In analyzing the development of United States Naval Command and Control (C2) doctrine in the aftermath of the Falkland Islands campaign, it is evident that the US Navy saw fit to incorporate at least four of the main lessons learned by the protagonists, namely the need for simplicity in command structure, the best location for the commander, the need for unity of command/effort and the means to manage information. The analysis was broken down into two main areas: (1) the flawed British command and control with U.S. Navy lessons learned from Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6 incorporated and (2) where the U.S. Navy is considering these lessons learned with command and control doctrine in the 21st Century. The analysis concludes the following: (1) the U.S. Navy took advantage of the British C2 lessons learned from the Falkland campaign, (2) the U.S. Navy is moving in the right direction in the 21st Century with the writing of new C2 doctrine, focusing on the operational level of war and the creation of the Maritime Operations Center (MOC), and (3) the senior leadership of the U.S. Navy is faced with the challenge of implementing the new doctrine.
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U.S. NAVY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN OF 1982

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:________________________

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ABSTRACT

U.S. NAVY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAMPAIGN OF 1982

In analyzing the development of United States Naval Command and Control (C2) doctrine in the aftermath of the Falkland Islands Campaign, it is evident that the US Navy saw fit to incorporate at least four of the main lessons learned by the protagonists, namely the need for simplicity in command structure, the best location for the commander, the need for unity of command/effort and the means to manage information. The analysis was broken down into two main areas: (1) the flawed British command and control with U.S. Navy lessons learned from Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6 incorporated and (2) where the U.S. Navy is considering these lessons learned with command and control doctrine in the 21st Century. The analysis concludes the following: (1) the U.S. Navy took advantage of the British C2 lessons learned from the Falklands Campaign, (2) the U.S. Navy is moving in the right direction in the 21st Century with the writing of new C2 doctrine, focusing on the operational level of war and the creation of the Maritime Operations Center (MOC), and (3) the senior leadership of the U.S. Navy is faced with the challenge of implementing the new doctrine.
In analyzing the development of United States Naval Command and Control (C2) doctrine in the aftermath of the Falkland Islands Campaign, it is evident that the US Navy saw fit to incorporate at least four of the main lessons learned by the protagonists, namely the need for simplicity in command structure, the best location for the commander, the need for unity of command/effort and the means to manage information. These four command and control lessons learned were selected because of their significance, relevance, and applicability to the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy could find itself in a similar situation, deployed with two carrier battle groups and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade with the senior commander conducting command and control from 6,761 miles away as was the case in this Campaign. The analysis will consist of the following: (1) background of the conflict, (2) flawed British command and control with U.S. Navy lessons learned from Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6 incorporated, (3) where the U.S. Navy is considering these lessons learned with command and control doctrine in the 21st Century, and (4) conclusions and recommendations.

As one reads the strengths and weaknesses of the British decisions and actions and their relevance to command and control, one understands that there are obvious differences such as culture, size of the military, and capabilities between the British Military and the United States Military. The British were fortunate that they were not fighting a more formidable foe because the command and control structure that was in place did not support timely decision-making.
BACKGROUND

On 2 April 1982, Argentina executed Operation BLUE, the seizure of the Falkland Islands which was intended to force Britain into conceding its sovereignty over the islands to Argentina. Britain was focused on the Cold War and did not expect to have to fight a conventional war without allies, a situation reflected in the British Defense cuts of the 1970’s. After three unsuccessful days of trying to solve the conflict peacefully through diplomacy, the decision was made to deploy a British Task Force to the South Atlantic. The British executed Operation CORPORATE. This campaign plan consisted of three major operations (see Attachment 1): (1) Operation PARAQUET – the seizure of South Georgia, (2) Operation SUTTON – the landing at Port San Carlos, and (3) the subsequent advance of ground forces from Port San Carlos to Port Stanley. One of the crucial challenges facing the British Forces in the South Atlantic was the ability to conduct command and control over a distance of 6,761 nautical miles.

WHAT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL?

The goal of command and control is to facilitate timely decision making and to then implement military action faster than the enemy. In order to do this, a simple, easily understood command structure must be established. The U.S. Joint definition of command and control is reflected in Naval Doctrinal Publication 6:

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2 (JP 1-02)\(^1\)

During the Falkland Islands Campaign, the British command and control structure had many flaws. These flaws were generally attributable to poor preparedness and the inevitable personality conflicts that affected the unity of command and timeliness in decision making. The *Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*, written in 1995, referenced C2 in the Falklands Campaign, “The command system proved to be less than perfect and caused a change to the current system, through the formal introduction of the Joint Command and Joint Force Commander.”

**THE COMMAND STRUCTURE AND ITS PERSONALITIES**

The Joint Force Commander for Operation CORPORATE was the British Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who remained in Northwood, England. The CNO was not normally a seagoing or operational commander; however, due to civilian and military politics, Admiral Fieldhouse thought it appropriate to assume command of the operation. He commanded the four deployed elements from 6,761 nautical miles away. His deputy at Northwood was Army General Richard Trant. The Ground Commander was Major General (Maj Gen) Jeremy Moore (Royal Marines), the Commander Amphibious Warfare (COMAW) was Commodore (COMO) Mike Clapp (Royal Navy), and the Carrier Task Force Commander was Rear Admiral (RADM) Sandy Woodward, Flag Officer, First Flotilla. In addition, the three British submarines that were operating in support of Operation CORPORATE reported independently back to Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM), Vice Admiral Peter Herbert who was based at Northwood and reporting directly to Admiral Fieldhouse, rather than RADM

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3 Commander Angus Ross, Royal Navy retired, interview with the author, October 2007.
The inability of RADM Woodward to control the submarines complicated both his control of the battle space and ability to manage the information.

The command structure was further complicated when Maj Gen Moore decided to remain in Northwood while the Task Force sailed toward the Falkland Islands (see Attachment 1). Maj Gen Moore’s decision was based on his assessment that he would better serve the Task Force by providing input into the operational planning effort being conducted back in Northwood and that he could link up with the force at a later date. Brigadier Julian Thompson, Royal Marine, the Commanding Officer of 3 Commando Brigade, assumed command of the ground forces until General Moore’s arrival on 31 May. BGen Thompson conducted the detailed planning for the ground scheme of maneuver with Admirals Woodward and Clapp while at sea. In No Picnic, Maj Gen Moore’s directive to BGen Thompson stated,

You will retain operational control of all forces landed in the Falklands until I establish my Headquarters in the area. It is my intention to do this, aboard Fearless, as early as practicable after the landing. I expect this to be approximately on D+7. It is then my intention to land 5 Infantry Brigade into the beachhead and to develop operations for the complete repossession of the Falkland Islands.

Maj Gen Moore sailed on the QE2 from Ascension Island to the Falkland Islands. He had no communications with BGen Thompson until he arrived ten days later because the QE2 was not configured to be a command and control platform. This communication failure may have produced a seam and possibly been exploited by the Argentines had the

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5 Commander Angus Ross, Royal Navy retired, interview with the author, October 2007.


7 RADM Sandy Woodward, interview with the author, March 1996.
British been fighting a formidable foe. The command structure changed when Maj Gen Moore and his staff arrived. He assumed command of 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade. Maj Gen Moore conducted command and control of the ground forces aboard HMS Fearless. This may have also presented a problem because Moore was not in command of HMS Fearless. The ship had conflicting priorities such as offloading stores and troops compared with Moore’s priority of command and control of ground forces.

There were thus three command elements at sea in addition to the three submarines; no one element directly worked / reported to the other. BGen Thompson reported back to Maj Gen Moore in Northwood. Attachment 1 depicts the distances over which decisions had to be made due to the location of senior commanders. COMO Clapp and BGen Thompson were at least on the same ship which facilitated staff coordination. However, RADM Woodward, who was located on a different ship, and BGen Thompson often disagreed on landing issues which could not be resolved without involvement from Maj Gen Moore and Admiral Fieldhouse.\(^8\) Disagreement among the commanders made building the joint plan difficult, because the approval authority was 6,761 nautical miles away. Admiral Fieldhouse did fly out to Ascension Island on 17 April 1982 to discuss the joint planning of the seizure of the Falkland Islands. After the brief, BGen Thompson talked to Admiral Fieldhouse about RADM Woodward’s recommendations to attack West Falklands or Lafonia vice the enemy center of gravity, the Argentine forces on East Falklands. Mr. Hastings and Jenkins described this in their book, *The Battle for the Falkland Islands*, “They had begun to grasp that it would be Fieldhouse, at Northwood, who would take the vital strategic decisions about when and where the landing force went

\(^8\) RADM Sand Woodward, interview with the author, March 1996.
ashore, rather than RADM Woodward on "Hermes. Woodward would be responsible for
the conduct of naval operations. He would not have the authority to compel 3
Commando Brigade to go to Lafonia, where they feared that a landing would be
devastated by air attack." This problem of command and control may have been reduced
had Maj Gen Moore and Admiral Fieldhouse deployed with the Task Force on 5 April
1982.

The British force that sailed toward the Falklands was a new team that had never
formally operated together. Navy doctrine addresses this flaw of organization between
ground and naval forces in NDP 6, “Naval forces prepare for combat as task-organized,
Navy-Marine Corps teams. Tailored for joint operations and scaled to the mission, they
can act as an enabling force for follow-on joint operations, serve as the core element of a
joint task force, or fully integrate in a way that clearly defines the structure of authority
and responsibility.” Having a simple well understood command and control structure
facilitates the flow of information promoting a quicker decision making process.

LOCATION OF THE JFC CAUSED PROBLEMS

The command structure was flawed due to the location of the JFC throughout the
campaign. Admiral Fieldhouse was determined to conduct command and control from
Northwood, England. This was a major problem because any deconfliction between the
element commanders, or any questions which arose, would have to be resolved from
almost 7,000 nautical miles away. In December 1982, the British Secretary of State for
Defence produced The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons. One of the primary lessons

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9 One must understand that this book was written immediately following the Falkland’s Conflict, so it lacks
the benefit of analysis. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York: W.W.
learned was “the designation of a two-star headquarters to command forces committed to such operations.” According to the United States Naval Doctrinal Publication 6, “the lower the echelon of command, the faster and more direct decision making can be. An individual unit commander can normally base decisions on factors that he observes firsthand.” Two major problems which resulted from this distance in time and space were the Bluff Cove disaster and the need to constantly clarify the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

**BLUFF COVE**

In an effort to put the enemy in a dilemma, the British scheme of maneuver was to attack the enemy from two directions: attack west from Port San Carlos with 3 Brigade and move 5 Brigade to Bluff Cove in order to attack northeast toward Port Stanley. On 8 June, Argentine air attacked the British logistic landing craft (LCL) *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Tristam*, which were moving elements of 5 Brigade. Communication broke down between the element leaders in the planning and execution of this operation. RADM Woodward was apprehensive about this operation due to its proximity to the enemy forces defending Port Stanley and described at as, “rather risky because you could see Bluff Cove from the church tower in Port Stanley.” RADM Woodward sent a message to COMO Clapp stating that there was going to be good flying weather the next day. However, in an attempt to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy, 5 Brigade conducted the ship to shore movement without air defense. The operation was scheduled to go during the hours of darkness; however, there was a problem with the stern gate of one of

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the transports, which delayed the ship to shore movement.\textsuperscript{14} This time delay resulted in a
daylight movement, which made the transports extremely vulnerable to air attack.

RADM Woodward did not know that the offload was not completed during the hours of
darkness until the Argentine aircraft attacked the vulnerable British ships and transports,
resulting in 50 British deaths. Perhaps, if the JTF commander had been in the area of
operation, he would have canceled the daylight transfer of troops from ship to shore
during pristine flying conditions in front of enemy troops or allocated adequate air
defense to support the movement.

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)**

The ROE were coming from the Minister of Defense in Whitehall via Northwood,
than on to the Task Force. On the interpretation of the ROE, RADM Woodward said, “I
had two senior commanders, in Barrow and Coward, who were basically reading them
entirely differently, and I reckoned they, and no doubt others, needed advice as to how
we were expected to behave during those vital first exchanges”\textsuperscript{15} Due to the vagueness
of the ROE, Admiral Woodward and his staff asked for clarification. The challenge was
the approximately six hour window line in order to receive a decision. “The correct,
formal process for any commander to alter his ROE is as follows: sit down and draft a
written encrypted signal, in hard copy, with the strategic and tactical situation. It would
then be forwarded up from the officer of the day at Northwood to Prime Minister
Thatcher, who was the approval authority for changing ROE.”\textsuperscript{16} This process for
clarification and changing ROE did not properly utilize time which forced RADM

\textsuperscript{14} Commander Angus Ross, Royal Navy retired, interview with the author, October 2007.
\textsuperscript{15} Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 107.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, pp 153-154.
Woodward to make a bold decision on the engagement of the Argentine Cruiser, *General Belgrano*.

The British Task Force perceived that the Argentine Navy was conducting a double pincer movement on the British Task Force using two task forces: (1) led by the carrier *Veintecinco de Mayo* and her five escort ships and (2) on the other pincer, the *General Belgrano* and her two destroyers. Of significance was the destroyers were armed with Exocet missiles. The ROE stated that the British Task Force would engage any Argentine forces inside the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) which was 200 miles around the Falklands; however it did not address engaging Argentine ships outside the TEZ. RADM Woodward did not want to lose contact with the *General Belgrano* and wait until the British Task Force was between both of the Argentine battle groups. In order to prevent delays in trying to get the ROE changed in a timely manner, RADM Woodward gave permission for the British nuclear submarine, *Conqueror* to engage the *Belgrano* Battle Group. He sent the message via satellite to Northwood knowing that it would get their attention because he was doing something unauthorized in changing the ROE. An immediate reply came from Northwood, which postponed the order but got the right senior officer on the radio, who eventually gave permission. This risky move got the attention of Northwood, who concluded that there was a problem with the ROE approval process. The loss of time and the bureaucratic challenge associated with C2 over such a distance could have been avoided if the senior commander had been on station.

**UNITY OF COMMAND & THE COMMANDER**

Two key elements in harmonizing order and creating tempo in battle is to have unity of command and clear communications. Commanders should command from
where they can best influence the action as well as develop the best appreciation and understanding of the situation and environment. According to NDP 6, “a naval force should operate under the insight, vision, and direction of a single commander. In this way one commander sets objectives for his forces, has the authority to plan and direct operations, and organizes his forces to fit the mission, exercises command through a chain of command, and ensures there are clear procedures in place for succession of command.”\textsuperscript{17} Trying to command a joint force from over 7,000 miles and in a different time zone did not promote unity of command.

Implicit communication is a key aspect of unity of command. In order to have implicit communication, a leader must have experience in that area. This was not the case in the assignment of RADM Woodward to the Task Force. Since RADM Woodward was at sea, Admiral Fieldhouse, a fellow submariner, assigned the task force to him, vice the newly assigned Flag Officer Carrier and Amphibs (FOCAS). This assignment of Admiral Woodward upset many naval surface officers who knew the FOCAS was a better man for the job based on his experience. In his book, One Hundred Days, the Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, RADM Woodward told his Royal Marine liaison officer, Colonel Richard Preston, “Like many naval officers, I have a preconceived idea, based on a profound ignorance of their problems that land forces will take forever to do anything, given half a chance. The history of amphibious warfare has too often been one of misunderstanding between the land and sea forces, with consequent delay.”\textsuperscript{18} RADM Woodward’s comments and his lack of experience with carriers, amphibious shipping, and ground forces did not promote a strong understanding

\textsuperscript{17} Naval Doctrinal Publication 6 (NDP 6) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1995). 53.
\textsuperscript{18} Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp85-86.
and confidence in his subordinates and sister services. In addition, numerous units in 5 Brigade were ceremonial forces; they had not operated as a joint force.

**MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION & THE COMMANDER**

The Falklands Campaign is a good case study to analyze information flow both up and down the chain of command because this war saw a major increase in technological advances. Technology often increases the speed at which information can be transmitted; however, too much unprocessed information can overwhelm a commander and his staff. Due to British NATO priorities, there was only minimal knowledge in the service about the Falkland Islands. The British Task Force was also trying to gain as much information about the Argentine Military as possible in order to reduce uncertainty. In addition, the command architecture and the location of the JFC also contributed to an increase in the information flow. RADM Woodward addressed the issue of dealing with large amounts of information as he was sailing toward the Falklands, “as you can imagine, the volume of information now beginning to pour in was very considerable.”

Furthermore, there was pressure to fulfill media requirements, as well as keeping, higher headquarters informed back in Northwood. The U.S. Navy conducted a summary report in 1983 on the *Lessons of the Falklands* and identified the same challenges, “Despite the importance of such traffic, it can overload the on-scene commander and his staff.”

This challenge has been addressed in chapter two and three, NDP 6 under Role of Information. Over 50% of this doctrinal publication addresses the relevance, accuracy, and confidence in his subordinates and sister services. In addition, numerous units in 5 Brigade were ceremonial forces; they had not operated as a joint force.

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timeliness, usability, completeness, precision of the information, and most importantly how to manage it so that the commander can make a timely decision.

**THE FUTURE OF U.S. NAVY DOCTRINE**

At the conclusion of the Falkland Islands Campaign, the British reviewed their doctrine and applied the lessons learned into their future doctrine. In addition, they established a standing headquarters in order to respond to a crisis such as the Falklands. Very similar to the action taken by the British after the Falkland’s Campaign, the U.S. Navy is taking action, following the Cold War. The U.S. Navy is currently rewriting their doctrinal publications in order to ensure they are aligned with joint publications, and to address the C2 of the navy operating at the operational level of war. The U.S. Navy is facing C2 challenges very similar to the British experience during the Falklands. Doctrine is addressing issues such as establishing simplicity in command structure, management of information and trying to determine the best location for the commander so he can exercise C2.

**FUTURE OF U.S. NAVY C2 DOCTRINE**

The U.S. Naval Warfare Development Command has been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to update NDP 1, Naval Warfare, and to incorporate all the other NDPs into it. The new NDP 1 will be a Capstone doctrinal publication. According to Captain Edward Long, USN (Ret), Maritime Doctrine Analyst, who is one of the lead writers for this document, “the old NDP 1 was still written with a Cold War mentality, focused on the Soviet Union. The new NDP 1 will emphasize irregular warfare as well as maintaining the traditional focus. It will also spell out the U.S. Navy’s role in the
Global War on Terror (GWOT).” The four Falkland lessons learned discussed in this paper: the need for simplicity in command structure, the best location for the commander and the need for unity of command/effort and the means to manage information will be carried forward into the new capstone doctrinal publication.

Furthermore, in order to reduce seams and misunderstanding and to promote unity of effort, this publication is to be signed by both the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).

**SIMPLIFY THE C2 STRUCTURE & THE MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION**

Since the end of World War II, the various U.S. fleet and major naval headquarters have evolved into their own unique composition, no two headquarters are the same. This is due to the different Areas of Responsibility (AOR), potential enemies in the AOR, and relationships with coalition partners. The U.S. Navy is experimenting with forming a standing headquarters at each of the numbered fleets and naval force headquarters which will be called the Maritime Operations Center (MOC). The purpose of the MOC is to standardize the way the staffs at both the numbered fleets and the major naval headquarters are organized and function, in order to simplify the command structure, manage information, promote unity of effort, and reduce the seams between the different headquarters. The plan is for the MOC to serve as the core staff for either a Joint Task Force (JTF), a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), or a naval component commander. The Naval Warfare Development Command is producing a Naval Tactics Techniques and Procedures (NTTP) publication titled *Maritime Headquarters* (MHQ). The purpose of this document is to spell out the organization,
operational procedures, management of information, wiring diagrams for a JTF, JFMCC, or naval component headquarters for the MOC. The NTTP will tie the tactical to the operational level of war at the MOC. As of late September 2007, General Dynamics has been awarded a contract to produce a new document entitled NDP 32. It is to be titled *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level*. According to Captain Long, NDP 32 will focus on the Navy and the Marine Corps at the operational level of war. It will provide the overarching concepts of how a maritime force responds to a crisis from building the force structure required to relationships. The NDP 32 is supposed to link the operational level of war to the strategic.23

**LOCATION OF THE COMMANDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

There is an ongoing discussion within the U.S. Navy as to the appropriate location of the commander on the battlefield especially at the operational level of war. It has been accelerated by the introduction of the MOC. According to Mr. Mark Warner, the Deputy Director for Naval Doctrine on the location of the commander, “There are always technology guys who say you can command and control from the rear because of the multiple systems and countering them are those naval officers who are emphasizing being afloat using mission type orders and commander’s intent.”24 This is a controversial issue because of the number and types of systems that are required to conduct C2 at the operational level are not found on current Navy shipping.

**COUNTER-ARGUEMENT**

Some may say the U.S. Navy is flawed in looking at the Falklands Campaign because of the following: (1) it occurred 25 years ago, (2) the Royal Navy and Marines

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24 Mr. Mark Werner, interview with the author, September 2007.
are no size comparison in relation to U.S. forces, and (3) Great Britain was not fighting a formidable foe.

In contrast, the U.S. Navy took advantage of the lessons learned from the Falklands Campaign because it was the most modern conflict where a country with a similar military culture, weapons, and technological capabilities employed its navy and Marines over great distances and won. The C2 challenges of this conflict are still valid today and for the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATION

The joint British Naval command structure during the Falklands Campaign was flawed. If the Argentines had coordinated their attack with their air, submarines, and surface navy, against the British Carriers, the result of the war might have been different. The British learned many lessons and applied them to their doctrine and structure. The U.S. Navy took advantage of the C2 lessons learned from this modern war and incorporated them in NDP 6, which was signed by both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations. NDP 6 was not a timely document. It was written in 1995 with a Cold War focus, six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has taken the U.S. Navy over ten years and the events of September 11, 2001 to begin writing a new C2 doctrinal publication.

The U.S. Navy is currently moving in the right direction in the 21st Century with the creation of the MOC, NTTP for the MOC, and NDP 32. The British C2 lessons learned: the need for simplicity in command structure, the best location for the commander, the need for unity of command/effort and the means to manage information are being considered in the production of the new U.S. Navy doctrinal publications and
the development of the MOC. In addition, the new NDP 1 should serve as the operational catalyst that the U.S. Navy needs in order to think and operate at the operational level of war.

The senior leadership of the U.S. Navy will then be faced with the decision to either hold subordinates and the institution accountable to the doctrine or just operate as if the new doctrinal publications do not exist. The answer is simple. The U.S. Navy needs to take these new shiny doctrinal publications and use them as source documents. The U.S. Navy must teach the doctrine to their sailors, both officer and enlisted. The doctrine needs to be part of their respective school curriculum, similar to the U.S. Marines and their doctrinal publications. Navy culture will have to embrace the new doctrinal publications so they can fight as part of a joint force at the operational level of war or stand as a core headquarters in order to control the sea in the 21st Century.
Attachment 1
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UNPUBLISHED INTERVIEWS


MAPS