FROM RAMPART TO CHAMBER HOUSE: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN AND THE DIALOGUE OF WAR

by

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From Rampart to Chamber House: Soldiers, Statesmen and the Dialogue of War

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The undersigned certify that this thesis meets masters-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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Preface

In 2004, at the Air Command and Staff College, I had the opportunity to read Eliot Cohen’s *Supreme Command*. While understanding that, ultimately, the soldier must be subject to the politician, I was struck by his construct that did not seem to provide for an adequate exchange of ideas during the planning and execution of war. My interest in the topic was further developed at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Cohen’s theory is not the target of my research, however; rather, it was a springboard for a larger question—what is the best framework for effective civil-military relations? It is to this end that I have conducted my research.

I extend my appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Stephen Chiabotti, my advisor, for his considerable guidance and mentorship throughout the research process. Additionally, I would like to thank Col Jim Forsyth, my reader, for his counsel with this project.

As with all of my accomplishments, I share this work with Amanda, Brandon, and Garrett.
Abstract

The relationship between political and military leadership in times of conflict is as crucial today as ever. In the face of limited warfare, counter-insurgency and peace-keeping operations, it is imperative that soldiers and statesmen employ the most appropriate means of communication while applying military power to achieve political ends.

This thesis seeks to determine the best construct for civil-military dialogue. It examines the frameworks presented by three renowned thinkers: Carl von Clausewitz, Samuel P. Huntington, and Eliot Cohen. Clausewitz maintains that, because war is an extension of policy, both dialogue and action must be two-way, even to the extent that the soldier become a statesman during war. Huntington disagrees; he views the camps as distinct, due to narrow areas of expertise and the necessity for the military to remain professional by limiting political oversight and forbidding acts of policy by generals. Cohen’s model allows for regular and liberal participation by the civilian leader into the military realm, not vice versa. He argues that the political situation is continually changing and that generals are not equipped to understand the complexities of the strategic environment beyond the conduct of actual war.

By examining each in light of historical examples, I measure the merit of the theories. The case studies presented are Winston’s Churchill’s decision to move British fighters into France in early summer of 1940, the actions of General George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff of the US Army during World War II, and the civil-military deliberations during the build up to Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999.

The case studies demonstrate that each theory is both validated and repudiated in some respect by history. I propose a fourth option that includes the positive aspects of Clausewitz, Huntington, and Cohen. I call this framework the appraised dialogue, where each side is respected for its expertise, but allowed to make appropriate inputs in the interest of successful military operations and beneficial political outcomes.
Introduction

As it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who is himself not the head of a state. Leaving out of the question that he is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all possesses the powerful accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and in secondary operations. Here are, certainly, sufficient motives to induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and the contest be of a magnitude worthy to him.

Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini

The Art of War

Baron Antoine de Jomini’s concept of one figure encompassing both political and military leadership is not possible in an electoral government such as the United States. Yet, while we embrace the strengths of our system in terms of representation and a broad distribution of power, we must also acknowledge that the separation of military leadership from political control somewhat complicates the application of force for the US and other democracies. And so, the often-tenuous relationship between the statesman and the soldier is, nonetheless, deemed crucial for successful combat operations.

For the United States, the issue of civil-military relations is as critical today as ever. The post-Cold War era has increased the likelihood of small wars. Counter-insurgencies, anti-terrorism campaigns, and other third-world conflicts seem more likely than addressing the threat posed by a large, conventional foe. As a result, we can expect more political restraints on warfare than we have experienced during periods of large-scale, nearly-total conflict. The insurgents in Iraq and the political considerations that accompany Phase-Four operations typify the enemy and strategic environment we are likely to confront in the future.
Phase-Four operations in Iraq have yet to be concluded; it would be premature to assess the strategy or the force structure at this juncture. However, the tug-of-war between the civilian leadership and the military establishment over the number of ground troops highlights the relevance of the problem in today’s strategic environment. Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned peace-keeping operations with a significantly lower number of troops than the service leaders deemed necessary. When General Shinseki suggested that Phase-Four operations would require more than 200,000 ground troops, he was publicly rebuked by the civilian leadership.

Neither Mr. Rumsfeld nor Mr. Wolfowitz mentioned General Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, by name. But both men were clearly irritated at the general’s suggestion that a postwar Iraq might require many more forces than the 100,000 American troops and the tens of thousands of allied forces that are also expected to join a reconstruction effort.¹

Undoubtedly, the civilians and the brass were divided on the issue of force structure. The question is, was the dispute resolved in the best manner? If, perhaps, the interaction exhibited by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Shinseki is based upon a faulty mode of interaction, then the best solution to this military issue was less likely to be chosen from the start. Exercises in determining the proper relationship between the statesman and the soldier are, therefore, well worth our time, especially if a framework can be presented that promotes appropriate dialogue on such divisive issues. The stakes are too high to permit a faulty relationship to drive errant decisions regarding military power.

In order to examine the relationship between generals and civilians, it is best to begin with the theories on the table today. Framing the debate are three notable constructs: those of Carl von Clausewitz, Samuel P. Huntington, and Eliot Cohen.

Carl von Clausewitz, quite possibly the greatest military theorist, addressed relations between politicians and generals when he wrote On War. His model stems from the belief that military action is always an act of policy; as such, he views politics and military leadership as inseparable during times of war. Clausewitz espouses a liberal

exchange between both sides. Politicians are to express concerns and desires to the military, while the generals can even wear the hat of a statesman during times of war in order to expedite the battle.

The civil-military relationship was the main subject of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, in which the author made clear his preference for a separation of roles and responsibilities. Huntington argues that representative societies require professional militaries, and such can only be achieved when uniformed servants are permitted to focus exclusively on the business of war. Huntington espouses distinct camps; soldiers should not expand their roles into politics, nor should they be overly controlled by politicians on strictly military issues.

Eliot Cohen wrote Supreme Command to take Huntington’s “normal theory” head on. Cohen charges that Huntington and company ignore the example of great statesmen such as Lincoln, Churchill, Ben Gurion and Clemenceau, who regularly engaged in military affairs and ensured success during war. Cohen contends that, because senior soldiers fail to grasp both the entirety and nuances of strategy, politicians must remain involved in military matters.

We see, therefore, three distinct opinions offered by the three theorists. Clausewitz maintains that the soldier must engage politically and vice versa. Huntington implores states to keep the two roles separate. Cohen argues for political intervention into military affairs only. At the risk of oversimplification, Clausewitz, Huntington, and Cohen advocate a two-way street, a barricade, and a one-way thoroughfare of ideas, respectively.

Which theory, then, is correct? This thesis attempts to determine the best model for civil-military relations by using historical studies to test the theories of Clausewitz, Huntington and Cohen.

After presenting the historical cases and making some cursory findings, it provides collective analysis of the theories. Using the historical evidence, it uncovers strengths and weaknesses for each. By eliminating the aspects of each theory that are refuted by historical study, we are left with a unique option that synthesizes the positive traits from the three theorists. I call this fourth option the appraised dialogue.
Overview

This study conducts an episodic, historical examination of civil-military relations as a method to evaluate the theories. Chapter 1 reviews Clausewitz, Huntington, and Cohen and their ideas about interaction between soldiers and statesmen. Chapter 2 provides the first historical study, that of Winston Churchill and his decision to commit fighter aircraft to France in May of 1940. Chapter 3 examines the Army Chief of Staff during World War II, General George C. Marshall. Marshall was obligated to engage in politics, diplomacy, and economics in order to effect the successful outcome of World War II. Operation ALLIED FORCE is examined in Chapter 4; the focus is on the US generals, Secretary of Defense Cohen, and President Clinton. In this chapter, the lines blur as generals and statesmen demonstrate both clarity and misunderstanding with regards to the coercion campaign against Slobodan Milosevic. Chapter 5 analyzes the three theories and determines a more suitable fourth option--the appraised dialogue.
Chapter 1

The Theorists – Clausewitz, Huntington and Cohen

Carl von Clausewitz

Perhaps Carl von Clausewitz’s greatest contribution to the discussion of civil-military relations is his maxim from On War that forever connects the two parties during times of combat. It is Clausewitz who describes war as an “act of policy;” as such, policy shapes all facets of military plans and operations.² Whereas many view war as a distinct phase in relations between two states, Clausewitz views military action as a “continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”³

Do political relations between peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged? Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.

If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.⁴

By positing war as a continuation of policy, Clausewitz implies limitations for both politicians and generals. For example, he cautions against policy directly affecting such operational details as the posting of guards or the manner in which patrols are to be

³ Ibid, 605.
⁴ Ibid.
But he also decries those who would collect all military power for the commander in order to draw up a purely military plan for war.\(^5\) Such proponents, according to Clausewitz, envision a viable split between policy and military in times of war; no such schism exists; however: “the supreme standpoint for the conduct of war, the point of view that determines its main lines of action, can only be that of policy.”\(^7\) For the great theorist, this link primarily shapes the conduct of war; it also impacts relations between military and civilian leaders.

Having identified the permanent bond between policy and war, Clausewitz also examines the relationship between political and military leaders.

War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.\(^8\)

Clausewitz recognizes that, as an act of policy, war must always be subordinate to the political objective; yet in this tract he also identifies the general’s need to communicate when objectives cannot be met with military power. In this regard, Clausewitz envisions a two-way exchange; policy dominates, but channels must be open for the soldier to appeal to the statesman when combat power does not support the desired political end state.

In fact, his consideration of war as an extension of policy prompts Clausewitz to make a bold statement regarding the senior commander, in a chapter where he addresses military genius. He claims: “To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman.”\(^9\) This statement has the potential to alarm those who fear an unrestrained military venturing into all levels of politics. After all, Prussia was once described as “not a country with an army, but an

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\(^5\) Ibid, 606.
\(^6\) Ibid, 607.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Ibid 111.
army with a country.” But the statesmanship of the general posed by Clausewitz is not without limits:

The great range of business that a supreme commander must swiftly absorb and accurately evaluate has been indicated… We argue that a commander-in-chief must also be a statesman, but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal.

He implores the leader to remain a general and use the means at his disposal; after all, Clausewitz imparts limitations on the military, even in a two-way exchange of ideas. In effect, he proposes military statesmanship only to the extent that such actions support the commander’s execution of the war.

For Carl von Clausewitz, the permanent condition of war as an instrument of policy dictates that the politician remain engaged during war since war is a continuation of the state’s diplomatic, economic, or verbal exchange with an adversarial state. Further, he supports a duality in communication between politicians and generals, even to the extent that the soldier is considered a statesman during times of war. This position defies the opinions of Samuel P. Huntington; in his view, both camps should remain distinct.

**Samuel P. Huntington**

Clausewitz views political interaction by the military commander as a necessity of war; Samuel Huntington forbids involvement in anything other than military matters, if the generals and the military are to remain professional. He also supports restraining the politician from military affairs. Separate camps characterize Huntington’s vision of political-military affairs, which he labels objective control. His theory begins with an examination of the professional soldier.

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10 Baron Friedrich Leopold von Schrötter, quoted in Col T.N. Depuy, A Genius For War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Falls Church, Va.: NOVA Publications, 1984), 16.
11 Clausewitz, 111-2.
“A democratic state is better defended by a professional force than by a democratic force.”\(^\text{12}\) Huntington’s determination to maintain the professionalism of the US military shapes his entire theory. He characterizes the professional soldier as Hobbesian, cautious, and pessimistic, if for no other reason than that the military man is charged with the protection of a society and must, therefore, assume the worst.\(^\text{13}\) Accordingly, the soldier is also one who cannot objectively determine the political intentions of other nations; rather, he assesses a threat based exclusively on capabilities.\(^\text{14}\) In fact, Huntington suggests, the ability to judge policies lies outside of the soldier’s competence; for this reason the general must remain neutral politically on all issues.\(^\text{15}\) However, if the soldier is limited politically, so too is the politician limited with regard to military issues:

The ideal military man is thus conservative in strategy, but open-minded and progressive with respect to new weapons and new tactical forms. He is equally expert in both the constant and variable aspects of military science…It is this area within which the statesman must accept the judgments of the military professional…Just as war serves the ends of politics, the military profession serves the ends of the state. Yet the statesman must recognize the integrity of the profession and its subject matter. The military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman. Civilian control exists when there is this proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.\(^\text{16}\)

Huntington sees realms that are best kept separate; this sentiment is reflected in his demand for objective control: “The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.”\(^\text{17}\) While demanding that soldiers give way to “superior political wisdom,” Huntington rejects overbearing leaders during wartime.\(^\text{18}\)

What does the military officer do when he is ordered by a statesman to take a measure which is militarily absurd when judged by professional standards and

\(^{13}\) Ibid, 63.
\(^{14}\) Ibid, 66.
\(^{15}\) Ibid 66, 71.
\(^{16}\) Ibid, 71-2.
\(^{17}\) Ibid, 83.
\(^{18}\) Ibid, 76.
which is strictly within the military realm without any political implications? This situation, provided that the last qualification holds and that it is completely removed from politics, represents a clear invasion of the professional realm by extraneous considerations. The presumption of superior professional competence which existed in the case of a military superior giving a questionable order does not exist when the statesman enters military affairs. Here the existence of professional standards justifies military disobedience. The statesman has no business deciding, as Hitler did in the later phases of World War II, whether battalions in combat should advance or retreat.\(^19\)

The general must be presumed to have superior competence in military affairs; the statesman is not afforded such consideration by Huntington. Herein lies one motive the separation of both entities—soldiers do not engage politically because it weakens their professionalism, and statesman avoid over-involvement (beyond establishing the political objective) in military issues because they are not supremely competent in warfare. A second reason stems from the first, according to Huntington—he fears that a politicized military might lead to a coup. “A political officer corps, rent with faction, subordinated to ulterior ends, lacking prestige but sensitive to the appeals of popularity, would endanger the security of the state.”\(^20\)

In the above excerpt, Huntington condemns Hitler’s actions, but he also elevates Germany at the outset of the twentieth century as the model of relations between the soldier and the statesman. Optimally for Huntington, the German military was limited exclusively to issues of war, while direct access for the military to the Kaiser ensured that there was no political meddling into military issues.\(^21\) In contrast, Huntington has scathing words for the situation in the United States during World War II. He contends that the military ran the war, consistent with the desires of politicians and American society, but without a political mandate from the President.\(^22\) He cites Roosevelt’s failure to override the military on all but two issues during the war.\(^23\) Additionally, Huntington criticizes the Joint Chiefs for venturing into politics, diplomacy, and economic issues.\(^24\) As a result, Huntington argues, the senior US military officials advocated political

\(^{19}\) Ibid, 77.
\(^{20}\) Ibid, 464.
\(^{21}\) Ibid, 101-3.
\(^{22}\) Ibid, 315.
\(^{23}\) Ibid, 322.
\(^{24}\) Ibid, 323.
objectives such as unconditional surrender, leaving the United States in a poor strategic position at the conclusion of the war.25

Huntington credited Clausewitz for first presenting the idea of civilian control of the military, but he sharply distinguishes himself from the previous theorist on objective control. Clausewitz would never have conceded a military measure that did not have political implications, but Huntington clearly envisions such a possibility. Clausewitz calls upon collaboration, even to the extent that soldiers act like statesmen in times of war. Huntington separates both parties in the interest of professional military success. So far, the pathway between politician and soldier is characterized by a two-way street (Clausewitz) and a barricade (Huntington). Eliot Cohen offers a third approach; he prefers the one-way thoroughfare, traveled exclusively by the politician.

Eliot Cohen

Clausewitz’s *On War* may be the consummate text for the military theorist, and Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* the treatise on civil-military relations; but Eliot Cohen’s *Supreme Command* seems to hold at least an equal place in readership for American government today. In addition to being part of President Bush’s summer reading in 2001, it was included on the Senate Armed Service Committee’s national security reading list.26 As of this writing, it also holds a place on the reading lists of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

In *Supreme Command*, Huntington’s theory of objective control is presented as the “normal theory of civil military relations;” and just as quickly Eliot Cohen dismisses it:

The result [according to Huntington] should be a limited degree of civilian control over military matters. To ask too many questions (let alone give orders) about tactics, particular pieces of hardware, the design of a campaign, measures of success, or to press too closely for the promotion or dismissal of anything

25 Ibid, 327, 344.
other than the most senior officers is meddling and interference, which is inappropriate and downright dangerous.

The difficulty is that the great war statesmen do just those improper things—and, what is more, it is because they do so that they succeed.\textsuperscript{27}

Cohen presents four examples of statesman who, through effective military intervention, demonstrate the imperative of such action. These men (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion) provide the material for Cohen’s case for routine participation by the statesman into the soldier’s realm.

His strongest argument for statesmen’s involvement lies in his demonstration of the fact that the political end state may very well change during the course of a conflict. Cohen references the changing nature of the Civil War to reinforce his point. Lincoln initially hoped to restore peace without freeing any slave, but afterwards was forced to acknowledge that emancipation was a central issue to the war, and that the political objective would have to expand beyond suppressing the rebellion to defeating Southern forces and society.\textsuperscript{28} Cohen’s point is clear: “Even the soundest strategic concept could not survive the crucible of war unmodified. Even a man with Lincoln’s political wisdom could not foresee the course of a great war; he would have to adjust and change course although his ultimate objectives remained the same.”\textsuperscript{29} On this ground, Eliot Cohen advocates regular political intervention.

Cohen maintains that the extent to which he advocates political involvement is in agreement with Clausewitz; the Prussian would not likely concur. Cohen argues that politicians must engage in military affairs, because war and policy are linked; this is without a doubt a Clausewitzian theme. However, he also contends that the statesman has the authority to interject on “any aspect of war-making.”\textsuperscript{30} He envisions some limits to this authority in the tactical realm, where the statesman may not be so inclined, but ultimately suggests that Clausewitz views “no arbitrary line dividing civilian and military responsibility, no neat way of carving off a distinct sphere of military action.”\textsuperscript{31} His assessment oversimplifies the Prussian; Clausewitz cautioned against political

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, 31-32.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 33.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
involvement at the operational level of war as well. Moreover, Clausewitz sensed that policy affected all aspects of making war, not that the politician should necessarily engage at all levels. Herein lies one subtle difference between the two. Cohen’s unequal dialogue, however, is not so subtle; he departs sharply from Clausewitz’s concept of the statesmanship of a general during war.

Cohen describes unequal dialogue as both means and result of the statesman trumping the soldier on military issues. While both parties share views, ultimately the civilian leader’s authority is “unambiguous and unquestioned.” At the heart of Cohen’s construct lies his skepticism in the broad understanding of the military leader:

Inevitably, a military commander’s point of view must be partial, restricted in various ways but not least by a sense of responsibility for the right point of view from which to judge military action. Usually, though not always, this entails deciding when political considerations must override legitimate, even pressing military ones, and this trade-off applies in the greatest wars and in far less substantial conflicts as well.

For Cohen, this limitation demands military intervention on the part of the politician. Even if the politician is mistaken on occasion, “some of the art of leadership may lie in intuiting when others are even more wrong than oneself.”

Summary

We have, then, three authors with three distinct positions. Clausewitz envisions a two-way exchange since war always supports policy. Huntington espouses distinct camps, with little interaction beyond establishing the political objectives for a campaign, in order to preserve the professionalism of the military and ensure successful operations. Cohen advocates political oversight without soldiers venturing into the political, because of the limits of the military mind. It may prove useful to examine cases of soldiers and statesmen interacting in war—cases that are different from those chosen by Cohen.

32 Cohen, 209.
33 Ibid, 214.
34 Ibid, 211.
History may demonstrate theories more feeble than the military minds they circumscribe. We start with one of Cohen’s subjects—Churchill, at somewhat other than his finest hour.
Chapter 2

Churchill and the Fighter Controversy: His Gravest Moment Precedes “Their Finest Hour”

Eliot Cohen is just one of several who consider Winston Churchill the “greatest war statesman of the century.” Truly, Cohen’s assertion is difficult to refute. As England’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defense during World War II, Churchill provided his countrymen and women with an indomitable fighting spirit that radiated out to the rest of the Allies in the contest.

He had many strengths as a war leader sitting in a Cabinet room or around a table with a handful of advisers. He had, as few men have ever had, the gift of composing trenchant state papers and penetrating memoranda. His art of leadership included, as we have noted, a skill at questioning and challenging professional subordinates that few others have mastered. But all these skills would have availed nothing had they not rested on a courage that, even at the distance of fifty years, is nothing less than magnificent.

These leadership qualities were never more evident than during the weeks of the Battle of Britain fought over the skies of England in the second half of 1940. Ironically, although Churchill’s brilliance, resolve, and direction were essential to winning the battle, it was Churchill himself who almost cost England the fight before it began. His errant decision to commit fighters to France in lieu of home defense greatly undermined the RAF to a point where the Battle of Britain was decided by a small margin in numbers of aircraft and Hitler’s decision to focus attacks on London. The Prime Minister advocated a doomed plan at the strategic level of war and pressed with his poor

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36 Ibid.
decision repeatedly until it was almost too late. The European situation in the late spring of 1940 and the course of events that transpired make this point evident.

**Situation in Europe**

The months leading up to May 1940 were characterized by the German push westward and an insidious leak of Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter aircraft into France. On January 27th, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill addressed Britons publicly regarding the Nazi’s conquest of Poland and Czechoslovakia:

> Come then: let us to the task, to the battle, to the toil—each to our part, each to our station. Fill the armies, rule the air, pour out the munitions, strangle the U-boats, sweep the mines, plough the land, build the ships, guard the streets, succour the wounded, uplift the downcast, and honour the brave.
> Let us go forward in all parts of the Empire, in all parts of the Island. There is not a week, nor a day, nor an hour to lose.  

For the RAF, this call to arms translated into moving even more fighters into France. The slow exodus of Hurricanes continued as the Germans bested the Allies in Norway during April. When the Nazi war machine entered Holland and Belgium on May 10th, it inflicted heavy losses on RAF fighters positioned forward. On May 13th, having already lost over two hundred fighters and distressed with having to send 32 more Hurricanes, Air Minister Downding took steps to address the War Cabinet personally.

The issue of fighters for home or abroad was central to the deliberations in mid-May for two reasons. In the first place, although British aircraft production surpassed German industry by 1939, the RAF had only 1,873 aircraft as opposed to 2,750 Luftwaffe aircraft on 10 May. The RAF fighter was indeed, in modern parlance, a high-demand, low-density asset. More importantly, however, the fighters characterized the tussle between two competing British strategies against the Nazi war machine in the

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38 Gilbert, 276.
41 Raymond A. Callahan, *Churchill: Retreat from Empire* (Wilmington, De.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1984), 77.
late spring of 1940: whether to halt the Germans on foreign soil as a coalition or to defend the British Isles alone.

**The Strategy Dilemma: Fight Abroad or Defend from Home?**

The British plan to fight abroad in an alliance was embodied in the British Expeditionary Force, or BEF. Initially, support from the government for a “continental commitment” was sparse, as London advocated defenses to repel the exaggerated capabilities of the German bomber forces instead of ground action on mainland Europe. Nonetheless, by April 1939 Great Britain took stock in her army to halt the Nazi onslaught. The BEF was adopted primarily because the British government recognized that a major commitment to continental land warfare would strengthen the alliance. Despite being the last to be readied, the ground force was also the first to be deployed (shortly after the German Army invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939).

In contrast, strategic plans for the defense of Britain with aircraft existed long before the War Cabinet took serious steps to develop the BEF. Prior to the war, Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding had prompted the Air Ministry for firm guidance regarding prospective air operations. In a written reply from the ministry, he received a twofold answer, that although “attack was the best form of defense”, he could take comfort that “in no circumstances would any Expeditionary Force leave our country until the safety of our Homeland was assured.”

While Dowding was always concerned with the level of fighter protection at home, even he conceded that Britain was obligated to support France with aircraft, while the Nazi threat was still distant. But, Dowding cautioned, “There could be no illusions concerning the wastage which would occur if we came up against the German fighters in France.” Dowding’s concerns were borne out as France was invaded. Several on the Air Staff were unprepared for the losses, much to Dowding’s disdain: “What do you

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42 David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them (The British Army in the Second World War) (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), 18.
43 Ibid, 21.
44 Ibid, 23.
46 Wright, 87.
47 Ibid.
expect? When you get into a war you have to lose things, including precious aircraft. That’s exactly what I’ve been warning you about.”

It was at this juncture, the second week of May 1940, when the two strategies appeared to collide in the War Cabinet. The demand for fighters in support of the allied ground effort on the continent finally caught up with losses that threatened Dowding’s desire to protect England from within its shores with the RAF. Of the two strategies, however, only the plan to shore up RAF resources and defend the island was suitable for the crucial days ahead.

The problem with continental defense focused about two issues: Allied army strength and geography. In the first place, French resolve and BEF strength undermined any serious attempts to halt German advances. The complacency that afflicted France was evidently lost on Churchill up until the middle of May 1940: “Despite his affection for France and his range of contacts there, Churchill obviously had not fully grasped the ambivalence with which many Frenchmen viewed the war.” As late as May 15th, however, Churchill seemed to sense the French moral collapse, even as he considered sending more RAF fighters: He called the move “a very grave risk”; however, “The first necessity was to support the French morale and give them a chance to recover themselves and deal with German armoured forces by the use of their own Army.” If French resolve was in question, so too was BEF strength.

Oddly, British efforts to outfit the Army in 1939 could be characterized as too much, too late. England’s response to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia doubled the Territorial Army, initiated a draft, and created thirty-two divisions (on paper) overnight. These hurried steps plunged the peacetime organizational structure, training and doctrine efforts, and military industrial complex into complete chaos, resulting in the BEF being under-equipped and too small on the eve of war. In sum, the French morale and British preparedness should have made skeptics out of those looking to ground forces to defend the continent. One last consideration, geography, tipped the strategic scales in favor of a robust air defense of England.

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48 Quoted in Ibid.
49 Callahan, 76.
50 Quoted in Gilbert, 347.
51 Fraser, 22.
52 Ibid.
The English Channel provides Great Britain with a strategic sanctuary that is unequalled by any terrain in lowland Europe or France. As the Germans advanced steadily west, two realities of the weeks ahead should have been apparent. First, the Channel was guaranteed to halt, at least temporarily, their advance. This would provide a sanctuary in England for Allied efforts. Secondly, airpower would be essential to maintaining this geographical advantage by the British. The earliest progress in aviation foreshadowed the threat to England, as evidenced by Lord Northcliffe’s prophetic remarks when Alberto Santos Dumont flew only 722 feet in 1906 in Europe: “It means the aerial chariots of a foe descending on British soil if war comes.” The significance of the channel and air power were (at least temporarily) on Churchill’s mind when he met with French leaders in Paris on May 16th. When accused of favoring English factories over Paris, Churchill replied coolly that “as long as the British could hold command of the air over England and could control the seas of the world, they were confident of the ultimate results, and it would be always possible to carry on.” Unfortunately, Churchill’s moment of strategic clarity in Paris was sandwiched between previous predilections to fight on the continent and an overwhelming desire to support the French during the middle of May.

The Churchill Pendulum: Decisions, 15-16 May 1940

The following timeline describes the events, the advice, and the Prime Minister’s decisions during that critical week of mid-May. On 15 May, Churchill received a phone call from French Prime Minister Reynaud, “telling Churchill that the counter attack on the Germans who had broken through at Sedan had failed, that ‘the road to Paris was open’, and that ‘the battle was lost’.” That evening, Hugh Dowding addressed Churchill and the cabinet. Rising from the table, he presented a graph to the Prime Minister, warning “if the present rate of wastage continues for another fortnight we shall not have a single Hurricane left in France or in this country.” The cabinet,

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54 Quoted in Gilbert, 351.
55 Ibid, 339.
speechless at first, agreed to halt the movement of any additional fighters to France.\textsuperscript{56} Immediately following the cabinet meeting, however, Churchill convened with a few others in the garden outside 10 Downing Street. The decision was reversed, and Churchill issued an immediate order for four more fighter squadrons to France.\textsuperscript{57}

On May 16th, Churchill met with the French in Paris. Observing large bonfires outside the meeting room, he concluded that steps were already being taken to evacuate Paris. In this meeting he made his aforementioned statement that with English air superiority and sea control of the world, his nation would eventually prevail.\textsuperscript{58} Yet shortly after the meeting, at the British Embassy, Churchill issued a request for six more fighter squadrons to France, noting “it would not be good historically if their requests were denied and their ruin resulted.”\textsuperscript{59}

In England, Dowding presented a letter to the Air Ministry reiterating his concerns expressed in the cabinet meeting the previous day.\textsuperscript{60} He reminded the Ministry that in the pre-war assessment fifty-two squadrons were deemed necessary to defend England—there were only thirty-six left.\textsuperscript{61} The letter made a great impression, causing Air Marshall Newall to “reach no other conclusion than that we have already reached the absolute limit of the assistance that we can afford to France.”\textsuperscript{62}

Events moved quickly from this juncture. Churchill returned to England and, on May 17th, met with the War Cabinet, calling his decision to send more fighters “the gravest decision that a British Cabinet had ever had to take.”\textsuperscript{63} The same day, word reached London that General Montgomery had begun a retreat from Brussels. On May 19th Churchill addressed the nation for the first time as Prime Minister. “We may look, Churchill added, ‘with confidence’ to the stabilization of the front in France. But once that happened, German aggression would then be turned ‘in a few days’ upon Britain.”\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{56} Wright, 104-106.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 107.
\textsuperscript{58} Gilbert, 350-351.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 352.
\textsuperscript{60} Gilbert, 114.
\textsuperscript{61} Hough and Richards, 89.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 90.
\textsuperscript{63} Gilbert, 354.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 365.
Following the address, Churchill issued the following message to General Ismay: “No more fighters will leave the country whatever the need in France.” Additionally, he ordered ten squadrons formed within a month from spare aircraft in the schools. Evacuation of Allied forces from Dunkirk began on May 26th.

From the timeline, it is apparent that Churchill was strategically willing to throw the fighter equivalent of good money after bad. The points above suggest that his insistence on sending Hurricanes was based upon a desire to support a feeble ally and save face historically. This judgment had detrimental effects on the RAF; had his decision prevailed to its conclusion, it would have been devastating. If there had been no stopping the bleeding of fighters to France, Fighter Command may have been weakened beyond its ability to survive the Battle of Britain.

**Cohen’s Assessment: Just How Serious an Error?**

To be fair, Eliot Cohen criticizes Winston Churchill’s decision to commit fighters to France on the eve of the Battle of Britain as a course of action “that could have proved a desperate error.” However, he describes the decision as one of several misjudgments at the operational level of war. Furthermore, contends Cohen, “Weighed against these undoubted errors is the cardinal fact that despite having the supreme power to act as he wished, he allowed himself to be talked out of every one of them. More important, one can find numerous examples of sound operational judgment—his drive for a technologically sophisticated set of solutions to the problems of a cross-Channel invasion, his belief in the eventual success of daylight precision bombing by the US Army Air Forces, and his support for an early amphibious strike in Italy in 1944.”

For Cohen, then, Churchill’s action in May 1940 is excused because it constituted a single, flawed, operational-level decision that he ultimately conceded. Cohen could not be more mistaken. The decision to send or keep fighters was a strategic decision, not an

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65 Hough and Richards, 90.
66 Gilbert, 366.
67 Hough and Richards, 90.
68 Cohen, 114.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
operational or tactical one. Additionally, Churchill did not concede his opinion; rather, it was overcome by German operational efficiency.

The geography of the English Channel and the concern for allies reinforce the strategic level of the fighter issue. There were incidental deliberations regarding how many fighters should be sent in support of a specific effort on the continent—these were operational, indeed. However, the debate in mid-May was whether to protect England with scant RAF assets by sending them forward or keeping them at home. Geography—specifically the English Channel—was central to the debate. As noted, Churchill himself recognized the significance of the channel when he addressed the French in Paris. Edward Luttwak explains the increased significance of terrain at the strategic, or theater level of war:

> Of course strategy has a spatial aspect at every level, but at the tactical level it is the detailed nature of the terrain that matters, while the combat encounters of the operational level could be much the same in any number of different geographical settings. At the theater level, however, some specific territory is the very object of the struggle. It may be as large as a continent or as small as an island; it can be a province, a region, an entire country, or a group of countries; but in any case a “theater of war” must form a reasonably self-contained space rather than just one part of a larger whole.\(^{71}\)

It is evident that the fighter issue was central to the debate regarding the best means to save England and the continent from Naziism. The English Channel was significant not only because it would slow down Hitler’s army; rather, it was key to providing the Allies with a sanctuary in England from which a realistic effort against the Germans could be mounted. Geography then, was a factor at the strategic level of war.

If geography points to Churchill’s failure at the strategic level of war, so too does his overwhelming regard for his French allies. Luttwak describes grand strategy as “this disproportionate top floor,” partially because “the net outcome of the technical, tactical, operational, and theater-strategic emerges in continuous interaction with all those dealings between states that are affected by, and in turn affect, what is done or not done

in the military sphere within any one state.” 72 This description is perfectly suited for the situation preceding the fall of France, where Churchill, advised against sending any more fighters, continued to do so because of great concerns regarding French-British relations, especially after the war. The decision has already been proven to be erroneous; here is evidence of its strategic nature.

Cohen mistakenly calls the fighter issue an operational decision; he also incorrectly praises Churchill for changing his mind. Rather, the evidence suggests that Prime Minister Churchill continued to advocate sending aircraft in support of a futile strategy until steady German advances made his choice moot. Churchill did not cede his decision to Air Marshall Dowding; he maintained his view until the Germans rendered it implausible.

The credit for stopping the flow of fighters to France – and for stopping it after only a few days of operations – has traditionally been assigned to Dowding, with the implication that if Churchill had had his way all would have been lost. The reality was rather more complicated...perhaps the sheer onrush of events was a still more potent factor. Imagine the Belgians, the BEF and the French in the north holding their forward positions only a little longer – say a fortnight – than they did. What pressures then might not have mounted to give such heroic resistance more protection in the air from the Luftwaffe – protection which would surely have made not the slightest difference in the end? Not only the firmness and good sense of Dowding and Newall, but also the unprecedented, unimaginable swiftness of the German advance saved the main strength of Fighter Command for the Battle of Britain. 73

Evidently, Churchill did not allow himself to be talked out of his decision; he changed his mind after the writing was on the wall.

Eliot Cohen mistakenly trivializes the size and scope of Churchill’s blunder in May of 1940. This being the case, Cohen’s charge that “it is up to the statesman to find the right point of view from which to judge military action” seems to be in jeopardy. 74 So is his contention that “some of the art of leadership may lie in intuiting when others are even more wrong than oneself.” 75 Churchill is one of Cohen’s four pillars, men

72 Ibid, 209.
73 Hough and Richards, 91.
74 Cohen, 214.
75 Ibid, 211.
chosen to demonstrate brilliance with such intuition. Yet, for all that Prime Minister Churchill did to positively affect the execution of the Battle of Britain, no one individual was more wrong than he in the battle’s prelude. This case suggests that Cohen has not considered that the strategic exercise of military power is a two way street, with essential input from both the statesman and the soldier. Churchill acted without regard for the accurate inputs that Dowding and others gave him in May of 1940. It was to his good fortune that the German war machine forced him to discard his plans on the continent in time to save England and the world.
Chapter 3

Soldierly Statesmanship: General George C. Marshall

Carl von Clausewitz views the permanent connection between policy and war as proof that generals and politicians must engage each other during war. Samuel Huntington advocates separate camps for the soldier and statesman. Eliot Cohen maintains that the politician must engage regularly to check the errant soldier during the planning and execution of military operations.

General George C. Marshall’s actions during World War II, however, suggest a different reality. Marshall engaged politically, economically, and socially despite being chief of staff of US armed forces. Marshall’s political wrangling was epitomized by his actions regarding Churchill, Roosevelt, and the choice between invading Africa and Italy or launching the Allied invasion of France from England. His considerations for US industry demonstrate keen awareness of the economic and social aspects of war, even to the extent that he limited the number of Army divisions for the sake of war production.

While Huntington and Cohen scoff at participation by generals in non-military affairs, Marshall understood the effect of socio-economic issues on military operations at the strategic level of war. His political involvement, though ineffective at first, was directed at securing the Allied invasion of France to speed the war’s end in Europe and achieve the desired political end state for the United States. Economically, he hoped to maintain the productivity necessary to support US and Allied forces engaged in two theaters of war. The actions of General Marshall suggest that at times senior military officials must engage on issues other than combat plans when they affect military strategy or operations. Marshall’s involvement in the political arena regarding the grand strategy for the European theater is the first such example presented here.
PLANS AND POLITICS: THE CHANNEL VERSUS AFRICA AND ITALY

The desired end state for Europe lay at the heart of the differing strategies proposed by Britain and the United States from the outset of each nation’s participation in World War II. Prime Minister Churchill reflected his government’s desire to maintain its empire to the maximum extent possible; the United States favored a balance of power that included the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and herself. Accordingly, Churchill preferred an indirect grand strategy, one that minimized the weaknesses of Great Britain in terms of human and material resources.\footnote{Mark A. Stoler, \textit{The Politics of the Second Front} (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1977), 4.} His strategy delayed assistance to the Soviets who were engaged desperately with Germany on the eastern front; whether this was intentional or not is subject to debate. US strategists favored an assault from England into France, in order to relieve the Russian front and directly attack and defeat the Germans from the west.\footnote{Steve Weiss, \textit{Allies in Conflict: Anglo-American Strategic Negotiations, 1938-44} (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996), 2.} Marshall was fully aware that the stakes far exceeded a mere military victory:

As to BOLERO, I told [the President] that I thought it was highly important for us to have at least a strong Army Corps in England because if events did suddenly culminate in an abrupt weakness of German resistance it was very important that there be a sizeable American representation on the ground wherever a landing on the continent of Europe was made. I also gave him as my personal opinion the fear that if we were involved at the last in Western France and the Russian Army was approaching German soil, there would be a most unfortunate diplomatic situation immediately involved, with the possibility of a chaotic condition quickly following.\footnote{Larry I. Bland, ed., \textit{The Papers of George Catlett Marshall}, vol. 3, \textit{The Right Man for the Job} (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 620-1.}

Marshall and the US strategists would have to be patient, however. Conditions were not suitable for the invasion of France from the outset of the war. In the first place, sea lines of communication had yet to be secured; they would be won for the Allies during the Battle of the Atlantic, from 1939 through 1943. Secondly, BOLERO, the
build up of supplies and troops for the invasion, was not alone sufficient. The Allies would also have to wait for the Combined Bomber Offensive to wear down the German war machine. Meanwhile, Churchill and Roosevelt pushed their respective strategies for adoption.

These competing military strategies were rooted in politics; and so, they were hashed out in the political arena, especially during the conferences attended by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1943. General Marshall eventually learned to play politics in order to ensure the adoption of the cross-channel invasion. His political success at Quebec in 1943 followed failures at the London conference in 1942 and the Casablanca conference in January, 1943.

By mid summer, British and US leaders had met twice already in 1942. April’s conference in London resulted in tentative plans for ROUNDUP, the cross-channel invasion, to occur mid-1943. Additionally, both sides agreed to SLEDGEHAMMER, a diversionary assault on the French coast, if necessary, to relieve the struggling Soviets. Churchill traveled to the Washington conference in June, where both parties agreed that the conflict in North Africa was going poorly, requiring action to protect Cairo. General Marshall traveled back to London in July to determine how to ease the Russian front and support operations in North Africa.

Just prior to the July conference, however, Roosevelt received a telegram from Churchill in which the Prime Minister firmly refused to support the Soviets indirectly while desert forces were being defeated in Africa. In short, he insisted on replacing SLEDGEHAMMER with an operation into North Africa labeled GYMNAST. Marshall vehemently disagreed with this plan, explaining in a memorandum that such efforts would do little as a diversion or as an aid to the USSR.

It was at this point that General Marshall played a hand that Roosevelt was unwilling to support politically. Marshall intimated in a memorandum to the President that if the invasion of France was taken off the table it would be better for the US to

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80 Ibid, 9.
81 Stoler, 52.
82 Ibid.
abandon the European theater until the Pacific had been won. Roosevelt was furious, calling the idea a red herring, equivalent to “taking up your dishes and going away,” and even suggesting that the records be changed to remove the suggestion that the US considered abandoning London.83

In the wake of this political blunder, Marshall was sent to London, where he was expected to reconsider SLEDGEHAMMER but ultimately support GYMNAST if necessary.84 The outcome of this conference was a North African invasion, renamed TORCH.85 Marshall had hoped that the Allies would focus on building up forces and equipment in England for invasion, or at least that any significant operations would relieve the Russian front. His failure to achieve this end was rooted in politics. In the first place, he underestimated Roosevelt’s affection for Churchill and the US obligation to the British. Secondly, he later noted that “the politicians must do something every year” in order to appear effective during wartime.86 General Marshall was required to confront Churchill’s plans at a conference in Morocco six months later; again, he failed politically with Roosevelt.

The lesson of Casablanca for Marshall was the imperative to win decisively over his own politician before engaging with other statesmen. Against competing national interests and strong personalities, a weak resolve spelled certain defeat. Unfortunately for Marshall, however, the US military demonstrated disharmony to President Roosevelt on the eve of the conference, rather than unanimous support. At the one meeting in which Marshall was able to iterate his desires for OVERLORD (the cross-channel invasion) to Roosevelt, the general admitted that “there was not a united front on he subject, particularly among our planners.”87 Naturally, Roosevelt was skeptical, and he entered the conference without a specific American goal to match the unified British desires for a push into the Mediterranean.88 The result of the Casablanca conference was again a disappointment for Marshall. Without Roosevelt’s support, previous decisions for large combat operations in the Mediterranean could not be overturned. Marshall

83 Ibid, 55-56.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, 57.
86 Ibid, 58.
87 Pogue, 15.
88 Ibid, 19.
capitulated, agreeing to postpone OVERLORD again, this time in favor of HUSKY, the allied invasion of Italy.\textsuperscript{89} But Marshall had become politically savvy; he quickly realized the necessity of getting the President’s support beforehand; and he did so in late 1943 with positive results.

By the summer of 1943, it was apparent that Churchill viewed HUSKY as a substitute for the cross-channel operation.\textsuperscript{90} Marshall disagreed, suggesting that Italy was an impossible path to Germany, rather than a simple solution to end the war:

Even though we were now firmly entrenched in North Africa, to have attempted to force Germany from the south across the Alpine barrier was on the face of it impracticable. In Europe’s innumerable wars no vigorously opposed crossing of the Alps had ever been successfully executed.\textsuperscript{91}

Marshall understood the limits of HUSKY in terms of geography; he also sensed that he would have to win the President over to unwavering support for OVERLORD prior to the next conference, the QUADRANT meetings in Quebec during August.

In the first place, Marshall worked throughout the first half of 1943 to secure unanimous agreement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and senior planners for the invasion of France. His efforts were aided by various documents and papers presented to the JCS that overwhelmingly supported OVERLORD as the only practical means to defeat Germany and achieve US objectives.\textsuperscript{92} Having received overwhelming military support, he urged the development of tactics, battle plans, and war gaming for OVERLORD; all were developed by late summer.\textsuperscript{93}

On July 25th, Marshall met with President Roosevelt to present a compelling argument for the invasion. He pointed out that Churchill’s strategy to apply pressure against Germany in the occupied countries only could result in stalemate and attritional warfare; this sticky scenario implied a warning for the President, who could not afford

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 31.
\textsuperscript{90} Stoler, 109.
\textsuperscript{91} Marshall, 11.
\textsuperscript{92} Stoler, 108.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
the political fallout in the US if the war were to pattern itself after World War I. By the end of the meeting, the President agreed with Marshall.\textsuperscript{94}

Marshall displayed newfound shrewdness when Italian operations exceeded expectations. As a matter of coincidence, while the President and his chief of staff met, Mussolini was deposed by the Italian Grand Council.\textsuperscript{95} This event reinforced Churchill’s case to push through Italy and continue to the Balkans. In response, rather than oppose continued action from the Mediterranean, Marshall supported it as long as the effort did not undermine OVERLORD or require additional troops.\textsuperscript{96} Marshall’s flexibility sat well with Roosevelt, and convinced him of the ultimate need to invade France. Secretary of State Stimson also had a positive effect, warning Roosevelt in early August to be aware of Churchill’s desire to pursue an easy end to the war without the cross-channel invasion.\textsuperscript{97}

The presentation of unity, clarity, and flexibility of the military position to the commander-in-chief worked flawlessly. Not only did Roosevelt agree to adopt OVERLORD, he even suggested undertaking it alone if the British refused to support the operation. When Churchill entered the QUADRANT conference in August, he discovered a US President completely backing his military. Against such resolve, Churchill was resigned to accept a limit to the Italian operation at the Pisa-Anacena line (much shorter than at the Po or the Alps as he had wished). He also agreed to unconditionally support OVERLORD in 1944 with an American commander.\textsuperscript{98}

Marshall’s eventual success in the political realm during the conferences in 1942 and 1943 is a credit to his talents; however, the fact that the soldier must engage politically is more significant here than how this chief of staff actually performed. One other example demonstrates how directly involved politically Marshall was bound to be. The incident regards a letter to General Devers concerning General Eaker in June of 1943. Eaker, the 8\textsuperscript{th} Air Force commander, had noted days before that his command had doubled since March and would do so again by October. Marshall, concerned about

\textsuperscript{94} Pogue, 243.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Stoler, 109.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, 115.
pressure for increased support in the Pacific from Dr. Herbert Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, penned the following admonishment:

Reference Eaker’s recent statement regarding rapid growth of the Bomber Command in England: put him on his guard against such statements because the immediate result was a heavy drive for more planes for the Pacific. Dr. Evatt made an assault on us the following day. If Eaker understands that he is selling out his organization he will be more discreet.\(^9^9\)

Had Marshall chosen not to shape the political landscape, the successful invasion of Normandy would at least have been delayed, if not abandoned. Politically, the operation may never have been advocated in the first place. Additionally, international pressure, such as that from Australia, could have weakened the US effort to amass the air and ground forces necessary for a successful invasion by 1944. These events suggest that a general has no choice but to engage politically in order to secure national military objectives. The same can be said for economic and social considerations, as evidenced by Marshall’s decision regarding US industry and the 90-division force.

**INDUSTRY AND WAR MANPOWER: MARSHALL ACHIEVES BALANCE**

General Marshall was hesitant to support operations in Africa and the Mediterranean for another reason: US troop strength could not support multiple operations. Marshall understood that American manpower was a critical but limited resource. This fact caused Marshall to regard economics in dialectic; he limited the number of divisions for the invasion of France in order to spare war production, but he also engaged on economic issues to ensure that industry would meet the demands for war in both theaters.

By the time the United States entered the war, it was estimated that there were approximately twenty-five million Americans fit for military service.\footnote{Maurice Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” in Command Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Center of Military History, 2000), 367. On-line, Internet, available from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/70-7_15.htm.} While this number appeared more than sufficient, the figure fell drastically as demands for war production were also considered; the services could expect to receive no more than sixteen million.\footnote{Ibid.} In fact, World War II placed more demands on non-military manpower than previous wars. American workers were required to arm Allied as well as US forces.\footnote{Ibid.} Additionally, the large expanses covered in two distinct theaters required more men and women supporting the vast transportation demands and lines of communication.\footnote{Ibid.} Finally, technological advances in aircraft, ships, and armor increased the scope of military production considerably. After the war, Marshall described the manpower challenge in this fashion:

These various efforts demanded large numbers of men and women, and necessitated their allocation among the various programs with exceeding care, so that the right numbers of men would be doing the most important things at the most important time. The mere statement of this requirement fails to indicate the exceeding difficulty involved in its application to the special claims of each industry and the demands of each theater commander. To resolve the conflicting requirements posed a most difficult problem for a democracy at war.\footnote{Ibid.}

For Marshall, the solution began with determining the absolute minimum number of forces necessary to prosecute the war in the European and Pacific theaters. Since air forces would engage the enemy first, Marshall advocated giving this group priority, both in terms of numbers (just over 2.3 million) and in terms of physical, educational and technical ability.\footnote{Ibid.} At the outset of 1943, the projection was for 8.248 million men, giving the Army enough ground forces for 105 divisions. However, just six months later
planners determined that the call-up would overly strain the nation’s manpower; thus the force was reduced to 7.7 million, or ninety divisions.  

Even though Allied mobilization exceeded that of the Axis powers (sixty-two million and thirty million respectively), the relatively small ground force was a gamble for the United States. General Marshall made several considerations in settling on this number in order to maximize war production. First, he recognized the economy of airpower. Sir Charles Portal, British Chief of Staff for Air, praised Marshall’s high regard for aircraft: “Marshall emphasized the fact that Anglo-American air superiority could offset German air power, and we could go into the Continent with less divisions than otherwise needed. He deserves great credit for seeing this early and pushing it.” Secondly, Marshall developed a plan for the fourteen reserve divisions. Rather than train them exclusively for seventeen weeks in the United States, he shipped them overseas as well, to be further refined before actually being committed to war. This well developed plan, coupled with inspections of twelve divisions in training, relieved Secretary Stimson of his concerns regarding a lack of sufficient replacements prior to OVERLORD. Finally, Marshall cut away the fat from his force structure. One unnecessary program was the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which was created in 1942. ASTP trained college students for “specialties such as medicine, languages, and engineering.” The program had been viewed by some as a security blanket for university administrators to keep their schools operating. In any case, Marshall terminated the program and sent the students to train with regular divisions in order to maximize manning for ground units. Marshall noted, following the war, “It is remarkable how exactly the mobilization plan fitted the requirements for victory.” Whether or not one supports his own assessment, one thing is clear: General Marshall understood the significance of the US economy during World War II. He shaped a lean ninety divisions accordingly. Yet this was not the full extent of his impact on war productivity; Marshall also engaged on issues

106 Ibid, 102.
107 Ibid.
108 Quoted in Pogue, 202.
109 Ibid, 361.
110 Ibid, 355.
111 Ibid.
112 Marshall, 106.
in the private work sector, when he saw tank, ship, or aircraft production jeopardized. One such instance was the threat of railroad strikes in late 1943.

General Marshall returned from the Pacific on December 22nd, to be informed by Secretary Stimson that the Railway Brotherhoods were likely to strike by the month’s end. Within a week, President Roosevelt gave the War Department authority to take over the railroads if necessary. In the days that followed, the Brotherhoods wavered on the decision to strike.\textsuperscript{113}

Marshall had previously not ventured into economics, especially labor disputes. He had even avoided signing a congratulatory note to business and labor in the months before; he was afraid of crossing the line from the military into the private sector.\textsuperscript{114} But the strikes threatened the war economy at a time when recent successes were causing enlistments to drop and production to fall.\textsuperscript{115} In this instance, his concern for the men overseas outweighed his concerns for propriety.

Marshall lashed out against the unions. Stimson arranged for his chief of staff to rant to the head of the Office of War Mobilization, James F. Byrnes, who ensured that several members of the press were on hand. General Marshall exploded, blasting Byrnes and cautioning him that the strike would reek of US bickering that would ultimately stiffen German resolve and potentially cost the Allies hundreds of thousands of casualties.\textsuperscript{116} Over the next several weeks he continued to make such remarks, including an address to the American Legion in early February:

Our soldiers must be keenly conscious that the full strength of the nation is behind them; they must not go into battle puzzled or embittered over disputes at home which adversely affect the war effort. Our small sacrifices should be personal even more than financial. They should be proof positive that we never forget for a moment that the soldier has been compelled to leave his family, to give up his business, and to hazard his life in our service.\textsuperscript{117}

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\footnotetext{113}{Pogue, 349.}
\footnotetext{114}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{115}{Ibid, 351.}
\footnotetext{116}{Ibid, 350.}
\footnotetext{117}{Ibid, 351.}
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A second example involves Marshall’s concern for political discord that had a disruptive effect on the delivery of war materials. In December, 1942, the War Shipping Administration (WSA) circumvented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and convinced President Roosevelt to give the WSA control over the loading of military cargo. Marshall expressed his concern in a personal letter shortly thereafter:

However, the difficulty is, we are out to win this war and while practically every agency of the Government is involved as well as the people back home, and the shipping agency is a crucial factor, nevertheless the military point of view must dominate, in my opinion, to the extent that it is not kept constantly on the defensive with the Chief Executive due to direct representations to him by other agencies, affecting fundamentals of military operations.\textsuperscript{118}

Marshall did not succeed in having the letter rescinded; however, he engaged further with Lewis Douglas, deputy administrator in charge of operations for the WSA in search of an amenable solution. Moreover, Marshall’s limited success in this matter does not diminish the significance of the event. The Chief of Staff understood that, at times, politics could undermine the conduct of war; therefore, the senior officer had to respond politically.

General Marshall clearly understood the impact of the US economy on the conduct of the war. Further, he recognized the imperative of making military decisions accordingly, such as the 90 division force; however, he also took steps to shape events in the private economic sector when necessary to ensure that war production met the demands of the US and Allied soldiers.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR HUNTINGTON, COHEN, AND CLAUSEWITZ**

Time magazine honored Marshall as “Man of the Year” for 1943, in part for his apolitical approach to his position:

Never in U.S. history has a military man enjoyed such respect on Capitol Hill. One reason is that he (who has never cast his vote) is completely free of political concerns. When Colorado’s Senator Edwin C. Johnson mentioned him as a Presidential possibility, General Marshall’s negative reaction was so unmistakeably genuine that Congress knew; this man is a trustee for the nation.119

Yet in that very year Marshall acted, perhaps reluctantly, on the political and economic stage. These acts have implications for the arguments of both Huntington and Cohen.

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington contends that during World War II, the military ran war strategy and policy, just the way American leaders and populace wanted, but shared control over economic mobilization.120 Further, he suggests that the politicians’ failure to provide objective control allowed the generals to achieve unprecedented power, while losing their military identity in place of national purpose.121

There are several problems with this argument. Huntington’s proof of the stateman’s compliance is Roosevelt’s failure to disagree with his generals except on two occasions (invading North Africa and abandoning the Indian Ocean offensive); yet the case study presented here demonstrates that the President engaged forcefully on each strategic decision in the European theater, whether he agreed ultimately or not.122 Furthermore, Huntington argues that the generals had a direct line to the President; the civilian secretaries were trivialized. Yet this fact does not diminish civilian control—the President was still at the helm. (In fact, Huntington cited centralized civilian control in the form of the Kaiser, with direct access for various top military leaders as one reason for legendary military professionalism in Germany at the outset of the 20th century.)123

Finally, Huntington argues that the military dominance during World War II caused the generals to depart from traditional considerations for a military end state; as a

119 “U.S. at War,” Time, 3 January 1944, 18.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid, 322.
123 Ibid, 102-3.
result, they became fixated on the goal of unconditional surrender.\textsuperscript{124} While Marshall may well have favored unconditional surrender as an element of victory, he clearly maintained the balance-of-power end state for Europe.\textsuperscript{125} This fact is evident in his insistence on supporting the Soviets while not wishing to let them beat the US or British into Germany.

In short, where Huntington sees no civilian control and unprofessional military thinking, General Marshall’s circumstances and actions suggest civilian control, military professionalism, and a genuine dialogue to achieve a successful outcome. The most obvious, unanswered question facing Huntington is this: How can professional soldiers ensure military victory without crossing into diplomacy, politics, and economics, as Marshall had to, because of their direct bearing on the conflict at hand?

For Eliot Cohen, George Marshall presents an even simpler rebuttal. Cohen contends that statesmen must engage in issues of war regularly, because the soldier is not capable of grasping issues beyond the landscape of military operations. Clearly, this was not the case with General Marshall. His understanding of the strategic end state and manpower concerns demonstrate a firm grasp of the broad issues during World War II. His preliminary struggles in the political arena do suggest, however, that politics were not initially his expertise. But, then, Roosevelt’s struggles to see the validity of OVERLORD suggest that military strategy was not his forté either. Perhaps both the soldier and the statesman should be afforded the opportunity to make inputs to the other’s sphere, with the understanding that the soldier’s realm always supports the politician’s, and that neither is the expert in the other’s world.

At first, Clausewitz appears to gain the most credence from the example of General Marshall. After all, he is the theorist of the three who applauds the crossing of the soldier into politics during war, and becoming a statesman out of necessity. However, part of Marshall’s success in the political realm was due to his determination to remain apolitical as much as possible; this was evident in his reluctance to speak out on the labor disputes. It would seem that Marshall proves that, in contrast to the Clausewitzian model, political action cannot be without limits. Otherwise, the general

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 327.
\textsuperscript{125} Pogue, 34.
may become the very threat that Huntington cautions against. Political moderation seems to be the key for an acting general—one should act for military purposes only, rather than for personal ambition.
Chapter 4

Skunks at the Picnic: President Clinton, General Wesley Clark, and Operation ALLIED FORCE

The previous case studies involving Churchill and Marshall are black and white examples of a statesman’s failure and a soldier’s success at the strategic level of war; in contrast, the crisis in the Balkans culminating in Operation Allied Force (OAF) is gray. To criticize President Clinton, one has to look beyond the successful conclusion: Ultimately, Slobodan Milosevic withdrew forces from Kosovo, accepted international peace-keeping forces, and permitted refugees to return to their homes. Additionally, the fact that the highest ranking US military officer in Europe, General Wesley Clark, wholly supported the air campaign appears to confound any case against the supreme US statesman. However, a close examination of the facts surrounding OAF suggests that President Clinton failed at the strategic level as he considered plans to resolve the crisis. He attempted a coercive campaign against a totalitarian leader without the US or coalition resolve that appeared necessary for success. Worse, he blundered by announcing that ground forces would not be considered before the campaign had even begun. Faced with such a meager threat, Milosevic held out until 78 days of coalition air strikes and the threat of ground forces convinced him otherwise. The examination presented here shows that the administration failed to plan properly and execute a coercive campaign with teeth. Additionally, the President relied exclusively upon General Clark for military guidance; however, Clark did not fully represent the military establishment. Senior military officials such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced strong concerns about the plans for Kosovo well before operations began. We begin with a brief

126 Bruce R. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 2002), xiii.
overview of the Clinton era and the Balkans, as far back as the presidential campaign of 1992.

**Clinton and Kosovo: From Presidential Campaign to NATO Campaign**

Governor Bill Clinton, using Bosnia to contrast his foreign policy plans with those of incumbent president George H. W. Bush, while on the campaign trail in 1992, opined: “Once again the administration is turning its back on violations of basic human rights and our own democratic values.” Before taking the reins as the 42nd President of the United States, Clinton had established humanitarian assistance as a valid objective for US intervention; furthermore, he had identified the Balkans as a region that would require such intervention should the violence and atrocities continue. Not surprisingly, President Clinton supported such action in the region during his first term.

Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s first offensive air operation in the region, began on 30 August, 1995, in an effort to compel the Bosnian Serb Army to cease its attacks on Sarajevo. Although the campaign achieved the desired end state, airpower alone was not decisive. In the first place, the Bosnian Federation forces mounted a strong counter-offensive that, with help from Croat and Muslim forces, regained ground in western Bosnia. Secondly, Milosevic realized that sanctions imposed by the UN against Serbia would only be lifted after peace was restored. As Serbia was already suffering economically, the sanctions put considerable pressure on the Serbian president as well. Air forces, although substantial contributors, were not exclusive to NATO success in 1995.

The outcome was formalized in the Dayton accords in December 1995. The accords stipulated a permanent cease fire, a concession to withdraw invasion forces from Bosnia, and the insistence that “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agree to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another and to

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129 Ibid, 194-5.
130 Ibid, 194.
settle disputes by peaceful means.\textsuperscript{131} Dayton shed a favorable light upon the air campaign, especially for President Clinton.

Clinton’s remarks on November 27th, 1995 lend insight to his assessment of the operation:

I decided that American ground troops should not fight a war in Bosnia because the United States could not force peace on Bosnia's warring ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Instead, America has worked with our European allies in searching for peace, stopping the war from spreading, and easing the suffering of the Bosnian people. We imposed tough economic sanctions on Serbia. We used our air power to conduct the longest humanitarian airlift in history and to enforce a no-fly zone that took the war out of the skies. We helped to make peace between two of the three warring parties -- the Muslims and the Croats.

But as the months of war turned into years, it became clear that Europe alone could not end the conflict. This summer, Bosnian Serb shelling once again turned Bosnia's playgrounds and marketplaces into killing fields.

In response, the United States led NATO's heavy and continuous air strikes, many of them flown by skilled and brave American pilots. Those air strikes, together with the renewed determination of our European partners, and the Bosnian and Croat gains on the battlefield, convinced the Serbs, finally, to start thinking about making peace.\textsuperscript{132}

Clinton’s rationale for not using ground forces was ostensibly the inability to force the ethnic groups involved to live peacefully; however, he undertook the air campaign with the same purpose in mind. Clearly the President wanted to avoid the sticky trappings associated with US ground forces in the Balkans—there would be no Vietnam on his watch. Additionally, while acknowledging some contribution by the Bosnian ground forces, he clearly gave airpower credit for the lead role in forcing change. His disdain for committing US ground forces and his preference and trust in airpower would be reiterated as the region flared up again towards the end of the decade.

The peace provided for by the Dayton accords was short-lived indeed; by 1997 escalating violence prompted by ethnic tensions caused considerable US and NATO


In October of 1998, Richard Holbrooke, special Balkan envoy for the administration, was able to obtain some concessions from Milosevic, including the halt of violence against civilians and safe access for international humanitarian organizations. However, to some observers Holbrooke’s efforts seemed to suggest a willingness to push the problem further down the road, rather than achieve permanent, significant objectives for the Balkans. Accordingly, President Clinton and NATO were going to square off against Milosevic within the year.

Holbrooke’s hard-fought peace crumbled quickly as Serb forces massacred ethnic Albanians in the town of Racak on 15 January 1999. On March 19th, peace talks were officially suspended in Paris; the following day, Milosevic launched Operation Horseshoe, a major ethnic cleansing operation against Albanians that included mass executions, burning of homes and villages, and other atrocities. In the face of such horrific action, Operation Allied Force was unlimbered.

Operation ALLIED FORCE: Successful Outcome, Failed Plan

From the outset, General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe envisioned a coercive campaign against Milosevic. As early as the summer of 1998, Clark determined that “the plan would be fundamentally coercive in intent. Milosevic would have to give in to the overall weight of his losses, because there wasn’t any way to block all Serb military and police efforts on the ground.” President Clinton specified the campaign goals to the American public on the eve of combat operations: "Our strikes have three objectives: First to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for

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133 Nardulli et al., 13.
those attacks. And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities."138

By the end of the campaign, Allied Force had indeed secured these three objectives and more: Kosovo was liberated, and by 2000 Milosevic had even been toppled as Yugoslavia’s president and was about to stand trial for international crimes at the Hague. However, OAF tried the patience of American and European electorates. It went on for 78 days without signs of imminent success. The outcome was more surprising than predictable. The shortcomings of the campaign lay perhaps in the failure to employ other instruments of power and the refusal to consider ground forces.

The NATO response to Serbian aggression focused largely on the diplomatic and military instrument of power. General Clark envisioned the air forces as the “crucial leverage for the diplomats to be able to achieve a meaningful agreement.”139 The plan was light, however, on other instruments of power. For example, there was little economic pressure applied to Yugoslavia, despite its struggling economy. This point was not lost upon the Department of Defense. Secretary Cohen’s after-action report to Congress noted that “as it became clear that Milosevic intended to outlast the alliance, more attention was paid to other ways of bringing pressure to bear, including economic sanctions. While ultimately these instruments were put to use with good effect, more advance planning might have made them more effective at an earlier date.”140 The NATO plan was too narrow in terms of instruments of power; it was also too narrow in the application of military power, as no ground option was included in the plans.

There are several factors that likely influenced the administration’s decision to avoid ground troops in the Balkans. In the first place, the ongoing crisis, while horrifying, did not directly threaten US national security. If President Clinton was going to make the case for humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping, he assumed that the case would be complicated with US ground forces involved. Secondly, the Monica Lewinsky scandal loomed, with Senate acquittal granted on 12 February, and limited the President’s

139 Clark, 117.
140 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, 126.
ability to engage domestically and internationally.\textsuperscript{141} Finally, Clinton felt that domestic and international opinion did not support the use of ground troops. In the US, senior military officers contributed to this perception by cautioning against any US action in Kosovo at all.\textsuperscript{142} Clinton also perceived that the issue of ground forces was contentious enough for European partners to split the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{143}

While some claim that the NATO victory proves that ground forces were not necessary, others saliently note that the talk alone of using troops by US and NATO planners demonstrated coalition resolve that spelled doom for Milosevic unless he complied.\textsuperscript{144} In the end, however, the issue is not whether the threat of a ground invasion tipped the scales or not, but how the administration advocated a coercion campaign without a plan to follow up air strikes if they failed to change Milosevic’s mind. Clinton’s aforementioned concerns were valid, but they were not more problematic than failure in the Balkans.

And so, as the war drug on and success seemed uncertain, President Clinton and NATO members were forced to confront their previous decision regarding ground forces. As they did, most of Clinton’s concerns dissolved. US polling showed modest support for troops in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{145} Senior US military officials who had not favored Balkan intervention felt strongly that overwhelming force should be applied now that efforts were underway.\textsuperscript{146} The European response further indicted Clinton, as noted by General Clark: “The thrust was, if there’s to be a ground option, the United States has to be a willing leader, then we can and will follow.”\textsuperscript{147} Ironically, this was the same attitude in Europe towards the end of the Balkan crisis in 1995, where the Clinton administration had also determined that ground forces in the Balkans were dangerous to NATO integrity.\textsuperscript{148} In effect, the main political fallout from the reconsideration of ground troops

\textsuperscript{142} Clark, 129.
\textsuperscript{143} Daalder and O’Hanlon, 97.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{146} Clark, 301.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, 330.
\textsuperscript{148} Gow, 306-7.
lay in the flawed strategy that refused to consider them initially and, more importantly, took them off the table of coercive options.\footnote{Clark, 305.}

The failure to incorporate strong economic pressure and ground forces into Allied Force resulted in a plan too weak to be effective. As a result, the campaign was long, overly dependent upon Milosevic, and, worse still, punitive rather than coercive.

Clark hoped for a result after a few days of air attacks. Instead, the air campaign continued for eleven weeks. The extension of the war cost the people on the ground dearly, especially the ethnic Albanians. While the campaign dragged on, up to 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were slaughtered by Serbs, 800,000 people were forced to flee Kosovo, and thousands were raped and brutalized.\footnote{Daalder and O’Hanlon, 3.} A more robust plan may have shortened the time for NATO success and prevented many of these casualties.

A stronger plan would also have been less dependent upon Slobodan Milosevic. While any coercive plan requires a decision from the opponent, OAF’s success can be partially attributed to the Serbian president’s offensive actions. Milosevic chose to unleash his forces on the ethnic Albanians during the course of the operation. This served to coagulate international disdain and unify the NATO alliance. Had he dispersed and concealed his forces, he might have drawn a similar response from the coalition.\footnote{Ibid, 19.} In effect, Milosevic’s hatred towards Albanians facilitated a change in strategy and his own undoing.

While OAF was prolonged and partially dependent upon enemy action, what is even worse is that it failed as the coercive campaign that Clark designed and Clinton advocated. Coercive diplomacy attempts to get a state or actor “to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force.”\footnote{Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 6.} By this standard OAF was not coercive. Military power was not applied to the destruction of the Serb army in its entirety, but NATO forces were applied in intensity and duration well beyond the levels of limited force. Such action describes a punishment campaign more than a coercive one.
Why was OAF non-coercive? Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence provides a clue:

To fight abroad is a military act, but to persuade enemies or allies that one would fight abroad, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military capability. It requires projecting intentions. It requires having those intentions, even deliberately acquiring them, and communicating them persuasively to make other countries behave…Another paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself or of one’s country.  

Whereas Schelling advocates having great resolve and little predictability, the Clinton Administration attacked Milosevic with little resolve and great predictability, even to the extent that the president announced what he was not going to do before he began. Only one question remains: Was the military complicit?

**General Clark and the Joint Chiefs: Disparity in the Ranks**

If President Clinton is to be faulted for strategic errors regarding OAF, then clearly General Clark, the highest ranking soldier in Europe and senior architect of the plan, is culpable as well. This is sad indeed for General Clark, because he clearly understood some of the inherent problems with the plan. For example, in June of 1998, Clark discussed possible plans for an air campaign with General Ralston, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. Asked what to do if the air strikes didn’t work, Clark replied, “I guess we’d have to do something on the ground, directed at Kosovo.” Clark silenced his acknowledgment for the possibility of a follow-on ground campaign when he engaged statesmen during the planning and early execution of the campaign. As late as 23 April 1999, well into the campaign and concerned about possible failure, Clark pressed Secretary of State Cohen about a ground option. Cohen cautioned, “Nothing about ground forces. We have to make this air campaign work, or we’ll both be writing our resumes.” While the secretary’s lack of consideration for military advice from SACEUR is disturbing, even worse was Clark’s reply, based on concerns for NATO

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154 Clark, 119.
155 Clark, 269.
unity: “Yes, sir…I’m not going to be the skunk at the picnic.”\(^{156}\) This, despite Clark’s admission that failure in Kosovo spelled disaster that could break up NATO permanently.\(^{157}\) In effect, General Clark considered politics and job security more important than military necessity. His actions stand in contrast to Air Marshall Dowding, who risked personal gain in order to convey his strategic concerns regarding military forces. Some have suggested wrongdoing in Clark’s appointment to SACEUR as Clinton’s friend, but the appointment was fair and legal. Yet Clark was wrong for suppressing his concerns about an air-only operation until it was almost too late. General Clark was not the only voice of the military during OAF, despite his status as the senior military leader in Europe. Other voices could be heard on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs provided a military perspective less deferent to politics. When combat operations neared, the service chiefs, along with chairman General Shelton, met in “the tank” at the Pentagon to formally object to an air-only campaign.\(^{158}\) They also requested use of other instruments of power, including economic action against Yugoslavia.\(^{159}\) In making these objections, they recognized and advised the administration about both strategic flaws with the plan.

Insiders noted that the previous hesitations with the air campaign were forwarded from the Joint Chiefs to the White House, and were weighed in the final decision to adopt Allied Force.\(^{160}\) This information is rather condemning. In the first place, it suggests that Clinton received the objections. Furthermore, he apparently rejected council from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1987, the same legislation that gave Clark authority as the regional combatant commander to plan for military operations in Europe, also deems the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the senior military advisor to the President. In this case, the senior military advice went unheeded.

The Joint Chiefs had initially not supported military action in the Balkans, as it was not threatening US national security. However, at the time of the subsequent

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156 Ibid.
157 Ibid, 305.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
meeting in the Pentagon, the generals had moved beyond the President’s decision to act, choosing instead to address his questionable methods.\textsuperscript{161} The exchange suggests that choosing to act and choosing how to act are distinct military considerations. It also suggests that choosing to act is the President’s prerogative, but the details of how to act may best be determined by the soldier. In this case, perhaps it was fully appropriate for President Clinton to choose to commit military forces to the Balkans, over the objections of the Joint Chiefs. However, when he dismissed military counsel regarding how to employ forces in the Balkans, he jeopardized his effectiveness as commander-in-chief.

**Allied Force and Elliot Cohen’s Supreme Command**

Elliot Cohen’s insistence that politicians continue to shape military operations is still valid despite the Allied Force case study. However, this third example pokes holes in his preference for statemen’s inputs over soldiers’ advice in military execution. In the first place, while there were differing opinions in the Defense Department during OAF, Cohen contends that it’s the stateman’s responsibility to sort through the counsel and pick the best option. Both President Clinton and Secretary Cohen (also a statesman in this case) failed to do so, because they too were limited with organizational biases (political constraints) that precluded them from recognizing basic principles of coercive diplomacy. And so Eliot Cohen is mistaken not because Clinton chose poorly, but rather in why Clinton chose poorly. Cohen describes at length the organizational biases that prevent the soldier from seeing a situation with clarity; OAF suggests that statesmen have organizational biases that limit their ability to see the correct application of military power on occasion.

Further, the distinction between why to commit troops and how to commit troops genuinely suggests that there are distinct areas of military power at the strategic level that are better determined by politicians, while there are others that are better determined by soldiers. If a president dismisses all of his general’s concerns because the general also disagrees that military power should be employed, he is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Generals may have key inputs as to how an operation can be successfully conducted, whether they want to see it conducted or not. Such was the case

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
in OAF. Elliot Cohen’s desire to involve the statesman is appropriate; his disdain for the general at the strategic level of warfare is not. One could argue that President Clinton did it by the book, Cohen’s book, with nearly calamitous results.
Chapter 5

Analysis

From the cases presented, it should be apparent that relations between political and military leaders are crucial to the planning and execution of military operations. Clausewitz, Huntington, and Cohen each have their moments. Yet we might intuit that each theorist is equally validated and refuted by the historical examples presented. This chapter serves to assimilate these points in the interest of deriving a more resolute theory for civil-military relations.

Prime Minister Churchill

Winston Churchill’s actions in the days leading up to the evacuation at Dunkirk directly challenge Eliot Cohen’s assessment of the Prime Minister. Churchill’s strategic oversight refutes Cohen’s suggestion that “he understood modern warfare better than did his generals.” But Cohen’s inability to recognize Churchill’s failure at the strategic level of war is more problematic than a mere historical error. The oversight permits Cohen to conclude erroneously that the best politicians are always suited to make superior judgments on military issues, especially over those made by generals. Our examination suggests otherwise.

The events in June, 1940 also have bearing on the other two theorists. The deliberations over sending fighters to France appear to reinforce the opinion of Carl von Clausewitz—that, at times, great soldiers grasp all of the military considerations and more than enough of the politics to arrive at the most suitable course of action during war. Clausewitz’s own thoughts even suggest that Hugh Dowding would not have been

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162 Cohen, xii.
insubordinate had he more strongly opposed Churchill, beyond rising up and making his ultimatum to the War Cabinet on May 15th.

For Samuel Huntington, the episode of Churchill and Dowding is more mixed. On one hand, Huntington praised the British generals for remaining apolitical and more professional than those of the US; he might argue that their aversion for politics allowed them to see the strategic necessity of the English Channel.163 The fighter debate was a difficult issue, however, because it intricately blended military concerns with those of politics at the strategic level of war. Although the Channel was important because it was more likely to halt Germany than the BEF and French ground forces, ultimately the issue involved diplomacy and politics as well as military strategy. Huntington envisions purely military thought for the soldier; although military considerations for geography were more important, the generals would have been wrong to neglect or dismiss British relations with France. This problem with Huntington’s model is reinforced by George Marshall’s behavior.

**General George C. Marshall**

The examination of General Marshall directly challenges Samuel Huntington’s theory. Not only is action by generals in non-military realms acceptable; Marshall’s behavior seems to imply that, at times, it is a necessity. Marshall had to interact politically in order to sell Roosevelt, and ultimately Churchill, on the Allied invasion of France. While Marshall made concessions to the military in the interest of industry, he was also compelled to speak out against strikes—such sentiment would not have had the same impact coming from the President.

There seems to be a subtle difference between political involvement for the sake of military expediency versus action for the sake of a general’s political ambitions—this distinction is not recognized by Huntington. As Time Magazine’s Man of the Year for

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163 “The real difference between the American ad British systems of conducting the war was that the greatly expanded scope of the American military chiefs forced them to adopt a broadly political viewpoint, while the restricted range of activity of the British military permitted them to adhere to a professional military outlook.” Huntington, 344.
1943, General Marshall was hailed for being apolitical. Yet, this “trustee” acted in the realms of politics, diplomacy, and economics. Huntington sees all political involvement by the military as faulty. Why? Huntington’s concerns are twofold: He fears an unprofessional military, spoiled by politics, and he fears a military coup. In Marshall, however, a military man, we see a highly professional general, who acts in the non-military realms only out of militarily necessary. There is, in Marshall, no mistaking political action with political desire. We see, through the Chief of Staff during World War II, that Huntington’s concerns for dissolution of the professional force and a military coup are unwarranted. Marshall’s political endeavors served military ends.

The self-imposed limits of Marshall’s political posturing challenges the position of Clausewitz as well. Carl von Clausewitz correctly identifies the inseparability of politics and military operations. But, in his suggestion that soldiers act like statesmen during war, he fails to adequately restrain the soldier in such a manner as was demonstrated by Marshall. Although Clausewitz made his point with the warning that the soldier “not cease to be a general,” his caution does not preclude all realms of politics as much as it insists that the general not neglect his military duties.164 Clausewitz is correct for advocating that both parties should at times engage beyond their respective areas of expertise, but he does not restrain the soldier from acting with political ambition.

Eliot Cohen’s theory on unequal dialogue is directly refuted by the performance of George Marshall. The Chief of Staff’s brilliant understanding of the industrial war and his gradual improvement in politics guaranteed that the right number of workers manned US factories while the remaining balance of able-bodied men attacked German forces—at the right time and place (on the coast of France, not Africa or the Mediterranean). In contrast to the opinion of Eliot Cohen, Marshall suggests that, in order to best employ the military instrument of power, soldiers are bound at times to operate politically, diplomatically, economically, and even socially. Additionally, while Roosevelt did participate in military affairs, it was not because Marshall was politically unaware or militarily incompetent; rather, the President engaged to convey his concerns for the conduct of the war as chief politician for the United States.

164 Clausewitz, 111-2.
In one regard, this point is apparent even to Cohen. He acknowledges a trend since Vietnam to expose military officers to politics;

Programs ranging from courses in American and international politics at the war colleges to internships in government exposed officers to politics in various forms. Today military officers serve on congressional bureaucracies as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Indeed, General Colin Powell, perhaps the shrewdest political general since Eisenhower, describes his year as a White House Fellow serving in OMB as his introduction to the bureaucratic politics that he would play so well during his time in Washington.165

In the same article, Cohen recommends that civilian leaders undergo military familiarization programs to better understand military organizations and modern warfare.166 In this discussion, Cohen implies that the average senior military officer may have a better understanding of politics and diplomacy than the average politician may have of military affairs and operations.

**Operation ALLIED FORCE**

In similar fashion to the studies of Chuchill and Marshall, OAF has implications for each of the theorists. Huntington’s separate camps theory fails to explain how to negotiate a conflict that involves several allies and a myriad of political limitations. General Clark was bound to participate in politics and diplomacy in order to function as Supreme Allied Command in Europe. For Eliot Cohen, OAF is even more problematic. Cohen’s model, as Chapter four demonstrates, appears to be the model that the Clinton administration applied, with calamitous results. Secretary Cohen repressed General Clark’s concerns for ground forces from the outset, and the politicians failed even to consider General Shelton, the principal military advisor to the President.

For Clausewitz, OAF further complicates the notion of unrestricted political access for the soldier. General Shelton’s first objection to military action was his argument that this situation was not enough of a threat to US national security to warrant

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166 Ibid.
combat. Subsequent, objective concerns for the weak coercion campaign fell on deaf ears, even after Shelton conceded the use of force in the region. This situation was repeated when Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, attempted to voice objective concerns after initially disagreeing with President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. His concerns were largely dismissed as well.167

The events of ALLIED FORCE suggest that generals must consider propriety in addition to military relevancy when venturing into the political realm. General Shelton may have overstepped his authority when he offered his opinion on what was appropriate, rather than what was militarily feasible.

A Hybrid Solution: The Appraised Dialogue

Churchill, Marshall, and the principals for ALLIED FORCE have illuminated strengths and weaknesses with the theories proposed by Clausewitz, Huntington, and Cohen. If we incorporate each theorist’s strengths and dispense with their weaknesses, we might arrive at a more refined theory for civil-military strategic discourse.

Samuel Huntington’s case for distinct political and military groups is not practical for successful military operations. However, his concerns for political interference in war and destruction of a professional military are valid. Eliot Cohen’s best argument for political involvement in war is the changing strategic environment during conflict, such as Lincoln experienced during the Civil War. Additionally, his dictum, that, at the highest level, military power serves politics, is well taken. However, he ought to reconsider the capabilities and sensibilities of the soldier outside of military matters. Finally, Clausewitz’s model best describes the nature of the relationship: an arrangement that should permit exchange and participation by each side in each other’s area of expertise. Yet unbounded, this relationship would indeed become dangerous for politicians, by overestimating their military savvy, and unprofessional for soldiers showing lack of restraint.

Therefore, our examination suggests a two-way street for a model, but one with distinct limits. Cohen calls his one-way exchange the uneven dialogue; our method can be described as the *appraised dialogue*. To appraise is to consider something’s worth or significance; appraised dialogue describes mutual conversation and participation that is weighed for its merit and propriety.\(^{168}\) In the first place, the appraised dialogue can be represented as a street with a double-yellow centerline; the road may be safely traveled by the statesman and the soldier, but both must respect that the other has more expertise in their respective realm, and avoid crossing completely into the other’s lane. Secondly, there should be a “proceed with caution” sign for each; the soldier must not engage politically for personal ambitions, or refute the politicians desire to apply force on merely subjective grounds. And, while the politician must engage to convey the changing strategic situation, he or she should avoid excessive involvement at the operational or tactical level of war. The appraised dialogue facilitates conversation that Huntington’s restrictive model and Cohen’s uneven dialogue does not permit. Additionally, the appraised dialogue imparts restraints beyond Clausewitz’s model, to ensure that the soldier remains a soldier and the statesman remains a statesman. The appraised dialogue ensures a full expression of opinion from each side, a mutual respect for each other’s talents, a default to the politician whether to use military force, and a reliance on the soldier for the best course of action for combat operations.

\(^{168}\) Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, 11th ed. (Springfield, Ma.: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2003), 61.
Conclusion

Examination of Prime Minister Churchill, General Marshall, and Operation ALLIED FORCE has tested the theories of civil-military relations posed by Carl von Clausewitz, Samuel Huntington, and Eliot Cohen. In short, none is suitable as a blueprint for interaction between generals and statesmen during wartime.

Clausewitz’s greatest contribution to the topic of civil-military relations is his contention that war is always an extension of policy. Intrinsic to this point is the need for politicians to engage militarily and for soldiers to be occasionally involved politically. However, his concept does not provide an appropriate measure of restraint; Prussia might stand for complete political participation, but democracies such as the United States require that generals avoid subjective involvement and acting on political ambition.

Huntington’s strengths and weaknesses are nearly the opposite of Clausewitz. He correctly envisions mandatory limits on the soldier, although his fears of a military coup may not be legitimate. He fails, however, to consider circumstances where the general is bound to engage politically, diplomatically, and economically in the interest of military success.

Eliot Cohen correctly asserts that the politician must provide guidance to the military component as the strategic environment causes the desired political end-state to change. This point is reinforced by the historical examples of Churchill, Marshall, or OAF. However, Cohen’s uneven dialogue establishes a dangerous precedent for relations; senior military leaders rarely receive the consideration they should be afforded on military issues under Cohen’s model.

We have, therefore, determined that a more suitable dialogue is even, but limited in participation beyond areas of competence. The appraised dialogue promotes mutual exchange without the risk of military impropriety in terms of political action or military operations ignorant of the political changes. It also takes into account the undeniable importance of the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals involved. Few plans
survive first contact with the enemy, and even fewer models account for the infinite variety of the human condition.
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