U.S., RUSSIA AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
“SHOULDER TO SHOULDER” INTO BATTLE?

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Preface

If you get your news only from sound bites on TV, our browsing headlines on the internet, it probably seems clear to you that the U.S. and Russia have developed a much closer relationship, and have certainly become strong allies in the global war on terrorism. But there is more to reality than is presented in the media for general consumption. Also recognizing that international relationships are more complex than warm handshakes and kind words of national leaders, we endeavored in this project to unearth nuggets of understanding that would serve well even a causal observer of U.S.–Russian relations.

Let it be said from the outset, none of us are Russian scholars. However, besides academic diligence and rigor, we also relied heavily upon people who truly are Russian experts. As research fellows at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy (ISCIP) at Boston University, we had the great fortune to work this effort under the tutelage its director, of one of the truly great Russian experts, Prof Uri Ra’anan. He helped us immensely as we attempted to get to the core of the enigma that is Russian foreign policy. ISCIP’s deputy director, Susan Cavan, was an invaluable resource off whom we would daily bounce thoughts and ideas. After a chuckle, she would always provide us with enormous insight. The remaining research associates at ISCIP provided us with an incredibly professional work environment and we sincerely hope their excellence is in some way reflected in our work. Thank you to the entire ISCIP team.
We all would also like to thank our families for putting up with our hours of mad typing. Without their love and support we would certainly have failed this task.
Abstract

The demise of the Soviet Union shifted paradigms around the world, causing many to conceive of a new era of cooperation between the new Russian Federation and the United States. Following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 11 September 2001, many assumed the resultant war on terrorism would finally unite the two nations against a common enemy, aligning interests as never before. In some ways cooperation was enhanced, but interests were hardly aligned. The siege of the Beslan middle school in September 2004, a “Russian September 11th,” brought renewed hopes for alignment between the two nations against an enemy that knew no bounds. Again, that appears not to be the case. This volume attempts to answer why that is so, and how might policy interpretation and implementation help realize such hopes.

This work begins with a review of the broader foreign policies of the United States and Russia and a specific review of each nation’s perspectives on the war on terror and on cooperation. It reviews some of the issues Russia has faced during its transition from Soviet rule to more liberal institutions, and it reviews the cooperative efforts between the two nations to date, both bilateral and multilateral. It ends with recommendations for policy implementation based on the fundamental differences in perceptions between the two nations, given the assessed policies of the United States. It is believed that by executing foreign policy with a consideration for the unique perspectives of each nation, more effective cooperation in the war on terror and elsewhere can be achieved.
Chapter 1

Introduction

“The United States stands side-by-side with Russia as we fight off terrorism.”

—President George W. Bush

In the wake of 9/11, the first foreign leader to call President Bush with words of
condolence and support was President Vladimir Putin. Putin is quoted as having said,
“So, we understand as well as anyone the feelings of the American people. Addressing
the people of the United States on behalf of Russia I would like to say that we are with
you, we entirely and fully share and experience your pain. We support you.”¹

In the wake of the Beslan school tragedy in southern Russia, President Bush sent
condolences to the people of Russia when he visited the Russian Embassy in Washington
shortly after the tragedy in September of 2004. Bush said “The United States stands side-
by-side with Russia as we fight off terrorism, as we stand shoulder-to-shoulder to make
the world a more peaceful place and a free place.” President Bush’s comments
continued, illuminating the personal relationship he shares with President Putin: “Please
pass on my very best wishes to President Vladimir Putin, a man who I admire. I talked
with Vladimir right after the incident. We had a very good discussion about the need for
us to continue to work together. I pledged our government would continue to work with
the Russian government and the Russian people.”²
The terrorist attack on America on September 11, 2001 will live in American history as a watershed event. Very much in line with President Roosevelt in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, President Bush was quick to frame the time for the American people. In his famous “Day of Infamy Speech” on 8 Dec 1941, Roosevelt said, “Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.”

In his radio address to the nation on 29 Sep 2001, President Bush concluded with the following: “We did not seek this conflict, but we will win it. America will act deliberately and decisively, and the cause of freedom will prevail.”

So, too, is Beslan a watershed event in Russian contemporary history, frequently called Russia’s 9/11. President Putin, in an address to the nation on 4 September 2004, said that: “We are dealing here not just with separate actions aimed at frightening us, not just with separate terrorist sorties. We are dealing with direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia, with a total, cruel and full-scale war in which our compatriots die again and again.”

In the wake of each of these events, the nations’ leaders called their countries forth into battle against the evil of international terrorism. The U.S. war plan for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), declared by the Bush administration, is set out in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSfCT). This strategy contemplates the dawn of new international order that forces former enemies to become indispensable allies: “At the same time, through our common efforts against terrorism, we are recasting our relations with Russia, ... The cooperation forged with these countries in the war on
terrorism highlights how our future relations need not be constrained by past
differences.”

With such an apparent convergence of national interests, both nations engaged in
‘war’ against international terrorism, and the now famous personal relationship between
Presidents Bush and Putin, one would assume that a relationship of unprecedented
cooperation would naturally occur between the two former super-power foes. Certainly
when compared to any time since World War II, the U.S. – Russian relationship is
enormously more cooperative and friendly. Extensive cooperation has, and is, occurring
on any number of global issues, not the least of which is combating international
terrorism. However, there is ample evidence that significant difficulties still exist in the
U.S. – Russian relationship, that maybe the two nations are not shoulder-to-shoulder as
the rhetoric of the leadership claims. Strained relationships over bilateral issues like the
U.S. abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), its war in Iraq, and Russia’s
problems in Chechnya and interference in the domestic affairs of its neighbors all seem to
take their toll on this newly constructed relationship and bring its depth and closeness
into question.

**Good Policy**

The general goal of this project is to shed light on the question of U.S. – Russian
relations. By examining the broader context of the GWOT, that of the security and
foreign policies of Russia and the U.S., this study hopes to illuminate underlying
conditions that may allow for more coherent policy development; policy that serves the
greater end by optimizing mutual interests, reducing misunderstandings, and minimizing
unanticipated consequences through a thorough understanding of mechanisms, biases, and motivations at work. GWOT policy cannot be made in a vacuum. Understanding the GWOT plays a major role in shaping foreign policy, it is not the only issue at work and any consideration of policy options with regards to the GWOT must be taken with a view towards the entirety of U.S. and Russian foreign and security policy objectives.

To grasp the depth and meaningfulness of a relationship between two parties, as well as to grasp the potential future arrangements, requires a thorough understanding and knowledge of each party: their unique likes and dislikes, their most avid interests, and their motivations. Additionally, a common language can greatly aid in ensuring the relationship is built on solid ground and can continue to serve both parties well by ensuring good communications and maybe more importantly, reduce the risks associated with miscommunication. The first couple of chapters set the groundwork for examining the U.S./Russian cooperation in the GWOT in the context of the entirety of their security concept, perceived threats, and security strategies. After a brief discussion of regarding historical context, a thorough examination of the national interests and national security strategies of both nations will follow. Working from big to small, basic security concepts and policy paths are discussed before getting into a discussion of the nations’ perception of the terrorist threat and their approaches to combating the threat.

Based upon this background, specific issue areas where national interests of the two countries seem to collide will be examined in some detail. The focus is on illustrating the role perceptions of national interests play and fundamental policy characteristics exhibited by each nation, shape the nations’ position in each case. These issue areas are
seen as roadblocks, or certainly obstacles, to increased cooperation. Some of the obstacles are real, others more a matter of perception.

The next chapter will cover how the national interests of the two nations have converged since 9/11. A look at U.S. – Russian cooperation to date on the GWOT will look at how each nation pursued its national interests in cooperation with the other. The specific issue areas occur in both bilateral arenas, as well as in U.S. – Russian cooperation within international or multi-lateral organizations.

The heart of this analysis is in outlining those areas in which there lies promise for optimizing the confluence of national interests to build a constructive relationship not only producing a more efficient war on terror, but a more productive relationship in general. The section is broken down by time frame and provides useful insights into producing policy that would have short-term, intermediate-term, and generational impact on the U.S. – Russia relationship.

The work will cover in reasonable detail those areas that have direct impact on the construction of foreign policy of the U.S. and Russia vis-à-vis each other in the war on terror. That is obviously only a subset of the issues that impact the relationship of these two nations, but should provide a broad enough context to allow this study to reach its goal. The reader is obviously the judge of that. Truly significant issues are not discussed because this is only a one volume work. Separate volumes could be written that would cover the host of economic and trade issues, energy interests, and relationships to rising great powers like China, India and Brazil. These analyses will be left for another group of analysts for another time.
Foreign and security policy of both nations are so complex due not only to the complexity of the strategic environment in which they interact, but also because the policy-making mechanisms of both countries is very complex and subject to forces not readily visible to researchers. This poses a serious methodological problem to foreign policy analysts. In the present work, the researchers took both a close look at the official words printed and spoken by the countries’ governments, and combined that with a careful analysis of the actual policy actions taken by the country, to arrive at general understanding as to why the countries behave the way they do. It is hoped that with this understanding of each countries’ policy that government officials can develop clear, coherent policies that allow each nation to pursue its interests most efficiently.

Notes

1 “Vladimir Putin: It Is a Brazen Challenge to the Whole Humanity,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 12 Sep 2001; RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest, via LexisNexis.
Chapter 2

U.S. Security Concepts, Policy, and Definitions

*The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.*

—President George W. Bush
Second Inaugural Address

At the outset of this study, the assumption was made that the global war on terrorism is a subset of the U.S.’s overarching national security strategy and must support its fundamental foreign policy goals. This construct, however, has been reduced in utility somewhat by the fact that to a large degree, the U.S. version of the global war on terrorism has taken on a meaning much larger than simply a campaign against those forces that perpetrate terrorism. Some have described the GWOT as a replacement for the Cold War as an organizing principle around which U.S. foreign policy will be centered. Just as nearly all foreign (and to a large degree, domestic) policy issues during the Cold War were viewed by policy-makers through the lens provided by the competition between the U.S.-led Free World and the Soviet-led Communist bloc, so too are nearly all of today’s issues seen through the lens provided by the competition between civilization and terror. There were arguments immediately after 9/11 that this not be made the case, that the GWOT “should not trump indefinitely or negate the rest of our national agenda,” that the global problems that existed on September 10th, 2001, still
existed and the GWOT “must be weighed and balanced against the other priorities that will continue to affect the vital interests and character of the nation.” Nonetheless, according to Walter Russell Mead in his book *Power, Terror, Peace and War*, the Bush administration has intentionally made the GWOT the centerpiece of their foreign (and to some degree, domestic) policy for a number reasons, most of which have to do with the domestic political landscape.

The issue will be discussed in more detail later in this section. First, a general discussion of the U.S. national security concept will provide a starting point from which one can more clearly understand U.S. foreign policy objectives and the strategy for pursuing those objectives. Following that will be a more specific discussion about the Global War on Terror, including useful background and definitions, analysis of the basic strategy, and U.S. efforts to date.

**The U.S. Security Concept**

U.S. foreign policy goals are virtually unchanged since the end of the Cold War. In fact, Walter Russell Mead claims that even before attaining great power status late in the 19th century, U.S. foreign policy has pursued what he terms “the American Project.” This project is to “protect our own domestic security while building a peaceful world order of democratic states linked by common values and sharing a common prosperity.” Without doing a complete recap of U.S. foreign policy, a quick review of the National Security Strategies (NSS) of the last three U.S. administrations illustrates how closely the U.S views its post-Cold War security with the advancement of democratic values, and free and open markets securing economic prosperity.
President George H.W. Bush’s administration’s first NSS included these words: “America will continue to support an international economic system as open and inclusive as possible, as the best way to strengthen global economic development, political stability and the growth of free societies.” The Clinton Administration’s last NSS stated that: “Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its [the United States’] central goals are: … To bolster America’s economic revitalization; To promote democracy abroad.” Certainly the current NSS is unambiguous: “The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” And in fact, President George W. Bush, in his second inaugural address went so far as to say “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands….America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” Encouraging the development of democratic values and robust, free market economies are the central pillar of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. vision of its national security is inseparable from the propagation of what President Bush calls the “single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” In 1992, in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government official policy towards the newly independent states (NIS) was summarized in a fact sheet generated by the White House in support of the recently signed Freedom Support Act of 1992. The fact sheet entitled “Once In A Century Opportunity To Consolidate Freedom” said:

The collapse of the Soviet Union provides America with a once-in-a-century opportunity to help freedom take root and flourish in the lands of Russia and Eurasia.
Their success in democracy and open markets will directly enhance our national security. The growth of freedom there will create business and investment opportunities for Americans and multiply the opportunities for friendship between our peoples.

Between 1994 and 2003, the U.S. expended more than $9.4 billion in the 12 countries that comprise the NIS on programs associated with the Freedom Support Act, the vast majority of which is spent by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State on programs related to encouraging the development of democratic political institutions. On Russia alone, the U.S. spent $784 million in 2002.

Central to the national security strategy of the U.S., according to NSS 2002, are the values for which America stands: “America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.” The strategy is simple and straightforward: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

The logic is that security and prosperity for America is assured by expanding the community of states joined by the values of western democracy and free markets because only by embracing these ideals can nations prosper. It is through increasing freedoms and prosperity that it is possible to swing the global balance in favor of those invested in the current world order and therefore wish not to threaten the status quo, as opposed to those not sharing the same values (and therefore prosperity) and threaten the status quo through violence, even to the point of wanting to topple it all together.
The economic part of the national security strategy goes further than just encouraging market economies. According to Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, “National security and global economic prosperity are inexorably linked.” Larson explains that the economic dimension of the NSS has three priorities. The first is to assure the economic security of the U.S., accomplished primarily through developing reliable and diversified supplies of energy. The second is to advance global prosperity by expanding trade and investment, primarily through multilateral trade agreements. And third, the U.S. must ensure that poor nations become part of the “rising tide of prosperity” by expanding the circle of development. Ensuring the secure flow of oil and stable economic markets that are safe for foreign investment represent major U.S. national interests. Entities that threaten stability in regions vital to the global energy market, as well as any state that presents the specter of becoming an unfriendly hegemon in that region, thus present the most significant threats to U.S. national security interest. This can only be done by creating investment-friendly conditions in poor countries by ensuring the rule of law, discouraging poor economic practices, and increasing accountability and transparency thereby reducing corruption.

U.S. strategy reflects the fact that the U.S. embraces its role as world leader. Richard Armitage says it well when he states:

“The United States stands alone as a nation of unmatched diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural might. As a people, we have greater capacity and capability to protect and advance our interests in the world than at any other time in our history. As a nation, we have greater responsibility to exercise leadership than at any other time in our history.

Nonetheless, for all our clout and influence, the United States faces some of the same security challenges that countries such as Sri Lanka face. In deed, no nation can hope to tackle successfully the decisive challenges of this age alone."
Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, focuses his thoughts on the great powers out of a sense of practicality, claiming that the U.S. is determined “to develop cooperative relations among the world’s major powers. It is here, above all, that the key to a successful conclusion to the war against terrorism lies.” Powell is talking not only about the traditional allies of the U.S., but also the great powers in the new world order with whom the U.S. has had difficult relationships in the past, namely Russia, India, and China. Through cooperation in the war on terrorism, the U.S. hopes to develop relationships and habits that assist the U.S. to lead in the solution of the myriad of other transnational problems.

While its leaders have repeatedly commented on the value and importance of multilateralism and international cooperation in making it more secure, the U.S., certainly in the last two administrations, has undeniably embraced its primacy on the world stage as illustrated by its willingness to take unilateral military action. The Clinton Administration’s willingness to take military action without UN approval against Iraq in Operation Desert Fox in December of 1998, and in Kosovo in 1999, had already raised international alarm over the potential dangers of the unipolar world in which U.S. power was not checked. Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration had demonstrated to the world through its actions that it had a penchant for unilateral action and was adverse to almost any policy that limits the exercise of U.S. power. The Bush administration believed that with the fading of the Soviet threat bringing an end of the Cold War, those institutions and relationships that were vital to Cold War security could no longer be presumed to have value, and would have to prove their worth in the new strategic order. “Coalitions of the willing,” more *ad hoc* and less permanent, were required to respond to the current
threats. Members of the Bush administration made their thoughts on this topic clear by informing the world that the Kyoto Protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Landmine Treaty, the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Protocol on Biological Weapons, and the International Criminal Court were dead as far as the United States were concerned.\textsuperscript{16}

Additionally, the administration chose to make very explicit the always implicit strategy of preemption. An unintended consequence of the Bush administration making preemption a highly visible part of its national security strategy is that they have had a more difficult time getting the public and allies to understand and support the President’s complete “vision for a better world.”\textsuperscript{17} According to the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, domestic and international commentary on nature of the Bush strategy, labeling it as unilateralist, militarist, and centered on preemptive war, so distorted the perception of President Bush’s vision that he felt compelled to attempt to “repair” it in an article in \textit{Foreign Affairs}. In the article, Powell defended the Bush record as one of “the primacy of partnerships,” highlighting the number of times the President sought UN resolutions for key actions, and remarking on the number of new and positive bi-lateral relationships that have improved dramatically over the President Bush’s time in office, most notably those with India, Russia and China.\textsuperscript{18} Nonetheless, topped with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April of 2003, in the aftermath of the administration’s failure to secure a UN Security Council Resolution supporting the invasion, the U.S. clearly demonstrated that it refused to have its power limited for want of a symbolic multilateral gesture that would suggest additional legitimacy for the action.
Threats to national security

It has taken the U.S. more than a decade to clearly identify the threats to U.S. security after the demise of the Soviet Union. In the absence of a real threat to state security, the post-Cold War U.S. national security strategies identified threats that fall generally into two categories: threats posed by rogue states; and threats posed by transnational actors/issues which include law enforcement issues (terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trade), health issues, and global environmental issues. The senior Bush’s administration was charged with developing the first post-Cold War threat assessment. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 helped keep the U.S. national security focus on danger posed by rogue nations, and the efforts by these nations to destabilize their regions through the aggressive behavior, sponsorship of terrorism, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The 1991 NSS mentions international terrorism in only in a cursory manner and lumps it together with other transnational threats such as narcotics trade and international organized crime.

As the Clinton administration’s NSS matured, international terrorism became more prominent in discussions of the threat. President Clinton proclaimed that “Terrorism is the enemy of our generation, and we must prevail.” The perceived threat of terrorism, however, appeared to have very little focus during the Clinton administration. The backdrop to Clinton’s views included the downing of a commercial airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the bombing of U.S. military installation in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) in June of 1996, and the bombing in Atlanta during the Olympic Games in August of 1996. That terrorism posed an
Increasing threat to Americans was began to be appreciated, but the nature of the threat was not yet discernable to most observers. These terrorist acts had been committed by a blend of domestic and international actors with a variety of perceived motivations. Probably the most shocking of the terrorist events, and until 11 September 2001, the most deadly on American soil, the Oklahoma City bombing caused many to re-evaluate the terrorist threat. As the story of the bombing broke, immediate speculation was that an Islamic militant organization had been the source of the terror, only to find out that the terrorist was a home-grown radical.\textsuperscript{20} Although the U.S. focus on the threat of terrorism progressively increased through the Clinton administrations’ strategies, fundamentally the focus remained the threat posed by rogue states, most of which were thought to sponsor terrorists as a matter of state policy.

During the 2000 presidential campaign, the threat posed by international terrorism was scarcely mentioned. President Bush campaigned on with foreign policy sound bites that made it clear he would seek a less aggressive, more “humble” agenda. According to Richard Clarke, the former National Security Advisor, as President Bush and his team took office in January of 2001, the discussion already centered on the ABM treaty and Iraq, with no special interest, apparently, in the nature of the threat posed by groups like Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{21} That all changed less than 8 months after the new administration took office.

In his cover letter on the 2002 NSS, President George W. Bush clearly stated his belief that “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.”\textsuperscript{22} Although he mentioned no specific enemies seeking WMD, presumably he is referring to both rogue nations and terrorist organizations. It is clear that the administration has intentionally conflated the threats presented by tyrannical leadership
of rogue states with global terrorist organizations. National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice explains in December of 2002: “These are different faces of the same evil. Terrorists need a place to plot, train, and organize. Tyrants allied with terrorists can greatly extend the reach of their deadly mischief. Terrorists allied with tyrants can acquire technologies allowing then to murder on an ever more massive scale. Each threat magnifies the danger of the other.”

Even as recently as February 2004, President Bush claimed that “…terrorist armed with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons…. [are] the greatest threat before humanity today.”

The U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

According to Martha Crenshaw, “The history of American foreign policy exhibits a pattern of reaction to shock, and in may have been inevitable that only a devastating blow from terrorism, causing thousands of civilian casualties on American soil, could bring about fundamental policy change.” Jolted from a counterterrorism policy path of “disjointed incrementalism” with a law enforcement focus, President Bush decidedly changed the flavor of U.S. policy by declaring a war on terrorism shortly after 11 Sep 2001. From that point, clearly, the assessment of the threat posed by terrorism had changed in scale. The National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, sums up the Bush administration’s approach to terrorism when she said that “9/11 crystallized our vulnerability….there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our society – a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called “Good War,” or the Cold War.”

Extensive debate was generated by the administration’s choice to apply the metaphorical war model to addressing the threat posed by terrorism. Jeffrey Record
 claims the “‘War’ is perhaps the most over-used metaphor in America.” “One cannot, it seems, be serious about dealing with this or that problem short of making “war” on it.”

On a number of points the “war” on terrorism doesn’t fit the traditional definition of war and the administration is left to help the public intellectually comprehend the differences. According to Crenshaw, “Using the metaphor of war defined the problem as a threat to national security, prescribed the solution as a military engagement, and predicted eventual victory over the adversary….” Maintaining public support for fighting a war against an enemy without a traditional fielded army, a war with no clear ending, and a war that affords only nebulous nonevents (the absence of a terrorist attack) as measures of success can prove problematic. Nonetheless, Record argues that the term may be useful in that, like the Cold War, GWOT denotes “a much larger, longer contest than the occasional hot wars…that were waged on its behalf,” campaigns that “were a part of a much broader grand strategy and struggle that has mobilized all elements of national power.”

Others argue that the war model is appropriate not only because it accurately reflected the deadlines of the threat, but because it symbolized national commitment, unity, and hardships that lay ahead. The war would require America to accept many of the characteristics of traditional wars: setbacks and losses, inconveniences for all and sacrifices unevenly distributed for a few.

The War Aim

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSfCT), published by the White House in February 2003, outlines what the U.S. war on terrorism is as well as laying out the foundational strategy for executing the war. This document clearly stated the administration’s position that the 11 September terror attacks represented acts of war, not
only against the U.S., but also against its allies and “the very idea of civilized society.”

It highlighted once again the administration’s perception of terrorism as an existential threat when it stated: “We will never forget what we are ultimately fighting for – our fundamental democratic values and way of life.” The war’s aim set by President Bush, is to “…Defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society.” As any good strategy does, the NS/CT also explicitly presented the objective, or war aim: “The intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.”

This is a point repeated over and over in government publications that “no cause justifies terrorism,” and that it is an essential principle of the fight against terrorism that “there are no ‘good’ or ‘just’ terrorists. We will be relentless in discrediting terrorism as a legitimate means of expressing discontent.” Additionally, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism also placed itself squarely in support of the National Security Strategy of the U.S., specifically Sect III, “by focusing on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders.”

Although this is not a study of terrorism per se, it is impossible to continue with the present analysis without some understanding of the problematic definition of terrorism as it is used in official policy development and proclamation. The U.S. National Security Strategy defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents.” This brief definition is less than satisfying in that it leaves open to question who determines who is innocent, and is the nature or the objectives of the perpetrator of terrorism important? In other words, could the ends ever justify the means? Nearly
every agency within the U.S. government has its own definition of terrorism, thus saying something a little different about how the U.S. government views terrorism. The most widely used definition of terrorism in U.S. official documents comes from U.S. law, and is the basic definition used by both the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, and by the State Department in their *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report: “The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Thus, according to this definition, the state cannot be accused of terrorism because by definition, terrorists are subnational actors. Even if a state’s behavior, whether targeting its own people or those of another country, meets all of the other characteristics (premeditated, political in nature, violence against noncombatants) the behavior must be labeled something other than terrorism. The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* goes on to state the official U.S. policy stance that “no cause justifies terrorism.” Extensive academic debate continues on the definition of the term “terrorism,” but as far as the term applies in the U.S. prosecution of the global war on terrorism, the above definition will be taken at face value.

**The Enemy**

The definition of the term terrorism, by itself, doesn’t identify the enemy in the metaphorical “war” on terrorism. The U.S. efforts focus almost exclusively on terrorism that is of the international nature, versus domestic terrorism. International terrorism is defined by the U.S. State Department’s publication, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, involves citizens or the territory of more than one country. The media name, Global War on Terrorism, is really a misnomer then. More accurately, the U.S. is waging a “war
on global terrorism.” It is international terrorism, according to the State Department, that has a direct impact on U.S. interests. The 9/11 Commission Report is even more specific: “But the enemy is not just “terrorism,” some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism—especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.”

When one talks about terrorism as an existential threat, Walter Mead explains, one must necessarily be talking about only those organizations capable of terrorist acts that “create devastation and economic dislocation on the scale of that approximating war.” Mead further claims that “the only organizations in the world with both the will and means to attack the United States on that scale are radical groups based in the Islamic world.”

Michael Scheuer, a CIA employee for more than 22 years and former Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center (and the “Anonymous” author of Imperial Hubris), is even more precise. He asserts that the preeminent terrorist threat has always emanated from certain Sunni Islamists quarters. Whereas “Hezbollah has never been anything more than a lethal nuisance to the U.S. and even Israel….Sunni organizations, in particular al-Qaeda, pose a potent national security threat to the United States.” Whereas in generations past nearly all terrorism was put into the “nuisance” category, today’s terrorism threat is viewed as being different in its very nature. In previous decades most terrorist organizations were secular, nationalist, and state sponsored. Today’s global terror network is transnational in nature, leveraging communications and information technology and freedom of movement in order to network globally, and has become decidedly more self-sufficient. In contrast to more traditional terror
organizations who in the past relied on state sponsorship, or less sophisticated and institutionalized criminal activity in order to fund their operation, global terrorist organizations are adept at financing their operations through any number or combination of legitimate businesses, nongovernmental organizations, criminal operations, and narcotics.\footnote{45} Other U.S. government officials and think tank experts make distinctions between “new” and “old” terrorism; between pre- and post-9/11 conceptions of terrorism. A former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, Andrew P.N. Erdmann, explains that old terrorism, embodied by organizations like the ETA in Spain, the Real IRA in Ireland, and the FARC and UAC in Columbia, used terror to obtain a limited political, usually secular, objective in one country or in a small region. Because of this, the “political objectives have traditionally provided some check on the level of violence they perpetrate. . . . Too much death and destruction…risks alienating support for their cause.”\footnote{46} The end of the Cold War and the success of decades of counterterrorism policy and diplomacy have combated the effectiveness of the old terror agents. “New” terrorism, according to Erdmann, is different on a number of counts: 1) these organizations, like al-Qaeda “have insatiable, even apocalyptic ambitions” which lead them to pursue unlimited means to accomplish them (i.e. weapons of mass destruction); 2) the threats are generally transnational and independent and therefore do not require state sponsorship or a single home base; and 3) by their nature, “new” terrorists are not subject to behavior modification through deterrence, “they do not fear retaliation and in some cases even welcome it.”\footnote{47} Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, emphasized this point when he claimed that “The calculation of gain and loss by suicide bombers is not limited to this world; they act to obtain benefits in the next
world….In short, we must deal with the idea that we are at war with terrorists who think that they can use terrorism not to exact some political concession from us, but to defeat us completely.”

Figure 1. The Structure of Terror

The NSfCT starts its discussion of the terrorist threat with a brief discussion about the “Structure of Terror.” Terrorism, according to the national strategy, is built on a foundation of “underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife” that create opportunities for terrorism to exploit.” The international environment sets boundaries for the shape of terrorist strategies while states, either through ignorance, inability or internet, offer terrorist a physical base from which to operate. Once in a safe operating environment, the organization takes root and grows with its capabilities being defined by its structure, membership, resources and security. The leadership, then, is the catalyst for action, providing strategy and overall direction. The national strategy sums up the changing nature of the terrorist threat like this:

While terrorism is not new, today’s terrorist threat is different from that of the past. Modern technology has enabled terrorists to plan and operate worldwide as never before. With advanced telecommunications they can coordinate their actions among dispersed cells while remaining in the shadows. Today’s terrorists increasingly enjoy a force-multiplier effect by
establishing links with other like-minded organizations around the globe. Now, with a WMD capability, they have the potential to magnify the effects of their actions many fold. The new global environment, with its resultant terrorist interconnectivity, and WMD are changing the nature of terrorism. Our strategy’s effectiveness ultimately depends upon how well we address these key facets of the terrorist threat.\(^{50}\)

The Strategy

As was discussed above, neither defense nor deterrence are satisfactory strategies to eliminate modern global terrorism as a threat to U.S. security and way of life as a free and open society. Under Secretary Feith claims that the only alternative to these bad strategies is one in which America strikes terrorists abroad, “where they do so much recruiting, training, equipping and planning. Given that our aim is to preserve our society’s liberties, we have no alternative to a strategy of offense.”\(^{51}\)

The fundamental strategy pursued by the U.S in its war on terrorism since 9/11 is spelled out in detail in The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. After outlining the general characteristics of terrorism and having analyzed its generic structure, the strategy looks to attack the structure at virtually every level. The document explains the basic expectation and strategy for the war on terror:

“Victory against terrorism will not occur as a single, defining moment….However, through the sustained effort to compress the scope and capability of terrorist organizations, isolate them regionally, and destroy them within state borders, the United States and its friends and allies will secure a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.”\(^{52}\)

The strategy calls for a 4-pronged approach. The U.S. will: 1) “defeat terrorist organizations of global reach;” 2) “deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;” 3) “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;” and 4) “defend the United States, our citizens, and our interests at home and abroad.”\(^{53}\) Also
known as the “4 D’s” strategy (defeat, deny, diminish, defend), each prong generates concrete objectives and policy efforts that will allow the U.S. to proceed towards security from terrorism.

Defeating terrorist organizations of global reach dictates attacking their organization and known infrastructure, including training camps, command and control capabilities, and safe heavens. With sufficient evidence that al-Qaeda perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, and the refusal by the Taliban government of Afghanistan to turn over key al-Qaeda leadership, including bin Laden, in October of 2001 the U.S., with UN Security Council and NATO support, undertook leadership of a coalition to execute a forced regime change Kabul and dismantle the al-Qaeda organization in Afghanistan. Although bin Laden still remains at large, he is far less visible and al-Qaeda training camps and other important infrastructure, as well as key leaders, have been “decommissioned,” compliments of the U.S. military and its coalition partners. By October of 2004, nearly three quarters of the known al-Qaeda leaders, managers and key facilitators were in custody or dead. Significant efforts by the U.S. and its allies have made gaping holes in the terrorist organizations and infrastructure in several other countries as well, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and the Philippines. Terrorist cells in a number of European countries, Canada, and the U.S. have been disrupted and dispersed. Ambassador Cofer Black, U.S. State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, discussed the threat posed by al-Qaeda in testimony to a House International Relations subcommittee in March 2003: “Bin Laden and his al-Qaida group enjoyed sanctuary, first in Sudan and then in Afghanistan. Now that its Taliban protectors have been defeated by the American-led coalition, al-Qaida has been disbursed and its
capabilities degraded. It is not the organization that it was previously. It is under stress and its leaders worry more about capture than initiating multiple large scale attacks. Indeed, many members have been caught or killed.  

Besides attacking the leadership, safe heavens and training camps, defeating terrorist organizations also means eliminating sources of funding vital to these organizations. Global terrorist networks are well funded through a myriad of global avenues. Since 9/11, and through the coordinated effort of more than 173 countries, terrorist have lost access to more than $200 million in assets that have been frozen or seized around the world. These “destroy” actions against al-Qaeda and pieces of its global terror network, have not eliminated al-Qaeda as a threat, however. It has caused al-Qaeda to devolve to more decentralized planning and shift to softer targets. They are also increasingly striking in alliance with other jihadi groups in various regions of the world.  

Simultaneous with “defeat” actions, the U.S. strategy seeks to deny further sponsorship and sanctuaries for terrorist organizations. Here the strategy addresses the role that the international environment plays in allowing terrorists to plan and carry out their acts of violence. The U.S. efforts then, have required strong support from all nations. Modern terrorism is not tied to any one location, but thrives where chances are best that it can conduct business without interference. Ungoverned spaces or national governments not able to control large portions of their country, typically in weak or failed states, and nations with sympathetic extremist government represent possible safe havens to global terrorist. It was the failed state of Afghanistan, led by the sympathetic radical Taliban government, that provided safe heaven for al-Qaeda training camps and operations centers from which the 9/11 attacks were directed. The strategy looks to deny
terrorist any sympathetic states from providing sponsorship or support to terrorist, and to create a global environment that eliminates safe havens from every part of the globe. The foundational step in this process to deny further support to terrorists globally, the U.S. pushed Resolution 1373 (UNSCR 1373) through the UN Security Council on 28 Sep 2001, making the responsibility to fight terrorism a function of national of sovereignty on all member nations. The resolution calls upon all nations to fully implement existing international conventions/protocols relating to terrorism, but also to “complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism.” Additionally, the resolution directs states to provide each other assistance with criminal investigations, prevent international movement of terrorist by ensuring effective border and travel documentation control, and to develop mechanisms improving the sharing of operational information. Finally, the resolution reinvigorates the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and directs member nations to provide reports to the CTC regarding their progress in implementing the directives of UNSCR 1373.

UNSCR 1373 allowed the U.S. and its allies to categorize the world’s nations under three headings: willing and able states, willing but unable states, reluctant or unwilling states. It is from the group of the willing and able that the preponderance of multilateral cooperation has come in the war on terror. These states not only assisted in freezing terrorist assets, enacted national legislation that improve law enforcement, and developed means with which to share information with other countries, many have also sent troops to assist the U.S. in the military operations in Afghanistan. Many of the willing and able
states are long-time U.S. allies, and include the countries that make up the heart of NATO. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., NATO invoked Article V of its charter which claims that attack against any member nation is an attack against the alliance, and under this article, the NATO alliance supported, and continues to support, anti-terrorism and security operations in Afghanistan.

Countries that are not traditional allies of the U.S. have also offered support, most notably, Russia, Pakistan, India, and several of the central Asian republics. All of these countries, however, have domestic problems linked to international terrorism of their own, and in each case, struggle to defend against militant Islamic forces operating within their borders. It is arguable that all these states could more neatly fit into the next group of states, the willing but unable. This group encompasses countries with the political will to combat terrorism but lack the resources to effectively do so, or lack the resources to meet their obligations under UNSCR 1373. These countries already struggle to muster the resources needed to address terrorist threats and political unrest within their own countries and are unable to effectively control their borders. It is in this group of states that the most progress can be made to deny support to global terrorism. Assisting nations to develop security capacity, improve law enforcement and investigative techniques, and improve the flow of information to one another can greatly reduce the likelihood that terrorist groups can establish operating bases and safe heavens in these countries with weaker governments. These efforts have been successful in countries like the Philippines, Yemen, Columbia, and the Republic of Georgia.

The last group of states, the reluctant or unwilling, are the ones that the U.S. subjects to the most determined diplomatic efforts. According to the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, some countries are reluctant to enjoin the war on terrorism on all fronts for fear that they will be placed on the terrorists’ target list, due to schisms in internal politics, or due to “cultural or political differences that lead to disagreements over what constitutes ‘terrorist’ or criminal activity.” The reluctant states receive diplomatic attention and “constructive engagement” in order to encourage them to more fully embrace the antiterrorism efforts of the U.S. and global coalition.

The unwilling states are those that sponsor terrorism. The strategy calls for holding those nations that sponsor terrorist organizations accountable. As discussed above, when Afghanistan refused to turn over bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization using Afghanistan as their operations base, the U.S. held the Taliban accountable by replacing the regime in Kabul. Currently, the U.S. State Department lists six countries as sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Iraq was removed from the list in October of 2004 following the regime change made possible through the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of the Hussein government. The U.S. war in Iraq and its role in the GWOT will be discussed in detail later. The U.S. continues to diplomatically pressure the remaining nations, particularly Iran and Syria. Both countries have been on the State Department list for a long time; Syria since December of 1979 and Iran since January of 1984. Due to being on the State Department lists, these countries are subject to U.S. sanctions which include, but are not limited to “a ban on arms-related exports and sales; restrictions on exports of dual use items; prohibitions on official U.S. Government economic assistance (except humanitarian assistance), including a requirement that the U.S. Government oppose multilateral bank assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous
trade and other restrictions, including a prohibition on imports and liability in U.S. courts for officials of that country that engage in terrorist activity.”

The goal of the diminish prong of the U.S. strategy is the one getting the most press in the wake of the elections in Afghanistan and Iraq. The policies pursued under this portion of the strategy aim to despite the fact that no political grievance justifies the use of terror, terror becomes an attractive policy option for those in situations in which there appear to be no hope. In order to diminish the breeding ground for recruits into the terrorist ranks, the U.S. claims to be waging a “war of ideas.” According to one of the architects of the U.S. war on terror, Douglas Feith, “If we are going to avoid placing ourselves on an ever-accelerating treadmill, our strategy must aim to stem the flow of people into the ranks of the terrorists. Doing this requires a focus on the widespread ideological support for the terrorism.”

Several key issues are highlighted in the Strategy; the most important is to “de-legitimize” terrorism, making it clear that terrorism, like piracy, slavery and genocide, should not be condoned or supported and must be opposed by all. Next is that the U.S. will work diligently towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S. has developed a Middle East Roadmap, an assertive effort towards a long-term resolution. In the Spring of 2003, President Bush introduced the Middle East Initiative that included several economic and trade actions that were meant to stimulate economic growth in the region and reduce the economic disparity that breeds discontent. In December of 2002, the U.S. also introduced the Middle East Partnership Initiative. This effort includes several programs aimed at encouraging democratic growth, economic freedom to reduce despair and hopelessness,
and quality, accessible and inclusive education. The President’s FY2006 budget request included $120 million for this program.

This strategy of encouraging democratic reforms and economic growth are also part of the administrations Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA represents a paradigm shift in U.S. aid to developing nations. Research has shown that foreign aid can actually contribute to the creation of the despair and hopelessness among large portions of a recipient nation’s population. Foreign aid becomes a commodity in under-developed societies, the control of which becomes a very attractive power source. Governments not accountable to the people have created policies that have made this assistance useless in alleviating the problems it was designed to solve. It instead empowers corrupt and ruthless government elites to grow richer. The MCA is designed to reward needy nations that take positive steps in developing long-term growth through a commitment to rule justly, invest in their people and encourage economic growth. Aid is predicated upon the formulation of proposals by recipient governments to move their country towards development. The governments are also held accountable to provide objective measures of their success. According to the President’s FY2004 budget request, the FY2004 budget was to represent “a first step towards the President’s (2002) commitment of $5 billion in annual funding for the MCA by 2006, a 50-percent increase in core development assistance.” Despite a slightly slow start, the administration has markedly increased overall international assistance spending. The FY 2006 Presidential Budget request has asked for $3 billion for the MCA, doubling its FY2005 request and more than tripling its FY2004 expenditures.
The final prong of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is to *defend* U.S. citizens’ interests at home and abroad. The preponderance of work here is being led by the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Their efforts include increasing security of vital infrastructure, enhancing responses to possible terrorist attacks, improving inter-agency coordination and information sharing, and detecting and preventing terrorist attacks in the planning stages before the attack is carried out. However, it is the entire strategy, all four D’s, that are aimed at preventing terrorist attack on the U.S. Should the U.S. suffer another terrorist attacks from the al-Qaida or other global terrorist organization, it would not have been only this last D, defend, part of the strategy that failed, it would have been the whole strategy.

**Evolution of GWOT – U.S.-led Invasion of Iraq**

The Global War on Terrorism, as originally understood by most, was a war against the global terrorist threat, as discussed earlier, the threat presented by al-Qaida and the militant, Sunni Islamic extremist who had clearly declared was on the U.S. with the attacks of 9/11. As the nature of the threat and the enemy differed from years past so did the strategy designed to combat it, especially in regard to the focus on diminishing the conditions of poverty and oppression typically exploited by the global terrorist. Following the successful U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling of its Taliban regime for having harbored bin Laden and al-Qaida, the U.S. set its sights on Iraq and the toppling of the Hussein regime. Many, both within and outside the U.S., argued such a move was outside of this original conception of the war on terror, and some have presented evidence that, despite administration claims that the Iraqi regime sponsored terrorists in the past, Hussein, a secular leader, tended not to host or support radical
Islamic terrorist, dismissing any connection real between Hussein and al-Qaida. Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy clearly identified the Hussein regime as a threat and enemy of the U.S. According to the administration, Hussein’s possession and continued pursuit of WMD warranted active policy to disarm him. Hussein had succeeded in frustrating more than a decade of efforts to ensure he had dismantled his weapons programs. The threat posed by Hussein was at the forefront of the administration’s thinking during a meeting between the President and his key security advisors at Camp David in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. There it was decided that disarming Hussein one way or another would be part of the war on terror. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in May of 2003, Feith explains that “The Iraqi dictator posed a serious threat. Given the nature of that threat, seen in light of our experience with the surprise attack of 9/11 and the crumbling, one after another, of the pillars of containment, it would have been risky in the extreme to have allowed him to remain in power for the indefinite future.”

In September of 2002, President Bush took his case for a renewed effort to disarm Hussein to the United Nations General Assembly. By the middle of October of that year, he had signed into law authorization for the use of military force against Iraq. The bill passed in the House by a margin of 296-113 and passed in the Senate by the margin of 77-23. Three weeks later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441, giving Iraq one last chance to make good on its obligations under the cease fire terms of the first gulf war to abandon weapons programs and allow inspection teams to confirm its dismantlement. In a show of compliance with UNSCR 1441, Iraq filed a 12,000+ page report in December 2002 on the disposition of its weapons program, but that was deemed
by experts to leave significant questions unanswered. By late January 2003, the U.S. claimed that it was obvious Iraq was not complying with the requirements of Resolution 1441. Between mid-February and early March 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell took the case for military enforcement of UN resolutions to the European capitals and three time to the UN Security Council. All efforts to get Security Council support for the enforcement of UNSCR 1441 failed and the U.S. undertook what was seen as a unilateral military action to remove the Hussein regime.

In the administration’s effort to gain domestic support for an invasion of Iraq, President Bush made his case for the military action to the American people and the world based upon the perceived threat of the nexus of Hussein’s virulent enmity, WMD, and global terrorism. Invading Iraq was forced into the GWOT strategy and became central to the war on terrorism because, the administration argued, it was necessary to remove Hussein as a sponsor of terrorists, including al-Qaeda, to defeat global terrorism’s potential to acquire WMD, and to deny terrorist a safe haven by compelling an unwilling state to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions. The invasion created serious security problems, ungoverned spaces, and a training ground for terrorist in what seemed to be an unforeseen insurgency. From this perspective, the invasion of Iraq seems to have actually worked against the U.S. strategy in the GWOT. What wasn’t highlighted in the run-up to the invasion or during the immediate aftermath was the idea many in the administration had that after removing Hussein a new democratic government could be formed, one that would serve as an example to the entire region of the power of democratic values to advance the hope of further development. Undersecretary Wolfowitz said in a speech in October of 2002: “Success
in Iraq would demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It would encourage those who dream the ancient dream, the ageless desire for freedom.” 68 After having admitted that the U.S. and its allies intelligence assessments about Hussein’s WMD programs were wrong, in November of 2003 President Bush started to play up the idea that Iraq would serve as the first to fall in a democratic domino theory of the middle East: “Iraqi democracy will succeed—and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Tehran—that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”69

Despite the ongoing insurgency, Deputy Undersecretary Feith summarizes the results of the military overthrow of Hussein: “Saddam’s demise has freed Iraqis of a tyrant, deprived terrorists of a financier and supporter, eliminated a threat to regional stability, taken Iraq off the list of rogue states with WMD programs and created a new opportunity for free political institutions to arise in the Arab world. All of this serves our cause in the Global War on Terrorism.”70 Whereas the connection between Hussein and global terrorism, especially al-Qaeda, was never a strong argument, and the WMD threat was a faulty one, the only real argument for making Iraq central in the war on terror is the power of democracy in Iraq to serve as a model for the Middle East that would diminish those conditions that are exploited by terrorist ideology.

**Summary**

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Notes


61 Counterterrorism, “Patterns of Global Terror.”

62 Feith, *U.S. Strategy for the War on Terrorism* ([cited]).


65 Abedin, “Are We Winning the War on Terror? An Interview with Michael Scheuer.”

66 Paul Wolfowitz, *Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 [cited 13 March 2005]).


Chapter 3

Russian Security Concepts, Policy, and Definitions

“The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

—President Vladimir Putin

This chapter will attempt to illuminate Russia’s foreign policy behavior by examining how Russia perceives the world and its role in it, and identifying some fundamental characteristics of Russian foreign and security policy. Russia’s policy concepts will then be reviewed in detail through a survey of Russian post-Cold War foreign policy and its pursuit of its national interests. Understanding how Russia perceives its role in the international community and how it operates within that role, allows for better analysis of Russia’s perception of the security threats it faces. Each of these threats will be discussed generally, followed by a more thorough discussion of the terrorism threat as it applies to and is perceived from Moscow. This entire discussion sets up the final sections of this chapter that discuss the global war on terrorism, as viewed from Moscow, and how Russia is currently fighting that war.

The Russian Security Concept

In analyzing Russian foreign and security policy, one first must understand Russia’s geopolitical realities, its self image, and its view of the international community.
The fixed reality of geography has played, and continues to play, a profound role in determining Russia’s orientation towards the rest of the world. The largest country on the planet with nearly 17,075,200 sq km, Russia is bigger than two of the 5 oceans and nearly twice as large as the United States. Russia borders 17 different nations, and as pointed out by Sergei Ivanov, “not all of them are really nice.”\(^1\) Russia is responsible for securing more 20,000 km of borders (compared with 12,000 for the U.S. and 3,600 for Germany), a task that would likely be beyond the resources of even the richest nations, never mind a country still suffering from the fallout of a failed economy and political system.

The realities of geography come to life when one considers Russian history. Since the 16\(^{th}\) century, the leadership in Moscow has been playing roughly the same international game with remarkably similar world views. The building and consolidating of the Russian, and then the Soviet, empires was accomplished with a firm “realist” understanding of hard power in the zero-sum game of regional domination and influence. Constantly threatened by powerful neighbors, the Russian Empire was born when Moscow escaped the domination of the Mongol empire, and saved the world from both Napoleon and the Nazis. Because of its history, the massive trauma to Russia’s self image caused by the rapid disintegration of the Soviet empire should not be underestimated. The policy elites in the Kremlin today are all products of the Soviet Empire and were all mid-level bureaucrats at the height of the Soviet ascendancy. In the mid-80’s, Moscow was the political center of the universe for the Eastern Bloc, the 7 countries of the Warsaw Pact, and commanded 126 Warsaw Pact tank divisions. By 1990, when the Warsaw pact ceased being, and the Soviets executed a hurried retreat to
the safe confines of the Soviet Union, Moscow still had an empire 286 million people and
the Red Army could still ready 200 full tank and motorized rifle divisions for war. The
disintegration trend accelerated after the failed coup in August of 1991, and by 1 Jan
1992, Moscow was now the capital of a decaying empire called the Russian Federation
with a population of just less than 150 million people. The Red Army quickly fell into
decline. Its force of more than 5 million in 1985 fell to just more than one million by
1999.

The resulting impact on the psyche of Russian policy elite is real. Fiona Hill, a
Russia expert at the Brookings Institution sees Russia “as being like Britain in the
1950s,” claiming that like Russia, “Britain was a surly, not-too-happy country.... It took
an awful lot of time to get rid of that imperial hangover.” Mourning over the loss of an
empire is still very much a part of the thoughts of Russian President Putin. In October
2004, President Putin said while visiting Ukraine that Russia has no ambition to revive
the Soviet Union as such an “attempt would be counterproductive and impossible.”
However, very much sounding like he was convincing himself, he followed with these
words: “Many in the CIS regret the loss of the Soviet Union and they are right in doing
so, but once that happened, we should concentrate on the here-and-now.” In his annual
State of the Nation address in April 2005, Putin claimed that “it should be
acknowledged...that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the century.” Although he followed these comments with a discussion
about the suffering and changes endured by the Russian people, few observers would
argue that Putin does not also mean that the disintegration of the Russian empire has had
a negative impact on the world as well. In a Wall Street Journal article, Janusz Bugajski,
director of the East European project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, quoted President Putin as saying that he is working to “restore what was lost with the fall of the Soviet Union,” and bluntly claims that “Russia still possess global aspirations that do not coincide with those of a democratic world order.”

Russia’s Great Power Image

As the Soviet Union, the nation was long recognized as one of the two superpowers in a bipolar world, with the attendant respect and freedom of action. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and even the creation (or re-creation) of nations from what had been Soviet states, the loss of territory created a national feeling of a loss of influence, as if mass were somehow key to international power. This national mourning has not so much ended as transformed itself into a protectionism that finds essential the requirement to maintain what influence Russia still has, both in terms of ability to act on the international stage and in terms of defining the identity Russia as a territory and as a state. Key to maintaining these are the concepts of sovereignty and international law.

Nowhere are both of these foundational concepts laid bare more explicitly than in statements in and about the primacy of the United Nations (or, as Russian diplomats tend to refer to it, the United Nations Organization) as arbiter of international legitimacy. No event has compelled Russia to invoke this concept more fervently than the NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo in 1999. Russia viewed NATO’s actions in Kosovo as a direct challenge, a diplomatic slap in the face. Russian officials had attempted to portray themselves as legitimate intercessors between the Serbs and NATO (maintaining the protective role the Soviet Union played previously), arguing that a diplomatic solution
must be pursued before military force was applied. When NATO forces, and most significantly U.S. forces, began the bombing campaign in Kosovo and Serbia, Russia condemned the West for acting outside of international law and before all diplomatic options had been exhausted. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, then head of the Defense Ministry’s Main Department for International Military Cooperation, in an interview after the bombing ended, cited NATO’s intervention as “an act of open aggression against a sovereign state.” He continued:

If force can be used to make peace between Serbs and Albanians, then where’s the guarantee that NATO, acting with the noblest of intentions, won’t decide to use force to reconcile North and South Korea, Taiwan and China, to bring democracy to Belarus, Iraq and Syria, or to intervene in Kashmir or Nagorny Karabakh.  

Further, he painted NATO intervention without a UN mandate as a defeat for the rest of the world:

The world community, represented by the United Nations, did not go far enough in condemning this, which, in a sense, does give cause to speak of defeat. The fact that a new world order has been established represents a defeat for Russia and for the whole world community.

In clear language, Russia cast these events starkly, with an intrusive and belligerent NATO and the U.S. as “them,” and Russia and the rest of the “whole world community,” who value diplomacy and a reliance on international law, as “us.” The United Nations, with its inclusion of Russia in the top-level Security Council, remains a fundamental part of the “us” of the world community, the single forum that determines the legitimacy of international action and can maintain the primacy of sovereignty. As Sergei Ivanov, the current Russian Minister of Defense, said to the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2001,

[W]e appreciate the role of the UNO in settlement of crisis situations and international conflicts. There may be no “humanitarian” considerations to
justify the interference into other countries’ internal affairs without sanctions of the UNO and its Security Council. That is why we oppose the concept of “humanitarian intervention.”

Russia’s role in the UN, with a permanent seat at the Security Council, provides it with a powerful tool in international relations, but to maintain that power, it is in Russia’s interest to maintain the authority of the UN. So while it may at times seem curious that Russia, with its background in Soviet affairs that seemed frequently at odds with standards of international law, so fervently supports the UN today, it is because that is the most visible and most significant body in international relations and the one place where Russia has at least as much say as the United States or any other nation in the world. It should not be surprising, then, the level of support Russia maintains for the UN and international law and the concept of sovereignty, for without those, Russia will very likely lose its status as a world power.

Beyond Russia’s role within the United Nations, the realities of its claim to great power status are tenuous at best. Tables 1 and 2 show how the world’s nations ranked by size of national economies and real defense expenditure. One could look at any number of economic and military indicators that would reflect the fact that Russia scarcely qualifies as a great power.
### Table 1. Rank Order of National Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Date of Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>$51,480,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>$11,050,000,000,000</td>
<td>2004 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$10,990,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>$6,449,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$3,582,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>$3,033,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$2,271,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$1,666,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>$1,661,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$1,550,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>$1,375,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$1,282,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# = Five Permanent Members of UN Security Council

### Table 2. Rank Order of National Spending on Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Spending</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$370,700,000,000</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>$60,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>$45,238,100,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$42,836,500,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$42,488,100,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$35,063,000,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$28,182,800,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$18,000,000,000</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>$14,522,000,000</td>
<td>FY03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$14,120,100,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>$14,018,800,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>$12,155,000,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$12,000,000,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>$10,439,400,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# = Five Permanent Members of UN Security Council
Of course the one measure that irrefutably puts Russia on the great power list is shown at Table 3. Although stockpile numbers are likely smaller today, 1999 numbers for deliverable nuclear warheads reflect today’s global nuclear balance. The Russians obviously have full appreciation of this fact as evidenced by the significant emphasis they place on the maintenance and modernization of their nuclear arsenal. The issue is discussed in rather cyclical manner in the Russian press. As perception of Russian cooperation with the West waxes and wanes, so to do the rich discussions about investments, improvements and capabilities of Russian nuclear missile launching submarines, strategic bombers, and land-based missiles. These discussions serve to stir up considerable debate and analysis from observers inside and outside of Russia. It’s obvious that all of this strategic nuclear talk is not meant to influence the behavior of terrorists, but rather to leave a mark in the minds of policymakers in other great powers as to Russia’s position in the international system.

### Table 3. Status of Nuclear Powers and Their Nuclear Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>+500</td>
<td>+500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>+50</td>
<td>~25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliverable</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>5,426</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>~325</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is assessed that 80% of Russia’s ICBM force (the most significant of the three legs of the Russian nuclear triad that includes strategic bombers and submarine launched ballistic missiles) will reach the end of their service life between 2005 and 2007. The Russians have conducted numerous test fires of older missiles to check reliability with
the aim of extending the life expectancy of these older weapons because they cannot
possibly be replaced at the rate in which they should retire. Russia continues its purchase
of its newest ICBM, the TOPOL-M in both its silo and mobile launched variants, as
quickly as budget realities allow. Russia also is continuing with plans to upgrade its
SLBM force. They successfully test launched a full-size mock up of the Bulava missile
in late 2004 and the program marches on at near-record speed towards procurement. The
Bulava is essentially a modified version of the TOPOL-M and can be carried on Russia’s
newest missile carrying sub, the Project 955 submarine, the first of which enters service
in late 2005 or early 2006. Two more project 955 submarines are planned to be assed to
the Russian inventory by 2010.14 In 2005, Russia will for the first time since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, purchase more armaments for its own military than it
exports to the militaries of foreign countries.15

Other moves made by Russia to increase the visibility of their claim to great
power status include the Defense Ministry’s decision to resurrect two dinosaurs from the
past. The first discussion involves the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). In his
January 2005 visit to Washington, it is reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov had discussed with U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the idea that
Russia would back out of the INF Treaty signed in 1987 that outlawed nuclear missiles
with range capabilities between 500-5,500 km.16 At least one analysts thinks that maybe
Ivanov is planning to outfit these missiles with conventional warheads for use against
terrorists in the south. This seems unlikely considering that without GPS guidance, these
missiles are not likely to have the accuracy required to make and operational difference
with a conventional warhead. Other analysts don’t see Russia’s reconstitution of it
intermediate range missiles as a threat to NATO or China. However, if it is not meant as a threat, then it is most certainly a cautionary signal of some kind meant to ensure NATO and China are still paying attention to Russia. Ivanov has also indicated that Russia will invest new money into its own missile defense system. The Soviet Union developed a missile defense system back in 1968 to protect Moscow and the industrial areas surrounding it. Although there is no plan to rebuild the system wholesale, it appears Russia will upgrade portions of this network of radars and high-speed missiles designed to shoot down incoming ballistic warheads with a one megaton nuclear weapon.

**Russian view of the international political system**

The current post-Soviet foreign and security policy did not instantly appear in the wake of the creation of the Russian Federation. The ending of the Cold War put an entirely new set of challenges in front of Kremlin decision-makers. With the ideological framework for ordering the international system gone, like the rest of the world, Russia needed to evolve its new understanding of the world order as events unfolded. Nearly crippled by domestic political and economic problems, the Russian Federation was only minimally capable of making coherent policy with regards to Europe, the nations that would become the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the rest of the world. Much of what took place “happened to” Russia and was not “directed by” Moscow. According to Celeste Wallander, what was heard from Moscow in the infancy of the new Russian Federation actually represented “the turbulent and contentious nature of the post-communist transformation” and Yeltsin’s attempt to secure great power status through aggressive westernization “reflected the view of a very narrow elite around Yeltsin.”
the early 1990’s, Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, led the team of young liberals that was committed to Russian integration into the west and its institutions.

This movement was short-lived, however, as a more nationalist tone was taken up by the Kremlin by 1993. Russia quickly perceived a need to balance its relationship with the West and China, especially with regards to the regional hegemony in the CIS that Russia assessed as being a vital national interest. In 1995 the Russian stance became even more staunchly realist as Yevgeny Primakov took over as Foreign Minister. Russians perception of the West more as a threat than an ally was most pronounced as Primakov negotiated with NATO regarding its first round of enlargement in 1995. Most observers credit Yeltsin’s need to broaden his political base to include more centrists groups within the elite with his backing away from his liberal approach. Wallander claims that “By 1997 a synthesis had emerged which still emphasized cooperation and integration, but with a strong measure of Eurasianism and great power thinking lending the policy a more traditional cast.”

The liberal-statist political balance that existed in the Kremlin regarding the view of how Russia should approach the international community shifted again in the 1998-99 period. Both the financial crisis of 1998, which had its causes in both domestic policy and international financial markets, as well as the West’s use of force to solve the Kosovo problem, demonstrated to Russia that cooperation with the West was less the answer, making calls for more statist approach all the more appealing. Since that time, the language used by Russian policy elites when discussing the international strategic environment very much reflects their perception of the threat presented by a unipolar world. One of President Putin’s first acts as President was to sign the National Security
Concept of 2000. The new strategy clearly moved the Russian threat perception from a primarily internal, economic focus, to one that explicitly cites the threats posed by external sources. Specifically cited were the behaviors of some nations that have weakened Russia’s influence and attempted diminished the international security role of organizations like the UN and OSCE.

Whereas the 1997 National Security Concept used words like “partnership” while referring to the West, the 2000 National Security Concept has substituted “partnership” with the more limited term of “cooperation.” It has become clear that although Putin understands the need to embrace a relationship with the West as key to developing Russia’s economy, politically Russia intends to balance East and West, without getting too close to either. In a live interview on Ukrainian television on back 26 October 2004, President Putin articulated his views with relative clarity: “Culturally, Russia is a European country, … But I, for one, believe that the world can only be multipolar.” Putin added, “Only a multipolar world can have internal energy and stimuli for its development.” The Russian president named China, India, Japan, South Africa, and Brazil as the “other poles of world civilization.”

**Fundamentals of Russian Foreign and Security Policy**

Russia’s geopolitical realities, imperial past and view of the international system come together in the construction of Russian foreign and security policy in the form of three fundamental characteristics that shape much of Russia’s policies. First, Russians generally believe that the international order, the structuring of power between states, presents the greatest promise to security as well as the greatest risk. This classic, old-school realism still better explains Russia’s general policy construct than any other
framework. Second, thanks fundamentally to the imperial history of Russia, the nations that made up the former Soviet Union matter more to Russia than understandable using the framework of normal international relations, that of sovereign nations operating in an anarchical community of equals. And finally, despite its significant degradation from his pinnacle as the Red Army, the Russian military continues to play a central role in the execution of Russia’s foreign and security policy by securing the stability and loyalty throughout Russia’s sphere of influence demanded by the Kremlin.

It is Russia’s righteous claim to its role as a great power center in a multipolar world that shapes Russia’s external policy more than any other characteristic. With this understanding one can more readily make sense of the Russian’s incessant discussion regarding their readiness of their nuclear arsenal and its ability to counter the development by the U.S. of a national ballistic missile defense. At the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February of 2001, Defense Minister Ivanov made the claim that “The key factor determining international security at the beginning of the 21st century, as we see it, is maintaining strategic stability.” To Ivanov, it is not international terrorism, not globalization, not the development of an international law regime, but rather the same “factor” that served as a prism through which the world was forced to view international relations. According to the Russian National Security Concept of 2000, “Threats to the Russian Federation’s national security in the international sphere can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world…”

The interaction of great powers, with their incumbent “spheres of influence,” which is generally seen by Russians as a zero sum game, is still a very useful framework with
which to understand Russian behavior. Although sometimes subordinated to
 coordination efforts that serve Russia’s immediate interests, pursuit of power and
 influence, “balancing,” and confrontation are still very much a part of the Russian
 approach to international relations. The result is a somewhat schizophrenic appearance to
 Russian policy. As highlighted in the 2000 National Security Concept, Putin understands
 that Russia’s great power status hinges on its economic development. This forces him to
 highlight cooperation and a “commonality of interests” of Russia and other states that
 lend themselves to “broader integration into the world economy and for expanded
 cooperation with international economic institutions.”

26 In the very next paragraph, however, Russia articulates the perception that not only is the unipolar world dangerous,
 but that Russia is already falling victim to its dangers: “At the same time, a number of
 states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily, and
 in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when solving major issues of
 international relations … are capable of undermining international security, stability, and
 the positive changes achieved in international relations.”

27 This tension, between needing to cooperate/integrate with the West and the propensity to see the world as a struggle of
 great powers inevitably resulting in conflict with the West, gives rise to policy and policy
 rhetoric that on the surface appear contradictory. Never was this truer than in the wake of
 the Beslan school tragedy which will be discussed in more detail later.

Nikolai Sokov explains the potential for misunderstanding Russia’s intentions when
 he claims that “Although U.S.-Russian relations are definitely not conceptualized in
 Moscow as resembling the Cold War, the surface similarity of the task, keeping
 competitors out of the sphere of influence, dictates the choice of similar methods.”

28
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explains further that Russia does not want confrontation with the West as that “could only complicate the resolution of domestic economic and social problems and hinder Russia’s integration into the world economy and politics.” He goes on to say that although he doesn’t believe either that the West is striving to return to Cold War politics, that the West should stop conceiving Russian policy in old stereotypes which results in the West viewing “every Russian move within the CIS as a manifestation of imperial ambitions.”

The second fundamental characteristic of Russian foreign policy has to do with the central role played by those countries that formerly comprised the Soviet Union. These nations are inseparable from the Russian concept of security and its image as a great power. Eventually 12 of the 15 republics that sprang from the ashes of the Soviet Union agreed to form the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was through this organization that Russia had attempted to wield Soviet-like influence over its smaller neighbors, treating them more like offspring than siblings. As will be discussed in later in this chapter, failing to exercise the influence it desired within the CIS organization, Russia turned to a more bilateral approach with the nations that comprise its near-abroad. Although often the terms NIS, CIS, near-abroad, and post-Soviet space are used interchangeably, they have differing connotations and context. For the purpose of this study, the term near-abroad will be used to refer to Russia’s neighbors that once made up the Soviet Union.

Since its inception, the Russian empire’s view of security has always required a buffer of friendly nations between it and the hostile nations of Europe, Asia, and Asia Minor. Additionally, huge energy resources reside in the countries of the near-abroad
and Russia has hopes of capturing some of the revenues raised in the process of extracting these resources and getting them to market through control of pipelines and ports.

However, the near-abroad states are far more important to Russia than simple geopolitical and macro-economic factors dictate. Analysts at the UK’s Conflict Studies Research Centre claim that the near-abroad represents Russia’s vital interest thanks to the “shared business culture, a common political culture with ‘parties of power’ at local and national levels, a common working culture across much of the security sector and pervasive economic interdependence.” In order to see clearly both Russian interests as well as Russian influence in the region, it is important to use more than the prism of normal state-to-state relations. Nearly every country in the near-abroad has large Russian minority populations. This fact often causes Russian policymakers to apparently confuse dealings with the near-abroad and domestic politics. This is reflected in Defense Minister Ivanov’s comments that “Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union vague borders exist between Russia and other CIS countries.” Although in the context of the speech Ivanov was referring to the difficulty in containing immigration that occurs illegally through Russian borders, especially with its southern neighbors, one gets the sense when viewing Russian policies and listening to the rhetoric, that Moscow has not yet settled on the idea that the Russian Federation will not grow in land area. So while the nations that represent the near abroad are sovereign, independent nations, it appears that from the vantage point of the Kremlin, these countries represent entities that are rightly directed from, even if no longer ruled by, Moscow. Hence the desire for loyalty and pro-Russian-
ness characterize Russia’s policy pursuits in the near-abroad. Moscow’s policy patterns in the near-abroad will be examined in detail later in this chapter.

Finally, despite the relatively abysmal readiness, morale, and modernization status of the Russian military, it is still very much seen by policy elites as the critical tool in foreign policy execution. Defense Minister Ivanov recently said that “whether we want it or not, the armed forces remain the common tool for achieving political goals and are a very effective means of combating global security threats.” Chairman of the Russian Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee, Mikhail Margelov, when asked why the defense minister often comments on foreign policy issues, answered “the Russian Army is and will be one of the tools of our foreign policy.” According to the Chief of the General Staff, Col-Gen Yuri Baluyevskiy, the Russian strategy for peace is not so different from that of the U.S.: “Security for ourselves through peace for all.” Baluyevskiy continues that “the existence of mighty Russian Armed Forces is a significant factor for achieving security by peaceful means.” Voices within the military still carry significant weight with regard to policy formulation and according to military analyst Alexander Golts, “No matter how often Russian generals claim that they are aware of the changes in the world, it appears that planning the future of the Russian army they continue to regard the United States as the major enemy.”

Pursuing National Interests in The Near Abroad

The westward expansion of the Russian frontier and the increase of the Russian “sphere of influence” have been Russian goals since Czarist times. Russians viewed a “buffer zone” of pro-Russian countries as a key to its national security. This expansionist drive reached its pinnacle when the Red Army defeated the German army and advanced
to the center of Europe. This post World War II sphere of influence was recognized, if not also legalized, by the Yalta Conference. While the Yalta military boundary was intended to be provisional, it became the political boundary between the two Cold War superpowers. In the bipolar Cold War world, Soviets delighted in their significant influence in the European affairs.

The loss of the Cold War caused significant erosions in Russian territory and influence. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation still considered the Caucasus, Central Asia and the former Soviet Republics as their “sphere of influence” alone. The strategic security positions, economic linkages, historic connections, proximity, and large Russian populations had become even more important to the weakened Russian Federation. In addition to actual Russian security interests, the remaining political and military influence was one of the last remnants of their lost superpower status. Russian leaders promoted and even insisted on the premise that Russia alone should be the sole arbiter in all former Soviet regions.

Russia, intent on maintaining its Soviet level of influence in the post-Soviet states, set up the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as its international vehicle. The organization was essentially designed to entrench Russia’s lead in coordinating the foreign and economic policies of its member nations. The CIS treaty recognized current borders, each republic’s independence, sovereignty, and equality. It also established a kind of free-market ruble zone and a joint defense force for participating republics.

Russian leaders since 1991 have looked to receive international recognition of the Russian sphere of influence. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin told the open session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 1994, that Russia’s
priority interests lie in the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union. Russia believed that it has the prime responsibility for ensuring peace and stability among its neighboring states. President Yeltsin said his country’s “economic and foreign policy priorities lie in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States...Russia’s ties with them are closer than traditional neighborhood relations; rather, this is a blood relationship.”

Most importantly, President Yeltsin maintained that “The main peacekeeping burden in the territory of the former Soviet Union lies upon the Russian Federation.”

“A solid truce has been established in Moldova,” he said. “The peace process in Georgia is developing; the hope of stopping bloodshed in Nagorno-Karabakh is emerging; and the first agreements on Tajikistan have been reached.” While always looking for international recognition, Russia was satisfied with international indifference that allowed it to pursue its own course without concern for international repercussions.

Yeltsin insisted that Russian military efforts in the region were a force for peace and stability, despite complaints by former Soviet satellites that the military interventions did not respect country’s independence or sovereignty. From the inception of the CIS, member states have chaffed at the level of Russian integration. Most CIS states have had occasion to criticize Russia, but these criticisms did little or nothing to change Russian policy.

The rapid collapse of the USSR at the beginning of the 1990’s surprised many Western countries. The initial post-Soviet domestic actions of the Russian government caused surprise to change into a kind of euphoria. During this euphoric period in Russian-Western relations, Moscow likely could have done anything in the former Soviet
states and the West would have given them the benefit of the doubt. Russia, however, only acted in their own national interest and really did not show any desire to assist in the development of other CIS countries.

Russia, immersed in its own political and economic problems, did not embrace its stated duty as the leader of the CIS. It did not, and still does not, have the capacity to modernize its political, military and economic systems let alone those of the CIS member states. Instead of aggressively championing “common values” in CIS countries (like the Western alliance models -NATO and EU) in order to provide attractive cooperation prospects based on these values, Russian efforts went into conserving its fleeting superpower status. Russian CIS policy relied heavily on supporting pro-Russian regimes already in power, often former Soviet leaders. Another component of Russian policy was to reinforce local conflicts to ensure ongoing reliance on Russian peacekeepers for security and stability. This meant freezing conflicts in a never-ending state with no possibility of political solution, especially a political solution originating outside Russia.

Russia has witnessed an accelerated loss of influence in its near abroad since 2001. The expansion of NATO and the European Union combined with the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) has significantly increased western interest in the Caucasus and Central Asia. These regions are now seen as important to the overall security and stability of Europe. This new world view was probably best conveyed by a senior European commission official, answering a question about the EU’s policy in the post-Soviet territory. He responded to the question by saying, “It’s the 21st Century, and there’s no longer any such thing as post-Soviet policy. How long do you intend to keep
thinking of all these different countries as a single entity, just because they used to be part of the USSR? For the next twenty years? Fifty years?"³⁹

Russia has been invaded several times during its history and this fact has only strengthened the Russian idea that its security is dependent on having a buffer zone of pro-Russian countries surrounding it. This security concept has forced the Russians to view foreign relations in its “near abroad” as a zero sum game. Western engagement, or an undue increase in the influence of another nation in these regions, is automatically viewed as a loss for Russia. Russian policy in these areas focuses considerable effort to blocking or limiting Western political, economic, and military involvement in its traditional sphere of influence. This near abroad policy and Russian repeated efforts to maintain its declining influence serve to isolate rather than integrate CIS member countries. This theme repeats itself over and over again in the following review of post-Soviet Russian efforts in the nations that constitute the near abroad.

Caucasus

Georgia

Georgia has suffered more than any other former Soviet Republic due to Russia’s aggressive “Near Abroad” policy. Even while waging two wars to crush the separatist movement within Chechnya, Russia maintained support for three separatist areas within Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjaria. Russia also maintains three Soviet era military bases and several smaller installations in Georgia even though in 1999 Russia officially pledged to gradually withdraw all troops from Georgia.⁴⁰
Political upheaval hit Georgia in late 2003. Inconsistencies in the November 2003 election sparked popular protests culminating in the Rose Revolution. The peaceful revolution ended with the resignation of former president Eduard Shevardnadze and the inauguration of new President Mikhael Saakashvili. Shevardnadze, a former Soviet politician, was disliked in Russia due to the Russian view that he had a significant hand in the fall of the Soviet Union, but that does not mean Russia embraced the new Georgian president. Saakashvili and his western tendencies were viewed with similar Russian distrust. President Putin, unlike other world leaders, did not congratulate or express support to Saakashvili after his victory. President Saakashvili’s rise to power, with his pro-western views and determination to resolve Georgia’s frozen conflicts, marked a significant souring of Russian-Georgian relations.

Georgia-Adjaria

Saakashvili’s initial confrontation was with Aslan Abashidze, the pro-Russia authoritarian leader of Adjaria. Located in the southwestern portion of Georgia, Adjaria does not have direct geographic connections to Russia, although the Russian military base at Batumi is located inside the autonomous republic. After weeks of mounting tension in late spring 2004, the crisis came to head on 2 May. Fearing a Georgian military offensive, Abashidze destroyed three bridges linking Adjaria to rest of country. This event sparked massive protests. Security forces loyal to Abashidze violently dispersed the protesters. Local support for Abashidze fell dramatically and he was forced
to resign. Saakashvili scored a large victory by peacefully resolving the Adjaria crisis. After Abashidze’s departure, Adjaria held new elections and Georgia vowed to preserve the region’s autonomy, but this initial success did not provide any momentum for resolution of the other frozen conflicts.

The situation in Adjaria is significantly different than the situations in Abkahzia and South Ossetia. The limits Georgia placed on Adjaria’s autonomy after its return to Georgian control will not satisfy the demands of the other two renegade regions’ leaders. Adjaria never sought complete independence, but Abkhazia and South Ossetia began asserting their independence immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed. Additionally, Adjaria is relatively free of ethnic tensions. Its population is almost entirely ethnic Georgian, unlike the Ossetian and Abkhaz majorities in their respective regions.

Saakashvili, emboldened by his Adjaria success, shifted his focus to the other breakaway republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow’s perceived security interests in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are much greater than the geographically separated Adjaria. The resolution of the Adjarian crisis, while encouraging Saakashvili, seemed to only strengthen Russian resolve to maintain control of the other regions.

**Georgia - South Ossetia**

Russia helped South Ossetia win de facto independence from Georgia in the early 1990s and has maintained close political and economic ties with the secessionist province ever since. In 1992 the Joint Control Commission was established to preserve the peace and monitor the ceasefire. The four-member commission includes representatives from Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia. This composition ensures that all votes go in Russia’s favor. In accordance with the ceasefire agreement, Russia also
established a peace keeping force within South Ossetia. Georgia and South Ossetia coexisted in relative peace since the end of the original separatist conflict, however Georgian success in returning Adjaria to governmental control fueled South Ossetian fears that the Georgian leadership might attempt to violently restore more of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Russia, fearing the same, stepped up its campaign of hindering Georgian efforts to restore control over South Ossetia and its other breakaway republic of Abkhazia. Moscow even went as far as granting Russian citizenship to residents of both provinces. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov cautioned Georgia against any attempt to its territorial integrity by force. “The risk exists that either side may try at any time to forcibly decide developments. We believe it would be disastrous for the resolution of both the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and the Georgian-[South] Ossetian conflict,” Lavrov said.43

In June 2004, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili disregarded Russia warning and ordered Interior Ministry troops into South Ossetia. Their stated mission was to stem the tide of Russian contraband entering Georgia via South Ossetia. The Georgian troops took positions where they could cut off South Ossetia’s supply routes, restricting their economy to a point where South Ossetian officials would be forced to comply with Georgian desires, similar to his successful Adjaria campaign. Tensions eventually degenerated into sporadic armed clashes that continued throughout the summer of 2004. Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian peacekeepers were each targeted by the other. South Ossetian gunmen started an abduction campaign against ethnic Georgians, which resulted in South Ossetia’s ethnic Georgians staging protests and blocking highways. The
escalating violence and international pressure eventually forced Georgian officials to withdraw the combat troops from South Ossetia.

Despite the simmering tensions, Saakashvili and Putin held a summit in early July 2004. Saakashvili pledged to push for Adjaria-style change in South Ossetia rather than resorting to violent methods to return the territory to Georgian control. President Vladimir Putin promised not to interfere in Georgia’s internal affairs. At the summit’s conclusion, Saakashvili said the two countries were “approaching a new phase when predictability and stability should be features of our relations.” Despite this rather upbeat appraisal, no true breakthrough was reached on any issue. While both Russia and Georgia continue to show some level of interest in dialogue, Russian dominance over the current negotiation format has only increased Georgian frustrations.

Days after the summit, Georgian forces stopped a convoy of military equipment with more than one hundred missiles from entering South Ossetia. Foreign Minister Lavrov stated on 10 July that Moscow was “ready for an emergency meeting of the Joint Control Commission at the highest level,” but Tbilisi pushed for talks outside of the commission. In response to the Georgian frustrations and requests for international assistance, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement that declared “[a]ny attempts to disrupt the negotiating process taking place in the framework of the Joint Control Commission must be stopped.” With limited international involvement, Georgia has been forced to maintain some level of cooperation with Moscow, especially as it looks to resolve the issues of Abkhazia and the closure of two Russian military bases at Akhalkalaki and Batumi.

**Georgia-Abkhazia**
Abkhazia first declared itself independent in March 1921. It signed a treaty of federation with Georgia in December 1921 and became an autonomous republic of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Throughout the Soviet period, Abkhazia was dissatisfied with their lack of self-governance and the increasing Georgian population in the region. In early 1992, these long-standing problems, fueled by the ouster of Georgian President Gamsakhurdia, led to the republic’s declaration of independence. In response to this declaration, the Georgian government deployed troops into Abkhazia. The Georgian military occupied all of the major cities of Abkhazia, including the region’s capital, Sukhumi, but the Georgian assault never fully defeated the Abkhazian forces.

Similar to other emerging conflicts in the post-soviet states, the Russian leadership was so focused on its own political and economic problems that it did not pronounce a consistent policy toward the conflict. Depending on your view of events, the Russian government allowed, or could not stop, local military leaders from getting involved. Eventually, however it became clear to Russian leaders that they could use the Abkhazian separatist movement as pressure to bring Georgia into the CIS and agree to a permanent Russian military presence in Georgia.

In mid-September 1993, Russia assisted Abkhazian forces in launching a massive counter-offensive to capture Sukhumi. Georgian troops were routed and the Abkhazians not only captured Sukhumi but reoccupied all of Abkhazia and advanced to the Inguri River (the Russian-Georgian border). The brutality of the counter-offensive caused most Georgians in the region to leave Abkhazia as refugees. After the defeat of the Georgian army, Georgia had no choice but to work with Russia in the hope that it would be able to save its territorial integrity. Shevardnadze agreed in December 1993 to enroll Georgia in
the Commonwealth of Independent States. He also agreed to a peace-keeping force in Abkhazia. Georgia hoped for a multi-lateral peace-keeping force to minimize Russian influence, but western indifference forced Georgia to look elsewhere. Shevardnadze asked the Council of Leaders of the CIS to deploy peace-keeping forces along the Georgia-Abkhazia border. This led to the deployment of 3,000 Russian troops along both sides of the Inguri River, the dividing line between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.

The initial deployment of Russian troops was supposed to be supplemented in the fall of 1994 by the deployment of troops from other CIS countries. However, this second deployment never occurred. In July 1994, Russia received international legitimacy for its occupying force when the United Nations endorsed Russia’s intervention as a UN peace-keeping operation. The surprising UN endorsement was presumed to be in response to Russia’s support of the U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti. Russia furthered its control by establishing the Russian ruble as the local currency and limiting international economic investment to Russian companies. Just as in South Ossetia, Russian has widely issued Russian passports throughout the Abkhaz population.

The current Russian peace-keeping contingent is approximately 2,000 contract soldiers. Due to extensive Russian interests in Abkhazia, the peace-keeping force is not neutral and does not conform to normal peace-keeping measures. Russia has resisted Georgian attempts to internationalization the peacekeeping force. In response, Russia has tried to include more CIS countries, but since CIS mandates have no international legal precedence, most CIS countries would not participate without a UN mandate. It is unlikely that the UN would endorse this ongoing Russian operation. While there have
been a few border disputes and overflight accusations, the conflict has remained fairly peaceful since 1994.

Russia’s influence in Abkhazia suffered a setback during the Abkhazian elections in October 2004, specifically the presidential election between Raul Khajimba and Sergei Bagapsh. While both candidates purposed a pro-Russian, anti-Georgian platform, Raul Khajimba was the Kremlin favorite. Russia sided with Khajimba due to Bagapsh’s calls for a truly independent Abkhazia. Bagapsh’s strong stance on Abkhazian independence was perceived as a threat to the current status quo. Despite Kremlin support, Khajimba lost the election on October 3, but refused to accept the Central Election Committees results. In response to the ensuing political turmoil, Russia closed its borders and cut off trade with Abkhazia, in effect shutting down its economy. Bagapsh bowed to Russian pressures and accepted a compromise. He agreed to a revote with Khajimba as his vice presidential candidate.

Even with Russia acting as the sole player, competing with no one for “hearts and minds” of the Abkhazian people, Russia could not “democratically” force their intended outcome. As evidenced later in the Ukrainian elections of 2004, it appears they did not learn anything from this event.

The 1999 OSCE Istanbul Treaty mandated that Russia and Georgia reach an agreement on the issue of liquidation of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki Russian military bases before 2001, but disagreements persist.6 Georgia is no closer to achieving the closure of these two Russian military bases or the transfer of the four other military facilities in Georgia. Russia continues to argue that due to budget constraints it will need 11 years to close the bases down in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Georgia insists that three
years will be quite sufficient. The Russian Defense Ministry’s 11-year requirement seems almost ridiculous due to the small size of these bases; there are approximately 1,500 men in Akhalkalaki and 3,000 in Batumi. The vast majority of these personnel are not even Russian: Armenians run the Akhalkalaki base and Batumi is operated primarily by Adjarian Georgians.

In addition to the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases, there is also the issue of the Russian military base at Gudauta in Abkhazia. Russia has stated that in accordance with the 1999 OSCE Istanbul treaty, all military equipment has been removed and the facility is being used by the Russian peacekeepers. Georgian authorities distrust the Russian assessment. In accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, OSCE inspections of Gudauta are obligatory. Russia, however, has delayed these inspections by requiring that Georgia ensure the safety of the international monitoring team, even though Georgia does not control Abkhazia. In addition to the Gudauta, Akhalkalaki and Batumi military bases, Russia also has several other military facilities on the Georgian territory, which must also be handed over to the Georgian Defense Ministry. There is little progress in this regard as well and what facilities have been returned have been completely stripped of useful equipment.

On 10 February 2005, after a two-year interruption, Georgia hosted Russian officials for another round of base closure negotiations. These negotiations again produced nothing, except increased demands for troop withdrawal. According to new Russian figures, eleven years and one billion dollars will be required for base closures. Additionally, Russia wants assurances that Georgia will not host any third-party troops and military installations on its territory. Russia wants to limit Georgia’s military
cooperation with other countries, specifically NATO. Russia also wants Georgia to formally recognize Russia’s primary role in settling the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts. After years of unsuccessful talks, it is clear that Georgia can do nothing to revive the negotiations. Russia is much more concerned with maintaining the status quo than finding any useful solution. It is unlikely that without international intervention that any progress will be made on base closures.

On several occasions since the hostage-taking incident at Beslan, Russian officials have stated that preemptive strikes against terrorists are more than a possibility. On 8 September 2004, Chief of the General Staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky, was quoted as saying that “Russia is prepared, if necessary, to conduct preemptive strikes against terrorist bases anywhere in the world.” Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov confirmed the possibility of preemptive strikes against terrorist targets the next day. Though Russia has not stated officially any potential targets or whether it would launch attacks beyond the confines of the Commonwealth of Independent States, due to limited military capability the possible target list seems to dwindle. Georgia and its small Chechen population in the Pankisi Gorge, seem to be at the top of Russia’s preemptive options list. The Pankisi Gorge has long been identified by Moscow as an allegedly safe haven for terrorists. Russian officials have threatened action in the Pankisi Gorge off and on since 2002. The Pankisi Gorge is located close to Russian airspace making it possible to execute a quick special forces insertion, an operation that Russian forces may have the capability to accomplish. In response to the September 2004 threats, the U.S. State Department quickly rushed to Georgia’s defense saying that Pankisi Gorge “is no longer a haven for
terrorists,” and added that the U.S. will continue to cooperate with Georgia in combating terrorism in the region.\textsuperscript{51}

Russia’s veto of the continuation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border patrol on the Chechen, Ingushetia and Dagestani borders follows the pattern of limiting international assistance in the former soviet states. With no international observers monitoring the borders, Chechen insurgents or terrorists could theoretically pass into Georgia. Russia could then use scanty or non-existent intelligence of terrorist positions in Georgia as yet another bargaining chip against Georgia.

The November 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia has had a significant impact on Russian policy toward its near abroad. Russia’s influence in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region took a major hit with the rise of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. Since that event, Russian policies have become increasingly anti-Georgian. However, Russia’s aggressive policy toward Georgia appear to have backfired. Russian officials have repeatedly accused Georgia of harboring terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, but instead of turning to Russia and requesting additional Russian military personnel, Georgia has opted to strengthen ties with the United States and NATO. The United States initiated the U.S.-led “train and equip” (GTEP) program for the Georgian army to ensure that Georgia had the capacity secure its territory and borders. In the same way, Russia’s continued support for Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist movements has pushed the Georgian leadership toward the West for support and resolution. Russia has alienated itself from the international community with coercive tactics while Georgia has gained
more Western support. Any Western participation in a peace settlement or dialogue would even further decrease Russia’s influence in its near abroad.

**Armenia/Azerbaijan**

The conflict between Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region has been the longest and bloodiest of all the post-Soviet conflicts. It has resulted in thousands of deaths and approximately 350,000 Armenian and 1.1 million Azeri refugees. This conflict was not just another ethnic, secessionist conflict in the post-Soviet region where Russia worked as the lone “interested” power. Due to the proximity of the conflict to the oil-rich Caspian Sea region, the religious complexion of the conflict, and the ethnic ties to other regional countries, this conflict had several countries competing for influence, as well as the OSCE and United Nations Security Council. Again, Russian troops were involved, but in this case, their involvement occurred on both sides of the conflict and tended to exacerbate the conflict.

**Figure 3. Nagorno-Karabakh prior to conflict**

Azeris and Armenians both have historic claims to the area of Nagorno-Karabakh. During a brief period of independence in 1918, both countries claimed the region. After Soviet dominion was established over the entire Caucasus region, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin decided that the Nagorno-Karabakh region would be an Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Similar to moves that Stalin made while dividing the entire Soviet space, he believed that ethnic tension would ensure Moscow’s power as the only guarantor of peace and stability within the region.
The loosening of Soviet governmental control under President Gorbachev revived the lingering hostility between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. In 1987, the Armenian ethnic majority in the contested region demanded the Soviet government in Moscow allow the region to be incorporated into Armenia. In February 1988, amidst ongoing ethnic-Armenian demonstrations in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, the region requested that both Armenia and Azerbaijan approve its accession into Armenia. Persistent demonstrations in the Armenian capital of Yerevan in support of Nagorno-Karabakh accession eventually forced Soviet troop intervention. Despite this show of force, ethnic tensions continued to grow and spread, and Nagorno-Karabakh’s call for accession grew more insistent.

As one might expect, the Armenian government voted to accept Nagorno-Karabakh into the Republic of Armenia, but Azerbaijan rejected any change to its territorial integrity. In spite of Moscow’s objections, Nagorno-Karabakh seceded from Azerbaijan in July of 1988. By September 1988, ethnic fighting intensified and Moscow was forced to declare martial law in the major cities within Nagorno-Karabakh and deployed Soviet Interior Ministry troops to major cities across Armenia and Azerbaijan in an attempt to calm the situation. However, even while under Moscow’s direct rule, and despite the presence of Soviet Interior and Defense Ministry troops, the level of violence continued to increase and conditions within the region deteriorated. By November 1989 Moscow was conceded temporary defeat and gave direct rule back to local authorities.

Almost immediately after Nagorno-Karabakh regained autonomous rule, the Armenian Supreme Soviet declared the region a part of Armenia. In response, the Soviet government sent additional Interior Ministry troops into the area of Nagorno-Karabakh.
This time troop deployment included sending troops not only to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border regions, but into Baku as well, the Azerbaijani capital, to crackdown on anti-Armenian violence. The Soviet troops regained control and restored a coerced calm. The Soviet military set up checkpoints throughout Nagorno-Karabakh and started to disarm militias on both sides of the conflict. In late spring of 1990, the Soviet troops conducted several operations to seize weapons in Armenian villages and apprehend members of Armenian paramilitary groups within Nagorno-Karabakh. These operations resulted in hundreds of arrests, the deportation of thousands of ethnic Armenians-emptying whole villages in some cases, and confiscation of a variety of weapons from civilians on both sides.\textsuperscript{53}

The August 1991 Moscow coup attempt ended one phase of the conflict, but initiated a new, much more violent phase. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 led to more problems in the area. Under intense domestic political pressure, President Yeltsin started a troop withdrawal from the area. The new Russian government was capable of exercising very little control over the remaining troops and the resulting breakdown of the Soviet military apparatus led to a huge influx of heavy weaponry on both sides of the conflict. With much deadlier weapons easily available and the somewhat stabilizing Soviet/Russian Interior Ministry presence gone, the region quickly became embroiled in all out warfare.

In June 1992, Azeri forces launched a large-scale counter offensive using a massive air and artillery bombardment in an attempt to destabilize and demoralize the Nagorno-Karabakh forces. The conflict, now essentially a full scale war, forced international action. The first request for international involvement by one of the parties to the conflict
came from Armenia. In August 1992, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan declared that Azerbaijan had committed aggressive act against Armenia and invoked the Collective Security Treaty. The Collective Security Treaty had been signed three months earlier by Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, an included a provision that in case of an act of aggression against any state, all others will give necessary, including military, assistance. However, the other signatories to the treaty rendered no assistance.

Table 4. Russia in Security Organizations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>CIS</th>
<th>Collective Security Treaty Organization</th>
<th>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members</strong></td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine</td>
<td>Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan,</td>
<td>China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Year Created</strong></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters</strong></td>
<td>Minsk, Belarus</td>
<td>Moscow, Russia</td>
<td>Shanghai, China and Tashkent, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the summer of 1992, the OSCE set up the Minsk Group as a negotiation body aimed at resolving the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The group, formed at a peace conference convened in Minsk, Belarus, consists of the United States, France, Russia, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan. Before the Minsk Group could effectively broker a cease-fire, Russia was already moving to undermine the group’s role by establishing its own separate negotiating position. On 10 April 1993, President Yeltsin offered to directly mediate, and held talks between the three warring parties in Moscow.\textsuperscript{54}

The UN Security Council finally was prompted into action and on 30 April 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 822, which called for a cease-fire, troop withdrawal from the Kelbajar region, the resumption of negotiations and humanitarian relief access.\textsuperscript{55} After the resolution, with Russia apparently back in the international fold, a Russian-Turkish-United States peace initiative was forward to all parties.\textsuperscript{56} The initiative called for a withdrawal of forces from Kelbajar, a sixty-day cease-fire, the end of energy blockade of Armenia, and continued peace talks.\textsuperscript{57} In what would become common in this conflict, two of the three parties agreed to accept the plan, but one, in this case Nagorno-Karabakh refused. The plan was modified and accepted in June 1993, but implementation was deferred one month. However, shortly after this apparent breakthrough, Azeri President Elchibey was removed via a military coup and President Heydar Aliyev took over. President Aliyev was viewed in Moscow as much more pro-Russian than President Elchibey and it appeared that the coup would invigorate Moscow’s participation in a peace settlement. Subsequently, on 23 July 1993, the Nagorno-Karabakh forces took the town of Aghdam and the Russian-Turkish-U.S. peace
initiative was never implemented. Condemning the seizure of Aghdam, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 853 calling on all parties to cease supplying weapons
that fueled the conflict, and requested the Republic of Armenia to use its influence over
the breakaway regional authorities to ensure compliance with all resolutions and
cooperation with the Minsk Group. Despite the new resolution and increasing
international pressure, the Nagorno-Karabakh forces pushed south toward the Iranian
border, seized Jebrail and threatened three other Azeri cities in August 1993.

Russia, concerned that violence could spillover into the northern Caucasus of Russia,
intensified its involvement. It wanted to use its involvement in the conflict resolution to
ensure that Russian troops would be permanently deployed in Azerbaijan and Armenia to
protect CIS borders. Additionally, they wanted to ensure that Caspian Sea oil exports
were routed through Russia. So while maintaining its position as a Minsk Group
member, Russia once again pursued its own peace initiative. A Russian brokered cease-
fire was announced on 31 August 1993. After a 6 September 1993 meeting with
President Yeltsin, President Aliyev announced he was willing to meet directly with the
Nagorno-Karabakh officials. One week later, the first bilateral Azerbaijani-Nagorno-
Karabakh talks were held in Moscow. Russia’s enhanced involvement in the peace
process provided immediate impact, at least for Russia as evidenced by the Azerbaijani
parliament vote to join the CIS on 20 September 1993.

The Azerbaijan-Nagorno-Karabakh direct talks seemed to stabilize the situation and
an agreement was reached to extend the cease-fire until 5 October 1993. The cease-fire
was extended a second time until November 5, but the cease-fire never reached that date.
The Nagorno-Karabakh forces pushed south all the way to the Iranian border. This new
offensive again prompted a flurry of resolutions from the UN and Minsk Groups, and once again escalated violence in the region. Finally, in February 1994, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev presented a new plan that called for an immediate cease-fire, disengagement and withdrawal of forces, Russian observers, and a joint Russian, Azeri, Armenian, and Nagorno-Karabakh staff to implement the plan. The final status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be decided, after the plan was implemented, at another Russian led summit. In March 1994, with heavy fighting still taking place, representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a provisional agreement on the removal of troops around Nagorno-Karabakh and the creation of a buffer zone between forces. Both the Minsk Group and the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly attempted to get involved. The end result was a modification of the original Russian that called for the cease-fire, disengagement of forces, observers from Russia and the CIS, including the conflicting sides, and deployment of 1,800 CIS peacekeepers. Through the process, Russia effectively succeeded in eliminating any international monitoring or oversight.

Attempting to re-insert itself into the situation, the Minsk Group called for a unified OSCE/Russian effort in June of 1994. Nonetheless, Russia continued to chart its own course. As a result of a bilateral agreement, Russia was allowed to establish military bases at Yerevan and Gyumri, Armenia. In an effort to diffuse international pressure, Russia agreed to modify its ceasefire plan to allow for 250 OSCE observers to accompany the almost entirely Russian peacekeeping force.

Even with Russia apparently back in step with the OSCE, the sides have found little common ground since 1994. The cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan has held, more or less, despite the absence of peacekeepers. But the disagreements about security
guarantees, return of territories, return of refugees, and the final status of the region have paralyzed negotiations. Beginning in 1999, Presidents Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia began a direct dialogue through a series of bilateral meetings. With intense French and U.S. involvement in 2001, the two presidents narrowed the gap of several issues but failed to reach a comprehensive settlement. President Heydar Aliyev died in 2003, and negotiations slowed as both countries held presidential elections that year. Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharian met in 2004, but a permanent settlement is still not in sight.

Russia continues to support the OSCE peace process and U.N. resolutions, but the sincerity of its multinational approach and its value as one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group are questionable. Russia’s behavior in repeatedly attempting to bypass the OSCE process entirely and in favor of pursuing a bilateral resolution could lead one to conclude that even if the Minsk group could find a peace solution acceptable for all parties, Moscow would attempt to thwart the solution in order to preserve its level of control of and influence in the southern Caucasus region. In the end, however, Russia’s political moves were similar to their moves in the other conflicts. They worked to maintain the status quo of simmering ethnic tensions to ensure their own power within the region.

“Western” Republics

We have spent a significant amount of time discussing Russia’s “superpower hangover”, but this is another issue that influences Russian policy in its “near abroad”, specifically in Eastern Europe. The issue pertains to Russian identity, specifically whether Russia is a European country, an Asian country or a bridge between the two
continents. The area of Russia west of the Ural Mountains could be considered European Russia. This area has the deep cultural and political ties to Europe and while obviously not a separate country, this area has a large portion of the population and wealth and includes the two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg. This area also has the strongest Slav and Orthodox ties to Eastern Europe. While Russia has been slow to relinquish its superpower ideal, it is unlikely that Russia would ever give up the idea that “Moscow is the Third Rome” and the heart of the Orthodox religion.

In his April 2005 address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin said

Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major European power. Achieved through much suffering by European culture, the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many centuries been our society’s determining values.

For three centuries, we – together with the other European nations – passed hand in hand through reforms of Enlightenment, the difficulties of emerging parliamentarism, municipal and judiciary branches, and the establishment of similar legal systems. Step by step, we moved together toward recognizing and extending human rights, toward universal and equal suffrage, toward understanding the need to look after the weak and the impoverished, toward women’s emancipation, and other social gains.

I repeat we did this together, sometimes behind and sometimes ahead of European standards.  

The three remaining Eastern European post-Soviet republics include Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. These countries comprise the “Western Republics” and are essentially Russia last geographic link to their previously dominant European position (excluding Kaliningrad). We will not discuss Belarus in depth, mainly due to the fact that Belarus acts in most cases as Russia’s “perfect” client state for Russia. Russia and Belarus signed a unification treaty in 1997. While there have been some political
potholes on the road of “spiritual affinity”, such as the 2002 Russian plan that would make Belarus essentially part of Russia, the relationship seems strong. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, the “last true dictatorship” in Europe, Russia was quick to defend Belarus. With the Russia/Belarus relationship cordial and supposedly eternal, we will look at Russian policy toward the other two “Western Republics”.

**Moldova**

The conflict in Moldova was multi-faceted with ethnicity, history, regional competition all playing a part, but similar to other conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the legacy presence of Russian troops played a significant, if not determining, factor in the current frozen condition of the conflict. The violent eruption of this conflict occurred during Russia’s political transition period, when Moscow was slow to clearly define its security position toward either the Moldova or Trans-Dniester. Once defined, the Russian position was difficult to enforce due to a tenuous domestic political situation and the apparently independent action of its forward-deployed military. The breakdown of the civilian chain of command allowed certain levels of the Russian 14th Army in Moldova to act on its own initiative and essentially establish Russia’s regional political agenda.

**Figure 4. Moldova including Trans-Dniestria**

Moldova had been part of Tsarist Russia since the 1860’s. After the Bolshevik’s seized power, Romania forcefully annexed this region from Russia. In 1940, the Soviet
Union reconquered the area and established the Soviet Republic of Moldovia. During World War I, Romania sided with Germany, in order to reestablish control over the area. The Red Army reasserted its control in 1944. Stalin then chose to incorporate the Trans-Dniester territories of Ukraine into Moldova, similar to other actions in the “near-abroad”.

This was the situation until *perestroika* during the second half of the 1980’s gave rise to a revival of nationalism in Moldova, led by a group called the “Popular Front.” This group pushed policies aimed at the “Moldovanization” of the country. They specifically wanted increased political power, and to replace Russian as the dominant language and increased ties with Romania. In February 1992, this group elected a new chairman and approved a new political program that called for the reunification of Romania and Moldova and the reestablishment of a unitary Romanian state. These moves aroused fears in the Moldova’s ethnic minorities, specifically in Trans-Dniestra (Russian and Ukrainian) and Gagauzia (Gagauz - ethnic Turkish) that this de-Sovietization would lead to a significant loss of social and economic status. Increasingly pseudo-ethnic nationalist policies pursued by the Moldovan government turned these fears into separatist movements in Trans-Dniestra and Gagauzia. In June 1990, Moldavia officially changed its name to Moldova (the Moldovan language pronunciation) and then three weeks later declared itself an autonomous Soviet Republic. After the failed coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, the Republic of Moldova declared its independence.

*Figure 5. Moldova with ethnic populations highlighted*
Moldova’s independence significantly increased tensions in two breakaway regions. However, these brewing conflicts developed dramatically different natures. While the clashes between Trans-Dniestria and Moldova became increasingly violent, the occasional clashes between Gagauz forces and Moldovan forces did not result in large casualties on either side. There are three primary reasons for lack of escalation in this region. First Gagauzia did not have ready access to personnel and weapons, as it was not a base for a large foreign army with ethnic ties to the population. Second the Gagauz leadership never questioned the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, except in the case of possible reunionification with Romania. The third reason is purely economic: Gagauzia was more dependent on Moldova than was Transdniestria.

The Moldovan government took steps to moderate its policies and ease fears in Gagauzia. The 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova included provisions for the autonomy of the Transdniester and the Gagauz regions and the Parliament of Moldova adopted a new law declaring Gagauzia as an autonomous territorial unit. This law basically awarded the Gagauz people self-determination within the current architecture of Moldova’s government and borders. While some tensions have remained, specifically in regard to representation in the Moldavian Parliament and the promotion of economic development, the power-sharing arrangement in Gagauzia succeeded in establishing a level of territorial autonomy that suited the central government and the ethnic minority.

While Gagauzia proceeded on a path of relatively peaceful conflict settlement, the Trans-Dniester region did not. In September 1990, the Trans-Dniester separatists formed the Pridnestrovia-Moldova Republic (PMR). After Moldovan independence, these separatist forces joined together to form the Dniester Republican Guard. In late 1991 and
early 1992 they embarked on a campaign to establish Trans-Dniester’s independence including the violent seizure of public and governmental institutions within the breakaway region. By March 1992, The Republican guard was attacking Moldovan police trying to eliminate their presence. The last Trans-Dniester-stationed Moldovan police units were attacked in the Dubosari region in mid-March. Their evacuation accompanied by the destruction of the two primary highway bridges spanning the Dniester River significantly reduced Moldovan control over the area.67

Armed clashes became increasingly frequent and violent. The Moldovan Police offered little resistance to the ever increasing military proficiency of the Republican Guard. These Dniester forces were also aided by the arrival of “Cossack” volunteers and illegal seizures from 14th Army arsenals. The insurgents’ apparent ease in traversing a major Russian minefield in order to seize large amounts of Russian military equipment indicated at least low-level support within the 14th Army.68 In late March, Trans-Dniester mobilized its population, while Moldova declared a state of emergency.

From December 1991 to March 1992, the Russian government did little to affect the Moldova-Dniester conflict. The 14th Army’s initial low-level support of insurgents was likely a result of local inhabitants’ presence within the ranks of the armed forces and not a distinct 14th Army policy decision. It became obvious that the ongoing violence would eventually lead to the 14th Army becoming totally embroiled in the conflict. Russia was forced to act.

On 1 April 1992 Boris Yeltsin decreed that the 14th army and all troops in Moldova had been placed under the control of the CIS Commander-in-Chief.69 Moldova protested the move. After assuming control over all former Soviet units, the threat of Russia using
of force to quell the violence seemed more than realistic. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev claimed that Russia “will be protecting the rights of Russians in other states of the CIS. This is top priority. We shall be protecting their rights firmly and will be using powerful methods if needed.”

While threatening to use force, in late April 1992, Russia promised to “ensure the continued neutrality of units of the 14th Army and its noninterference in the conflict.”

Moldova attempted to get the international community engaged to the ever-increasing conflict and the continued build up of Russian Cossack military units. An editorial in Izvestia said:

For a year and a half the Russian government has been hiding its head in the sand, not making clear in any way its official attitude toward the appearance of a Cossack host form Russia in the Dnestr Republic, which Moldova does not recognize. Ukraine is also looking the other way, pretending that it doesn’t see anything. But it was possible to feign ignorance only until the armed clashes in Dubossary began to assume the nature of a mounting conflict between states...

In May 1992, when Republican Guard units moved seized Russian tanks and armored vehicles near Dubossary, President Snegur called it proof of “foreign aggression against the Republic of Moldova.” The Moldovan parliament adopted a statement addressed to the Supreme Soviet of Russia. It specifically called for Russia to take a position in accordance with its stated principles of “noninterference in other states’ internal affairs and observe Moldova’s sovereignty.”

With little chance for international assistance and the 14th Army’s continued support for separatists, the Moldovan government was in a difficult situation. In early June 1992, when asked if Trans-Dniestria would become part of Russia, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said, he “would not rule it out.” Faced with this worsening military
and political situation, Moldova moved to find a diplomatic solution and agreed to bilateral talks with Moscow. On 3 July 1992, Presidents Yeltsin and Snegur agreed in principle on a plan to stop hostilities and later that month, signed a peace agreement. Similar to strategies pursued by Moscow in other such conflicts, the agreement established a tripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) consisting of Moldovan, Russian and PMR delegations to implement the cease-fire. The Joint Military Command (JMC) was also established under the JCC to run and monitor the combine Russian, Moldovan and Trans-Dniestrian peacekeeping forces. On 29 July 1992, the peacekeeping operation started and has been basically observed by both sides until now.

Following the cease-fire agreement, Moldova moved to finalize an agreement on the withdrawal of the 14th Army. In February 1994, President Yeltsin proposed a parallel approach to resolving the conflict in Moldova. He suggested creating a commission with Russian, Moldovan and Trans-Dniestrian representatives to work on the political issue, while simultaneously Russian and Moldovan military officials would negotiate the withdrawal of the 14th Army. In April 1994, the newly elected Molodan legislature ratified Moldova’s membership in the CIS, bringing the last of the non-Baltic Soviet republics into the organization and not surprisingly later that year, Moldovan officials agreed to a three year phased withdrawal of the 14th army that would occur simultaneous with the political settlement of the conflict.

Foreshadowing the problems of the next ten years, in June 1995, Russian Defense Minister Grachev proposed the retention of some combat units in the Trans-Dniester region. These units would become a permanent Russian military base in Moldova. On 24 May 1995 the Duma passed a resolution of the 14th Army. The document imposed a
ban on both the structural reorganization of the command and control directorate and the reduction and redeployment of the 14th Army and its equipment.

Depending on one’s point of view, the situation in Moldova has remained stable or has been bogged down since 1994. The cease-fire has been upheld and some confidence-building measures have been implemented, but no significant moves have been made to address the fundamental problem between Moldova and Trans-Dniestria. The Trans-Dniester leaders want a federation, where the Trans-Dniestrian Republic is a sovereign state. The Moldovan government wants to give Trans-Dniestria considerable local autonomy and the legal right to self-determination, but within the Moldovan constitution.

The situation looked like it might end in Russia’s favor in February 2001. The Party of Communists of Moldova (PCRM) was elected on a platform of pro-Russian policies. The new Moldovan president, Vladimir Voronin, pledged a conciliatory policy towards Transdniestra and was interested in further participation with its strategic partner, Russia. President Voronin signed a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Russian President Vladimir Putin in November 2001. In 2003, Russia forwarded to their new receptive friend the Kozak Memorandum. This memorandum supported the legitimization of Trans-Dniester’s separatist regime within a loose confederation and required Moldova to commit to an ongoing Russian military presence in Trans-Dniesteria until 2020. President Voronin intended to sign the Russian-prepared plan until mass demonstrations against the proposal erupted, pressuring authorities into rejecting it and seeking other avenues for conflict resolution. After the plan was rejected, Russia-Moldova relations became increasingly tense. In December 2003, Voronin commented “Are we capable of being friends with Moscow only under the threat of a thousand of Russian gunmen?”
Numerous negotiations between Moldova and Russia on the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army have taken place since the end of open hostilities. Troop withdrawal had been specifically accepted by Russia in bilateral agreements signed in July 1992 and October 1994 as well as part of the CFE Istanbul Agreement of 1999. Since then, Moldova has repeatedly expressed a desire for the withdrawal of Russian troops, but Russia has maintained its 1994 position that the withdrawal must be synchronized with a political settlement of the conflict. In November 2004, at meeting of the OSCE’s Joint Consultative Group (JCG) which deals with issues related to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), Russia again rejected removing its troops from Moldova, contending that the Russian troop withdrawal is a bilateral issue. The Russian claim is that it is outside the Adapted CFE treaty, because it is interrelated with the negotiations toward a settlement of the Trans-Dniester problem. The Moldovan delegation to the JCG pointed out again that the original Istanbul Commitments did not provide for any conditions for the withdrawal of Russian troops. Moldova’s statement underscored that “attempts to synchronize the withdrawal of the troops with the political settlement of the Trans-Dniester problem amount to unilateral revision of the Istanbul Commitments.”

The presence of the 14th Russian Army, now known as the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, in any configuration will remain the primary military issue in the region. Trans-Dneisteria sees the 14th Army as its protector against Moldovan aggression, even though their military is estimated to include approximately 5,000 active duty personnel and would realistically be more than capable of defending the region against Moldovan forces. Moldova sees the continuing Russian presence as creating an
atmosphere of instability in which there is no possibility of conflict resolution. Russia obviously needs the 14th Army in Moldova to maintain a strategic foothold at the crossroads of the Slav world, the Black Sea, and the Balkans. This position is made even more important due to the new political landscape in Ukraine. Russia will push to delay the troop withdrawal as long as possible. The troops provide Russia with leverage over Moldovan affairs. As Western expansion in the form of NATO and EU continue into former Soviet territories, Russia becomes even more reluctant to forsake any position of power even in Trans-Dniesteria. Yet, by pursuing coercive policies in an effort to reassert its influence, Moscow just pushes Moldova closer and closer to the West.

Ukraine

On 24 August 1991, Ukraine became an independent country. Ukraine quickly adopted a foreign policy that pursued European integration while maintaining Russian cooperation. Russia and Ukraine had a fraternal relationship during the Soviet period, but like in other regions of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine found that cooperation with its now estranged big bother to be difficult at best. Ukrainian-Russian relations were tense basically from the beginning with many Russians unwilling to accept the end of the Soviet Union or Ukraine as an independent state. To many Russians Ukraine’s independence was temporary and reunion with Russia inevitable. This Russian political view seemed to support former United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s thesis, proposed in his 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, that “there is no Russian empire without Ukraine.”

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Figure 6. Map of Ukraine

In his book Brzezinski stated,

Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south. However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.

Several disputes could have triggered a Russian intervention or even a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, specifically disputes over energy supplies, Russian minority rights within Ukraine, the status of Crimea, basing rights for the Black Sea Fleet, and the status of Ukraine’s nuclear inventory. Unlike other former Soviet regions, Russia did not use these issues to foment conflict or conduct a military intervention under the aegis of the CIS. This maybe due to the fact that while Russian-Ukrainian relations endured this significant tension during the first years of Ukraine’s independence, Ukraine essentially remained in Russia’s sphere of influence, primarily due to their government’s inability to enact democratic reforms and its Russian style oligarch driven economy. It was not until Russia’s ill-advised, ill-fated attempt to ensure the political victory of pro-Russian former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich that the Orange Revolution pushed Victor Yushchenko into power and forced Ukraine to actually pursue its long stated goal of European integration.
The Orange Revolution

The Ukrainian Presidential campaign was held in the summer and fall of 2004. While there were 26 candidates for presidency, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and former Prime Minister and opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko were the primary candidates. Russia viewed the election as pivotal since Yushchenko proposed a much more pro-western, pro-European integration platform. The campaign was highlighted by several allegations of media bias, voter intimidation and even attempted murder, specifically the September 2004 dioxin poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko. Due to this perceived importance in July 2004, Russia sent several “spin doctors” to Ukraine to assist Viktor Yanukovich’s campaign. In addition to the personnel and expertise, Russia allegedly sent significant funds to support Yanukovich’s election.

Shortly before the first election, President Putin visited Ukraine to show his support for Prime Minister Yanukovich. The first round of presidential elections on 31 October resulted in neither candidate achieving the 50% vote requirement for outright victory. A runoff was then scheduled for November. As would be the case with both runoff votes, opinions differed about the quality of the vote. Bruce George, the head of the European election observer team organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, said that the campaign and the 31 October vote had “widespread campaign irregularities in the Ukrainian presidential election,” including “bias by the state media, interference by the state administration in favor of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, the disruption or obstruction of opposition campaign events by state authorities and inadequacies in the Central Election Commission’s handling of complaints.”81
The OSCE also assessed that voter registration lists were full of errors and omission; that some 40 percent of polling station commission chairpersons were selected subjectively; and that a “significant number of territorial election commissions lacked independence, collegiality and transparency.” The International Republican Institute observer team called the Prime Minister’s campaign a “systematic and coordinated use of government resources on a national scale created an atmosphere of intimidation and fear designed to pressure people into supporting the government-backed candidate.” The CIS observers said that the vote was in accordance with international standards and that the large numbers of international observers rather than intimidation by state authorities “caused nervousness at the polling stations.”

Apparently not learning from the initial ballot, President Putin again visited Ukraine prior to the run-off vote. President Putin again showed his support for Mr. Yanukovich. He also participated in a call-in television show and made a public appearance with Yanukovich at a military parade.

The initial run-off vote was held on 21 November. While Yushchenko led in exit polls, the preliminary results indicated that Prime Minister Yankovych would win easily. Yushchenko, the opposition, and numerous international observers called the election a fraud. OSCE and other western observers again said that the vote did not meet international standards. Senator Richard Lugar, called the vote, “concerted and forceful program of election day fraud and abuse with either the leadership or cooperation of government authorities.”

Figure 7. Ukrainian official results for the 21 November 2004 run off vote by region.
On 22 November, despite the lack of official results, rapidly growing street demonstrations and international condemnation, President Putin congratulated Prime Minister Yanukovich on his victory. A day later, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission declared Yanukovich the winner. On 25 November President Putin chastised the US after a Russia-EU summit saying that outsiders have no moral right to push Ukraine into “mass mayhem.” He again formally congratulated Yanukovich, while the opposition filed a complaint to Ukraine’s Supreme Court. After a week of mass protests (the actual Orange Revolution) and negotiations between the campaign rivals, the Ukrainian Supreme Court declares the runoff election invalid and orders a repeat vote to be held on 26 December.

Figure 8. The change in claimed turnout between the 1st (31 October) and 2nd (21 November) rounds of the election according to the Central Election Commission

Figure 9. Ukrainian official results for the 26 December 2004 run off vote by region

The final run-off vote in December following the Orange Revolution was hailed by the OSCE as free and fair. Interestingly the CIS observers found issues and stated that the vote should be “considered illegitimate.” This was the first time ever that the CIS observation teams challenged the validity of an election. The OSCE lead observer, Bruce George, condemned the CIS observers saying “They haven’t ever seen a good election and wouldn’t know one if it hit them in the face.”
Stalin supposedly said, “Those who cast the votes decide nothing. Those who count the votes decide everything.”\textsuperscript{93} While no one would suggest that Russia has fallen back into Stalinist approaches, their actions in Ukraine were far from transparent, helpful, or democratic. Closer to the actual point were comments by Donald Jensen, the director of communications at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He suggested that, “Russia pursues a managed democracy, but Putin prefers management to democracy.”\textsuperscript{94}

The Russian perceived importance of Ukraine did not evaporate with the Orange Revolution. Ukraine’s size, geographic location, large Russian minority and integration during the Soviet period, still make it a key in Russia’s security designs. Russia’s embarrassing setback during the 2004 elections means that it will have to exert less overt force on Ukraine. There are still significant areas where Russia can influence Ukraine, specifically the large Russian populations in the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine and the presence of the Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. These issues, in addition to economic pressure, specifically energy supplies, may now be the only pressure points where Russia can exert influence in Ukraine, but increased levels of Western attention and interest will severely limit Russia political maneuvering.

**Crimea**

The Crimean region of Ukraine faces two “ethnic” issues. The first issue is the presence of the ethnic majority Russians and their status in Crimea. Second is the issue
of the return of ethnic Crimean Tatars. The Crimea had a significant Tartar population due to the region’s Ottoman Turk history. Russia gained control of the area in the late 1700’s. On 18 May 1944, the Soviet Union started deporting Crimean Tatars throughout the Soviet Union, specifically Central Asia. The resulting population vacuum was filled by Russians from the Soviet Union and this is the reason for the current Russian majority.

In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev decided to transfer Crimea from Soviet Russia to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine in honor of the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. This unusual transfer is still questioned by some officials in Russia and led to some Crimean Russians calling for independence and reincorporation with Russia in the early 1990’s.

In September 1991 the Crimean Parliament proclaimed Crimean sovereignty as part of Ukraine. The majority of the Crimean population voted for independence through a December 1991 referendum. Despite this vote, the peninsula remained part of Ukraine.

On 23 January 1992 the Russian parliament started a reexamination of the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. Four months later, the Russian parliament declared the transfer null and void. It called for immediate Russian-Ukrainian negotiations to resolve the issue. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin rejected Russian claims to the region.

Emboldened by the Russian parliament’s actions, in February 1992 the Crimean Supreme Council voted to change the status of the Crimean Autonomy to that of the Republic of Crimea. It also adopted a draft of the Constitution, which defined the republic’s legal status as a state, with its citizenship and ownership rules, as well as relations with other countries.
On 5 May 1992 Crimea proclaimed independence. In response, Ukrainian leaders granted the peninsula by expanded autonomy and its status was changed from autonomous oblast’ to the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea”. The Ukrainian action led to the Crimean Parliament delaying its resolutions on complete separation from Ukraine.

In September 1992 the Crimean parliament adopted amendments to its Constitution, which demarcated Crimea’s local powers and the Ukrainian law. In July 1993 the Russian joint session of parliament unanimously declared Sevastopol part of the Russian Federation. They claimed that Russia did not transfer its sovereignty over Sevastopol when the Crimea was transferred to Ukraine in 1954. Former Ukrainian President Kravchuk reacting to the Russian declaration said that, “The attempts of some political forces in Russia who cannot rid themselves of imperial thinking toward Ukraine and other former Soviet republics are sowing hostility between peoples and undermining the region’s peace and stability.”

The Crimean parliament, taking solace in Russian support, held presidential elections in late 1993 and on 16 January 1994 Yuri Meshkov became the president of Crimea.

After the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections, Ukrainian President Kuchma took a more aggressive stance toward the Crimean problem. The Ukrainian Parliament passed resolutions initially requiring the Crimean constitution to be amended to be inline with Ukrainian law. When the Crimean Parliament failed to comply, a second resolution in late 1994, invalidated several Crimean laws. In March 1995, the Ukrainian Parliament cancelled the Crimean presidency, and re-established a status of the Crimean autonomy within Ukraine, abolished the 1992 Crimean Constitution and cancelled a number of laws contradicting Ukraine’s legislation. Finally, on March 31, 1995 President Kuchma issued
a decree which subjected the Crimean government directly to the Council of Ministers of Ukraine. The Crimean problem was basically resolved in 1997 when Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty recognizing Ukraine’s territory.

**Tartars Return to Crimea**

Further complicating the political situation in Crimea is the issue of the return of Crimean Tatars. The Tartars started to return at the end of the Soviet period in the late 1980’s. They still amount to a small percentage of the population, but have forge strong political bodies due the pressure placed on them by the pro-Russian Crimean population. The Tatars have worked hard to ally themselves with the Ukrainian central government and not surprisingly voted heavily for Victor Yushchenko in the presidential election.  

There have been some Tatar-Slav ethnic problems since the Tatars started returning to the Crimea. Several local groups opposed the resettlement. There is little or no compensation for returning Tatars, so their economic situation is adverse. Additionally, crime and corruption are pervasive. Crimea takes the top point at the list of crime activities among Ukrainian oblasts. While the possibility of ethnic clash between Tatars and pro-Russian Crimeans is unlikely, this is another issue where Russia can exert force on Ukraine.  

Since taking power, President Victor Yushchenko has moved to fulfill his promise to replace all local authorities in the Crimea in order to fulfill his electoral program. His nomination of Oleksandr Matvienko, a reform minded Pro-European integration candidate, as the premier of the Crimean Autonomous Republic is the start of a change in the Crimea. President Yushchenko stressed, “the Crimea has long been waiting for fair power, first of executive one.” This is the first of many changes to come. President
Yushchenko has guaranteed continuing autonomy for the region, but wants a much higher level of inter-ethnic relations.

**Eastern Ukraine**

In addition to problems in Crimea, there are also issues in Eastern Ukraine. These issues were highlighted during the Orange Revolution, but they have existed since the beginning of Ukrainian independence. The 1994 RAND report on Ukrainian and European Security said, “The real problem facing Ukraine is not ethnic tension between Russians and Ukrainians, but a differentiated pattern of economic development in Eastern and Western Ukraine. The eastern regions, where large Russian populations live, are inordinately dependent on obsolescent military and heavy industry.”

Eastern Ukraine is a largely rural area, but the area does include several of the country’s key industries and has a considerable Russian population 43.6 per cent in Donetsk region and 44.8 per cent in Lugansk, which allows Russia to have a significant amount of political influence in the Region. Since 1990, several regional political movements have called for increased regional autonomy and closer links with Russia. After declaring independence on 24 August 1991, Ukraine could not solve the regional economic issues in the east as it was dealing with other issues. Several strikes in 1993 forced the central government to give the region more economic and political autonomy.

In 1994, the Donetsk region voted on a referendum on the status of Russian language and the state structure of Ukraine. Around 90 per cent voted to have Russian as the state language and roughly, the same populace was in favor of Donbas federation and Ukraine’s close engagement in the CIS. This regional movement did not attract mass support and after President Kuchma’s election in 1994, he was able to limit Russia
intervention in Ukrainian politics through his consolidation of power and essentially the elimination of opposition.

After the Orange Revolution and the eventual election defeat, some members of the pro-Yanukovich party publicly discussed the possibility of succession of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. The ten eastern and southern provinces all supported Yanukovich, but in only four of those provinces did Yanukovich garner more than 70 percent of the vote. Those regions were Donetsk (94 percent), Luhansk (91 percent), the city of Sevastopol (89 percent) and the Crimea (81 percent). These regions are not territorially contiguous and would not realistically be able to support a secessionist conflict barring massive Russian intervention.

While Russia has succeeded in conducting this type of campaign previously in Georgia and Moldova, it would be much more difficult in Ukraine. Ukraine has a large, fairly well equipped Army and even though the majority of the military voted for Yanukovich, it is unlikely that they would mobilize for these successionist regions. Without Ukraine’s military supporting these regions, an armed conflict would be difficult, logistically, to sustain.

While President Yushchenko has moved quickly to change the political landscape in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine will prove more difficult. Many of the primary power-brokers do not hold elected office. During a February visit to the region, President Yushchenko accused Donetsk leaders of corruption and promised to break up the “criminal system of government” and create a “different Donetsk.” He also threatened punishment for local leaders who called for breaking away from Ukraine in reaction to Yushchenko’s election, warning “separatists will answer to a court.” In April 2004,
Yushchenko made his first move. Borys Kolesnykov, the most powerful Donetsk political leader and chairman of the oblast council, was arrested.

Kolesnykov was the ideological driving force behind former Prime Minister Yanukovich’s Donetsk-based Party of Regions and a friend of Donetsk’s top businessman and Ukraine’s richest oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. He was arrested on 6 April on charges of extortion and separatism. In November 2004, Kolesnykov proposed creating a Southeast Republic if Yushchenko won. After Yushchenko’s victory, he was called to Kiev to answer questions about Eastern Ukrainian separtism, but no charges were filed at the time. President Yushchenko has declared that his government will fight corruption and bribery, “no matter by whom.” It appears that despite significant remaining Russian influence in Eastern Ukraine, Yushchenko is prepared to push his reforms ahead.

**Black Sea Fleet**

Ukraine will host Russia’s Black Sea Fleet until 2017. The fleet’s presence causes several problems. Russian authorities can use the Black Sea Fleet to test Ukraine’s resolve with respect to its national sovereignty. They can also use it as a bargaining chip, failing to acknowledge the temporary nature of its presence and attempting to renegotiate its lease. The fleet’s presence serves to embolden pro-Russian Crimean separatists. It also raises the risk of Ukraine unwillingly being drawn into Russian conflicts with other countries. While the Black Sea Fleet issue was officially resolved in 1997 by the signing of several agreements, due to the previously stated reasons there is some remaining friction between both sides. This friction was recently
exposed in an event that serves to demonstrate the state of relations between the two countries.

On the morning of 23 March the NIKOLAI FILCHENKOV, a thirty year old Russian Alligator type IV large landing ship commenced an unauthorized amphibious landing at the military training area of Mount Opuk on the southeast coast of Crimea. The landing was supposed to be the main component of an annual Russia exercise normally conducted during April, but in this case the annual exercise never received Ukrainian approval.

The Russian amphibious ship, based in Sevastopol, picked up the Russian based landing party in Novorossiysk, Russia, on 22 March. She was underway the same day and crossed into Ukrainian territorial waters outside of Feodosiya later that night. The Russian ship appropriately notified the Ukrainian authorities prior to entering Ukrainian territorial waters, but did not provide any information regarding the landing party or military exercise. The NIKOLAI FILCHENKOV then proceeded to the exercise area and began landing the personnel and hardware of the Black Sea Fleet’s 382nd independent marine battalion based in Temryuk, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In all 142 people and 28 pieces of hardware, mainly armored personnel carriers, were offloaded at the amphibious training range.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that Russia violated the May 28, 1997 bilateral treaty on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet’s presence on Ukrainian territory, the associated agreement on the Russian Fleet’s use of training grounds on Ukraine’s territory, the Ukrainian law on the procedures regarding access of foreign military units on Ukraine’s territory, as well as Ukrainian national sovereignty.
The basics of the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Agreements and its associated agreements include:

1) Russia and Ukraine split the Black Sea fleet 50-50 with Russia then buying 62 percent of Ukraine’s 50 percent back with cash;

2) Russia leased the ports and training areas in and around Sevastopol for 20 years at $97.75 million per year, but the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s land forces based in Russia can not use Ukraine’s territory for military exercises without Ukrainian parliamentary approval (the issue in this case);

3) Russia would also credit Ukraine with $526 million for the use of part of the fleet, as well as $200 million for the 1992 transfer of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal to Russia. The payments will go toward reducing Ukraine’s $3 billion debt to Russia. \(^{108}\)

4) Russia recognized that Crimea (and the city of Sevastopol) is legally and territorially a sovereign part of Ukraine. \(^{109}\)

The official Ukrainian reaction to the unauthorized military exercise was passed via letter on 24 March to charge d’affaires of the Russian Federation in Ukraine Yevgeni Panteleev. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry letter demanded explanations from the Russian diplomats on the uncoordinated military exercise.

The Ukrainian President and Prime Minister took a diplomatic approach to the incident. Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko said on 25 March that the Ukrainian government was committed to complying with the Black Sea Fleet accords and that no old bilateral accords were going to be revisited. “I want Russia to take us as reliable partners,” the Ukrainian PM added. \(^{110}\)
President Viktor Yushchenko called the incident a “military oversight.” He also said that the incident was not a political provocation by Russia. “We have accepted the Russians’ apologies and believe that the political agreement that regulates the presence of the fleet was, in fact, violated, but, considering the statement that the Russians issued, I regard this incident as settled,” he said. At the same time, President Yushchenko announced that Ukraine would conduct a review of the Russian fleet’s activities in recent years, and check that record against the terms of the 1997 agreements: “There are many problems in this area,” he noted.

Russian reaction was basically indifferent. The Russian Black Sea Fleet command issued a press release that stated, “The incident occurred because of uncoordinated actions by the Ukrainian authorities and the BSF command.” Andrey Krylov, the officer in charge of the Black Sea Fleet press office, said that the amphibious landing was carried out strictly in accordance with the plans of combat training of the Russian Navy coordinated ahead of time with the Ukrainian Naval Command. In addition, the Ukrainians had planned to send their own naval infantrymen to take part in the exercises.

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko said that a Black Sea Fleet representative responded to Ukraine’s letter and that the incident resulted from some technical misapprehension. As he claimed, the Ukrainian side was notified beforehand about the ship’s voyage to Feodosia, but, probably, the notice failed to reach the Ukrainian party. Additionally he said that the incident should not be over dramatized.
The 1997 agreements on the stationing of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine run through 2017. At present, no Ukrainian official calls outright for revising the agreements or abridging the duration of their validity. However, should incidents such as this recur, many in Ukraine could become less tolerant of the Russian fleet’s presence, and could demand additional legal safeguards to restrain arbitrary actions and uphold Ukrainian sovereignty.

More importantly, this event serves to show the peaceful yet still antagonistic relations between the two countries. President Yushchenko, despite being branded pro-Western, appears to still understand the importance of conciliatory relations with Russia. He also displays graceful diplomacy in being able to downplay what could have been an inflammatory situation. Russians, on the other hand, appear still to be awkward and ungainly in their policy execution in near-abroad regions. To their credit, however, Russians also sought to downplay the event instead of letting it become a lightning rod for policies in the region.

Ukraine’s Path toward Europe

Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma often discussed pursuing a pro-European path. In 2002, he even set NATO membership as a key Ukrainian goal, but these moves always seemed more like ways to pressure Russia and less like actual goals. Kuchma’s heavy handed tactics with regard to political opposition and the press kept pushing him back into Russia’s open arms. President Yushchenko speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) said that “We, along with the people of Europe, belong to one civilization.”
Yushchenko repeated an election promise that “the strategy of our foreign policy aim is membership in the European Union.” He promised to push reforms to assist in European integration, saying EU-Ukrainian integration will “become a real, and not a declarative, reality.”

Yushchenko wants to maintain his Orange Revolution momentum and take advantage of his current western popularity. He likely will push for an EU membership plan in 2005. While the Ukraine in EU may be disturbing to Russia, it is most likely years away. The Ukraine in NATO is much more troubling to Russia and is much more likely to happen.

Diverging Paths prior to the Orange Revolution - Ukraine and NATO

Even before the Orange Revolution, Ukraine and Russia had started to diverge, specifically militarily. Ukraine inherited a huge Soviet-legacy military when it gained independence in 1991. While a powerful force, this military was designed as a component of the overall Soviet military apparatus and did not serve the evolving needs of the newly independent Ukraine. Additionally, Ukraine did not possess its own military/civilian institutions due to the central command model of the Soviet-era forces. The process of adapting the military into a truly Ukrainian force, capable of meeting Ukraine’s security challenges, was slowed by the creation of its defense institutions, such as the National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Component Service Commands and Defense Academy. NATO participation and assistance with Ukrainian military reform started almost immediately after the country’s independence and since President Viktor Yushchenko’s ascendency to power, the possibility for Ukrainian full membership in NATO looks brighter than ever.
A History of NATO-Ukrainian Cooperation

NATO-Ukraine relations started in 1991 when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, now known as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Ukraine joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1994. While politically and economically tied to Russia, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma saw increasing ties with NATO as a way to reduce Russian influence. In 1994, Ukraine became the first CIS country to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at a time when Mikhail Gorbachev called the PfP “just a way to sneak US influence closer to Russia’s borders.” This NATO program was designed to enhance security and defense cooperation between NATO and individual countries.

Russian disinterest in signing a treaty with Ukraine, recognizing its borders, just pushed Ukraine toward a policy of greater rapprochement with NATO. In 1997 Ukraine informed NATO that the Partnership for Peace program no longer met Ukraine’s security needs and wanted a special partnership agreement with NATO. President Kuchma said, “NATO is an alliance of democratic and civilized states which do not threaten or pose territorial claims on anyone.” National Defense and Security Council chief Volodymyr Horbulin stated that “certain actions and statements by Russia’s Duma and members of the Russian government force Ukraine to seek to protect its security in a security system.”

While NATO and Russia were proceeding with talks about their new relationship, Ukraine moved to establish official relations with NATO and sign a special partnership agreement at the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit. During NATO discussions, Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council head Volodymyr Horbulin, Foreign Minister
Hennady Udovenko, and Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk agreed that the current military status of Ukrainian forces would not allow it to join NATO, but they reserved the option to apply for NATO membership in the future.

Ukraine’s push for official NATO ties and potential membership forced President Boris Yeltsin to visit Kiev prior to the Madrid Summit. In Kiev, Presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin agreed in principle to the Ukrainian-Russian treaty. The treaty was signed in May 1997 and ratified by the Russian parliament in December 1998 and February 1999. The obvious lesson was that continued Ukrainian engagement with NATO provided Ukraine with leverage when dealing with Russia.

**Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and Partnership for Peace**

At the NATO Madrid Summit in July 1997, Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. The document covers cooperation in the areas of economic security, conflict prevention, crisis management, military reform including enhanced civilian control, non-proliferation, arms control and transfers, and combating drugs and organized crime. Additionally, the Charter allows for expansion in all areas.

After the signing of the Distinctive Partnership Charter, the record of Ukraine-NATO cooperation has been impressive. Ukraine has frequently hosted NATO military exercises for both ground and naval forces. It converted its Soviet-era Yavoriv military range, Europe’s largest military training area, into a NATO peacekeeping training center. It maintains a joint military unit with the Poles, the Ukrainian-Polish joint battalion, UkrPolBat, which participates in NATO peacekeeping missions. The battalion participated in the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo under NATO command. It also has been deployed to the Lebanese-Israeli border as part of the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL. Ukraine has allowed nearly 1,200 military flights, mostly American to transit Ukrainian airspace, enroute to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Ukraine has established an outstanding record of Partnership for Peace participation. Ukraine has taken part in almost 200 PfP events every year since 1999. In addition to participation, Ukraine has hosted several annual PfP exercises. The largest naval, air and amphibious exercise conducted by NATO in the former USSR was hosted by Ukraine in the Black Sea in June 2000 entitled ‘Cooperative Partner-2000’. The Annual ‘Peace-Shield’ PfP exercise has also been hosted by Ukraine. Even more impressive, despite the ongoing political situation and some “hostile rhetoric” during 2004 in Ukraine, the Ukrainian military still participated in 220 events in the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.\textsuperscript{120} Ukraine and the United States conducted joint naval exercises in the Black Sea in November 2004 that included Ukraine’s flagship, the Hetman Sahaidachny, the Kostiantyn Olshansky large landingcraft, and the United States’ 6th Fleet command ship, USS La Salle. The exercise was conducted in preparation for the Ukrainian Navy joining NATO anti-terrorism operation Active Endeavor conducted in the Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine is scheduled to join the operation in 2005.\textsuperscript{121}

While NATO had been careful not to elevate Ukraine or Russia above the other in regard to NATO relations, Russia’s new special place in NATO, the NATO-Russia Council established in May 2002, could have resulted in a downturn in Ukrainian relations. This did not happen and in fact, on 23 May, President Kuchma decided to initiate preparations toward full membership of Ukraine in the alliance, and to draft a strategy toward that goal.\textsuperscript{122}
At the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted. While not part of the Membership Plan, the Action Plan set out specific goals, covering political and economic issues, information issues, security, defense and military issues, information protection and security, and legal issues. NATO urged Ukraine to take the reform process forward and strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the market economy. NATO agreed to significantly step up its efforts to transform the defense and security institutions in Ukraine.

To support the implementation of the Action Plan’s objectives, Annual Target Plans are agreed upon in which Ukraine sets its own targets in terms of the activities it wishes to pursue both internally and in cooperation with NATO. Assessment meetings take place twice a year and a progress report is prepared annually. Despite the lack of progress in democracy, law, human rights and economy, the military has done surprisingly well in achieving its goals in both the NATO-Ukraine 2003 and 2004 Target Plans.

**Military Reforms Despite Political Tensions**

While initially slow, the Ukrainian military reform was simulated by aggressive NATO involvement, specifically Poland. In 2004, the Ukrainian Army was cut by 70,000 personnel. When Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk was dismissed in 2004 due to an ammunition storing and disposal issue, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told new Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk that military reform must be further promoted. “We must not dismiss those who benefit the armed forces. I am referring to military professionals,” the former Ukrainian president said. “We must depart from old approaches and stereotypes concerning military threats, and develop the armed forces on
the basis of the principle of a sufficient defense." One week before Kuchma’s comments, NATO Military Committee chief Harald Kuyat had given high marks to Ukrainian military reform progress and said the long-term plan for reform is “quite healthy.” Kuyat said that all NATO evaluators noted the positive aspects of Ukrainian military reform and the “openness and sincerity” with which Ukraine made its report on this reform.

In October 2004, the Ukrainian government announced plans to further reduce its armed forces by 50,000 to 235,000 servicemen in 2005, Defense Minister Alexander Kuzmuk said. The reduction was inline with the approved, NATO-endorsed Ukrainian armed forces reform. Servicemen will be dismissed in 2005 in contrast to the previous years when the armed forces were reduced at the expense of redundant positions and smaller conscription.

Since becoming president, Viktor Yushchenko has pushed for more military reforms. Yushchenko wants the terms of conscription reduced from 18 months to 12 months in the ground forces and from 24 months to 18 months in the Navy by the beginning of 2005. More importantly he wants a plan for the entire Armed Forces to switch over to a contract system by the beginning of January 2010. In the fall of 2004, the first few combat units started a test period for the new contract system.

The Defense Ministry also has other problems, such as an outdated monetary allowance system, a huge disparity between civilian and military pay and current retirement issues. The Ukrainian Defense Minister has formed working groups to reform the system of monetary allowances and social bonuses and compensations to the servicemen and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces. The main objective of the
working group is to develop a concept for a new and more effective system of payment for all Ministry personnel, as well as to find ways to provide housing to servicemen and improve the mechanisms of social bonuses and compensations to servicemen and military pensioners. The first meeting of the working group, held in February 2005, discussed the issue of reforms of the monetary allowances and social bonuses and compensations to servicemen and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, and the plan to draw up the aforementioned concept.127

Ukraine’s Road to NATO

Since President Yushchenko’s rise to power during the Orange revolution, he has made it clear that his policies will be toward European integration. He was the only non-NATO head of state invited to the 22 February NATO meeting. At that meeting, NATO leaders expressed support for Ukraine’s reform agenda and agreed to strengthen cooperation with the country. At the special NATO-Ukraine Summit, President Yuschenko outlined to NATO Heads of State and Government his plans and priorities for the reform process in Ukraine. “NATO is ready to work with you,” ready to “sharpen and refocus” the existing cooperation, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said at a joint press conference with President Yuschenko.128 “Ukraine has made its position clear about joining the Membership Action Plan,” he told reporters, “At the same time it means that our country will be also using the possibilities that are provided by the existing instruments for cooperation, meaning the Action Plan between NATO and Ukraine.”129

As an expression of its determination to enhance cooperation, NATO has launched a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund project to help Ukraine deal
with the huge Soviet-era stockpiles of ammunitions, small arms and light weapons. The Project will help Ukraine destroy these aging stockpiles including numerous Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). This 30 million dollar initiative is the largest single demilitarization effort in the world and the largest of its kind ever undertaken. The United States will act as the lead nation for this NATO/PfP Trust Fund project, the first time the United States has volunteered as the lead nation.\textsuperscript{130}

President Kuchma’s multi-vectored foreign policy never fully aligned Ukraine with NATO. His repeated use of NATO as leverage against Russia served to start the reform of the Ukrainian military. More importantly, no matter the political situation or rhetoric, Ukraine never stopped pursuing their NATO Action Plan goals. In early 2005, President Yushchenko took command of a military that is much closer to NATO standards than the post-Soviet legacy military inherited by President Kuchma.

With that said, Ukraine is still several years away from joining NATO. They still have significant defense reform to complete prior to achieving NATO standards. Additionally, if we look at the 1995 NATO enlargement criteria 1) established democracy, 2) respect for human rights, 3) market-based economy, 4) armed forces under civilian control, 5) good relations with neighboring states (resolution of internal ethnic disputes), Ukraine has significant work in each area.\textsuperscript{131} President Yushchenko needs to continue his string of victories by having Ukraine designated as a market economy this year and receiving WTO membership before the March 2006 parliamentary elections. WTO success coupled with further reformist success in the 2006 elections could then accelerate the NATO application process. President Bush and NATO Secretary-General
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer have emphasized NATO’s “open-door” policy that would admit Ukraine if President Yushchenko can succeed with his reforms.

**Russian Policy toward Ukraine**

Despite the fraternal relationship, it took Russia and Ukraine six years and twelve presidential summits to agree to terms on the Black Sea fleet basing and the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. Russian apprehension was primarily caused by the fact that signing the agreements meant that it would recognize the status of Ukraine as a sovereign state. In the same way, Russia seems lost when deciding its new policy toward Ukraine. Whether in direct response to Ukraine’s elections or not, in March 2005, President Vladimir Putin essentially pronounced the Commonwealth of Independent States to be defunct as a mechanism for integration. He said that the “CIS was a mechanism for civilized divorce.” Meanwhile Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov cautioned post-Soviet countries against pursuing policies completely independent of Russia, in the international system: “We will not achieve a respected place in the emergent new world order as individual countries or by joining individually the international organizations that are beckoning.”

Russia still suffers from the same problems it did at the end of the Cold War: it has little to offer. While still having a large military, it is not a conventional military power, relative to other advanced countries. While it attends G-8 meetings, it is not an economic power. While still sitting on the UN Security Council, it is not an important political player. At the same time, Russia has not changed its foreign policy toward former Soviet states. It pursues it national interests with no concern for the Post Soviet states interests, still viewing the countries as part of a larger entity. Ukraine has set its
course toward Europe, while Russia seems to have set no course. For these reasons, Russia will likely see Ukraine’s future successes not as a good for Black Sea and European security but as failures of the CIS and their own policy.

Central Asia

Russia’s lack of political unity and radical economic reforms after the break up of the Soviet Union severely limited their ability to stay engaged in Central Asia. Due to being overwhelmed by the circumstances of the time, early post-Soviet Russian policy toward the Central Asian republics was slow to materialize even during Tajikistan’s civil war. Once engaged, Russia took many of the same steps in Central Asia as it had in the other near-abroad regions in order to ensure its dominant position.

Figure 11. Map of Central Asia in relation to Russia

Russia benefited from the slow development of western relations with these countries. While the west did move to create diplomatic, political, and economic ties with Central Asia, western influence provided little impetus towards the central Asian nations becoming democratic and market-oriented states. Instead, the newly independent Central Asian republics struggled to deal with internal political dissent and religious extremism. The Central Asian countries became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of western support for their internal development and perceived a lack of western understanding of the urgency of the internal political and social threats. Western investment in the Central Asian republics was limited particularly considering the potential for the development of energy resources. Instead of financial support and investment, they received criticism for human rights violations and political oppression.
In the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new states of Central Asia regressed back into authoritarian and repressive regimes in order to maintain internal security and stability.

Despite the inattention of the West, Russia still had competition for influence. Iran, Turkey and China all sought to increase stake in the area. With numerous options available, the Central Asian states pursued and still pursue very different foreign and security policies. On the extremes, Turkmenistan sought complete neutrality. Uzbekistan attempted to make itself the top regional power. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan opted for less extreme policies, while Tajikistan had too many internal problems to really be concerned with foreign policy. These differing foreign policy environments added to Russia’s problems in developing a cogent Central Asia policy.

Even while slow to develop its foreign policy toward Central Asia, Russia had already become increasingly aware of the penetrating reach of militant Islam in the Russian Federation. Russian counter-terrorism actions in Chechnya (discussed later) have cast a shadow over their repeated statements of foreign funding for domestic separatist and fundamentalist movements that challenge the territorial integrity of Russia.

For these domestic reasons, Russia was concerned with the expansion of Islamic extremism and militancy in Central Asia. Its geography forces Russia to be more “sensitive” to the problem of Central Asian extremism, since it borders so many Islamic countries and its actions could attract more militants to Chechnya. Russia’s concern is that Islamic militants could create an unstable Central Asia and thus destabilize the domestic situation in Russia.
For these reasons, Russia played a major role in initiating moves by the UN to combat terrorism. Her calls for an international effort to combat terrorism have been repeatedly met with skepticism since some see it as an attempt to simply legitimize her ongoing operations in Chechnya. This western skepticism and use of terms like insurgents to describe Chechen fighters, still infuriates Russia.

President Vladimir Putin discussed the Russian view of counter-terrorism actions against the threat of transnational militant Islam in an interview in Paris Match in July 2000. He said:

Today we are the witnesses of the creation of an extremist international in the so-called arc of instability beginning in the Philippines and ending in Kosovo. This is in the first instant very dangerous for Europe, as it has a large Moslem population. People who adhere to Islam as a religion to achieve provocative and terrorist goals compromise Islam. Islam is a religion of peaceable and orderly people. What does the problem consist of? You indeed know that one of the extremist organisations, which is headed by the notorious terrorist no.1 in the world Osman bin Laden, is the International Islamic Front, which, in my opinion, puts as its task the creation of an Islamic khaliphate, a United States of Islam, in which should enter a number of Islamic states, and some Central Asian states and part of the contemporary territory of the Russian Federation. Such are their fascist plans. I call them fascist, as they call for the creation of a united front against the Jews and “crusaders” as they call us. This is indeed a terrorist international. And in this sense Russia stands at the forefront of the struggle against this international terrorism. And Europe should get on its knees and show a large amount of gratitude for the fact that we struggle against it, so far, unfortunately, on our own.\textsuperscript{135}

The primary Russian armed intervention in Central Asia occurred during the Tajikistan civil war. Like other conflicts in Russia’s declared sphere of influence, Russia did not take immediate military action to ensure a pro-Russian outcome. Instead, Moscow’s involvement in Tajikistan gradually increased from 1990 to 1995 as its near
abroad policy was refined. This time, instead of “freezing” the ethnic/religious conflict as it had done in other countries, Russia militarily installed a pro-Russian government then used force to ensure that the conflict was allowed only to simmer conflict to simmer thus ensuring the government’s ongoing need for strong Russian political and military presence in Tajikistan.

The initial conflict period in Tajikistan’s civil war occurred during “Perestroika” which allowed for the formation of pro-democratic opposition political parties. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Communist party the conflict flared along regional-clan based lines and engulfed the entire country. The Leninabad and Kulyab pro-Communist clans and the Pamir and Garm opposition clans began fighting for control of Tajikistan. The devastating civil war that ensued left approximately one hundred thousand and hundreds of thousands homeless.

The Russian military lacked clear guidance from its essentially dysfunctional civilian chain of command. Russian officials, preoccupied with their own political struggles, failed to devise a clear objectives and missions for its army forces stationed in Tajikistan, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD). Despite the position of neutrality ostensibly adopted by the Russian government, the many connections between the 201st MRD and the Communist Tajik government, the numerous ethnic Tajik conscripts, and the brutality of the conflict made this policy nearly impossible to maintain. The involvement of Russian troops became almost inevitable. Russian military forces, at least at the lower levels, started to get involved at the beginning of 1992. Finally, in May 1992 at a CIS summit which included the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Collective Security Treaty was signed. This treaty
legalized the presence of the 201st MRD in Tajikistan and allowed the regional leaders to call for and initiate armed intervention in the Tajik civil war.

By December 1992, the opposition to the pro-Russian government was defeated, although not destroyed, thanks to significant Russian and Uzbek military support. A coalition of regional and clan groupings was established. The opposition was shut out of the new coalition government and in early 1993, it commenced an armed insurgency mostly from across the Tajik-Afghan border. Russia maintained its heavy military support of the Tajik government and Uzbekistan maintained a battalion of peacekeepers in Tajikistan. Even after the civil war ended, Russian border troops remained directly engaged in anti-opposition combat operations near the Tajik-Afghan border. Russia’s efforts in Tajikistan, however, did little to end the insurgency or stop the military stalemate. It chose not use its influence to push the Tajik government towards a political solution. The ongoing low level conflict ensured Russia the influence it sought due to the Tajik government’s need for Russian forces.

In June 1997, the UN successfully mediated a settlement of the civil war. Elections were held in 1999, but their legitimacy has been questioned since the incumbent President Imomali Rahmanov was re-elected by almost unanimous vote. The CIS peacekeeping mandate ended in 1999 at which time the last Uzbek soldier left Tajikistan. However, the 201st MRD did not leave.

While western programs designed to promote democratization and market reform failed, for numerous reasons, to produce the desired results, one endeavor that enjoyed some success in the decade after the Soviet Union collapsed was NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The program, intended to be a way of dealing with Russian fears of
NATO enlargement and helping promote civilian control of military institutions, allowed NATO to develop direct military-to-military ties with the Central Asian countries. This program laid the foundation for increased military cooperation and would play a significant role in facilitating the NATO military efforts after September 11.

The West, and specifically the U.S., was forced to entirely rebuild its view of Central Asia in the wake of September 11. The requirements of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan drove the U.S. to actively seek favorable relationships with the governments in Central Asia that would eventually turn into military basing rights. Central Asian countries made numerous contributions to the U.S. war effort with Russia’s blessing. The two most significant were made by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan provided access to the military facilities at Karshi-Khanabad. Kyrgyzstan granted basing rights to U.S. and coalition personnel at Manas airport. Both facilities were significantly upgraded at coalition expense to conform to NATO standards. Both of these sites played key roles to the coalition offensive air campaign against Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Kazakhstan has also moved to expand its military cooperation with the west. It has sign bilateral military cooperation agreements with the US and NATO. Kazakhstan has even taken the next step by deploying some troops to Iraq in August 2003 at the United States’ request. The success of the coalition campaign against the Taliban has increased regional stability by removing one of the most significant threats. As the situation in Afghanistan continues to stabilize, Russia will likely push its Central Asia friends to decrease or end the anti-terror coalition’s military presence in the region. Russia, although fully supporting the United States in its efforts against the Taliban, is opposed to any permanent basing of the U.S. forces in the region.
Russia continues its efforts to reassert its influence in Central Asia. In October of 2003, Russia announced that it will open a new air base in Kyrgyzstan, the first new military base constructed outside of Russia since the Soviet Union collapsed. This move, made under the auspices of the CSTO, serves to provide Russia an important counterbalance to U.S.-led coalition forces at Manas airport only a couple kilometers away. Kyrgyzstan officials were apparently very happy with Russia’s return as a military force. Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Esen Topoyev told reporters the CSTO rapid deployment force that was to be stationed there would “have a sobering effect on terrorist bandit formations that are planning to destabilize the situation.” Earlier Kyrgyz President Akayev told reporters that Kant “clearly shows that Russia’s power is continually growing and it can afford an air base that will protect its friends from any threat.” This battle for influence has put the Kyrgyz government in a position to play one country off against the other, or potentially have to choose one or the other. All indications are that if forced to chose, Kyrgyz leaders would choose Russia. Like other Central Asian authoritarian leaders, the Kyrgyz leaders are still more comfortable with Russia. Defense Minister Esen Topoyev summed up his government’s position by saying, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy priority “was, is and will remain the development of productive multi-vector cooperation within the framework of the CIS, the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”

In October 2004, Russia continued to increase and legalize its military presence in Central Asia. Tajikistan formally granted Russian forces in the 201st Motorized Rifle Division a permanent military base, and in return Russia agreed to transfer border security responsibility from Russian to Tajik troops. In April 2004, Tajik President
Emomali Rakhmonov announced that Tajikistan would take over control of its own borders and would ask Russian border troops to leave the country. In June 2004, President Putin bought time to review and renegotiate by convincing President Rakhmonov to put the power transfer on indefinite hold, pending a complete review and renegotiations.

Approximately 14,000 Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, more that 11,000 of them ethnic Tajiks. Russian border troops were phased out from Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In the same year, Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty. Tajikistan wanted to display to its regional competitors and neighbors that it too can defend its own borders. President Rakhmonov was determined to have Tajiks control the border by the end of 2004. Nuriddin Amirqulov, deputy chairman of the Tajik State Border Protection Committee, said: “I disagree with the opinion that we are not ready to protect our border. We are ready to do our utmost to protect our border. And speculation that narcotics will flow from Afghanistan to Tajikistan after Russia’s withdrawal is baseless.”

During early negotiations, Tajikistan voiced a desire for a significant say in the base operations, personnel movements, and use of the 201st in various contingencies. It also wanted a significant increase in the financial compensation it received for hosting the Russian unit. Rakhmonov’s desire to control his own borders gave Putin the bargaining chip he needed. While national pride and regional competition motivated President Rakhmonov, President Putin used this opportunity to formalize a basing agreement with Tajikistan for the 201st MRD and secure a significant, permanent, military presence in the region. The 201st had lacked legal status since its CIS
Peacekeeping Mission was terminated in 1999. The agreement stipulates that Russia’s border troops will retain an operational/liaison group in Tajikistan, train Tajik border troop officers, and provide Tajik border troops with modern Russian equipment. It also gives Russia until 2006 to relocate the Russian border guards. Equally important, Tajikistan received a $2 billion dollar investment deal and some much needed debt relief. Tajikistan gave Russia land for a consolidated base and it legally recognized the presence of the 201st MRD.

In the post-Beslan, post-OEF environment, Russia wanted to repeat its initial Central Asia, CSTO successes and demonstrate increased military cooperation throughout the CIS. These desires echoed the counter terrorism focused discussions of the 16 September 2004 CIS Astana summit. However, re-energizing the CIS proved to be a daunting task. In April 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan quit the CIS Collective Security Treaty when these countries simply allowed the treaty to expire without taking action to renew it. Uzbek President Islam Karimov expressed the widely shared frustration within the CIS before the Astana summit. Speaking to Uzbek TV in September 2004, Karimov said, “CIS summits are held regularly, as if they are actually doing something. But do they have any impact? I think this is a natural question. We pinned great hopes on the CIS. Unfortunately, its activity over the past 13 years has not met our expectations.” Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev, host of the Astana Summit, took the next step by proposing radical reform of the CIS in hopes of promoting real progress in countering terrorism. He suggested abolishing a wide range of political structures that were originally designed to maintain cooperation in post-Soviet republics. It is clear that the countries of Central Asia want effective collective military
cooperation to ensure security and stability within their regions and Russia is urgently trying to reassert itself before CIS and CSTO member states look elsewhere for solutions. With this in mind, Russia created new incentives for military integration.

In late 2004, the Duma ratified a protocol allowing major increases in the military and technical cooperation among CSTO member states. "The protocol’s ratification creates grounds for increasing supplies of military products to the CSTO member states," stressed Russian First Foreign Deputy Minister Valeriy Loschchinin. This document encourages admission of new countries to the CSTO and furthers military integration. It also creates the legal basis for increasing supplies of military hardware transferred to CSTO countries at preferential financial rates.

In addition to more equipment at better prices, Nikolay Bordyuzha, CSTO Secretary-General confirmed that CSTO member states examined a concept of forming a much larger combined force than currently exists in the Central Asian region. The suggested military unit would include a joint group of troops including units from all the CSTO states Armed Forces and would number almost 10,000 personnel. This group, once formed, will be almost four times the size of the current Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), which currently operates in Central Asia. Just like all CSTO military groups, the majority of the forces that comprise this group will be from the Russian combined-arms military base in Tajikistan and the Russian air force base in Kyrgyzstan.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 were a defining event for US and western policy toward Central Asia. In the zero sum game of influence, especially as seen through the eyes of Russian policy makers, America’s increasing interest in the region,
while serving to reduce the threat of Islamic extremists, poses a general threat to Russia’s perception of security. To counter that perceived threat, Russia is working to become the focal point of a thoroughly integrated regional military arrangement capable of countering terrorism throughout the CIS. Russia is intent on proving that it can still serve as a primary source of security for its neighbors and is more than just a viable alternative to NATO and the US. It has done this by strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organization, including forming the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. It has strengthened its military position by re-opening and expanding Kant air base and agreeing with Tajikistan on basing rights for the 201st MRD. Russia has developed new incentives to increase bilateral relations with its Central Asian neighbors.

But Russia’s attempts to increase its security influence within Central Asia are not just to counterbalance the continuing presence of U.S. and Western military forces into the region in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Central Asia is Russia’s best chance to establish a useful cooperative security environment and retain its sphere of influence. Other regions of the CIS, as previously discussed, are full of frozen conflicts and NATO aspirations. In addition to their own efforts to consolidate their influence, Russia has been helped by western governments and non-governmental organizations mounting criticisms of Central Asian countries’ massive abuses of human rights. During the active prosecution of OEF, the criticism was muted, but it has increased ever since. Additionally, the fallout from the Orange Revolution in Ukraine may actually strengthen Russia’s position in Central Asia. Central Asian leaders have shown little capacity or desire to improve human rights or make progress toward democratizing their countries. These western values are usually a requirement for ongoing and ever increasing military
cooperation with the West. By developing security ties with Moscow, Central Asian leaders are able to avoid taking actions that they may deem as dangerous while strengthening their security situation. Central Asian states appear more comfortable in dealing with Russia, secure in the knowledge that Russia will not leave the region and more importantly Russia will not place political pressure on host governments in return for military or security assistance. Russia’s renewed interest and Central Asia’s fears of western policies will ensure Moscow’s sphere of influence at least in this region.

Near Abroad Summary

What is sometimes lost in discussions about Russia and its near-abroad is Russia’s strength relative to its neighbors. “Russia’s relative weakness, so often cited by Putin apologists, is dangerously misleading, especially when its neighbors are institutionally and economically weaker and politically more vulnerable.”145 The table below highlights the reality of this point:
Table 5. Military Strength of Russia and Near-Abroad Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>42,050</td>
<td>38,900</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>72,100</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>47,770</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>18,170</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td>19,100</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>67,300</td>
<td>46,800</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>6,562</td>
<td>5,512</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>806,000</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>4,000-4,500</td>
<td>3,000-4,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>257,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>53,700</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total figure for the Ministry of Defense only. This figure excludes other armed forces such as Ministry of Interior troops, paramilitary forces, border guards etc.

Donald Jensen, the communications director at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, fully accepts that Russia has legitimate security, economic, and political interests in the near abroad, but explains Russia’s sometimes dysfunctional and counterproductive approach to the region by explaining that

Russia’s leaders are prisoners of an imperial worldview. They often treat nearby countries as colonies, rather than as equals. This view of the world also causes them to view whatever the West does – especially the United States – as a threat. One had the sense during the Ukraine crisis last Fall that the Kremlin opposed Viktor Yushchenko partly because the U.S. supported him, not because it had calculated what its interests in Ukraine actually were.”
Other realities creating “irrational” Russian policy in the near-abroad stem from the level at which Russia permeates the fabric of these countries and the number of different government and non-governmental Russian parties that have influence and interests in the region. Combined with bureaucratic problems with regards to information flow in both directions between Moscow and the near abroad, and it is possible that there is no clear prism through which one could look to make sense of Russian policy.

There is indication that Kremlin thinking has been impacted by the recent events in the near-abroad. Georgian Foreign Minister, Salome Zurabishvili, called Russia “irrational and emotional,” and that its behavior represented “…a manifestation of the difficulty for Russia of reconciling itself to the new neighborhood around itself…and the way the world is changing.” Moscow’s awareness of this is increasingly evident. In the wake of the elections in Ukraine in late 2004 that saw the pro-Moscow candidate embarrassingly defeated, Marat Gelman, a political consultant who advised the pro-Moscow candidate Viktor Yanukovych, said that “Russia should now give up its imperial project,” because “…although there is no chance of realizing any scenario of the restoration of the empire, our wounded imperial consciousness remains and is posing a serious problem.” Duma Deputy Yuriy Konev, a member of the majority Unified Russia party, thinks that “Now is not the time to think about how to break up other states but to take care about the unity and sovereignty of our own country.”

In addition to having the effect of reducing its influence, Russian policy’s toward its near-abroad has actually served to hamper both the global fight against terror and its own security position. The unrecognized states of the frozen conflicts have become conduits for drugs, weapons, and people. The ungoverned spaces are not subject to
normal state requirements and their leaders tend to become increasingly authoritarian to ensure their own power. By attempting to retain these pro-Russian areas at all cost, Russia has developed terrorist sanctuaries on or near its borders.

**Pursuing National Interests in Russian Client States**

The Soviet Union has pursued a more mutually beneficial style of relations with Middle Eastern states than the "forced" relations with the countries in its "near abroad". The Soviet Union thought that its international movement could exploit the same repressed conditions present in the Middle East as the Pan-Arabic movement and the Political Islamic movements, a disenfranchised populous and significant unemployment. In the zero-sum game of Cold War influence, any country that could be lured into the Soviet realm would be outside the West realm, regardless of other internal political factors. Additionally, the geographic proximity and large Muslim populations in Soviet Union provided impetus for good relations.

In establishing Middle Eastern policy, the Soviet Union benefited from the fact that Tsarist Russia did have a colonization conquest period in the Middle East. After seizing power in 1917, the Bolsheviks did not carry the historical baggage that the Western powers held and used this to their advantage. Soviet Russia enjoyed relatively "good" relations with the Middle Eastern countries until Stalin basically ended relations during his reign. Once Khrushchev came to power, the Soviet Union looked to further enhance its political and military presence in the region.

In hopes of winning support for the Communist cause, the Soviet Union supported national liberation movements in Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Palestine. This support was diplomatic, economic and military, and it allowed the Soviet
Union to establish a footprint across a large area of the region. The support did have its limitations, however: the USSR never withdrew its recognition of the state of Israel; it did not export its most sophisticated weapons; and it did not sign mutual defense alliances and thus was not drawn into Arab-Israeli Wars.

The collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the Middle East’s, and in general the third world’s, choice of superpower military and economic aid donors. Russia participated as co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process in 1991, just before the Soviet Union’s collapse, but due to their significantly reduced prominence the bargaining position was weak at best.

The political and economic turmoil of the early 1990’s had a significant effect on Russia’s foreign policy in the region. While Russia still wanted to play an independent role in the Middle Eastern region, it also wanted United States and European assistance, especially in the economic realm. The general economic and political weakness within post-Soviet Russia, coupled with the pro-western attitude of the Yeltsin regime, led to a Russian foreign policy that was much less independent and much more aligned with that of the United States, with the exceptions of policies in Bosnia and Iran.

In 1994, under domestic pressure, Russia began to push an independent foreign policy toward the Middle East. The February 1994 Hebron massacre marked a change in Russian foreign policy, as it acted independently from the United States. Russia pushed for a Security Council Resolution instead of the U.S. preferred presidential statement. Then Russia succeeded in pushing many of its preferences into the UN Security Council Resolution 904, specifically calling for increased measures to guarantee the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians throughout the occupied territory, including the
possibility of a temporary international peacekeeping presence. Additionally, the resolution reinforced Russia’s position, by requesting the co-sponsors of the peace process, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, to continue their efforts to invigorate the peace process, and to provide necessary support for the protection of Palestinians.\textsuperscript{152}

In July 1994, Russia continued down its own Middle East policy. Russia and Iraq started a series of meetings, some held in secret, between Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Russian Foreign Ministry officials. After their 7 July meeting, Deputy foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov said that Russia “is ready to initiate discussion in the Security Council of the question of lifting the oil embargo against Iraq after a certain probationary period has expired.”\textsuperscript{153} Whether Russia’s pro-Iraqi stance was more related to economic interests, Iraq still owed Russia several billions dollars from the Soviet period, than a foreign policy that counterattacked U.S. hegemony, does not matter since both would have served Russian perceived national interests. Russian and Iraqi officials continued to meet throughout 1994. In April 1995, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 986, the first Oil for Food resolution. That resolution gave permission to Iraq, while still under other UN sanctions, to sell $2 billion dollars’ worth of oil to buy food, medicine and other supplies. While Iraq later rejected this resolution, Russia’s independent position, in regard to Iraq, was reestablished.\textsuperscript{154}

Russia also brokered a cease-fire agreement in Yemen in 1994. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yemen had been a close ally of Russia and Russia did not want to lose influence in the country. While the cease-fire lasted only a few hours
before being broken, it reinforced the idea that Russia would act outside the United Nations with no international assistance to shore up its influence.\textsuperscript{155}

In January 1996, Yevgeny Primakov became the new Russian Foreign Minister. Mr. Primakov’s attitude toward Russian foreign policy was simple, “Despite its current difficulties, Russia was and remains a great power. Her foreign policy should correspond to that status.”\textsuperscript{156} He wanted to move Russian foreign policy away from that of any other world power and focus it on regions where Russian national interests can be achieved, especially areas where Soviet influence had been significant.

Primakov had previously served as head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Agency and presidential envoy to the Middle East, and he considered the region to be a key interest. The first reason was due to the region’s geographic location relative to Russia. The Soviet Union’s collapse caused a weakening of defenses in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus region. Primakov considered the Middle East Russia’s “soft underbelly.” Similar to the Russia thinking about Eastern Europe as a buffer, Primakov thought the Middle East should not become a region dominated by the United States as this would be provide Russia with no protection from an attack and threaten its security.

The second reason for a Middle East focus was economic: Primakov wanted to reinvigorate the market for Russian defense systems and thus increase Russia’s influence in the region. With influence reasserted it would be in a better position to force the Middle Eastern gas and petroleum industry toward a pro-Russian solution to the development of the Caspian Sea region.

Russian relations with three Middle Eastern states in particular, Iraq, Iran and Syria, bear closer inspection.
Iraq

The Soviet Union and Iraq have a history of good relations. The Soviet Union supported Arab cause in both the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Additionally, the Soviet Union had a more pro-Palestinian view toward Israel. For these reasons, Iraq chose to expand relations with USSR as a counter to U.S. influence. In 1972 the countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty did not align Iraq with the Soviet Union but did provide Iraq with military equipment and technical assistance. The relationship remained steady through the 1970’s, although Iraq’s oil fortune allowed Iraq to diversify its economic relationship with the west.

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked the first ripple in relations between the two nations: Saddam Hussein condemned the invasion. The second ripple arose when the Soviet Union stopped supplying arms to Iraq in 1980 in an attempt to stop the Iran-Iraq war. Moscow resumed arms supplies to Iraq in the 1982, but Saddam Hussein was henceforth distrustful of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union continued to supply Iraq with weapons, but again Saddam was not happy with the political support received from the Soviet Union in forcing Iran to comply with the UN Security Council cease-fire resolution of July 1987. In 1990, Moscow opposed Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait.

Since 1994, Russia has been active in its attempts to engage Iraq and move beyond the post-Gulf War I sanctions. This continued with Russian efforts to mediate in 1997 and 1998. In November 1997, Russia successfully lobbied Iraq to allow UN weapons inspectors to return, while Russia promised to continue to push for the end of UN sanctions. In 1998, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergejev claimed that the ongoing issue of Iraq represented a threat to vital Russian national interests and it could not be approached only in the context of American-Iraqi relations. The Foreign Ministry
made it clear that Russia would veto any UN Security Council sanction for U.S. military intervention in Iraq, but at the same time, it urged Baghdad to give the UN special commission its full cooperation.\textsuperscript{158}

The four-day U.S./UK Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 was universally denounced in Moscow. President Yeltsin’s official statement called the bombing an “unprovoked act of violence...that flagrantly violated the UN Charter.”\textsuperscript{159} He finished his statement with “The Iraqi problem can be resolved only by political and diplomatic methods based on compliance with international law and the resolutions of the UN Security Council.”\textsuperscript{160} The Duma called the military action “an act of international terrorism”.\textsuperscript{161} Russia’s Defense Ministry’s Chief Administration for International Military Cooperation, Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, said that “if Russia’s opinion continues to be ignored, Moscow will be forced to alter its military and political vectors.”\textsuperscript{162}

The Russian leadership also strongly opposed the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. They argued that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 did not authorize military action and threatened to veto any resolution that did. Russia not surprisingly favored the status quo, arguing for continued UN weapons inspections. As in early situations in Kosovo and Iraq, Russia was opposed to any military action not formally approved through the UN Security Council.

As military action loomed, Russia was careful not to endanger U.S. relations over Iraq. After Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, Russia moved to heal any rift in relations and avoid damage to the anti-terror coalition. While still objecting to U.S. unilateral military action, Russia did support the UN Security Council resolution 1483 in
May 2003 that lifted sanctions and legitimized the U.S./UK occupation force. Russia’s policy toward Iraq, however, was unable to stop military action.

**Iran**

Iran and the Soviet Union did have ties, much like the Soviet ties to Iraq, but they have been tense at times. Prior to the Islamic revolution, the United States had the primary role as superpower supporter of Iran. After the Revolution, Khomeini condemned both the United States and the Soviet Union as equally “evil” forces. Since the United States had supported the Shah, the U.S. drew the majority of attention and the label the “Great Satan.” The Soviet Union was disliked, but not with the fervor shown toward the United States. Iran, like Iraq, was very critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was also critical of Soviet arms support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Despite these events, Iran and the Soviet Union maintained cordial diplomatic relations.

After the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia has had a cooperative relationship with Iran, especially since reemerging with an independent foreign policy in the 1990’s. Iran provided Russia with a lucrative arms market and a civilian nuclear technology market, while Iran respected Russian interests in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus.

The largest current issue for the U.S. in regard to Russian policy is the 1995 agreement to complete the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. While Russia only provides civilian nuclear technology, the concern is that Iran could use that technology to enrich its own uranium deposits and thus develop a nuclear weapon. Russia has repeatedly rejected the international claim that Iran is attempting to develop a nuclear capability. Russia has also repeatedly recommended that Iran cooperate fully with the IAEA. Russia has forced Iran to sign a protocol that would force Iran to return
all used nuclear fuel. The United States does not see this measure as sufficient, since the issue is technology transfer that could lead to uranium enrichment. While supporting the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency and urging Iran abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which Iran is a signatory, Russia will almost certainly resist pressure to stop the lucrative nuclear construction deal. While not wanting another nuclear power on its “soft under-belly,” Russia views the current inspection and treaty regime as sufficient.

**Syria**

Syria enjoyed possibly the closest relations with the Soviet Union of all Middle Eastern countries. For more than twenty years, the Soviet Union provided weapons to the Syrian military while Syria ran up more than 13.4 billion dollars of arms debt to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union established a significant military presence within Syria, a presence that reached its pinnacle in 1984 with an estimated 13,000 Russian personnel and advisors in Syria. The Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Syrians in 1980. The Soviet Union also signed an agreement to cooperate with Syria on the development of peaceful nuclear power in 1983.

Although the Syrian-Soviet relationship was close, over time it soured. The Soviet Union got little in return for its military assistance. As the Soviet Union neared collapse, the relationship had become of limited value to both nations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria has not been able to keep pace with Western, Israeli, or even neighboring Arab countries military advances.

After the unsuccessful attempt to stop military action in Iraq, Russia may have wanted to reassert itself in the Middle East, beyond the nuclear issue in Iran. On 12
January 2005, citing unnamed sources, Kommersant first reported Russian plans to sell a number of advanced missile systems to Syria, ahead of Bashar Assad’s visit to Russia.\textsuperscript{165} Initial reporting indicated that the potential sale likely would include 200 shoulder-fired SA-18 Iгла (NATO designation Grouse) anti-aircraft missiles, eighteen of Russia’s new and made-for-export SS-26 Iskander-E missile (NATO Designation Stone), and a small number of S-300PMU-2 (NATO designation SA-10 Grumble) air and missile defense systems.\textsuperscript{166}

On January 2, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held a secret cabinet meeting to discuss intelligence and attempt to develop responses to the possible Russian-Syrian arms deal. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Silvan Shalom, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, head of the National Security Council Gior Eyland, and the heads of all Israeli special services, reportedly attended the meeting. After the meeting, negotiations began between Israel and Russia, aimed at heading off any deal prior to Syrian President Bashar Assad’s visit to Russia later that month. “We had consultations over the past few days, and we hope to reach the necessary agreement,” AP quoted Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom as saying.\textsuperscript{167} Additionally, Shalom said that the sale of advanced missiles to Syria would disrupt regional stability and Moscow should call off the deal. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres summed up the Israeli position, telling reporters, “We have enough problems on the ground with Syria and we don’t need more problems from the sky.”\textsuperscript{168}

The European Union’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, warned that the sale could derail the Middle East peace process and could have implications throughout the entire region. “I trust that President Putin will not do anything that will go against the
stability of the region, which is as much an interest for him as it is an interest for us,” Solana said.\textsuperscript{169} U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher also addressed the issue: “We have reports of the sale. The U.S. policy on this is very clear: We’re against the sale of weaponry to Syria, against the sale of lethal military equipment to Syria, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and we think those kinds of sales are not appropriate. The Russians know about this policy.”\textsuperscript{170} Boucher also said Washington would consider wide sanctions against Moscow if the reported sale went through. The U.S. State Department had previously sanctioned companies in Russia over arms deals with Syria, the most recent case coming in 1998 when Russia agreed to sell Metis-E and Kornet-E anti-tank missile systems to Syria. That deal resulted in economic sanctions against the missile system producer, the Tula-based Instrument-Building Design Bureau.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov was forced to answer questions about the possible arms deal during his official visit to Washington. “We do not have any negotiations with Syria on the possible shipment of such missiles,” Ivanov told reporters at the Russian Embassy in Washington in January 2005.\textsuperscript{171} Ironically, Defense Minister Ivanov was in Washington to discuss ways to stop the spread of portable missiles with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The Russian Foreign Ministry also downplayed the initial media reports and denied any strain in the relationship between Russia and Israel. “In our export policy we give special attention to prevention of sensitive arms getting into the hands of international terrorists, and the Israeli leadership knows this,” claimed a Russian Foreign Ministry statement.\textsuperscript{172}

The alleged military deal now appears to include only the shoulder-fired SA-18 missile. The SA-18 \textit{Igla} is one of the best portable surface-to-air missiles available. The
current missile is not an enhancement of a previous design, but an entirely new design. Its improved seeker and enhanced aerodynamic design provide increased range and speed, enabling the missile to be used against faster, more maneuverable targets. The missile’s high effectiveness against countermeasures, specifically electro-optical and IRCM jammers that are installed on most military aircraft and Israeli commercial aircraft, make it very troubling to some countries and very appealing to others. Military analysts consider the Igla to be one of the most sophisticated portable missiles and an ideal weapon for militants. The Igla could be used effectively by Hezbollah fighters in south Lebanon against Israeli aircraft or in Iraq against the United States. There are currently thousands of older Russian Igla-1 and Strela missiles in the Middle East. The deployment of this decoy-defeating weapon could make a deadly difference in the region.

During his trip to Israel in early May 2005, President Putin emphasized that Russia would sell Syria a vehicle launched version of this missile and that the sale of the missiles to Syria would not upset the balance of power in the Middle East. Israeli defense sources say that the vehicle-mounted missile is an equal concern since the launchers can be dismantled and reconfigured into a terrorist friendly shoulder-launched version. Putin joked that the missiles “will of course make it difficult to fly over the residence of the Syrian president.”

In addition to the weapons, Syrian President Bashar Assad received a debt-reduction package that wrote off almost ten billion dollars of Syria’s debt from Soviet Union-era military purchases. The visit also promised Syria some support on the UN Security Council. President Putin thus reestablished at least part of the former Soviet Middle East footprint.
Russia’s International Arms Market and its Middle East Policy

Russia dramatically reduced arms exports to the Middle East in the early 1990s resulted in several countries in the region choosing to replace Russian arms with European and American weapons. The Russian military-industrial complex certainly would like to regain its once dominant position in the Middle East arms market.

The Vice President of the Russian Academy for Geopolitical Problems Vladimir Anokhin said, “The expansion of arms trade with Syria is beneficial for Russia and does not violate international norms... We have virtually lost the market in the Middle East. The expansion of military-technical cooperation with Syria is in fact our comeback to the Middle East market,” he said.175 He also noted, “Talks are under way on the resumption of deliveries of spare parts for weapons in Iraq which seems controversial in the present conditions. . . . Why shouldn’t we be delivering arms to a stable country such as Syria?”176

Russian attempts to recapture some of the Middle Eastern arms trade may be more urgent due to the effects of the 26 December 2005 tsunami that hit Indonesia and other countries in the South Pacific. Indonesia is set to cancel an $890 million jet fighter deal with Russia because the money was diverted to the relief effort. “It’s all about the tsunami basically. . . . It has already affected Indonesia’s previously announced plans to buy Sukhoi planes and combat helicopters. It’s a serious situation for us,” said an unnamed Russian defense official.177 The total losses to Russian arms sales due to the tsunami could reach $1.5 billion.178 The diversion of the Middle Eastern arms market in the early 1990’s left Asia as the key market for Russian arms sales. The cancellation of Indonesia’s planned purchase will only add to Russian problems. Moscow’s arms
exports in the region already suffered a setback with Thailand’s decision to go with an Anglo-Swedish consortium over Sukhoi to replace its F-5 fleet.

Other problems could be looming on the horizon. Indonesia has conducted apparently free and fair elections and may push for the U.S. and E.U. to lift their arms embargoes. Before the U.S. embargo, Indonesia’s military imported about 70 percent of its weapons from the United States. Russia may be in a similar position with regard to China. Since 1989 arms embargoes, both the United States and members of the European Union have continued to engage in military transfers to China. According to a 1998 General Accounting Office report, presidential waivers of the U.S. ban between 1989 and 1998 resulted in defense transactions to China worth approximately $350 million. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom also have delivered military items to China since 1989 and many E.U. members view the embargo as symbolic. Russia is currently China’s leading supplier, providing as much as $2.1 billion worth of arms annually. If European defense companies gain access to China’s market, Russian companies potentially could lose a significant amount of money.

The arms trade is a competitive business, but unlike most businesses the complexity of international politics plays a large part. Russia traditionally chooses to sell its weapons where its competitors cannot or will not due to political considerations or pressures. The Russian tolerance for international condemnation of its arms sales has been an advantage to Russian arms companies and has provided Russian leaders with an international bargaining chip. Just as in the Iran nuclear power deal, Moscow is not going to give up a very lucrative contract or its perceived power due to international pressure.
Moscow does not identify rogue-states or build lists of countries that support international terrorism, so it feels free to sell weapons to almost anyone. Weapons proliferation and an apparent lack of concern for the repercussions likely will cause Russia major problems, certainly in the long run. Putin’s insensitivity to fragile relationships within the Middle East could result in Russia’s loss of stature in brokering a Middle East peace plan even while it is a member of the quartet.

**Russian Middle Eastern Foreign Policy**

In his September 10, 2004 article “Middle East Horizons of Russian Foreign Politics. Russia returns to one of the world’s key regions”, Mikhail Margelov, the Head of the Foreign Relations Council of the Russian Federation, writes that Russia is pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy that will “strengthen Russia’s authority on the international arena and stabilize of socio-economical situation in the country.”

President Putin called for the renewal of contacts with the countries with which Russia maintained long friendly relations and invested a lot of material and intellectual resources. The Arab countries constitute a large part of those counties.

The situation forming in the Near East region today presents difficulties for Russia, because new geopolitical realities can form here without Russia’s participation and without taking into a proper account of its interests. This is why Russia is advocating for stability and predictability of the development of the military-political situation in the Near East, [and] for ensuring stable peace and security there. Russia’s active foreign policy role in the Near East can play a positive role in ensuring the balance of forces and interests, [and] aid successful solutions to the urgent regional problems.

Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East client states is not anti-American per se. It appears to follow three general tenets. (1) As Primakov stated, Russia still views itself as a global power. While that power has diminished, Russia remains powerful by virtue of its nuclear arsenal, UN Security Council seat and G8 position. (2)
Russian leaders know that Russia currently can not compete against the United States. The nation needs time to elevate its economy and military before it can compete on the world stage, so they will seek status quo wherever possible. (3) In an effort to ensure Russian national interests are not overlooked, Russian leaders will push for solutions through international institutions where they still wield power such as the UN Security Council.

Figure 12. Map of Middle East in relation to Russia

As the United States has increasingly charted a unilateral course, Russia’s view is that the United States is permanently changing the world’s order and there is nothing they can do. At the end of January 2003, when it was clear that Russia would not support military action against Iraq, deputy chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev said that Russia was not defending Saddam,

. . .but the modern world order that has existed throughout the post-war period and is based on the fairly simple tenet that the world community’s only body authorized to take decisions to use force, to use military force in international relations, was, is and will evidently remain the United Nations Organization. Time after time the United States of America—it happened in Yugoslavia, it happened in Afghanistan and now it’s happening over Iraq—is attempting to force an entirely different model on the world, which presupposes a dramatic increase in the role of individual decisions. That is, the model the U.S. is putting forward means decisions are taken at the national level, by the United States for example, as to who’s good and who’s bad, who’s a pariah and who isn’t.
The Threats to National Security

Russia’s current National Security Concept contemplates a range of threats. Interpreting these can be difficult, but the authors have attempted to do so using Russia’s National Security Concept, its available military doctrine, and through openly-available intelligence on its capabilities. Russia’s major perceived threats include economic threats, the West, uncertainty, and terrorism in its various incarnations.

Economic

The greatest threat to Russian national security, according to the National Security Concept, stems from the economic and political trauma caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The economic chaos of the 1990’s, especially the financial crisis of 1998, led Putin to conclude that “more of the same” political-economic reform that characterized the 1997 National Security Concept was not the way to go. The 2000 document talks not only about the condition of the economy and the failures of economic transition, but also of the “incomplete nature of the system and structure of the authorities of state and society.” Clearly many of the several economic woes, in addition to and serving to exacerbate social maladies, were caused by the weak powers of the state authority. The power vacuum left by the decaying state communist institutions have resulted in the criminalization of social relations and increases the vulnerability of the Russian to a broad range of internal and external threats. Despite Russia’s stabilization fund growing at record pace and predicted to more than $1.2 trillion before the end of the year, economic development and modernization are still fundamental to Russian security. At the top of the list, and realistically the cause the rest of the threats, it is believable that Putin started his Presidency believing that “Economic disintegration,
social stratification and the dilution of spiritual values promote tension between regions
and the centre and pose a threat to the federal structure and the socioeconomic fabric of
the Russian Federation.”

The West

There still exists significant portions of Russia’s politically active who espouse “the
West is out to get us” threat formulation. The most powerful and vocal spokesmen of
this viewpoint are former members of the army or defense ministry in the past but have
since been ‘reorganized’ out of their positions and more or less cast aside. As an
example, former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov displays a particularly blunt and
thorough belief in the conspiracy of the West. He is also more likely to say what others
only hint at.

It is also obvious that this war (Chechnya) benefits America, which has
long since implanted plenty of its agents and ‘advisors’ in the Kremlin, the
government, the Defense Ministry, and the special services. The United
States has a direct interest in keeping the embers of war in the Caucasus
constantly smoldering, sapping the strength of an already-drained Russia
still further: aren’t the recent events in Georgia sufficient evidence of
that?¹⁸⁷

The Russian people are still apt to believe that the U.S. and the West are the enemy.
In a poll conducted in October 2004 by Russia’s Public Opinion Fund, 25% of the 1,500
respondents see the U.S as Russia’s primary enemy and believe that the U.S. could attack
Russia at any time. The poorly defined group of “Arab and Islamic countries” finished a
distant second at 7%. Interestingly, the U.S. wound up #5 on the list of Russia’s friends
as well, ahead of all the CIS countries except Ukraine and Belarus.¹⁸⁸

As mentioned earlier, fundamental to Russia’s foreign policy elites’ construction of
the world order is the interaction between Russia and the West as part of a classic great
power struggle to which all other policy issues are subordinated. But this does not necessarily mean that the Kremlin conceptualizes the West as the ‘enemy,’ or a threat. Putin, Ivanov and Baluyevskiy have all clearly stated that presently Russia faces no great power military threat. Of course they all are closely watching the movements of the great powers and are quick to rattle the nuclear saber whenever they think NATO or the U.S. have forgotten that they are great power with regional in global interest to protect.

Putin does find some value in conceiving of the West, in a very vague manner, as a threat. Most telling on this account was Putin’s state of the Nation address he gave the day after the tragic conclusion to the terrorist hostage crisis at the public school in Beslan. During his speech Putin makes a curious mention about the actions of nations who supported the terrorist in an effort to weaken Russia.

We showed weakness, and the weak are trampled upon. Some want to cut of a juicy morsel from us while others are helping them. They are helping because they believe that, as one of the world’s major nuclear powers, Russia is still posing a threat to someone, and therefore this threat must be removed. And terrorism is, of course, only a tool for achieving these goals.

Whether his words were playing to the portion of the Russian audience who buy into the anti-Russian conspiracy myths, or whether Putin inadvertently gave the world a glimpse of his true beliefs is the subject of much analysis. Head of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, claims that Beslan should be understood in the dogma that “a good Russia is a weak Russia.” Therefore, any international terrorism larger than a local rebel movement “has always been and still remains an instrument of the Great Game.” Days after his speech, Putin met with a group of western reporters and although the words changed somewhat, the accusations still were very clear:

I didn’t say Western countries were initiating terrorism, and I did not say it was policy. But we have observed incidents. It is a replay of the Cold
War mentality. There are certain people who want us to be focused on internal problems and they pull strings here so that we don’t raise our heads internationally.”

It is very plausible that the former KGB officer and his like-minded policy elites would truly believe that anti-Russian forces would use terrorism, much like insurgency was used in the Cold War, to weaken, distract, and diminish the influence of a competing great power. It is non-traditional warfare. But who is directing it if not governments and not policy? Borrowing the concept of “othering” from political scientist Carl Schmidt, Sergei Medvedev from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, explains the speech as an attempt by Putin to further Russian identity development. The external “other,” real or fictitious, serves the purpose of shaping and uniting the political community by posing an existential threat. Therefore, “Putin secures the Russian identity not on waging war on the West, but on re-establishing the Russian State as a centerpiece of the Russian nation, and a key instrument in his project, the modernization of Russia.” The threat of the West is formulated and fomented for domestic consumption enabling national mobilization and war rhetoric, all which serve to strengthen the role of the state.

“Uncertainty”

In October of 2003, Sergei Ivanov introduced what has become a buzzword for him when discussing the threats facing Russia. The “uncertainty factor,” as Ivanov calls it, surfaced in the white paper on the Russian Army Ivanov presented to the officer corps and President Putin, subsequently renamed the ‘Ivanov Doctrine’. In a summary printed in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the Ivanov Doctrine asserts that a new relationship with U.S. has allowed for reduction in nuclear and conventional capability without reducing security. Accordingly, Russia has no pronounced adversary but that doesn’t mean one won’t
emerge. The “uncertainty factor” signifies the probability that something could emerge that threatens Russia’s interest. The review stated that “At the present time such factors include both the internal situation and stability in the border areas, including the countries of the CIS.”

Ivanov came back to his concept of the uncertainty factor in an interview in April 2005. As the tide of Russian political losses in the CIS mounted, Ivanov again explained “the factors of uncertainty, we mean a situation…that may seriously change geopolitical situation in the regions of the world being priorities for Russia’s interests or can create a direct threat to Russia’s security. To such factors belongs development of the situations in the CIS countries and bordering regions.” Uncertainty factor is the basic fear of instability or hostile government formation in the CIS. The Defense Minister attempted to put a happy face on events in the CIS by saying “In general, if we speak about the current situation in the post-Soviet space, I do not see such threats there.”

The revolutions on Russia’s borders must make Moscow very anxious. There is considerable evidence that the political pressure on the Russian government continues to build. Should this pressure turn into unrest, to whom will the government turn for support? The loyalty of the average armed forces soldier certainly has to be questioned. The image of angry pensioners and reserve officers lining up at the post office to mail their pension supplements and benefits compensation checks back to President Putin helps keep alive the widespread discontent that exploded over the monetization of benefits. Secret opinion polls taken by the Defense Ministry and leaked to the press show that 80% of the officers in the Russian Armed Forces do not support the policies of the Russian leadership. When asked for his response to the results of the poll, Major-General Nikolai Bezborodov, a member of the Duma’s defense committee, was anything
but surprised: “When we meet with officers to discuss monetization of benefits, they look lawmakers straight in the eye and say: ‘we hate you!’” Military journalist Alexandr Golts commented that “This poll highlighted a very interesting point linked to the military’s extremely low respect for the country’s current leadership...Officers are infuriated by the authorities’ hypocrisy, shouting on every corner that they are the glorious defenders of the fatherland while at the same time doing nothing to improve their social standing.” Although most analysts don’t think the unhappy soldiers represent a threat to the administration in terms of a coup, they agree that the soldiers loyalty (or lack there of) will show should the government come under physical threat.

The Kremlin has recently courted a private organization of military men who have been pushed to the “outside” by the current administration. The Military Commander’s Club, led by another former defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, is different from other groups of “outsiders,” because it lacks the bitterness or anger that characterizes the other groups. Instead the group vaguely describes its objectives and claims they are just interested in ensuring that the military experience represented by the group is available to assist officials in developing and implementing policies that make sense for the nation. The Club’s inauguration ceremony was attended by the Russian Federation Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov spoke at the meeting, claiming that he and the club both wanted to prevent “manifestations of ideological and political extremism, in Russia, in particular.” Although the club is made up of those who have been placed on the “outside” by the current government, obviously the government still sees this club as possible allies should some sort of unrest start to brew in Russia.
Another move that has the appearance of the government looking to solidify some reliable allies is President Putin’s request for the Duma to pass a law that would institutionalize and broaden the practice of recruiting Cossacks to serve in various army and police units.\textsuperscript{201} Already Cossack vigilante patrols assist police as well as work with border troops to guard Russian borders. With more than 230,000 adult members willing to enter state service, the Cossacks represent a significant potential to assist in maintaining order should unrest start to take shape.

For those with a little more cynicism, the rumor that Ivanov plans to combine the special purpose forces of the GRU with those from the MVD and FSB, (a rumor he claims is not being enacted, but is being discussed) can have only one purpose.\textsuperscript{202} In combination with the recent law to allow defense ministry troops to fight terrorism (which to the Russian’s also includes political extremism and separatism), the purpose of combined special forces command will be to provide the Kremlin capability to combat any revolutionary unrest that might develop within Russian society. As the colored revolutions close in on Russia, Ivanov, with the help of the Cossacks, will have the tools to apply force (that was so clearly missing in the revolutions of the CIS countries) to put down such a domestic threat should the need arise. Ivanov is preparing for the threat environment of the future where the threats to the Kremlin are as likely to come from within as they are from without.

**Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism**

Closely tied to the concept of uncertainty is the threat posed by terrorism, extremism, and separatism. As Russia is not directly threatened by any foreign state. Therefore, terrorism presents a security challenge to Russia greater than any other. Terrorism is
seen as a threat due to its ability to cause instability and give rise to the uncertainty factor Ivanov describes above, both domestically and in Russia’s border regions. And just as in past U.S. National Security Strategies, in the past Russia also lumped terrorism into a threat category with organized crime:

The scale of terrorism and organized crime is growing because of the conflicts that frequently accompany changes of ownership and also an increased struggle for power along clan and ethnic or nationalist interests. The lack of an effective system in society for preventing legal infringements, inadequate legal and logistic support for the battle against organized crime and terrorism…are all increasing the impact this threat has on the individual, society and the state.\textsuperscript{203}

However, the Russian perception of the threat presented by terrorism has changed over time. This is most evident when comparing the discussion of terrorism in the National Security Concept, as well as the Military Doctrine, with the rhetoric of Russia’s national leaders since the massacre at Beslan.

In the National Security Concept international terrorism is one of several phenomena, including natural disasters, from which Russian citizens need protection. Clearly, the terrorist threat, as conceived in this document, emanates from domestic sources: “Russia’s national interest in the domestic political sphere lie in stability of the constitutional system and of state authorities and its institutions; …and in removing factors causing and feeding social, intercommunal and religious conflicts, political extremism, national and religious separatism and terrorism.”\textsuperscript{204} The 2000 Russian Military Doctrine lists international terrorism \textsuperscript{12} on its list of external threats to Russia, and is essentially included in all six of the internal threats facing the nation.\textsuperscript{205}

Very rarely in Russian discourse do you see the term “terrorism” without its evil siblings, “extremism,” and “separatism.” In its official security documents, Moscow is much more concerned with extremism and separatism as threats to the state than any
vague concept of terrorism. Terrorism is often been the tool of choice for extremists and separatists, especially in Chechnya and Central Asia, and it is primarily in this context that Russia even today perceives terrorism as a threat. In this construct, Russia very clearly sees terrorism as an existential threat to the state, and the fight against terrorism, according to President Yeltsin, “is a fight for the life of Russia…. This is a fight for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”

Terrorism poses a threat not only to the physical security of the Russian people and the sovereignty of the Russian state, but also, to the Russian economy. The National Security Concept claims that “Adverse trends in the economy lie at the root of the separatist aspirations of a number of constituent parts of the Russian Federation.”

Before Beslan, and even before 9/11, Russian leadership had already started warning the world of the dangers of international terrorism. Sergei Ivanov, speaking to the Munich Conference in February of 2001 clearly made the connection between the threats of separatism that Russia faced, and international terrorism: “Unfortunately, at the end of the 20th century we have us to confront the new threats: growth of international terrorism, aggressive nationalism, separatism and other forms of extremism, activation of ethnic-political conflicts and crises.” Whereas Ivanov ties the threat of terrorism to the domestic movements that represent separatism or religious extremism, after Beslan, Russia’s terror threat is presented exclusively as a function of international terrorism. Sergei Medvedev highlights this by noting that the most interesting thing about President Putin address to the nation following the Beslan massacre wasn’t so much what he said, but rather what he didn’t say. Although he acknowledged that the terrorists were trying to rip Russia apart (possibly implying separatists motives but also implying that an
external enemy is using terrorism as a “tool”), President Putin never once mentioned the name Chechnya in the address. Whether they thought it was true or not, almost from the minute the crisis had started, the Russian authorities were painting it as an attack from international terrorists, even going so far as ignoring and hiding the fact that the hostage takers’ had made written demands for Chechen independence. Putin made said: “One cannot fail to see the obvious. We are dealing here not just with separate actions aimed at frightening us, not just with separate terrorist sorties. We are dealing with direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia, with a total, cruel and full-scale war in which our compatriots die again and again.”

Since that time, there has been an incessant barrage of rhetoric from the Kremlin designed to ensure the world interpreted Beslan as just another battle in the war against international terrorism. Moscow has shifted off the locus of the threat off of separatist and onto international terrorist. This was an attempt not only to gain domestic and international freedom of action with regards to his policies in Chechnya, and gain international sympathy, but in these comments Putin also attempted to divert people’s attention away from the responsibility for the massacre rightly assumed by the Russian government. However, the primary reason was to focus the nation on what he wanted them to focus on: “the main thing is mobilization of the nation before a common danger. Events in other countries have shown that terrorists received the most effective rebuff where they encounter not only the power of the state but an organized united civil society.” These points made by Putin were primarily for domestic consumption. By shifting responsibility to international terrorism, Putin relieves himself of the government’s role in causing the tragedy (although he couldn’t duck his obvious role in
preventing or responding to it). Additionally, Medvedev argues that this shifting of responsibility is all part of the familiar script of geopolitics. “On the domestic front, this entails enemy construction, national mobilization, and war rhetoric.”213 The best way to examine the nature of the terrorist threat in Russia is to analyze the conflict that epitomizes Russia’s internal security threats: Chechnya.

Chechnya

Chechnya, a republic just larger than U.S. state of Connecticut, embodies, all of the social maladies that threaten Russia: separatism, ethnic conflict, and international terrorism giving rise to internal and external forces that create instability. Chechnya is the most pronounced, but by no means the only, source of Russia’s security concerns on this front. The remainder of the north and south Caucasus, including Russian republics and sovereign nations, as well as Central Asia, are pressure cookers of ethnic, separatists, and extremist energy ready to boil over and destabilize all of Russia.

Background

Chechen separatist violence has existed since Russian domination of the north Caucasus, which eventually included Chechnya, was completed in the 19th C. (see appendix A for complete chronology of the Russia-Chechnya conflict ) The Chechens resisted longer than any other nationality, and fought Russian domination almost incessantly. Brutal repression and eventual deportation of the Chechens (and other north Caucasus ethnic groups) to Central Asia under Stalin continued cementing hatred towards Russians now firmly ingrained in the Chechen people. The Chechens were allowed to return to Chechnya in 1956 and although there was friction between the Chechens and the
Russian population that was moved to Chechnya to run the region’s industry, things were fairly quiet until the 1990’s.

[Map of Chechnya]

**Figure 13 Republic of Chechnya**

A new movement seeking increased independence from Russia for Chechnya formed in the Fall of 1990, led by Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev, the first Chechen to ever hold the rank of general. Capitalizing the distraction and polarizing affect of the failed coup in Moscow in August of 1991, Dudayev eventually comes to power in an election disputed by both Moscow and Dudayev’s Chechen opponents. Dudayev announced a law that essentially declared Chechnya’s secession from Moscow which prompted Russian President Yeltsin to send in Russian troops under state of emergency to regain control. Dudayev subsequently declared martial law in Chechnya mobilized the National Guard which handily crushed the Russian Military operation.

**First Chechen War**

Although his popularity strengthened after defeating the Russian forces, Dudayev eventually faced overwhelming governing crisis resulting in a growing opposition, especially after he disbanded the parliament in 1993 and declared Presidential rule. Russia’s policy of benign neglect eventually had to change as Yeltsin received enormous political pressure to reassert Russian control over the republic. Attempting to cling to Chechnya as important piece of the energy pipeline route from Caspian and Central Asian sources, to reduce its role in brewing organized crime, and to prevent the possibility that other restless republics in the region didn’t attempt to breakaway as well, Yeltsin ordered full-scale military operation in Dec of 1994 to take the capital and
presidential palace. With 40,000 troops and nearly 500 tanks, the Russian army was to make quick work of the 3,000 troops commanded by Dudayev. However, when the Russians arrived in Grozny, thousands of volunteers had showed up to support the Chechen forces and put up resistance not anticipated by Moscow or the military command. Following a disastrous offensive on New Years Day 1995, the Russians changed tactics and began a bombardment of Grozny that resulted in 10’s of thousands of deaths and more than ¾ of the city’s population to leave.\textsuperscript{214} The assault completely destroyed Grozny. The near-complete incompetence of Russian army resulted in extremely high casualties. The brutality of the Russian tactics was well documented by journalist and resulted in enormous political pressure being brought upon the Kremlin.

The Russians could not consolidate their gains and they time and again suffered humiliating losses at the hand of an enemy far inferior in number. The rebels took the fight to Russia as well. In June of 1995, rebel commander Shamil Basayev led a group of Chechen rebels in taking a large group of hostages in a hospital in the southern Russian town of Budennovsk, demanding removal of all Russian troops from Chechnya. When the crisis was over, 140 hostages were dead and the Russian government had secured passage of the rebels back to the mountains of southern Chechnya. As the Russian presidential election of 1996 approached, opinion polls showed that the Russian electorate considered ending the fighting in Chechnya its highest priority.\textsuperscript{215} Although negotiations were started in early 1996, fighting continued. In April, 1996, the Russians were finally successful in killing Dudayev. Nonetheless, after more rebel success in the summer of 1996, the pain was too much for Moscow and the game was up.
In August 1996, Yeltsin’s rival and Security Council Chairman, Gen Alexander Lebed, signed the Khasavyurt Accords with Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov, agreement that would allow for Chechen autonomy and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Elections were held in January of 1997 and as expected, Aslan Maskhadov was elected President, vowing to bring peace. The exact cost of first war in human lives is unknown but estimates run between 60,000 – 100,000. It is estimated that more than 3,000 Russian army soldiers died and at least an equal number of Russian security service personnel were lost as well.

**Between the Wars**

Nearly a half of million Chechens had been forced to leave their homes as a result of the first war. Ethnic Russians had fled Chechnya in large numbers prior to the war which resulted in the little industrial capacity Chechnya had, primarily related to the energy industry, to be nearly wiped out. Almost 30% of Chechnya’s housing stock had been destroyed and thousands of rebel fighters were now in need of employment. Lawlessness and organized crime grew rampant, and threatened to spread to other parts of Russia.

Chechnya’s rebel groups reflect Chechen society in that identity and loyalty is given to clans and families, placing identification with the Chechen state quite a way down the list. Although Maskhadov enjoyed broad support, individual rebel commanders still had considerable power, and he was not able to unite the rebel movement behind his government. Maskhadov made it clear that he wanted to create a moderate Islamic state “combining the norms of secular society with the requirements of the Sharia law” which was not wholly acceptable to the ultranationalist or Islamist rebel formations. Many military commanders ignored Maskhadov’s government and pursued their own agendas,
content to run their own fiefdoms. Kidnappings, bombings, and skirmishes with Russian troops near the Dagestan border were prevalent as violence continued to grow.

In Moscow, many of the government’s power ministries were not happy with Khasavyurt Accords and the Yeltsin government offered little to stabilize Chechnya. Instead of preparing for negotiations with the Chechens in advance of the 2001 vote regarding secession, the power ministries in particular were strengthening their own forces to exact revenge.  

Finally, in the summer of 1999, Islamist Chechen rebel leaders Basayev and Ibn-ul-Khattab, the Saudi-born self proclaimed leader of foreign jihadi in Chechnya, decided to assist their rebel brothers in neighboring Dagestan in expanding the Islamic caliphate in the north Caucasus. They conducted several incursions and bombing raids into its eastern neighbor’s territory hoping to rid it of Russian troops. At the same time, bombs were going off in apartment buildings in Moscow. Although never proven, the bombings were linked by the government to Chechen rebels. These two events in August of 1999 were just the trigger needed for hard-line Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to prepare Russia to go back to Chechnya in September, 1999. Putin’s plan: “We will pursue the terrorists everywhere,” Putin said. “You will forgive me, but if we catch them in the toilet, we will rub them out in the outhouse.” And he has never stepped away from this strategy.

Second Chechen War

This time Russia conducted a deliberate military buildup and used air raids and bombing to ‘soften’ the battlefield in late September. In October 1999, approximately 100,000 Russian troops invaded Chechnya, applying lessons learned from first Chechen
conflict. In a month’s time Russians controlled most of Chechnya north of the Caucasus using the “pacification through bombardment” tactic, bypassing or leveling villages as they went. By January 2000, Russian troops controlled Grozny, once again after bombing it to the ground and unintentionally allowing the rebels to escape to the south into hiding.

Chechnya was placed under direct control of Moscow and President Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov administrator, a one-time rebel leader who had switched sides in 1999 due to frustration with Maskhadov’s inability to keep the rebel movement in line. By January 2001, control of Russia’s military operations in Chechnya were transferred to FSB and Russia’s strategy shifted from combined arms to counter-terrorist, ‘search and destroy’ raids by special forces. Slowly the conflict transitioned to what today is a low intensity insurgency with occasional armed clashed between security forces and small groups of rebels and an increased number of attack on “soft targets” in the Caucasus as well as in greater Russia. Moscow claims that the change in tactics by the rebels is a result of the effective military operations its forces have conducted, reducing the capability of the rebels and forcing them into terrorist tactics of striking soft targets. The Kremlin insists that the war is over and what remains is policing action against “illegal armed formations.” Alternatively, the rebels, led by Basayev, may be attempting to apply the lessons learned in the Budennovsk raid, that by bringing the terror to the heart of Russia, may make the pain too great and leave the government with no choice but to negotiate.219

Different from Yeltsin in the first war, it appears that Putin has the will to pursue this war even in the face of mounting losses. The Kremlin doesn’t face the political backlash
for its waging of the war in Chechnya with the second war like it did with the first. According to Russian Scholar Mark Kramer, this is true for several reasons: 1) the Russian people have benefited from improved economic conditions and are less likely to risk loss of that improvement by demonstrating displeasure with the government; 2) the elimination of an organized opposition in Russia has relieved the administration of an organizing agent for protest; and most importantly 3) Moscow’s aggressive censorship of television news reporting has prevented the general populace to get a real taste for what is happening in Chechnya. Kramer explains that although print media has not been subject to the same level of control, the vast majority of Russians get their news from the television, and therefore their perceptions are heavily influenced by news reports of the horrible acts by Chechen “bandits” and “terrorists.”

Starting with the suicide bombings of Russian facilities in June and July of 2000, and progressing through the siege of a Moscow theater in October 2002, suicide bombings at Moscow metro stations and rock concert in 2003, suicide bomber downings of two civilian airliners in August, and finally the siege of the public school in Beslan in September, 2004, the Chechen rebels have taken a decidedly different track. (for full list and detail of Russian terrorist attacks, see Appendix B) This new and more radical track has escalated the Chechen conflict into new territory for Russia and the rest of the world.

**Radicalization of the Chechen Separatist Movement**

As was mentioned at the opening of this section, separatists movements have been a part of Chechen politics since the initial Russian conquest almost 300 years ago. It was this widely accepted separatist aspiration that led to the initial attempts by the Dudayev government to establish independence in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, as was the case with many of the Soviet Union’s ethnic republics. Failure on the part of the Chechens at self government under Dudayev in the early 1990’s, which in part precipitated Yeltsin’s perceived need to re-establish control over the republic in the first Chechen war, caused the situation in Chechnya to go from bad to ghastly.

It was the absolute devastation of civil society in Chechnya wrought by the Russian forces in the first war, however, that irreversibly cast the direction this conflict has taken over the past decade. Hatred, fear, and hopelessness were all that the Russian’s left intact in Chechnya in the wake of ‘94-’96 war. As disparate as the separatists groups were in the early ‘90’s, the role and influence of Islamic extremists groups were negligible. The movement at that time was almost entirely nationalistic with the objective of throwing off the yoke of Russian domination. As the first war closed, already the role and attractiveness of the foreign, extremist Wahhabi Islamic movement had made it powerful enough so that Maskhadov was forced to include Sharia Law in the design of the independent Chechen government. Although this was an arrangement he clearly did not support with any enthusiasm, he found it necessary in order to develop a political consensus between the most powerful guerrilla commanders. By this time, Shamil Basayev had already risen to a position and influence. The jihadi ideology, combined with financial support from Arab, Wahhabi, jihadist groups including al-Qaeda, filled the vacuum in the hearts and heads of young militant Chechens who needed a way to channel their hatred and find a purpose. The number and influence of these extremists groups continued to grow, and although Maskhadov had been elected President in 1997 with 59% of the vote, in what was the freest election in Chechnya, he could not control the Islamists. The Islamists attacks into Dagestan, clearly not in
Maskhadov’s best interests, and the lawlessness that prevailed in Chechnya as a result of Maskhadov’s ineffectiveness, resulted in the events that led to the second war.

Even the President Putin’s current advisor on the North Caucasus region pins the blame for the civil violence on the heads of government (local and federal). Aslanbek Aslakhanov, a former Soviet and Russian Interior Ministry official, makes this understatement: “The excessive cruelty of certain police and military structures in the country, especially the abduction of people, their torture and execution and disappearance without a trace…has an impact on the terrorist situation.”

As a result of the second war and ensuing insurgency, the extremist Islamist fighters, exemplified and for the most part led by Basayev, now dominate the Chechen cause. Basayev and the Islamist militants to a large degree have hijacked the goals of the insurgency, despite being very small in number (estimates put their numbers between 1,600-1,800). Whereas most Chechens are war-weary, have given up on independence, and just want security, Basayev continues to publicly insist upon Chechen independence and Islamic states while even more extreme groups continue to pursue a wider brotherhood of Muslim Republics creating a caliphate between the Black and Caspian seas. Chechnya has become the new combat training zone for young Muslim militants from various regions of the world. Key Lt is Saudi Wahhabi, Abu Hafs, who was allegedly involved in the Beslan siege and is likely a primary entry point for funds from the movement’s Arab supporters.

Mark Kramer, a Russian Scholar at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, claims that the radical Islamitization of the Chechen guerrilla movement has had two deleterious effects on the situation. Although the rebel leaders
allegiance to Wahhabism has made the movement less attractive to the greater population of Chechnya who don’t share their vision for a Taliban-style state, so too does the radical dogma decrease the likelihood of any kind of compromise that would end the fighting.²²⁴

**Russia’s Policies towards Chechnya**

Following decades of neglect, and two devastating wars, the Kremlin is approaching Chechnya with something that on the surface looks like a strategy. The primary symbols of this strategy of “Chechenization,” the effort to develop political institutions that allow Chechens to secure Chechnya’s security and development, are the referendum on a new constitution that passed in March 2003 with a reported 96% support of the 85% voter turnout; and the widely disputed Presidential election in October 2003 won by Moscow’s candidate, Akhmad Kadyrov. Masha Lipman, an editor at the Carnegie Moscow Center, thinks that the elections were a missed opportunity for the Kremlin to develop a pro-Moscow coalition. The war weary people of Chechnya, as well as good portions of the large diaspora in Moscow, would be willing to support a Moscow-backed government that had some autonomy. However, Lipman explains, “Putin’s administration is not about political subtlety. His style of government,…’a vertical of power,’ is all about control and subordination.” In Chechnya, the one-man-government turned into a violent and cruel regime.²²⁵ Kadyrov’s pro-Moscow government never enjoyed popular support. His administration and their police force quickly became the primary targets for the Chechen insurgents, presumably with the intent to exact revenge for the brutal tactics used by the regime to ‘keep the peace,’ as well as to discourage others from cooperating with Moscow. Kadyrov was assassinated in May of 2004 and has since been replaced by Alu Alkhanov, the former interior
minister, in an election held in August 2004, amidst the horrible terrorist attacks throughout Russia.

Russia has also apparently recognized the need to begin investing in putting Chechnya back together. Dmitri Kozak, President Putin’s representative in the North Caucasus, says that 64 billion rubles (U.S.$2 billion) have been spent in reconstruction over the past 4 years. However, thanks to the prevalence of corruption and crime, much of the money was embezzled, diverted to security operations, or squandered. The legitimacy of the Chechen government has developed little help from these investments from Moscow.

Another important piece of Chechenization was the building and training a professional Chechen state police force. With the optimism of Spring (as opposed to the gloom of impending winter appropriate for when this piece was written in November of 2002), Vremya MN reported that Chechenization, and in particular the development of a Chechen police force, would allow Putin to accomplish “several goals at one stroke. Transition to peaceful life is facilitated, the crime rate is reduced, life is made difficult for the terrorist underground, the military encounters civilians less frequently, and the level of independence of Chechnya is raised somewhat. Moreover, everyone will see now that the Chechen people themselves are fighting terrorists for the prerogative of remaining a part of Russia.” However, the increasing size and power of the Chechen police force under Akhmad Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan, has just created another group of armed, corrupt and brutal bandits wearing the Moscow brand. A creation of the Russian government, the Chechen police force generally serves to de-legitimize both the government in Grozny as well as the one in Moscow.
Thomas DeWaal argues that the conflict in Chechnya is a self-perpetuating conflict for several reasons. The fundamental one is that there are too few incentives for the active parties to stop the fighting. De Waal identifies four groups that he sees as still party to the conflict: 1) corrupt and brutal federal forces who are institutionally rewarded for staying in Chechnya by higher pay and benefits. Up until late Spring 2005, these troops were virtually never held accountable for the atrocities they committed throughout the Chechen population; 2) Kadyrov’s police forces, who are the most ruthless and notorious, and are making money off of security, raids, kidnapping etc; 3) Islamists, embodied by the image of Basayev taking credit for the Beslan massacre, who have ideas of widening the conflict; 4) and most pathetically, the silent majority of Chechens who long ago gave the dream of independence and want only security. With the death of Maskhadov, this group has virtually no voice. DeWaal contends that the forces once commanded by Maskhadov have been “squeezed into almost non-existence and the chief conflict now going on in Chechnya is a civil war between Moscow’s proxy army, …and the Islamists.” On the point that Maskhadov’s fighters have been pushed to one extreme or the other, DeWaal finds considerable debate among Chechen observers. However, on the fact that the power and fear generated by the Chechen security forces as perceived by Moscow, he is supported by the presence of almost 80,000 federal troops presently in the Republic. Although FSB Chief Patrushev had announced that the anti-terrorist operation had ended when he handed over leadership of the Chechen theater to the Interior Ministry, despite Ivanov’s insistence that the war is over, and regardless of the promise of Chechenization for peace and security in Chechnya, the large troop
formations give insight into the level of trust the Russian military forces have in the Chechen security apparatus.

The flip side of Chechenization has been the crackdown Putin ordered in the wake of the terrorist attacks in late 2002 and 2003. The crackdown is happening all over the north Caucasus, but in Chechnya, federal forces are actually sounding upbeat about the success of their new strategy. Instead of seeking to engage armed groups of rebels, federal forces have taken to hunting down and assassinating rebel leaders. Sergei Ivanov explains that “physical extermination is the only language that may be used.” This “new, psychological warfare phase of the counter-terrorist operation” has met with some success. There is indication that the Islamists are getting desperate. Numerous of their prominent leaders are now dead or captured. They have lost a considerable fighting because the federal forces have been able to restrict the flow of resources and because of the number of their experienced fighters that have been killed or captured and replaced with younger recruits who lack experience.

The highest profile victim of this new psychological “decapitation” strategy was none other than Aslan Maskhadov who was killed in early March, presumably by FSB troops. It is not only the details of Maskhadov’s death that remain sketchy. Exactly why would the Kremlin want to kill Maskhadov? Many, especially in the West, argued that he represented the symbol of legitimate authority, the single individual that could be negotiated with, and that he was able to control the radical Islamists. Many analysts had concluded that this probably wasn’t true and that Basayev and company would have go one fighting regardless, as they did in 1996. It is apparent from his public pronouncements that Putin had no intention of negotiating with Maskhadov. Putin’s
position was cemented when in October of 2003, during a period in which Kremlin officials, with Putin’s consent, were exploring the possibility of holding talks with Maskhadov, Chechen rebels seized the Dubrovka theater. From that point on, Putin has considered Maskhadov in the same group as he does Basayev. In the wake of Beslan, Putin has received enormous pressure from the West to find a political solution to the Chechen conflict. To Putin, there is no one to negotiate with and he has grown indignant with the West’s increasing insistence, bristling at the suggestion that he negotiate with even Maskhadov, likening it to President Bush negotiating with Osama Bin Laden. With Maskhadov gone, lecturing from the West to negotiate has been silenced.

Others argue, as was previously mentioned, that institutional incentives have been created for several parties to this fight and the prospects of negotiation, which have only ever come under increased political pressure domestically or internationally, would have stopped the gravy train. And finally, some question, as did an editorial in the Boston Globe “whether Putin is waging a war in Chechnya out of an unthinking Stalinist reflex or whether he wants to prolong the conflict so that he can use his own war on terrorism as justification for increasing concentration of power in the Kremlin?" The reality is likely much closer to the first argument, that Putin could not negotiate with Maskhadov because, to Putin, Maskhadov had too much innocent blood on his hands. He was not going to do what was done to Yeltsin at Budennovsk and allow a terrorist to receive concession, especially considering that any accord with Maskhadov would likely fail anyway. With Maskhadov gone, the attacks on the Kremlin are muted and Putin can continue to prosecute his hard-line strategy without having to constantly fend off specific attacks from his detractors.
Threats to Russia and the West

The Chechen conflict presents two fundamental threats to Russia. The first is the short and long-term impacts on society of fighting this deadly conflict. The conflict continues to consume human life and is a tragic roadblock to relieving the horrendous social conditions in Chechnya. The conflict has cost Moscow countless billions of rubles, lives, and has had a devastating impact on the social psyche of the Russian people, both those who have done the fighting, and those who have suffered from it. The lack of stability in Chechnya also represents huge losses and continued threats to the lucrative oil industry that flows through Chechnya and is the essential life blood of the Russian economy. Politically, Chechnya is the weakest of Achilles heels for the Kremlin. The unending source of material for detractors, especially in the West, Chechnya continues to be a more than awkward obstacle standing between Russia and closer relations and economic integration with the West. Prospects for an end to the violence and hopelessness in Chechnya are dim. This radicalized movement doesn’t lend itself to any sort of ending.

An even worse scenario is that as this conflict becomes more radicalized, there is already evidence that it will spill over into neighboring republics in the North Caucasus inflaming other ethnic conflicts. Shamil Beno, who served as Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev’s foreign minister in 1991-1991 and then as the Moscow representative of the pro-Moscow Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov in 2000-2001, explained in a recent interview that Moscow’s demand for absolute loyalty to itself from the leaders of republics in the North Caucasus is increasingly cutting them off from the local population and opening the way for the growth of radical Islamic groups there and
clearly sees conditions in Muslim communities across the North Caucasus becoming increasingly unstable.”

Aslanbek Aslakhanov also notes that there has been a steady increase in the number of clashes between Islamic rebels in other parts of the North Caucasus outside of Chechnya. With an enormous security formation in Chechnya, Islamic extremist guerrillas find themselves better suited for terrorist operations outside Chechnya, like in neighboring Ingushetia, Dagestan, and North Ossetia. One analyst reminds us that “while rebellions require armies, terrorism does not. There will thus continue to be a sufficient supply of alienated, desperate or radicalized young men and women – not least thanks to the excesses of the militias – to carry out further atrocities.”

More and more the ranks of the Islamic rebels groups are being filled with young people from all over Russia’s southern republics.

There are a growing number of analysts and pundits who are claiming that Russia’s problems in the Caucasus threaten more than just Russia. The conclusion reached by a group of analysts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is that

The ongoing conflict in and around Chechnya is helping feed Islamist terrorism that is already directed against the West. Violence is spreading to wider areas of the North Caucasus and it is no longer accurate to speak of ‘Chechen militants,’ as such. The conflict has become a potent symbol of injustice and the persecution of Muslims by non-Muslim states, and...acts as a rallying cry for the international ‘jihadi’ movement. The next ‘soft target’ of North Caucasian terrorism could be a Western one.

To this point, however, no government has stood up and made such a claim, that there international community is now threatened by north Caucasian violence. Although many feel free to deride the Kremlin for its brutal prosecution of operations in that region, none have publicly made the logic leap to the idea that now the West is threatened by Russia’s mismanagement of, and inability to solve, the Chechen conflict.
Separatism or International Terrorism?

The above discussion regarding the radicalization of the Chechen insurgency begs the question: is Russia’s threat from terrorism the same international terrorism threat that represents the enemy in the U.S. global war on terror, or is it rather simply an extremist, separatist movement whose core is still simply seeking independence from Russian domination and oppression? The answer is unequivocal: both.

Few observers today deny any connection between the Chechen guerrillas and international terror groups like al-Qaeda. Plenty of evidence exists that indicates personal, financial, and ideological ties between the radical factions in Chechnya and the broader extremist Islamic terrorist organizations. But Mark Kramer sees problems with Putin’s attempts to equate the separatist movements in Chechnya with international terrorism. His primary evidence is that “up to now, even the most radical Chechen terrorists have confined their attacks to the Russian Federation and have focused their demands solely on Chechen independence, rather than wider Islamic fundamentalist causes.”

Although Kramer sees a risk in the future of further radicalization of the Chechen conflict towards wider conflict and goals that tend towards supporting establishment of a Muslim caliphate contemplated by international groups, the indications are that the middle of the Chechen movement is still seeking separatists goals. The perpetrators of the Dubrovka theater siege, despite sporting al-Qaeda tactics and vernacular, put forth demands and sought negotiations, clearly placing them in a different species than the suicidal mass murderers of 9/11, Madrid train bombings, Bali, or Istanbul attacks by al-Qaeda units.

DeWaal, too, underscores the fact that foreigners were and are present in Chechnya (he calls them a “jihadi element,”) but that Chechnya is not Afghanistan. It is
small, most rebels live in villages most of the time, and therefore large groups of foreigners are unsupportable. He claims that something even more frightening than a jihadi take-over of the Chechen separatist movement has occurred. “A radical fringe of the Chechens has become Islamiscised without much foreign help at all. They have grafted what they have learned from Hamas and the Middle East…onto an older revenge culture and made themselves into very frightening creatures indeed.”

The blending of ethnic separatism with the religious extremism associated with international terrorism forms a terrorism threat to Russia that is quite different from that presented to the U.S. and the rest of the West. To a large degree, this blending took place as a result of failed policy from Moscow, failure of the Chechens to effectively self-rule between the wars, and hatred and hopelessness created by years of oppression and atrocities. Russian scholar Fiona Hill succinctly sums up the debate by saying that “Unlike the United States, terrorism is not so much targeting Russia as Russia is unintentionally spawning it. State failure, not success, is the root of Russia’s terrorist threat.”

Russia’s Definition of Terrorism and Global War on Terror

Russia cast itself in a central role in the global battle against international terrorism. Sergei Ivanov claims that Russia continues to play its historical role as the front line against evil, suffering disproportionately: “Terrorism is the world’s general pain; the analogy may be drawn that Russia, a front-line warrior fighting international terrorism in Chechnya and Central Asia is saving the civilized world of the terrorist plague in the same way as it used to save Europe of Tatar-Mongol invasion in 13th century, paying with sufferings and privation.” It is impossible to miss the pain and suffering of the
Russian people at the hands of terrorists, especially when one reviews the snapshot of terrorists attacks listed at Appendix B.

Russia’s “war on terror” started in the fall of 1999 as a domestic war on terror with the military operations in Chechnya which from the start was designated by Russian leadership as a counter-terrorist operation. For reasons discussed above, the Russian government quickly made the connection between the violent terrorist attacks against targets in the Caucasus and throughout Russia, and international terrorism. Called “Wahhabi” by Russian officials, the foreigners that brought radical and alien ideas of creating a Muslim caliphate in the “arc of instability” to the largely Muslim regions of south Russia have undoubtedly assisted in radicalizing the otherwise nationalist separatist movements of the region. Certainly since Beslan, but even before, the authorities have tried to lay the blame for Russia’s terror threat onto the greater evil of international terrorism.

But almost irrespective of how the threat emerged on Russian soil, since the very beginning Russia repeatedly called international attention to the problem. First Deputy Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Trubnikov said in December 2000, “We can’t seriously hope to solve it [terrorism] with our own resources only…. Our stand repeatedly set out in the speeches and statements of the leaders of the country, is that there is the need for coordinated actions of the entire world community at global, regional and national levels.” The plainly indicates that Russia saw the international component of their terror problem as something they would need assistance in solving. But Trubnikov gave further insight into the Russian perspective on how to fight international terrorism in April 2001 when he argued that it was the incomplete development of the new world
order that limited the international community in its struggle against this global threat.\textsuperscript{247} This sentiment is very much in line with the published Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation signed by President Putin in the summer of 2000 and is fundamentally the “big picture” for Russian policy-makers. The Foreign Policy Concept lists as foreign policy objective number 1: “To ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as one of the most influential centers of the modern world, and which are necessary for the growth of its political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential.” Foreign policy priority number one, according to this document, is the forming of a new world order, centered on the UN and other international organizations, specifically mentioning the G8. Russia

The attacks of 9/11, in a manner, vindicated Russia and its perception of the danger presented by international terrorism. Russia’s very vocal insistence on international cooperation in the fight against terrorism instantly elevated its standing in the international community, seen by the U.S. as one of the most important allies in the U.S.-led GWOT. Russia had hoped to forward three basic foreign policy objectives with its new found standing. First, Russia hoped to use its new “partnership” with the U.S. to influence not only the conduct of the GWOT, but also construction of the resulting “world order.” Second, Russia was interested in eliminating international sources that fed instability in Russia, namely support of the Chechen rebels flowing through the Republic of Georgia, and the threat of extremists Islamic militants threatened stability in Central Asia supported by the Taliban in Afghanistan. And third, it had hoped that it
could reform world opinion of the conflict in Chechnya, insisting that it was the front line in the global war on terror, affording them greater latitude, and less criticism, in the prosecution of their mission there.

The strategy Russia used to obtain the first two objectives was to prove its worth as a partner in the GWOT. U.S. – Russian coordination during the U.S.-led operation to remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which will be discussed in more detail later, served that purpose very well. Russia was willing to “give” by supporting the presence of U.S. military bases in their Central Asian sphere of influence and in return, the coalition eliminated a significant threat to regional stability that Russia had been alarmed about for years. The operation also seemed to reinforce Russia need for an international solution to the problem presented by the Taliban because the U.S. action was apparently constrained by virtue of their effort to obtain UN Security Council support prior to commencing hostilities. The legitimacy of the UN was validated by this action and Russia felt it had its proper role in shaping the world’s events.

As the U.S. prepared for what appeared to be a much more unilateralist approach to a war with Iraq, Russia distanced itself from its “partner” and continued to press for a more active role for the UN as the central mechanism for prosecuting the global war on terror. In April 2003, Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Safonov argued for an anti-terrorist system built “on a firm foundation of international law and the UN coordinating activities with due account for the Security Council’s powers and responsibilities in the sphere of global peace and security….Success of international anti-terrorist cooperation depends to a great extent on the continued unity of the anti-terrorist coalition.”248 Just as many
European nations were wont, Russia was hoping to empower the UN as a means of constraining the U.S.

In the wake of 9/11, Russia also stepped up its efforts with other international organizations, looking to become, and lead, counterbalancing forces to the U.S. hegemonic approach to the GWOT, especially within area Russia considers its sphere of influence. Playing important roles in clubs made up of the primary western powers like the G8, NATO, EU, and the OSCE, Russia was key to establishing legal frameworks through which these organizations would combat terrorism. The role and impact of Russian policy within these organizations will be looked at in more detail in a later section.

Additionally, Russia used its dominant position in the CIS to lead those nations into treaties on cooperation in fighting terrorism. In 2001, the signatory countries of the CIS Collective Security Treaty agreed to setup an anti-terrorism rapid reaction force. Since 2000, the member nations have been holding anti-terror military exercises, primarily in Central Asia. In May of 2002, theses same countries formed the CSTO in order to cope with the military threat presented by terrorism in a more permanent manner. In the same way Russia led the organization formerly known as the Shanghai Five (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) into developing formal agreements and mechanisms which will help them coordinate anti-terror activities. Now known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in 2001 this group agreed to establish an anti-terrorist center to combat the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The center was eventually located in Tashkent and began operations in 2003.
Russia’s other foreign policy objective with regard to the global war on terror, re-shaping world opinion of the conflict in Chechnya, has fallen to arguing for the need of an international definition of terrorism. Russian attempts to get the West to accept that the conflict in Chechnya is a war against international terrorism are still unsuccessful. Despite claims like that made by the State Duma deputy from the Chechen Republic, Akhmar Gapurovich Zavgayevhas, that “over 450 foreign citizens from 42 countries were detained and then destroyed on Chechen territory in the last four years,” it is clear that the international community is not willing to let Moscow off the hook for their complicity in the conflict. More than 2,000 people that were taken away by the Russian troops are still listed as missing in that same time period.

The most glaring and painful reminder to the Russians that they are not on the same page as the West with regards to Chechnya is the existence of two Chechen rebels, envoys to the former Chechen President Maskhadov, who are being allowed to seek asylum in the West. Akhmed Zakayev, the former actor and a Minister of Culture in Chechnya under Soviet rule, took up arms in the separatist movement in the early 1990’s. In 2001, it was Zakayev who represented President Maskhadov in secret negotiations that, according to the BBC, ended with Russia refusing to accept the Chechen offer that would give Chechnya wider autonomy. Following the Dubrovka Theater hostage crisis, Zakayev was labeled a terrorist and has been sought by the Russians. Zakayev spent time in jail in Denmark before being released by the Danes who could find no information linking him to the theater attack. Since his release, Zakayev has been residing in the UK, and is undergoing extradition hearings which could take months. He
is still visible in the media as a representative of the late Maskhadov and the separatist cause in Chechnya and most believe that he will not be extradited.

The other man is Ilyas Akhmadov, who served as Maskhadov’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefly before the Second Chechen War. Also labeled a terrorists by Moscow as a representative of Maskhadov, Akhmadov has traveled through the West working to gain support for the Chechen separatist cause and condemnation for the human rights violations perpetrated by the Russian forces. Akhmadov sought asylum in the U.S. and after initially being refused it, a Boston court ruled in Akhmadov’s favor in May 2004.

The idea that these two men that Moscow has labeled terrorists for their presumed role in various terrorist acts could get asylum in countries that are central to the international coalition fighting the war on terror inferiorates the Russians. They attempt to combat this situation by pushing the international community, through the UN, to develop an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. The definition, worded correctly, could force the West to label these two, seen by most as moderates, as terrorists and therefore vindicate their policies relative to Chechnya. Without that definition, the Russians don’t feel like they have the leverage to force the U.S. and U.K. to extradite these two back to Moscow for trial, and has the effect of implying that there are some “good” Chechen rebels, a concept that is absurd in Moscow. FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev claims that “We have to take a more proactive approach in eventually working out an adjusted definition of terrorism. It is high time we created a legal basis for a person treated as a terrorist in one country to be treated likewise in all countries and therefore be deprived of a political asylum.”

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in an address to the UN, is equally pointed: “Those who killed the children in Beslan and who seized the
aircraft to attack the USA are creatures of the same breed. Providing terrorists, their accomplices and sponsors with political asylum undermines the unity and mutual trust between members of the antiterrorist front, serves as a justification for terrorists’ actions, in effect, encouraging them to commit similar crimes in other countries.”

But the issue of coming up with an acceptable definition of terrorism is problematic and has stymied the UN for more than 40 years. Despite being able to develop 12 separate protocols dealing with state responsibility to combat terrorism, the UN has not been able to come to an agreement on a definition. The potential use of terrorism by a state, as well as the difficulty in telling freedom movements from terrorists has caused the stalemate. In late 2003, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, commissioned the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to help bridge the “deep divisions among the Member States on the nature of the threats that we faced and the appropriateness of the use of force to address those threats.” The panel was chaired by Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, and included Brent Scowcroft, former U.S. National Security Advisor, and Yevgeny Primakov, former Russian Federation Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. The panel’s report released in December of 2004 highlighted that the “Lack of agreement on a clear and well-known definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image. Achieving a comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a clear definition, is a political imperative.”

To that end, although it didn’t propose a definition, the panel did make recommendations as to what that definition should contain. The panel recommended that description of terrorism be included that read: “any action, in addition to actions already
specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” Even with this definition in hand, it is unlikely that the Russians, who have championed this cause since early on, will obtain their policy objective of forcing the West to hold Russia blameless and accept Chechnya as a battle front in the war on terror.

The global war on terror for Russia starts in their own backyard. The radicalization of the Chechen separatist movement has actually served the purpose of giving Moscow a scapegoat to accept responsibility for the violence their, relieving them of their own role in creating the monster. The problem is, no one thinks that way except them.

**Fighting the Global War on Terror**

Russia’s counter-terror efforts are carried out by various government institutions. Chief among them, and sometimes at odds with one another, are the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Interior Ministry. Additionally, the Defense Ministry also adds significant capability, but the bulk if its contribution remains outside Russian borders. Not to be overlooked are the contributions from outside sources that also help Russia battle its perceived terrorist enemies.

**Domestic War on Terror – The Power Ministries and Their Forces**

The 1998 law *On the Fight Against Terrorism*, the first such law in Russia, signed by Boris Yeltsin, defined the threat and the actions the Russian government will take. It
states that the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Protection Service (FSO), the Defense Ministry, and the Federal Border Service (FPS) are charged with “directly carrying out the fight against terrorism within the limits of their competence.” It further states that the FSB or the MVD will have control of counterterrorist operations depending on which has “predominant competence in the conduct of the specific counterterrorist operation.”

This legislation, however, has proven less than clear in practice, with some confusion and confrontation between the FSB and MVD in leading the counterterrorism fight.

Without detailing the specifics of each agency, the FSB is Russia’s primary agency for counter-intelligence, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and organized crime. The MVD is Russia primary internal crime-fighting agency, with regional detachments throughout the country. The SVR, as its name implies, is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence. However, previously within Russia there existed a separate organization, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information (FAPSI), charged with conducting eavesdropping and scouring open sources, but that organization was dissolved by presidential decree in March 2003 and its assets reallocated to the FSB and Defense Ministry. The FSO is charged with protecting ranking national and regional leaders. The Defense Ministry’s mission is, of course, national defense, and the FPS is charged with protecting the nation’s borders. With the aforementioned presidential decree of March 2003, the FPS and all its forces were resubordinated under the FSB. Previously with its own unique structure, it is being realigned to conform with the regional structure of the security services.
In recent years, especially under the Putin administration (Putin himself being a former FSB officer), the FSB has received the lion’s share of the tasking and credit for counterterrorism operations, although frequently counterterrorism operations are multi-agency affairs. The FSB typically relies on its special forces units Alfa and Vympel to conduct counter-terror operations; the MVD as well relies on its special forces OMON units. Examples of government response to terrorist events have included the stand-off and storming of the besieged Dubrovka Theater Center in Moscow in October 2002 during a production of the play Nord-Ost, giving the event its name, and the operation to free hostages at Beslan Middle School Number 1 in Northern Ossetia in September 2004. In both events Chechen separatists took over the buildings and took hostage the hundreds of people within, demanding an end to the Russian conflict in Chechnya and a withdrawal of troops from the region. In the Nord-Ost event, approximately 50 Chechen rebels took hostage over 800 theater-goers at the downtown Moscow theater. Following a 58-hour stand-off, government forces blew a hole into the side of one of the theater complex buildings and piped into the theater what was later revealed to be an anesthetizing gas, hoping to sedate the rebels and hostages alike. Then some 200 Russian special forces personnel, reportedly from the FSB’s Alfa and Vympel units, stormed the theater, killing the rebels and freeing hostages. By the time the operation was completed, however, in addition to the hostage-takers, approximately 120 hostages were killed as well, most from the effects of the sedative. While the use of gas was an innovative approach to subduing the rebels, the relatively high civilian losses caused some to criticize the Russian government for using excessive means.259
In the Beslan incident, local police forces, members of the Russian army, and the FSB’s *Alfa* and *Vympel* units, and possibly also members of the Interior Ministry’s OMON unit, quickly surrounded the besieged school as some 30 Chechen rebels took over the local middle school early on the first day of classes, a day which typically saw both students and parents initiating the school year in the building. Additionally, local civilians approached the perimeter as well, in what would turn out to be an extremely confusing end to the crisis. The siege quickly settled into a stand-off, with the hostage-takers keeping all hostages in the center of the school gymnasium surrounded by explosives set to go off with simple foot-triggers, or other mechanisms designed for easy activation should the building be stormed or gassed, as special forces had done in the *Nord-Ost* siege. Hostage-takers also brought along dogs, presumably as an added defense against such an attack. Notable during this siege was Putin’s pronouncement that Russian forces would not negotiate with the hostage-takers, despite their demands for just that. The stand-off broke on the morning of 3 September shortly after the rebels agreed to allow the bodies of the dead to be removed. It is unclear precisely how the siege broke: either armed civilians around the perimeter, perhaps out of frustration, fired first, causing the hostage-takers to believe they were being stormed and then to detonate the explosives; or the hostage-takers unintentionally detonated one of the explosives, causing the civilians and special forces to assume the hostages were in immediate peril, which sent them charging at the school. In either case, pandemonium prevailed within and outside the school, characterized by a wild firefight of indiscriminate shooting. When the violence ended some ten hours later, over 350 hostages had been killed along with most if not all of the 30-plus hostage-takers, and hundreds more had been injured. Well over a
dozen special forces troops were killed as well, including the commander of the Alfa unit.260

Following a series of insurgent attacks in Ingushetia during summer of 2004, President Putin declared that the MVD had the lead in counter-terror efforts in the Caucasus.261 During the same summer he called on FSB head Nikolai Patrushev to develop a reform plan for the FSB to help improve its performance. The Beslan siege, which captured the world’s attention as a demonstration of the new nature of terror attacks outside of Chechnya proper and which also demonstrated the FSB’s inability to properly and credibly respond to such events, gave pause to the reforms.

Late in 2004, however, several announcements regarding FSB restructuring appeared in the media. The biggest included raising the status of the FSB director to that of minister while reducing the number of deputies from 11 to 4 (although no one was fired from government service).262 In November 2004, the Duma got its first reading of a new anti-terror bill. Among its provisions, the bill would allow government agents to negotiate with terrorists “for the purpose of saving lives or preventing injury, protecting material valuables, or identifying possibilities for stopping a terrorist attack without the use of force.” This marks a departure from President Putin’s policy of no negotiations, but it limits these negotiations to essentially life-saving measures. The bill also discussed the role of the Federal Anti-Terrorism Commission which would coordinate the efforts of all participating sections of government and the civilian sector during an event such as another Beslan-style siege involving hostages. The FSB, along with the Defense and Interior Ministries, has developed an additional initiative to set up regional command centers as well to monitor and analyze situations in their respective regions, develop
response plans, and coordinate responses among all participating parties. The federal and regional command centers would work together as required, but an important element of this initiative is the special authority the regional command centers will have to organize and execute a response to a terrorist event.\textsuperscript{263} This draws the chain of command from the regional anti-terrorism commanders directly to the FSB, not through the regional leadership. It specifies that “[t]he Federal Security Service (FSB) is unequivocally defined as playing the leading role in carrying out measures aimed at preventing terrorist activity,” removing any confusion that regional leaders, elected or otherwise, are part of the anti-terrorism chain of command.\textsuperscript{264} A final significant element of this legislation is the introduction of “terrorist threat modes,” or TTMs. These include “terrorist danger mode, counter-terrorist operation mode, [and] state of emergency mode,” with the latter being the most severe. A local on-scene commander has the authority to declare the appropriate TTM. One of the implications of a TTM is restricted or even banned media access to the scene. “The leader decides how and to what extent the public will be informed about a terrorist attack, and can even deny journalists any access to the operation zone.”\textsuperscript{265} Yet another implication is a temporary reduction of civil liberties, including stepped-up identification checks, phone and e-mail monitoring, and restrictions on public gatherings. While there is a 60-day limit on a TTM declaration, commanders have fairly wide authority to declare such measures, even in anticipation of an event.\textsuperscript{266}

At the same time, the Border Guard Service announced the details of its own reformation program, “State Border of the Russian Federation in 2003-2010”. This program plans what it calls a three-phase program, with the first phase focused on enhanced quality of life initiatives for the border guards and their families, the second
phase focused on improved communications within the department, with a real-time picture of border status sent from the regions to a centralized control station at Lubyanka, and a third phase that improves and modernizes the hardware and equipment used to monitor the borders. The goal is enhanced border security in the Caucasus, Central Asia (Kazakhstan), the Baltic States, and the border with Ukraine by 2011, at an estimated total cost of 60 billion rubles. As the Caucasus remains the most critical region, that area will get the priority in the short term, with 14.8 billion rubles required by 2006 to build dozens of new cantonments and detachment commands in the region (many already under construction), a training center in Stavropol for standardized training, and new or improved roads between outposts.

In early 2005, the FSB appeared to begin a series of stepped-up counter-terror operations that included widely reported attempts to capture or kill suspected terrorists in Makhachkala, Dagestan, and in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria. In these two events, large numbers of government forces conducted combined arms raids that reportedly included tanks, heavy artillery, and a flamethrower, and which saw the demolition of an apartment building. In the Makhachkala raid, three policemen and one officer from the Alfa unit were killed; in the Nalchik raid. This renewed effort, which mainly favored federal forces over regional forces (the latter thought to be less secure and more likely to leak information) probably led to the assassination of Aslan Maskhadov in the Chechen village of Tolstoy-Yurt in March 2005. Although reports summarizing the event are not completely clear, it appears Maskhadov was killed in a “bunker” in the basement of a house. Initial reports claimed he was killed when FSB commandos threw a grenade into
the bunker; later reports claimed he was shot. Whatever the details, federal FSB forces, although the units were not specified, got the credit for the assassination.

From the perspective of internal Russian counter-terrorism capabilities, the assassination of Maskhadov is also noteworthy because it appears to signify that, within the Chechen theater of operations, an apparent de-Chechenization of forces is underway. While it had appeared that the Kremlin’s policy in the region was one of Chechenization, that is, creating a security force within Chechnya largely run by pro-Moscow Chechens, Moscow appears to have backed away from that policy. As evidence, Maskhadov’s assassination was admittedly conducted without the assistance of any pro-Moscow Chechen security forces. So too were the government raids in the Caucasus outside of Chechnya, mentioned previously. Still, however, Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of the elected pro-Moscow Chechen leader who was assassinated in May 2005 before he could assume power, is the Chechen Deputy Prime Minister who is the de facto leader of the indigenous security forces. He effectively controls the pro-Moscow Chechen forces, conducting his own raids and “investigations,” evidently with loose rules of conduct. Kadyrov and his forces were criticized specifically in a Human Rights Watch report in March 2005: “While in previous years, Russian forces were the main perpetrators of ‘disappearances,’ over the last year they seem to have largely been replaced by Chechen security forces . . . most of which are effectively under the command of Ramzan Kadyrov.” It appears that, by distancing federal forces from indigenous forces, the Kremlin is aware of either the lack of operational security to which such forces are naturally subject (as neighbors within villages may “fight” on opposite sides in the Chechen conflict), or of the political costs of having indigenous forces draw attention to
themselves for abuses, or both. In either case, Russia increasingly relies on federal forces to conduct counter-terror operations, especially in the Caucasus.

Outside of Russia, while information is scant, of note is the capture and detention in Qatar of two GRU officers for the assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev in Doha, Qatar. Yanderbiyev died in February 2004 when his car exploded in Doha, where he had been living in exile. Three Russians from the local embassy were detained, but one was released due to his diplomatic status. The other two reportedly confessed and were eventually sentenced to life imprisonment in Qatar, with the judge in the trial proclaiming the two had acted on orders from Russia. Russian representatives insisted that the men were simply working in the embassy charged with collecting intelligence on terrorist activities. In a deal whose details were not revealed, the two agents were repatriated in December 2004 to serve out their sentences in a Russian jail, but they promptly disappeared from public view. The lesson to draw from this event is that, even though Russian forces are able to track and capture or kill alleged Russian terrorists even outside of Russia, perhaps the ability to conduct completely clandestine operations has diminished in recent years.

**Russia’s International War on Terror – GWOT and the Russian Military**

Unlike the U.S., Russia has not published a single document outlining their strategy for combating terrorism. However, with only a cursory survey of official statements made by high-level government officials, and by reviewing policies taken in the name of the war against terrorism, a reasonably clear picture emerges as to the basic Russian strategy. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated in December of 2004 that “I have many times stated that a war has been declared to us, and when at war behave like it is a
In September of 2004, Chief of the Russian General Staff, Col-Gen Yuri Baluyevsky said that Moscow is prepared to deliver preemptive strikes at terrorist bases no matter where they are located. Confirmed on numerous occasions later by Ivanov, the Russian’s declared preemptive strike posture has generated debate not only in regards to the legality of such of policy, but also as to the targets that might be struck and the means with which Russia would strike them. Leaving the issues of legality and targets to another time, the purpose here is to discuss the capability of the Russian armed forces to project power outside of the Russian borders in a strike supporting national objectives in the battle against terrorism.

Based upon the analyses made in this column over the past several months, things don’t bode well for the Russians in this regard. Leonid Ivashov, the vice-president of the Academy for Geopolitical Problems, agrees. He thinks that the threat of pre-emptive strikes is “A highly dangerous statement! Dangerous because it is a complete bluff, out of touch with the realities and utterly presumptuous…. Knowing the situation in the armed forces, I can make the claim that we have no means of applying either strategic or operational pressure on terrorists.” Ivashov blames the General Staff for not properly equipping the army. “To investigate, for example, why a mobile infantry regiment did not go to the aid of the lawful authorities and the populace when gunmen attached Nazran. The story is that it was because of the shortage of batteries for its armored vehicles.” This statement is in line with most observers’ general assessment of the Russian armed forces and supports the idea that the Chief of the General Staff and Defense Minister are bluffing. However, when directly confronted with the question as to the credibility of the threat, Ivanov responded “These are not political declarations.
We really will carry out preventive strikes….We have high-precision weapons, we have spetsnaz troops.”

Instead of being simply dismissive, one should examine the facts. Ivanov mentioned “high-precision weapons.” High precision weapons capable of striking targets outside of Russia are most likely to have been launched/released from an aircraft. According to the Russian Air Force Chief of Staff, Col-Gen Boris Cheltsov, “Today our long-range aviation has high-precision long-range weapons which enables it to find terrorists anywhere in the world and inflict on them the damage they deserve.”

Notwithstanding the unlikelihood that the weapons he spoke of could actually assist in “finding” the terrorists (one has to know where the terrorist are before you employ the weapon), Cheltsov’s claim that some of Russia’s Soviet-era cruise missiles have been modified to carry a conventional warhead is widely accepted. The Kh-555 cruise missile (modified version of the nuclear-armed Kh-55) can be carried by the 1950’s vintage, turbo prop, Tu-95 Bear as well as the 1980’s vintage, supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers. Test firing of these weapons/platform mixes were accomplished most recently in the Spring of 2004. The Air Force is scheduled to receive two additional (one new and one refurbished) Blackjacks in 2005 to bring their total to 15, in addition to an unspecified number of the modified cruise missiles. The Air Force should also begin receiving the new Kh-101 conventional cruise missile in early 2005. The Kh-101 is said to have a 600kg conventional warhead, have a intercept-defeating radar cross section of 0.01m², a range of approximately 5,000 km, and a predicted accuracy of between 6 and 20 meters. The missile, however, still relies on terrain reference system for en route navigation and televisual system for terminal guidance. This means that it
The other platform capable of delivering precision weapons over a substantial distance is the Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber. The Russian Air Force has 66 updated Backfires still in their inventory. The Backfire, with a nominal combat radius of 1,300 miles, is said to have enjoyed more success than the older frontal aviation aircraft in the second Chechnya campaign thanks to its updated fire control system, flexibility in weapons load, and all weather capability.

The combinations of heavy bombers with cruise missiles, and medium range bombers with precision guided munitions (PGM), sound like a formidable strike force. The reality is, however, that Russia’s inventory of PGMs is woefully lacking. Similar to the cruise missile mentioned above, Russia’s PGMs are not GPS guided but rather they rely on laser or electro-optically guidance, which reduces their utility in bad weather. In addition to hardware shortfalls, the chronic funding shortages over the past 15 years have resulted in a fairly low level of readiness of pilots and maintainers in nearly all flying units. It is this reality that accounts for the fact that 10 out of the 11 Russian Air Force combat aircraft lost in mishaps in 2003 crashed due to “human factors”—violations of regulations either intentionally or due to a lack of training. Although averages don’t tell the whole story, Russian bomber pilots averaged less than 40 hours per year (compared with more than 200 hours per year for their U.S. counterparts). The complexity of a mission employing precision weapons requires significantly more training than would be available to the average pilot. The long range aviation of the Air Force is obviously not in any position to carry out sustained combat operations. However, a handful of bomber pilots undoubtedly receive more training than average and are more capable of executing
operational strikes. Considering that one Tu-160 can carry up to 12 of the modern Kh-101 (more than is likely in the inventory at present), it wouldn’t take more than a couple planes to do real damage to point targets in a terrorist safe haven.

Ivanov also mentioned the possibility that Russia would use spetsnaz to conduct preemptive strikes. While several of Russia’s power structures have special force units attached to them, what Ivanov was likely referring to was the special designation forces assigned to the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), known as spetsnaz. Spetsnaz brigades, 2,000 men strong, are assigned to the intelligence directorates of each of the 7 military districts and each of the 4 fleets. Within each brigade, there are several 200-man commando units that actually do the work. Specializing in small team operations, these commando units were trained to carry out local missions like reconnaissance or sabotage in the enemy’s rear area, or capturing key infrastructure (like NATO tactical nuclear weapons sites) or beachheads in advance of the main forces. However, it became apparent during the first Chechen campaign that the spetsnaz units were the only truly battle worthy units left in the army. For this reason, they were used for any number of missions outside of their designed specialty, including storming cities and conducting defensive actions. Today, although most units are still manned primarily with conscripts, the spetsnaz retains considerable capability. To maximize their capacity, there is current discussion about combing all the spetsnaz units under a single command with the creation of a new “Special Purpose Forces” arm of the armed forces. Under the current force configuration, attempting to combine the efforts of multiple units requires overcoming significant bureaucratic obstacles that exist between the Defense Ministry and the military districts. By creating a separate command for special purpose forces,
training and operational planning and employment become much more standardized and
efficient.\textsuperscript{284}

Should this new arm of the armed forces be created by the Security Council, it will be very important to distinguish the roles and missions of the new branch from that of the Airborne Troops. The Airborne Troops represent one of the few truly capable elements of the Russian armed forces. With more than 30,000 troops organized in 5 airborne divisions, eight airmobile assault landing brigades, and other special units including a \textit{spetsnaz} unit, the airborne troops are the best equipped, best trained troops in the Russian army. The premier airborne division is the 76\textsuperscript{th} Pskov Guards division. Nearly a third of this elite division, now manned completely by contract soldiers, have just returned from deployment to Chechnya during which they were responsible for closing up rebel transit routes and safe havens in the mountainous region of southern Chechnya, doing so with some acknowledged success.\textsuperscript{285} Having returned home, the 76\textsuperscript{th} is readying itself for a fast-paced 2005 exercise schedule. In 2005, Russia will conduct joint military exercises with the forces of India, Uzbekistan, China and Germany. The 76\textsuperscript{th} will participate in all these exercises, not only putting Russia’s best side forward in the international arena, but also providing that unit invaluable experience operating in various terrain and combat environments.\textsuperscript{286} Considering more than 80\% of current airborne troops have combat experience in Chechnya, there is no doubt that, in a fight of any size, airborne troops would be the first to arrive and the 76\textsuperscript{th} would be in the lead.

As capable as the airborne troops might be, they still suffer from some serious
deficiencies. The professionalization of the 76\textsuperscript{th} has proved that this process alone will not fix the discipline and crime problems that plagues nearly all of the armed forces.(See
previous NIS observed) Equipment modernization, while picking up speed as defense budgets soar and procurement increases, still lags even in these elite units. The limits placed on training and operational deployments by the lack of funding for fuel, aircraft maintenance, and aircrew training, has the biggest impact on the total capability represented in the form of the Airborne Troops. Execution of last summer’s major anti-terrorism exercise, Mobility-2004, which required the movement of 800 airborne troops from Pskov to the Far East, took the combined effort of the military’s airlift capability as well as civilian airliners to accomplish. The Defense Ministry started saving fuel for this exercise months in advance. According to then-chief of combat training for the armed forces, Col-Gen Alexander Skorodumov, “At present the Russian army needs over a month to transport 800 servicemen to the Far East. We had to use civil jetliners….Our troopers could not return to the base for two months because we did not have enough fuel.” The Russian military would surely struggle to move and sustain a force of significant size any distance to accomplish even a modest objective.

This brief examination of the of Russian armed forces capabilities and readiness allows one to conclude that although the armed forces are not without some capability to accomplish an international strike, thanks to outdated weapon systems and low rates of total force readiness, the Russian armed forces are really only capable of achieving limited objectives over a short period of time. A strike would most likely take the form of cruise missile strike from a 4-ship of bombers, a limited attack across border from a formation of airborne troops, or a covert spetsnaz mission abroad against a very small objective. In all cases, there would be huge political risk associated, varying greatly with
target selection and perceived legitimacy of the strike, and would result in little 
operational gain based upon the sum total of the forces that could be brought to bear.

There are some who think that the government’s tough military talk with reference to 
the war on terror has objectives beyond threatening terrorists. One analyst believes that 
“the Russians are seeking to rationalize their continued commitment to maintaining an 
arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons fit for a superpower by rolling them into the 
global war on terrorism,” and that “the Russians continue to use the language of the 
global war on terrorism to justify their wider program of rearmament.”

The validity of this analysis becomes clearer when one considers the views of Ivanov with regards to the 
role of the armed forces in the war on terror and foreign relations in general. In June 
2004, the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta made the observation of Mobility-2004 that it was a “somewhat strange” way to exercise a counter-terror operation. The paper quoted Ivanov agreeing that launching a large-scale operation against terrorist was like 
“beating off mosquitoes with a hammer.”

Clearly, Ivanov was not a big supporter of 
fashioning a military to do simple anti-terrorist missions. Subsequent to making that 
comment, Ivanov has had to back pedal, claiming that he didn’t mean that the armed 
forces shouldn’t be used in the war on terror. It is very unclear what he did mean then. 
The reality is that the Defense Ministry is still very focused on the military’s role in great 
power politics, not its role in law enforcement activities in domestically. Ivanov sees the 
world like this: “Nobody has put it better that (Tsar) Aleksandr III. As before, we have 
two allies, the army and the navy….the reliable defense of our sovereignty can be 
ensured only by a strong army and navy and an effective economy.”

Ivanov believes 
that although Russia prefers to use political, diplomatic and other non-military means to
protect its interests, Russia must possess enough arms in order to make this protection effective.\textsuperscript{292} Ivanov’s understanding of the need for a strong military is slightly different from those within the defense establishment who still see the U.S. as the real threat to Russia. Subtle words uttered by high ranking general officers, think tank specialists, and journalists make this very clear: While discussing the test of newly modified air launched cruise missiles, Major-General Anatoly Zhikharev, commander of the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Air Division, comments that “A Tu-95MS carries six missiles. It takes six to eight missiles to destroy an aircraft carrier;”\textsuperscript{293} Leonid Ivashov says that “Russia is surrounded by a network of military bases, and NATO aircraft patrol the length of Russia’s borders….Yet the defense minister and the General Staff never tire of reiterating that they see no threat to Russia’s security;”\textsuperscript{294} Explaining his perception of the Defense Ministry’s thinking regarding Russian military exercises with Germany, \textit{Nezavisimaya Gazeta} author Vladimir Mukhin states “Ten years ago, Russian troops withdrew from East Germany. Now there is a training war again. Germany is the main opponent of the United States within NATO, so it is necessary to be friends with Germany as well.”\textsuperscript{295} Clearly reforming and reequipping the Russian military will increase its capability to combat the terrorist threat at home and maybe accomplish strikes abroad. Just as clearly, however, the Russian perception of the role of military power and the nature of its enemies don’t stop at international terrorism. It’s current strategy of using the cover of the war on terror to build its military capability allows Russia to continue its drive for re-attaining great power military status, focused on balancing the U.S., while at the same time, appearing to be an ally in the war on terror.
Summary

Russia’s history, geography, culture and paradigms, like those of all nations, have combined to produce a set of perceptions and a set of national and international policies as curious as they are complex. Although not quite the enigma Churchill described, there is still a unique logic in Russia’s operation on the international stage that only begins to become clear upon examination. This chapter has attempted to review Russia’s broader foreign policy stance and its various facets, from its near-abroad to the US and the West, from its fear of economic instability to its fear of terrorism and separatism, and from its perceptions of friends and enemies. Assessing these perceptions, however, is painstaking work and is at best an approximation. Publicly available information serves to answer some questions; publicly available comments from national leaders serve to answer others. Comparing the two sometimes yields new questions, however, while leaving others unanswered. At best this examination can give is a flavor for why Russia perceives the world as it does, if not why it acts as it does.

The next chapter will attempt to focus more specifically on the war on terrorism and to discuss the ways in which Russian and U.S. policies appear to be at odds with one another sometimes.

Notes

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256 Ibid.
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These attacks appear to have made use of a recent counter-terror tactic using the government’s new GROU, or operational command groups, combining forces from the Interior Ministry, the FSB, the Defense Ministry and the Emergency Ministry. Such tactics were put on display for all to see on a Channel One TV report in February 2005 highlighting an interdepartmental anti-terror exercise in the Moscow Region. The report showcased In the presentation, the forces, “[a] mini army . . . helicopters, special troops and armoured hardware,” were under command of a single person from the Interior Ministry, in this case Colonel General Nikolay Rogozhkin. It appears that this is designed to be an Interior Ministry-led team. The report stated that such groups have already been “set up in 12 parts of the Southern Federal District” in the second half of 2004 (although not specifically as a result of the Beslan siege). However, as this was presented as an Interior Ministry-led effort, and the FSB appears to have since taken the lead in such operations, it is not known if this tactic will be used in the future. “Russian Power Agencies Drill Troops For Joint Fight Against Terrorism,” Text of report by Russian Channel One TV, 18 Feb 2005, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.


271 Ruslan Alkhanov, the Chechen Interior Minister, confirmed somewhat somberly that his forces were not involved in the Maskhadov assassination: “This was a unique operation, and we can only regret that Maskhadov was not killed by Interior Ministry staff.” Catherine Belton and Valeria Korchagina, “Maskhadov Declared Dead in FSB Sweep,” The Moscow Times, 9 March 2005, p.1.
Notes


276 “Russia’s Threat of Pre-Emptive Strikes Exposes It to Greater Danger,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 Sep 2004; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets.


280 “Procurement - Russian Federation.”


291 “Russian Defense Minister Gives Views on Army, Terrorism,” BBC Monitoring.
Notes


294 “Russia’s Threat of Pre-Emptive Strikes Exposes It to Greater Danger,” BBC Monitoring.

Chapter 4

Issues Impacting U.S. - Russian Cooperation

Ceci n’est ce pas une pipe.

—René Magritte

When considering the issues that impact relations between the United States and Russia, one must always be cognizant of the unique and often different perceptions each nation’s citizens and leaders have of the same events. Beyond the pithy comparison of “terrorists” and “freedom fighters,” seemingly simply interpreted events can take on vastly different meanings when mixed with cultural, historical, regional, and bureaucratic biases. The weight of centuries of Russian heritage alone, when compared to the relatively recent ascent of the United States to the world stage, can force differing translations of circumstances between the two nations, not to mention the seven decades of the Soviet experiment, directed by a series of leaders each a study in dictatorial eccentricities.

So it behooves all who study the relations between these two nations to begin with the simple realization that no event or circumstance is a singularly understandable thing; what is important is the perception, or the picture of the event or circumstance upon which national decisions will be made. Indeed, Magritte’s pipe has long ceased to be of
any import; what remains for all to contemplate is the picture he drew of it—his perception of that pipe.

**Different Starting Points**

In order for the preceding chapter to be more useful in understanding the interaction (overlap and divergence) of the perspectives of Russia and the United States on the Global War on Terror, this chapter starts with an attempt to reduce the preceding chapter into schemas, or patterns of perception, for each country. These schemas are only a tool that will help place the “facts” of history into an ordered perspective for each nation. To be sure, there are significant cautions and limitations to the use of such schemas. It is only with some amount of hubris that one can attempt to develop a single schema for an entire nation of millions of individuals, but the value of any such schema must be measured by how well it appears to order national perceptions as assessed using official government statements and the words of the highest national officials. Also, there may easily be more than one schema at work within a single nation, indeed even within a single small organization, each with explanatory value. However, as this analysis attempts to focus on the relationship between the U.S. and Russia specifically on the issue of terrorism over a relatively short period of time in each nation’s history, the authors have limited the analysis to a single schema for each nation. Finally, there are always limits to the explanatory value of schemas; sometimes an individual can make an impetuous or uninformed decision without regard to even a well-accepted national schema. This fact can make the assessment of a schema difficult, and it can limit its usefulness in future policy considerations. Therefore, any assessment or recommendation made in these pages must be considered with the recognition of the value of well-
delivered diplomacy in any case of interstate relations. That is, even the best foreign policy can fail when executed gracelessly.

U.S. foreign policy tends to be based largely on its “City on a Hill” model. The “American Project,” as discussed earlier, is to be a beacon of democracy (or more accurately, representative liberal government with a largely transparent market economy) for the rest of the world, and to help other nations achieve the dream of democracy that the U.S. enjoys. This mission gives rise to an alternate driving force in U.S. foreign policy, protection of the dream. That is, when the U.S. and its mission come under attack, as it so clearly did on 11 September 2001, the nation is called upon to defend itself and protect its mission. The U.S. has chosen to do so by waging war in Afghanistan and Iraq in fairly short order, claiming essentially that the future of civilization depended on America’s fight.¹

The two missions, bringing enlightened, democratic government to the world and the protection of that mission, lead to two fundamentally different political prescriptions. The former is a decidedly liberalist prescription, seemingly based on the Wilsonian view that democracies do not fight one another. The latter is a decidedly realist perception, one that justifies the means via the ends and measures international conduct only in terms of power and its balance. The two perceptions are intertwined throughout U.S. policy and politics. Indeed, we see them in action even today: U.S. (and a small coalition’s) intervention in Iraq is couched in both liberalist rhetoric (“Freedom in the heart of the Middle East, freedom and democracy in the place that has bred [sic] resentment and terror, is in our national interests. A free Iraq will help change the world.”²) and realist rhetoric (“America is more secure and the world is more free, because we got rid of
Saddam Hussein.” While there is no consistent dominant perception within the U.S. government (although some ascribe the realist viewpoint to the White House and Department of Defense, and the liberalist viewpoint to the Department of State4), there are times that the prescriptions of one contradict the prescriptions of the other. Those are the times that may result in mixed messages coming from different representatives of the U.S. government, or even what appears to be inaction on the part of the U.S. as it wrestles with its own conscience about its next steps.

The Russian view of global politics, if one can be so bold as to attempt a brief description of such a wide-ranging subject, still owes much to the Soviet Marxist-Hegelian-Leninist version of the dialectic. This mapping of grand strategy essentially states that there is always competition between groups (classes in the Marxist sense; nation-states in the modern, realpolitik sense) that will inevitably lead to conflict between the groups and their systems. From this inevitable clash (from the Marxist perspective, necessarily war) a new structure will be born that is hoped, though not guaranteed, to advance man’s condition. Marx focused on the inevitability of this pace, the fact that conflict is a given, only the intermediate outcomes are in question. Lenin added the notion of alliances, whereby it made sense for dissimilar groups (initially, peasants and workers; later, dissimilar nations like the Soviet Union and China) to unite to oppose common enemies in the inevitable clash. This alliance-building might also be used to buy time in which to prepare for the next conflict, and to better position one’s group or nation for victory. This basic schema of grand human interaction pervaded so much of Soviet thinking for so long that it is naïve to think that a mere decade or two following the collapse of the Soviet system will erase its power. While today there is no broad
discussion of the proletariat joining with the peasants to revolt against the bourgeoisie, there is always an underlying expectation of the basic conflict in all state interactions, and a grand dialectic that forever pits the noble “us” against the ignoble “them.” Underlying the constant battle between “us vs. them” is the Russian longing for international power and prestige, the ability to be a respected actor on the world stage.

In all state-level actions and relations, then, Russians are naturally the core of the “us” in this “us vs. them” equation. Consequently, when Russians, as a monolithic nation, are presented with evidence that they have behaved outside of international norms of nation-state behavior, they perceive, in the “us vs. them” schema, an ulterior motive and the accusation as being used as a tool that will give the accusers some advantage over the Russians. Call it paranoia, call it irrationality, call it a comic stereotype that has outlived its usefulness, it is a fact of life in international relations with Russia, one clearly seen on any given day. A recent example followed the Beslan siege in September, 2001, when the Moscow Times reported that Russian President Putin himself chided “some countries [that] could be supporting the terrorist attacks to try to weaken Russia, whose nuclear deterrent they see as a threat. The efforts to ‘tear off a big chunk of our country’ are being assisted by those who ‘think that Russia, as one of the greatest nuclear powers of the world, is still a threat, and this threat has to be eliminated.’” In this example, “they” are countries that see a united Russia as a nuclear threat. “Us” includes Russia and the territories that comprise it, including Chechnya, which all contribute to make Russia the respect-worthy behemoth it ought to be. The conspiracy is that “some countries” appear to be working with Chechen terrorists in an effort to weaken Russia by forcing it to relinquish control of some of its sovereign soil, in this case, Chechnya.
Whether there is some international conspiracy against Russia to “weaken” it or not, this constant Russian perception must always be considered.

An additional point impacting the “us” and “them” discussion is that since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has yet to clearly define what constitutes “us” and what constitutes “them,” specifically within the former Soviet-space. For instance, Chechen separatists, even though they may have been born within the borders of Russia proper, are typically considered part of “them”; Abkhazians, although they may have been born within the borders of independent Georgia, are typically considered “us.” This may be, in part, a sleight of diplomatic hand that allows Russia a bit of leeway in international relations. It may also simply be an unfinished part of the political maturation of the nation as it continues to develop a post-Communist identity.

Finally, to complete the development of the simplified view of Russia it is important to note Russia’s recent official acknowledgement of the existence of government corruption and its deleterious impact on so many state actions. President Putin himself declared, “We have allowed corruption to undermine our judicial and law enforcement system.” In a previously uncharacteristic admission of his administration’s shortcomings, “Putin said his regime and Russia as a whole have failed to protect the country from the threats of terrorism. ‘We demonstrated our weakness, and the weak are beaten,’ he said, in a surprising reversal of the image of a strong country with a strong leader that he has always tried to project.” Ostensibly, it was this acceptance of a national failing that prompted the Russian president to introduce new policies aimed at tightening his control over his government, a topic discussed in more detail later. It may
also help explain, in a way no complex bureaucratic politics model could, some of the difficulties Russia sometimes has speaking and acting with a single voice.

**U.S. View of Russia’s Perceived Terrorist Threat**

Although not always well-enunciated, the U.S. government has developed a fairly thoughtful and consistent perception of Russia’s terrorist threat, largely centered on the Chechnya conflict. In the first comments from President Clinton on the initial Russian incursion into Chechnya in 1994, he maintained that “[i]t is an internal Russian affair, and we hope that order can be restored with a minimum amount of bloodshed and violence.”\(^9\) His administration maintained this view officially throughout the first Chechen conflict, as shown in a U.S. National Security Advisor statement from 1996:

> There is . . . the tragedy of Chechnya, a tragedy for the Chechens, for the Russians and for all friends of Russian democracy. We support the territorial integrity of Russia, and we oppose attempts to change international borders through the use of force. We oppose terrorism in all its forms. But we also oppose strongly the means the Russians have been using. Widespread and indiscriminate use of force has spilled far too much innocent blood and eroded support for Russia. The cycle of violence must end. We welcome President Yeltsin’s decision announced yesterday to begin withdrawing army units and to intensify the search for a settlement there. We call on the Chechens to respond in a similar spirit.\(^{10}\) (Italics added.)

Even during the first Chechen conflict, the U.S. administration acknowledged Russia’s plight with terrorists and Chechnya. While such statements as this couch mild criticism between words of support, it is a fairly clear statement of understanding of the nature of the problem Russia faced—terrorism—along with a nod toward Russia’s implication in its root causes.

Some outside (and some of those not very far removed from) the administration, however, took a decidedly different tone toward the Russian actions in Chechnya. In an
editorial in the European edition of The Wall Street Journal, Mr. John J. Maresca, a former senior member of the U.S. State Department, took President Clinton to task for his “internal Russian affair” comments, claiming they rose from an inappropriate “Russia First’ policy” that left the new Russia unaccountable for its actions. He (and others later) condemned the Russians for using brutal tactics against Russian citizens who happened to be Chechens and for pursuing “neocolonialist behavior” in the former Soviet regions. He chided the U.S. administration for refusing to hold Russia to international norms of state behavior, invoking images of the Soviet gulag, “a new Yalta dividing line between East and West,” and restored Russian hegemony over former Soviet states.\(^\text{11}\) Such criticisms of U.S. policy, coming from within the U.S., may have served in some ways to mix the message sent on Chechnya, but official U.S. policy has rarely veered from this original line.

Even after Russian forces re-entered Chechnya in 1999, the U.S. administration maintained a fairly reserved view of the conflict. President Clinton himself framed the action as a response against terrorism, but he quickly hinted that this was perhaps not the only, nor the best, response the Russians could have taken.

I would never criticize anyone taking vigorous action against terrorism. I think that’s very important. The real question is whether or not the nature of this uprising in Chechnya can be solved exclusively by a military strategy. And I think you could see—you can sense in this audience—it’s not just the United States, it’s virtually all the Europeans don’t believe that an exclusively military strategy can prevail, that it will lead to greater than necessary civilian casualties and greater than necessary refugees.\(^\text{12}\)

While not condemning Russian action, clearly the Clinton administration sought to convey that diplomacy should also be pursued. Under the George W. Bush administration, however, following the events of 11 September 2001 and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. government has become quite clear in its stance:
Let me say a word about a most difficult issue, Chechnya. We sympathize with Russia for having suffered from terrorist attacks, such as the bombing of the Moscow metro in February. We recognize Russia’s right to defend itself against terror, and we support its territorial integrity. We do not support Chechen separatism. Nothing can justify acts of terror, whether in Russia or elsewhere around the world, and we condemn such acts in no uncertain terms. At the same time, we fear that the cycle of violence in Chechnya is sustained by continuing human rights abuses on the part of Russian federal and local security forces. These cannot be justified by the abuses – and even acts of terror – committed by the other side. We do not underestimate the difficulties inherent in bringing the hostilities there to an end. But enough is enough. More than enough blood has been spilled in Chechnya.13

So while the official policy from the United States has attempted to criticize both sides of the Chechen conflict for brutal tactics in the conduct of war, mildly at first but now more clearly, the U.S. government has fairly consistently maintained support for Russia in its struggle against terrorists in Chechnya, from the beginning recognizing those agents supporting Chechnya as “terrorists.”

However, the U.S. has also stated clearly in the State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terror* that these terrorists are not the concern of the Global War on Terror. To reiterate terms of reference, the U.S.-led Global War on Terror is perhaps more appropriately named the War on Global Terror or the War on International Terror in that the targets of U.S. efforts are those agents that support international terrorism, defined as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.”14 Consequently, the fact that the U.S. has repeatedly maintained, in spite of criticism, that Chechnya is an “internal Russian affair” means that the U.S. does not consider it “global terrorism.”

Local insurgents in the North Caucasus remained the greatest terrorist threat to Russia and were responsible for the murder of hundreds of Russian citizens, civilians as well as military. There is evidence of a foreign terrorist presence in Chechnya, although *much of the actual terrorist activity there is homegrown* and linked to the Chechen separatist movement.15 (Italics added.)
Because Chechnya is a part of Russia, because “much of the actual terrorist activity there is homegrown,” and because the U.S. has consistently regarded the conflict in Chechnya as an “internal Russian affair,” the terrorist threat posed to Russia through Chechnya (and perhaps the broader Caucasus) has not born inclusion in the U.S.-led Global War on Terror. Sympathy, yes; inclusion, no. And this rounds out the sometimes misunderstood consistency in the U.S. position regarding Russia and its perceived terrorist threat. With the recognition that Russia is still a developing democracy in the years following the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. policy, stemming as it does from a desire to promote democracy, is willing to let Russia’s nascent democratic system solve its own internal issues. Since the terrorism threat posed by Chechnya does not rise to the level of global terrorism, it poses no threat to U.S. democracy or its pursuit around the world, so there is no impetus for direct U.S. intervention. In the Chechnya situation, then, both the realist and the liberalist points of view align, albeit at a crude level that does not take into account human rights issues\(^\text{16}\), creating a surprisingly consistent, if debatable, and longstanding U.S. policy.

**Russian View of West’s “Double Standard.”**

Pity the unpopular Russians. In July [2000], Mexico elects its first president from outside the country’s ruling party; *The Economist* magazine labels it a “real democracy.” Russia elects a president from the political opposition in 1991, then holds no fewer than five competitive, generally free, national elections in the following years; *The Economist* calls it a “phony democracy.” Colombia has a problem with organized crime, and Washington gives its government $1.3 billion to help fight the drug lords. Russia also has a problem with organized crime, and American politicians sternly lecture Moscow not to expect any more aid until it cleans up its act. An undercover U.S. operation finds several Mexican banks laundering drug money in the United States, and Washington apologizes to the Mexicans for conducting sting operations on their territory. An American bank allegedly launders money for Russian organized criminals, and a leading senator accuses the Russian...
government of being “the world’s most virulent kleptocracy.” When the Asian crisis scares investors away from the Brazilian market and the real collapses, commentators declare it a bump in the road. When the Asian crisis scares foreign investors away from the Russian market and the ruble collapses, commentators declare the crash proof of the failure of liberal economic reform in Russia.

That many Russians these days see a double standard in Western opinion toward their country is perhaps not altogether surprising.17

Following the hostage siege in Beslan in September 2004, Russian president Putin held several press conferences during which he chided westerners for observing a double standard toward Russia regarding terrorism. While Putin understands the underlying basis for the Chechen unrest is a separatist movement there (and which itself is grounds for labeling all who support such movements as terrorists themselves, according to Russia’s support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization definition of “terrorists”), he has stated repeatedly that any group that kills children in the furtherance of their goals, no matter what their goals, are due only force in response, not diplomacy. His frustration appears to be with repeated suggestions that the key to preventing future such attacks (on schools, apartment buildings and the like) is a political solution to the Chechnya conflict.18 This appears to be interpreted within Russia as an invitation to negotiate with Chechen separatists. Says Putin: “No one has the right to advise us to talk to people like that. I don’t advise you to meet Bin Laden, invite him to Brussels and NATO or the White House, hold talks with him, and let him dictate what he wants so that he will then leave you alone. But you tell us that we should talk to everyone, including child-killers.”19

In truth, “Russia’s September 11th,” or the signal event that sparked a national recognition of the capability of terrorists to bring violence to Main Street, was actually a series of events that occurred during August and September, 1999. Early in August,
Shamil Basayev and Ibn-ul-Khattab led an invasion of over 1,000 Chechen militants into the neighboring republic of Dagestan, seizing several villages and towns along the Chechen-Dagestan border. This prompted Russian forces to conduct air and ground strikes on the militants and the seized areas, with great devastation. At the end of August, the first of several explosions in Moscow, including a shopping mall and apartment buildings, took place, killing several hundred civilians. These explosions were attributed to Chechen separatists and Islamic terrorists, especially when Khattab declared, “From now on, they will get our bombs everywhere. Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities.”\textsuperscript{20} The Chechen invasion, coupled with the terrorist-attributed attacks elsewhere on Russian soil, provided the \textit{casus belli} for what has become the second Chechen War.\textsuperscript{21} This war was cast in terms somewhat different than the first (which had been a conflict to prevent the secession of the territory), with both President Yeltsin and later President Putin declaring this was the new front in the war against international terrorism. Said the former:

\begin{quote}
This is a fight for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. It is also part of the international community’s effort against international terrorism. I am sure that those in the West who for some reason have still not understood this will be convinced that we are in the right. International terrorism has no borders. It now has the whole world in its sights.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

President Putin reiterated this perception in an interview with \textit{Paris Match} during his first year in office, justifying Russia’s actions in Chechnya:

\begin{quote}
Today we are witnessing the creation of an extremist internationale along an arc of instability all the way from the Philippines to Kosovo. This is above all very dangerous for Europe because of the large Muslim population there. . . . And in this sense Russia is in the forefront of struggle against this international terrorism. Strictly speaking, Europe should be grateful to us because we are fighting against it albeit, regrettably, single-handed.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}
These perceptions appear to pit the Russians against the wave of international terrorism developing “along an arc of instability,” and in doing so invite the West to join “us” in this fight. In fairly stark terms for Russia, it appears to be offering the western world a somewhat rare entry into the world of the Russian “us” to join in the fight against the “terrorist internationale.” It goes further to define the fight in terms of right and wrong, as well, attempting to make the choice seem easy for the west.

That President Putin specifically mentions Kosovo as part of the “arc of instability” is telling, for adding to Russia’s perception of legitimacy in waging this war is the example of the U.S. and the rest of NATO earlier in 1999, having just waged a largely aerial campaign against Serbia and its actions in Kosovo. This action, in addition to the fact that it completely contradicted Russian concepts of sovereignty and international law, led to an instability of its own, for which the U.S. and NATO bore some responsibility. As Colonel-General Ivashov noted in a previously-cited statement, “The U.S. did more than any other country to trigger the war in the Balkans, and Russia did more than any other country to bring it to a close.”

Regarding the charge that NATO was compelled to act in an attempt to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, Ivashov explained, “[t]he truth still isn’t completely clear. But I would point out that refugees fled Kosovo en masse only after these barbaric bombings, which killed hundreds of innocent people, began.” The U.S. and NATO, therefore, acting outside their borders, are themselves complicit in fomenting instability. Internal conflicts require diplomacy and internal action, not intervention.

So when faced with what it perceived as a direct threat to its national security—not only its territory but civilians even in Moscow—Russia felt no apprehension in
responding with force, pitting the Russian “us” against the lawless terrorists operating from and near Chechnya. It also felt compelled to attempt to solve its own internal security issues before outside forces, a “them” that included NATO, and specifically the U.S., felt compelled to intervene themselves as they had in Kosovo. This required a show of power in the tactical sense, to rebuff militant attacks in the region and throughout Russia, and in the strategic sense, to rebuff outside intervention into Russian territorial conflicts. The fact that the conflict, as it has unfolded and despite early claims to the contrary, has yet to be settled either militarily or diplomatically is irrelevant; both requirements simply called for Russia to act and to act rapidly.

The critique from the U.S., however, while acknowledging Russia’s legitimacy in resolving its own territorial conflicts, focused on the conduct of the war. Russian forces, claimed the U.S., were conducting a war of terror themselves, disregarding the safety and security of non-militant Chechens as they pursued terrorists. Said U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, following talks with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, “We want very much to see Russia deal with what is a global problem ... of extremism and terrorism, but to see that Russia deals with that problem in a fashion that meets international norms. . .[T]he feeling is that this standard has not been met.”

This perhaps marks the beginning of the current Russian perception of the double standard in the War on Terror: When the U.S. engages in war against what it calls militants in Kosovo, it fights the proper war, despite the toll in innocent civilians that follows, and despite the absence of any UN imprimatur; when Russia engages in battle within its own borders against what it calls militants, indeed terrorists who have killed
hundreds of civilians far removed from Chechnya, it is chided by the U.S. itself for doing so.

**Perceptions since 11 September 2001**

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that President Putin was among the first to contact President Bush on 11 September 2001 with a message of support. That he may also have been whispering to himself “I told you so” should not be surprising, either. Finally, Putin may have reasoned, the Americans will see that drastic times call for drastic measures. Finally, perhaps this unfortunate event would provide an opportunity for the U.S. to join “us” in the fight against terrorists who attack innocent civilians. Said Putin, “We understand the feelings of the American people better than anyone. I want to tell the American people in Russia’s name, ‘We are with you. We fully and wholeheartedly share and feel your pain. We support you’.”

Following the events of 11 September 2001, many assumed, perhaps like Putin, that the U.S. and Russia would now be aligned in the fight against terrorism, married by a common enemy, a “them” defined as violent Islamic militants seeking to limit the ability of states to conduct business. Russia no doubt also hoped such a relationship would tend to mute U.S. criticism of Russia over its conduct in Chechnya, especially considering U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime the following month. In some ways this did happen, but the honeymoon relationship was not long-lasting.

While this relationship did produce some meaningful cooperation between the two nations, notably the ability of the U.S. to position military forces in the former Soviet Central Asian countries to support operations in Afghanistan, a U.S. agreement to nuclear weapons reductions, and U.S. support for Russia’s entry into the World Trade
Organization, the first major blow came barely three months after the September attacks. On 13 December 2001 the White House made the official announcement that the U.S. would withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a move much discussed prior to September but assumed to have been put on hold. This appeared especially inflammatory coming as it did so soon after President Putin visited President Bush at his ranch in Texas, less than a month before the announcement. It was during this visit, as the White House was quick to point out, that the two presidents discussed this decision and attempted to soften the appearance of damage to bilateral cooperation. This explains Putin’s subdued official statement in response to the announcement, claiming that such a move “does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.” He further stated his hopes “that the present level of bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia should not only be preserved, but also be used for quickly working out new frameworks of strategic cooperation.”

The now-muted enthusiasm of cooperation carried over into the new year, with Russia still attempting promote its interests as coincidental with those of the U.S. and the rest of the western world in combating terrorism. In his speech to the 38th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov presented the current, post-11 September, Russian perspective on terrorism, highlighting the parallels between the struggles against Islamic terrorists the U.S. and western Europe faced and Russia’s struggles with Chechen terrorists. He also pointed to Russia’s concern with terrorists gathering in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge and that nation’s inability to control them, and he discussed the “vague borders [that] exist between Russia and other CIS countries” following the demise of the Soviet Union. These porous borders, he argued, offered
terrorists a springboard into Western Europe, implying that any Russian actions
strengthening border security should also be seen as supporting Western Europe. Ivanov
clearly aligned Russian security policy with that of the U.S., citing Putin’s statements
during his U.S. summit that “terrorism must be eliminated everywhere and in all its
manifestations,” painting the two nations as clearly fighting alongside one another in the
same conflict. Ivanov reiterated the need for nations to pursue non-military means as
well as force to combat terrorism, invoking the authority of the United Nations in this
regard. He bemoaned the fact that there still was not internationally accepted definition
of terrorism and, in familiar refrain, complained of “double political standards with
regard to separatism, religious extremism and fanaticism.” He continued:

If those who blow up apartment houses in Moscow and Buinaks are
declared freedom fighters while in other countries such persons are
referred to as terrorists one cannot even think of forging a united anti-
terrorist front. For, they are all criminals and our attitudes to them must be
the same.

In these remarks again we see Russia describing its alignment with the west in “us”
vs. “them” terms, with Russia and the west on one side, and terrorists and those who
support them (Georgia, painted as powerless against Pankisi Gorge terrorists) on the
other. We also see Russia’s emphasis on the UN as a common denominator for
international action. Further, we see Russia attempting to gain a UN imprimatur, in the
form of a definition of terrorism that includes Chechen militants, as a means of justifying
its actions, denying its critics, and more closely aligning Russia with the west in the War
on Terror.

The end of 2002 saw Russia much less enthusiastic and much more frustrated
regarding an alliance with the west. In October, Chechen terrorists took over a Moscow
theater during a performance of the play *Nord-Ost*, holding some 800 civilians hostage.
Ending the two-day ordeal, Russian special forces personnel used an unnamed gas to subdue the terrorists (along with the hostages), stormed the building and ended the siege. In the process, 120 hostages were killed (most from the gas). While faintly praised as a success, many in the west, including the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, second-guessed Russian methods in storming the theater and called for more information on the type of gas used. Russia again tried to link this event with the U.S. struggle against terrorism, but was clearly annoyed at having its methods openly questioned against what it deemed ruthless fanatics.30

Some weeks later, Putin attended a European Summit in Brussels, during which he discussed with European leaders EU and Russian cooperation measures. During a press conference at the end of the summit, Putin was asked by a Le Monde reporter about Russia’s use of anti-personnel and fragmentation weapons. His response began in measured tones but caromed into an impassioned soliloquy about the nature of Islamic terrorists facing both Russia and the west. “[Terrorists] speak about the necessity to kill Americans and their allies. I think you come from a country that happens to be an ally of the United States—you are in danger,” he exclaimed. Embarrassingly, he ended his rant with a poorly received joke about circumcision, but that was ascribed to the stress following the Nord-Ost siege. He did, however, stick to his familiar message:

If the so-called freedom-fighters terrorize us and threaten to take over nuclear and other vital facilities ... we will either have a common interpretation of such activity or we will have a problem. I only want to warn you that you should not create any loopholes for these people. Anything, even the smallest trifle that’s to their advantage, is perceived by them as a weakness and will be used by them against those who demonstrate this weakness.31

Yet again Putin implored the western nations to develop a definition of terror and terrorists that included the militants Russia was fighting. The alternative, he cautioned, is
that these same “freedom-fighters” will become “your” problem if “we” are not permitted to defeat them ourselves. This appears to be Putin’s version of the now-familiar mantra “You are either with us or you are with the terrorists.”

Later in November, a NATO Summit announced what might have been seen as a blow to Russia—the inclusion of three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) into NATO—had it not been followed immediately by a separate summit between Putin and Bush in St. Petersburg. Comments by Bush before and after the summit appeared to reaffirm the spirit of U.S. cooperation with Russia in the War on Terror, but the unavoidable hint was a *quid pro quo* involving Chechnya and Iraq, to be discussed in more depth later. In comments to Eastern European press members prior to the summit, Bush made three points. First, he emphasized that “I’ve got a good friend in the fight against terrorism in Vladimir Putin.” Second, Bush supported the Russian president’s actions during the Nord-Ost siege, saying Putin “was confronted with a very difficult situation” during which “he made some very tough decisions.” Bush went on to clarify that even though “people tried to blame Vladimir; they ought to blame the terrorists. They’re the ones who caused the situation, not President Putin,” seeming to use words directly from Putin’s notes. Finally, he acknowledged al Qaeda influence in Chechnya and stated that even though a diplomatic solution is preferred, “to the extent that there are al Qaeda members infiltrating Russia, they need to be dealt with—they need to be brought to justice.” In comments following the summit, Bush thanked “Vladimir and his foreign policy team for working together to pass a strong resolution out the United Nations on Iraq.” He also framed NATO as an organization focused on the war on terror, and that its expansion “should be welcomed by the Russian people. After
all, there are new nations on our border that are members of—nations that are new members of NATO, but nations pledged to peace, and pledged to freedom.” President Putin reiterated his position on NATO expansion: “We do not believe that this has been necessitated by the existing pact, but we take note of the position taken by the President of the United States and we hope to have positive development of our relations with all NATO countries.” This hope, Putin explained, springs from the fact that “interests of Russia and the United States coincide well in many economic fields. But they are also identical in many strategic areas.”

It must be noted that many such comments directly from these presidents, especially drawn from press conferences featuring both leaders together, are invariably a product of what has become a surprisingly close personal relationship. While such comments are most certainly sincere, they may be somewhat tempered by this personal relationship, in that each president appears to take pains to paint the actions of the other in the best possible light to the citizens of their respective nations, instead of using such fora as true state-to-state diplomacy venues. But while Putin may have appeared to cave in to NATO expansion with muted complaint, the fact that he openly disagreed with the act in a press conference with President Bush is notable for the distance it put between their interests.

More notable, however, is the dynamic that began to appear about this time, in the run-up to war with Iraq. Many NATO members, France and Germany most significantly, openly opposed the threat of U.S. action in Iraq, action framed as key in the continuing war on terror. President Bush, however, praised Russia as a partner in helping realize UN Resolution 1441, the 8 November 2002 Security Council Resolution that demanded Iraq comply with previous demands to disarm and to provide, within 30 days, “a currently
accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects” of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. While the resolution provided no defined consequences for non-compliance, other than a reminder “that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations” of previous resolutions, it would serve as the closest thing to approval the U.S. would get from the UN for action in Iraq.\textsuperscript{34} In this and the following months, one sees the United States fully seized of the need to invade Iraq for the dual purposes of spreading democracy within a tyrant-controlled nation and protecting democracy’s benefactor from the threat of Iraq-produced WMD. We also, however, see Russia walking a fine diplomatic line between NATO, the UN, and a bilateral relationship with the U.S. While Russia finds the expansion of NATO distasteful, even somewhat intrusive as it steals away states that were previously identified as part of the “us” of the Soviet Union, it finds common cause against a U.S. plan to invade Iraq, itself a sovereign state, with such EU stalwarts as France and Germany. It also finds itself in the powerful position, along with France, of having one of the precious few UN Security Council votes that could either confirm or deny legitimacy to U.S. action in Iraq, a position that it clearly has long relished as perhaps its supreme claim to international power. Still, its relation to the U.S. acts as a counterbalance to its sometimes rocky relation with the EU, often the most vocal critic of Russia’s methods in Chechnya.

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov summed up Russia’s assessment of its position in international affairs just before the Iraq war in an end-of-year interview:

In general it can be said that the role of this country in world affairs has strengthened. There has been practically no international issue of whatever stature whose solution was not shared by Russia. This concerns above all the work of the UN Security Council, in which Russia not only continues
to discharge the functions of a permanent member, but also gives real assistance to resolving issues of peace and security. The most graphic example is the adoption of resolution 1441 by the Security Council on Iraq.

In this interview, Ivanov also cites “a new atmosphere of trust and partnership in our relations with the U.S. and the EU,” although he focuses on EU cooperation through an economic lens, “since very soon—following its enlargement—the EU will account for half of our trade turnover.” Still, this spirit of cooperation sits well with Ivanov: “[I]n general what we are seeing is that the world has never since the Second World War been so united in the struggle against the common evil [terrorism]. This sense of new world unity, of course, fully meets Russia’s national interests.”

It is this sense of unity that gave Russia a freedom of diplomatic action rarely seen before. Russia was able to leverage economic interest as required to garner EU support when necessary. It was able to leverage the unique personal relationship between Presidents Putin and Bush when it felt excessive pressure regarding Chechnya from the EU. And most importantly, it was able to leverage the exceptional power it wields on the UN Security Council to avoid having the one remaining superpower set international precedents that appear threatening, such as intervention within a sovereign nation’s borders for reasons other than imminent danger. Thus Russia was able to assert any of three different versions of the “us” vs. “them” schema it found appropriate: Russia and the EU, Russia and the UN, and Russia and the U.S. The one complicating factor in this three-card power deck is NATO, which essentially combines the EU and U.S. It is this organization which made Russia’s role in the UN so important, and perhaps the most persuasive reason for Russia to cultivate the UN as the single worldwide arbiter of diplomatic legitimacy at every opportunity.
The U.S.-Led War in Iraq: A Test of the Relationship

The test of this three-position power lever came in March 2003, when the U.S. elected to invade Iraq with a meager “coalition of the willing” that included few NATO members and most significantly did not have UN backing. Although President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, and many others argued vociferously for UN support prior to invading Iraq, the U.S. never brought a resolution before the Security Council for a vote. Had it done so, judging from the rhetoric before and after the war, both Russia and France would have vetoed it. The non-vote, however, allowed the U.S. to avoid the active show of non-support, and it allowed Russia to maintain an element of diplomatic superiority.

In the event, the U.S. argued the legal authority for war with Iraq derived from UNSCR 687, which marked the end of the 1991 Gulf War and demanded Iraq disarm itself of all WMD. Based on the most recent statements from UN weapons inspectors, Iraq had not complied with the terms of that resolution, so this was, in essence, a continuation of the original conflict—the ceasefire was, in effect, void. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov countered that no UN resolution “authorizes a forcible change of leadership in a sovereign state.” On the contrary, he stated, “the prospect of disarmament of Iraq through inspections has become real.” He continued that only by relying on “the United Nations Charter and international law . . . can we ensure conditions for the continuation of an efficient multilateral cooperation in the struggle against global threats and challenges with the preservation of the central role of the United Nations Security Council.”
The fundamental argument for U.S. intervention was the dual need to depose a ruthless dictator who supports terror and to dispatch the imminent threat to the U.S. from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Said U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow during a radio interview in Moscow, “I think it is clear to everyone in the world that Saddam Hussein supports terrorism in the Middle East. . . . What we are doing [in Iraq is] trying to uphold the authority of UN resolutions and to eliminate a serious and immediate threat to the security of the region and the world.”

The counter-argument (one Russia shared with France, Germany, and China) was that sovereignty, no matter the legitimacy or the abuses of power a nation’s leader demonstrates, is inviolable, and nothing short of an imminent threat is grounds for military action, especially action not supported by international agreement. And the threat from Iraq was by no means imminent. Said Putin as the war began: “Iraq has presented no danger, neither for neighbouring countries nor for any region in the world.” The fact that the U.S. has trampled international law by going to war with Iraq without the express consent of the United Nations represents “the threat of a collapse of the international security system.”

Although some analysts assumed the U.S.-led war in Iraq would lead to an irreconcilable split between Russia and the U.S., or even the demise of the United Nations Security Council itself, along with Russia’s last vestige of international power, both nations did their best to minimize the bilateral fallout. Putin himself remained noticeably absent from much of the debate prior to the war, and even as the war began, despite his criticism and that of his ministers, both sides took pains to assure the world that the U.S.-Russia relationship would survive this crisis. Said Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, “We will remain partners rather than opponents.” The alternative, he admitted,
would be even worse: “If this war breaks us apart, then it will weaken us in the face of new global threats.”

Importantly, however, the war in Iraq, for all of the international furor it has caused, has not changed the basic schema of the two countries. This may be attributable to two outcomes. First, the fact that the U.S. did not bring a draft resolution to the Security Council for a formal vote of approval to go to war with Iraq validated, in many respects, both the international system and Russia’s role in it. Had the U.S. brought such a resolution up for formal vote, it is very likely Russia (along with France and perhaps even China) would have vetoed such a measure, sending the U.S. off to contemplate a planned invasion not just without the consensus of the international community, but with its expressed dissent. To have continued with the war under such circumstances likely would have rendered even more and more lasting long-term diplomatic damage to the U.S. position in the international system, indeed, its self-styled mission to bring democracy to the world, than actual events have wrought. The fact that the U.S. was willing to act without seeking UN support, knowing it was not forthcoming, tends to strengthen Russia’s role in the world, for even the strong personal relationship between Putin and Bush could not sway the Security Council, putting the U.S. in the “them” camp at no expense to Russia. The other outcome that has strengthened this schema is the apparent success, thus far, of the democratic movement within Iraq, despite the resistance from insurgent groups, and the otherwise inexplicable blooming of democratic processes elsewhere in the region. The fact that Iraqis, by and large, voted, coupled with elections in Palestine following the death of Yasser Arafat, new elections, albeit limited, in Saudi Arabia, and even the move to toss the yoke of Syrian domination in Lebanon plays right
into the U.S. schema and its role as bringer of democracy. Whether it is a case of causation or coincidence, the fact that the U.S. “delivered” freedom and democracy to a nation enslaved under a tyrant like Saddam Hussein, and following this deliverance other nations in the region pursued a similar deliverance strengthens the U.S. desire to continue its work, in an ends-justifying-the-means rationale.

Still, there remains some distance between the two nations in the war’s aftermath. With well over 100,000 U.S. troops deployed within Iraq at the war’s end (not to mention the troops still supporting operations in Afghanistan), and a building insurgency within Iraq, the U.S. sought post-war support, to include troops, civilian personnel, and cash and in-kind aid, from all quarters as a means of both sharing the burden of war (the reality of which was undeniable, along with the world’s interest in a positive outcome) and repairing relations with nations that had opposed U.S. intervention, including Russia. To this end, the U.S. sought and obtained UN Security Council Resolution 1511, in which the UN officially sanctioned the multinational force helping to secure the country and train Iraqi security forces and “urges Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force.” Russia, along with France and Germany, supported the resolution, with some reluctance, to emphasize international unity and the support for Iraq’s resurrection, but vowed not to contribute troops to the effort.

Following this resolution, the U.S. convened a conference in Madrid in October 2003 to garner donations for Iraq’s reconstruction following the war. This conference was an attempt to help bridge the international rift that had developed not just between the U.S. and Russia over Iraq, but between the U.S. and all nations who opposed U.S.
intervention. Significantly, even before the conference began, President Putin vowed that Russia would not yet contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction, citing that the UN resolution did “not create the necessary conditions for the full-scale participation of the UN in the settlement,” and that Iraq “does not [yet] have proper conditions” for Russian investment. The Russian argument, essentially, was that because there was not a legitimate government in place in Iraq, it would be premature to contribute to its reconstruction.\(^45\) Russia did express a willingness, however, to work with the U.S. to help reduce Iraq’s foreign debt, some $8 billion of which was owed to Russia.\(^46\)

This essentially marks the current state of “cooperation” between the U.S. and Russia on Iraq—Russia supports the efforts of the U.S. and other nations in rebuilding Iraq, but refuses to participate. The U.S. forces are fairly well anchored in the region until the security situation improves, or until Iraqi forces are able to sustain the nation’s security, or until the elected government requests that U.S. forces depart, whichever comes first. From the U.S. perspective, Iraqi security has become its obligation, given that largely U.S. forces decommissioned the previous regime. From the Russian perspective, Iraq does not now, nor did it really ever, pose an international threat to security, nor has it specifically requested Russian aid, so there is little interest in committing resources to enhance the U.S. agenda in the region.

**Russian Policy Elsewhere in the Caucasus and Russia’s Near Abroad**

In additions to each nation’s perceptions of the terrorist threat and the actions each nation takes to counter such perceived threats, there are several additional issues only casually related to terrorism that shape the cooperative relationship between the two nations. As U.S. national policy proclaims a fundamental belief in the importance of
democracy and freedom for people across the globe, some actions Russia has taken in its “near abroad” would seem to make cooperation between these two countries less savory as they appear to run counter to these U.S. beliefs. It is worth examining a few such cases to help frame perceptions on both sides of the issue.

**Russia and the Duality of Self-Determination**

In the post-Soviet world, Russia may have emerged as the dominant member of the former Soviet Republics, but it bears subtle and significant difference to its form before the Bolshevik revolution, a fact notable within the Russian consciousness. The implications of this are perhaps best described by the writings of the former mayor of St. Petersburg (and Putin mentor) Anatoly Sobchak. Within the USSR, Russia’s dominance made moot the fact that “Russian” lands were ostensibly transferred to and between subordinate republics (the Crimea to Ukraine under Kruschev, for example). As Russia and Russians were the de facto leaders of the union, the fine print denoting the technicality of state land ownership (sovereignty), a concept with dubious meaning in a communist system in any case, was hardly worth writing, much less reading.

With the demise of the union, however, Bolshevik-drawn boundaries between the newly-emancipated states became the point of reference, and many of the lands, some quite valuable, that had once been “Russian” were now Ukrainian, or Moldovan, or Kazakh. To pretend otherwise and attempt to make claim to these regions would mean outright war on many fronts, a war perhaps not worth fighting during the turbulent transition period of the 1990s. However, large populations of ethnic Russians still populate many of these disputable regions, a fact that official Russia at times emphasizes, whether by demanding local leaders consider the wishes of these populations or even
offering members of these populations Russian passports. Ethnic Russians occupying these lands, it is argued, should be given full opportunity to decide their own national allegiances. That is, should these “Russians” feel the need to return to Russia proper, they should be allowed to come and to bring their land with them.

Within the current boundaries of Russia, however, there should be no such right, for Russia, with its vastness, would cease to exist as the dominant power it historically has been. These Russian boundaries should be decided by Russians, for Russians, and by no one else. Statements from foreigners that Russia ought to let Chechens, for example, create a separate state amount to attacks on Russia’s very sovereignty. Russians determine what Russia should look like and no one else. Thus the duality, as expressed by Sobchak himself: “I think that in the new Russian constitution, we should write down a rule: the right to entry and no right to exit. There should be no rights for self-determination and no possibility to destroy the wholeness, unity of a state and to exit as they consider necessary.”

This paradoxical perception may be difficult for Russians to see, but it is certainly clear to others in the region. Says Georgian Parliament Speaker Nino Burdzhanadze: “On the one hand, Russia is fighting separatism on its territory, but sometimes feeds it on Georgia’s territory.” That is, on the one hand, Russia condemns Chechen separatist, and those who propose anything having to do with Chechen independence as part of the solution to the conflict, as trying to break apart Russia by destroying its sovereignty. On the other hand, Russia freely supports South Ossetians in Georgia as they attempt to gain their independence from Tbilisi rule. Yet the Russian perception, as described above, permits both actions without a logical disconnect. The reality of the perception is
understood; the rationality of it is irrelevant. The implication of this perception is that concepts of “us” and “them” vary according to a unique geo-strategic logic.

**Russia’s Role in Frozen Conflicts**

The paradox of self-determination presents even more acute problems to those immediately outside Russia’s borders. Georgia, for instance, is perhaps in the worst position, geographically and politically, with respect to the Russian perception of self-determination. Georgia’s conflict with its breakaway regions Abkhazia and Ossetia appear to be intractable. These regions are home to fairly well-armed anti-Georgian militias, but they are without the control of a recognized government structure, instead being “led” by groups that either impose rule on the masses or attempt to ethnically cleanse the regions to create a not unsupportive population. Realizing the any stability in the region would be an improvement, Russia, somewhat heavy handedly, had stationed its own troops nearby and maintains ties with self-styled regional leaders. Georgia screamed that such actions run counter to the very concept of self-determination and looked west for support. However, despite the diplomatic affront Russian troops create, Georgia still has major economic and cultural ties with Russia and truthfully could not exist as a nation were it not for mutual cooperation between the two. So there are myriad reasons for Georgia to avoid direct confrontation with Russia, despite the threats Russia’s actions pose for Georgian sovereignty.50

Furthermore, Russia’s intervention appears geared directly to create and sustain what have become known as frozen conflicts in these regions. That is, real solutions appear to have become unreachable between these breakaway regions and the nations within whose borders they reside, a condition which appears to satisfy Russia. Having armed the
militias in these breakaway regions and effectively created stalemates between them and Georgian forces, Russia is content to leave its troops in the region, ostensibly on a protracted withdrawal timeline, with no diplomatic solution in sight. From Russia’s perspective, it provides employment for otherwise redundant Russian forces, it ensures real combat is kept to a minimum, and the conflicts remain confined within predictable geographic boundaries. From the Georgian perspective, these two conflicts in particular are a political albatross with Russian forces mocking Georgian sovereignty daily, they require not insignificant funding for Georgian military forces with Georgia, funds that clearly could be better used elsewhere in this fledgling democracy, and it simply makes for remarkably poor domestic politics to have simmering armed conflicts in not one but two areas of a relatively small nation. But, as mentioned previously, to move toward a solution that runs counter to what Russia appears to want might create longer-term drawbacks in Georgia-Russia relations. Meanwhile Russia slowly creates a state that is more and more beholden to it for maintaining “peace” within its borders.51

Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent two of the four recognized frozen conflicts to which Russia is party; the others are Transdnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In each of these regions, Russia supports the separatist movements in opposition to the national governments of the states within which these regions exist. Variously supporting them with arms, troops, money and rhetoric, Russia’s actions serve to destabilize the state governments and stymie their progress away from the old Soviet system, not only by forcing those governments to acknowledge Russian influence in the region, but by also insisting that Russia be part of the “solution”; indeed, the primary part. The fact that these conflicts are frozen, and not worsening, appears satisfactory to
Russia. In some of these cases, political mechanisms exist for resolution, but effecting resolution appears to require arbitration led by non-interested third parties. Russia, a third-party, is not only interested, it appears to be locked in old Soviet-style methods of statecraft in these regions, demanding that outside nations keep away from its sphere of influence and that the parties involved should find a solution acceptable to both sides (and to Russia). Outside nations appear willing to indulge Russia this forced unilateralist approach. Meanwhile, the nations who find their sovereignty under attack bemoan the situation. Said Georgian Parliament Speaker Burdzhanadze: “We are for a peaceful solution (of the frozen conflicts within Georgia). But the situation is complicated right now. We cannot say the conflicts are frozen, it’s the very process of solving them that had been frozen.”

U.S. Perceptions of Russian Intervention in Georgia

From the beginning of Russian intervention into Georgia in support of the Abkhazian separatist movement, the U.S. has expressed its support of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Following a meeting at the White House between President Clinton and President Shevardnadze, the White House issued a press statement declaring: “The United States reaffirmed its full support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and pledged its continued backing for United Nations efforts to facilitate a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the Abkhaz region of Georgia.” Following the 11 September attacks, the U.S. held generally held this position, but by this time, with no active fighting, there was little need for U.S. comment.

The Rose Revolution, however, offered President Bush the opportunity to briefly paint the outcome as a victory of democracy, without specifically painting Russia as a
threat to democracy. While the implications may have been perceived, officially there was only praise and support. In comments following President Saakishvili’s visit to the White House in February 2004, shortly after his election, President Bush proclaimed that it was “an historic moment . . . [when] the people peacefully exercised their voice and raised their voice. And Georgia transitioned to a new government in an inspiring way.” He expressed his hope that Georgia’s democratic turn would inspire other nations to peacefully choose democracy. In that same press conference, President Bush also professed that he expected “the Russian government to honor the Istanbul commitment. The Istanbul commitment made it very clear that Russia would leave those places. We will continue to work with the President and President Putin on that commitment.” He cited the new Georgian president’s first trip abroad to Russia as a “very sophisticated move” and “a smart thing to do.” Bush also stated that he would “work with Vladimir Putin, with whom I’ve got a good relationship, to make sure relations are good with Georgia.”

The U.S. clearly supports indigenous democratic movements like Georgia’s, but appears happy to support these from a distance. President Bush appears to be relieved that Georgia’s revolution was a non-violent affair that required no outside assistance to resolve, and he appears further relieved that Georgia understands its geopolitical relationship with Russia and realizes Georgia must attempt to mend its own relations with Russia. That is to say, the fact that Georgia has embarked on the road to democracy on its own not only bodes well for its future but leaves the U.S., the self-styled guarantor of democracy, free to pursue other endeavors. For a democratic Georgia is adequately
equipped to handle its own affairs with Russia bilaterally, in a manner that represents the true will of the people, instead of requiring U.S. intervention politically or otherwise.

However, that does not mean the U.S. has left Georgia solely to its own means. More specifically related to the war on terrorism, Russia has long held that Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge to be a haven for terrorists chased out of Chechnya, a perception with which the U.S. agrees. In an attempt to help Georgia fight terrorists within its borders, the U.S. instituted the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in 2002. This program, which ended in 2004, used U.S. soldiers and marines to train five battalions of Georgian personnel in staff operations and tactics that might be useful in counter-terror operations. The program also provided military equipment, to include uniforms, small arms, communications and medical gear, and construction equipment. Following the conclusion of this program, the U.S. continued its engagement operations with Georgia by using a Marine mobile training team to train future Georgian boot camp instructors in infantry basics. Touted as highly successful, these operations give the U.S. a foothold in the region and access to some amount of information regarding operations in the Caucasus.

More recently, the U.S. European Command signed an agreement with Georgia creating the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) which will use both U.S. and U.S.-trained Georgian instructors to train and equip another brigade “according to the modern international standards.”

Still, however, Russia appears unimpressed by U.S.-enhanced Georgian counter-terror capability. Following the Nord-Ost siege, and again following the Beslan siege, President Putin and his Kremlin staff made clear their suspicions that terrorists still
sought refuge in the Pankisi Gorge of Georgia and claimed Russia’s right to attack there unilaterally, without Georgia’s concurrence. As of this writing, they have not done so.

Perhaps to the credit of both nations, neither the U.S. nor Russia has made much of U.S. engagement in Georgia. The U.S. has rarely mentioned GTEP publicly, and when it has, it has only done so to relay the facts of the arrangement and congratulate those involved. Russia, while inevitably bristling at the intervention into its “space,” nevertheless has made little public specific complaint about the presence of U.S. forces in Georgia. While some critics may see this as a diplomatic intrusion into what Russia perceives as its sphere of influence, the fact that there is little diplomatic outrage indicates that such a perception poses minimal harm to U.S.-Russian relations.

**Russian Participation in Ukraine Elections**

In the run-up to the 31 October 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, the two leading candidates were portrayed as proxies of the east and west and the election as a referendum on Ukraine’s future alignment. Sitting Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was touted as outgoing President Leonid Kuchma’s choice, and, thus, President Putin’s as well, with so much of Mr. Yanukovych’s support coming from Ukraine’s largely ethnically Russian eastern regions. Indeed, Putin confidante Gleb Pavlovsky was involved in Mr. Yanukovych’s election campaign. While his support was never formally declared before the October election, President Putin’s visit to Kiev and his invitation to Mr. Yanukovych to attend his birthday party in the days leading to the October election spoke volumes. Former prime minister and businessman Viktor Yushchenko was touted as the pro-western candidate, the reformer who could finally bring Ukraine into the European Union, with much of his support from the more urban western part of the country.
The October election proved extremely close, leading to a run-off between these two candidates on 21 November 2004. Without pretense, President Putin openly supported Mr. Yanukovych as the run-off election neared, while western leaders openly supported Mr. Yushchenko.\textsuperscript{62} As the run-off election votes were counted, the official tally showed that Mr. Yanukovych received a plurality of the votes cast, by just under 3%, but exit polling showed Mr. Yushchenko firmly in the lead. Moreover, OSCE monitors, including U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, charged widespread fraud and abuse in the voting, calling the result into question.\textsuperscript{63} In perhaps the most surprising diplomatic gaffe, however, on the morning after the run-off election, when the votes had been counted but no victor officially declared, President Putin called Mr. Yanukovych personally to congratulate him on his “convincing” victory in an “open and honest” election.\textsuperscript{64} This was somewhat premature.

In the days following the run-off election, Mr. Yushchenko refused to concede defeat, and a popular movement, made up largely of youth supporting Yushchenko and numbering in the hundreds of thousands, set up a tent city in the streets of Kiev. By 3 December, the Ukrainian Supreme Court annulled the run-off election results, and on 8 December the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill to allow a new run-off election to take place on 26 December. The third round of elections appeared to run more smoothly than the previous round, with Mr. Yushchenko reportedly taking a decisive lead in the balloting. Mr. Yanukovych promptly disputed these results, alleging numerous claims of election abuse himself and even submitting his resignation to still-president Kuchma. By 20 January 2005, the Supreme Court rejected Mr. Yanukovych’s final appeal, leading
him to concede defeat. On 23 January Mr. Yushchenko was sworn in as president of Ukraine.  

Following the disputed November run-off election, President Putin and other Russians accused western nations of interfering in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. The outcome of the election, Putin maintained, should be decided by Ukrainians. “We don’t think we have the right to interfere in any way in the election process and impose our opinion on the Ukrainian people,” said Putin. He urged outsiders to let the Ukrainian courts attempt to solve the issue. Westerners could hardly disagree with these words, although some perhaps feared that a judicial system still under the Kuchma regime might sign off on the elections, which the OSCE had so publicly criticized.

At a meeting of the OSCE in December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov scolded the organization for “the thematic and geographical distortions persisting in the work of the Organization and the widespread application of ‘double standards,’” an apparent reference to the lack of international attention given to election irregularities in more established democracies like the U.S. compared to the international clamor following the Ukrainian elections. He further said such practices were “ever more deleterious” and that the OSCE itself was poised to turn into an “instrument of political manipulation and a factor for destabilization.” Because of this perception, Lavrov suggested that OSCE was due for “a comprehensive reform of its structures, specialized institutions, field activities and system of financing.”

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell refuted these speculations almost immediately in some of the most vociferous rhetoric between the U.S. and Russia seen since the fall of the Soviet Union.
I categorically disagree. All OSCE participating states signed up to the proposition that fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of legitimate concern to us all. . . . For our part, the United States takes seriously its commitments to respect human rights, practice democratic government and uphold the rule of law. We have sought to lead by example with transparency and openness. . . . The United States always welcomes suggestions for ways to further strengthen the OSCE. We are open to increasing the OSCE’s activities to promote security and economic development, but not at the expense of the OSCE’s core democracy and human rights work.70

The secretary went on to cite Russia’s own transgressions within the OSCE framework: “Russia’s commitments to withdraw its military forces from Moldova, and to agree with Georgia on the duration of the Russian military presence there, remain unfulfilled.” He also noted: “In parts of our OSCE community, frozen conflicts still remain frozen 15 years after the end of the Cold War,” specifically citing “Nagorno-Karabakh [and the] breakaway regions of Moldova and Georgia.”71 With these words, U.S.-Russia relations appeared to suffer yet another setback.

The timing of the Ukrainian elections, and the long period of time during which the result was in question, was serendipitous for a couple of reasons. The U.S. presidential elections took place on 2 November, almost immediately after the first Ukrainian election; the U.S.-backed elections in Iraq, the first since the U.S. invasion of that country in 2003, took place on 30 January, just days after the Ukrainian elections were finally resolved. Neither the U.S. nor the Iraqi elections escaped comment from Russia. Prior to the U.S. presidential election, President Putin, at a news conference in Tajikistan, gave what amounted to a full-fledged endorsement of President Bush. “International terrorists [in Iraq] have set as their goal inflicting the maximum damage to Bush, to prevent his election to a second term,” Putin said. “If they succeed in doing that, they will celebrate a victory over America and over the entire anti-terror coalition.”72 While he further
maintained that Russia did not support the U.S. war in Iraq per se, he did support the U.S. president. While his comments raised eyebrows abroad, it did not atone for perceived Russian missteps in the Ukrainian elections.

Following the decision to pursue a third election, some speculated on the existence of a diplomatic quid pro quo between Russia and the U.S. on Ukraine and Iraq. The trade, it was speculated, consisted of Russia withholding comment on U.S.-engineered elections in Iraq in return for an end to criticism on its conduct with respect to Ukraine’s elections and a favorable consideration for oil contracts in Iraq when the opportunity presented itself.\(^{73}\) The argument appeared compelling, especially coming on the heels of a Moscow visit by Iraq’s interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi. At a press conference following the meeting, President Putin made a declaration:

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\text{[Russia had] agreed to write off the Iraqi debts to a greater extent than any other member of the Paris Club of creditors. We have done this in the name of solidarity with the friendly Iraqi people, but we also believe that the interests of Russian companies will be taken into consideration by [the Iraqi] leadership and the future Iraqi government after the [30 January 2005] elections.}^{74}\]

However, he also said at the same press conference, “I cannot imagine how it is possible to organize free elections in a country completely occupied by foreign troops.”\(^{75}\) This appeared to be a counter to the U.S. charges of election irregularities in Ukraine. It also appeared to support the quid pro quo speculation: Russia was willing to write off at least some of its $8 billion debt with Iraq in return for future business contracts, but it needed the west to refrain from charges of improper influence in the Ukraine, if not outright recognition of Russia’s sphere of influence. If not, expect more criticism instead of assistance.
While it makes for a good conspiracy theory, it is probably only that. The westward-leaning Yushchenko proved the final winner in Ukrainian elections, Iraqi elections did take place on schedule, and Putin himself called them “a step in the right direction” the next day. More likely, Putin’s words reflect the Russian frustration with U.S. and western efforts at democratization. These efforts tend to thrust change and disorder into regions integral not only to Russia’s international relations but, more importantly, to Russia’s international economic partners. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was clearly a political event, but not so much an economic event. Indeed, regions that had once been geographically integral to the nation were now only economically integral. From the Russian perspective, such incursions threaten not only Russia but all nations who are unwilling to participate in such democratization efforts.\(^76\) As Putin frames it, such incursions are “‘counterproductive’ and destabilizing.”

I do not want to see a situation like in Germany where it was divided between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, into first- and second-class citizens.\ldots\) The first-class people get to live under stable, democratic law while people of the so-called dark political color are being dictated to by a kind but strict uncle ... and if they don’t obey, then they will be beaten with a rocket and missile club, as happened in Belgrade.\(^77\)

Furthermore, an organization such as OSCE, which can simply issue a statement announcing that a set of elections were hampered by irregularities and put a whole nation into turmoil, appears to wield a power well beyond its charter. Russia’s fundamental complaint does not lie with the concepts of democracy and free-market economics per se, but with the means by which such institutions are installed, means which appear to be counter to the presumed values of those institutions—rule of law and peaceful transition of leadership. Perhaps it is for these reasons that Russians appear to want a more measured entry into the so-called “first-class” of people, one that creates the orderly
trappings of these institutions first, and then builds the supporting ideals to maintain them. To Russians, a nation with a democratic form of government may be a good neighbor; a nation with a government that does not foment revolution nor upset long-standing economic relationships is a better one. This perspective on “us” vs. “them” builds on the first- and second-class citizens, with Russia now aligning itself with all those nations whose forms of government come under U.S. criticism despite measured progression toward democracy. The new “we” are simply trying to maintain a peaceful order to the world during this progression.

**Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Program**

In September 2002, Russian technicians reportedly began work on a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, Iran. Later that year, the U.S. accused Iran of constructing two unannounced nuclear facilities at Arak and Natanz, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), to which Iran is a signatory. The U.S. published satellite pictures of these facilities as confirmation. These facilities, when completed, would give Iran a full nuclear fuel cycle capability, according to U.S. reports. That is, they would give Iran the ability not only to produce nuclear power, but to purify spent nuclear fuel rods as well, an ability critical to producing nuclear weapons. In 2003, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors confirmed the existence of these facilities, but Iran claimed they were only for peaceful purposes. The U.S. doubted these claims, as much of Iran’s nuclear program had evidently been underway in secrecy for years.⁷⁸

Late in 2003, France, Germany, and the UK (the EU-3) entered into talks with Iran hoping to create an agreement whereby Iran would either give-up the capability to enrich uranium (the EU-3 proposal) or allow stringent IAEA inspections ensuring such
capability was used only to peaceful ends (the Iranian counter-proposal). While no firm deal had been reached, negotiations were continuing through the spring of 2005. The goal was to corral Iran’s nuclear ambitions and retain international visibility into its program without pushing so hard that Iran is compelled to renounce the NNPT, thus removing all diplomatic pressure for transparency.\(^79\)

Three days after a summit between Presidents Putin and Bush in Bratislava, Slovakia, where President Putin noted, “We talked a lot about the situation in Iran . . . and we share a common opinion in this regard, and we are taking a similar approach,” Russia announced it had signed a deal with Iran to complete the Bushehr reactor and supply fuel for it on the condition it was returned to Russia for reprocessing.\(^80\) While an apparent contrast to U.S. hopes for the situation, President Bush attempted to portray Russia’s move in a positive light.

As to Iran, what Russia has agreed to do is to send highly enriched uranium to a nuclear civilian power plant and then collect that uranium after it’s used for electricity, power purposes. [T]hey recognize . . . that we can’t trust the Iranians when it comes to enriching uranium; that they should not be allowed to enrich uranium. . . . Russia said: Fine, we’ll provide you the uranium. We’ll enrich it for you and provide it to you and then we’ll collect it. And I appreciate that gesture. So I think Vladimir [Putin] was trying to help there. I know Vladimir Putin understands the dangers of an Iran with a nuclear weapon. And most of the world understands that as well.\(^81\)

Some have claimed Russia’s support of the Iranian nuclear effort is a payback for U.S. influence in the Ukrainian presidential election. A less nefarious explanation is simply the financial motive—building nuclear facilities is a massive undertaking, and those who build them stand to make money. Clearly Russia has economic interests in the region, as shown by its pursuit of oil contracts with the new Iraqi regime. It stands to reason that it should pursue other business opportunities in the region. Furthermore,
there is an underlying logic in Russia’s actions, at least for the moment: if Russia supplies the fuel rods as it claims it will, and re-processes them after use, it takes away Iran’s need for an indigenous uranium processing capability. Although it may smack of the chicken in the henhouse, at least the rhetoric is supportable. While the Bush administration would prefer that no nation support any nuclear activity in Iran, at least the promise of having spent fuel rods re-processed outside of Iran offers some measure of security. Again, however, this solution appears to be only temporary: Iran maintains that, despite Russian promises, it still hopes to build a complete and indigenous fuel cycle capability eventually. 

This episode appears to have put the U.S. in the role of defining the “us” and “them.” While Russian support of Iran’s nuclear program is decidedly in contrast to U.S. perceptions of proper actions in support of the global war on terrorism, apparently it is not worth breaking apart what alliance does exist between the two nations. So the U.S. has put itself into Russia’s “us” camp despite these differences. Indeed, any rapprochement with Iran, even that which appears to support terrorist aims, may provide the U.S. with enough access to intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program to enable more thoughtful and measured decisions in the future.

Putin’s Consolidation of “Power Vertical”

In December 1999, days before President Yeltsin installed Prime Minister Putin as his successor, Putin delivered a broad policy statement describing his stance on a variety of issues. In this statement, published on a government website, Putin proclaimed his goals and objectives for Russia and Russians, and laid out a wide-ranging list of tasks that he proposed to pursue in the future. Clearly the first public statement of the Putin for
President campaign, this document offered many clues about what initiatives Putin would pursue as president. Upon review, perhaps the real surprise is that the west did not anticipate his later actions.

In his manifesto, Putin declares that “Russia has reached its limit for political and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms and radical reforms” and that “responsible socio-political forces should offer the country a strategy for Russia’s revival and prosperity based democratic reforms and implemented only by evolutionary, gradual and prudent methods.” Key among these methods was a strong state.

*The key to Russia’s recovery and growth today lies in the state-political sphere. Russia needs strong state power and must have it.* I am not calling for totalitarianism. History proves all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of government are transient. Only democratic systems are lasting. Whatever the shortcomings, humanity has not devised anything superior. *Strong state power in Russia is a democratic, law-based, workable federal state.* [Emphasis in original.]

Indeed, such a strong state was a unique need of all Russians, a requirement quite different from that of the U.S. or the UK. “Our state and its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly to be discarded. Quite the contrary, they see it as the source and guarantee of order, and the initiator and the main driving force of change.”

In this light, then, perhaps the reforms that President Putin enacted should have been anticipated. Among the moves to strengthen the so-called “vertical of power” in Russia, the Kremlin has appointed seven Presidential Representatives to represent the president regionally to the governors (adding a layer of “representation” between regional governors and the president); removing elected governors from the Federation Council (the upper house of the legislature); eliminating altogether popular elections for
governors, instead appointing them to the regions (with regional approval); and increasing federal control over broadcast media. These changes are seen as an alarming trend, not as a return to the totalitarian state of the Soviet Union’s days, but as a shift away from what were perceived as a clear democratic trend during the 1990s. Indeed, there is still a strong voice of dissent in the print media and over the internet, and the voice of the people still looms large as evidenced by public protests over the government’s attempt to monetize benefits to seniors early in 2005.

Perhaps more troubling is the timing of some of these reforms: immediately following the Beslan siege, President Putin announced the plan to scrap direct parliamentary elections, saying such moves were necessary to help the state combat terrorism. Corruption, he claimed, was a tremendous plague in Russia, especially in the regional governments, and many had become beholden to non-state interests. “I have observed with alarm the growing influence of economic groups and various economic clans ... at the level of regional government,” said Putin. These groups and clans, he reasoned, may not have the best interests of Russia in mind. For these reasons he attempted to secure the vertical of power, ensuring only civic-minded Russians control Russia’s politics.

While bringing a vociferous attack upon President Putin and his administration from within and outside Russia, these reforms do not appear to have critically damaged the relationship between the U.S. and Russia, although it is consistently a topic of conversation. At a press conference featuring the Presidents Putin and Bush at the Bratislava summit in February 2005, both presidents were repeatedly questioned about these reforms. President Putin proclaimed, “Russia has made its choice in favor of
democracy.” President Bush seemed reassured by Putin’s statements and confident in his leadership and their common values.\textsuperscript{90} While may simply be a case of \textit{realpolitik} and the fact that the U.S. needs Russia in the war on terror, the fact is that Russia’s pursuit of the vertical of power has not yet slowed U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Notes


\textsuperscript{5} For a basic overview of Soviet political doctrine, see William E. Odom, \textit{The Collapse of the Soviet Military} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{6} Simon Saradzhyan, “Putin Tells Nation ‘This Is An Attack Against All Of Us’,” \textit{The Moscow Times}, 6 September 2004, via ISI Emerging Markets.


\textsuperscript{8} Simon Saradzhyan, “Putin Tells Nation ‘This Is An Attack Against All Of Us’,” \textit{The Moscow Times}, 6 September 2004, via ISI Emerging Markets.


Notes


15 Patterns of Global Terror 2003, p. 35.

16 The example of Kosovo notwithstanding, human rights violations alone rarely motivate US intervention into internal, or even interstate, affairs. The clearest example of this may be the lack of intervention into Rwanda in 1994, where tribal Hutu militias killed some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in what hasroundly been called the worst modern case of genocide. See “Rwanda Genocide: 10 Years On,” BBC News, 24 December 2004, available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/africa/2004/rwanda/default.stm.


23 Vladimir Putin, “We Shall Seek To Come To Agreement With Chechens,” Paris Match, 5 July 2000; translation reprinted from Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian Press Digest, 10 July, 2000, via Lexis-Nexis, and also quoted in Mark A. Smith, Russian Perspectives on Terrorism, (Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, July 2004), pp. 3-4.
Notes


25 Ibid.


Notes


36 Ibid.


51 “Rose-Roth Report.”
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53 Danilova.
54 “Joint Declaration On Relations Between The United States Of America And The Republic Of Georgia,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 March 1994, available online at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/030794-press-release-on-us-georgian-relations.htm
61 Gennady Petrov, “What Happens After The Victory Of Viktor Y.?” Russia Profile, 1 November 2004, via Johnson’s Russia List # 8436, 2 November 2004;
25 November 2004
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69 Twelfth Meeting of the Ministerial Council: 6 and 7 December 2004, p. 75.


71 Ibid.


75 Ibid.


77 “Putin Warns West Against Sowing Division Ukraine,” Agence France Presse, 6 December 2004 via Lexis-Nexis.


79 Ibid.


82 “Iran, Russia Sign Landmark Deal To Fire Up Controversial Nuclear Plant,” Agence France Presse, 27 February 2005, via Johnson’s Russia List # 9070, 28 February 2005.


84 Vladimir Putin, “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” 29 December 1999, p. 6.


86 Ibid, p. 5.
Notes


Chapter 5

Cooperative Efforts to Date

There are no small parts, only small actors.
—Donald Rumsfeld

When President George W. Bush first met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Slovenia, he said, “I was able to get a sense of his soul, a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country.”¹ After the events of 11 September 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first international leader to call the U.S. president and offer condolences and support. He later said, “Russia knows directly what terrorism means. And because of this we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. In the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people — we are with you.”² This close relationship seemed powerful enough to forge through disagreements on ABM treaty, NATO expansion, and military support for Georgia and establish a new cooperation in the Global War on Terror.

There is an old adage that there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. In this chapter we will look at both bi-lateral and international institutional cooperation between Russia and the United States.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Cooperative Threat Reduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 opened the possibility that some of its formidable weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal may not be adequately protected and could fall into the hands of rogue states or even terrorists. Recognizing this concern, U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar sponsored the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. This legislation, renamed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in 1993 but commonly also referred to as Nunn-Lugar, was enacted to assist Russia and other former Soviet States in protecting and eliminating its nuclear and other weapons and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite the cold war and its fifty years of distrust and antagonism, the Nunn-Lugar and its related programs have been successful. The United States has spent more than 7 billion dollars and with Russia’s cooperation; the two countries have achieved concrete results. The complete timeline of the program’s success is available in Appendix X.

Challenges ahead

Despite the numerous success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program there are still significant areas of concern.

Chemical Weapons: Russia has a declared stockpile of 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, the world’s largest. The stockpile is predominantly made up of highly advanced nerve agents. Moscow has repeatedly refused to disclose any additional information thus limiting the effectiveness of current reduction measures and stymieing cooperation. If Russia has disclosed the correct figure, estimates for the total elimination
start at $10 billion. The United States has been destroying its chemical weapons since the
1970s, so far is rid of only one-third of them, and already has spent $16 billion.³

**Non-SSBN Submarine Dismantlement:** Nunn-Lugar is limited to dismantling
strategic missile submarines (SSBN). The United States is not involved in dismantling
the more than 100 SSN nuclear submarines that Russia possesses.⁴

**Tactical Nuclear Weapons:** Russia has not disclosed numbers for their tactical
nuclear weapons. Due to the physical size of a tactical nuclear weapon, it is inherently
more portable than a strategic nuclear weapon and thus a potentially greater threat for
proliferation. Cooperation is required in basically all areas, including reporting,
deployment status, elimination and storage security.

**Fissile Material Security:** Only approximately 40 percent of Russia’s storage
facilities have received security upgrades thus far.

**Biological Weapons:** Four former Soviet biological weapons facilities remain
closed to U.S. inspectors. While there has been progress where Russia has opened
facilities, their hesitancy to open all biological weapons plants makes cooperation
impossible.

**Plutonium:** Russia still has 134 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium that is
not covered by any cooperative threat reduction program.⁵

**WMD Scientist and Technician Employment:** Again significant progress has
been made, but the overall economic situation in Russia has not lead to an explosion of
high technology jobs. As each U.S. program or peaceful research grant ends, the highly
trained individuals that supported these programs may fall into a period of personal
economic desperation, bringing with it the possibility that their services may be for hire
by a terrorist organization or some other enemy of the United States. Cooperation must continue until the Russian economic can provide sustainable, profitable private sector jobs.

**Additional Agreement:** Russia has not ratified the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement. This agreement is a key for future cooperation. It ensures that all threat reductions money, including money supplied by other G-8 countries, is protected from Russian tax authorities. It also provides required liability protection for contractors in case of accidents or mishaps. The Duma has not voted on this measure.

**Joint Statement 2005**

Both Russia and the United States appear to recognize the requirement for enhanced cooperation in this arena. During President Bush’s summit with President Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, in February 2005, the discussed this aspect of cooperation. The following is the Joint Russian-American Statement on Cooperation in Questions of Security in the Nuclear Sphere that resulted from the Bratislava talks.

The United States and Russia will enhance cooperation to counter one of the gravest threats our two countries face, nuclear terrorism. We bear a special responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material, in order to ensure that there is no possibility such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist hands. While the security of nuclear facilities in the U.S. and Russia meet current requirements, we stress that these requirements must be constantly enhanced to counter the evolving terrorist threats. Building on our earlier work, we announce today our intention to expand and deepen cooperation on nuclear security with the goal of enhancing the security of nuclear facilities in our two countries and, together with our friends and allies, around the globe.

To this end the United States and Russia will continue and expand their cooperation on emergency response capability to deal with the consequences of a nuclear/radiological incident, including the development of additional technical methods to detect nuclear and radioactive materials that are, or may be, involved in the incident.
We will work together to help ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and early adoption of an International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

U.S. and Russian experts will share “best practices” for the sake of improving security at nuclear facilities, and will jointly initiate security “best practices” consultations with other countries that have advanced nuclear programs. Our experts will convene in 2005 a senior-level bilateral nuclear security workshop to focus increased attention on the “security culture” in our countries including fostering disciplined, well-trained, and responsible custodians and protective forces, and fully utilized and well-maintained security systems.

The United States and Russia will continue to work jointly to develop low-enriched uranium fuel for use in any U.S.- and Russian-design research reactors in third countries now using high-enriched uranium fuel, and to return fresh and spent high-enriched uranium from U.S.- and Russian-design research reactors in third countries.

The United States and Russia will continue our cooperation on security upgrades of nuclear facilities and develop a plan of work through and beyond 2008 on joint projects. Recognizing that the terrorist threat is both long-term and constantly evolving, in

2008 our countries will assess the joint projects and identify avenues for future cooperation consistent with our increased attention to the security culture in both countries.

We have established a bilateral Senior Interagency Group chaired by Secretary of Energy Bodman and Rosatom Director Rumyantsev for cooperation on nuclear security to oversee implementation of these cooperative efforts. A progress report will be due on July 1, 2005, and thereafter on a regular basis.6

Important elements within this statement include the vows for continued cooperation and sharing “best practices” for physical security, and the recognition that that this was integrally part of fighting the global terrorist threat. The establishment of a progress report, with a timeline and a claim that it would continue, will help help ensure further cooperation in shoring up Russia’s WMD capabilities.
However, the most difficult and possibly most pervasive problems for enhanced U.S.-Russian cooperation are the limited access and transparency. While some Cold War mentality definitely still exists on both sides, large sections of Russia’s political and military bureaucracy still view the United States as an enemy. Though the possibility of military conflict is almost gone, U.S. actions throughout the world are viewed in Russia as attempts to limit their national interests and efforts to impede Russia’s return to superpower status. For these reasons, threat reduction program requests for more access and greater transparency are met with significant suspicion from many Russians.

After the joint statement in Bratislava, some nationalist Russians called the joint statement “Russian capitulation.” Strategic Missile Troops Commander Col-Gen Nikolay Solovtsov said on May 5, “As far as inspections of nuclear warheads in storage facilities are concerned, I do not think access to them will be afforded in the near future.” In March 2003 a U.S. General Accounting Office study found that this lack of access to nuclear warhead, fissile material, and biological weapons production facilities had significantly slowed progress for several threat reduction programs.

**Russian Support for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

Soviet military forces withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989 following a protracted and largely unsuccessful effort to defeat Muslim insurgents. Despite western predictions of a quick victory, the mujahadeen fighters needed more than three more years to overthrow the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan in April 1992. After their withdrawal, Soviet and then Russian military advisors continued to work with and supply the pro-Russian Afghan army. In 1994, after two more years of infighting, the Taliban began to take control of Afghanistan. In response, and in an interesting turn, Russia then
began its support of the Northern Alliance and Ahmad Shah Massoud, the former mujahadeen commander and hero of Afghanistan. This support continued through the 1990’s as Russia alleged that the Taliban was providing support, in the way of arms and training to Chechen and Uzbek terrorists. In a notable recognition of its own strategic interests, Russia was concerned that the Taliban could promote extremist terrorists throughout the relatively weak Central Asian republics and thus significantly threaten Russia itself. In April 2000, Defense Minister Ivanov stated that Russia might conduct preventative air strikes against terrorist bases in Afghanistan.10

In fact most of Russia’s senior security personnel viewed Afghanistan in the same light. In July 2001, then Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Kvashnin, identified Afghanistan and the phenomena of extremism, separatism, and international terrorism as the main threats then facing Russia.11 While touring Central Asia in May 2000, President Vladimir Putin discussed providing more military aid for the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, including direct military support.12 After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some Russians felt that their stance in the Caucasus and Central Asia had been vindicated. The United States and the rest of the world would now have to recognize the threat, the same threat in Russia’s eyes, that it have been fighting for years in Chechnya.

Immediately prior to the events of 11 September 2001, there was no shortage of disagreement between Russia and the United States. The United States had continued to push Russia toward a peaceful resolution in Chechnya. The United States was committed to continue its work on a missile defense plan that would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Russia was concerned about U.S. influence in the Caspian Sea region and
the possibility of oil bypassing Russia enroute to the west. It was concerned with increasing levels of cooperation between Central Asia and NATO, specifically in the Partnership for Peace. It opposed further NATO enlargement and United States’ cooperation with Georgia. Despite all of these issues, however, Russian cooperation with the U.S. was almost immediate.

President Putin was the first world leader to offer condolence by phone to President Bush following the terrorists attacks in the U.S. A week after the attacks, in an emergency meeting of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Countering Threats from Afghanistan, Russian officials said that Russia is ready to “render all possible support to the United States” in the fight against terrorism. Despite all the differences previously discussed, Russian leaders put forward no conditions for their support.

On 24 September, President Putin officially outlined Russia’s support. Russia would increase military aid to Afghan opposition, the Northern Alliance. Moscow would share its intelligence with Washington, very important given the amount of Soviet military experience in the region. Specifically, Putin said there would be “active cooperation” between Russian and American secret services.

While allowing some transport overflight, Russia would not permit U.S. or coalition warplanes from using Russian airspace or facilities. Russia would allow humanitarian aid and some search and rescue operations to be conducted from its airspace. Most importantly, President Putin said the Central Asian republics shared Russia’s position but were free to decide if their airspace and air bases can be used by the U.S. military. This opened the door to the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan governments allowing coalition airplanes to be based at Khanabad and Manas.
In addition to all the promised assistance that did come to fruition, there were numerous reports of Russian troop involvement. After the coalition bombing campaign started, Pavel Felgenhaur reported in The Moscow Times:

Reliable sources in Moscow say that parts of the Russian 201st division have also crossed from Tajikistan into Afghanistan to help fight the Taliban. Russian officers and tank crews are operating with the anti-Taliban forces only 30 kilometers north of Kabul.\(^{16}\)

From the American perspective, the benefit for Russian participation was simple. The coalition would sweep the Taliban from power and thus eliminate its support for Islamic radical groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and thus increase security and stability in Central Asia. Central Asia could then serve as Russia’s buffer against extremism, increasing Russia’s own security.

Russian perspective was different. The Russians had made it clear to Secretary of State Powell at the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Countering Threats from Afghanistan that there were no conditions for their support, but this is and was not the case. Russia’s view was that cooperation equaled a free hand in dealing with its internal and external problems, specifically Chechnya. After enduring years of international condemnation of its human rights abuses in Chechnya, Russia would now be able to move freely. Moscow analyst Yefim Dikii, said that following Russian efforts at cooperation with the U.S. war on Afghanistan, the “world public” would no longer be able to condemn the Russian military’s brutal tactics in Chechnya.\(^{17}\) Another Russian analyst, Mikhail Leontyev, suggested that Russia should make use of the current “beneficial situation” and “try to resolve at least some part of our problems in Chechnya and Georgia.” “If Russia now wipes out the Chechen militants in the Pankisi Gorge (located in Georgia), not a single soul in the world will be able to reproach us,” Leontyev asserted.\(^{18}\)
Even while offering Russian support, President Putin said that, due to the attacks in America, “the conflict in Chechnya could not be viewed outside the context of the combat against terrorism.”\textsuperscript{19} That is, there was now a common vocabulary for the fight against terrorism, and Chechnya was synonymous with Afghanistan. Each nation, however, assumed different returns on the investment in cooperation in Afghanistan. The situation, with its overlapping national interests and national priorities, made cooperation the obvious choice. From both national perspectives, only good could come of this cooperation. The nature of “good,” however, was different for each nation.

**Intelligence Sharing**

Public statements and comments from U.S. and Russian sources clearly indicate that U.S. and Russian agencies share intelligence on terrorism and other issues, but it should hardly be surprising that the details of such cooperation are highly classified and hard to come by in the public domain. As stated previously in this chapter, U.S.-Russian collaboration on Afghanistan began well before the terrorist attack in the U.S. and continued, in some cases with renewed vigor, after that event. This cooperation, in addition to being classified, is largely compartmentalized, meaning situation-specific information is shared only with agencies with a need to know that information.

One example of cooperation that has been publicly announced, albeit without detail, is the recent agreement between the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). A December 2004 meeting between FBI Director Robert Mueller and FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev resulted in a memorandum of cooperation focused on counterterrorism and WMD cooperation, in addition to other issues. According to Director Mueller, “the most important thing is that the agreement
provides for information exchanges on important operational issues.” Also during this visit, the FBI director met with Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev to discuss cooperation in the counterterrorism fight and in combating transnational organized crime. This was the most recent example of cooperative efforts between the two nations law-enforcement agencies. Previous agreements had sought to improve information-sharing on “the location and intentions of suspected extremists.”

This level of cooperation, which includes not only agreements between agency heads but real cooperation at the operational and tactical levels, is one of the more useful aspects of U.S.-Russian collaboration in the war on terror. Beyond the simple sharing of intelligence, which by itself could be hugely valuable given Russia’s experiences in the region and its relations with client states in the Middle East, this type of cooperation provides opportunities to share insights into each nation’s values and interests that are not otherwise publicly stated. So not only is information-sharing an opportunity to expand U.S. intelligence on terrorists groups, their methods and locations; it is a unique opportunity to build insight into the workings of the Russian foreign policy mechanism—an additional category of intelligence. Even beyond that, however, is the opportunity to share U.S. perspectives regarding law enforcement, democratic institutions, and the limits of state power with Russian bureaucrats, those elements of the Russian system that execute the policies of the state.

**U.S. – Russia Counterterrorism Working Group**

As a result of the Clinton- Putin Summit in June 2000 in Moscow, the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan (WGA), an intergovernmental working group, was established to explore “ways to stem the threats to the international community from
Taliban support for terrorist activities.” The groups first meeting took place in August of that year, focused on expanding and strengthening UN sanctions imposed against the Taliban.\(^{21}\)

Prior to 11 September 2001, the Group was a useful way of consolidating diplomatic positions. It resulted in increased pressure on the Taliban to:

- cease their support for terrorism and close terrorist training camps;
- comply with UN Security Council Resolution;
- expel Usama bin Ladin;
- commit to a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan;
- end their support of illegal narcotics production and trafficking;
- accept international standards on human rights, including with regard to the status and treatment of women and girls.\(^{22}\)

The efforts of the group resulted in additional UN Security Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban leadership through Security Council Resolution 1333 because of their continued support for terrorism. The group also helped mobilize the international community to avert a humanitarian tragedy. The extended civil war and drought left Afghanistan on the verge of widespread famine. The WGA encouraged UN donor states to increase assistance. Additional assistance was then provided to rural population affected by a ban on opium poppy cultivation.\(^{23}\)

After September 2001, the WGA was used as a way to discuss progress Operation Enduring Freedom and plan for Afghanistan’s future governance together. However, press statements on meetings following the terrorist attacks took on a more nebulous character. Despite the fact that “[t] he two delegations noted the extraordinary depth and
breadth of cooperation and consultation between the Russian Federation and the United States,” little real detail was given.24

In 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed an agreement for a new strategic relationship, including promises to cooperate on counterterrorism. The cooperation included expanding the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan to become a U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism.(CTWG). Since its reformation the CTWG has continued its work, just on a much larger scale. Subgroups were set up to cover specific regions such as the Caucasus and specific concerns such as WMD.25

The most obvious contribution of such a group to a cooperative effort has been its use as a venue for communication. Although it appears from the press releases that little real cooperation has arisen from this group since the war on terror began, many U.S. initiatives have been discussed in this forum, notably the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), in which U.S. forces agreed to train Georgian forces to fight terrorists within Georgia.26 It appears WMD discussions have also been substantive, at a subgroup level, which may be a key to its further success.27 If nothing else, such a forum has served to cushion the blow from U.S. initiatives that might otherwise engender a more vitriolic response from Russia.

**U.S. – Russia in Multinational Institutions**

In addition to bilateral cooperative efforts, the U.S. and Russia also have participated in multilateral efforts with some success. Chief among these are efforts with the United Nations and NATO.
UN and the Security Council

Since the embassy bombing in 1998, the Russia has supported 22 anti-terror UN Security Council resolutions. (See Appendix Y.) The most recent anti-terror resolution 1566 was sponsored by Russia after the Beslan attack. Russia’s draft resolution called for the creation of a new blacklist of terrorist suspects subject to extradition. The current Security Council blacklist is solely for Taliban and al Qaeda suspects.

Shortly after the Beslan siege in Russia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for a new counter-terrorism resolution during a UN General Assembly speech. As discussed elsewhere, Russia has repeatedly denounced “double standards” in the fight against terrorism. Russia viewed Beslan as their (second) 11 September, and Lavrov took the opportunity to leverage international sympathy for Russia to support a resolution that would have states such as Britain and Qatar extradite suspected Chechen fugitives and financiers. The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees sets out specific rules about refugee and asylum, specifically that asylum does not apply to anyone who has committed a war crime, a crime against humanity, or other serious crime, or who is guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Without rewriting the definition of terrorism that would include Chechens (or, more simply, separatists) in this group, Russia is not likely to get the assistance it was looking for post-Beslan.

The draft resolution that was considered following Beslan did attempt to define terrorism, which the 191-member Assembly has been unable to do in the past. Algeria’s UN ambassador, Abdalla Baali, the Security Council’s only Arab member, said, “As long as we are not able to agree on a definition of terrorism, between acts of terrorism and the fight for liberation, it will be hazardous to open the (black) list,” or attempt to extradite
people based on erroneous definitions of terrorism. This draft resolution did pass, but with a definition of terrorism that did not completely satisfy Russia. (See Appendix Z.)

The resolution that did pass included a broad definition of terrorism that focused on the means, rather than the motivations, terrorists used:

[C]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.

Like most UN documents, the resolution is not especially straightforward or easily understood unless you are a lawyer. While this kind of language usually allows for mass approval it did not in this case as all member states did not accept the interpretation. While containing a definition of terrorism, the failure of the resolution to specifically articulate the differences between acts of terror and the legitimate right to fight against foreign occupation upset such member states as Algeria as it upset Russia for the opposite reasons. Furthermore, the resolution failed to impose penalties on states that do not cooperate in prosecuting terrorists nor on states that provide a haven for terrorists. Neither does the resolution does not call for bans or sanctions against those who incite terror. It appears that Russia gained little political ground while suffering its worst terrorist attack ever.

While such frustrations would seem to lead Russia away from the UN, that is doubtful. The seat on the Security Council is one of Russia’s last remaining superpower
positions. These frustrations do, however, show the classic difficulty in getting meaningful agreement and cooperation among the many nations of the UN, and therefore the limits of its value as a cooperative body.

**G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG)**

While Russia may have felt somewhat shortchanged by the U.S. in its cooperation in Afghanistan, one area where Russia was definitely rewarded is the G-8. In 2002, Russia was rewarded with possible full membership in the Group of Eight and the right to host the 2006 G-8 summit despite a small still corrupt economy. Until 2002, Russia has been allowed into the political discussions of the G8 but excluded from financial meetings of the Group of Seven powers — Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. President Putin hailed the G8’s awarding of the 2006 summit to Russia as a “good sign,” adding: “Russia’s role is growing, and what is most important is the quality of our relations with the leading industrial countries is changing.”

The Russia’s counter-terror cooperation with the G-8 focuses in two areas: WMD threat reduction and the Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG). In 2002 the G-8 agreed to expand the scope, funding, and timeline for WMD threat reduction activities in Russia. In 2003, the G-8 established the CTAG to coordinate international counterterrorism activities as a means of eradicating the root causes of terrorism worldwide. The G-8 CTAG works closely with the international crime section and has already worked to develop cooperation in specific areas, such as:

- counterterrorism capacity building;
- dissemination of G8 counterterrorism best practices through the UN Counterterrorism Committee;
- passport issuance standards;
- advance airline passenger information,
- critical information infrastructure protection;
- freezing of terrorist assets;
- use of DNA evidence;
- judicial cooperation for prevention terrorist crimes; and
- protection of children from sexual exploitation online.

While the U.S. has an interest in WMD safety and monitors it through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the G-8 countries also have a vested interest in reducing the threat potential of former Soviet states WMD programs. The creation of the G-8 Global Partnership was meant to be a way of jump starting multilateral WMD threat reduction. G-8 countries have promised to commit 20 billion dollars to nonproliferation efforts in Russia. Under the Global Partnership plan, the United States will spend 10 billion dollars in addition to the approximately 1 billion dollars a year already committed through the CTR programs. This is the so-called “10-10-10 agreement.” The U.S. gives Russia 10 billion dollars while the other six members of the G-8 give 10 billion dollars over the next 10 years. Since the partnership’s start in 2002, the other G-8 states, the European Union, and a few non-G-8 countries have pledged approximately 8.5 billion dollars.

The major interest of this partnership focuses on areas outside of the current CTR programs such as infrastructure development for chemical weapons destruction and
plutonium disposition, non-SSBN submarine dismantlement, re-employment of weapons scientists in Europe or European companies, safety projects for Soviet-designed nuclear reactors and environmental clean-up projects in the former Soviet Union. It provides a forum to expand on CTR concerns without creating any obstacles to the continued success of that program.

The CTAG was designed to identify countries that had difficulty implementing the requirements of UNSCR 1373 and then provide counterterrorism assist to those countries. The initial push was focused on terrorist financing, port and maritime security, aviation security, and Police and law enforcement. In May 2004, the first compliance report was produced with Russia being assessed as in full compliance. The string of terrorist attacks in Russia in late summer 2004 brings this assessment into question. Russia has repeatedly affirmed the importance of improving counter-terrorism capabilities in developing countries.33 Just as in other areas of cooperation, Russia’s lingering superpower self-image, without the capability to support such perceptions with action and example, actually hurts cooperation. Russia sees itself as a donor of CT assistance and not a recipient, despite of the evidence to the contrary.

**NATO-Russia Cooperation**

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The Founding Act mentions terrorism specifically.34

NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as terrorism.
While cooperation between NATO and Russia, specifically in the area of counterterrorism have expanded due to the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington and Beslan. There is still a long way to go before NATO Russia Cooperation becomes the rule rather than the exception.

As recently as 14 October 2004, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov highlighted the failures of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The problem with NATO Russia cooperation, like other areas, it suffers from differing perspectives and cold war thinking. According to a NATO press release after the Rome Summit in May 2002, the NATO-Russia Council was designed to provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision making, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. Additionally, the NATO-Russia Council would serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship “in areas where our ability to help one another as equal partners is unmistakeable, areas such as countering terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, emergency planning and search and rescue operations at sea.”

The creation of the Council seemed like a new start for Cold War foes and a way for NATO and Russia to work together to address 21st century security challenges. Many defense leaders publicly were optimistic about the fledgling relationship: “We want to build a culture of cooperation,” said Aleksandr Alekseyev, one of Russia’s envoys to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “It is a mark of the political will underpinning the new NATO-Russia relationship that we have been able to get down to real business so quickly and so effectively,” said then-NATO Secretary General George
Robertson. “We are confronted with very serious threats to our security,” Russian Minister Ivanov said. “Those threats need to be combated with very different tools than those used during the Cold War.”

While the NATO press releases were joint statements, NATO’s and Russia’s perceptions of the Council were never the same. Russia viewed the Council as a way to give Moscow a voice in NATO decisions on such issues as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, crisis management and military cooperation. NATO saw the Council as a confidence-building measure, a way to assure the Russians that they have nothing to fear from NATO or NATO expansion.

Despite the differences, two weeks after the new council was established, Russia and NATO agreed on a joint defense regime. The package included increasing cooperation on countering terrorism specifically for NATO peacekeepers in the Balkans, conducting a joint assessment of terrorist threats to airliners, nuclear power plants and other civilian and military targets, and preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The NATO-Russia Council’s quick start, however, did not lead to the development of a highly useful or productive military relationship. Distrust, fueled by deeply ingrained Cold War mentalities and differing expectations, froze the Council in its immature and initial state. NATO’s and Russia’s expectations of the Council appear to have been as different as their perceptions of its mission. The U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, represented the NATO expectation saying, “We should think big for the long term but move step by step in the short term.” “For the first phase,”
Vershbow added, “it is better to have a concrete list of modest goals to avoid being disappointed.”

Russia’s view of the limited scope and slow progress of the Council can be summed up by the deputy head of the Moscow-based Institute for Applied International Research, Andrei Zagorsky, who said, “What is most worrying is the lack of any real military cooperation” between Russia and NATO. Aleksei Arbatov, Deputy Head of the State Duma’s Defense Committee, agreed, saying that the much-heralded improvement in NATO-Russia relations had been mostly hype. “New relations with NATO are contained to high-level summits and meetings, while common programs are rare and lack interest,” Arbatov said.

The Council has worked slowly, but a few successes have been achieved over its history. The Council has:

- Launched a military-to-military interoperability program to allow Russian and NATO troops to operate jointly. This program led to a fairly aggressive 2004 schedule of 21 joint exercises, including eight conducted within Russia;
- Conducted civil emergency exercises in Russia. With the intended goal of developing a multinational rapid deployment capability for civil emergencies, exercises have been conducted including a chemical attack exercise in September 2002 and a nuclear attack exercise in 2004. A large-scale civil-emergency planning exercise (850 participants from 30 countries) was completed in Noginsk, Russia. The NRC is currently studying lessons learned;
- Completed joint assessments of terrorist threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area, including al-Qaida, and the threat of chemical and biological weapons from non-state actors;
- Cooperated on submarine search and rescue, including actual exercises conducted earlier this year;
- Conducted a Joint Theater Missile Defense Command Post Exercise in Colorado Springs in March 2004;
Agreed to Russia participating in Operation Active Endeavor, NATO’s anti-terrorist naval operations in the Mediterranean.48

In the opinion of Vadim Razumovsky, Director of the Institute of Applied International Studies, the most important goal of the NATO-Russia Council is to overcome mutual distrust in relations, however, overcoming distrust has proven to be very difficult.49 Current Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevskiy, wrote in April 2003, “despite the transformations that have occurred in the North Atlantic alliance under the impact of the dynamic changes of the past decade and its own so-called modernization, it has remained, basically, a military bloc.”50 He wrote in the same article, “it is still our view that the decision on NATO enlargement is erroneous. It will have a negative impact on the general security architecture in Europe, affecting the security interests of a number of states, including Russia’s.”51

The first ever joint naval maneuvers between Russia and NATO took place in the Atlantic Ocean in August of 2004 and provided a demonstration of the lingering suspicion and hostility Just days prior to the exercise, Admiral Vladimir Valuyev, Commander of the Baltic Fleet, commented on Russian television, “Every nation, including Russia, must seek to strengthen its armed forces and its navy. It will come in useful. If NATO behaves peacefully, we’ll stick to peacetime tasks. If, however, the situation is escalated, we’ll always be ready to take appropriate action.”52

General Baluyevskiy and Admiral Valuyev are primary players in the Russian military. Their rhetoric reflects a deeply ingrained view within Russian military circles that continues to portray NATO as the enemy. Their assessment of the threats faced by the Russian Federation does not take into account the rapprochement between NATO and Russia, nor does it adequately convey our shared 21st century threat environment.
NATO’s view is that each successfully conducted joint exercise will continue to erode the “NATO is the enemy” view, especially in the junior officers.

During a January 2005 speech to the Russian Security Council, President Putin highlighted lingering Russian fears over further NATO expansion, but promised to increase cooperation with the alliance. Newly elected Ukrainian President Yushchenko, inaugurated just days prior to Putin’s speech, repeatedly has made it clear that he will push for Ukrainian membership in NATO. Russia opposes membership for Ukraine based on several emotional reasons linked with its enduring self image as a superpower, but actual security concerns include the location of the Black Sea Fleet in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol and the thousand mile plus border Russia would have with NATO, if Ukraine joined the alliance.

Putin’s discussion of increased NATO cooperation in his 2005 address was significantly different from his last Security Council speech in July 2004. President Putin had focused on Russia’s preeminent role within the Commonwealth of Independent States. He stated, “Russia’s role in increasing the influence and authority of the CIS is highly significant.” At the same time, he acknowledged, “We (Russia) are facing increasing political and economic competition with the CIS (region).”

The Kremlin’s desire to strengthen the CIS seems to have accomplished little in stemming the tide of frustration within some former Soviet countries. President Putin is now facing the question, of how to return Russia to its previous greatness without political and military domination of the post-Soviet lands. Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have made it more difficult for Russia to influence political processes across the near abroad. This new reality finally may force the Russian government to find other
avenues, outside of bullying, to further its agenda within its proclaimed “sphere of influence.”

During his 2005 speech, President Putin emphasized a long-standing component of Russian foreign policy, “As before, we are convinced that there is not an arguable basis for the geographic expansion of NATO.”55 Andrei Kelin, Deputy Director of the European Cooperation Department in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, put it this way, “As far as our attitude to the (NATO) expansion is concerned, it remains calmly negative.”56 He also said, “To put it briefly, there is nothing good in the NATO expansion for Russia. And we have both military and political objections.”

Russia’s primary concern with former Soviet states joining NATO appears to be the growing dependence of the NIS on NATO’s system of decision-making, both in the political and military arenas. The influence that Russia once wielded over these countries has dissipated with NATO’s expansion; without this influence, Russia finds itself with less control over the post-Soviet sphere. The secondary issue is Russian residual distrust, notable after the breakup of Yugoslavia, particularly after the 1999 Kosovo conflict. NATO basically enlarged its military mission to include out-of-area operations in a region whose problems did not directly threaten any member states’ security, but did threaten European stability as a whole. After NATO’s action against the Serb-dominated rump Yugoslav state, 96 percent of Russians either agreed or totally agreed with the proposition that “NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia is a crime against humanity,” and 77 percent either agreed or totally agreed that “there is nothing stopping NATO from getting involved in Russia as it did in Yugoslavia.”57
NATO likely will continue to view the NATO-Russia Council as a confidence-building device more than as a useful institution in itself. The council’s mandate deliberately has been circumscribed to help ensure that its functioning corresponds to Russia’s own readiness to cooperate productively with NATO. Russia has yet to prove itself a reliable or constructive partner in operational matters in as far as NATO is considered. Practical cooperation in the operational environment has not increased over the past two years, however Russia and NATO have found some common ground and numerous exercises have been completed. While the current relationship seems much less than Russia originally wanted from NATO, the council does serve as a communications conduit – even if it is currently reserved primarily for exercise development and political propaganda. Taking the long view, the council has achieved its limited goal of maintaining a working relationship with Russian diplomats while establishing contacts with the next generation of Russian military officers.

NATO will remain the key provider of European security and stability for the foreseeable future. Russia already has chosen a course of cooperation with NATO. If President Putin truly wants to take the NATO-Russia alliance to a new level, Russia must overcome psychological scars it carries from the Cold War. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted at the Russian-U.S. Council for Economic Cooperation, that current U.S.-Russian relations still bear traces of the past, featuring “attempts to play a zero sum game.”

Russia, not the United States or NATO, is fixated on the idea of keeping its superpower “sphere of influence.” Russia’s inability to deliver security and stability to the former Soviet states will only provide the impetus for continued NATO expansion.
Russia simply cannot compete—even in their own backyard. NATO and the United States will not limit their own military or political initiatives in any post-Soviet region based solely on Russia’s historical claims. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are in various stages of the NATO membership process. Increased NATO-Russian cooperation certainly could be mutually beneficial, but until Russia overcomes its self-image problems, it is not likely to happen.

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Chapter 6

The Way Ahead

*First, [U.S. foreign policy] must recognize that American security is threatened less by Russia’s strength than by its weakness and incoherence.*

—Condoleezza Rice

Given the interests, perceptions, and histories of the two nations with respect to the war on terror, it seems clear there are opportunities for continued cooperation. Successful programs should continue; new programs and associations may also be added. All future U.S. efforts, however, are best considered with and eye toward the long view. That is, it is necessary to consider the complexion the U.S. would most like its long-term relation with Russia to have, then consider the steps with which to achieve that. Without argument, this long-term relationship will be complex, multi-faceted, and based on many more factors than simply the war on terror, but as a significant issue for both nations, it also appears to be a tool that can help align some values and interests between the two nations.

That the broader U.S.-Russian relationship is important almost goes without saying. As the nation with the largest supply of nuclear weapons in the world, Russia’s actions can potentially affect global security on a scale that is one of the few eerie specters remaining from the Cold War. To turn a blind eye on Russia’s internal and external policies is to live in denial of that reality. What perhaps needs clarification is the
importance of the continued U.S.-Russian relationship in the Global War on Terror—why does it matter? Russia’s position in world security, owing not only to its nuclear arsenal but also to its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its geo-political location that bridges Europe and Asia, and its coterie of client states and former Soviet states that form a significant swath of the “crescent of terrorism” and that still rely on Russian relations more integrally perhaps than the west can fully comprehend, means that despite whatever perceived loss of great power status the nation has undergone in the past 15 years, it still matters. Without Russia’s influence, its advice, its experience, and its lessons learned, the west in general and the U.S. in particular face manifold challenges staving off a continued terrorist threat. As Condoleezza Rice indicated, a strong Russia whose interests align with those of the U.S. can be a significant asset in the continued war on terror.

Whereas previous chapters attempted to present perspectives from both the U.S. and Russia, this chapter purposely focuses on U.S. actions and initiatives; that is, on what the U.S. can do in the future. Clearly Russian perceptions and actions will affect the success of these initiatives, but the U.S. in general, and this work in particular, has little say in what Russia does. As a sovereign nation, it is free to make its own choices. The analysis in this paper up to this point has attempted to put into context the actions and reactions of both the U.S. and Russia. This chapter will extrapolate on what the U.S. can do in the future, given its stated interests and its characteristic actions thus far, and what Russia might do in cooperation or response, again, given its stated and unstated interests and its characteristic actions thus far.
Axes of Analysis

Two major axes of analysis should help characterize the policies the U.S. takes with respect to Russia and the War on Terror. The first should be the time horizon for action. The nature of the U.S. political system, along with the realization of generational planning, will both influence what can be accomplished and the likelihood of success of any set of initiatives. Toward these ends, the authors propose three sets of time horizons, with considerations for each. As U.S. presidential elections are held every four years, and as U.S. law effectively prohibits a president from running for more than two terms, it is likely that U.S.-Russia relations will change noticeably following the U.S. presidential elections in 2008, when U.S. President George W. Bush will leave office (and when Russian President Putin is slated to leave as well under the current Russian constitution). Therefore the first time horizon will be the current U.S. administration’s remaining time in office.

Another time horizon should focus on generational changes between the two nations and the time required to effect those changes. This horizon will focus on long-term goals for relations between the two nations, attempting to influence how the next generation of national leaders for each country perceives the actions of the other country’s leaders. Therefore, these actions will attempt to create effects up to and beyond approximately 25 years in the future, or 2030.

To bridge the gap between the next three years and the next two decades, it is useful to create an intermediate time horizon, one that extends beyond this current president but will likely be carried on by the next administration regardless of party affiliation. A useful example of this in the past is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, enacted in the U.S. in 1991. Not only has this initiative survived Republican and Democratic presidential administrations and congresses, it has proven so successful that it has changed the political discourse of nuclear proliferation in this country. Now it is not an issue whose merits are debated; it is simply a question of how much additional funding should it receive.¹ (In all likelihood, in another decade this will have become a generational change in policy.) For this reason, the intermediate-term horizon will focus on actions that will achieve effects within 10-15 years, beyond the current political administration but not necessarily (but not prohibited from) achieving generational change. These will likely be bureaucratic initiatives that will depend on the efforts of non-appointed, non-elected government leaders.

The second axis of analysis will attempt to prioritize separate, and often competing, U.S. interests and values. While the war on terror has generated its own strategy for the U.S., that strategy is but a part of the U.S. national security strategy, with its broader interests and values. When those interests and values align, policies should be self-evident. When they do not align, useful policies derive from the recognition of national priorities, whether publicly stated or not. Recommendations will be made in this chapter, but they will be based on a considered prioritization, which in turn will be based on the available information. Clearly more information, or contradictory information, may lead to a different prioritization, which may then prescribe different policies. The value of this analysis, even without such information available to the authors or this analysis, is the elucidation of known interests, values and information, and the ways these will or should impact U.S. policy.
As stated previously, the U.S. strategy for fighting the war on terror is a four-pronged approach: (1) defeat terrorist organizations; (2) deny terrorists sponsorship, sanctuary, and support; (3) diminish the underlying conditions that enable terrorism; and (4) defend U.S. interests at home and abroad. Perhaps put in order of importance, or at least immediacy, this strategy might better say: Defend, defeat, deny and diminish. That is to say, when competition for resources forces decision-makers to choose between diminishing the enabling conditions for terrorism or defending the U.S., the latter will take priority. It must be realized, however, that such decisions are rarely so clear-cut. Collateral issues and second-order effects may confound the decision process.

More to the point, the very National Security Strategy (NSS) under which the war on terror operates may also contain competing interests or goals. Therefore, any policy analysis must also keep these in mind. As mentioned in Chapter 2, U.S. values, according to the NSS, are: “the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.” Additionally, according to the language of the NSS, U.S. interests, defending the nation; promoting global security and peace where it exists today; and “[extending] the benefits of freedom across the globe . . . [Bringing] the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” No rank ordering is given for either of these guiding proclamations, so when necessary, it is presumed that they have been presented in order of importance. That is, national defense outweighs extending the benefits of freedom beyond national borders, should a conflict arise.
Finally, the NSS also mentions two “strategic principles” that can help guide U.S. action:

The United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.

The United States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.4

That is, it may be worth the effort to develop alliances and institutions that are able to assist in regional situations when necessary, and those who are ready and willing to accept U.S. assistance will receive it before those who are not, regardless of need.

Given the national security priorities and foreign policy priorities within this and future administrations, more effective international relations with Russia, and, thus, more effective cooperation in the war on terror, can be achieved by bearing in mind precisely what the administration’s foreign policy priorities are. More importantly, successful relations may be more readily achieved by assessing the real importance of the highest-priority policies; that is, by deciding beforehand which issues are worth fighting for and which are not. Without question there is great utility in a certain level of ambiguity within a nation’s foreign policy, but that ambiguity should not exist within the foreign policy mechanism. In this case, the absolute prioritization of U.S. security issues and foreign policies does not need to be made public, but the highest-priority issues, and the implications of this prioritization, should drive more effective relations with Russia, both in the war on terror and in other relations.

A final introductory word about the nature of relations with Russia is in order. In much of the cited commentary and analysis for this paper, many diplomatic transactions presume the existence of a *quid pro quo* arrangement. This likely derives from the nature
of U.S. and Soviet relationships in the past, with their roots in realism, which presumes international relations are necessarily a zero-sum game: a power transaction, a geographic transaction, or a financial pay-off underlies every “deal” between the two nations. This is a useful analytic tool to be sure, but increasingly it is losing its value in a post-Cold War world. From the U.S. perspective, international relations can and frequently should be mutually beneficial transactions, or so-called “win-win” situations. This is especially true in bilateral relations, where the obvious metric is the costs charged and the benefits afforded to one or both of the two parties (and where any additional costs borne by a third, non-participating party may not be part of the official calculus). Although this may appear to put a liberalist veneer on a realist assessment, especially for the purposes of alliance-building with Russia, this may be useful.

Initially, it will be difficult to avoid Russian perceptions of *quid pro quo* arrangements with any foreign policy arrangement. No matter how U.S. diplomats explain U.S. policy stances, or *quos*, Russians will likely look for balancing *quids*, especially in the near-term. The change in perception to win-win policies will take time and is desirable, but expect the near-term policies will need to be couched in *quid pro quo* language, especially as the U.S. makes the case for prioritizing its policies. That is, expect U.S. diplomats will have to demand Russian acquiescence to the highest-priority U.S. policies (*quo*) at the expense, explicitly or otherwise, of lesser priorities (*quid*).

**The Long View**

Before the nation takes steps to foster continued cooperation with Russia, it is necessary to reflect on the strategic goals such cooperation should help to achieve. In keeping with Dr. Rice’s statement at the beginning of this chapter, a strong Russia
appears to be in the best interest of the U.S. A strong Russia in this sense means a nation with strong democratic values ("the non-negotiable demands of human dignity" mentioned previously) and the institutions that support those values; a shared perspective on U.S. interests, or at least an alignment that is not contradictory; and a diplomatically congenial relationship that allows national leaders to communicate with one another reasonably freely. As mentioned in the analysis throughout this work, Russia’s values and interests appear to veer away from some of these U.S. aspirations: while Presidents Bush and Putin appear to have an unusually congenial relationship, some democratic institutions (such as freedom of broadcast media, the rule of law and equal justice, and the limited power of the state) increasingly appear to be threatened, especially under President Putin’s rule, although endemic corruption is frequently blamed for this. Also, Russian actions belie interests that often appear to run directly counter to U.S. interests (such as Russia’s sale of missiles to Syria and its role in maintaining the status quo in so-called frozen conflicts). Obviously cooperation in the Global War on Terror alone will not achieve such goals, but neither should such cooperation cause U.S. policy to veer to far from these goals, or to veer from them for too long. Therefore, U.S.-Russia cooperation should always be pursued with an eye toward the long view.

**A Plan for Successful Cooperation with Russia**

This analysis does not attempt to set a new foreign policy agenda for the U.S. or for its Global War on Terror. That is left for national policy-makers. This analysis does attempt to show how the current U.S. foreign policy and the strategy for cooperation in the Global War on Terror might achieve better results by taking into consideration the similarities and differences between U.S. and Russian perceptions as examined over the
preceding chapters, and how the two might take advantages of synergies while avoiding misinterpretation and mixed messages. Although diplomacy and foreign policy can be likened to dark arts practiced only by the most learned, in execution it will behoove all who participate in the foreign policy process to heed not only the desired effects but the predictable perceptions these words and actions will generate.

**Achieving Success in the Near-Term**

In the near-term, the U.S. may consider making the most of the especially close personal relationship that exists between the leaders of the two nations to help frame the dialog and the mission of cooperation to each nation’s citizens. There are a host of stereotypes on both sides that are detrimental to enhanced cooperation, and these might best be attacked by having the leaders of each nation speak directly to the other nation’s legislature in a televised presentation. Each president carries the baggage of his nation’s history and the other nation’s preconceptions and prejudices, but as evidenced by Putin’s press conference to western media following Beslan and President Bush’s presentation to Georgians during his visit in May 2005, each leader is able to deliver effective comments to audiences that may begin to change national perceptions, especially if presented in a spirit of cooperation. A signal interest for each nation lies in defeating terrorism, however it is conceived, and a presentation to each nation’s legislature and public that highlights the goals of the cooperation, the effectiveness thus far, and the need for good relations may help maintain and expand this alignment.

Either in such a forum or separately, at the highest level, the U.S. might also consider communicating to Russian leadership its precise priorities, or policies for which it demands compliance. Given the most recent statements, these seem self-evident, but
cooperation would only be aided by addressing them directly. The two priorities for U.S. foreign policy in the near term that appear to conflict with Russian perceptions are support for fledgling democratic movements in former Soviet states and the thawing and resolution of so-called frozen conflicts. In speeches during the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, President Bush made several speeches, most notably those in Latvia and Georgia during visits to those countries. In those speeches, as in others before, President Bush emphatically hailed the pace of democratic reform in many former Soviet republics and looked forward to its continuation elsewhere.

All the nations that border Russia will benefit from the spread of democratic values—and so will Russia, itself. Stable, prosperous democracies are good neighbors, trading in freedom, and posing no threat to anyone. The United States has free and peaceful nations to the north and south of us. We do not consider ourselves to be encircled; we consider ourselves to be blessed. No good purpose is served by stirring up fears and exploiting old rivalries in this region. The interests of Russia and all nations are served by the growth of freedom that leads to prosperity and peace.\(^5\)

The U.S. needs to make clear to Russian policy-makers that fledgling democratic movements are to be supported in their efforts, or at the very least not denied the opportunity to compete for leadership in free and fair elections. To assuage Russia’s fears of instability on its borders, however, the U.S. should express the conditions under which it will support those movements and the nature of that support. The Ukraine and Georgia democratic movements are instructive in this case. These “velvet” revolutions, so described for the lack of violence during the regime transitions, tended to rely on three elements: a strong middle-class disillusioned with corrupt authoritarian rule; a vocal youth movement; and a business class disenchanted with oligarchic collusion in the government.\(^6\) When at least two of these elements, if not all three, exist in a state, the U.S. should be willing to support a democratic movement and demand Russian non-
interference. U.S. support, however, should be limited to creating and enhancing democratic institutions without financially or otherwise supporting one candidate or party over any other. Again, these policies should be made explicit to Russia. To mitigate Russian suspicions that the U.S. is only interested in occupying states on Russia’s borders, there may be an opportunity to create a U.S.-Russian cooperative organization to assist democratic movements. It is likely that this organization would have little real impact beyond the show of cooperation, but that alone may justify the effort. If nothing else, it will provide a window into Russian actions and perceptions that may be useful in the future.

To further assuage Russian suspicions, the U.S. may be well served by avoiding inflammatory rhetoric regarding less-than-democratic former Soviet states, such as Belarus. Recently U.S. Secretary of State called Belarus “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.” When asked whether that could be “interpreted by some as fomenting revolution,” she replied: “I don’t think fomenting revolution is—first of all, if it brings about democratic progress, why is it a bad thing for people to throw off the yoke of tyranny and decide that they want to control their own futures.” The example of the French Revolution notwithstanding, such rhetoric fuels Russian perceptions and suspicions about U.S. motives. To help align U.S. and Russian interests and avoid creating further distance between the two in the near-term, U.S. policy-makers might be better served by publicly focusing on states in which the conditions for a peaceful democratic “revolution” currently exist and avoiding suggestions that the U.S. is interested in creating new democratic movements (and possibly, from the Russian
perspective, violence and instability on Russian borders) in states where they do not yet exist.

It also may be worthwhile to demand Russian assistance in resolving frozen conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdniestr, and Nagorno-Karabakh. While Russia may have a national interest in protecting residents in these areas, they still fall within the sovereign borders of states recognized by Russia and across the globe. Prohibiting their resolution not only conflicts directly with U.S. values, it has the potential to create ungoverned spaces that will serve as breeding grounds for terrorist movements in the future. In recent speeches, President Bush has hinted, somewhat obliquely, that this issue demands peaceful resolution led by the state governments under which the conflict areas reside.

[The frozen conflict in Abkhazia] is a dispute that is going to be resolved by the Georgian government and by the folks in the separatist regions. The United States cannot impose a solution, nor would you want us to. But what we can do is we can help. We can work with international bodies and work with the U.N., for example. We can work with other groups, all aimed at helping resolve this issue peacefully. But this is an issue that will be resolved by the duly-elected government of Georgia in a peaceful way. And the President has, as just mentioned, reached out in a constructive way, suggested autonomy and self-government, but . . . he wants the country to remain intact. And we’re more than willing. . . When he calls, if he’s got some suggestions where . . . he thinks I can help and I think it makes sense, I will be glad to do so.9

The fact that this and other such statements make the U.S. commitment to resolving these frozen conflicts less than clear risks miscommunication. Such miscommunication could result in the U.S. and Russia acting at cross-purposes at best, or Georgian leaders acting without real U.S. backing and thereby making the situation even worse in the worst case. The U.S. is in a position to demand that Russia allow outside intervention, either through the OSCE, the UN, or some other multilateral arrangement,
to help the parties involved reach an amicable solution while maintaining state sovereignty. If the U.S. has prioritized such a goal, it should make this clear to Russian diplomats.

In the near-term, there is probably little value in publicly chastising Russia for its perceived divergence from democratic norms, such as increasing federal control over the legislature and reducing independent commentary over the broadcast media. While such criticism may be warranted and in keeping with longer-term U.S. interests, certainly in the near-term it is not likely to be effective, especially given Russian President Putin’s inevitable attempts to navigate elections in 2008 for his party and his chosen successor. Security and stability within Russia will likely be key issues in that election, and President Putin appears to have chosen to exercise a bit more state control than his predecessor in achieving that goal. Private discussions between U.S. and Russian leaders may be useful, as well as cooperative efforts that demonstrate to Russian leaders and bureaucrats that traditional democratic institutions commonly found in the west can still help maintain, even enhance, state security. While fostering and maintaining democracy in general is important to the U.S., in the near-term such public criticisms are more likely not only to reduce rather than enhance cooperation in the war on terror, but also to steer Russia and Russians even further away from those very democratic end states U.S. policy values. It is useful to emphasize the democratic path Russia claims to have chosen, and U.S. diplomats and the president himself have missed few opportunities to do just that, but to say that the U.S. has made Russian democratic reform a U.S. policy imperative would probably generate few positive outcomes in the near-term. In Russian terms, this may appear as a trade-off: Russian acceptance of the existence of democratic movements
outside its borders will result in reduced criticism of so-called non-democratic reforms within Russia. That is not inherently bad, however. Again, Russia still thinks in such terms, and the fact is that pushing this issue is likely to be unsuccessful for the U.S..

One final broad policy consideration with respect to the war on terror is the Chechen conflict. Direct public criticism of this issue has been notably muted recently, with the exception of the U.S. State Department’s review of human rights across the globe in March 2005. This report criticized the Russian government’s record on human rights in Chechnya, especially the conduct of law enforcement officials in the region. It did balance this criticism by saying that rebels in the region were also at fault in this case. The report also affirmed U.S. policy by re-iterating that “[t]he United States recognizes the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,” thus allowing that the conflict is still an internal Russian matter. So it appears that the Chechnya conflict is also relatively low on the U.S. foreign policy prioritization list. In the short-term, then, although the conflict remains an issue in the war on terror, more humane Russian conduct in the region should probably not be emphasized any more forcefully.

Current agency-to-agency cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Russia should continue. Specifically, FBI cooperation with the Russian FSB and Interior Ministry should remain in place, and even expand where possible. Not only is this effort useful for providing information on terrorists and assessing future threats, it is a window of observation between the two nation’s internal security apparatuses. It allows U.S. personnel visibility into the workings of the Russian system, and it allows Russians to see an example of democratic processes at work, including support for the rule of law and equal justice. A further step in this cooperative effort might be the establishment of an
operations center either in Russia, near the volatile Caucasus region, or in a former Soviet republic, perhaps Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge or Central Asia’s Fergana Valley, through a tri- or multilateral arrangement whereby host nation security personnel also participate. Again, this would provide an opportunity not only to share information on terrorism, but to share perspectives on democratic processes at work. Such efforts, however, must be engineered so that Russians perceive an equal footing with U.S. personnel, especially in a multilateral arrangement. For maximum benefit, not only should this put the two nations on an “us vs. them” relationship against terrorists, it should create an “us vs. them” relationship against other participating nations if this becomes a multilateral effort. Also, the U.S. must avoid the perception by other nations that this amounts to a dual occupation by the U.S. and Russia. Maintaining a relatively small manpower contingent, with minimal (but technologically advanced) hardware, and including host nation personnel would help alleviate such perceptions (especially if accompanied by offers of financial aid).

Maintaining the bilateral focus of cooperation, the U.S.-Russia Counter-terrorism Working Group (CTWG), though it appears to have had few major successes thus far, should continue to be a well-used vehicle of cooperation. As it expanded from the Afghanistan Working Group to a larger counter-terrorism focus, so it can continue to expand not so much in scope as in mission, moving from infrequent high-level coordination meetings to operational-level engagement. This appears to be a useful vehicle to expand from a U.S. Department of State program to a Department of Defense co-sponsored program, with offers of cooperation between services on a bilateral level. This provides a useful scheduling tool for scheduling military training and exercises that
does not depend on NATO coordination (with the inevitable animosities that exist), and it allows for more frequent meetings under the CTWG aegis than is currently the case. As a side benefit, it allows perhaps the two most powerful foreign policy executive agents in the U.S. government to coordinate their own efforts at regular intervals, helping to ensure U.S. foreign policy remains coherent with respect to Russian and the war on terror.

Nunn-Lugar cooperative efforts should continue without significant change, except for prudent funding where required. With the success demonstrated to date, this has the potential to achieve generational change—it may be possible for the next generation to take for granted that the use of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, especially by third-parties, is simply beyond comprehension.

Regarding these bilateral cooperative efforts, it may appear attractive to policymakers to combine several efforts under a single program. For instance, it may seem advantageous to combine FBI cooperative efforts under the CTWG. In fact, such a combination, at least in the near-term, is probably unwise. Not only would it risk diminishing the gains these efforts have made heretofore, it risks diluting the individual goals each of these efforts has set. Also, with the introduction of new parties into each arrangement, new personal relationships will be required, each trading time for trust. There simply is not enough time remaining in the current administration, with the current political leadership, to risk these programs. Furthermore, the unique aspects of each of these programs require relationships with unique elements within the Russian government. Combining programs makes coordination ever more difficult by forcing increasingly complex efforts of scheduling.
The NATO-Russia Council should continue, but there is little likelihood for
dramatic success in the near-term. Between NATO’s lack of a clear mission in the post-
Cold War era and Russia’s inherent distrust of NATO and its enlargement, it is unlikely
any concrete results will be achieved, especially regarding the war on terror. However, it
remains a useful venue of communication between Russia and the NATO nations, so
even without significant achievements, it is worth retaining. As part of this
communications capability, the NATO-Russia council may look to host a counter-terror
summit to review lessons learned in fighting terror and terrorists. Russia can bring its
lessons, dating back to Afghanistan in the 1980s; the U.S. and other participating NATO
nations can bring lessons from the Middle East; other NATO nations can bring lessons
from their post-colonial experiences. Such a summit would almost certainly be useful at
a tactical and operational level, especially if it is used to establish contacts at the junior
officer level; it would also be useful to help sway Russian perceptions of a double
standard in the fight against terrorism, as it would subtly, though not explicitly, put
Russian efforts in Chechnya on the same level as western efforts against other terrorists.
It would have the added benefit of casting a light on Russian methods in the region and
allowing NATO members to offer constructive criticism, at a tactical level, that might
improve the conditions of combat in the region.

**Achieving Success in the Mid-Term**

The mid-term time horizon, from about 2010 to 2020, allows the U.S. to begin
addressing those issues and interests that it deems important but which are unlikely to be
effectively addressed during the current presidential administrations in Russia and the
U.S., either because of the current political climate in both countries or because of more
pressing concerns. It may also provide opportunities to focus on issues that simply cannot be resolved in a shorter period of time. In either case, there are actions that can be taken today and options that should be kept open for the future.

Perhaps most important to the U.S. is the pursuit of democracy within Russia, judging from President Bush’s rhetoric. While not an issue of global counter-terror cooperation per se, a path away from democratic institutions within Russia will present problems to future cooperation. It is clearly an interest of the U.S., and a more democratic Russia will, presumably, share more of the same values as the U.S.. In the next decade, this issue will likely be of higher priority than it is now, especially if Russian internal policies become even more severe than they are today. Continuing to emphasize the virtues of democracy will reinforce this issue, but opportunities for engagement and education also may help forward this cause. Agency-to-agency programs give Russian bureaucrats a window into established democratic institutions, with lessons that they can apply in their own agencies. Further opportunities to share the lessons of democracy may also be helpful, such as internship programs in various unclassified U.S. government agency offices, officer exchanges in military schools, police academies and other law enforcement and security agency training programs, and regular conferences and fora in which to share experiences and insights. Such opportunities will invariably assist any transition to more democratic government processes should Russian leadership make such a decision. That decision, as well, may be speeded by U.S. offers of reward, either into additional alliances, economic collaborations, or political support. Obviously this falls outside the domain of the war on
terror, but in the mid-term, this will likely rise in priority, possibly even above some short-term counter-terrorism goals.

Within the decade, almost certainly the resolution of the Chechen conflict will rise in priority. This obviously bears more directly on the war on terror. If the conflict continues as it is, and there is no indication otherwise, the world can expect further violence and bloodshed, and more importantly from the U.S. perspective, it may serve as a training ground for terrorists based outside the region. Successful resolution of this conflict will almost certainly benefit from internationalization. That is, bringing in assistance from outside Russia may help calm the violence, provide a neutral forum for negotiations, and pave the way for a peaceful end state without impinging on Russian sovereignty. Presenting such options, however, is difficult in the near term and can only be done with a well-conceived plan. Such a plan may make use of lessons that can be learned in the resolution of frozen conflicts in former Soviet states, as mentioned previously. Should the U.S. administration pursue such a policy in the near-term, using programs of internationalization and negotiation, it very likely would create useful templates for resolving the conflict in Chechnya. For maximum effectiveness, the resolution of frozen conflicts and the Chechen conflict should probably include well-integrated Russian participation at multiple levels of management and command. By employing those Russian agencies that have been instrumental in avoiding resolution thus far in these conflicts and providing them with new tools for achieving peaceful progress, long-lasting models of conflict resolution can be created with a uniquely and appropriately Russian flavor to them. Such resolutions would have the added, indeed
ultimately desired, effect of reducing hotbeds of instability which can tend to breed terrorists and insurgents, problems that directly affect the U.S.

As mentioned previously, U.S. discussion of Chechnya has been muted of late. Whether by design or not, it appears to have fallen in priority. Resolution in Chechnya, however, should not come at the expense of other U.S. priorities. By the mid-term it is likely the war in Chechnya, assuming it remains unresolved in the near-term, will generate effects well beyond Russia’s borders. That will make it an issue of global concern. There may still be trade-offs required with Russia for resolution, but democratic reform should not be one of those trade-offs. If it is, a lack of popularly-supported government institutions may see further Chechen-style violence elsewhere in Russia, ultimately requiring similar resolution.

The mid-term is also a time period during which the U.S. can further attempt to align interests with Russia, especially those more germane to the U.S. Global War on Terror. Russian support of Iran’s nuclear program, and its sale of anti-aircraft weapons to Syria, both arranged somewhat to the dismay of U.S. policy-makers, each by itself does not represent a serious breach of bilateral trust. But taken together, they and other Russian policy choices begin to form a pattern of obfuscation and cross-purposes, with inappropriate support for its client states and nations the U.S. has previously categorized as “rogue” that starts to appear pre-meditated. At some point, the U.S. will have to begin to break this cycle, either by demanding Russia back down from a specific policy choice, or, perhaps less inflammatory, by coordinating and cooperating with Russia in one of these arrangements. For instance, the U.S. might look to create either a U.S.-Russian team, or a multilateral team, possibly sanctioned by the UN to ensure compliance with
NPT obligations. This would have the effect of stopping Russian counterproductive intentions before they can reach fruition, ensuring U.S. and Russian interests are served, and starting to break the mold of competition that appears to have arisen between the two nations. It would also fall roughly in line with the strategic principle of developing regional alliances.

As the price of oil appears to be in no hurry to fall, and as the Middle East appears poised to remain in some state of turmoil into this time horizon due, in part, to the war on terror, it is likely the U.S. will have to re-examine its energy policy. Inevitably, that discussion will take into consideration Russia’s considerable petroleum reserves, as yet untapped. Although currently Russian discussions center on the oil supply to Asia, undoubtedly, given Europe’s reliance on petroleum, there will be opportunities to send part of the Russian and Central Asian supply west. This will be a high-risk, high-payoff maneuver for the west, full of traps into which the U.S. must avoid falling. On the positive side, such projects have the potential to serve as massive Russian public works projects that can provide jobs to the jobless and help strengthen Russia’s middle class; provide opportunities for managed economic cooperation among Russian and western oil companies; and create an energy source alternative to the beleaguered Middle East. On the negative side, a pipeline that brings the oil west will be forced to cross regions of instability, requiring significant resource and personnel protection and even then operating at some danger level; it will require significant long-term investment in a Russian economy that has still not fully developed into a stable, post-Soviet system; and it may tend to reinforce Russian notions of quid pro quo international relations, wherein Russian diplomats constantly dangle oil as a reward for western submission to some
undesirable Russian demand. Each of these negative results can certainly be mitigated, and indeed some of them provide more opportunity for cooperation and engagement, but as valuable as Russian cooperation may be, especially with respect to petroleum, it should be balanced against other national priorities. Furthermore, the fact that this oil will, by virtue of geography and physics, be more readily available to Europeans than to Americans may create conditions in which U.S. and European interests diverge, creating an opportunity for Russia to exploit this divergence in another “us vs. them” schema. As the Global War on Terror demands international cooperation, such a divergence may tend to complicate the conduct of that war.

Beyond the near-term, major international organizations that may have significant roles in the war on terror will benefit from having well- or re-defined missions. NATO, in particular, appears still to be struggling with its role in the post-Cold War world. Some have suggested, among other missions, that NATO re-focus on fighting the war on terror. This would likely prove a mission at least as demanding as the defense of Europe during the Cold War, its original mission. This would also require an alignment of interests and values within the organization that could prove challenging as well, with the differing experiences with terrorism of the member nations and the increasing Muslim population within Europe. Those challenges notwithstanding, NATO could prove a useful alliance for combating global terrorism, and that is a worthy mission for NATO and the U.S. to pursue. More to the point, such a redefinition, especially one based on an ideological sphere of interests rather than a geographic sphere, would help ease the friction NATO’s existence and expansion creates with U.S.-Russian relations. Beyond the NATO-Russia Council, a clear mission statement for NATO that defines its role in
European and international relations and helps spell out when it will act may tend to avoid the type of situation the Balkans represented to the Russians: intervention beyond NATO’s sphere of interest and into the internal politics of a region for which Russians felt some responsibility. Such a mission redefinition need not prevent such intervention missions, but it may help soften the blow and reduce criticism and friction should the need arise in the future. Such missions, with coordination through the NATO-Russia Council, might then provide real opportunities for Russian and the west to better align interests well before operations take place, taking away another “us vs. them” argument.

If President Putin is serious about significantly increasing cooperation between Russia and the larger NATO, certain additional options present themselves: strengthening or altering the existing NATO-Russia Council; establishing a new joint NATO-Russia command; or moving toward the inclusion of Russia as a full NATO member. These, and their implications, are worth further examination.

Option 1 – Strengthen the NATO-Russia Council. Contacts in the context of the NATO-Russia Council are usually high level. Direct military to military interaction or cooperation is often limited to a single exercise. The council could set up a standard annual exercise schedule, increase the numbers of lower-level personnel exchanges, and look for creative ways to promote military technology sharing. Strengthening the council in these ways would probably not have any immediate effect on interoperability for either Russia or NATO, but it would offer Russia the opportunity to work with other liberal democratic nations than the U.S., most notably eastern European nations. These contacts can provide new perspectives to Russians in addition to training opportunities while
offering both NATO and Russia the ability to develop common tools for fighting terrorists.

Option 2 – Establish a joint NATO-Russia Command. With the prospect of significant changes to U.S. force disposition within Germany and even Korea, the opportunity exists to establish a joint Russia-NATO command. Such a command, headquartered in Russia, could offer Russian leadership visibility (undoubtedly limited) into NATO plans and operations and help eliminate Russian fears of NATO troops massing on its borders. The command’s mission focus should be something relatively low tech, such as joint peacekeeping, stabilization and reconstruction in areas of interest to both. Focusing in these areas, the command would be able to deal with security concerns on both sides, while at the same time allowing the inclusion and participation of all troops regardless of their readiness level.\textsuperscript{13} One small alternative to this plan would be to have such a command focus on a mission outside the traditional “spheres of influence” of either Russia or NATO, say, Africa, which might offer neutral territory for cooperation, removing some of the antagonisms that missions in former Soviet states or Central Russia might bring.

Option 3 – Russia begins the path toward full NATO membership. In 1995, NATO advised potential new members that the general membership criteria were as follows: (1) an established democracy (with individual liberty and the rule of law); (2) respect for human rights; (3) a market-based economy (with social justice and environmental responsibility); (4) armed forces under civilian control; (5) and good relations with neighboring states (with the resolution of internal ethnic disputes). While the current situation in Russia appears to be diverting ever further from this “western”
model, it is not useful to discuss Russian NATO membership. The possibility, however, should remain for consideration beyond the long term, both as a reward to Russia for complying with the entrance criteria and as path toward a redefined mission for NATO.

Much has also been made of the need to reform the UN, not only in the U.S. but within the UN as well. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s proposals call for a new UN “strategy against terrorism” that sounds remarkably like the U.S. strategy...

[I]t must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must deter States from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human rights.

Most notably in his proposal is the call for a common definition of terrorism, one that has been previous submitted, and a broadening of the Security Council membership to include additional representation from the developing world, albeit with no new veto powers created. Both of these specific proposals will probably be greeted favorably by Russia—they have sought a clear definition of terrorism that will include Chechen separatists, and with the Security Council veto power being Russia’s most powerful foreign policy tool, any reform that does not dilute that capability will likely not be opposed.

As these and other reforms are debated, however, U.S. representatives should consider the implications. The UN has consistently sought to target the act of terrorism as opposed to the motives. Russian desires to include separatism in the definition of terrorism run the risk of outlawing democratic movements in many nations. Not only would this serve to separate Russian and U.S. interests, it may tend to confound U.S. efforts to fight terror by supporting democratic movements and thereby dissuading people from supporting terrorists. Also, new members of the Security Council may tend to look
to Russia for support, rather than the U.S. or European powers, creating new client states for Russia in the developing world. This is not inherently subversive to U.S. interests in the war on terror, but until U.S. and Russian interests are better aligned with respect to Russian support for its client states, the U.S. should observe such opportunities warily.

**Achieving Generational Change**

In the long-term, the U.S. will likely seek a relationship with Russia based on mutual trust, mutual interests and mutual values. The actions in the near- and mid-term should create opportunities for confidence-building measures, training and education especially at the bureaucratic level, and demonstrations of capability and results that show U.S. and Russian interests, even when they are not synonymous, can still be served simultaneously. As these actions are repeated, one hopes that the next generation of leaders begins to drop the Russia vs. the U.S. schema, if not the “us vs. them” schema altogether. The sooner and more frequently such endeavors can show success, the more likely and more enduring will be the generational change.

Another desirable generational change is moving Russia away from the traditional concept of spheres of influence. The fact that Russia still appears to hold onto the perception that it maintains responsibility for stability in the former Soviet Union and part of the Warsaw Pact region puts it frequently in competition with the U.S. and Europe, war in Serbia and the Ukrainian elections being cases in point. By developing partnerships with Russia, not just bilateral but multilateral as well, it may be possible to shift Russian conceptions of foreign policy away from geopolitics and toward interest politics, or away from the idea that geographic location forms the basis for international relations to the idea that national competencies and ideologies form a better basis. For
example, the U.S. has “branded” itself, so to speak, as a purveyor of democracy with little regard to location. With a successful transition to a reasonably democratic government and a market economy, Russia could create for itself a reputation of assisting former communist countries with the transition to democracy. No small feat, indeed, but yet another reason to help Russia pursue such reforms over the long-term. Furthermore, with perspectives many in the west can only comprehend vaguely, Russians would be aware of the manifold difficulties of such a transition and would have valuable insights to share.

A risky venture for the U.S., to be sure, but the advantage would be significant. Instead of having U.S. forces and diplomats assist the myriad nations in the post-communist and/or developing world in their march toward democracy, Russia (and, perhaps, others) could share some of the burden. Of course the fear is that Russia would simply be creating new client states or selling its proverbial old Soviet wine in new skins, but that is what makes this a goal for generational change. Only by demonstrating an alignment of interests does this policy serve U.S. interests, and such demonstrations are likely achievable only over a period of several decades. Such a policy would help the U.S. “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe,” and it would do so by abiding by strategic principles: relying on an alliance with Russia and, perhaps, others, and bringing more nations into the category of the willing, allowing nations who prefer not to work so closely with the U.S. to still march on the path toward democracy.

One generational change that is already well underway is the global attitude toward nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Nunn-Lugar and the NPT have gone a long way toward defining the practical responsibilities of and requirements for possessing nuclear weapons, and they have also done much to instill an
almost instinctual fear of these. Continued support for these programs will help ensure such healthy attitudes are maintained. However, there is a real possibility that a terrorist group may gain possession of such a weapon and find use for it in a catastrophic attack. While all WMD-fearing nations should do everything possible to prevent this, the possibility is unavoidable. Should this come about, there will probably be demands to void some of these agreements and treaties, especially if there is any state tie to the weapon or the group that uses it. Such notions are more likely to be counterproductive than effective. By maintaining adherence to the standards of these agreements, and by ensuring Russia does as well, the U.S. can continue to marginalize terrorists and their supporters. After such a battle of conscience and a real test of the merits of these agreements, a generational change in global perceptions of the utility of WMD, especially as a tool of terror, will almost certainly be achieved.

Notes


7 This describes the recommended limit of US governmental cooperation; there may be other organizations not directly affiliated with the US government that aspire to a more influential role, perhaps even supporting a particular candidate. The perception that both officially sanctioned and other organizations do more than simply pave the way for fair elections exists not only within Russia but in many other areas of the world. For a revealing discussion of this perception, see K Gajendra Singh, “In Ukraine, a Franchised
Notes

Revolution,” Asia Times, via CDI Russia Weekly, #333, 3 December 2004. Mr. Singh has served as Indian ambassador to Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Romania and Senegal.


Chapter 7

Conclusions

Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises.

—Samuel Butler
Notebooks

The goal of this volume has been threefold:

- Bind together a reference on Russian interests, objectives, and perspectives in the
  war on terror, based on its unique history, character, and geopolitical location
- Develop a considered analysis of the Russian perspective on the war on terror
  and on cooperation with the U.S. and the West
- Extrapolate vectors for successful cooperation with Russia in the Global War on
  Terror based on the above.

Perhaps implicit in this goal is an assessment of the real likelihood of success of this cooperation.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, hope abounded across the planet for a new era of rapprochement and cooperation. The era brought lavish claims and predictions, from predictions of a New World Order\(^1\) to phrases such as “The End of History,” the title of an article and later a book by Francis Fukuyama that considered whether liberal democracy, as it increasingly appeared to be the last, best form of government standing in the world, was the end of a natural political social evolution.\(^2\)
Under this conception, the U.S. and other western nations had finally shown the way to enlightened state and personal existence; it was simply a matter of time until the rest of the world joined the ranks of those enlightened nations and a new era of peace and cooperation, though realistically not quite utopia, could be realized.

Heady stuff, indeed, but what of the nations, like Russia, that had only just embarked on the path to this enlightenment? Were they uncontrollably at the mercy of those who had already arrived? After a period of confusion and reflection, the answer appears to have been, and still is, “No.” Russia, like many countries the U.S. and the West criticize for falling short of the dream of liberal democracy, still proclaims a strong voice in world affairs, sometimes cacophonous, sometimes harmonious. And why should it not? With a vast nuclear arsenal, the greatest land mass in the world, and a location that literally bridges the east and the west, in many regards there is no equal to this nation. There is no escaping the fact that Russia, like it or not, still matters. And so does its cooperation.

That new world order seemed to change again for the U.S. on 11 September 2001, when it appeared that history had not ended but had just begun anew, with a completely new and largely unanticipated threat. Again it was hoped that, in the depths of this great tragedy, the U.S. and Russia, which had recognized the existence of the terrorist scourge years before, could put aside whatever cultural and historical baggage that had separated them in the past and begin anew with a vow to cooperate in this war on terror, albeit with Russia continuing on its path toward liberal democracy. While there was cooperation, to be sure, in the war in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the old baggage had not been put away completely, notably with the U.S. abdication from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty later
that year, much to the displeasure of Russian leadership. But it did provide the two nations with a vocabulary, if not a value basis, for common dialog.

The Beslan tragedy nearly three years to the day later appeared to provide yet another opportunity for cooperation, one even more promising than in 2001, for by now the U.S. had the experience of fighting the terrorists in hand-to-hand combat, of interrogating them in U.S. prisons, of working so hard to win hearts and minds in regions that should have been more accepting of U.S. support than they appeared. Again, however, old baggage appeared. In this case it was President Putin using the opportunity to bring out “reforms” to the legislature that appeared to reduce public voice and participation in Russian government, moving Russia further away from the liberal democracy end state that, from the U.S. perspective, it really should be moving closer toward. Also, courts in the UK and U.S. granted or are hearing cases for political asylum to be granted to individuals that Moscow has labeled terrorist, giving rise to boisterous cries of a “double-standard” with regards to who is a terrorist and how they are to be handled internationally.

As frustrating as these events have been, they should also serve to educate. For after each such clarifying event, during a period in which what appeared as the most obvious, indeed, the most obligatory policies that a nation should take were customarily disregarded in favor of policies that appeared to be undertaken as if for spite, each nation appeared almost surprised at the reaction its policies engendered in the other. Indignant, each nation seemed thus further emboldened to continue with these policies, if not before, then almost certainly after, in spite of this opposition. If it were not clear before, it should certainly be clear now: the U.S. and Russia are sometimes so amazingly similar
in their actions as to be almost predictable, yet so starkly different in their perceptions as to seem utterly enigmatic.

This work, then, has sought to clarify, as much as is possible in a few hundred pages, the guiding forces, especially within Russia, that give rise to these enigmatic perceptions and then give rise to otherwise almost entirely predictable actions. If it stands up to scrutiny, the value of such an analysis is two-fold: it can be used to predict the steps Russia is likely to consider in a given decision opportunity and to help fashion U.S. responses to those steps; it can also be used to help alleviate Russian objections to U.S. foreign policies, especially with respect to the war on terror, before they are proclaimed. No secret decoder ring is this analysis, but a thoughtful tool that appears to fit the facts, or perceived facts, as they are available in the public domain. Certainly more information can help improve on this analysis. But in the absence of such, this analysis should still be helpful, not only to those who make and assess U.S. foreign policy, but to those who study it and Russian foreign policy as well.

The limitations of this work are legion, and some are recognized. This analysis made scant mention of the economic factors which surely underpin any element of international relations. It did not consider the Russian investigation and prosecution of Mikhail Khordokovsky and his Yukos Oil Company, nor did it bring into consideration the future of the U.S. Jackson-Vanik legislation. To open the door to economic considerations would certainly have been useful, but it would have increased the scope and complexity of this analysis beyond what would fit comfortably between the cover pages. It certainly remains required research for the future.
Much of this analysis was accomplished with scant attention paid to the underlying language differences between the two nations. Indeed, the three authors could at best communicate only with a Russian toddler in his native tongue. But with the thaw in relations between the U.S. and Russia over the past 15 years or so, and an opening of public criticism within Russia (especially in the print and electronic media), it appears that much “fact” and commentary on Russia has migrated across the language barrier. It is hoped enough has made it across to make this volume useful.

Its limitations notwithstanding, in the final analysis this work also seeks to bridge the gap between the thinking of foreign policy and the doing, providing insight to each. There are those who create and execute foreign policy with considerable knowledge, both academic and practical, but without a context or a consideration of the realities of policy execution that make it fraught with the possibility of failure. There are also those who teach, learn, and research foreign policy without the context of the ungainly mechanism in which it must operate. It is hoped each group can find value in this research.
Prior to the Beslan school attacks, the following terrorist attacks had already occurred in Russia:

August 31, 2004 - A female suicide bomber kills nine people and herself, and wounds 51 others when she detonates a bomb outside a subway station in northeastern Moscow.

August 24, 2004 - Two Russian passenger planes are blown up almost simultaneously, killing 89. Federal Security Service focusing on whether acts of terrorism brought down the jets after traces of explosives found in wreckage of planes.

June 22, 2004 - Rebels seize an interior ministry building in Ingushetia, near Chechnya, killing at least 92 people, including the acting head of the Ingush Interior.

February 6, 2004 - A rush-hour blast kills at least 30 people and injures 70 on a metro train in Moscow.

December 9, 2003 - A suicide bomber in central Moscow kills at least five people.

December 5, 2003 - An explosion on a commuter train in the Stavropol region north of Chechnya kills at least 36 people and injures more than 150.

September 3, 2003 - Six people are killed in an explosion on board a commuter train near the Northern Caucasus spa town of Pyatigorsk, but police say it is not the work of Chechen rebels.

August 1, 2003 - A suicide bomber kills at least 50 people at a military hospital in the town of Mozdok in North Ossetia bordering Chechnya.

July 5, 2003 - Two women suicide bombers kill 15 other people when they blow themselves apart at an open-air rock festival at Moscow’s Tushino airfield. 60 are injured.

June 5, 2003 - A woman bomber ambushes a bus carrying Russian air force pilots near Chechnya, blowing it up and killing herself and 18 other people.

May 14, 2003 - At least 16 people are killed in a suicide bomb attack during a religious festival in the town of Illskhan-Yurt, east of Grozny. 145 are wounded.

May 12, 2003 - Two suicide bombers drive a truck full of explosives into a government administration and security complex in Znamenskoye, in northern Chechnya. Fifty-nine people are killed, and scores hurt.

December 27, 2002 - Chechen suicide bombers ram vehicles into the local government headquarters in Grozny, bringing down the roof and floors of the four-story building. Chechen officials say about 80 people killed.

October 23, 2002 - About 50 Chechen rebels seize a Moscow theater and take about 800 hostages. After a three-day siege Russian forces storm the building using gas, killing most of the rebels and 115 hostages.

August 8, 2000 - A bomb in a busy Moscow underpass kills eight people.
July 2-3, 2000 - Chechen guerrillas launch five suicide bomb attacks on bases of Russian forces within 24 hours. In the deadliest, at least 54 people are killed at a police base near Grozny.

June 7, 2000 - In the first attack of its kind in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, two Russian special police are killed in a suicide car-bombing near the regional capital Grozny.

September 1999 - Bombs destroy apartment blocks in Moscow, Buynaksk and Volgodonsk, killing 200. The government blames Chechen rebels, who in turn accuse Russia’s secret services. Then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin responds by sending troops into Chechnya for the first time since 1997.

August 31, 1999 - A bomb explodes in an underground shopping center near the Kremlin, injuring 20 people.

January 1996 - 350 Chechen militants seized a hospital in Kizlyar, eastern Chechnya, and took more than 3,000 people hostage. In military operation to free them, 65 civilians and soldiers were killed.

June 1995 - Chechen rebels seize hundreds of hostages in a hospital in southern Russian town of Budennovsk. More than 100 die as Russian commandos launch botched raid. Rebels allowed to leave for Chechnya after five days in return for freeing captives.

Notes

1 “Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which ‘the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong. . . .’ A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.” George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict,” 6 March 1991, available online at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1991/91030600.html.


Appendix B

Chechnya Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>Gradual Russian expansion into Caucasus - opposed by Chechen peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785-1791</td>
<td>Jihad by Chechen Sheik Mansur against Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817-27</td>
<td>General Yermolov’s campaign to pacify Caucasus. Grozny founded as Russian fortress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836-1859</td>
<td>Imam Shamil’s campaign against Russia occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-1921</td>
<td>Attempts to create independent Mountain Republic in Caucasus, including Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-</td>
<td>Soviet rule established in Chechnya &amp; rest of Caucasus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Mass deportation of Chechen population to Central Asia because of claimed support for German invaders. Up to a quarter of population died and Chechen Republic abolished (February).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>Khrushchev rehabilitates Chechens &amp; allows their return to Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Chechen declaration of independence under President Dzhokar Dudayev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>First Chechen War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Dudayev killed in Russian missile attack (21 April 1996). Khasavyurt Agreements end war, acknowledging de facto Chechen independence (August).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 “Russia and the Cis - Chechen Republic.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Election of Aslan Maskhadov as president of Chechnya (January).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Incursions by Chechen rebel groups into Dagestan; Vladimir Putin appointed prime minister by President Yeltsin (August). Series of explosions in apartment blocks in Buynaksk, Volgodonsk and Moscow (September). Russian troops enter Chechnya “to establish security zone” (October). Yeltsin resigns as president and is replaced by Putin who is subsequently elected president in March 2000 (December).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Russian troops complete occupation of Grozny (February). Putin imposes direct rule from Moscow on Chechnya and appoints Kadyrov as head of temporary administration (June). First suicide bombing attacks on Russian installations (June-July).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Control of operations in Chechnya transferred to Federal Security Service (FSB) (January). Major rebel attack on Gudermes (September). Talks between Akhmed Zakayev (Maskhadov’s representative) and Kazantsev (presidential representative in Caucasus) (November).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Georgia accuses Russia of carrying out air raids on suspected rebel bases in Pankisi Gorge. Rebels shoot down Russian Mi-26 helicopter at Khankala, killing over 120; other successful attacks on helicopters follow (August). Chechen rebels seize 800 hostages in a Moscow theatre. Most rebels and an estimated 120 hostages are killed when security forces storm the building after using gas to neutralise resistance (October).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>A referendum was held on the new constitution of the republic and the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. According to the official statistics, 85 per cent of eligible voters participated (this includes the Russian troops stationed in Chechnya) 96 per cent of them supported the new constitution; 94.9 per cent and 95.8 per cent supported the laws regulating the presidential and parliamentary elections respectively (March).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Chechen opposition is blamed for the bombing of the Moscow metro (February). Yelimkhan Yandarbiyev, a former Chechen president, is assassinated in Qatar in what is likely to be a Russian intelligence operation (February). Ruslan Gelaev, a leading rebel commander, killed in a gun battle with Russian border guard forces (February). President Akhmad Kadyrov assassinated on 9 May 2004. New president, Alu Alkhanov, elected (August). Terrorist attacks on 2 Russian aircraft and a school in North Ossetia (August-September). Russian forces launch a major offensive in the southern mountains in response to the attacks (September-October). New Federal Commission on North Caucasus established under Dmitry Kozak’s leadership (September).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sergei Abramov, seconded from Moscow, appointed prime minister (October).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C


The following information is also available at www.armscontrol.org

- **1992:** Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to return their inherited Soviet Nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states.

  Two science centers designed to provide alternative employment for WMD scientists and technicians (a significant proliferation problem) were opened.

- **1993:** The Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase agreement was signed. Under the agreement the United States would buy 500 metric tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) mixed with natural uranium to eliminate its weapon utility.

  The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program established to improve the security of Russia’s fissile material. Additionally the countries agreed to build a new Russian facility to store fissile material.

- **1994:** Russia and U.S. sign an agreement to assist Russia in stopping its weapons grade plutonium production.

  Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program established to offer more assist to WMD scientists and technicians in the area of non-weapons technology projects.

- **1995:** The United States and Russia implement a new program to convert Soviet-designed research reactors to no longer use weapons-grade uranium.

  In April, Kazakhstan became a non-nuclear weapons state.

- **1996:** In June, Ukraine became a non-nuclear weapons state.
In November, the last Soviet nuclear warheads returned to Russia from Belarus. Now all former Soviet republics were non-nuclear weapons states.

- 1997: United States and Russia revise original plutonium production reactor agreement to facilitate the end of plutonium production.

- 1998: Nuclear Cities Initiative established again aimed at provide work opportunities for WMD scientists and technicians.

- 1999: United States and Russia agreed to extend the CTR agreement.

- 2000: United States and Russia signed a plutonium disposition agreement providing for the elimination of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium by each country.

- 2003: United States and Russia signed an agreement for the U.S. to finance the modernization and construction of replacement fossil fuel plants in exchange for a Russian commitment to shut down and decommission the three remaining plutonium breeder reactors.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Facts

Per information available at the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program Website (lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugarch.htm), U.S./Russian cooperation has led to the following weapons systems deactivated or destroyed under the Nunn-Lugar programs:

- 6,312 nuclear warheads;
- 537 ICBMs;
- 459 ICBM silos;
- 11 ICBM mobile missile launchers;
- 128 bombers;
- 708 nuclear air-to-surface missiles;
- 408 submarine missile launchers;
- 496 submarine launched missiles;
- 27 nuclear submarines; and
- 194 nuclear test tunnels.

Additionally:

- Storage sites containing 260 tons of fissile material have received security upgrades.
- 60 nuclear warhead storage sites have received security upgrades.
- 208 metric tons of HEU have been blended down to LEU - the equivalent of more than 8,300 nuclear warheads.
- 35 percent of Russia’s chemical weapons have received security upgrades.
- Joint U.S.-Russian research is being conducted at 49 former biological weapons facilities, and security improvements are underway at 4 biological weapons sites.
- The International Science and Technology Centers have engaged 58,000 former weapons scientists in non-weapons work.
- The International Proliferation Prevention Program has funded 750 projects involving 14,000 former weapons scientists and created some 580 new peaceful high-tech jobs.
- One major biological weapons production plant has been eliminated.
- Fissile Material Storage Facility, designed to house more than 12,500 nuclear weapons is under construction.
- Russia’s first Chemical weapons Destruction Facility for nerve agent proliferable weapons is under construction.
Appendix D

United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism
Russia has supported, 1998 – 2004

Resolution 1566 Threats to international peace and security
Resolution 1540 Threats to international peace and security
Resolution 1535 Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
Resolution 1530 Bomb attacks in Madrid, Spain, on 11 March 2004
Resolution 1526 Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
Resolution 1516 Bomb attacks in Istanbul, Turkey, on 15 November 2003 and 20 November 2003
Resolution 1465 Bomb attack in Bogota, Colombia
Resolution 1456 High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism
Resolution 1455 Implementation of measures imposed by paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 (1999), paragraph 8 (c) of Resolution 1333 (2000) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 1390 (2002) on measures against the Taliban and Al-Qaida
Resolution 1452 Implementation of measures imposed by paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 (1999) and paragraph 1 and 2 (a) of Resolution 1390 (2002)
Resolution 1450 Condemning the terrorist bomb attack, in Kikambala, Kenya, and the attempted missile attack on the airline departing Mombasa, Kenya, 28 November 2002
Resolution 1440 Condemning the act of taking hostages in Moscow, Russian Federation, on 23 October 2002
Resolution 1438 Bomb attacks in Bali, Indonesia
Resolution 1377 Adoption of declaration on the global effort to combat terrorism
Resolution 1373 International cooperation to combat threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
Resolution 1368 Condemning the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania, United States of America
Resolution 1363 Establishment of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000)
Resolution 1333 Measures against the Taliban
Resolution 1269 International cooperation in the fight against terrorism
Resolution 1267 Measures against the Taliban
Resolution 1214 Situation in Afghanistan
Resolution 1189  Terrorist bomb attacks of 7 Aug. 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania
Information from the United Nations, online at www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm:
Appendix E

The Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 as well as its other resolutions concerning threats to international peace and security caused by terrorism,

Recalling in this regard its resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004,

Reaffirming also the imperative to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law,

Deeply concerned by the increasing number of victims, including children, caused by acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism in various regions of the world,

Calling upon States to cooperate fully with the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), including the recently established Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the “Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee” established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and further calling upon such bodies to enhance cooperation with each other,

Reminding States that they must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

Considering that acts of terrorism seriously impair the enjoyment of human rights and threaten the social and economic development of all States and undermine global stability and prosperity,
Emphasizing that enhancing dialogue and broadening the understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and addressing unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues, will contribute to international cooperation, which by itself is necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight against terrorism,

Reaffirming its profound solidarity with victims of terrorism and their families,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious threats to peace and security;

2. Calls upon States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, especially with those States where or against whose citizens terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens;

3. Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature;

4. Calls upon all States to become party, as a matter of urgency, to the relevant international conventions and protocols whether or not they are a party to regional conventions on the matter;

5. Calls upon Member States to cooperate fully on an expedited basis in resolving all outstanding issues with a view to adopting by consensus the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism;

6. Calls upon relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to strengthen international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and to intensify their interaction with the United Nations and, in particular, the CTC with a view to facilitating full and timely implementation of resolution 1373 (2001);
7. Requests the CTC in consultation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and the United Nations bodies to develop a set of best practices to assist States in implementing the provisions of resolution 1373 (2001) related to the financing of terrorism;

8. Directs the CTC, as a matter of priority and, when appropriate, in close cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to start visits to States, with the consent of the States concerned, in order to enhance the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and facilitate the provision of technical and other assistance for such implementation;

9. Decides to establish a working group consisted of all members of the Security Council to consider and submit recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, including more effective procedures considered to be appropriate for bringing them to justice through prosecution or extradition, freezing of their financial assets, preventing their movement through the territories of Member States, preventing supply to them of all types of arms and related material, and on the procedures for implementing these measures;

10. Requests further the working group, established under paragraph 9 to consider the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families, which might be financed through voluntary contributions, which could consist in part of assets seized from terrorist organizations, their members and sponsors, and submit its recommendations to the Council;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to take, as a matter of urgency, appropriate steps to make the CTED fully operational and to inform the Council by 15 November 2004;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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