. During the dominating phase of a contingency plan, the military takes the lead, while the rest of the USG is preparing to take the lead once the military provides a safe and secure stabilization and reconstruction environment. All elements of the USG DIME work in unison to ensure the Enabling Civil Authorities phase of the contingency plan is implemented.

I propose that Congress should develop legislation to approve a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the NSC, creating the Global Assistance Staff (GAS). The NSCs should become the President’s facilitating agent to ensure the smooth transition and execution of USG interagency activities. Combatant Commanders should plan holistically, including all relevant parties in the plan. The ultimate objective of winning a war, if it’s required, must also include setting the conditions in concert with the rest of the USG to convince future antagonists that going to war with the United States is not a winnable proposition.
The GAS Staff should facilitate the implementation of all USG activities, support all USG lead departments and agencies including foreign and domestic events. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the GAS staff could have mandated that DOD use its massive logistics and its Command Control and Communications and intelligence (C3I) capabilities to provide situational awareness to support the Department of Homeland Defense sooner in efforts to feed and evacuate personnel in New Orleans. As it happened, the rest of the world saw this lack of prompt support from the USG to its citizens in New Orleans as a major U.S. weakness. In this incident the majority of the world related to the citizens who were stranded in New Orleans during this natural disaster, seeing them as betrayed and abandoned by the world’s only superpower. The country that moved a half a million men half way around the world to “liberate” Kuwait in 1991 was incapable of supporting its own citizens. What message did the aftermath of Katrina send to the rest of the world? The GAS staff could have assisted the Department of State in leaning forward to coordinate international assistance that was offered to the USG, such as the support that Mexico provided or that other nation states offered--but such assistance was not utilized. This is an example of how the GAS Staff, acting on behalf of the President, steps up and leads the USG as the conductor to ensure the USG efforts are coordinated and synchronized.

If Congress approves the GAS concept, funding must also include a new state-of-the-art secure facility that is only ten to fifteen minutes from the White House. An ideal location with immediate access to the White House would be the grounds of the National Observatory, which has military, and Secret Service security. This facility must have the same technological capabilities as the National Military Command Center and
the National Security Council Watch Center with twice the bandwidth. This facility must have a robust communication capability with a 24x7 watch center, with sufficient global communications to provide Department Secretaries, Combatant Commanders, Ambassadors, Governor’s, and their staff’s immediate access to GAS to coordinate interagency activities on behalf of the President. The GAS Staff would operate with a core staff of civilian and military professionals. I propose that the NSC’s GAS Staff, as a minimum, must be organized as indicated in Figure 6 below:

This organizational structure is designed to facilitate the various activities required by the USG to ensure the safety and security of the United States and to protect its
national interests. This staff should include experts from the Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government that have DIME expertise in the elements of national power as well as a regional focus to support the efforts of the Combatant Commanders. This staff should not include contractors, with the exception of Information Technology requirements. The requirement to eliminate contractors from these positions would ensure that only USG personnel are making decisions that affect the United States. Additionally, the ultimate goal of the GAS is to ensure that the Federal Government employs the DIME efforts of the interagency like a symphony orchestra that supports the President’s National Security Strategy by ensuring the effective implementation of his policies. The National Security Council includes experts at developing policy; however, its major shortcoming is in the implementation of the policy that its sets. This is due to a variety of factors:

- No standard for NSC structure; each President that comes into office has the freedom to change the NSC to meet his preferences and objectives.

- The NSC Staff rotates when the current administration changes office, so there is very little continuity of operations.

Additionally, the benefits sought in the National Security Act of 1947 have simply not been fully realized:

The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. The Act created many of the institutions that Presidents found useful when formulating and implementing foreign policy, including the National Security Council (NSC). The Council itself included the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other members (such as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), who met at the White House to discuss both long-term problems and more immediate national security crises. A small NSC staff was hired to coordinate foreign policy materials from other agencies for the President. Beginning in 1953
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs directed this staff. Each President has accorded the NSC with different degrees of importance and has given the NSC staff varying levels of autonomy and influence over other agencies such as the Departments of State and Defense. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, used the NSC meetings to make key foreign policy decisions, while John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson preferred to work more informally through trusted associates. Under President Richard M. Nixon, the NSC staff, then headed by Henry A. Kissinger, was transformed from a coordinating body into an organization that actively engaged in negotiations with foreign leaders and implementing the President’s decisions. The NSC meetings themselves, however, were infrequent and merely confirmed decisions already agreed upon by Nixon and Kissinger. The Act also established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which grew out of World War II era Office of Strategic Services and small post-war intelligence organizations. The CIA served as the primary civilian intelligence-gathering organization in the government. Later, the Defense Intelligence Agency became the main military intelligence body. The 1947 law also caused far-reaching changes in the military establishment. The War Department and Navy Department merged into a single Department of Defense under the Secretary of Defense, who also directed the newly created Department of the Air Force. However, each of the three branches maintained their own service secretaries. In 1949, the Act was amended to give the Secretary of Defense more power over the individual services and their secretaries...  

Congress exercising its constitutional authority should authorize the President in the new FY 2010 National Security Act to create the Global Assistance Staff (GAS) within the National Security Council. The GAS should serve as the U.S. Government’s one-stop shop for interagency coordination for all U.S. government policy, plans, and operations. The GAS would assist in developing and facilitating all interagency plans, it would execute centralized and coordinated domestic activities requiring interagency coordination; it would monitor stabilization and reconstruction and enabling civil authorities, as well as humanitarian relief efforts that are currently adrift in the USG. GAS should consist of experts from all Executive Departments and Agencies of the USG. GAS would also coordinate USG interagency efforts with foreign governments via the State Department, international organizations (IO), and NGOs as necessary.
Additionally, the creation of the GAS should also include an increase in the Staffs of all Executive Departments to ensure that there is sufficient staff to support this new paradigm. The Congressional decision to form this organization responds to many challenges and inefficiencies hindering the efficient performance of the USG, as documented in US Government Accountability Office reports and other studies, such as the 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina studies. These reports and studies describe an overall lack of focus in the federal government’s approach to problems. They identify overlapping activities and escalating costs. They find no programmatic measures of USG success. The synergy of effort and resources that this Staff would generate will contribute significantly to alleviating the challenges mentioned above and the accomplishment of the Presidential Management Agenda (PMA). This office should focus on competitive sourcing, integrating budget performance, financial management, and strategic management of human capital. GAS through its interdepartmental coordinating activities would also achieve efficiencies in other Departments by identifying duplications of effort and ensuring that scarce resources are focused on the mission.

GAS would improve competitive sourcing by encouraging agencies to use both the government and private sector in the execution of humanitarian and reconstruction projects. It would conduct strategic studies to enable the President to identify the most efficient means to accomplish the task. By integrating existing federal relief and reconstruction programs, the Staff can enable participating departments to focus on performance. The Staff should collaborate with OMB to identify appropriate objectives for a few important programs in order to assess what programs are doing to achieve
these objectives, to track how much they cost, and to recommend improvements. The Performance Analysis Rating Tool (PART) should be used to complete these program assessments.

The Staff would employ financial systems that produce timely information to support informed operational and investment decision-making, to ensure consistent and comparable trend analysis, and to facilitate improved performance measurement. These initiatives support the President’s desire for improved financial performance. The Staff would identify high quality outcome measures, monitor their performance, and begin to survey the costs. The Staff would identify and reinforce high-performing programs and discontinue or reform non-performing programs. In accord with PMA, GAS would assist USG Departments and Agencies in achieving the following long-term results: flatter and more responsive bureaucracies; an emphasis on results rather than process; harmonious interdepartmental cooperation; and a new focus on employee knowledge, skills and abilities in order to meet the needs and expectations of their ultimate clients – the American people.

In conclusion, Congress should attend to the words of former CJCS General John Shalikashvili: “[I]n my view, the most important area for improvement is the emergence of a broad reform movement focused on our national security structure and the entire interagency process?”27 He further observed:

[P]roblems in the interagency arena today remind me very much of the relationship among the services in 1986. We need an agreed-on, written-down, well-exercised organization and a set of procedures to bring the full capability of the Department of Defense and all the relevant government departments and agencies to bear on the complex crises to which future presidents might commit us.”28
As former CJCS General John Shalikashvili states, Congress must move expeditiously to correct the deficiencies in the interagency process and thereby ensure the USG is prepared to meet the challenges of a dynamic and ever-changing world before a U.S. President is forced to engage in war to protect this nation. No administration in history has ever been capable of fixing itself while attempting to govern. The 1947 National Security Act and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act were initiated by Congress to correct major deficiencies in the nation’s national security environment and within DOD. It is time for Congress to take a similar initiative and draft a new law that mandates the USG develop the capability to support contingency plans and respond to national emergencies in order to support the President’s National Security Strategy. As with the 1947 National Security Act and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, new legislation will not provide a quick fix. These problems have accumulated and persisted for far too long, so stop-gap quick fixes developed to resolve many of these deficiencies have not worked. The problem with this approach is that these quick fixes do not adequately address the entire problem that they are intended to address, nor do they address root causes of these problems. The potential payoff for Congress in creating a new law to reform interagency coordination by correcting these glaring deficiencies promises enormous dividends for the USG for years to come.

Endnotes


5 Ibid.


7 Joint Publication 3-08, vii.

8 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; of the English Language, unabridged, S.V. “interagency.”


11 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG is written guidance from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff for the preparation and reviews of contingency plans for specific missions. This guidance includes the relative priority of plans, specific forces levels, and supporting resources levels projected to be available for the period of time for which such plans are to be effective. It is a primary source document used by Chairman Joint Chief of Staff to develop the Joint Strategic Capability Plan. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Sept. 2007)1-6.


13 Shape. Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives. They are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. “Shaping” phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve effects in another. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-27.
Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary actions by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It differs from deterrence that occurs in the “Shape” phase in that it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the operation/campaign. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities, initial overflight permission(s) and/or deployment into a theater, employment of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection and logistics requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS, CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Liaison teams and coordination with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign. Many actions in the “Deter” phase build on activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of SCPs and activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-27.

Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the imitative in combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny their initial objectives. If an enemy has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge enemy forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during the “Dominate” phase. During this phase, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-28.

Dominate. The “Dominate” phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in non-combat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area quickly as possible. When a campaign is focused on conventional enemy forces, the “dominate” phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives. Against unconventional enemies, decisive operations are characterized by dominating and controlling the operational environment. Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions for an early favorable conclusion of operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase of the campaign. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-28-29.

Stabilize. This phase is required when there is limited or no functioning legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, OGA, IGA, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting on the provision of basic services to the population. The “Stabilize” phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified as early as
possible. Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-29.

18 Enable Civil Authority. This phase is predominately characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance. This support will be provided to the civil authority with its agreement at some level, and in some cases especially for operations within the United States, under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provisions of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting multinational, OGA, IGO, and NGO participants and influencing the attitude of the population favorably regarding the U.S. and local civil authority’s objectives. The joint force will be in supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the “enable civil authority” phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during this phase and should be identified as early as possible. The military end state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of joint operations. The joint operation is concluded when redeployment operations are complete. Combatant command involvement with the other nations and OGAs, beyond the termination of joint operations, may be required to achieve the national strategic end state. Joint Publication 3.0, IV-29.

19 Joint Publication 3-08, xiii.

20 Parker.


25 Author created chart for Reforming the Interagency Coordination Process in Support of Contingency Operations.


28 Ibid., 74.