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The principles of war have been a major part of the foundation for Joint Doctrine since its inception, and a broadening range of military operations has resulted in their evolution into the “principles of joint operations.” The range of domestic response roles for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and partner agencies has similarly grown. Considerations of natural and accidental disasters are now coupled with preparedness requirements for intentional and mass-destruction events. In the post-Hurricane Katrina revision to the National Response Plan, DHS has drafted a simpler National Response Framework. This document presents a set of principles titled “five key principles of response operations” that are defined as the doctrine of response operations, bringing new terminology and concepts to the domestic response community. A comparison of the twelve principles of joint operations and the five key principles of response operations reveals that while their number and titles are dissimilar, there are substantive similarities between the underlying meaning of the two sets.

Due to this similarity, the Joint Force Commander is well served by many of the principles of joint operations provided they are viewed through a proper domestic response perspective, with only a few that should be completely set aside. Suggestions are provided for DHS finalization of the Framework to make the key principles of response operations more clear and singular in focus. Furthermore, any effort to bring the concept of doctrine into domestic incident management should consider getting broad buy-in to use doctrinal concepts to unite the Framework and other related efforts such as the National Incident Management System and Preparedness Goals, rather than have it as a small element of the Framework.

Principles at the end of the ROMO: A comparison of the Principles of Joint Operations to those of domestic incident response

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________

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Abstract

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The principles of war have been a major part of the foundation for Joint Doctrine since its inception, and a broadening range of military operations has resulted in their evolution into the “principles of joint operations.” The range of domestic response roles for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and partner agencies has similarly grown. Considerations of natural and accidental disasters are now coupled with preparedness requirements for intentional and mass-destruction events. In the post-Hurricane Katrina revision to the National Response Plan, DHS has drafted a simpler National Response Framework. This document presents a set of principles titled “five key principles of response operations” that are defined as the doctrine of response operations, bringing new terminology and concepts to the domestic response community. A comparison of the twelve principles of joint operations and the five key principles of response operations reveals that while their number and titles are dissimilar, there are substantive similarities between the underlying meaning of the two sets. Due to this similarity, the Joint Force Commander is well served by many of the principles of joint operations provided they are viewed through a proper domestic response perspective, with only a few that should be completely set aside. Suggestions are provided for DHS finalization of the Framework to make the key principles of response operations more clear and singular in focus. Furthermore, any effort to bring the concept of doctrine into domestic incident management should consider getting broad buy-in to use doctrinal concepts to unite the Framework and other related efforts such as the National Incident Management System and Preparedness Goals, rather than have it as a small element of the Framework.
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Introduction

Merriam Webster indicates that a principle is “a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption.”¹ The quest for underlying fundamentals to explain countless mysteries surely extends back to the earliest times of human sapience. Given the impact and import of war in human history, the pursuit of underlying principles of war has garnered much attention, etched into history as large collections of aphorisms in the writings of Sun Tzu in 490 B.C. and more recently evolving into a concise, titled set of principles of war.²

Joint Publication 1, the capstone publication and the bridge between policy and doctrine for the U.S. military, identifies the role of 12 broad principles known as “principles of joint operations” as a foundational element of joint doctrine. This doctrine provides the “common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best).”³ These principles of joint operations clearly have a significant place supporting a broad array of joint doctrine and the subsequent planning, training, and conduct of military operations.

Other elements of our government carry out intensive, inter-agency, direct operations that are comparable to some of those conducted by the military in its broad mission set, notably the federal response role in all-hazards incidents that exceed local and state capabilities, such as response to hurricanes, earthquakes, or terrorist attacks. With a recent proposed update to the overarching national plan, concepts of doctrine and principles have been introduced to this domestic response discipline.

Domestic incident response, particularly at the scale requiring federal assistance, has been guided by the National Response Plan, of which DOD is one of 32 signatory departments and agencies. This plan was developed following the terrorist attacks on 11
September 2001 (9/11) to “establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.” DOD implements its supporting role to the NRP under the mission of Civil Support, as described in the so-titled Joint Publication.

While the National Response Plan arose from the 9/11 terrorist attack response, Hurricane Katrina served as the impetus for a re-titled replacement National Response Framework (NRF), currently in a draft undergoing national review. The new name is significant, as it recognized that the NRP was not a plan, just as military doctrine is not a plan. Additional changes provide a document more national in focus, with greater emphasis on all parties (not just federal or government) involved in incident response, with less bureaucracy and duplication of details in other related documents. Additionally, the draft NRF strives for greater readability (or, in the draft NRF’s words, less “stylistically turgid”).

Concepts of doctrine and principles are new elements found in the draft NRF. The September 2007 draft has a new section identifying “key principles of response operations” that “comprise national response doctrine.” The draft NRF notes that doctrine influences the development of plans and policy, training and organization of forces, and the procurement of equipment. While the five key principles may appear intuitive to the domestic responder, their documentation as principles is new in domestic response guidance.

Comparing the principles of joint operations (hereinafter “joint principles”) with the key principles of response operations (hereinafter “response principles”) is of interest for several reasons. Previously clear jurisdictional lines are shifting. We no longer live in a world where the military can focus primarily on kinetic and decisive state-on-state warfare, nor can the domestic responder ignore threats of terrorist attacks, weapons of mass destruction, or
secondary devices. Even in natural disasters, breakdown of civil order may elevate risks and require associated force protection. Security concerns delayed search and rescue, utility restoration, and medical support in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina response. There should be some similarity in principles at the intersection of these two domains as well as overarching principles that apply across the wider spectrum of military and response operations.

A view of the overlap between military functions and the response functions under the NRP and the draft NRF is given in Figure 1, which shows where Civil Support falls on the Range of Military Operations, and what functions may be performed under Civil Support as described in Joint Publication 3-28. Some Civil Support functions will be performed under the umbrella of the draft NRF, while others may not if they are not conducted in the context of an incident response (such as designated law enforcement support, or other presidentially assigned activities). The Joint Force Commander’s consideration of military doctrine and the
underlying joint principles will be different based on the operational context given such a
broad range of military operations. This comparison of principles applies to the area of
component of the Civil Support mission conducted under the NRF shown in Figure 1, which
will be referred to as the domestic response context.

Furthermore, a potentially derivative relationship is implied by draft NRF wording
regarding principles as the foundation for response doctrine along with a footnote stating that
“the term ‘doctrine’ has clear and rich meaning as a guide to action within the military
services.”¹² Such a derivative application and modification of principles has been applied in
other fields, such as principles for international development proposed by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) administrator.¹³

Finally, as an agency of the U.S. Government, signatory to the former National
Response Plan¹⁴ and presumably an equivalent partner when the National Response
Framework is finalized, the Department of Defense will also operate under the response
principles when supporting Civil Authorities during domestic response. The Joint Force
Commander leading a domestic response mission should be cognizant of any substantive
differences in the fundamental principles underlying this mission set. Furthermore the
domestic responder may also benefit from lessons contained within the long history of the
joint principles.

Background

Evolution of the Principles of Joint Operations

The joint principles, contained in Joint Publication 3-0 – Joint Operations, are the
result of the union of principles from two sources: the long-standing principles of war
contained in Joint Doctrine since its inception,¹⁵ and the Principles of Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW). This change occurred in a unification of operational approach to military efforts across the Range of Military Operations that eliminated the MOOTW concept\textsuperscript{16}. The principles of war contributed the principles of objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity\textsuperscript{17}; the three additional principles of restraint, legitimacy, and perseverance were derived from experience with MOOTW\textsuperscript{18}.

The nine joint principles that derive from the principles of war have a long evolutionary history. In his “seminal work”\textsuperscript{19} on the principles of war, military historian John Alger follows the evolution of principles from the undefined and seemingly limitless collection of advice, axioms, or maxims from the early writings of Chinese General Sun Tzu in the 6\textsuperscript{th} century B.C. to the pre-Napoleonic Wars era, to the increasing defined and succinct set of principles in the analysis and digestion of the lessons of Napoleonic Wars.\textsuperscript{20} Alger credits Antoine Henri Jomini, a French General and prominent writer on the Napoleonic Wars, for the most profound contribution in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century to the “emergence and growing popularity that a small number of principles guide the commander in his quest for success on the battlefield.”\textsuperscript{21} U.S. Doctrine, in Field Service Regulations, first started reflecting principles similar to the principles of war in narrative form in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, with a titled list very similar to today appearing in 1921, greatly influenced by a similar list included in British field manuals the prior year.\textsuperscript{22}

The additional three principles derived from MOOTW experience were added to the principles of war as other principles to become the joint principles. The three had been introduced in Army Operations manual in 1993, and had been incorporated into joint doctrine soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{23} Four main differences of MOOTW accounted for their emergence: focus
on promotion of peace and deterring war, sensitivity of political considerations, more restrictive rules of engagement, and adherence to a hierarchy of national objectives.\textsuperscript{24}

The step of combining principles was a result of the elimination of the division of military operations into \textit{war} and \textit{other than war}, as the Joint Doctrine Development Community realized that this separation had outlived its usefulness.\textsuperscript{25} Work progressed to fuse these into “a single set of principles—based on war as it is, not as it was—that serves as the basis for the training and education of our warrior leaders and upon which we base our conduct of war across the range of military operations.”\textsuperscript{26} Table 1 shows how the war and MOOTW principles were combined to form the joint principles. Elements of each principle will be address in the below analysis, with full detail in Appendix A.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Principles of War\textsuperscript{28} & Principles of MOOTW\textsuperscript{29} & Principles of Joint Operations\textsuperscript{30} \\
\hline
Objective & Objective & Objective \\
Offensive & Offensive & \\
Mass & Mass & \\
Economy of Force & Economy of Force & \\
Maneuver & Maneuver & \\
Unity of Command & Unity of effort & Unity of Command \\
Security & Security & \\
Surprise & Surprise & \\
Simplicity & Simplicity & \\
Restraint & Restraint & \\
Perseverance & Perseverance & \\
Legitimacy & Legitimacy & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Evolution of the principles of joint operations}
\end{table}

The extensive study and frequent debate regarding the principles of joint operations is an interesting backdrop and possible benchmark for a newly published set of principles, the key principles of response operations ("principles of response") from the draft \textit{NRF}.

\textbf{Principles of Response: Emergence and Debate}

A discrete set of principles are listed in the recently drafted \textit{National Response Framework (NRF)}, released in a public draft on 10 September 2007. The draft \textit{NRF} indicates
that “Five elemental principles of operations animate incident response actions in support of
the nation’s response mission. Taken together, these five principles of operation constitute
national response doctrine.” The five key principles in the NRF are detailed in Appendix B.
The titles are engaged partnership; tiered response; scalable, flexible and adaptable
operational capabilities; unity of effort through unified command; and readiness to act.

The response principles are not directly derived from the National Response Plan or
other predecessor documents to the NRF; in fact, with the exception of “unified command,”
none of these other phrases appear even once within the 426 page document. Information
from the writing team of the NRF indicates that the response principles are based on very
senior agency input to the NRP/NRF rewrite process.

While the joint principles have been the subject of extensive academic and commu-
nity dialogue and critical study, the response principles are gaining this first assessment in
the public comment period of the NRF running from 11 September to 22 October 2007. The
public docket provides a community perspective on the principles. Although there are nu-
merous comments on the NRF as a whole in what is reportedly one of the largest in FEMA
history, the number of comments regarding the response principles section is more limited,
with only a small number speaking to the response principles as a whole.

The docket, reviewed following the October 22 closure date, contained input from
143 commenters, resulting in nearly 2,500 line-item comments on the document. To
evaluate input on the response principles, these comments were filtered to only those
regarding the relevant pages of the NRF (pp 8-11) or those containing relevant keywords
(doctrine, principle, engaged, tier, flex, unity, readiness). While filtered data still contained
132 comments, most of these addressed minor points regarding style, wording, references,
and similar issues. 37 comments fell in a middle ground for significance, with aspects of the principles narrative drawing repeated comment: a statement about DOD working only within the military chain of command raised concern for unity of effort (10 comments), a statement indicating unified command is required in multi-jurisdictional incidents (6 comments), the implication in readiness to act that responders may act without dispatch or coordination (4 comments), and a statement in readiness to act that responders act on instinct (4 comments).37

Only nine comments addressed the response principles section in a holistic manner. Of these, four indicated that the wording and meaning must be clarified, including better definition of the purpose of the response principles section, two praised the response principles, and were three critical of the principles section as it introduced new vaguely defined concepts or did not reflect the collaborative input of partners.

While there were no apparent comments suggesting additions or deletions to the five response principles, there were comments that might be used to justify a safety & security principle (13 comments advocated for a more significant focus on safety in the NRF) and a simplicity principle (3 comments spoke to the overall need to simplify the NRF and related documents).38 While no comments spoke to the need for a principle of objective, despite its role as a fundamental component of the National Incident Management System39 its presence as the first joint principle, and the well-known management-by-objectives axiom of “begin with the end in mind.”

Provided DHS can resolve the large number of independently minor detailed wording suggestions, the substantial comments regarding the response principles that call for major change are limited and should be feasible to address in finalizing the plan. However, overall community view of the appearance of response principles in this document may be tarnished
by its association with the draft document itself, which has been fairly controversial largely because of process and terminology as can be seen in the docket submissions, press reports, editorials, and congressional concern.

Because the longevity of the joint principles and use of them as a basis for doctrine, it is reasonable to believe that there would be similar benefits in identifying and articulating the underlying principles for domestic response. An analysis of the similarities and differences between the Response and Joint principles may reveal differences worth considering in addition to comments submitted to the docket as the NRF is finalized.

**Analysis: Comparing the Principles**

Table 2 presents the results of a comparative analysis of the two sets of principles, and is followed by reasoning for the noted linkages. Because the descriptive wording following the titles of several of the response principles contains multiple concepts, the third column in Table 2 identifies comparison based on the contents of the descriptive narrative, even when the title of this response principle may not reveal this concept. In this analysis, a comparison that may be reasonably derived from the title (such as a comparison between the unity of command and unity of effort through unified command) is referred to as a “title level” comparison. A comparison drawn from the narrative wording not implied by the title is referred to as a “narrative level” comparison (such as the comparison between objective and engaged partnership). Additionally, the table identifies the closest relationships in bold.

The following paragraphs explain the relationships shown in Table 2. Joint principles are listed and summarized, and the comparable response principles are presented with italicized emphasis of key words from their descriptive narrative. All comparisons are made from the domestic response perspective, wherein there is generally a reduced threat of attack.
or sentient response by the enemy. Although secondary attacks or devices are possible in a terrorist attack, the NRF-based domestic response comparison in this paper does not envision a battle with an enemy in the traditional military sense. All emphasis in the following section is the author’s for purpose of highlighting similarity between principles.

Table 2. Comparisons between Joint Principles and Response Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Engaged partnership, and unity of effort through unified command</td>
<td>Tiered response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>Readiness to act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy of Force</td>
<td>Scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maneuver</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unity of Command</td>
<td>Unity of effort through unified command</td>
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<td>Security</td>
<td>Readiness to act</td>
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<td>Restraint</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perseverance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Tiered response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bold text indicates stronger alignment between Joint and Response Principles.

Objective: While the titles of the five principles that constitute response doctrine do not appear to contain the joint principle of objective, readers of the text of the response principles will discover that the concept of objective is included indirectly through the definition of these two other principles. This joint principle speaks to ensuring all military operations have “a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal,” which does not need to be military or destructive in nature. The expectation of change of objective over time, and requirement to maintain alignment with political objectives are noted. The concept of objective is contained within the narrative of response principle of engaged partnership and unity of effort through unified command. The engaged partnership text indicates that “leaders at all levels must communicate and actively support engaged partnerships to develop shared
goals…” The description of the unity of effort through unified command principle incorporates the concept of objective first by noting that “Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives.” The description goes on to state “The [National Incident Management System] identifies multiple elements of unified command in support of incident response. These elements include (1) developing a single set of objectives…”

**Offensive:** Concepts embodied within the joint principle of offensive are directly related to those in the readiness to act response principle, a relation that can be anticipated by similarity in the titles of these principles. Joint doctrine indicates that “the purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” It is further described as supporting the objective, maintaining freedom of action, and achieving decisive results. Defensive actions are discouraged, noting the need to seize or re-seize initiative. The comparable response principle of readiness to act encompasses similar concepts. It notes that at all levels, “national response depends on the instinct and ability to act.” “To save lives and protect property, decisive action on-scene is often required of emergency responders.” While much of the rest of this response principle is focused on safety and addressing risks, the concepts of initiative and decisive actions are clearly comparable in these two principles.

The concept of the joint principle of offensive is reflected in the narrative description of the response principles of tiered response and engaged partnership. Tiered response notes that “It is not necessary that each level of become overwhelmed, or fail, prior to surging resources from another level. Just the contrary, a tiered response will also be a forward-leaning response…” During large-scale events, all levels will take proactive actions to
respond, *anticipating resources* that may be required.48 This element in the response
principles most resembles the exhortation in the joint principle of offensive against adopting
a defensive posture. Proactive anticipatory action avoids entry into a reactive mode of
responding to failures by other tiers as they occur, a situation analogous to a defensive
posture in domestic response.

**Mass:** The joint principle of mass, if broadly interpreted, could be compared to the
response principle of scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities, although the
alignment is not strong. Joint doctrine states that “the purpose of mass is to concentrate the
effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive
results.” The importance of massing effects, not concentrating forces is emphasized.49 The
response principle of scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities allows for a
“rapid *surge of resources* from all levels of government.”50 This response principle clearly
envisions application of the correct, not necessarily the maximum or consolidated, capability.
Given the absence in most domestic response situations of an enemy center of gravity upon
which to focus mass, it could be interpreted as scaling and applying appropriate resources in
the domestic response context, although this view requires creative interpretation.

**Economy of Force:** Similar to mass, the economy of force can be loosely associated
with the response principle of scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities. Joint
document definition of economy of force recommends allocating “minimum essential combat
power to secondary efforts… to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.”51
While preservation of capability for a hypothetical decisive point in domestic response
operations is not seen as a reason for economizing force, resources rapidly surged under the
response principle of scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities will be “appropriately scaled to need.”

Unity of Command: There is close alignment between the joint principle of unity of command and the unity of effort through unified command response principle. The joint principle states “the purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort.” It is further recognized that in multinational and interagency operations, “unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.” The response principle similarly notes that “Effective unified command is indispensable… Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives.”

Rather than push for unity of command that is infeasible in most multijurisdictional domestic incidents, a specific time-tested command and control structure called unified command is used to achieve unity of effort while retaining agency jurisdiction and oversight.

Security: While the joint principle of security is largely about preventing enemy advantage and attack, it also notes that “Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces… Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution.” While there is no apparent title-level comparison to readiness to act, the narrative of this response principle reveals that a third of the description is devoted to safety and risk management: “Effective incident response requires readiness to act balanced with an understanding of risk… Although some risk may be unavoidable, first responders can effectively anticipate and manage risk through proper training and planning.” Both sets of principles speak to protecting forces by balancing risks, with wording reflecting differences in typical risks.
Legitimacy: The joint principle of legitimacy speaks to the legality, morality, and rightness of actions, as well as sustaining the legitimacy of the host government. There is narrative-level comparison to the response principle of tiered response. Fortunately, in domestic response actions, the legitimacy of our multiple government levels to intervene domestically in response to an incident is not seriously questioned; more likely the lack of intervention will receive attention. Concerns do arise regarding how different levels of government become involved. The continued recognition of the primacy of our federal system of government is apparent in the narrative of tiered response: “Most incidents begin and end locally and are wholly managed at the community level… some require additional support from neighboring communities or the state. A few require federal support. National response protocols recognize this and are structured to provide additional, tiered levels of support when there is a need for, and ability to supply, additional resources or capabilities…”58 The tiered response principle helps to ensure that appropriate tiers of government are involved based on the scale of the event and local needs. While this approach may seem self-evident, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the question of when DOD might assume overall disaster leadership was a recommended step by the White House,59 a proposal that caused consternation among civilian emergency management practitioners as it was felt that this could easily disrupt the appropriate respect for scale and sovereignty issues.60 As previously noted the docket contained a collective 14 concerned comments addressing DOD operation outside unified command and the potential for self-dispatch.

Maneuver, Surprise, Simplicity, Restraint, and Perseverance: These four joint principles have no analogous response principles. Maneuver in joint doctrine has the purpose of keeping the enemy off-balance and at a disadvantage through movement and flexible
application of power. Surprise allows the commander to shift the power balance by striking an unprepared enemy. Simplicity aids operational success by keeping plans and orders simple and concise. Restraint limits collateral damage and erosion of support from excessive force. Perseverance seeks the long-term commitment required to achieve the strategic end state. While several of these principles are related to the sentient enemy factor typically not a major concern in domestic response, the possible added benefit of some, like simplicity, is described in below in recommendations for the domestic responder.

Conclusions

Recommendations for the Joint Force Commander

While a Joint Force Commander responding in a domestic response context will not necessarily strive to apply all joint operations principles, the cultural impact of these principles is likely to resonate as they underlie the training, equipping, and outfitting of our forces. Fortunately, there are numerous fundamental similarities between the joint principles and the response principles when properly interpreted in the context of a domestic response operation. Elements of the joint principles of offensive, mass, economy of force, and unity of command can be found within the response principles and can be effectively applied. Objective, while not called out as a response principle title, is clearly a concept contained within the narrative of two of the response principles. Finally, the principle of legitimacy could be interpreted, assuming legitimate governments at all levels in the U.S., to mean that appropriate constraints on DOD operations in a domestic environment are followed to stay within this legitimacy assumption.

The remaining joint principles of simplicity, restraint, perseverance, maneuver, surprise, and security are not apparent within the response principles, and intuitive adherence
to these principles may be beneficial, neutral, or detrimental to the response depending on the situation. Joint Force Commanders should consider whether the application of these principles, conscious or unconscious, benefits the response effort. Some of the principles are likely to serve the Joint Force Commander well in nearly any situation, such as simplicity. Restraint will be important in domestic response operations in situations where force may be warranted, given the involvement of U.S. citizens and *posse comitatus* limitations; the Standing Rules for the Use of Force For U.S. Forces are included in Civil Support doctrine and emphasize that force should normally be a measure of last resort and should be the minimum necessary. The need for perseverance will often be reduced in domestic operations, as DOD is normally provides a capability of last resort, filling gaps that cannot be provided by states or other federal agencies until this gap can be filled. Maneuver, absent enemy action, will likely be unnecessary.

Actions under the principle of security that protect the forces to ensure continued capability is beneficial, although may not be required. Force protection actions such as safety considerations from hazardous materials and dangerous situations may play a more significant role as opposed to security from the enemy. In situations where coordination with other response players is beneficial to common objectives, operational security considerations must be balanced against the impacts on information sharing and coordinated efforts.

In most domestic response missions, where the DOD is providing a capability requested by other civilian responders and is not acting against an enemy, the joint principle of surprise will likely be counterproductive.

Overall, there is enough similarity between the joint principles and the response principles that an experienced Joint Force Commander will find commonality between the
spirit of the joint and response principles, and will likely be served well if inculcated principles are appropriately interpreted and put into practice given the domestic response context. The Joint Force Commander supporting domestic response is well served by many of the joint principles (objective, offensive, economy of force, unity of effort, legitimacy, simplicity, restraint and properly applied mass and security) even when operating at the end of the ROMO spectrum furthest from war.

**Recommendations for the domestic responder**

The implications for the domestic responder and plan writers are more significant, although not the primary focus of this comparison. The inclusion of the concept of doctrine, largely new to this community, is a significant shift in the emergency management paradigm. More and earlier strategic communication on how and why this and other changes are occurring may have reduced the protest. Doctrine, if continued as a concept, should seek to encompass not only response, but also knit together prevention, protection, and preparedness. To be effective, the foundation of response doctrine must be placed at a higher-level than a single-page element of the *NRF*, exclusive of response-related mission areas.

If the concept of response doctrine and response principles endure through the critical comments regarding the entire *NRF*, the principles themselves are worthy of attention. It is positive that the principles have alignment with several of the time-tested joint principles, provided these are viewed with the proper mindset. However, while the joint principles are singular in focus, several response principles include secondary and sometimes completely unrelated concepts in narrative (e.g., preparedness in engaged partnership, safety in readiness to act, objective in engaged partnership and unity of effort). Three additional principles
objective, simplicity, and safety & security warrant consideration based on analysis of the elements of the five principles combined with common themes from the NRF docket.

Simple and direct terminology will be more enduring as principles compared to the trendy catchphrases used to title the response objectives. Unity of effort should replace unity of effort through unified command. Flexible capabilities (or simply flexibility) is preferable to scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities. Further detail should be addressed in the narrative that could be updated to changing conditions as warranted.

If concepts of doctrine are advanced, appropriate capstone and subordinate doctrine could be used to address other components in the realm of incident management, such as prevention, protection, and preparedness that are awkward fits in a this response framework.

In sum, while the response principles with some minor modifications are a sound basis for response doctrine, if the Department of Homeland Security wishes to adopt doctrine as a bridge between existing plans, systems, frameworks, and guidance and strategy, a broader effort must take place beyond the four-page presentation of doctrine and principles in the introduction of the draft NRF. Adoption, with appropriate adjustments, of a fraction of the effort DOD invests into joint and service doctrine could conceivably expand this bridge to incident preparedness and response partners and stakeholders beyond just the NRF and provide the nation with this overarching set of fundamental guidance.
Appendices

Appendix A: Principles of Joint Operations


SECTION A. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

1. Objective
   a. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.
   b. The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support attainment of the overall political goals of the conflict. This frequently involves the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and their will to fight. The objective of joint operations not involving this destruction might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).
   c. Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation itself changes. The JFC should anticipate these shifts in political goals necessitating changes in the military objectives. The changes may be very subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives may no longer support the political goals, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

2. Offensive
   a. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
   b. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to achieve a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.
   c. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

3. Mass
   a. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.
   b. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to produce decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

4. Economy of Force
   a. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
   b. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

5. Maneuver
a. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
b. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

6. Unity of Command
   a. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
   b. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command.

7. Security
   a. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.
   b. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

8. Surprise
   a. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.
   b. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

9. Simplicity
   a. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
   b. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in multinational operations.

SECTION B. OTHER PRINCIPLES

10. Restraint
    a. The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.
    b. A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military operations, and the national strategic end state. For example, the exposure of intelligence gathering activities (e.g., interrogation of detainees and prisoners of war) could have significant political and military repercussions and therefore should be conducted with sound judgment. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.
c. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel are properly trained including knowing and understanding ROE and are quickly informed of any changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and/or national embarrassment. ROE in some operations may be more restrictive and detailed when compared to ROE for large-scale combat in order to address national policy concerns, but should always be consistent with the inherent right of self-defense. ROE should be unclassified, if possible, and widely disseminated. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in joint operations are not needlessly endangered. In multinational operations, use of force may be influenced by coalition or allied force ROE. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure an understanding of ROE and influence changes as appropriate. Since the domestic law of some nations may be more restrictive concerning the use of force than permitted under coalition or allied force ROE, commanders must be aware of national restrictions imposed on force participants.

11. Perseverance
   a. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.
   b. Prepare for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of the national strategic end state. Some joint operations may require years to reach the termination criteria. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. This will frequently involve diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

12. Legitimacy
   a. The purpose of legitimacy is to develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.
   b. Legitimacy is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of the actions undertaken. Legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. Interested audiences may include the foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and the participating forces.
   c. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. Security actions must be balanced with legitimacy concerns. All actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic and tactical requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy.
   d. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a local government through the perception of the populace that it governs. Humanitarian and civil military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the supported government. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate. During operations in an area where a legitimate government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.
Appendix B: Key Principles of Response Operations from NRF


ENGAGED PARTNERSHIP

Leaders at all levels must communicate and actively support engaged partnerships to develop shared goals and align capabilities so that none allows the other to be overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities at Federal, State and local levels allow for planning together in times of calm and responding together effectively in times of need. This doctrine includes ongoing communication of incident activity among all partners to the Framework, and shared situational awareness for a more rapid response. The war on terror in our era requires a heightened state of readiness and nimble, practiced capabilities baked into the heart of our preparedness and response planning.

Preparedness and planning are essential to nurturing engaged partnership. Effective incident response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted well in advance of an incident. Preparedness involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising and organizing in order to build, sustain and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the personnel, training and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident.

Preparedness activities should be coordinated among all involved agencies within the jurisdiction, as well as across jurisdictions. Integrated planning, described later in this Framework, will assist in identifying gaps in capability and developing mitigation strategies to fill those gaps.

To support national preparedness, DHS has published the National Preparedness Guidelines. This document lays out 15 National Planning Scenarios that form the basis of the newly-coordinated national exercise schedule and priorities, and it identifies 37 core capabilities that are needed to support incident response across the nation. The Guidelines identify core community and State capabilities that will be supported by the DHS homeland security grant programs.

TIERED RESPONSE

Incidents must be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional response capabilities when needed. It is not necessary that each level become overwhelmed, or fail, prior to surging resources from another level. Just the contrary, a tiered response will also be a forward-leaning response.

Most incidents begin and end locally and are wholly managed at the community level. Many incidents require additional resources or support from across the community, and some require additional support from neighboring communities or the State. A few require Federal support. National response protocols recognize this and are structured to provide additional, tiered levels of support when there is a need for additional resources or capabilities to support and sustain the response and initial recovery. During large-scale events, all levels will take proactive actions to respond, anticipating resources that may be required.

SCALABLE, FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTABLE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

As incidents change in size, scope and complexity, the response must adapt to meet requirements. The number, type and sources of resources must be able to expand rapidly to meet needs associated with a given incident. The Framework’s disciplined and coordinated process can provide for rapid surge of resources from all levels of government, appropriately scaled to need. While pre-staged, planned and exercised to meet the full range of emergency management scenarios from small to severe, execution must be flexible and adapted to fit each individual incident. For the duration of a response, and as needs grow and change, responders must remain nimble and adaptable. Equally, the overall response should be flexible as it transitions from the response effort to recovery.
This Framework is grounded in doctrine that demands a tested inventory of common organizational structures and capabilities that are scalable, flexible and adaptable for diverse operations. Its adoption across all levels of government and with businesses and NGOs will facilitate interoperability and improve operational coordination.

**UNITY OF EFFORT THROUGH UNIFIED COMMAND**

Effective unified command is indispensable to all incident response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization. Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common objectives.

Unified command is an important element across multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incident management activities. It provides a structure to enable agencies with different legal, geographic and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan and interact effectively. As a team effort, unified command allows all agencies with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for the incident to provide joint support through mutually developed incident objectives and strategies established at the command level. Each participating agency maintains its own authority, responsibility and accountability. This Framework employs the NIMS structures and tools that enable unified command to be effective in incident management.

Concepts of “command” and “unity of command” have distinct legal and cultural meanings for military forces and military operations. For military forces, command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of the combatant command to the Department of Defense (DOD) on-scene commander. The “unified command” concept is distinct from the military chain of command. And, as such, military forces do not operate under the command of the Incident Commander or under the unified command structure. Nonetheless, the DOD is a full partner in the Federal response to domestic incidents and their response is fully coordinated through the mechanisms of this Framework.

The NIMS identifies multiple elements of unified command in support of incident response. These elements include: (1) developing a single set of objectives; (2) using a collective, strategic approach; (3) improving information flow and coordination; (4) creating common understanding of joint priorities and restrictions; (5) ensuring that no agency’s legal authorities are compromised or neglected; and (6) optimizing the combined efforts of all agencies under a single plan.

**READINESS TO ACT**

Effective incident response requires readiness to act balanced with an understanding of risk. From individuals, families and communities to local, State and Federal agencies, national response depends on the instinct and ability to act. A forward-leaning posture is imperative for incidents that have the potential to expand rapidly in size, scope or complexity, and for no-notice events.

Once response activities have begun, on-scene initiative based on NIMS principles is encouraged and rewarded. To save lives and protect property, decisive action on-scene is often required of emergency responders. Although some risk may be unavoidable, first responders can effectively anticipate and manage risk through proper training and planning.

The unified command is responsible for establishing immediate priorities for the safety of responders and other emergency workers involved in the response, and for ensuring that adequate health and safety measures are in place. The Incident Commander should rely on a designated safety officer who has been trained and equipped to assess the operation, identify hazardous and unsafe situations and implement effective safety plans.

Acting with dispatch, but effectively, requires clear, focused communication and the processes to support it. Without effective communication, a bias toward action will be like firing blind – ineffectual at best, likely perilous. An effective national response relies on disciplined processes, procedures and systems to communicate timely, accurate and accessible information on the incident's cause, size and current situation to the public, responders and others. Well-developed public information, education strategies and communication plans help to ensure that lifesaving measures, evacuation routes, threat and alert systems and other public safety information are coordinated and communicated to numerous audiences in a timely and consistent manner.
Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

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