Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

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**Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement**


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SUMMARY

For almost a decade, Congress has expressed reservations about many complex and intertwined peacekeeping issues. The Bush Administration’s desire to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping stems largely from the major concerns of recent Congresses: that peacekeeping duties are detrimental to military “readiness,” i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nations. Critics, however, are concerned that withdrawals of U.S. troops from peacekeeping commitments will undermine U.S. leadership.

Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations, performing tasks ranging from providing humanitarian relief to monitoring and enforcing cease-fires or other agreements designed to separate parties in conflict. Of these, 42 were serving in seven operations under U.N. control (as of July 30, 2001). Others are serving full-time in operations run unilaterally by the Department of Defense (DOD) or together with U.S. allies in support of these operations, particularly the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 37,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea. These “peacekeeping” operations are undertaken to promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace, and can sometimes be dangerous.

For Congress, two initial issues were (1) whether U.S. troops should be placed under U.N. control and (2) when the President should consult with and seek congressional approval to deploy U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions. As the number of troops under U.N. control declined steeply, the first concern became less pressing. Regarding the second, in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, President Clinton set forth the procedures for informing Congress and consulting with congressional leaders about ongoing and potential peacekeeping operations, but did not say that congressional approval would be sought. Congress is currently informed through regular monthly consultation between the armed services and foreign affairs committees (usually at the staff level) and executive branch officers. Other important concerns have been the high cost of and the appropriate method for funding DOD peacekeeping activities, and how much of U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping should be reimbursed.

Currently, the most salient Congressional peacekeeping concern is the military “readiness” issue. Members and military analysts worry that costs drain funds that DOD uses to prepare its forces to defend against a threat to U.S. vital interests, and that troops deployed for peacekeeping lose their facility for performing combat tasks. A related issue is the suitability and desirability of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping operations.

With the United States and other NATO nations undertaking seemingly indefinite peacekeeping commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo, another key issue facing the 107th Congress is what, if any, adjustments should be made in order to perform peacekeeping missions with less strain on the force, or whether the United States should continue to participate in these missions at all.
Most Recent Developments

The conference report on the FY2002 defense authorization bill, filed December 12, 2001 (S. 1438), contains the full $2.84 billion requested by the Bush Administration for contingency operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the overseas contingency transfer fund. On November 28, the House passed its version of H.R.3388, the FY2002 DOD appropriations, containing $2.74 billion for those operations in the contingency fund; the Senate version, passed December 7, appears to incorporate the committee recommendation of including $2.24 billion for those operations in the services’ regular budget accounts. All bills incorporate an unspecified amount for Southwest Asia operations in the services’ regular budget accounts. As plans move ahead for a possible peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration has reiterated that it U.S. troops will not participate.

Background and Analysis

Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping. These have ranged from the basic question of definition — what is peacekeeping? — to the broad strategic question — how and when does it serve U.S. interests? Some issues directly concern U.S. military involvement and are discussed here, or in other CRS reports. For several Congresses, two primary issues were (1) when should the President consult Congress and seek its approval to send U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions; and (2) whether Congress should restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. control. The first issue is covered briefly below, and more completely in other CRS Reports. The second is covered in CRS Report RL31120, Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues. Currently, Congressional attention focuses on three issues: (1) the costs of peacekeeping, (2) peacekeeping operations’ effects on the U.S. military’s warfighting capacity (“readiness”), and (3) the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, for information on the costs of U.N. operations and its capability to handle them.)

Debate over peacekeeping has been complicated by the difficult context in which the demand for U.S. troops and funds for such operations takes place. At home, this has included the downsizing of U.S. forces, and the press of U.S. domestic programs for funds spent on the military and on foreign aid. Internationally, complicating factors have included the sometimes fractious relationship between the United States as a world leader and its allies, and the nature of current ethnic and regional conflicts.

Context for the Debate

The Definitional Problem

“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote,
maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing observers to monitor elections, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict. The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United Nations peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional” force to separate parties that had been in conflict and to supervise the keeping of a peace accord they had signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of peacekeeping activities. In particular, it created the term “peace enforcement” to describe operations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. Subsequently, the Administration and executive branch agencies replaced the term “peacekeeping” with “peace operations.” (DOD categorizes peace operations among its “operations other than war” [OOTW].) Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,” as does this Issue Brief. The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are without risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war.

**Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping**

Thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a wide variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most sponsored or otherwise endorsed by the United Nations. As of October 31, 2001, 43 U.S. troops were serving in seven U.N. peacekeeping operations. These were located in the Middle East (14 in two operations), the Western Sahara (15), Georgia (2), Kosovo (2), East Timor (3), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (7). Other U.S. forces are deployed in operations that the United States undertakes by itself or in cooperation with other nations under U.N. authority. As of November 1, 2001, some 3,132 U.S. troops were participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR), and 6,515 in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), with another 1,309 in Macedonia providing support to KFOR. (Numbers fluctuate with troop rotations.) Over 37,000 U.S. troops serve in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. Another 865 serve in the coalition Multilateral Force (MFO) in the Sinai, which has no U.N. affiliation. There is no sign of any reduction in these numbers due to the Afghanistan operation.

Approximately 20,000 (the numbers have fluctuated somewhat) U.S. troops — mostly sailors and marines — usually have been involved in Southwest Asia around Iraq for the past several years, enforcing maritime sanctions in the Arabian Sea and two no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. (The Bush Administration had budgeted for 18,000 during FY2002.) These tasks are among those involved in “peace enforcement” efforts, i.e., the upper end of the peacekeeping spectrum where unstable situations require the threat or application of military force, although the Bush Administration has decided to budget them as ongoing peacetime U.S. activities. The air operations — Northern Watch and Southern Watch — are performed in coalition with the United Kingdom. (See CRS Report 98-120, *Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces*, for information on U.S. activities around Iraq.) Several other nations contribute to operations in the Arabian Sea.
PDD 25 and Clinton Administration Policy

On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a classified presidential decision directive (PDD 25) that defined the scope and conditions of future U.S. participation in, and contributions to, multilateral (mostly United Nations) peacekeeping efforts. (References in this Issue Brief are to a 15-page unclassified summary, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Department of State Publication 10161, May 1994.) As the Clinton Administration’s statement of peacekeeping policy, it defined guidelines for U.S. support of and U.S. military participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations that narrowed the broad, “assertive” multilateralist vision the Administration expounded during its first year which had cast the United Nations, with U.S. support, as a central player in ensuring world stability. PDD 25 delineated the more restrained role for peacekeeping that Administration officials articulated after the deaths of U.S. special operations forces in Somalia in 1993 made peacekeeping operations highly controversial. (See CRS Report 94-260, Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy, for a discussion of PDD 25 and a copy of the unclassified summary.)

Under PDD 25 guidelines, a primary consideration for U.S. support of multilateral peacekeeping operations was to be whether “there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security.” Basic considerations for political and financial support were whether U.N. or other peacekeeping operations advanced U.S. interests and whether other countries would commit adequate resources. In deciding whether to send U.S. troops, other factors to consider were: whether the U.S. presence is essential to an operation’s success, the risks to U.S. troops are acceptable, resources are available, and domestic and congressional support “exists or can be marshaled.” Where U.S. troops might encounter combat, other factors included whether there are: “a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;” “a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;” and “a commitment to reassess and adjust” as necessary the size, composition, and use of forces.

Despite PDD 25 and its guidelines, or perhaps because of it, the debate over peacekeeping intensified. Some critics judged it as “significant revolution” in U.S. security policy that could result in “increased subordination of American Military forces and U.S. foreign policy prerogatives to the U.N.” (S.Rept. 103-282) Others found the guidelines either too vague or too restrictive. Some doubted that they could prevent the U.S. military from becoming entangled in missions that initially appeared manageable, but eventually would cost more lives and money than U.S. interests would merit. In addition, the Clinton Administration may not have adhered to PDD 25 guidelines in decisionmaking on subsequent peacekeeping operations. GAO attempts to investigate this have been thwarted by a lack of cooperation from executive agencies. (See GAO testimony of Nov. 1, 2000, GAO-01-180T, U.N. Peacekeeping: Access to Records Concerning the U.S. Decision-making Process.)

The Bush Administration Seeks Reductions in Peacekeeping Deployments; QDR Promises to Address Issues Created by Peacekeeping

During his presidential campaign, President Bush expressed a dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces, but did not promise any specific actions regarding peacekeeping operations. However, Condoleezza Rice, then his foreign
policy advisor and currently National Security Advisor, stated during the campaign that if elected Bush would end U.S. participation in Balkans peacekeeping operations. Since the election, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld urged a withdrawal of U.S. troops from peacekeeping duties, with specific references to the Balkans and the Sinai, and from the training of African troops for peacekeeping, although in early June he acknowledged that U.S. troops must be present in Kosovo. Secretary of State Colin Powell (who as an active-duty army general was known for deep reservations regarding peacekeeping) has emphasized that the United States must respect its commitments abroad. Critics of reducing or withdrawing U.S. commitments have argued, however, that relatively few U.S. troops are involved in peacekeeping operations compared to the large forward presence of the U.S. elsewhere, including some 37,000 troops (technically involved in peacekeeping) in Korea and some 40,000 in Japan.

Bush Administration actions are consistent with President-elect Bush’s remarks in early 2001 that he was “in consultation with our allies” concerning his desire to reduce the U.S. peacekeeping presence in the Balkans. Denying that he intended to precipitously withdraw U.S. troops, the President-elect nonetheless stated that “we’d like for them [the allies] to be the peacekeepers....And it’s going to take a while.” (New York Times, January 14, 2001) After that, the de facto Bush Administration policy, at least towards Bosnia, appeared to be to quietly seek to minimize forces through negotiations with U.S. allies. For Bosnia, the Bush administration sought to reduce the U.S. presence through established NATO procedures. Despite news reports that an announcement would be made at the June 7-8 NATO defense ministers meeting cutting SFOR strength from some 21,000 to 18,000 military personnel, with the U.S. contingent cut by about 500 from some 3,600 to 3,100, no such announcement was made. However, DOD documentation for the amended budget cited U.S. troop strength in Bosnia at that point in late summer at 3,250, to be maintained through FY2002. (For more on Bush Administration statements and policy regarding U.S. troops in Bosnia, see CRS Report RL30906, Bosnia-Hercegovina and U.S. Policy. For U.S. military commitments abroad, see [http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mm/military/miltop.htm].) No new U.S. troops participated in NATO’s 30-day Macedonia arms collection operation which commenced in mid-August under the leadership of the British. U.S. troops already in Macedonia attached to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) provided transport and logistics support, but did not participate in the collection of weapons.

The September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests, however, that the Bush Administration is willing to maintain peacekeeping in its military tool kit to help deter aggression in selected circumstances and areas. The QDR states that the United States must, together with its allies and friends, “maintain and prepare” its forces for peacetime “smaller-scale contingency operations;” smaller-scale contingency operations is a category which includes support for humanitarian operations and disaster relief, peace accord implementation and other forms of peacekeeping, maritime sanction and “no fly” zone enforcement, shows of force, counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and strikes and other limited intervention. The document (available through the Department of Defense website) also states that “DoD will explicitly plan to provide a rotational base – a larger base of forces from which to provide forward deployed forces – to support long-standing contingency commitments in the critical areas of interest....Moreover, DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.”
In short, the document promises that DOD will address the stresses created by current policies for deploying forces to contingency operations such as peacekeeping (see sections on the readiness controversy, below) and by the current mix of U.S. forces that many view as inappropriate to handle the current range of operations. The document also states that the new planning construct to be employed by DOD “explicitly calls for the force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of smaller-scale contingency operations.” It does not, however, specify any increase in the total size of the force.

**Issues of U.S. Military Involvement**

**Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval**

A primary concern of Congress is that it be consulted about the commitment of U.S. forces in peacekeeping operations; many Members also want Congress’ approval sought if and when U.S. forces are to be placed at risk. Debate over the type of consultation and approval that the executive branch must seek is a continuation of the ongoing dispute regarding powers under the Constitution to deploy U.S. troops abroad into hostilities. The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), a 1973 legislative attempt to clarify that dispute, requires the President to consult with and report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The War Powers Resolution also requires that troops usually be withdrawn after 60 days if Congress does not approve a continued stay. It does not provide a mechanism for Congress to disapprove the initial deployment of troops. Congress’ primary power to exercise control over peacekeeping deployments and expenditures is the power of the purse, but many consider this insufficient. Not all Members wish to change this situation, preferring not to take a position on uses of force abroad.

The first session of the 104th Congress rejected attempts to repeal the War Powers Act and substitute another mechanism. Since then, several Congress’ have debated placing conditions on peacekeeping deployments, although most such efforts have been defeated. The Bush Administration is continuing the practice, adopted during the Clinton years, of informing Congress of ongoing and/or planned operations through monthly meetings with staff of the armed services and foreign affairs committees.

**Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements**

As U.S. spending on U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping activities soared in the early to mid-1990s, Congress became increasingly concerned about the costs of those operations. Because the “incremental” costs of peacekeeping and other military contingency operations generally have been funded through supplemental appropriations, DOD has had to postpone and cancel training and maintenance and to rescind funds from weapons modernizations and other accounts. Supplemental appropriations designated as “emergency” funding do not disrupt DOD activities and plans, but they can be controversial as they can raise overall spending above the budget caps set by Congress. During the second session of the 104th Congress, Members sought to resolve the problem by budgeting funding for ongoing missions in an “Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund,” (OCOTF) in the annual DOD measures. This mechanism was included in legislation of the 105th and 106th Congresses, but the
President still sought supplemental funding for Bosnia, and then Kosovo, in subsequent years. (For more information on the concept of incremental costs, and on legislative and executive attempts to create more efficient methods of funding contingency operations see CRS Report 98-823, *Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers.*)

**Costs.** Until the 1990s, DOD did not keep a central accounting of figures on peacekeeping because these “incremental” costs (i.e., the amount spent on peacekeeping over that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, and on routine training, equipment repairs and replacements) were minimal. At the end of this report, there is a detailed chart of DOD incremental costs (actuals) of peacekeeping and related security operations from FY1991-FY2000, and part-year FY2001 incremental costs, all in current dollars. Incremental costs in constant FY2002 dollars though FY2000 are available in CRS Report RS21013, *Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.*

**Bush Administration FY2001 Supplemental and FY2002 Appropriations Requests.** On June 1, 2001, the Bush Administration requested some $5.6 billion in supplemental funding for the Department of Defense that included $32 million for the OCOTF, to cover additional costs of providing Reserve personnel for contingency operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia, in line with the policy of further incorporating Reserve components into contingency operations. (See the section below on readiness, particularly the subsection on greater use of the reserves.) In the request documents, DOD stated that the “Army Reserve Component manpower supporting contingency operations will increase from the projected level of 2,336 troops to 3,524 troops, an increase of 1,188.” DOD indicated that the $32 million represents the base pay and allowances that are incurred in deploying the additional reserve forces. One June 11, the President withdrew the $32 million request for additional army reserve funding, and also proposed a rescission of $61 million from the OCOTF. The OCOTF had been funded at $2.8 billion ($2,838,777,000) for FY2001 in the FY2001 DOD appropriations act, P.L. 106-259. (That act also included some $1.1 billion for the OCOTF in FY2000 emergency supplemental appropriations.)

On June 27, 2001, the Bush Administration submitted a revised FY2002 defense budget, calling for $2.8 billion ($2,844,226,000) in FY2002 funding for the OCOTF, slightly lower than the preliminary FY2002 request (submitted in February 2001) of $2.993 billion. The $2.8 billion is intended to cover incremental costs in Bosnia and Kosovo. As of FY2002, the Bush Administration has decided to fund operations in Southwest Asia directly through each of the services’ accounts, rather than through the OCOTF. (In documents for the amended budget made public in late summer 2001, DOD projected FY2002 SWA at a rounded figure of $1.2 billion.) The July 2001 GAO defense budget report, cited above, warns this change could have both positive and negative effects: while this funding method “could provide an incentive to better control costs,” it could also mean that Congress will no longer be able to track the expenditure of those funds and know of their possible diversion to other uses. The GAO suggested that Congress could require (1) written notification if funds intended for Southwest Asia (SWA) were obligated for other purposes and (2) that DOD continue to report monthly on the costs of SWA operations.

**Congressional Action on Supplemental Appropriations.** Both the House version of the supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 2216 (H.Rept. 107-102), passed June 20, and the Senate version, S. 1077 (S.Rept. 107-33), incorporated in H.R. 2216 as an
amendment passed July 10, would rescind greater amounts from the OCOTF than the Administration proposed. The House figure was $81 million; the Senate $200 million. Neither contained additional funding for the army reserves. The conference version (H.Rept. 107-148), as enacted into law (P.L. 107-20) on July 24 set the rescission at $200 million.

**Congressional Action on DOD authorization and appropriations legislation.** As introduced in the House, reported September 4, 2001, by the Armed Services Committee, and approved by the House on September 25, the FY2002 DOD authorization bill, H.R. 2586 (H.Rept. 107-194), contains the full amended $2.8 billion Bush Administration request in the OCOTF account. Section 1003 would limit obligations for DOD incremental costs for Bosnia peacekeeping to $1,315.6 million and for Kosovo peacekeeping to $1,528.6 million, unless the President waives the limit through by certifying to Congress that increased funding would serve U.S. national security interests and submits a supplemental appropriations request for the additional DOD funding. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s version, S. 1416, reported (S.Rept. 107-62) on September 12, also contains $2.8 billion for Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping in the OCOTF account. The Senate version had no special restrictions on this funding. The amended version of that bill, S. 1438, revised after the events of September 11, and taken up for consideration in the Senate in late September, contained the same amount. The conference version, filed December 12 (H.Rept. 107-333) contains the same Balkans funding, and the House restrictions. On October 24, the House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2002 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 3388 (H.Rept. 107-298). That version allocates some $2,744,226 million – $100 million less than the request – for the OCOTF for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following the Administration’s lead, all three bills incorporate funding for Southwest Asia (SWA) operations in the services’ regular budget accounts rather than the OCOTF, without specifying the amount.

The Senate version of the FY2002 DOD appropriations bill, approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on December 4 (S.Rept. 107-109), contains $2,243,966,000 million for the Balkans, but just as an unspecified amount for SWA operations, in the services’ regular budget accounts. The Committee report commended DOD for placing SWA funding in the services’ accounts because they are “planned operations, not contingencies,” and argued that “this reasoning obtains equally for operations in the Balkans.” (The Committee also stated that the GAO found that only 13% of FY2000 OCOTF expenditures were committed to the direct cost of operations, with other funds in the account paying for routine base operations, real property and depot maintenance, and planned training.) The version passed by the full Senate appears to contain the same amounts.

**July 2001 GAO Report on Budgeting for Contingency Funding.** A GAO report, issued in early July 2001, noted that mid-year cost estimates for FY2002 differed substantially from earlier estimates because, despite an increase in military personnel costs due to the use of reserves in Bosnia, overall costs in the Balkans were significantly lower because of an overall decline in the number of Army personnel and the amount of equipment in Bosnia and Kosovo and other efficiencies. As a result, the GAO found that there would be a no need for the requested $32 million in supplemental funding, and that there could be some $121 million left in the OCOTF at the end of FY2001. (See GAO-01-829, Defense Budget: Need for Continued Visibility Over Use of Contingency Funds.)
U.N. Reimbursements. Some Members argue that the costs of U.S. direct or indirect support for U.N. and U.N.-sanctioned operations, including DOD incremental costs, should be credited towards the payment of U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping operations and other payments to the U.N. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103 for more on U.N. assessments.) (In the 104th Congress, provisions to credit such support towards U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping were included in “Contract with America” legislation – S. 5 and H.R. 7 – but did not become law.) Currently, the United States is reimbursed only for the troops which it contributes to actual U.N. operations, and for assistance provided under Letters of Assist where the U.N. specifically pledges reimbursement. A little under one-third of U.N. reimbursements for troop contributions is credited to DOD to cover DOD’s incremental costs in deploying troops; the remainder is credited to the State Department.

Policymakers who object to provisions requiring reimbursement for all costs to the United States of supporting U.N. operations note that such assistance is voluntary and would not be provided if it were not in the U.S. interest. Also, many other countries provide voluntary support that is not reimbursed or credited to their assessments by the United Nations. A State Department compilation of the 1995 voluntary contributions of the United States and 13 other countries to support U.N. peacekeeping operations (excluding economic and humanitarian aid), shows that the United States provided 57%, 11 NATO countries and Australia some 42%, and Japan slightly under one percent. (The contributions are incremental costs for either FY1995 or calendar year 1995.) Subsequently, the State Department questioned whether these figures, because of the different methods used to compile them, presented a valid comparison, and did not update them. (An exhaustive CRS attempt in 1999 to gather information on NATO contributions to Kosovo found no single, definitive source of consistent data on military and non-military contributions, and at best could provide an approximate idea of relative costs. See CRS Report RL30398, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo, A Preliminary Report.)

The FY2001 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 106-259, H.R. 4576) did not repeat provisions of the DOD appropriations acts for FY1998-FY2000 regarding reimbursement, which required quarterly reports from the Defense Secretary on all DOD costs in support of the U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. Security Council resolutions, a detailing “all efforts” made to seek credit against past U.N. expenditures and to seek compensation from the U.N. for DOD costs incurred in implementing and supporting U.N. activities. It did, however, repeat provisions from those acts requiring DOD to notify specified committees 15 days before obligating or spending money to transfer defense articles or services (other than intelligence) to another nation or an international organization for use in any U.N. or other international peacekeeping, peace-enforcement or humanitarian operation. (Section 8070)

NATO/European Burdensharing. The FY2001 DOD authorization bill (P.L. 106-398) contained a new reporting requirement regarding NATO burdensharing in Kosovo. The conference version eliminated a House amendment which would have required the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kosovo if the President did not certify to Congress before April 1, 2001, that the European nations, European NATO member nations, and the European Commission had met specific goals related to their Kosovo pledges. In deleting the provision, conferees noted that European nations and organizations had made progress towards fulfilling their pledges, but stated they would “pursue legislative options in the future” if the European commitments were not met. They retained a Senate provision requiring a semiannual Presidential report on European contributions to peacekeeping in Kosovo. (Section 1213)
The first of those reports, submitted by the Clinton Administration on December 21, 2000, shows that of the $2,695 million that it calculated was pledged between July 1999 and October 2000 by the European Commission, 20 individual European states, and the United States, the European share was 78% and the U.S. share was 22%. Of these pledges, the United States had contracted for the expenditure of or disbursed 96%, while European pledges were 80% contracted. The United States contributed no funds at that point to the reconstruction budget, but had pledged about a third of the combined U.S./European amount committed for humanitarian assistance, and a little under a fifth of the combined amount for the Kosovo budget. The United States proportion of funds contracted was similar to its proportion of pledges. The report notes that the amounts Europe had contracted for were probably higher, as in some cases available data was several months old. (The European states included the 15 member states of the European Union, plus the Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Switzerland, and Turkey. Other organizations and nations also contributed.) Further pledges were made at a February 2000 donor conference. For further data see CRS Report RL30453, Kosovo: Reconstruction and Development Assistance.

U.S. troop contributions to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from June-November 2000 was some 13-14% of KFOR troop levels, according to the report, with troops from other NATO countries contributing some two-thirds of the forces. Regarding police forces, the United States pledged about 13% of the total 4,499 pledged to the date of the report, the EU/NATO nations pledged 30%, and other nations pledged 57%. Of those, the report showed that the United States actually deployed 90%, the EU/NATO nations 80%, and other nations 97%.

Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission

Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping operations. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be fighters, while the skills and instincts needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to work in units and employ higher levels of force are seen as necessary.) Another reason is that peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations. Many senior U.S. military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force. U.S. troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy. Most peacekeeping tasks, however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” or “decisive” use of force.

As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the Army field manual outlining doctrine on Peace Operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.) In part this argument is based on the growing recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that part of the task of a peacekeeping operation is to provide a deterrent to the continued use of force and that the most credible deterrent is a soldier well-trained for combat. U.S. military participation in peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by some military officers who argue that although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”) during peace operations, many other skills necessary for military operations are enhanced. (See section on Training Effects, below.)
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces. On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,” U.S. troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S. forces. On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces if the United States does not, and that U.S. participation in peacekeeping is an important part of “shaping” the world environment to decrease the possibilities of future conflict and war.

In recent years, the military services made several changes to adjust for peacekeeping missions. In particular, the U.S. military has been increasing special training for peacekeeping functions. Most of the training is for units who are deployed, or expect to be deployed, for peace operations: the Army norm is that units should receive four to six weeks of special training. The unified commands have developed exercise programs involving staff planning, command and control, simulated deployments, and training with non-governmental organizations and foreign militaries. Units that are drawn upon for peacekeeping operations have also incorporated training for peace operations in their normal training routines.

Some analysts argue that U.S. combat forces should not be used for peacekeeping. Instead, they suggest two options: establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the current military service branches, or create special units dedicated solely to peacekeeping within the current services. (In PDD 25, the Administration stated that it did not support the concept of a standing U.N. army, nor would it earmark military units for participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.) The military has resisted the concept of dedicated units.

On June 12, 2001, DOD sponsored a briefing on an Institute of Defense Analysis defense transformation study commissioned by the Secretary of Defense that recommended the creation of a standing humanitarian joint task force, “with a joint command and control capability similar to our war-fighting capability...with some immediately [sic] airlift and security capabilities” to respond to humanitarian crises. According to the briefing transcript ([http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t06122001_t612tran.html]), the task force would precede civilian contractors to the field as a stop-gap measure in a benign environment and for a limited time in a more troubled environment where “the circumstances required a military response.” These do not appear to be the type of dedicated peacekeeping units envisioned by some, but questions might be raised as to whether they eventually engage in humanitarian interventions that could require a longer than anticipated military presence.

The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns

“Readiness” issues have been a driving force in congressional debate over the extent to which the U.S. military should engage in peacekeeping. Readiness is a subjective and ambiguous concept referring to the degree to which the armed forces are “prepared” — i.e., currently in training and well-equipped — to defend the nation. As the U.S. military has been increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the same time as it has downsized significantly — Members have questioned whether U.S. military forces can perform their “core” mission, i.e., national defense where U.S. vital interests are threatened, if they engage extensively in other activities. Readiness, as related to peacekeeping, depends on several factors: the size of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length, and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat skills during a peace operation.
There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of the readiness issue. Peacekeeping (and all other operations other than war) is directly related to the readiness problem, if one is looking strictly at the results of the readiness ratings that are calculated periodically. That is because all the standards – all the factors and tests – that are used to measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness, that is, its ability to fight and win wars. These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the state of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their wartime skills. When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping operations, scores on these measures can decline, and they have declined in some cases.

This happens for several reasons. For one, people are transferred from units that are not deployed to peace operations to take part in peacekeeping. Second, funds for training and equipment have been diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations. Third, military personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat skills when participating in peace operations; and fourth, the U.S. military has been deployed for peacekeeping operations at the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army, has been reduced substantially.

Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends on one’s perspective on the utility of readiness measures. The standard of readiness ratings is based on the concept that the U.S. military must be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). Those who believe that in holding the military to that standard when there are many other necessary military missions see the measures as flawed. They believe that peacekeeping is a significant mission and argue that readiness standards should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks.

If one looks at the larger “readiness” problem, that is the perception that U.S. military personnel are in general overworked and underpaid, that military equipment is in poor shape, that there are rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military forces cannot recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness is less pronounced. Peacekeeping is responsible to some extent for this larger readiness problem, but there are many other contributing factors. The strong economy is frequently cited as impairing the military’s ability to recruit and retain personnel. Equipment is deteriorating and spare parts are increasingly in demand not only because of peacekeeping deployments, but also in many cases because the equipment was old and deteriorating. The area in which peacekeeping most affects readiness is the stress that frequent deployments have placed on certain troops – the so-called increase in Operational tempo (optempo) and personnel tempo (perstempo).

**Training Effects.** The effects of peace operations on a soldier’s ability to maintain military and combat skills through training has been a source of concern; military analysts and personnel have noticed mixed effects on soldiers’ skills, and thus on readiness. For some types of military activities and skills, participation in peacekeeping operations is considered to be a good substitute for normal training activities. This is true for many activities short of high-intensity combat skills, e.g., support functions, such as intelligence, medical, logistics, transportation and engineering, where units deployed in peacekeeping perform tasks that are quite similar to their wartime tasks, and in an environment that approaches a wartime environment. Many military officers and analysts state that peacekeeping operations provide far superior opportunities for small unit commanders to develop leadership skills than do normal training exercises. Nevertheless, for combat personnel, it is indisputable that some combat skills may deteriorate and the “warrior” spirit may be taxed by the mundane tasks...
performed and the restraint required by peacekeeping. All acknowledge that participation in peacekeeping operations significantly “degrades” crucial combat skills such as shooting (“live firepower”) skills, coordination of the use of weapons and equipment (combined arms skills), and large unit maneuver ability, which cannot be practiced in a peace operation. (The longer the deployment, the greater the deterioration of skills, according to some analysts.) To reduce such deterioration, efforts are made for troops to continue some level of combat training during peacekeeping deployments. For instance, the Army provides opportunities for those deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo to practice wartime skills while on duty.

**Deployment Strains.** The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army. For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment. In one of the first publicly-available studies of the stresses caused by peacekeeping, a March 1995 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) found that the increasing “op tempo,” deployments due to peacekeeping, and reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces, such as quartermaster and transportation units, and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of a MRC, to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to MRCs. DOD disagreed at the time, but the pace of operations subsequently became a source of concern throughout the services and DOD, as well as in Congress. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found several shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including an inadequate number of active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully trained and available Air Force AWACs aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.

The Army has also taken steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better management of its resources, as has the Air Force. In recent years, the army has addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to 6 months, and including national guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in Bosnia, thus attempting to reduce the optempo of combat duty units. The Air Force, since 1999, has established Air Expeditionary Units that deploy under a predictable rotation system in an attempt to reduce the stresses of deployment to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and to meet other disaster and humanitarian assistance demands as they arise. Nevertheless, in July 2000, the GAO issued a report noting that the Air Force was unable to meet the demand for aerial surveillance with AWAC aircraft because of a shortage of AWAC crews. In some cases, however, these solutions may generate other problems. For instance, the Army’s attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by instead deploying reservists may, some analysts worry, affect guard and reserve personnel recruitment and retention. Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements in resource management could ease stresses. Others prefer changes to the force size or force structure.

**Debate Over Force Size and Structure.** Many defense analysts and military officers have questioned whether the military is appropriately sized and structured to fight two MRCs and also take on peacekeeping and other so-called “non-combat” missions. For several years, many Members have expressed concern that the U.S. military is too small and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. Since the mid-1990s, several policymakers and military experts have suggested that 540,000 would be an appropriate size for the army.
to prepare for two MRCs while undertaking peacekeeping missions, i.e., considerably more than the current 480,000 troop army end strength.

There are also proposals to restructure U.S. forces. These include proposals to increase the total number of personnel most heavily taxed by peacekeeping, and to establish special dedicated units for peacekeeping. Some military analysts suggest that the overall force might be restructured to include more of the types of specialities needed for peacekeeping, and in units sized appropriately for peace operations. For instance, civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units are specialties that are particularly needed in peace operations, but are in short supply in the active military. This could entail increasing the number of such specialties in the active force and reserve, or altering the current requirement that the military be prepared to engage in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Some analysts have suggested that structuring the forces to engage in one MRC and a few small-scale contingencies such as peace operations might be more appropriate to current world conditions; others argue that this would leave the United States too vulnerable to military challenges from states such as Iraq and North Korea.

**Greater Use of the Reserves.** Increasing use of Army reservists and National Guardsmen in peacekeeping operations culminated in the Texas Army National Guard’s 49th Armored Division’s assumption of command of the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent on March 7, 2000. Some 1,200 Texas guardsmen were placed in charge until October 2000, when they were replaced by the active duty Third Infantry Division. Reportedly, it was the first time since World War II that a National Guard General had commanded active duty Army troops, of which there were some 3,000. For the near future, Army National Guard divisions will alternate with active duty divisions in commanding the U.S. SFOR contingent; after October 2002 through 2005, under a 2000 Army planning schedule, it will be commanded exclusively by National Guardsmen.

Two areas of concern have been the cost of their use and the effect on recruitment and retention. The costs of increasing the use of the Reserves and Guard for peacekeeping could vary substantially, depending on the size of the active duty force and on the “tempo” of operations, i.e., the size, length, and frequency of deployments, according to defense experts. While Reservists and Guardsmen are less expensive to maintain on a daily basis than active duty soldiers, who are paid year round, once deployed they temporarily increase the number of active duty personnel and thus the overall cost of the force. They also add more to the incremental cost of an operation than do active duty soldiers. GAO/NSIAD-00-162 states that the “integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions such as Bosnia significantly increases the cost of these missions...” Many defense experts fear that repeated call-ups for reservists and guards are affecting their recruitment and retention, thus depleting the pool available for such operations and for deployment to a major regional conflict. To mitigate that prospect, the Army announced on March 6, 2000, that future deployments of active and reserve components for operations other than war would be limited to 179 days. This has displeased some reservists who desire longer tours for promotion and other career reasons.

**Bosnia and Kosovo Debates**

Since 1993, the Balkans debates have reflected many of the above issues. On the issue of presidential authority to deploy troops on a NATO peacekeeping mission to Bosnia, Congress in effect deferred to President Clinton, leaving unchallenged his initial decision to
seek congressional support, but not authorization, for the deployment. Despite continuing reservations and opposition within Congress to the Bosnia mission, Congress has continued to fund U.S. military actions there. Even Members who have opposed the deployment have stated that they did not wish to deprive U.S. troops of the means to perform their mission. In 1998 and 1999, Congressional reactions to the possibility of U.S. military action under NATO in Kosovo, a region of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro), indicated that Members remained reluctant to restrict the President’s ability to act. Congressional action on FY2000 and FY2001 supplemental and FY2001 regular appropriations for Kosovo indicated continuing reluctance to restrict the President, although some Members feel strongly that it is within the Congress’ prerogatives to do so. For information on Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia, and other provisions and legislation related to U.S. deployments there, see CRS Issue Brief IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy; CRS Issue Brief IB10027, Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations, CRS Report RL30729, Kosovo and the 106th Congress, CRS Issue Brief IB93056, Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations, and CRS Report RL30906, Bosnia-Hercegovina and U.S. Policy.

(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)

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<td>86.9</td>
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<td>505.3</td>
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*Notes:* This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. Opinion as to which of them constitute "peacekeeping" or "peace operations" differ. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Totals may not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic), Provide Promise (Humanitarian Assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity as incremental costs. The Haiti accounts do not include the DOD processing of Haitian migrants, which totaled $108.1 million in FY1994 and $63.7 million in FY1995. As of FY2002, the Bush Administration has determined that costs for Southwest Asia will be included in the services' budgets, therefore only a rounded figure of $1,200.0 is available in public budget documents. For figures in constant FY2002 dollars through FY2000, see CRS Report RS21013, Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.
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