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NATO IN AFRICA:
READY FOR ACTION?

by

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Preface

I came to the Atlantic Council in the summer of 2006 with some general ideas about the mission of the Council and some vague ideas as to what line of research I thought I wanted to pursue. But shortly after arriving, I was immersed in a whirlwind of activity on behalf of the Council with regards to NATO. One of the initial topics of discussion coming from NATO in Brussels was for the Council to look at how might NATO engage in Africa, and if so, how might they approach executing that engagement. Initially I thought this might be a fairly easy topic to cover. However, shortly after commencing research, the U.S. Department of Defense announced it was moving forward with the creation of a new Unified Command for Africa. Now there were a few more angles to cover, and I also discovered there was a briar patch of political issues that needed to be worked through. Nonetheless, the research was rewarding, and this paper should serve as a foundation for further discussion on future NATO roles and mission in Africa.

I want to thank the entire Atlantic Council for their support and help with the senior fellows over the course of the year. I would particularly like to thank Mr. James Townsend, the Director for the Program on International Security, and his deputy, Mr. Magnus Nordenman. Between the myriad projects they had going on at the same time, the comments and advice they rendered on this project were substantial. I would also like to thank my family for once again enduring my research programs.
Abstract

NATO has demonstrated a commitment and capacity to conduct out-of-area operations in areas that would not have been countenanced a decade ago. Moreover, for the first time, in June 2006, NATO exercised its NATO Response Force (NRF) in Africa, validating NATO’s new expeditionary capabilities. The strategic importance of the continent of Africa has already grasped the attention of the West, and the range of strategic issues is vast. With recent announcements in the U.S. Department of Defense about the creation of a Unified Command for Africa, what role would or should NATO have on the continent? Some questions that need to be answered before engaging in the continent are: What lessons has NATO learned from current out-of-area operations that might be applied for Africa? Is NATO equipped, trained, and manned sufficiently to assume any type of role in Africa above and beyond its current obligations? What are the competing interests that would allow or hinder NATO forces in Africa? Is NATO better off training and equipping regional and sub-regional organizations to provide forces throughout the continent? This paper will discuss these issues and provide some potential options for NATO planners who might be called upon to prepare NATO forces for the gamut of operations on the continent of Africa.
Chapter 1

Introduction

...We want to help implement African solutions to African problems.¹

—NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Why Africa?

Ten to fifteen years ago this would have been a justifiable question to a world still mired in the vestiges of Cold War geopolitical thinking. However, in a post-9/11 world, the view that Africa is not strategically important is rapidly waning. A variety of issues and problems immediately come to the fore when discussing Africa: terrorism, energy security, HIV/AIDS, environmental disasters, civil war, instability, refugees, failed or failing states, only to name a few. Coupled with these complex problems are the impact these issues in Africa have on a regional level, and their potential to become transnational in nature. Highlighting the potential for issues in Africa to become transnational in nature, US Secretary of State Rice noted that “weak and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons.”² Supporting Secretary Rice’s assertion is recent data from the World Bank, which has listed 23 states in Africa on its LICUS (low income under stress) index for the years 2003-2006. The majority of these states are listed because of their status as either “conflict-affected or post-conflict affected.”³
To underscore the United States’ concern about Africa, within the last few months the US Department of Defense announced it can no longer risk having Africa divided up amongst its regional combatant commands, and will be moving forward with the creation of an Africa Command (AFRICOM), that will consolidate all military-related functions under a single commander, thereby focusing engagement activities under one umbrella. This is a significant shift in the United States’ strategic thinking about Africa. However, lost in the dialogue is where NATO (and in some respects Europe) stands with regard to collectively confronting the variety of issues in Africa. Some NATO member states share the Mediterranean border with North Africa, and are likely the first to be impacted by potential transnational risk factors emanating from the continent. As a French academic noted, “Europe should feel particularly concerned by what is happening on its doorstep, and by what is shaking countries with which some European nations have longstanding relations. The shortcomings of the current system have to be corrected.” Should NATO in turn be casting a more focused look to its south and begin to discuss what role(s) it might play in enhancing regional stability? How might it assist in building local capacities, and what potential mission(s) might be best suited for its forces?

Why NATO in Africa?

Whether NATO should or should not be involved in Africa, and in what capacity, will be addressed in more detail later in this paper. However, what may come as a surprise to some in the United States is that NATO is already involved in Africa. The most recent activity is the current assistance it is providing to the relief effort in Darfur, Sudan. Likewise, the NATO Response Force (NRF) conducted its first out-of-area exercise (Operation STEADFAST JAGUAR) in Cape Verde in the summer of 2006, showcasing the Alliance’s ability to project
power at a significant distance. And lastly, since 9/11, NATO naval forces have been patrolling the Mediterranean in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, working alongside North African states to combat proliferation and engage in the global war against terrorism.

NATO has clearly demonstrated its ability to conduct out-of-area operations in a variety of roles, not only those previously mentioned operations and exercises in Africa. The Alliance has conducted out-of-area operations ranging from providing humanitarian relief to an earthquake-ravaged Pakistan, to combat operations in Afghanistan, to conducting maritime patrols in the Mediterranean stemming illegal proliferation and combating terrorism. But why should NATO be involved in Africa? General James Jones, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe put it best when he stated “…the future of NATO is not to be a reactive defensive static alliance, but it is to be more flexible, more proactive. We must take on the family of missions that actually prevent future conflicts instead of reacting to future conflicts once they've started…” As noted earlier in the World Bank report, Africa with its twenty-three states either currently embroiled in conflict, or suffering from the aftermath of conflict, meets the criteria laid out by General Jones, but the political will to engage is another question.

What NATO brings to the table more so than any other military alliance or peacekeeping body is its interoperability. The interoperability is a result of decades of joint training, planning, procurement, and in the end joint experiences in combat and peacekeeping operations, which has produced a force able to operate effectively in any kind of hostile environment, despite twenty-six contributing member states. This wealth of experience needs to be shared with Africa, shared with African militaries, with the expectation that Africans can build capacity and begin to solve problems locally, as many of their own leaders have expressed the willingness to do.
Overview

This paper will seek to explore how NATO might bring its capabilities to bear in Africa, and in what capacity. First a short discussion of how NATO emerged from the Cold War to transform itself into an entity capable of conducting such missions outside of its traditional area of responsibility will be necessary to set the stage. Additionally a brief review of NATO’s capabilities, based on its member states and its current commitments will help frame potential future courses of action. This will involve a quick look at past NATO operations, and then a glance at current NATO military commitments. Then the study will discuss what roles might best suit NATO (if any at all), whether it is providing training and support, either on a bilateral basis with individual nations, or in a capacity-building relationship with regional African organizations such as the African Union. Likewise this study will explore NATO working in tandem with other well-established organizations such as the European Union or the United Nations, to better leverage these organizations’ capabilities, and provide synergies of effort, rather than compete for limited resources amongst these supranational players. Lastly, the paper will look at the formation of the U.S. Africa Command, and discuss if this development will impact NATO planning for operations on the continent.

Notes

3 Ibid.
Notes

6 NATO, “Steadfast Jaguar 2006: Background, related, media information, etc… ,” http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/sfig_06.htm (accessed February 10, 2007). This site provides a complete breakdown of events related to Exercise Steadfast Jaguar, 21-28 June 2006. Of note, Gen Jones, former SACEUR has commented that the term “out-of-area operations” is no longer used at NATO, because these types of operations are the norm; however for the purpose of this paper, the term will still be used.


8 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006):105. Daalder and Goldgeier discuss how NATO needs to broaden the membership criteria for the Alliance to include partners from around the globe, to help offset the increasing demands on the NATO partners.
Chapter 2

NATO: An Overview

_NATO has proved its relevance in the most difficult circumstances._¹

—Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson

**NATO’s Raison D’etre**

NATO was born in the aftermath of World War II, where the fragility of Western Europe was threatened by a menacing Soviet Union. In 1949 twelve states signed the Treaty of Washington, creating a system for the collective defense of all its member states. This collective defense idea was embodied in Article 5 of the treaty, and has been the foundation of the Alliance ever since. The initial twelve members has since grown over the history of the Alliance to stand today in 2007 at twenty-six. Yet despite the enlargement, the commitment to the Alliance’s central tenet of collective defense has remained as the cornerstone for the organization.²

However, the need for a collective defense treaty, particularly in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has repeatedly been questioned, with some suggestions that NATO was an anachronism of the Cold War.³ Yet the Alliance persevered and continued to grow, spreading to cover many of its former adversaries in the Warsaw Pact. This enlargement in turn raised questions as to whether or not the body could reach consensus with such a diverse number of member states. This too, has proven false as has been demonstrated by the number of
engagements by NATO outside its traditional sphere of influence since the mid-1990s. But what now? What is the primary purpose(s) of NATO since former foes are now NATO allies?

**NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union**

The Alliance has taken on the question of its viability in the post-Cold War era a number of times since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, NATO has entered into a series of partnerships that have engaged states outside the traditional North Atlantic area of responsibility, demonstrating the Alliance’s flexibility and transformational nature. NATO’s character today is based on a series of evolutionary small steps taken over the last fifteen years, which leads to the possibility today of enhanced out-of-area operations for the Alliance.

**What is meant by “out-of-area operations?”** Since NATO’s inception, the Alliance has been focused on collective defense of its members in “the North Atlantic area.” Article 6 of the Treaty of Washington sets more formal parameters for the Alliance’s area-of responsibility: “on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France [since rescinded on 3 July 1962], on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” The term “out-of-area operations will refer to areas outside the confines of those listed in Article 6.

The first iteration of “whither NATO?” in a post-Cold War environment came with the overarching Strategic Concept that was defined in 1991 at the Rome Summit of NATO heads of state and government. While the Rome Summit looked towards engagement and partnerships with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, it also was looking ahead at problems surfacing in the Balkans, specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how NATO might respond. Particularly
how would NATO support United Nations’ peacekeeping initiatives in the Balkans.⁴ This was an important step, for it attempted to define how NATO would operate with non-NATO entities in a combat environment for the first time.

NATO’s evolution continued and at the Brussels Summit of 1994, established the foundation for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. PfP “…is a partnership formed individually between each Partner country and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government.”⁵ The program is still alive and well and currently has twenty-three partners throughout Eurasia, many of which, while not members of NATO, are contributing to NATO operations both in Europe and Afghanistan. The initiatives embarked upon at Brussels in 1994 carried themselves to the Washington Summit in 1999, where at the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, three new member states were admitted to NATO in light of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

One of the primary guiding principles for NATO that emerged from the Washington Summit in 1999 was an updated and revised Strategic Concept, which offered the Allies a roadmap for NATO’s future.⁶ The Strategic Concept outlined the new security environment and opened the door for future operations potentially outside its traditional sphere of influence: “NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations.”⁷ Likewise, NATO secured more active participation in non-alliance partnerships such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, stating “Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO’s cooperative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes
transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts.”

September 11, 2001 significantly impacted the NATO Alliance and how it viewed its collective security. For the first time in its history, the Alliance invoked Article 5 after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States. A symbolic deployment of five NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) to patrol the eastern coast of the United States represented a significant out-of-area deployment for NATO, in an ironically unanticipated direction. Not only did the events of 9/11 provide a catalyst for NATO to invoke Article 5, but it also provided the catalyst for the next evolution of the Alliance at the Prague Summit in 2002.

The Prague Summit finally laid to rest whether or not NATO would be in the business of out-of-area operations. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated that the, “Allies agreed that in facing new threats, artificial geographic limitations make no sense. They agreed that NATO should deter, disrupt, defend and protect against threats from wherever they come. And that our forces must be able to go wherever they are required to carry out their mission.” This statement reinforced NATO’s new post-Prague direction. The Summit reaffirmed NATO’s commitments to its Mediterranean Dialogue partners, and most importantly, established NATO’s first permanent expeditionary capability, the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF would provide a “technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.” The NRF concept was a far cry from the static, fight-in-place force that had been the foundation for NATO throughout the Cold War. The expeditionary nature of the unit would give NATO the ability to pursue the full spectrum of options with regards to addressing security
issues at the source. As former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General James
Jones noted, the creation of the NRF was “…an important recognition on the part of the Alliance
that the international security environment has changed dramatically.”\textsuperscript{13} However, the most
important facet to emerge from the Prague Summit was the announcement of NATO’s
commitment to shoulder the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan: the first NATO peace support mission outside of the confines of Europe, and for
many NATO states, the first major combat operation since the end of World War II.

NATO’s out-of-area mindset was resurrected and reaffirmed at the Istanbul Summit in
2004. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer remarked that “territorial defence
remains a core function, but we simply can no longer protect our security without addressing the
potential risks and threats that arise far from our homes.”\textsuperscript{14} Continuing to broaden its
engagement outside of Europe, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which
provided a greater level of dialogue, cooperation and engagement with interested partners in the
broader Middle East.\textsuperscript{15}

NATO’s future capabilities and \textit{modus operandi} were most recently outlined in the
Comprehensive Planning Guidance, approved at the Riga Summit in November 2006.
Recognizing the transnational nature of threats emanating from failed or failing states, terrorism,
proliferation of advanced weaponry, and asymmetric warfare, NATO reaffirmed its requirement
to operate outside its traditional area of responsibility.

In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must have the
capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller
operations for collective defence and crisis response on and beyond Alliance
territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will
need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations,
and the Alliance must retain the capability to conduct large-scale high-intensity
operations.\textsuperscript{16}
Additionally, out of the Riga Summit, NATO declared the NRF as having reached full operational capability. Moreover, NATO announced the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative “to help train the militaries of its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners.” This new training initiative would expand access for MD and ICI partners in relevant NATO education and training programs, and held out the possibility of a regional training center located in the MD or ICI area, with local funding and NATO assistance and trainers.

Post-Riga, NATO stands in the midst of a major transformation effort. The Alliance is simultaneously engaged in a number of military operations running the gamut from peacekeeping/presence operations to combat operations and stability/reconstruction efforts, while pursuing multiple training and capacity building programs with countries in the Middle East and North Africa. It is here where we can begin to frame how NATO might approach engagement in Africa, and in what context. However, before a discussion on engagement in Africa, a look at how NATO is prepared organizationally to assume new missions will be discussed.

Notes

Notes

7 Ibid., paragraph 31.
8 Ibid., paragraph 38. The Mediterranean Dialogue could be characterized as NATO’s first working arrangement with countries in Africa. Of the seventeen initial participants, four were in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria.)
12 Ibid., para 4a.
Chapter 3

NATO Today

The kind of NATO that we need – and that we are successfully creating – is an Alliance that defends its members against global threats: terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and failed states. To counter these threats, NATO doesn’t need to become a “gendarme du monde”. What we need is an increasingly global approach to security, with organisations, including NATO, playing their respective roles.1

—NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

Membership

Today’s NATO is clearly not the same entity that was created after the Treaty of Washington in 1949. The original twelve members have blossomed to its current membership of twenty-six states, including many that were previously associated with the former Warsaw Pact. Likewise, while the Article 5 idea of collective defense remains the cornerstone of the Alliance, over the course of the last fifteen years, NATO’s scope and reach has transcended its traditional European area-of responsibility. This new posture, as mentioned earlier, was the result of an evolutionary series of steps, which allowed NATO to be able and willing to conduct out-of-area operations. The first major operational step began with the civil war in Bosnia Herzegovina, and since the first NATO air strikes against Bosnian-Serb targets in 1994, NATO has continued to lead operations around the globe, from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Sudan.
However, despite the enlargement and the current commitment to transformation, problems remain. Funding remains a central problematic issue for the Alliance. This has been repeatedly highlighted by senior military and civilian officials within the Alliance, but has been a high hurdle to overcome. In 2005, when NATO began to undertake the Darfur mission, it was noted that only seven of NATO’s 26 member states had kept above the NATO goal of member states devoting 2 percent of their respective gross domestic products (GDP) towards defense expenditures.2 As NATO obligations increased with the expansion of NATO operations in Afghanistan, the figure continued to remain static in 2006. With multiple ongoing operations, the lack of financial support was beginning to strain the Alliance.3 The traditional method of “letting costs lie where they fall” type of an approach to conducting operations had become a hindrance on some states supporting a more robust expeditionary posture, prompting the call for a more fair and equitable common cost approach where all members shoulder a portion of funding operations. Yet in light of the noted problems associated with problematic funding and troop contributions, General Jones remained cautiously optimistic; “There’s a curious divergence in Europe right now, and within NATO itself…as we’ve clearly seen over the last three years, there’s political will for the alliance to do much more, but there’s an equal an offsetting political desire to cut budgets.”4

In order to determine how NATO might continue to conduct out-of-area operations, particularly in Africa, a brief review of NATO’s expeditionary capabilities and its commitments are in order.
The NATO Response Force (NRF) grew out of the Prague Summit, and was most recently declared operational at the Riga Summit in November 2006. The NRF is a joint, multinational unit comprised of ground, air, and sea components. The force is designed around a core of 25,000 available troops, capable of deploying and sustaining itself for up to 30 days. The NRF consists of a brigade-size element, a naval task force designed around a carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, and an air component capable of conducting 200 combat sorties per day. Likewise, niche capabilities of combat support and combat service support are also integral pieces of the NRF. According to NATO, missions will be determined “on a case by case basis by the North Atlantic Council, without any preset geographical limit.” The NRF will perform the range of missions from Article 5 collective defense to non-Article 5 missions (ranging from disaster management, evacuation operations, CBRN-related missions, humanitarian crises and counter-terrorism.) The force could also be utilized in “show of force” type missions or deployments to demonstrate NATO resolve. Show of force could involve out-of-area naval deployments under the NATO flag (similar to NATO naval training missions previously conducted in the Middle East.)

The NRF concept culminated with Operation STEADFAST JAGUAR in Cape Verde in June 2006. The exercise tested the NRF’s tactics, techniques and procedures in an austere environment, demonstrating the capability for strategic lift, counter-terrorism, conventional military operations (air, land and sea), and humanitarian relief, on the continent of Africa.

Aside from STEADFAST JAGUAR, the NRF had already conducted real-world operations both inside and outside the European area of responsibility. The missions ranged
from supporting security efforts for the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, to providing security assistance to the Afghan Presidential Election in 2004; the airlifting of supplies to the United States to aid victims of Hurricane Katrina in 2005; and providing humanitarian support to Pakistan after a devastating earthquake in October 2005.9

Today the NRF stands ready for future deployments, based on the decisions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). However, as will be discussed later in the paper, the potential for contributing members with other competing commitments may have a negative impact on the political decision-making in the NAC, and could hinder the ability for the NRF to deploy in a timely manner in the future.

**Out-of-Area Operations**

**Past**

The Alliance was first able to test the concept of operating outside the traditional Article 6 area of responsibility in the IFOR (Implementation Force) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its related predecessor, Operation DENY FLIGHT, the air operation to support UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force). Since then, NATO has engaged in a full spectrum of military operations ranging from peacekeeping in Bosnia, to armed intervention against Serbian forces in Kosovo. Likewise, it has also engaged in humanitarian assistance and military presence missions both inside and outside the traditional European area of responsibility. (See chart 1 for a complete listing of past NATO operations)

**Chart 1. Past NATO Operations**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Deny Flight</td>
<td>Apr ‘93-Dec ‘95</td>
<td>Air support to UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Alliance’s first large scale peacekeeping op</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>1996-2004</td>
<td>Succeeded IFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Allied Force</td>
<td>Mar-Jun ‘99</td>
<td>Air campaign against Serbian forces; stem humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Essential Harvest</td>
<td>Aug-Sep ‘01</td>
<td>Disarming ethnic Albanian groups; destruction of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amber Fox</td>
<td>Sep ‘01-Dec ‘02</td>
<td>Protection of international monitors; prevent destabilization of region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allied Harmony</td>
<td>Dec ‘02-Mar ‘03</td>
<td>Military presence to prevent destabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Distinguished Games</td>
<td>Jun-Sep ‘04</td>
<td>Support to Summer Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Earthquake Relief</td>
<td>Oct ‘05-Feb ‘06</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Display Deterrence</td>
<td>Feb-Apr ‘03</td>
<td>Contribute to the defense of Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Post 9/11</td>
<td>Sep ‘01-Dec ‘02</td>
<td>AWACS support to Eastern Seaboard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina</td>
<td>Sep-Oct ‘05</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Present**

If the Prague and Riga Summits opened the door for NATO out-of-area operations, some might declare that NATO was already there--fully engaged on a global basis. Whether it is maintaining a military presence in the Balkans, to full combat operations in Afghanistan, to its
military training mission in Iraq, to NATO support to the African Union in Darfur--NATO is, and has been fully engaged on a global basis (See Chart 2). However, the current operational tempo has highlighted problems with the current construct in NATO.

The current operation in Afghanistan is the largest commitment of NATO resources the Alliance has ever faced, and the military problem set is varied, with simultaneous high intensity combat operations and stability and reconstruction efforts. Over thirty-seven contributing states (some contributors are not NATO members) with over 35,000 troops are supporting the operation. As the largest mission, many have been watching to see how NATO evolves to handle the mission, and it has not been an easy road. As noted in a recent editorial, for many of the contributing nations to ISAF the operational tempo and combat intensity is the most demanding since the United Nations action in Korea in the 1950s, and for some since World War II.\textsuperscript{10} The duration of the operation has some contributing members beginning to claim “donor fatigue” as one of the primary reasons for the poor response in contributing forces to ISAF. However, whether or not this is the case, only a small cohort of NATO states have borne the brunt of the combat in Afghanistan—notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and non-NATO ally, Australia. As recently as September 2006, in response to a call for 2,000 additional soldiers by General James Jones, SACEUR, many countries, including several key states, asserted that they had reached their threshold for providing more forces, or would only provide limited numbers of forces with caveats on the employment of their forces, thereby limiting their utility in combat situations.\textsuperscript{11} Not only have some states claimed to have reached their thresholds for providing more forces, but some states have considered reassigning forces that are currently dedicated to other missions, in particular the EU mission in Bosnia, to support the increasingly complex and demanding mission in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{12}
Additionally, the current operation in Darfur has run into some political roadblocks, to include some reservations from Alliance members, notably France and Belgium. These states have expressed concerns that the mission to support the African Union in Darfur should have been a European Union mission vice a NATO mission. The French Foreign Minister highlighted the concern when he stated, “NATO is not the world’s policeman.”\textsuperscript{13} Ironically, this same phrase has been repeatedly echoed by multiple NATO Secretary General’s, but with a different spin. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated, “I am not saying that NATO should or will become the world’s policeman. But it will no longer simply be Europe’s neighbourhood patrol.”\textsuperscript{14} The current NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer countered French concerns, commenting that, “NATO doesn’t need to become a ‘gendarme du monde’. What we need is an increasingly global approach to security, with organizations, including NATO, playing their respective roles.”\textsuperscript{15} NATO leadership has stressed on a number of occasions that the support to Darfur was not a NATO-led operation, but an African Union (AU)-led operation, with support from both NATO and the European Union.\textsuperscript{16} As will be mentioned later in the paper, the support to AU forces in Darfur offers both the EU and NATO an opportunity, rather than a competition in a zero-sum game environment, to work collaboratively in an area that represents challenges to both organizations.

NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor is the Alliance’s only Article 5 mission, and also offers a framework that might be replicated elsewhere on the continent. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004, NATO opened up Active Endeavor’s current list of participating nations to include members of the Mediterranean Dialogue if they so chose to do so. Further discussions linking Active Endeavor participants with Mediterranean Dialogue partners could be an avenue NATO
continues to pursue through its NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, providing yet another link between NATO and states in Africa.

**Chart 2. Current NATO Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>11 Aug ‘03* - present</td>
<td>Support to the government of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>NATO HQ Sarajevo</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>NATO military presence in Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>Airlift support to African Union</td>
<td>Jul ‘05-present</td>
<td>NATO support to African Union forces in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>NATO HQ Skopje</td>
<td>Apr ’02-present</td>
<td>HQ support to multiple regional efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I)</td>
<td>Nov ’04-present</td>
<td>Training Iraqi military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Jun ‘99-present</td>
<td>Peacekeeping in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Active Endeavor</td>
<td>Oct ’01-present</td>
<td>Campaign against terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ISAF began prior to assumption of NATO command in Aug 2003.

Clearly, the assumption of any new taskings must take into consideration the current slate of ongoing commitments, both in a NATO capacity, and as we will see later, in an EU and UN capacity as well. With the current strain, both financially and from a troop commitment perspective, new mission areas will have to have a high degree of political support from the major actors in the NAC. ISAF and the Balkans will certainly be weighing heavily on the decision makers’ ability to muster support for any additional burdens to an Alliance that is perceived by some as overtaxed.
Notes

1 Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at Bibliotheque Solvay, Brussels on November 6, 2006, found at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s061106a.htm (accessed January 14, 2007).

2 According to General James Jones, NATO states informally agreed to maintain the defense budgets at 2% of GDP or better. See SACEUR’s speech at the Center for the Study of Democracy Sofia (Bulgaria), November 18, 2005.


4 See James Kitfield, “Divided We Fall,” The National Journal, April 8, 2006.


6 Ibid., 6.

7 Ibid., 3.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 6.

10 Special Report, “Predictions of its death were premature-NATO’s future; NATO’s future,” The Economist, November 25, 2006, 23.


12 Mark Beunderman, “NATO Chief tells EU not to ‘replicate’ army tasks,” EUObserver.com, November 6, 2006, accessed January 17, 2007. Specifically, both the UK and Germany have considered drawing down forces in the EU mission in Bosnia to bolster contributions to Afghanistan.


16 This point was reemphasized by General James Jones, SACEUR, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 28, 2005, where he noted “NATO’s proposals balance the sensitivities of the African Union and the desire for ‘African solutions to African problems.’ They also emphasized NATO’s supporting role to the AU…” See page 4 of Jones testimony.
Chapter 4

Options for NATO: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

“We have now successfully transformed NATO into an alliance with global responsibilities, capabilities and partners.”

—U.S. Diplomat, U.S. Mission to NATO

Much has been said about allowing for “African solutions to African problems.” But what happens when African solutions fail, or do not achieve anticipated results? What happens when the failure of African solutions threatens to destabilize regional security or international security? Regarding US unilateral action, it has been commented on that “boosting conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and punitive measures will unquestionably be difficult, but it can be done if the United States builds multilateral partnerships to share diplomatic and financial burdens.” The same could be said to hold true for NATO. The following courses of action lay out potential options for NATO, and provide both pros and cons for each course of action.

International and Regional Partnerships

The United Nations (UN)

NATO’s cooperation with the United Nations is not a new concept. The Washington Treaty of 1949, which serves as the foundation of the Alliance, operates within the framework and legal structures of the UN Charter. Specifically, NATO’s Article 5 derives its substance from Article 51 of the UN Charter. According to Article 51, “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…” NATO also has routinely operated under the mandate of the UN Security Council for its operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, with the notable exception of Kosovo (see discussion under unilateral action.)

If any organization comes to the fore when discussing partnering in any type of military-related mission in Africa, the UN must be mentioned first. The UN currently has the largest number of ongoing operations worldwide (15 as of March 2007), with six in Africa in particular. Moreover, the UN provides the much needed international mandate for other organizations to operate in the eyes of the international opinion. As noted by a former diplomat, “There are many UN operations with no EU, NATO or US involvement…but there are no EU, NATO or US operations without some, often quite important UN involvement.”

Another factor for working with the UN is to leverage the recently created UN Peacebuilding Commission, which links key members of the UN Security Council, major UN financial and resource contributors, and major troop and civilian police contributors together to provide an organization specifically dedicated to post-conflict recovery and stability and reconstruction operations. The decision-making process for engaging UN forces in some respects can be more straight-forward than gaining the mandate from either the EU or NATO (both of which have a larger body of voters with the authority to disapprove of a particular mission.) However, the ultimate decision to deploy forces under the UN flag is made in the UN Security Council, where the ideological divide can also inhibit the effective employment of forces that are urgently needed (Rwanda and Kosovo serve as examples.)

When discussing and planning for the deployment of UN forces, a number of factors needed to be taken into consideration. First and foremost, UN forces primarily enter under permissive
circumstances, unlike NATO missions in the past that have required forced entry (Afghanistan, Kosovo), or deployed in a non-permissive environment (Bosnia.) The second factor to consider is what type of mission the UN can undertake. The UN provides functionality where traditionally NATO does not, particularly in the realm of post-conflict operations and civil tasks. Thirdly, the UN can perform its service at a much lower overall cost than employing EU or NATO forces. For example, in 2005, the UN had 57,000 soldiers under its operational command in 17 different countries around the world at a cost of approximately $4B, which was less than the cost to the US of operating in Iraq in one month. In 2007 the numbers are even more significant, with just under 100,000 personnel serving around the world in the various operations, the cost remained approximately $5.25B. However, like EU and NATO forces, the UN is suffering from a high pace of deployment, prompting former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to warn of peacekeeping overstretch, and calls for more strategic reserves for current and future missions.

Yet the legitimacy provided by the UN is a strong lure for many when reaching out for assistance. South Africa’s UN Ambassador, commenting on peacekeeping intervention in Africa stated, “The UN must be involved. We can't have the UN subcontract international peace and security." However, some in many regions of Africa would disagree, specifically Somalia’s Deputy UN envoy who noted recently that “any force would be welcomed. Somalis were tired of war.”

The UN has already stepped out with supporting and working with regional African organizations, most notably the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS.) Likewise, NATO has also established a relationship with the UN in support of AMIS. Working with the UN, or more importantly, supporting UN forces with logistics, training, and intelligence may provide NATO (as well as the EU) a cost-effective approach to bolstering stability on the continent. However,
working with the UN would require a commitment to sustain UN operations, which have suffered in the past from lack of support after their initial deployment. Additionally, while the UN Security Council may provide a mandate for action in a particular region in Africa, it is not a guarantee that the requisite numbers of troops, supplies, and logistics will be immediately on-hand. In some respects, a UN mandate could precede the immediate ability to act, which may account for the number of actions taken on the continent only to be approved by the United Nations in retrospect. (See unilateral action section for more details.)

**The European Union (EU)**

Military interaction between NATO and the EU has not been without its issues. One of the primary issues between the two organizations could be characterized as an ambiguous division of labor, essentially replicating one another’s mission set. Both organizations share twenty-one member states (with the recent addition to the EU of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU), setting the stage for potential duplication of effort and increasing demands on scarce resources. Similar to the current sourcing problems plaguing NATO when it has been seeking new forces for its ongoing missions, the EU has faced similar problems. The lack of available resources was publicly noted in early 2006, when the EU was preparing to set out on a new mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Three of its leading contributors, Germany, France and the UK, made public pronouncements that they were overcommitted at the time. This is not a problem that is just plaguing the EU and NATO; the UN as previously mentioned has had varying degrees of difficulty with troop contributions.

The EU’s foundation for its military structure is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which established its own military infrastructure distinct from that of NATO’s. The ESDP’s initial aims were to carry out the “Petersberg Tasks,” which run the gamut from
peacekeeping/humanitarian intervention to peacemaking operations. Some have criticized the EU for establishing its own autonomous military arm, at the cost of potentially diminishing support to NATO and its resources. Yet others have countered that the EU requires its own distinct (non-US) military capability. However, like NATO, the EU has been actively engaged militarily in a number of areas around the globe. It has completed seven operations, mainly in the Balkans, but also two operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and one in Aceh, and as of March 2007, is engaged in nine separate military and civil/police operations. Additionally, the EU has taken some progressive steps in its engagement activities with Africa. A “European Union Strategy for Africa” was agreed upon by the EU in December 2005, essentially coordinating the EU’s engagement activities, and outlining a new EU doctrine for the same.

Both entities (EU and NATO) maintain a rapid reaction capability, albeit in different guises. The EU’s goal is to have “the ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis…in full complementarity and mutual reinforcement with NATO and NATO initiatives such as the NATO response force.” The EU’s battle group formations (13 formations of 1500 personnel) are however significantly smaller that the NRF’s standing force. Yet it has yet to be fully tested whether the battle group formations can be introduced into a non-permissive environment.

Skeptics point out that few European states could support the deployment of simultaneously tasked forces for the NRF, an EU battle group and other bilateral or UN military activities. This “funding” dilemma most recently manifested itself with the failure in September 2006 in NATO’s effort to raise 2,000 troops for operations in Afghanistan.
As mentioned earlier, cooperation between the two organizations has not been without issue. Underlying tensions between the EU and NATO broke out in the open in early 2006, ignited when Germany was tapped to lead the EU mission to the Congo in 2006. German Chancellor Angela Merkel had suggested that a NATO planning headquarters be utilized for the planning effort, but the idea was scrapped at the behest of the French. Additionally, while not necessarily speaking on behalf of the EU, France raised objections to the NRF’s initial plan to exercise in Mauritania in 2006, prompting the Alliance to work with Cape Verde as an alternative. Another example of friction still plaguing the two organizations is the current competition to assist with the African Union in Darfur, leading NATO Secretary General Scheffer to note, “We should get away from replicating one another’s initiatives.”

Ironically, the developing situation in Somalia in early 2007 has called into question just how selective the EU might be in picking and choosing the types of operations in considers. With the call for support to the nascent government in Mogadishu, and prior to the introduction of African Union forces, the EU pointed to the UN, stating “The UN will have to take responsibility. The rest of the world will have to pay.”

Yet despite these problems, NATO and the EU have shown that they can cooperate together. A great example is the change in command from a NATO headquarters to an EU headquarters in both Bosnia and Macedonia. Moreover, the EU and NATO maintain routine contacts and have established mechanisms for cooperation. This cooperation was formalized in the 2003 “Berlin Plus” arrangements (see Appendix B), “through which the EU can have ready access…to the collective assets of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily.” Berlin Plus, as interpreted by the US provides a “right of first refusal” option requiring the EU to give NATO that right “even in cases where it did not intend to use NATO
assets.” To work Berlin Plus arrangements the EU established and maintains a military headquarters entity at SHAPE. In essence, the infrastructure is in place in the event both NATO and the EU have to cooperate or parcel out resources for similar efforts.

As a potential workaround for the limited resources shared between the two organizations, it has been suggested that the EU, because of the small size of its expeditionary capability, focus on small-scale peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, and civilian rule-of-law operations. The larger, more logistically complex operations would be handed to NATO. These activities could be coordinated in a phased approach, whereas if required, NATO could be called upon to provide initial entry of forces in a potentially hostile environment. The split responsibilities can be mutually reinforcing, and conducted simultaneously in certain situations, which would ensure that neither organization felt it had been relegated to a “second-string” status. The current operation in Darfur, if better coordinated could serve as a demonstration of shared responsibilities across an area of responsibility that requires capabilities found in both organizations. Likewise, the operation in Afghanistan offers the full spectrum of military activities, in both permissive and non-permissive environments, and can serve as a foundation for cooperative efforts and become a blueprint for future large-scale operations elsewhere, including Africa.

**Regional African Organizations**

The use of regional organizations to solve African issues is not a new phenomenon. Since 1990, regional African organizations have deployed forces in ten operations: five by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), three by the African Union (AU), two by the South African Development Community (SADC), and one by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC). In fact, Europe, and in particular
the EU has for a number of years looked to the use of African regional organizations as a more effective means to tackle an issue, since the United Nations has become financially stretched with its current slate of ongoing operations. Indeed, the EU has created the “African Peace Facility,” funded with 250M Euros to build capacity for African regional organizations. This has prompted many African leaders to push an agenda supporting the use of such entities. One such leader, South African President Mbeki noted, “It's critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations on the continent, and that includes Darfur. . . . We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It's an African responsibility, and we can do it.” Yet other African leaders have been more forthright in their assessments of the current state of preparedness of such regional organizations as they stand today. In an unusually honest assessment, the Senegalese FM commented

We are totally dissatisfied with the fact that the African Union . . . has asked the international community to allow it to be an African solution to an African problem, and unfortunately the logistics from our own governments did not follow." Now, he said, "The U.N. Security Council, the European Union, the African Union, the United States -- we should all come together in a new way of dealing with the suffering of the people of Darfur . . . . We have to do something."

The proliferation of the use of regional organizations in Africa has not negated their legitimacy. In fact, regional organizations have been working in tandem with the UN to confer legitimacy for the conduct of their respective operations. Absent UN recognition, regional organizations have worked with host governments to obtain legitimacy for their missions.

Two major African regional organizations are currently operational in various missions across the continent. The African Union, currently comprising 53 states on the continent, is by far the largest and most diverse. The AU states it can conduct full-spectrum operations ranging from mediation and peacekeeping to forced entry operations. The AU has conducted three major
operations, the first in Burundi, and the second, currently ongoing in Darfur, Sudan, and most recently the third in Somalia. Additionally, the AU has plans for an African Standby Force (ASF), which will have five regional headquarters each with its own standby brigade, scheduled to be ready for operational deployments in 2010.

ECOWAS, comprised of 15 West African states, while smaller, has a longer history of conducting peace operations. ECOWAS’ responsibilities range from humanitarian relief operations to resolving inter and intrastate conflict.31

The deployment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) has highlighted problems with the use of regional organizations. As recently as late 2006, the President of Sudan was still under consideration for the Chairmanship of the African Union, when African Union forces were monitoring the fighting in Darfur, Sudan.32 The paradox of potentially nominating a leader to head an organization charged to monitor that leader’s country highlights to a degree some of the political issues surrounding many of these regional organizations. The EU, which as mentioned earlier has devoted some resources and effort to support African regional organizations, has recognized that these same organizations have had a mixed review in creating a regional identity. Likewise, some African leaders have viewed partnerships with European or Western organizations with suspicion. This suspicion of western motives was one of the reasons provided when the AU rejected a call by the EU to deploy forces in Cote D’Ivoire in 2004.33 An additional problem, or potential problem resides in the theory as to why Sudan allowed AU troops to operate in Darfur, rather than a robust UN force. Press reports have speculated that because Sudanese leaders realized that AU forces would not operate as effectively as a NATO- or UN-sponsored entity, it could allow the AU entry, as a sign of good will, but with no underlying commitment to cease the atrocities. The UN estimated that approximately 20,000
troops would be needed for the effort, but the AU has approximately 7,000—well below what is needed. Moreover, the forces that have been deployed are ill-equipped, unpaid, and lack the necessary authority, which has prompted some in the west to ensure that the UN vice local organizations lead any future effort on the continent.

An additional concern regarding African regional organizations is the inherent lack of these respective organizations to sustain themselves for a prolonged operation, which is unfortunately the norm for the most recent interventions by the AU. Moreover, logistical concerns plague both entities (AU or ECOWAS) if required to project forces over a considerable distance. The strategic power projection issue may be ameliorated when the African Standby Force is operational, reducing lift requirements to a localized, tactical level. With the recent addition of the new mission in Mogadishu, it remains to be seen how much longer the AU can continue to support these extended open-ended missions without some degree of increased support from other organizations.

However, despite their problems, the AU has contributed to some successes on the continent. Notably, the Africa Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was considered such a success that it was able to migrate responsibilities after creating a semblance of order, to the new UN Operation in Burundi. Additionally, the recent deployment of AU forces into the Somali capital of Mogadishu has the potential for establishing order in an area that has bordered on anarchy for over a decade. Likewise, despite observations of its force being overstretched and undermanned, the AU has benefited from its experience in Sudan and with its partnership with NATO. This assistance was noted by the AU’s Commissioner for Peace and Security during his visit to NATO headquarters in March 2007. He observed, “NATO has been providing capacity-
building support in Sudan and we are exploring possibilities for expanding the cooperation into other areas. We are looking to including the long-term cooperation and support of NATO. \(^{38}\)

A note of caution has been sounded about the use of African regional organizations. The concept of using African forces for African problems might also be viewed by the Africans themselves in two different lights. It could be construed that the less effective, more poorly trained and equipped forces that traditionally predominate in the African regional organizations would be the only recourse to instability on the continent, whereas the better trained western or European forces would be deployed to more strategically significant locations, such as the oil-rich areas of the Middle East, or to ethnically-charged areas on the European periphery. This belief has led some to conclude that Africa would only be offered a lower quality of peacekeeping. \(^{39}\) The second and opposite charge is a legacy of the colonial-era. Any activity by western forces in conjunction with local African forces could be construed as infringing on the sovereignty of Africans. As one diplomat wryly suggested, “Africans don’t want to see white, European troops coming to Sudan.” \(^{40}\) Clearly, when cooperating and working with these regional organizations, an effort needs to be placed on strategic communications to engage the populace as to the intent of the effort, to discourage a potentially negative debate on the west’s “ulterior motives” for operating in Africa.

Working in support of regional organizations in a capability building capacity offers perhaps the best option for NATO, and may be a trend that is gaining credence in international circles. Of note, the AMIS could be characterized as the first of many operations whereby a regional African organization is supported logistically by the EU or NATO, with the blessing and political top cover of the UN. \(^{41}\) As for NATO, a good first step for engagement in Africa should utilize aspects of NATO’s Training Cooperation Initiative, currently supporting MD and
ICI states. This initiative could be a useful tool to provide to AU and other African regional organizations, and could provide synergy of effort to other similar efforts by the EU, and in particular France (especially France’s RECAMP initiative—see bilateral arrangements below.) 42 Additionally, while still primarily on the drawing board, supporting initiatives as the AU’s Standby Force, with training, may offer dividends in future crises.

**Bilateral Arrangements**

The term bilateral arrangements, for the purpose of this paper, will discuss NATO operating in conjunction with an individual state. European countries, despite the number of options for operating under the umbrella of various organizations, have opted to act bilaterally in Africa in the past. Since 1990, the British have operated in Sierra Leone, and the French in the Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 43 The French have been the most proactive in this regard, with permanent forces stationed on the continent, and have established the “Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities” (RECAMP), which supports African efforts in peacekeeping operations with education, training, and to some extent, operational partnerships. 44 Likewise, NATO has participated in bilateral discussions with African states, specifically with MD partners. The possibility of looking at a bilateral arrangement, first with MD states who have already been engaged with NATO, and of utilizing the PfP framework to enhance that particular nation’s ability to train, or participate with NATO members in various exercises or operations is an idea that should be explored. 45 If NATO were to find that this type of engagement continued to merit further attention, it might look to explore
this type of relationship with individual member states in the AU, or with a headquarters entity within the AU, thereby providing training and assistance to a wider audience. Areas already mentioned as possibilities for discussion on a bilateral basis with select states include: advice on defense reforms, budgeting and planning, civil-military relationships, and military-to-military cooperation in the form of exercises or training arrangements leading to participation in NATO operations.46

NATO Unilateral Action

The term unilateral action for the purpose of this paper will discuss NATO operating without the consent of the host nation, most likely in a forced entry type of mission. Many have characterized NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo as a clear demonstration of unilateral action by an international body against a sovereign state, essentially not gaining the requisite UN Security Council support for the action. However, the lack of action of any type resulted in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, despite the presence of a small contingent of UN forces in country, with no additional action taken by the Security Council despite having information regarding the conflict. Former UN Secretary General noted the dilemma on how the international community should view humanitarian intervention, and the possibility of NATO-like unilateral action when he commented “…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”47

Unilateral action by regional organizations in Africa does have a precedent. ECOWAS intervened in Liberia in 1990 without UN Security Council authorization to do so. Indeed,
almost two years after the invasion, the UN Security Council approved a resolution supporting ECOWAS operations in Liberia *ex post facto*.\textsuperscript{48} In a somewhat similar manner, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone to restore order, and was supported by a UN Security Council resolution two months later, sanctioning ECOWAS to engage militarily in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{49} Three other interventions across the continent took place with either retroactive UN support or none at all: ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau in 1998; The Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords (MISAB) in the Central African Republic in 1997\textsuperscript{50}; and the South African Development Community in Lesotho in 1998.

So the question turns to would or how might NATO conduct unilateral action on the continent of Africa. Would such action be inside or outside the legal framework of the United Nations? Would the situation in Darfur, which has been characterized as genocide despite the presence of an African Union mission and United Nations attention, constitute a situation that would merit a more robust NATO effort? When determining the legitimacy of acting unilaterally, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty noted, The Western states’ reaction to both Iraq and Kosovo suggest a preoccupation with the humanitarian justification for intervention by ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations. African states, which as former colonies have historically been at the forefront of challenging traditional prohibitions on the use of force in internal conflicts. The African examples also suggest a growing consensus that state sovereignty is no longer inviolable when there is mass human suffering and democratic or legitimate governments are toppled.\textsuperscript{51} This new characterization of how humanitarian crises are viewed would suggest NATO (or the EU or UN) could take a more proactive approach to the crisis in Darfur if indeed the international community determined genocide is taking place. However, realpolitik would suggest a more aggressive support to the African Union and UN as an easier path to take than placing European boots on the ground in Sudan.
There are circumstances that could prompt a unilateral NATO action. A “show of force” demonstration, perhaps in a naval capacity off of a particular coastline, or in shipping lanes plagued by piracy, could demonstrate NATO commitment, and might serve to temper the situation. Additionally, circumstances might dictate NATO providing support to non-combatant evacuation operations if the situation warranted. However, most likely this option will remain in the lanes of individual countries, or perhaps African regional organizations, rather than a unilateral NATO action on the continent.

**U.S. Africa Command**

The United States has stepped out to create a Unified Command that will unify what had been under the purview of three commands. The main goals for the United States have been characterized as, “Instead of the United States being reactive, ... we want to be more proactive in promoting security, to build African capacity to build their own environments and not be subject to the instability that has toppled governments and caused so much pain on the continent.” The new Africa Command will most certainly assume many of the former European Command’s Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs related to Africa. Among the programs that directly affect Africa include the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which currently includes most North African states, to include some participants in West Africa. Another program is the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which was funded by Congress to assist the United States in working with regional states and selected international organizations in better enabling peacekeeping forces. The Africa component to this initiative is the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program. AFRICOM will also inherit
EUCOM’s bilateral assistance programs with both the AU and ECOWAS. The support to the AU will assist the AU’s vision of establishing its Standby Force, along with its component regional headquarters. Another program is the State Partnership Program, which pairs US National Guard units with individual militaries in Africa. Lastly, the multitude of Security Assistance Programs such as Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) will also be assumed by AFRICOM.53

But as mentioned in the introduction to this paper, while NATO should have an interest in the transnational nature of threats emanating from Africa, so does the United States. General James Jones, former Commander, European Command stated “The transnational nature of these dangers undermines our ability to foster a broader and lasting stability in the region.” However, General Jones also noted that the US can not be a lone actor when engaging in Africa. He believed that from a US perspective, it must be an interagency effort in conjunction with the array of partners and allies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, working hand-in-hand with the Africans to realize common objectives.54 Whether NATO and the EU will wait for the United States to take the lead remains to be seen. Some European countries, as noted earlier, have a robust effort on the continent (France in particular), and have been aligning their respective efforts with those of the EU. Indeed, a proactive AFRICOM engagement on the continent may spur the EU or NATO to become more fully engaged as a potential partner of the US. Yet colonial legacy is still alive and strong in Africa (witness French objections to NATO exercises in Mauritania), so history could prove a useful lever to have more coordinated engagement between AFRICOM and either the EU/NATO in operations in Africa.
Notes


7 See Dobbins, “NATO’s role in nation-building,” and the UN Peacekeeping website’s background note on current operations.


10 The extent of the relationship was supporting the UN Department of Peacekeeping in the preparing and executing an exercise of senior AMIS staff. See General Jones Testimony, page 5.

11 The argument that there is a clear division of labor is made by Julian Lindley-French, in his article “The Ties that Bind,” NATO Review (Autumn 2003) http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/art2.html (accessed March 12, 2007). His basis argument is the ESDP is designed for operations in the low-to-mid levels of intensity, whereas NATO should be prepared to cover the spectrum from low-to-high intensity operations.


Notes


18 See Special Report, “Predictions of its death were premature-NATO’s future; NATO’s future,” The Economist, November 25, 2006, 23.

19 Judy Dempsey, “EU-NATO inhibited by inefficient rivalry; competition cutting into effectiveness,” IHT.


22 Turner, “UN under pressure to extend presence in Somalia.”

23 See “ESDP: Structures and NATO Coordination,” Foreign Policy 152 (January/February 2006): S6; also see the Washington Summit Declaration of 1999 for more information regarding sharing military forces.


25 Ibid., 103.


27 Richard Gowan, “Effective Multilateralism:” Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalised UN (London: Foreign Policy Centre, December 2004) 38-39. In particular this information comes from the chapter entitled “Can the EU Create Africa’s NATO?”


29 Ibid.

30 Bellamy and Williams, 157-195.


33 Gowan, 39. In the case of the AU, the view that the AU was being treated as a subcontractor to the EU, not an equal partner.


Notes

36 Seem Turner’s article “UN under pressure to extend presence in Somalia,” on a discussion of AU overstretch.
37 Bellamy and Williams, 157-195.
39 Bellamy and Williams, 195.
40 Judy Dempsey, “Pressure rises over NATO’s Darfur Role,” International Herald Tribune, February 20, 2006. From an unnamed diplomat quoted when discussing US pressure for NATO to expand its role in Darfur.
42 See U.S. State Department, “Deputy Chief of Mission Johnson Comments on New NATO: World-Class Capabilities in Global Partnership.” The new Training Initiative provides training in “counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and peace support operations.” All of which have a high degree of applicability in Africa.
43 Bellamy and Williams, 157.
44 Leday, 35.
45 NATO Ambassador Nicola de Santis, current Coordinator for MD and ICI countries in NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division has suggested the possibility of a PfP-type arrangement being utilized on a case-by-case basis in his article “Opening to the Mediterranean and Broader Middle East,” NATO Review (Autumn 2004) http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue3/english/art4.html (accessed March 12, 2007)
46 Ibid. Also see NATO Public Diplomacy Division’s brochure entitled, “Security Cooperation with the Mediterranean region and the broader Middle East,” Brussels, n.d.
49 Ibid., 107.
51 ICISS, 168.
53 For a complete list of Africa-related European Command programs likely to be inherited by AFRICOM see http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/main.asp
54 See General Jones testimony, September 28, 2005, 9-12.
Chapter 5

Conclusions

_The most basic responsibility of this Alliance is to defend our people against the threats of a new century._

—President George W. Bush

This paper has taken a look at how NATO has transformed itself over the last fifteen years from a static, collective defense of Europe alliance, to become an expeditionary organization with current commitments around the globe. Additionally, a quick discussion of current commitments and potentially conflicting factors has uncovered that NATO is not only engaged to a point that its members are feeling the strain, but that there has been some lack of willingness to financially contribute what is expected, thereby compounding the former problem of straining existing force levels. Lastly, a discussion of potential partners or bilateral/unilateral actions has been looked at, with some examples of how these types of operations have been or are currently being handled in Africa.

So, the question remains: Is NATO ready for action in Africa? If so, how should it proceed? Presently NATO is exploring how it might do so, but not in Africa. The Middle East Training Initiative, along with advancements in dialogue and partnerships with the MD/ICI community may hold the long-term answer for how it might proceed in Africa. A slow and steady progress of engagement has been underway since the Istanbul Summit, ensuring that all NATO members have a voice in framing future partnerships and potential courses of action with regards to being
involved in new out-of-area commitments. Small incremental steps, such as increasing the number of foreign officers from the MD/ICI area at NATO schools both at the tactical level (Oberammergau and Stavanger) to the Operational/Strategic level (NATO Defense College, Rome) are currently underway. Additionally, these partners are also gaining experience on how NATO conducts training and operations through their contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo, and to some extent Afghanistan.  

But for the near term, NATO is already engaging in Africa, so how should it continue to proceed, if at all? If the Darfur mission were to cease operations tomorrow, there will still be a clear need for European involvement on the continent, to help stem the rising emergence of the litany of issues discussed in the introduction. As has been discussed earlier, all operations, for the sake of legitimacy should have as their foundation United Nations approval from the Security Council. But on a more practical level, the United Nations offers a path for NATO to assist with the introduction of United Nations-led formations on the continent should the need arise. As has been identified, more often than not, this could include the use of regional organizations such as ECOWAS, the AU, and in the future, the AU’s African Standby Force as organizations positioned to execute UN-mandated tasks. But the need for assistance with sustainment, logistics, transportation, and intelligence may be the niche where NATO can step in. Much in the same manner that NATO is currently assisting AU forces in the Sudan. Likewise, partnerships with the EU could provide synergies of effort to ensure the full spectrum of capabilities are brought to the table, from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, and return to rule-of-law operations.

Stopping local and regional African problems before they metastasize into transnational problems should be the goal of both African regional organizations, as well as the international
bodies discussed in this paper. For the sake of European security, it should not become a zero-
sum game for competition between the EU and NATO for providing assistance to Africa. All
the organizations mentioned here; the UN, the EU, and NATO can find more work than they can
possibly accomplish, but scarce resources dictate that they do this smartly and efficiently. Thus,
a common approach to Africa that utilizes the niche capabilities that the UN, the EU, and NATO
bring to the table should be organized and employed in conjunction with one another. Obviously
easier said than done. However, Darfur offers an opportunity to do just that. Despite ongoing
NATO and EU commitments, together in Darfur, elimination of duplication of effort could
provide savings to both organizations best used elsewhere. Framing a joint EU-NATO mission
could serve as a blueprint for future endeavors that merits significant attention.

Utilization of NATO education programs offers a good first step to headquarters elements in
the AU that could serve as the future cadre of the regional AU African Standby Forces. Taken in
incremental steps so as not to overtax the current system, would also allow NATO to assess the
costs/benefits of such an association. And lastly, if capable, introduction of small elements of
AU forces into NATO PfP exercises and NATO operations could pay dividends to those
participating units if called upon to deploy in future crisis spots in Africa.

NATO has a wealth of knowledge and capabilities to offer Africa to help resolve problems
locally. This can’t happen overnight, but will require a sustained effort over many years.
Additionally, the commitment to move in this direction will take a strong voice, possibly the US,
to shake the central focus of Afghanistan, to take note that closer to Europe’s doorstep the
potential for problems to affect Europe looms large. Now is the time to act.
Notes


2 Comments from Deputy Secretary General of NATO during visit to the Atlantic Council of the United States, March 2007.
Appendix A

Relevant NATO Articles

ARTICLE 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6*/**
For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.
* Article 6 has been modified by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey.** On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council modified this Treaty on the independence of the Algerian departments of France.

Notes

Appendix B

Berlin Plus Arrangements

The “Berlin Plus Arrangements” were codified in 17 March 2003, and serve as the basis for NATO- EU cooperation. The following excerpts cover the major details of the Berlin Plus Arrangements.1

- A NATO-EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules);
- Assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;
- Availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;
- Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements (and who is always a European) - and European command options for NATO;
- NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.

Notes

1 The NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP and The Berlin Plus Arrangements, both found at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policy.html.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Air War College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADRE</td>
<td>College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAF</td>
<td>Community College of the Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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*Washington Post*