THE ARMY RESERVE: MEETING HOMELAND SECURITY OBLIGATIONS AMIDST TRANSFORMATION

BY

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The United States Army Reserve is undergoing tremendous change during transformation to include Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC). It is closing 176 reserve centers, occupying 125 new joint reserve centers; disestablishing ten Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) and three Regional Readiness Groups, and establishing four Regional Readiness Sustainment Commands and restructuring several Operational and Functional Commands. During transformation, the Army Reserve will dissolve RRC alignment with the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions, activate several sustainment and combat support commands to support Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), and field the Future Combat Systems within the next ten years to meet operational reserve requirements.

The Army Reserve can meet its obligation for Homeland Security through the foreseeable future, but must guard against creating capability shortfalls during transformation. This paper will examine the challenges and provide some recommendations that can ensure and enhance its ability to provide civil support when the Nation calls.
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ARMY RESERVE VISION STATEMENT

The Army Reserve is a community-based federal operational force of skill-rich Warrior-Citizens providing complementary capabilities for joint expeditionary and domestic operations.¹

—LTG Jack Stultz
Chief, Army Reserve

The United States Army Reserve is undergoing tremendous change. It is closing reserve centers, occupying new joint reserve centers; disestablishing Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) and Regional Readiness Groups (RRGs), establishing Regional Readiness Sustainment Commands (RRSCs), and restructuring several Operational and Functional Commands. Simultaneously, the Army Reserve is adjusting its primary focus from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve in support of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) while undergoing the evolution to the Future Combat Systems.

As the Army Reserve focuses on meeting the demands of an operational reserve, it cannot neglect its obligation to sustain its defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) capabilities for the Department of Defense (DOD). The Defense Science Board Task Force conducted a study which questioned the “availability of National Guard and reserve personnel and equipment to meet homeland security, civil support, and domestic emergency requirements along with robust overseas deployments.”² The transition from a traditional strategic reserve to an operational reserve force is stifled by reality. The Defense Science Board Task Force did not find any enabling steps by the Army to facilitate this transition. Accordingly, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, asserted that the military must ensure it “preserves a significant ‘strategic reserve’ capability and capacity.” These words of caution imply that traditional mission requirements for the reserve components will continue in this transformational environment.

The Army Reserve can meet its obligation for homeland security through the foreseeable future, but must guard against creating capability shortfalls during transformation. This paper will address the breadth of changes in the Army Reserve which may lead to an inability to meet homeland security obligations; identify some of its specified and implied tasks in the civil support domain; and define challenges to providing civil support. This paper provides recommendations that will help the Army Reserve guard against potential capability shortfalls and overcome some challenges to its ability to fulfill its specified and implied obligations when the nation calls.

As the Army Reserve undergoes change, it must guard against any potential and inherent capability and performance shortages. As a consequence of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Army Reserve is sustaining a historically high level of mobilization and deployment of units and personnel. To meet the demands of the ARFORGEN model, the Army Reserve has developed a five-year process (Figure 1 below) which moves units through three defined phases: (1) reset and train; reconstituting units as they recover from recent deployments or constitute due to reorganization or activation, (2) ready; evaluate and validate units prior to certifying them as available for deployment, and (3) available; on order, provide available units that can mobilize and deploy with minimal additional
training tailored to the operational environment. All Army Reserve endeavors in the near future must reconcile with the five-year rotational cycle in support of ARFORGEN.

### Army Reserve Support to ARFORGEN

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- **INDIVIDUAL**
  - Individual Training
  - Combat veterans reintegrate
- **COLLECTIVE**
  - Army Reserve Functional Exercise (Squad/Crew/Team Training)
  - External Evaluation
  - Units in Army Reserve Warrior Exercise (Company Team Training)

- **External Evaluation and Validation at Combat Training Center (or equivalent)**
- **Battalion/Company External Evaluation**
- **Mobilize**
- **Mob Station Validation**
- **Deploy**
- **Operational Mission**

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**Figure 1. Army Reserve Support to ARFORGEN**

In 2005, the Army Reserve began implementing the BRAC Commission’s instructions which aims at closing 176 reserve centers and occupying 125 new joint reserve centers between 2005 and 2011. This shift and improvement of reserve centers should improve personnel strength by relocating some units to higher density population centers and attract a larger pool of eligible candidates for military service to improve recruiting and increase the readiness of units. On the other hand, it may reduce the
presence of reserve units in lesser populated areas or communities throughout the continental United States (CONUS).

The greatest change for the Army Reserve is driven by its participation in Army Transformation. In 2007, the Army Reserve began to restructure its force with a goal of completing the command and control portion of the reorganization by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. The Army Reserve plans to disestablish eleven RRCs and three RRGs. Ten of these RRCs were originally structured to align with the same geographical area of responsibility as FEMA’s ten regional headquarters. Current relationships between the RRCs and FEMA regions will dissolve as the Army Reserve establishes four RRSCs, restructures several Operational and Functional Commands, activates eight Sustainment Brigades, five Sustainment Commands (Expeditionary), two Combat Support Brigades (CSB) Maneuver Enhancement (ME), one Military Police Command, and one Aviation Command. In addition to these changes, reorganizing brigade and below level units will undergo personnel and equipment changes in accordance with the Future Combat Systems program through 2015 and beyond.

There are various opinions on whether the Army Reserve is organized to sustain or increase its contribution to DOD civil support missions, but many agree that the Army Reserve possesses capabilities essential to fulfill these missions. As the Army Reserve transforms to balance its structure to complement the Active Army and National Guard in support of the current operating environment, it must ensure it maintains capabilities that are applicable to civil support missions. The Army Reserve must guard against the creation of a capabilities shortfall for DSCA missions as it undergoes transformation, especially in skills that mostly reside in the Army Reserve such as medical services,
mortuary affairs, and transportation. Additionally, Army Reserve Soldiers often possess civilian acquired skills that are not resident in the Active Army but useful in some civil support mission assignments. Therefore, the expectations for the Army Reserve continue to grow beyond the specified requirements.

Specified and Implied Homeland Security Obligations

The Army Reserve has very few specified tasks but several implied obligations to fulfill as a partner in the federal response to domestic incidents. A survey of several authoritative documents on Homeland Security (i.e., Title 10 U.S.C., Title 31 U.S.C., DOD Directive 3025.1, DOD 3025.1.M, DOD 7000.14-R, The Strategy for Homeland Defense (HLD) and Civil Support (CS), National Incident Management System (NIMS), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 3501, and Stafford Act) reveals that Army Reserve specified tasks for DSCA include:

Specified Task 1 - Provide support to FEMA regions, on a reimbursable basis, for emergency communication, security operations, and associated management and ensure the availability of such support during any time of war or national mobilization.

Specified Task 2 - Establish an Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program that assigns, trains, organizes and equips teams to serve each FEMA region.5

As a partner in executing assigned DSCA missions and historical support, the Army Reserve’s implied obligations include the following:

Implied Task 1 - Solicit volunteers to meet personnel requirements consistent with the request for assistance (RFA) through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).

Implied Task 2 - Synchronize available unit equipment with volunteers to meet RFA mission requirements within an area under short notice.
Implied Task 3 - Train and rehearse Army Reserve civil support mission assignments for all hazards in compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

Implied Task 4 - Reconcile annual training (AT), active duty for training (ADT), active duty for special work (ADSW), and temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) personnel for appropriate reimbursement, funding and yearly training requirements management.

Implied Task 5 - Providing support to FEMA regions, on a reimbursable basis, for emergency medical service, chemical, transportation, quartermaster, aviation, and associated management.

The specified and implied obligations of the Army Reserve to provide DSCA capabilities continue despite ongoing changes. If not properly managed, restructuring, and ARFORGEN support requirements can potentially reduce the viability of the Army Reserve to meet growing expectations in an already resource constrained operating environment.

Challenges to Providing Civil Support

Many challenges confront the Army Reserve while attempting to sustain and improve its ability to provide defense support to civil authorities during a presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency. Some of the challenges include legal restraints, administrative requirements, transformation from a strategic force to an operational force, and structure changes. Several of these challenges inter-relate and are stifling under the current laws, policies and directives.

The first challenge is to sustain strong relationships with FEMA regions as the Army Reserve command structure disestablishes the ten RRCs currently aligned with the FEMA regions. Each RRC has a habitual relationship with their aligned FEMA region and DCO. This relationship will dissolve by the end of FY 2009 without a clear replacement once the RRC inactivates. When considering the specified and implied
tasks for the Army Reserve, this loss of habitual relationships will complicate coordination efforts. The requirement to coordinate with potentially several commands within a single FEMA region to alert, command and control, and deploy volunteers and available unit equipment required to meet the RFA for a specific incident negatively affect Specified Task 1 (providing signal and military police support to FEMA) and 2 (establishing a viable EPLO program); and Implied Task 1 (soliciting volunteers), 2 (synchronizing unit equipment and volunteers to fulfill RFAs), and 5 (providing medical, chemical, transportation, quartermaster and aviation support).

A key link between FEMA and the supporting military forces is the DCO. The DCO acts as the primary coordinating officer between FEMA and DOD. In the event of an incident, the DCO validates requests for assistance from FEMA and approves all mission assignments that task military units/elements to deploy and employ their capabilities. The DCO must coordinate actions with Active Army commands, the National Guard EPLO from each state within the DCO’s region, and the Army Reserve EPLO. The DCO will also command and control units that deploy to an incident. The DCO is assigned to every FEMA region and has a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) to assist him/her in performing those duties. The DCO and DCE will continue their regional alignment. If an incident is large scale, DOD, via NORTHCOM, will designate a Joint Task Force Commander in lieu of the DCO to command and control units in the designated area of responsibility.

The Army Reserve has assigned at least one EPLO to support each DCO/E for each region. Under the current construct, forces belong to the RRCs that have aligned EPLOs. If the RRC administratively assigned EPLOs are subsequently assigned to
RRSCs, the EPLOs will not belong to the commands that provide the forces. When the RRSCs achieve full operational capability, they will not possess combat support and combat service support units to employ. Most forces will fall under the operational and functional commands in the new command and control (C2) structure. This new C2 structure multiplies the number of commands that the EPLO and DCO/E must coordinate with and task to provide capabilities to meet mission assignments.

The second challenge involves maintaining command and control of identified units for employment. Command and control of units, personnel and equipment can be very complex. The transfer of command and control of units, personnel and equipment in a region will change during pre-deployment, deployment, and recovery. This will complicate the execution of providing FEMA units and a viable EPLO program, soliciting volunteers and synchronizing unit equipment with them to fulfill RFAs, and Implied Task 4 (reconciling reserve active duty for proper accounting, reimbursement from FEMA, and yearly training management of personnel). During this process the EPLO must track the personnel and equipment employment for each incident, the cross-leveling of volunteer personnel, the task organization and utilization of equipment by unit, and the costs and expenditures based on the duty status of personnel and services rendered. Of the various reserve active duty statuses, Annual Training (AT) is the most restrictive but quickest method to activate units. A reservist must conduct at least 14 days of AT annually, but cannot perform more than 30 days of AT in a given year.6

During pre-deployment, United States Army North (USARNORTH) can query units near the affected area for possible employment based on capabilities and readiness. In
turn, these units can solicit volunteers for possible mission support. Commands cannot involuntary recall reserve units to support DSCA missions but “individual Reservists may be ordered to active duty, with their consent, under 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 672(d) (reference (fff)).” These volunteers may receive unit equipment to accomplish the draft mission assignments that accompany the RFA. Current laws and regulatory limitations reduce the viability of using time consuming mobilizations to respond to emergency situations. Voluntary calls to active duty result in ad hoc task organizations that bring together personnel from disparate units in a region. The personnel in these ad hoc elements may be in different duty statuses (i.e., active duty for training (ADT) temporary tour of active duty (TTAD), or even AT). The term reserve active duty will include ADT, TTAD, active duty for special works (ADSW) and AT for the remainder of this paper.

Currently, personnel and equipment from a geographic area are subordinate to the RRC. When the RRCs are dissolved, the EPLO and subsequently, the DCO, Task Force Commander (TFC) or Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) will interface with several Reserve commands to field a sufficient Army Reserve element to meet RFA requirements. Maintaining command and control of identified units for employment may become more complicated once RRCs are dissolved. Therefore, USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH, regional DCOs/DCEs and EPLOs may have to change processes and procedures to facilitate and track personnel and equipment from several reserve commands to support future incidents. Options for simplifying future employment of reserve forces require (1) a procedure which solicits volunteers from one command in an area to meet requirements, (2) a change in the law to allow an exception to policy for
federal disasters and emergencies that meet specified conditions to streamline the mobilization (involuntary) of units with specialized capabilities, or (3) a special provision for additional reserve active duty of up to 14 days for units called to duty under specified conditions to meet RFAs.

Command and control of military forces in support of civil authorities is normally split between National Guard forces under a state governor IAW Title 32 U.S.C. and Active and Reserve forces under the authority of the President and Title 10 U.S.C. National Guard commands under Title 32 U.S.C. cannot command and control Army Reserve units or other federal forces unless they are converted to or dually authorized under Title 10 U.S.C. authority for civil support missions. When reserve or active forces deploy, a DCO, TFC or JTFC is required to work along side National Guard units in civil support events. A limit on the civilian chain of authority of federal forces is reserved for the President of the United States and does not extend to state governors. Unity of command of military forces is seldom achieved but unity of effort is satisfactory. Keeping the separate commands avoids inappropriate orders to reserve forces that may violate posse comitatus, but increase military command chains in the area of operation.

Under the streamlined mobilization or the additional reserve active duty option, the Army Reserve must program funds for DSCA missions in a given FY. The program authorization of these funds must be reprogrammable if not expended for this purpose. These options require changes in current DOD directives and the streamlined mobilization option will require congressional action. Streamlining mobilization or authorizing a reserve active duty can minimize the need for volunteerism, streamline the duty status of personnel, provide coherent units for incident support and simplify
command, control and cost of support. Remedying command and control issues will positively impact the staging, deployment and consequence management/support phases, but does not overcome challenges in the shaping or transition phase.

The third challenge includes **training and rehearsing Army Reserve forces for potential homeland security mission assignments** based on unit capabilities. This challenge relates to providing various units to support FEMA and Implied Task 3 (training and rehearsing for civil support missions for all hazards in accordance with (IAW) the NIMS). Aside from the involvement of the DCO/DCE and EPLO, very few Army Reserve units are involved in deliberate training or exercises for civil support missions. United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) has nominated a few medical, chemical, quartermaster and transportation units as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response forces. Some of these units must conduct training for mitigation of potential hazards created by toxic industrial chemicals or materials for certification prior to employment in support of a civilian agency. Otherwise, unit training scenarios and annual training events are oriented toward war time missions. This orientation is cultural and appropriate for an operational and strategic reserve, but the five-year rotational cycle to support ARFORGEN does provide opportunities for DSCA type training for units in year one through three (Figure 1). USNORTHCOM estimates that over ninety percent of the skills and training for combat operations is sufficient for DSCA missions, but the rules of engagement are somewhat different. One Deputy DCO noted that “units will do what they know how to do, but with a civilian twist in a different environment.” However, rules about the use of forces and interaction with the public to include the media are
foreign to the way units train for combat missions. As a remedy, USARNORTH can develop DSCA scenarios and coordinate with the appropriate Army Reserve training command to develop training support packages (TSP) and facilitate 18 to 24 hour training events that expose units to a DSCA environment with mission assignments tailored to the function and capabilities of the subject unit. Training commands will aim to evaluate and enhance unit operating procedures to include nuances specific to DSCA missions to increase unit awareness of the homeland security environment. A unit’s level of readiness or status in the five-year rotational cycle affects its ability to participate in a training exercise.

**Readiness of redeployed forces and new organizations** is a fourth challenge. Personnel and equipment readiness are the primary challenges for the first year after redeployment or reorganization. Many units that return from OEF, OIF or other deployments lose over fifty percent of their personnel strength as a result of losing (1) cross-leveled Soldiers, (2) those reaching the end of their service obligations, (3) those remaining on active duty, (4) those relocating to another area, and (5) those retiring. New organizations systematically report themselves as non-deployable for a prescribed time period as they work to achieve an acceptable readiness level. Reorganized or newly activated units may also have training challenges.

For redeployed units, the Army Reserve implemented a program for combat fatigued Soldiers to be absent from weekend Battle Assemblies for up to six months. Additionally, equipment retrograde can lag personnel redeployment by thirty to ninety days. Equipment may be in need of major repair, or become obsolete due to
organizational changes. New or recently reorganized units may have both personnel and equipment shortages as a consequence of new requirements.

As a result, returning or new units are expected to be in a non-deployable or low state of readiness. This low state of readiness may have a negative affect on the Army Reserve’s ability to provide various units, solicit volunteers and synchronize unit equipment to fulfill RFAs in the event of an incident of national significance requiring a DOD response.

The Army Reserve has a great recruiting and retention effort to resolve personnel shortfalls, but there is no guarantee that a redeployed unit will recuperate and reconstitute within six months to a year. Recruiting and retention milestones focus on increasing unit personnel strength to a deployable status within one year. Recruiting and retention incentives are revised approximately every six months in an attempt to shift resources to support emerging Army Reserve priorities to meet operational and strategic reserve demands. The infrequent change in incentives provides a lagging positive impact on personnel strength.

Currently, the Army Reserve utilizes a unit status report (USR) that gives strategic leaders a view of the combat readiness posture of battalion-sized units and above plus separate specialty units at the company and detachment level. As mentioned earlier, combat and civil support missions may use many of the same skills and capabilities but in different operating environments. Combat missions are inherently more demanding than civil support missions as a consequence of the force protection requirements, infrastructure capacity and cultural/language challenges. Commanders need a systematic method of reporting civil support capabilities to senior leaders.
complementary to the unit status report. They should address their readiness confidence for potential participation in civil support missions based on personnel, equipment and training readiness. Army Reserve commands, USARNORTH, Forces Command (FORSCOM), USNORTHCOM, and the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) could then use the USR to maintain situational awareness and incorporate that awareness in the shaping phase of DSCA. Since civil support is easier to conduct than combat, most units should be capable of performing civil support missions in year two and three of the five-year rotational cycle to support ARFORGEN, and could be the primary option for supporting an incident in their region. This approach could minimize the affect of the low level readiness of recently redeployed units and reduce distractions for units in year four and five of the Army Reserve Support to ARFORGEN.

In the case of reorganized or recently activated units, a civil support comment on the USR becomes even more important. The local commander can assess the capability and form an opinion of the unit’s civil support readiness posture after receiving the DSCA training. These units do not fit the five-year rotational cycle to support ARFORGEN, but will depend on when the unit is activated and becomes mission capable as prescribed by higher headquarters. Once these units achieve DSCA mission capable status, higher headquarters should consider them as primary candidates for DSCA missions in the region until the Army Reserve designates them as validated (year four and five in support of ARFORGEN).

Both redeployed units and new organizations are capable of fulfilling DSCA mission assignments prior to achieving deployable status on the USR or any other combat readiness evaluation. USARC posits that any unit, regardless of its deployment
status, can provide immediate response for RFAs. When sourcing for special capabilities, USARC will consider units in year four and five for mission assignments.\textsuperscript{11} New units are susceptible to mission assignments prior to achieving full operational capability and may alleviate the fifth challenge to some degree.

**Reserve Center Coverage**

![Map of Reserve Center Coverage](image)

50 mile Buffer around Reserve Center

Source: RCTOT file Dec07

Figure 2. Reserve Center Coverage as of 2008.\textsuperscript{12}

The fifth and final challenge is **providing a time sensitive response to remote locations**. The effectiveness of staging and deploying DOD response capabilities is dependent on unit location and installations available to support the alert, deployment and employment of units. As BRAC changes reduce the number of reserve centers across the country and re-position them in highly populated areas, the Army Reserve must assess and mitigate any potential reduction in its ability to support incidents in
rural or less populated areas. The distance from an incident negatively affects how quickly a unit can respond. In this case, early alert and pre-positioning of units becomes essential to successfully providing a time sensitive response to civil authorities. Figure 2 displays the areas that have reserve units within a 50-mile radius (white circles). The areas covered will reduce more over the next two years as a result of BRAC implementation.

US Census Metropolitan Areas 2000

Figure 3. U.S. Census of Metropolitan Areas in CONUS.¹³

Figure 3 depicts where metropolitan areas exist (shaded areas). Examining these two figures together reveal that the metropolitan areas in northern California, central Nevada, and southwestern Oregon are without reserve centers within a 50-mile radius.
Further study is required to consider repositioning and filling reserve units in uncovered areas to potentially improve the responsiveness of support to civil authorities in those areas in priority by population density, but such a study is beyond the scope of this paper.

A secondary consequence of BRAC implementation is the removal of reserve units from some communities. A tertiary consequence may be the impact on the Army Reserve’s ability to provide various units, solicit volunteers, and synchronize unit equipment with them to fulfill RFAs responsively. The National Guard is the primary DOD reserve component contributor to DSCA missions, but may be overwhelmed based on the size and severity of the incident or the availability of National Guard units. Although Emergency Management Agreement Compacts exist between states, upon a presidential declaration of a national emergency, DOD could improve the response and efficiency of support by using an Army Reserve unit that may be several hundred miles closer to the incident. The current operational tempo of the Active Army continues to reduce its ability to support DSCA missions as it attempts to grow the force to meet ARFORGEN requirements. Therefore, the Army Reserve can position itself to use its available resources to support DSCA missions when needed. It can work with USNORTHCOM and USARNORTH to reduce time-distance challenges for western areas of the country through early warning and staging for any anticipated requirements.

Many challenges to the Army Reserve’s ability to meet its specified and implied obligations for homeland security exist. Changes in the Army Reserve have the potential of creating many capability shortfalls. The Army Reserve can use the following
recommendations to sustain or improve its ability to fulfill its obligations for homeland security.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations are aligned with the specified and implied obligations of the Army Reserve in relation to homeland security. These recommendations should help accomplish each task or obligation, and overcome associated challenges. These recommendations should help sustain or improve the Army Reserve’s ability to provide DSCA during a domestic national disaster or emergency.

1. Identify the signal, military police, chemical, medical, transportation, quartermaster and aviation units in the reset/train phase by region and establish points of contact with functional and operational commands accordingly.

2. Task USARNORTH and Army Reserve training commands to develop TSPs and facilitate 18-24 hour DSCA scenario training events.

3. Add a civil support comment requirement to the USR.

4. Familiarize EPLOs with operational and functional commands and available subordinate units at least semi-annually.

5. Change law and regulatory restrictions to allow an ADSW (voluntary), a special unit level reserve active duty (involuntary) up to 14 days, and funding pool for DSCA missions.

Identifying various units with DSCA applicable capabilities in the reset/train phase by region enhances the Army Reserve’s ability to provide various units, solicit volunteers, and synchronize unit equipment with them to fulfill RFAs. Identification of units with capabilities highly applicable to DSCA missions will help USNORTHCOM, USARNORTH and DCOs shape the environment through confidently and accurately communicating reassurances of available forces to FEMA and other agencies.
concerned about available support during times of war and mobilization. Predictability breeds confidence and appropriate planning. DOD agencies are able to gauge and match expectations with actual capabilities. This will help DOD sustain strong relationships with FEMA and identify the current chain of command of potential deploying units and personnel.

Developing TSPs and exercise scenarios help sustain the Army Reserve’s ability to provide various units to support FEMA and improve the training of these units for all hazards IAW the NIMS. If USARNORTH and Army Reserve training commands develop training programs for targeted reserve units, units will enhance their understanding and readiness posture for civil support missions through greater awareness of the DSCA environment. Such actions will meet the intent of NIMS and provide training and rehearsal opportunities for reserve units.

Adding a civil support comment to the USR helps shape support to FEMA, activate personnel and access available unit equipment to respond to RFAs. A civil support comment card on the USR will give greater visibility to higher headquarters and managers of DSCA, and opportunity for the commanders of units to differentiate their units’ ability to perform DSCA missions versus combat missions. Such information enables USNORTHCOM and others to shape the DSCA environment with information and efficiently solicit potential units and personnel to meet RFAs. With the comment card, unit commanders can articulate their unit’s readiness for DSCA missions whether they have redeployed, reorganized or recently activated.

Familiarizing reserve EPLOs with area commands frequently help improve the EPLOs’ identification of personnel and unit equipment for mission assignments. The
training of EPLOs should include familiarization with the units identified as available for DSCA missions based on unit status reports or the units’ year in the five-year rotational cycle to support ARFORGEN. A semi-annual update will keep EPLOs abreast of the transition of units from RRCs to operational and functional commands over the next two years. With this knowledge, the EPLO can coordinate actions efficiently between reserve commands and the DCO/E to fulfill RFAs.

Collectively, the first four recommendations provide a framework that allows the EPLO to play a significant role in providing support to FEMA by acting as the link between reserve commands with subordinate units in their respective regional DCO/E and FEMA headquarters. USARNORTH, FORSCOM and the USARC can use the USR data to build a list of available candidate units in the reset/train phase of the ARFORGEN support framework which enhances the EPLO program; command and control throughout all phases of DSCA; and the synchronization, training and rehearsal of reserve units for DSCA missions.

Changing laws and policies to allow reserve active duty for DSCA missions would enable greater Army Reserve support to FEMA with units, increase the relevance of the reserve EPLO, and provide complete units and personnel in a single duty status specifically tailored for mission assignments. Changing laws and regulatory restrictions on the use of reservists on active duty provides an improved method of facilitating the participation of reserve units in DSCA missions. The current Chief, Army Reserve recommended that the Commission on National Guard and Reserves explore an amendment to Title 10 U.S.C. that allows the call up of Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve for domestic disasters.¹⁴ An amendment to Title 10 U.S.C.
may allow a faster activation of units than mobilization, which can reduce the response
time to remote locations. Legal and policy changes would enable a reduction in the
types of possible duty statuses of reservist to ADSW for an individual reservist and a
form of annual active duty for those employed as a unit but not mobilized. Law and
policy changes would allow units to use their regular AT for wartime training and limit
the number of days a unit can participate in DSCA missions in a given FY, thus,
maintaining predictability and minimizing disruptions to the civilian occupation of citizen
Soldiers.

Conclusion

Over the next decade, the Army Reserve will experience several challenges to
meeting its specified and implied obligations pertaining to homeland security. As the
Army Reserve transforms, it must adjust processes to meet current expectations for
DSCA missions. The five recommendations provided above should remedy many
potential capability shortages created by BRAC, Army Reserve structure changes,
evolution toward the FCS and modularity, and the Army Reserve support to
ARFORGEN.

Future studies need to address the specific training programs that USARNORTH
and Army Reserve training commands need to develop and implement, a strategy to
respond quickly to the municipalities where no Army Reserve units exist, and suggest
any specific congressional language to change Title 10 U.S.C. or Stafford Act. The
Army Reserve and USNORTHCOM should collaborate and forward specific
congressional language with justification through the Joint Staff as a recommendation to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review and action. Further study could address specific training requirements tailored to DSCA missions for reserve units.

Identifying specialty units in the reset/train phase by region, developing TSPs with DSCA scenarios for reserve units, adding a civil support comment to the USR, and familiarizing EPLOs with available units at least semi-annually may be implemented without congressional action. However, their execution may be limited by the Army Reserve’s inability to call units to active duty involuntarily until the law is changed. These recommendations will improve the shaping, staging, deployment, consequence management/support, and transition phases of DSCA if implemented in whole or in part by providing (1) greater awareness of who and what capabilities are available in a region, (2) pre-coordination between command elements in each phase, and (3) DSCA training for reserve units. Changes to laws and policies will further enhance the Army Reserve’s ability to meet homeland security obligations amidst transformation.

Endnotes


9 MAJ Christopher Caldwell, Plans Officer, G3, USARC, email to author 11 January 2008.

10 LTC Travis Grigg, Deputy DCO, Region VI, USARNORTH, email to author 9 January 2008.

11 MAJ Christopher Caldwell, Plans Officer, G3, USARC, email to author 11 January 2008.


