The Organization is Flat: An Integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command

Robert L. Perry

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

Abstract

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for the first time acknowledged the critical importance of "strategic communication" (SC) as a primary strategic concern for the Department of Defense (DoD). The subsequent guidance in the QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication laid out the basic objectives for DoD strategic communications and placed primary responsibility for executing SC in the field with the Combatant Commanders (CCDR). However, the guidance did not discuss how the CCDRs should reorganize their commands to address SC. During the past two years, the CCDRs have established various SC organizations with various degrees of satisfaction and success. To help the CCDRs structure their SC processes more effectively, this paper reviews the advantages and disadvantages of four standard organizational models. It compares these to the current practices of the current CCDRs and the planned Africa-based combatant command. Finally, it proposes for the CCDRs' consideration an "integrated organizational model" based on the most relevant elements of the core competency, matrixed, and process/horizontal models. It concludes with several recommendations that discuss how the CCDRs can maximize the proposed model's effectiveness.

Subject Terms

Strategic communication, Combatant Commander, organizational model, organizational structure, combatant commands, process/horizontal model, matrixed model, core competency model

Security Classification

UNCLASSIFIED
THE ORGANIZATION IS FLAT:
AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
WITHIN THE COMBATANT COMMAND

by

Robert L. Perry
GS-15, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

5 November 2007
Abstract

THE ORGANIZATION IS FLAT:
AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
WITHIN THE COMBATANT COMMAND

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for the first time acknowledged the critical importance of “strategic communication” (SC) as a primary strategic concern for the Department of Defense (DoD). The subsequent guidance in the QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication laid out the basic objectives for DoD strategic communications and placed primary responsibility for executing SC in the field with the Combatant Commanders (CCDR). However, the guidance did not discuss how the CCDRs should reorganize their commands to address SC. During the past two years, the CCDRs have established various SC organizations with various degrees of satisfaction and success. To help the CCDRs structure their SC processes more effectively, this paper reviews the advantages and disadvantages of four standard organizational models. It compares these to the practices of the current CCDRs and the planned Africa-based combatant command. Finally, it proposes for the CCDRs’ consideration an “integrated organizational model” based on the most relevant elements of the core competency, matrixed, and process/horizontal models. It concludes with several recommendations that discuss how the CCDRs can maximize the proposed model’s effectiveness.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed Focus on Strategic Communication</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion/Analysis</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized Model</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Competency Model</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matrixed Model</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process/Horizontal Model</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated “Matrixed-Capability-Process” Organizational Model</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Model Advantages and Disadvantages</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question of the Steering Committee Layer</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Factors for Model’s Success</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A – U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B – U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C – U.S. European Command</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D – U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E – U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix F – U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix G – U.S. Strategic Command</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix H – U.S. Transportation Command—Planning Stage</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I – U.S. African Command—Notional</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix J – Integrated Model Structure and Functions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1: Matrix of CCDR Elements</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Decentralized Model</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Core Competency Model</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Matrixed Model</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Process/Horizontal Model</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Integrated Model</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Integrated Model: Capabilities Preparation and Execution-Example</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>“Nested” SC Planning</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>“Nested” SC Process</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

The author wishes to thank and acknowledge all those individuals within the Combatant Commands, Multinational Forces-Iraq, and the Department of Defense who shared their information and expertise with me, including in alphabetical order:

- John Armeau, Director, Joint Strategic Communication Support Cell (JSCSC), Joint Information Operations Warfighting Center, San Antonio, TX
- Jeff Breslau, CDR, USN, Deputy, Strategic Communication, U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL
- Stephen T. Campbell, COL, USA, Commander, Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE), Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, VA
- John Carman, Deputy Director, Strategic Communication, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA
- Lance Carpenter, Chief, Joint Interagency Coordination Group, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL
- Anthony Cooper, CAPT, USN, Chief, Public Affairs, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL
- Denny D’Angelo, Col, USAF, Director of Staff, Strategic and Logistics Directorate, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL
- John A. Davis, COL, USA, Commander, 1st Information Operations Command, Ft. Belvoir, VA
- Christine Anne N. Fiala, LTC, USA Reserves, Deputy Director, Strategic Communication, U.S. European Command
- Robert J. Giesler, Director, Information Operations and Strategic Studies, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Warfighting Support), Washington, DC
- Douglas P. Habel, Jr., LTC, USA, Office of Strategic Communication, U.S. Africa sub-unified Command, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
- Vic Hines, Lt Col, USAF, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI
- T.L. McCreary, RDML, USN (ret.), Director of Strategic Effectiveness and Communication Division, U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, FL
- Sarah Nagelmann, Director of Strategic Communication, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL
- Hal Pittman, CAPT, USN, Acting Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense (Joint Communications), Washington, DC
- John S. Renda, LTC, USA, 1st Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Ft. Bragg, NC, temporarily assigned to Naval War College
- Gregory J. Smith, RDML, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Chief of Public Affairs and Director, Strategic Effectiveness Communication Division, Baghdad, Iraq

Any errors of fact or interpretation in this paper are solely those of the author.
The Organization is Flat:
An Integrated Model for Strategic Communication within the Combatant Command

INTRODUCTION

Changes in the global information environment require the Department of Defense (DoD), in conjunction with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, to implement more deliberate and well-developed Strategic Communication processes.¹

-- QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) stressed that the Department of Defense (DoD) must inculcate a comprehensive approach to communication into “its culture, developing programs, plans, policy, information, and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government’s overall strategic objectives.”² It stated that the QDR had identified gaps in the primary supporting capabilities: Public Affairs (PA), Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD), Military Diplomacy (MD), Information Operations (IO), including Psychological Operations (PSYOP). It focused the DoD on closing these gaps with improved organization, training, equipment, and resources as well as offering “new tools and processes for assessing, analyzing and delivering information to key audiences” and enhancing “linguistic skills and cultural competence.”³ The Roadmap provided an extensive plan for how the DoD plans to strengthen strategic communication (SC) processes within the DoD culture and build “a staff process that integrates and supports Strategic Communication initiatives among the Combatant Commands and other elements of DoD…”⁴ It also added Visual Information (VI) as a primary supporting capability.⁵

However, neither the QDR nor the Roadmap specifically address the critical question of how the CCDRs are supposed to organize their Commands at the strategic or headquarters level to exercise effective command and control of the new SC processes that will guide this highly complex effort. As important, the formal DoD definition of strategic communication
as both a “process and efforts”\textsuperscript{6}, the QDR’s focus on the gaps in the four supporting capabilities, and the Roadmap’s addition of the fifth capability have caused confusion among the CCDRs and their staffs as well as the operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{7} To date, although several CCDRs have established SC organizations, as a whole, the CCDRs have not yet determined an effective approach to establish and enculture effective SC processes that can achieve the objectives and fulfill the intent of the QDR, Roadmap, and SC Concept of Operations.

This paper considers for the CCDRs which organizational model might support the integration, coordination, and synchronization of SC plans and capabilities across these hemispheric-in-scope, very complex organizations so that these plans and capabilities may help the CCDRS achieve their, the DoD’s, and the USG’s SC objectives. This paper will summarize the current organizational methods that eight of the nine CCDRs—and one notional structure from the sub-unified US Africa Command (AFRICOM)—now use to organize their SC processes; it will identify their shared elements, consider whether they are likely to be effective, and analyze what the SC subject matter experts in the CCDRs consider an appropriate structure and process. It will consider the advantages and disadvantages of four standard organizational models. It will propose a new model to help the CCDRs design and implement an organization and a process that can both seize the initiative to achieve strategic objectives and respond effectively to any adversary’s global information campaign.

BACKGROUND

Between 2001 and 2005, it has been generally acknowledged, the USG as a whole, and the DoD in particular, had failed to recognize their critical weakness in both responding to the Islamist extremists’ dominance of the global information environment and seizing the initiative from them in the “strategic communication” campaign of the War on Terror. The
DoD also had failed to put into practice a lesson of previous successful counterinsurgency (CI) campaigns: “strategic communication” to gain the support of the local population is always one of the most critical factors in a successful CI campaign. “While irregular wars are quintessentially won or lost in the minds of men (and women), the U.S. government and the Pentagon have not mastered modern information operations.”8 Instead, it has been one of the critical weaknesses of the U.S.’s strategy and operational planning in this struggle.

Renewed Focus on Strategic Communication

Beginning in early 2004 with a report by the Defense Science Board (DSB), the problem has been brought to the forefront of the DoD’s WOT and CI efforts. “This Task Force concludes U.S. Strategic Communication must be transformed…with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security.”9 The DSB report significantly influenced the thinking of the Department of State (DOS) and the DoD. In February 2006, the DoD released the DoD 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). For the first time, the QDR acknowledged and emphasized that “strategic communication” forms a critical part of the Information element of the four National instruments of power: Diplomacy, Information, Military Power, and Economics (DIME). It identified SC as one of five “areas of particular emphasis” that would play key roles in the continuing transformation of the DoD to confront a strategic environment “characterized by uncertainty and surprise.”10 The QDR stated that the DoD “must instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, developing programs, plans, policy, information and themes to support Combatant Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government’s overall strategic objectives.”11
With this emphasis, the QDR released the QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication that defined SC as: “Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.”

Two significant aspects of the QDR’s emphasis, the Roadmap’s definition, and the Roadmap’s objectives and tasks have complicated the DoD-wide effort to achieve significant progress in this area. First, the QDR and the Roadmap place the primary responsibility for developing and executing SC plans and programs with the nine Combatant Commanders (CCDR); however, neither the QDR nor the Roadmap provide any clear, detailed guidance to the nine CCDRs about the DoD’s expectations, the specific strategic objectives that apply to the CCDRs, suggested development processes at the CCDR level, and similar basic direction that would make sure the CCDRs understood how they should implement this new concept.

Second, the formal definition of SC is a long, multi-faceted statement that has tended to cloud rather than clarify what SC in the DoD context actually means. In the definition, SC incorporates both processes and efforts; this inherently dual nature has driven different understandings of which aspect should take precedence. “Strategic communication has become everything to all people. Some view it as a catchphrase; others are searching for how to do SC in the best way,” said T. L. McCreary (RDML, USN [ret]), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Director of Strategic Effectiveness and Communication Division. John Renda, LTC, USA, who has served as an Information Operations (IO) battalion commander, expressed concern that the term is too nebulous. From his vantage point, the
CCDRs and the DoD are “confusing strategic communication with aggressive public affairs (PA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). PSYOP and IO are becoming subsumed under the SC umbrella to overcome the ‘propaganda’ stigma.”

In this unclear situation, the CCDRs must implement an organization, processes, and operations that both seize the initiative and respond effectively to any adversary’s—especially the radical Islamists’—information campaigns based on what Steven Metz has called “armed theater” and “propaganda of the deed.”

To make the connection between the Roadmap’s general direction, focus on internal OSD tasks, and general view of the CCDR’s responsibilities, Joint Publication 5.0, *Joint Operation Planning*, posits SC as “a natural extension of strategic direction” that supports all of the complementary National security and DoD military strategies. JP 5.0 requires the CCDRs to include SC in their joint operation planning with DOS diplomatic missions and in the CCDRs’ peacetime theater security cooperation plans (TSCP). They must address SC in their contingency plans (CONPLANs) and Crisis Action Plans (CAPs) and brief the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on SC in those plans. At the operational level, JP 5.0 urges synchronized planning and supportive relationships among PA, DSPD, and IO as well as those with the Interagency. And in the only specific requirement in JP 5.0, each CONPLAN and Operation Plan (OPLAN) must now include an Annex Y that proposes a synchronized SC strategy for “interagency coordination and implementation.”

JP 5-0 provides more general guidance, but only hints at the specific internal organization that can plan and arrange the required synchronization and integration. Specifically, representatives of the PA, DSPD, IO, and other SC supporting capabilities must be included in SC planning as well as the CCDR’s liaisons to DOS (foreign policy advisor or
political advisor) and other Interagency elements. Beyond these fairly obvious participants, JP 5.0 does not offer any guidance on how the CCDR can best organize this broad range of roles and responsibilities into his planning at both the theater strategic and operational levels.

**DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS**

Even without more specific guidance, during the past two years, almost all of the CCDRs have initiated strategic communication structures and processes with varying degrees of stability and continuity. At present, of eight (of a total of nine) actual—and one planned—CCDRs researched for this paper, three CCDRs have fairly stable SC structures and processes, four are re-examining their SC approach, one is in the final planning stage of standing up its SC organization, and the “CCDR-in-waiting” AFRICOM was developing its final SC plan for when it becomes an independent CCDR, scheduled for FY2009.

A theme that runs through most of these efforts is the adage “centralized planning-decentralized execution.” As Appendices A-J show in detail, the CCDRs have established or have attempted to establish different structures that can their need for an adaptable, flexible approach that can carry out their intent and achieve their SC objectives.

**Standard Organizational Models and Their Advantages and Disadvantages**

Although the CCDRs have the authority to determine which structure best fits their leadership style, a model based on established structures often used in modern organizational development can help CCDRs evolve their SC process in their competition for regional information dominance. In addition, the CCDRs may want to consider combining the advantageous elements of theoretical structures with those effective elements of actual structures that some CCDRs have applied to their apparent satisfaction.

This paper considered eight standard organizational models already used by thousands
The eight models include centralized, decentralized, core competency, product/service, matrixed, process/horizontal, customer/industry-based, process/horizontal, and transitional. Of these, three were discarded from analysis because they focused specifically on business and not military objectives (product/service, customer/industry-based, transitional), and a fourth (centralized) was discarded because several SC directors specifically stressed that the centralized model would not work.

Each of the remaining four (decentralized, core competency, matrixed, and process/horizontal) were analyzed for traits and advantages that could help establish a flexible, adaptable, rapidly responsive structure. This analysis identifies the most directly applicable traits and advantages and evaluates them against their disadvantages to present an integrated model for the CCDRs to consider.

Decentralized Model

First, a decentralized organization has a small headquarters staff with autonomous decision making entities; “operating decisions are made within the…units” while strategies and objectives are set at the HQ level. (See Figure 1). Its advantages include very flexible in fast-changing environments, self-contained and internally managed, and significant visibility to the target population. Its disadvantages include serious command and control
(C2) issues between the CCDR’s command group and the autonomous decision makers as well as cross-capability cooperation and coordination problems, competition for limited resources because of resource duplication in each unit, and lack of shared learning across units. This model is similar to that followed by the U.S. Special Forces Command (SOCOM) for its special missions, and it does not appear efficient for a HQ structure. The likelihood of significant coordination issues, inefficient action, and resource constraints could accentuate the existing problems with the CCDR’s SC efforts.

Core Competency Model

The core competency model can be considered analogous to the DoD’s “capabilities” approach to achieving objectives. A competency is defined as an ability to perform a function or accomplish a mission whereas a capability is a facility that can be used for an indicated use or purpose. “Competency” relates to a personal attribute while “capability” relates to an organizational attribute. The difference is between the personal and the impersonal, while the more significant similarity is that each--personal or organizational--has abilities to carry out a function to fulfill a purpose. For example, a PA officer has the competency to plan and carry out a series of publicity events; the “Public Affairs” capability is the aggregation of the combined knowledge, skills, and abilities of all PA officers and their resources.

Accepting that comparison, the core competency model requires a small HQ staff; centralizes administrative, training, and similar functions; and focuses the operation on what the organization does best. (See Figure 2). Its advantages include efficient processes, more resources for those units with the core competencies, and maximized application of strengths. Its disadvantages include: 1) It may be only as strong as its weakest competency when the competencies must integrate and synchronize their activities, and 2) Lack of cross-
fertilization across the competencies can mean loss of continuity, loss of skills, and “loss of control over outsourced functions if contractual relationships are not well defined.” Certain of the model’s advantages (efficiency, maximized effort, sharp focus, maximized resource allocation) apply directly to the CCDRs’ requirement to be able to compete effectively with flexible, adaptable adversaries. However, its principal drawback is the lack of coordination and continuity without headquarters-based oversight of the different units.

Matrixed Model

The matrixed model shares line and staff functions; units report to both capability and functional managers. (See Figure 3). The capabilities (i.e., PA, DSPD, MD, IO, VI) define, develop, and carry out their separate missions but report to the functional manager for support. Both managers are accountable for their units’ success. This model relies on teams and the technical acumen, i.e. designing PSYOP products, of the supporting capabilities. Its primary advantage is that the teamwork “makes specialized knowledge available to all projects.” It emphasizes direct interaction, encourages consistency among capabilities, creates pools of specialists within the Service components for cross-cutting efforts, involves managers in decision making, stresses collaboration among teams, and solves complex problems effectively.

Its disadvantages include divided management responsibility; stress on political rather than technical expertise; need for constant Command support; overlapping or confused roles, responsibilities, and tasks; rapidly shifting and multiple team responsibilities; and less efficient performance because of the high degree of coordination and synchronization.

Process/Horizontal Model

Finally, this model aligns staff “by processes, not functions or tasks”; organizations
with only a few core competencies and heavy pressure to execute their mission use it.\textsuperscript{31} (See Figure 4). It relies on teams to carry out all significant tasks and is almost exclusively customer-driven. Each process requires an internal owner who forms cross-disciplinary teams to execute processes and establish specific performance objectives and measures for each.\textsuperscript{32}

Its advantages include a strong focus on outcomes; it “flattens the hierarchy” even more than the other three, makes process owners responsible, encourages significant information exchange, enhances cohesion, encourages employees to diversify their skill sets, and focuses on continuous process improvements that can maximize their effectiveness.

Its disadvantages include resources for continuous training and improvement of one person’s multiple skill sets; it requires adaptable employees who can master continuous learning requirements; establishes cross-function roles for each employee; requires an empowered culture led by senior leaders; requires talented managers who can supervise multiple functions simultaneously; and adds complexity to normal leadership challenges.\textsuperscript{33}

Integrated “Matrixed-Capability-Process” Organizational Model

Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of these four and analyzing the current organizations that the nine CCDR SC staffs are using or considering, an integrated hybrid of the core competency model, matrixed, and process models offers an effective choice that the CCDRs can use to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of the three models. (See Figures 5 and 6). To date, several of the CCDRs have established SC organizations that reflect some of the characteristics of this new model. The following compares the elements of this “Matrixed-Capability-Process Organizational Model” hybrid with existing CCDR structures.
1. Small headquarters (HQ) staff: Provide supporting functions to senior leadership, coordinate and synchronize strategic working group capabilities to focus on CCDR’s intent, mission, and objectives and approved themes, messages, and plans. Located within the HQ, they report to the Chief of Staff or Senior command group. SOUTHCOM has a five-person staff; CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, and the notional AFRICOM are considering three- to five-person staffs. EUCOM and JFCOM have one-person staffs that draw on other offices for support.34

2. Senior Executive Group (SEG): With SC HQ staff’s assistance, review, seek changes to, and approve the working group’s plans. SOUTHCOM and EUCOM SC staff report to a senior command group (COS, D/CCDR, and CCDR).35 SOCOM and PACOM have much larger SC Executive Committees that include all “J” directors and the like.36 The latter can add another hierarchical layer between the final decision makers (CCDR, D/CCDR, and COS) and the working group. This additional layer, this author asserts, would be useful for only three purposes:
   a. To gain consensus at the “J” director level, if needed and if they were not members of the working group described below.
   b. To make recommendations directly to the CCDR—if the COS and/or D/CCDR chair or co-chair the group rather than “vet” them through a command group.
   c. To make routine decisions.

3. Standing Working Group (SWG): Meet regularly to 1) review the draft of the CCDR’s overall SC strategy, including themes and messages, and give feedback about its execution; 2) review and recommend SC operations and tactics based on the
CCDR’s intent; 3) synchronize the themes, messages, and operations of each plan and assess results; and 4) encourage collaboration, consensus, and coordinated efforts. SOUTHCOM has a loose, 25-member working group, and EUCOM a 22-member group that includes every “J” planning staff as well as essential others, such as the JAG, D/PAO, EUCOM DOS Liaison, etc. SOCOM has two SCWGs, each oriented toward a different SOCOM overarching function.

4. Capabilities: As in the process model, the capabilities operate in teams or alone, as the situation requires, to draft operational plans and execute the plans reviewed by the working group and approved by the executive group. The capabilities’ responsibilities include frequent reporting of their results and their objective measures of effectiveness to the working group for lessons learned, mid-course corrections, and next steps. (See Figure 6.)

Integrated Model Advantages and Disadvantages

This new model has the following advantages: Like the process and core competency models, it encourages the capabilities to do what they do best and makes their expertise available across a Command generally and to other capabilities specifically. Like the matrixed and core competency models, it provides direct access through the SC staff and/or the senior command group to the CCDR for prompt input and feedback/decision making. If the working group included the appropriate members (O-6 or GS-15 level or above), the “flatness” of the integrated organization—one level removed from the Senior decision makers—could gain the Seniors’ attention more readily than either the competency or matrixed model. Like the matrixed and process models, it allows relatively easy sharing of personnel and resources across different operations when they work together regularly in the
SCWG and on capability teams/cells. Like the core competency and process models, it frees the managerial and administrative resources required by the separate functional and capability units of a matrixed model and the autonomous units in a decentralized model. By adding the small HQ oversight staff, it creates and sustains consistency with its emphasis on coordination and synchronization. The HQ staff has the responsibility and the authority to facilitate a consistent approach, while it avoids becoming a capability or bureaucracy. A SCWG’s synchronization actions can avoid most conflicts over tasks and responsibilities; as important, it can avoid “information fratricide,” that is, the mistake that occurs when uncoordinated efforts send conflicting messages to the same audience.

The primary disadvantage of the new model would be that the working group could fail to react to a crisis or a breaking news event quickly because of the need to coordinate among the group and gain executive approval—and fail to counter the adversary’s message effectively. However, an existing SCWG is more likely to respond more quickly than 15 or 20 stovepiped capabilities and functions. Furthermore, in a flattened hierarchy like this, senior leaders, located only one level away from the capabilities, may be tempted to micro-manage operations and tactics rather than focus on whether or not a plan can fulfill, or an operation has fulfilled, the CCDR’s intent and strategic objectives. In addition, the more articulate or more politically astute members of a SCWG could sway the views of the other members regardless of the feasibility of their ideas. A SCWG also could lapse into “groupthink” and “group protection” rather than engage in a productive exchange of ideas and make decisions promptly. In addition, the model requires close, continuous interaction and information sharing among the leaders and the “doers” across the capabilities. Again, the strongest advantage of a small SC staff is that it can act as an intermediary and mediator with
the coordination that can help ameliorate these drawbacks.

Question of the Steering Committee Layer

The question of whether to include a “J” Director-level steering committee between the SCWG and the CCDR HQ is very important because adding this layer affects the nature of the work and the SCWG’s scope of authority. Several existing CCDRs have added this “steering committee” layer to review and synchronize the SCWG’s plans and work. In this situation, it appears that the SCWG is doing the actual planning for strategic communication. This author believes this approach is not efficient because large committees traditionally do not develop plans quickly or effectively. Usually, subcommittees of larger groups do the actual work. In this case, the CCDRs already have these smaller groups in their existing operations planning (J5) and capabilities (IO cells, PA Office, etc.).

This author asserts that the best approach would be to minimize the layers and have the working group include the “J” directors or deputies. The basic planning should be done within the existing structures—the J5 operations planning, the PA shop, and the Information Operations cell or the like—so the capability specialists, i.e., PSYOP planners, can do what they do best—in accord with the core competency, matrixed, and process models. The SCWG should only review, coordinate, and synchronize these plans to make sure that they reflect, and the tactical units can achieve, the CCDR’s intent, objectives, and desired outcomes. If synchronization is the SCWG’s main task, the steering group should be unnecessary. Most importantly, eliminating the layer should mean faster response planning, decision making, and action making during a crisis and more efficient use of time and resources during normal planning operations.

Critical Factors for Model’s Success
The success of this model relies heavily on four critical factors:

- Most important, the CCDR’s strong support for the “flat” structure and his and his staff’s willingness to encourage the SCWG and the capabilities to do their jobs. With a relatively flat organization transparent to the CCDR, Nagelmann emphasized, the CCDR must take personal ownership and responsibility for communication strategy and be seen to consistently support SC.\(^{39}\)

- True empowerment of the capabilities and their leaders to make plans, collaborate at the working group level, act quickly, and coordinate those actions effectively.

- Effective facilitation by the SC staff whose underlying responsibility must be to keep the working group focused on carrying out the Commander’s intent.

- Insistence that “strategic communication” remain an overarching concept that supports National and theater-strategic strategies. Because the SC concept was created to help the USG achieve desired outcomes, an SC plan must be nested within the CCDR’s TSCP; the execution process must integrate all of the CCDR’s instruments of power and capabilities for using that power.\(^{40}\) (See Figures 7 and 8).

As noted, four of the CCDRs (SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, SOCOM, and JFCOM) are already applying many of the traits of the integrated model to guide their strategic communication efforts. Their SC leaders acknowledge their similar organizations help to keep their working groups and steering groups focused on “strategic communication” as an integrating and synchronizing process rather than as a capability or an alternative to existing organizations.\(^{41}\) This flat, one- or at most two-level organization “should keep the existing capabilities in place to be used for operations as needed,” McCreary stressed.\(^{42}\) (See Appendix J and Figure 7).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To become a concept that pervades, even drives the thinking and planning of the CCDRs and every activity that take places across a CCDR’s AOR, strategic communication must first become ingrained as a Command-driven process that involves every key element and activity. Strategic communication must be considered an “enterprise-wide architecture that supports the development of policy and strategy” that can bring to bear all of the required capabilities to accomplish missions and achieve strategic objectives, emphasized Robert J. Giesler, Director, Information Operations and Strategic Studies, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Warfighting Support).

In addition, two vital elements in a comprehensive approach to SC must be brought to the forefront: the role of intelligence and SC’s role in and support for effects-based planning, according to RDML Gregory Smith, Chief of Public Affairs and Director, Strategic Effectiveness and Communication Division, Multi-National Force-Iraq. The most critical overlooked piece in the current SC process, as many counter-insurgency campaigns have learned, is the constant requirement for actionable intelligence.

An integrated structure both supports and is supported by effects-based planning, Smith explained. With sound intelligence as its information base, goal-focused force allocation, and constant assessment of results, effects-based planning offers a “new way of thinking, a new planning construct.” With an effects-based focus, an SC working group can plan for intended effects, analyze possibilities to predict unintended consequences, and develop accurate measures of effectiveness. The impact of strategic communication becomes embedded in every plan. SC-based operational planning results in synchronized efforts to create desired behaviors among all affected audiences. A set of tactical actions can
have intended strategic ripple effects that traditional processes cannot.\textsuperscript{50} (See Figure 8).

This paper has explored theoretical and practical frameworks that may help the CCDRs to seize the initiative and respond effectively to an adversary’s sophisticated use of the global information environment. The CCDRs must structure their own planning and decision making organization and processes so that they are as adaptable and flexible as those of the adversary. The following points of emphasis may help the CCDRs gain dominance in the “strategic communication” campaign.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Adopt the integrated model as their SC structure. It offers more advantages for collaboration, consensus, synchronization, oversight, decision making, and empowered execution than any other model alone or in combination.
  \item Strengthen their focus on intelligence as the linchpin for effective SC. The SC process must thoroughly comprehend the adversary’s strategic, operational, and tactical elements. Only a culturally attuned, adequately resourced J2 capability can provide this depth.
  \item In the global information village, where a “strategic corporal’s” tactical mistake in Baghdad can cause damaging strategic results, the CCDRs must adopt an attitude that communication is the fundamental activity that drives human relationships, and as such, demands the closest attention of every member of their Commands.
  \item Empower in the SCWG the full range of stakeholders, including such innovative participants as anthropologists and historians, to gain the widest range of insight and opinion, achieve the deepest and broadest buy-in, seize the initiative, and respond quickly to crises.
  \item Use the model to apply effects-based planning, operational, and assessment methods so that the capabilities gain the advantages of all three.
\end{itemize}
APPENDICES

Note 1: The following appendices (A-J) describe the basic organizations for eight of the nine current Combatant Commands as well as the notional structure for the now-sub-unified U.S. African Command. The standard format for these descriptions includes the following categories. Table 1, placed after the bibliography, summarizes the information.

Separate SC Office:
Separate SC Director:
Separate SC Staff:
SC Staff Roles/Duties:
No. of SC Staff Members:
Director of SC Reports To:
Location of Staff:
Senior Oversight Group:
Chair of Senior Oversight:
SC Working Group (SCWG):
SCWG Chair:
No. of SCWG Members
SCWG Members:
SCWG Roles/Duties
SC Approval Process:

Note 2: The information below was current as of mid- to late October 2007. Several of the Commands were reviewing and revising their structures at that time. Please refer to the individual Commands for more recent information.
APPENDIX A

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

Separate SC Office: Yes, Office of Strategic Communication
Separate SC Director (D/SC): Yes, GS-15
Separate SC Staff: Yes
SC Staff Roles/Duties: Drive operational planning, synchronize SC efforts, conduct long-term (6 month to one year) SC planning, manage Working Group agenda and meetings,
No. of SC Staff Members/Ranks: D/SC = GS-15 Civilian. Of 5 staff =1 GS-15 and 2 military O-5s, 3 GS-12 Civilians
Director of SC Reports To: SOUTHCOM Command Group (CCDR, D/CCDR, COS)
Location of Staff: SOUTHCOM HQ
Senior Oversight Group: Monthly SC Board
Chair of Senior Oversight: D/CCDR (three-star flag rank)
Members of Senior Board: J2, J3, J5, J7, Foreign Policy Advisor, PA, and COS; D/SC acts as non-voting Secretariat
SC Working Group (SCWG): Yes
Meeting Frequency: Weekly, one hour
SCWG Chair: D/SC
No. of SCWG Members: 25, flexible depending on issues
SCWG Members: Representatives of J2, J3, J5, J7, IO Chief, PA, JAG, POLAD, engineering chief, Chaplain, any stakeholder in an SC campaign
SCWG Roles/Duties: Develop and review SC messages, themes, and campaigns and recommend to Senior Monthly Board.
SCWG Approval Process: Total inclusion and transparency; D/SC, Board, or CCDR adjudicates, as appropriate.
Comments: “This Office is focused on planning six months to a year out. Our mission is to drive operational planning because our philosophy, which the CCDR has owned, is ‘everybody here is in the business of strategic communication—without exception,” Sarah Nagelmann, D/SC, stressed.51 With this SC-oriented operational approach, military assets are means to the CCDR’s ends and can be applied anywhere and at any time to help carry out an SC operation. On the OSC staff, two O5s manage the plans portfolio and interfaces with the J3, but are located in the HQ; one GS-12 civilian manages internal communication planning and “branding”; one GS-12 is a regional expert who reviews plans and vets them with the country liaisons, as appropriate; and one is a Command Historian who lends his expertise to put any SC ideas into their proper historical and cultural contexts.52
APPENDIX B

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM):

Separate SC Office: No
Separate SC Director: Yes, SES (retired Rear Admiral)
Separate SC Staff: No, matrixed decentralized execution with SES D/SC
SC Staff Roles/Duties: N/A
No. of SC Staff Members: Matrixed throughout Directorates
Director of SC Reports To: Senior Command Group
Location of Staff: Within Directorates
Senior Oversight Group: SC Executive Committee-- all Directorate leaders (J2, J3, J5, Judge Advocate General, Chief of Public Affairs, Acquisition, etc.)
Chair of Senior Oversight: co-chaired by the Deputy Commander (D/CCDR) and the SC Director
SC Working Group (SCWG): N/A
SCWG Chair: N/A
No. of SCWG Members: N/A
SCWG Members: N/A
SCWG Roles/Duties: N/A
SC Approval Process: Through SC Executive Committee to CCDR Command Group
Comments: As the USG lead for counterterrorism, SOCOM, with its cross-functional, self-contained approach, has an “SC structure more like a matrixed organization that synchronizes SC along the horizontal lines of operation (LOO),” said Director of Strategic Communication T.L. McCreary (SES and RDML, USN [retired]).

SC focuses on “centralized planning and synchronization and dispersed implementation within the lines of operation” to avoid duplicative effort and “maintain consistency of messages.” The matrixed structure has two sides which “reflect the left and right sides of the brain,” McCreary commented. They work through with “virtual committee capabilities:

1) “Left side” organizational communication: PA, Legislative Affairs, Command Action Group, and CCDR speechwriters; they tell the SOCOM story to the U.S. public, Congress, internally to the DoD and SOCOM.
2) “Right side” War on Terror: Information Operations, PYSOP, Military Diplomacy, etc. “It communicates more broadly to the internal SOCOM audience with what we are doing and why we are doing it and we hope that they agree.”
APPENDIX C

U.S. European Command (EUCOM)

Separate SC Office: No
Separate SC Director: No, EUCOM Chief of Staff (O-8) dual-hatted as D/SC
Separate SC Staff: Yes--1, O-5 Reservist as Deputy Director/SC
SC Staff Roles/Duties: integrate roles, responsibilities, and activities among Directorates
No. of SC Staff Members: 1
Director of SC Reports To: CCDR
Location of Staff: EUCOM HQ
Senior Oversight Group: Two Groups:
- ESC = D/CCDR, COS, DD/SC
- SEC (Strategic Effectiveness Council) = Led by J5 (O-8), plans overall strategy, reviews Working Group recommendations, referees conflicting priorities. Members are Directorate heads
Chair of Senior Oversight: ESC = D/CCDR; SEC = J5 O-8
SC Working Group (SCWG): Yes
SCWG Chair: PA Chief (Navy O-6)
No. of SCWG Members: 22
SCWG Members: Every directorate (J2, J3, J5, J39 IO Cell, etc.), EUCOM Liaison (ELO) to DOS, JIASC (Joint Interagency Steering Committee) rep, etc.
SCWG Roles/Duties: Prepares SC plans/ops with specific objectives, themes, and messages.
SC Approval Process: SCWG achieves consensus, recommend to SEC for routine operations and to CCDR for strategic decisions.
Comments: Since February 2007, EUCOM has been re-assessing and re-organizing its SC processes to institutionalize the process, assign roles, responsibilities, and integrating activities among SC staff, and determine the organization and resource allocation, stated LTC Christine Anne N. Fiala, Deputy Director of Strategic Communication. EUCOM’s SC organization has a “Parthenon-like shape with three pillars and a capstone,” she said. The SC capstone is the EUCOM strategic communication command group, led by the EUCOM Chief of Staff (O-8) who is dual-hatted as the Director/Strategic Communication (D/SC). The pillars include SEC, SCWG; and Senior Leadership Engagement Portal (SLEP): Web-based depository for all strategic communication plans and Senior leader travel and visits for the 92 EUCOM countries.
APPENDIX D

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)

Separate SC Office: Yes
Separate SC Director: Yes
Separate SC Staff: Yes and no. Several Public Affairs staff work for Deputy SC

Staff Roles/Duties: planning for each weekly meeting (rooms, VTC connections, agenda development, email advisories/reminders, mid/long range agenda development, portal construction and maintenance, meeting minutes, maintenance of the communication strategy.

No. of SC Staff Members: “1 of 1” separate Deputy, GS-15 civilian
Director of SC Reports To: COS in D/SC role
Location of Staff: JFCOM HQ
Senior Oversight Group: JFCOM Board of Directors;
Chair of Senior Oversight: COS

SC Working Group (SCWG): Communication Synchronization Cell and Enabling SC Cell (ESCC): Communication Synchronization Cell (CSC) oversees the communication actions for the CCDR or at Command Group (D/CCDR and COS). The COS’s Charter directs who will participate in each cell, who leads each, and the products expected from each. ESC Cell coordinates independent JFCOM entities doing SC work, e.g., Joint Training Program, Information Operations Range, and SC Joint Integrating Concept (SC JIC) within the Joint Experimentation directorate. ESCC and CSC each meet for one hour weekly.

SCWG Chair: DD/SC
No. of SCWG Members: About 30 staff members involved in various aspects of the headquarters and several direct-reporting commands focused on Joint Training and Joint Experimentation activities.

SCWG Members: J1, J2, J3/4, J5, J6, J7, J8, J9, J00P, J00L, Protocol, Commander’s Action Group, Command Business Manager, and SJFHQs.

SCWG Roles/Duties: See above. One-hour, weekly meetings to synchronize activities.

SC Approval Process: CSC recommends to CCDR or approves routine; ESC recommends through the Experimentation Directorate to the chain of command.

Comments: JFCOM has a unique role because it has a “very broad charter” as the lead Command for cross-DoD transformation efforts, stressed John Carman (GS-15), Deputy Director for Strategic Communication. Although he is “one of one” on the org chart, several people in the JFCOM PAO work for him. For the past three years, JFCOM has adopted an effects-based approach to SC and developed a communication strategy that is tightly integrated and synchronized with the CCDR’s strategic objectives. “The CCDR’s strategy has nineteen objectives and six priorities; objective number fourteen enables SC
activities and the SC plan is nested within each of the 19 objectives. In the SC plan—a living, changing document on our portal—we track back every event and every product to a planned desired effect and relate it to one of the 19 objectives. This approach forces an operational rhythm, disciplines the process, and directs focus on the objectives,” Carman explained.\textsuperscript{60} The SC plan is also connected to the elements integral to JFCOM’s joint training curriculum for Joint Task Force (JTC) commanders and staffs, annual major CCDR exercises, and three major training programs for Senior executive leadership: Capstone, Pinnacle, and Keystone.
APPENDIX E

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)

Separate SC Office: No, handled by Operations Planning Group (OPG)
Separate SC Director: No
Separate SC Staff: No
SC Staff Roles/Duties: N/A
No. of SC Staff Members: N/A
Director of SC Reports To: N/A
Location of Staff: OPG staff locations
Senior Oversight Group: Strategic Communication Steering Group (SCSG)--J5 Chief of Staff (SES), J20 Intelligence Director (SES), J30 Operations Director (one star), Legislative Affairs Chief (O-6), Chief of Public Affairs (O-6), J39 Information Operations Cell Chief (O-6), Public Diplomacy Advisor (GS14/15), and JAG (O-6).
Chair of Senior Oversight: Tri-chairs—two with SES rank and a military one-star: J5 Chief of Staff (SES), J20 Intelligence Director (SES), and the J30 Operations Director (one star)
SC Working Group (SCWG): Handled by OPG
SCWG Chair: N/A
No. of SCWG Members: N/A
SCWG Members: N/A
SCWG Roles/Duties: N/A
SC Approval Process: Operations planning recommendations sent to SCSG for review, approval
Comments: The PACOM SC process has been evolving for two years, according to LTC Vic Hines, Deputy Public Affairs Officer. Strategic communication issues are ‘addressed in operational processes by the Operations Planning Group, while the SCSG convened to respond to serious situations. The SCSG would meet with the planning directors to determine the general response and they would work with the action officers to develop specific objectives, themes, and messages. In late October 2007, PACOM was considering moving toward a small cadre staff with dedicated resources and a full-time Director of Strategic Communication who would report to the CCDR. The goal of any reorganization, LTC Hines emphasized, “is to become more strategic and less reactive and less tactical.”
APPENDIX F

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

Separate SC Office: No
Separate SC Director: No
Separate SC Staff: 2 Cells in J5:
   A) Digital Engagement for Arab language translation
   B) Counter-Ideology involved with PD with DOS reps and OSD for conferences
SC Staff Roles/Duties: See above
No. of SC Staff Members: 25 in two cells
Director of SC Reports To: N/A
Location of Staff: J5 Planning Directorate
Senior Oversight Group:
   Chair of Senior Oversight:
SC Working Group (SCWG):
   SCWG Chair:
   No. of SCWG Members
   SCWG Members:
   SCWG Roles/Duties
SC Approval Process:

As of late October 2007, CENTCOM was reorganizing its approach, according to Deputy Director of Strategic Communication Jeff Breslau, CAPT, USN, the CENTCOM SC cell, located in the J5 Planning Directorate, had been divided into two divisions with a total of 25 people: Digital Engagement and Counter-ideology, primarily engaged in public diplomacy. Breslau said based on internal discussions, CENTCOM was considering going to a small staff model that would synchronize and coordinate SC activities and “move away from tactical activities.” They plan to use the CENTCOM Theatre Security Cooperation Plan to inform the SC staff and planning and use their planning to take the initiative rather than react to events.
APPENDIX G

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)

Separate SC Office: No, managed by JIOWC
Separate SC Director: No
Separate SC Staff: No
SC Staff Roles/Duties: N/A
No. of SC Staff Members: N/A
Director of SC Reports To: N/A
Location of Staff: JIOWC, San Antonio, TX
Senior Oversight Group: STRATCOM command group
Chair of Senior Oversight: not separate
SC Working Group (SCWG): JIOWC Strategic Communication Support Cell (JSCSC)
SCWG Chair: Commander/JIOWC reports to STRATCOM CCDR
No. of SCWG Members: JSCSC
SCWG Members: JSCSC
SWG Roles/Duties: Provide SC-related support to the CCDRs (25% of effort), the Joint Staff and the DoD (25% total), as requested and support SC for STRATCOM HQ (50%).
SC Approval Process: For STRATCOM SC, JSCSC recommends to JIOWC Commander who reviews and submits to STRATCOM HQ for review and approval.
Comments: Unlike other Commands, STRATCOM, headquartered in Omaha, NE, has located its SC process within the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) in San Antonio, TX, according to JSCSC Director John Armeau. The JIOWC provides SC support teams that might include the J39 IO cell and the J5 for planning joint operations. For STRATCOM SC, the Commander JIOWC within the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency is the SC lead for the CCDR STRATCOM. If an issue affects another CCDR, JIOWC has reach back capability through its contract support to numerous experts in their home companies. He emphasized that the SC role internal to STRATCOM is evolving to more of a collaboration and coordination effort as well as assessment of results through its influence modeling team. The JSCSC divides its effort with 50 percent to STRATCOM support, such as SC for STRATCOM Operations Plans (OPLANS), 25 percent for the Joint Staff and the DoD, and 25 percent for CCDR support.
APPENDIX H

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)--Planning Stage

Separate SC Office: Yes
Separate SC Director: Possible
Separate SC Staff: Yes
SC Staff Roles/Duties: Integrate and synchronize overarching message alignment
No. of SC Staff Members: Small number
Director of SC Reports To: Senior command group
Location of Staff: TRANSCOM HQ
Senior Oversight Group: Yes
Chair of Senior Oversight: Undecided
SC Working Group (SCWG): Yes
SCWG Chair: Undecided
No. of SCWG Members: Undecided
SCWG Members: Reps from all involved Directorates and supporting Offices
SCWG Roles/Duties: Prepare SC campaigns, coordinate activities
SC Approval Process: Possible—recommend to oversight group for its review and recommendation to CCDR.
Comments: By late October 2007, TRANSCOM’s SC efforts had reached the final planning stages. Three O-6 level officers (Chief of PA, Director of its Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), and the J54 Director of the Strategy and Logistics Directorate) were leading the planning effort, noted CAPT Anthony Cooper, USN.70 Lance Carpenter, D/JIACG, explained that TRANSCOM is a unique functional CCDR with global responsibilities, global partners, and a global AOR.71 They foresee a small senior-level core SC group, a mid-level Directorate group, and a core working group of action officers with flexible membership, including the Political Advisor, driven by issues and events. A critical element of the TRANSCOM plan will be its communication with the other eight CCDRs as well as the Interagency, the Services, international governments, non-governmental organizations, and its hundreds of industry partners, such as those working with the Military Sealift Command, noted Col Denny D’Angelo, USAF, the J54.72
APPENDIX I

U.S. African Command (AFRICOM)—Notional

Separate SC Office: Yes
Separate SC Director: No, Director of Strategic Outreach equal to traditional “J” Directorates
Separate SC Staff: Yes
SC Staff Roles/Duties: Integrating process that would synchronize all SC plans, messages, and themes
No. of SC Staff Members: 5-person cell
Director of SC Reports To: Senior command group
Location of Staff: AFRICOM HQ
Senior Oversight Group: Undecided
Chair of Senior Oversight: Undecided
SC Working Group (SCWG): Staff within Strategic Outreach Directorate
SCWG Chair: N/A
No. of SCWG Members: N/A
SCWG Members: N/A
SCWG Roles/Duties: N/A
SC Approval Process: N/A
Comments: AFRICOM was stood up as a sub-unified Command within EUCOM on 1 October 2007. The plan is for it to become an independent CCDR on 1 October 2008. Its notional SC organization would include a five-person cell named the Office of Strategic Communication (OSC); it would be located in the HQ and report to the overall Directorate of Strategic Outreach. This directorate would be equal to the other traditional ones, such as the J3, and include SC, Washington liaison, and partnership operations and integration. SC would be an integrating process “rather than it be an afterthought,” said LTC Douglas P. Habel, Jr., USA, a member of the transition team as well as the team’s Strategic Outreach Working Group. AFRICOM is unique; its emphases on developing permanent partnerships with African nations, interagency collaboration, and regional teams that correspond with African regions will require a highly decentralized structure for SC as well as the rest of the CCDR.
Appendix J

Integrated Model Structure and Functions

An effective SC organization could include the following elements and duties:

- **SC Director:** Either one-star flag rank or equivalent SES for direct access to the CCDR with authority/experience to supervise SC staff, coordinate a SCWG, and lead a Secretariat.

- **A small HQ staff** (O-6/GS-15 to O-4/GS-12/13) experienced in SC and CCDR staff work.

- **SC staff direct report to CCDR** signifies CCDR’s ownership of and commitment to SC. Prevents the growth of an organized capability and direct involvement in operations. Reduces resource requirements, avoids overlapping responsibilities, encourages greater participation from Directorates, and allows SC staff to act as mediator. On the other hand, location within a J3 or J5 implies that the individual Directorate controls SC agenda and resources.

- **Critical staff functions:**
  - Synchronize strategies, themes, and messages across SCWG; coordinate command group’s meetings and processes; facilitate SCWG’s work; and “referee” conflicts among SCWG members.
  - Draft initial and update annual SC strategy and coordinate review by SCWG for presentation to the command group.
  - Act as Secretariat for the SSG: Plan meetings, prepare agendas, gather and share the briefing materials, coordinate presenters, coordinate issues and decision making, etc.
• Command group members: all CCDR Senior leaders: CCDR, Deputy CCDR, and Chief of Staff, or *empowered* group with all “J”-level Directors or Deputies.

• Working Group members: All O5/6 or GS-14/15 leads of every directorate with any involvement in any aspect of strategic communication. (See Figure 5).
Bibliography


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAITS/CCDR</th>
<th>SOUTHCOM</th>
<th>SOCOM</th>
<th>EUCOM</th>
<th>JFCOM</th>
<th>PACOM¹</th>
<th>CENTCOM¹</th>
<th>STRATCOM¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separate Office</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, JIOWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Director</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, COS dual hatted</td>
<td>Yes, reports to COS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate SC Staff</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PA Staff provides support</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2 J5 Cells</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC Staff Roles</td>
<td>Drive plan, coord, sync</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Integration among Ds</td>
<td>Coord &amp; sync; develops SC plan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Translation &amp; counter-ideology</td>
<td>JIOWC staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of SC Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC Director Reports To</td>
<td>Senior Cmmdrs</td>
<td>Senior Cmmdrs</td>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>COS as D/SC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Location</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Directres</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>OPG²</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>JIOWC, San Antonio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Oversight Group</td>
<td>Yes-Mthly SC Board</td>
<td>Exec Comm</td>
<td>Yes, 2 ESC &amp; SEC</td>
<td>Yes, JFCOM BOD</td>
<td>SCSG</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>CCDR seniors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair of Senior Oversight</td>
<td>D/CCDR</td>
<td>Co-Chair D/CCDR &amp; D/SC</td>
<td>ESC=D/CCDR SEC=J5 O-8</td>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Tri-Chairs: J5, J2, J3</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC Working Group (SCWG)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ESCell and CSCell</td>
<td>OPG</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>JIOWC SC Support Ce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCWG Chair</td>
<td>D/SC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>PA Chief</td>
<td>DD/SC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>CDR/JIOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of SCWG Members</td>
<td>25 flex</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30 in ea of 2 groups</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>JSCSC²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCWG Members</td>
<td>J Directors &amp; stakeholders</td>
<td>J Directors &amp; stakeholders</td>
<td>J Directors, JLA, JAG, CAG, Protocol</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>JSCSC²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCWG Roles/Duties</td>
<td>Review, coord</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Prep plans, objs, themes, messages, Sync</td>
<td>Wkly sync mtgs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>Divide supp 50% HQ, 25% DoD 25% CCDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC Approval Process</td>
<td>WG⇒Mthly Board⇒CCDR</td>
<td>Exec Comm⇒CCDR</td>
<td>WG⇒Steering⇒ESC⇒CCDR</td>
<td>CSC⇒CCDR; ESC⇒Exp Dir, Chain of Command</td>
<td>OPG⇒SCSG⇒CCDR</td>
<td>Endnote 3</td>
<td>JSCSC⇒JIOWC Cdr⇒HQ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 - PACOM was revising its structure in mid-October 2007.
2 - Operational Planning Group acronym.
3 - CENTCOM was revising its structure in mid-October 2007.
4 - TRANSCOM planning for first SC organization was in work in mid-October 2007.
5 - Notional AFRICOM structure after it stands up as a separate CCDR planned for FY2009.
Figure 1: Decentralized Model

Source: CARE Academy
Figure 2: Core Competency Model
Figure 3: Matrixed Model

Source: CARE Academy
Figure 4: Process/Horizontal Model

- Headquarters
- Increase Popular Support
  - PSYOP Campaign
    - Drop Leaflets
    - Set up Radio Station
    - Meet with Local Leaders
    - Hire Local PR
  - PSYOP Capability
  - SOF Capability
  - Public Affairs Capability

Source: CARE Academy
Figure 5: Integrated Model

CCDR
Headquarters
+ Senior Command Group
* SC Synchronizing Office

Synchronized Intent, Themes, Messages, Plans

SC Working Group
COS, J2, J3, J4, J5, J7, J8, JAG, POLAD/FORAD, D/PAO, J39, JIASC,
Legislative Affairs, Chf Engnr, Chaplain, D/DSPD, D/MD, VI, PSYOP, Etc.

Draft/Final Themes, Messages, Plans

SC Capabilities: Preparation and Execution
(See Chart 6)
Figure 6: Integrated Model: Capabilities
Preparation and Execution--Example

Sync'ed Theme, Message, Plan from SCWG
Figure 7: “Nested” SC Planning

Strat Comm Plan
CCDR Priorities
CCDR Objectives
TSCP
CCDR Intent
Figure 8: “Nested” SC Process

1. CCDR Objectives
2. CCDR Priority
3. SC Plan-Desired Effects
4. Events Tracking
5. Desired Effect Assessment
NOTES

3 Ibid.
5 Ibid, 3.
6 Ibid, 3.
7 Numerous sources related their confusion and frustration about the meaning of “SC” and the lack of guidance they have received from the DoD to date.
8 Steven Metz, “Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007), 77.
11 Ibid, 92.
16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: 26 December 2006), II-2.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid, II-3.
20 CARE Academy, “Organizational Development: Overview of Organizational Models.”
21 Sarah Nagelmann, telephone call with author, 28 September 2007; Christine Anne N. Fiala, telephone call with author, 12 October 2007.
22 Ibid.
23 Author’s note: For the purposes of this paper, the term “units” is analogous to the capabilities (PA, IO, PSYOP, DSPD, etc.) that a CCDR would use to execute strategic communication plans and campaigns.
24 Ibid.
26 CARE Academy, “Organizational Development.”
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
35 Nagelmann call, Fiala call.
36 McCreary call; Vic Hines, telephone call with author, 15 October 2007.
37 Nagelmann call, Fiala call.
38 McCreary call.
39 Ibid.
40 Carman call.
41 Nagelmann call, McCreary call, Fiala call, and Carmen call.
42 McCreary call.
Nagelmann call.
Gregory Smith, telephone call with author, 9 October 2007.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
McCreary call.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Fiala call.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Carman call.
Ibid.
Hines call.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
John Armeau, telephone call with author, 3 October 2007.
Ibid
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Habel call.
Nagelmann call.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.