Joint and Multinational Command and Control Architecture in the Korean Theater of Operations:

How did we get here and where are we going?

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A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

The War on Terrorism predominates the military’s mission set and inherent in this is our ability to integrate and operate with our nation’s allies and coalition partners to achieve victory. There is no greater example of this paradigm than the alliance between the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) forged in war in the mountains and rice paddies of the Korean peninsula over half a century ago. Like our NATO alliance in Europe, our alliance with the ROK remains strong today because our military relationships and roles have evolved over time along with the ever-changing elements of National Power. With the recent decision to transfer wartime operational command and control (C2) of the ROK military from the U.S. to the ROK in April of 2012, the U.S. must forge a new role in the alliance over next five years to ensure continued security and stability on the Korean peninsula.

In this paper, I will analyze the latest evolution of the operational level C2 architecture of the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO). First, I will provide a brief history of the C2 architecture in the KTO. Second, I will provide a contextual background using the elements of National Power (DIME-diplomatic, information, military and economic) as the construct. Third, I will define what the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of the ROK military is and what the ramifications of that decision are with respect to the design of the C2 architecture for the KTO. Lastly, I will extract some lessons learned for the Joint and Multinational Force (MNF) warfighters by evaluating the KTO using the interconnected operational environment model promulgated throughout Joint doctrine.

Wartime OPCON Transfer, Republic of Korea, ROK, Combined Forces Command, CFC, Theater design, Command and Control, Korean Theater of Operations, KTO, DIME, operational environment

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06 November 2007

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Abstract

The War on Terrorism predominates the military’s mission set and inherent in this is our ability to integrate and operate with our nation’s allies and coalition partners to achieve victory. There is no greater example of this paradigm than the alliance between the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) forged in war in the mountains and rice paddies of the Korean peninsula over half a century ago. Like our NATO alliance in Europe, our alliance with the ROK remains strong today because our military relationships and roles have evolved over time along with the ever-changing elements of National Power. With the recent decision to transfer wartime operational command and control (C2) of the ROK military from the U.S. to the ROK in April of 2012, the U.S. must forge a new role in the alliance over next five years to ensure continued security and stability on the Korean peninsula.

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Introduction

The War on Terrorism predominates the military’s mission set and inherent in this is our ability to integrate and operate with our nation’s allies and coalition partners to achieve victory. There is no greater example of this paradigm than the alliance between the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) forged in war in the mountains and rice paddies of the Korean peninsula over half a century ago. Like our NATO alliance in Europe, our alliance with the ROK remains strong today because our military relationships and roles have evolved over time along with the ever-changing elements of National Power. With the recent decision to transfer wartime operational command and control (C2) of the ROK military from the U.S. to the ROK in April of 2012, the U.S. must forge a new role in the alliance over next five years to ensure continued security and stability on the Korean peninsula.¹

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Context

The design of the operational C2 architecture in the KTO at the close of the Korean War in 1953 would best be described in today’s doctrinal vernacular as a MNF organized in a “lead nation command” construct. The U.S. was the lead nation under the United Nations (UN) flag with OPCON of the ROK and other UN military forces in the KTO. This was further codified by the signing of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in Oct 1953 committing the U.S. to defend the ROK if attacked and thus began the alliance under which both nations currently operate. In the Mutual Defense Treaty, the ROK ceded control of their military forces to the U.S., as the lead nation, to defend the ROK per “mutual agreement.” As one would expect in an alliance type relationship with a long-term view, the development of the ROK military would, for all practical purposes, doctrinally mirror our own armed forces over the ensuing years.

With the growth of the professional ROK military both in capabilities and strength, there was clearly a need to realign the C2 architecture of the KTO to make best use of the available forces and the capabilities of each nation. In response to the need for change, the ROK and U.S., by mutual agreement, established the Combined Forces Command (CFC) on 7 November 1978. The CFC is a doctrinally MNF “integrated” command headquarters and has continued to mature to its current fully integrated command at echelon across all components (ground, air, maritime, and special operations).

In 1994 there was another significant change in the C2 architecture of the KTO with the OPCON transfer of ROK military forces to the ROK during peacetime. In practice this was probably not a major change in day-to-day military operations on the peninsula. This was
primarily due to the fact that the National Command Authorities (NCA) of both the ROK and U.S. provided guidance to the CFC commander on the employment of forces in the KTO. However, in symbolic terms this was a major step in demonstrating ROK sovereignty in its military component of National Power. Particularly, given the fact that the ROK and U.S. consultations for wartime OPCON transfer, in effect allowing the ROK military to take the lead in the defense of the ROK, began at this time.

Since 1994, there has been unprecedented economic growth, democratic reforms of the ROK government and the continued modernization of the ROK professional military forces. Simultaneously, there has been the development and promulgation of U.S. Joint and MNF doctrine as well as transformation of all U.S. service components. These myriad changes to the operational environment resulted in a need to make another adjustment to the C2 of forces in the KTO. In January 2007, the ROK and U.S. agreed to return wartime OPCON of ROK military forces and to disestablish the CFC on 17 April 2012.

Ironically, the agreement will re-establish a doctrinally MNF in a “lead nation” C2 structure with the ROK military now as the lead nation supported by the U.S. and UN forces. Inherent in that decision is the requirement of the ROK military to form a doctrinal Joint Force headquarters currently identified as the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC) to assume the responsibility of C2 of forces during wartime. Additionally, the ROK military joint headquarters has been designated as the “supported” command for the wartime operations while the U.S. and UN forces will be “supporting” commands. To ensure the success of the supported to supporting construct, key elements of multinational force “parallel command structure” in the form coordination centers, boards and cells will be employed by the ROK and U.S. and UN commands at echelon.
The evolution of the C2 architecture in the KTO is at its core the application of operational art. Joint Pub 3-0 in part defines Operational Art as “the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs…to design strategies…and organize and employ military forces …that integrates the ends, ways and means across the levels of war…it is a thought process that seeks to optimize the employment military capabilities to achieve a common goal.”

Inherent in the application of operational art is the recognition of the need to continuously assess and properly balance the operational factors of time, forces and space. Clearly this process is reflected in each significant change to the design of the C2 architecture over the last 54 years.

At the end of the Korean War the ROK was a devastated nation with no industrial base, a country in ruins and so it only made sense that the ROK military was subordinated to the U.S. who had the dominant forces and capabilities. The Mutual Defense Treaty guaranteed peace and stability for the ROK and enabled the Koreans to rebuild their country and institutions. Most importantly, it provided the secure and stable environment necessary for the Korean economy to transform from an agrarian to an industrial to information age society in a relatively short period of time. The unprecedented economic growth of the ROK is one of the most extraordinary success stories in recent history.

As with the economy, the ROK military forces reaped the benefits of the economic boom and increased in capability and size. As a result of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. influenced development of tactics, training, doctrine and equipment (particularly C4I) that have continuously improved interoperability between ROK and US forces. “The structures of the two militaries are complimentary. The ROK armed forces bring mass and the US forces bring technology. The ROK forces are groundcentric, and the US brings significant
Recognizing the need to capitalize on the ROK expanding military capabilities, it was an inevitable and a logical progression to adjust the design of the theater C2 architecture with the establishment of the CFC. Furthermore, as the ROK military developed more combat power and capabilities through the modernization and equipment procurement initiatives, they have been and still are taking on missions formerly conducted by U.S. forces. The most recent transfers of these missions freed up U.S. forces and assets to be employed elsewhere as necessitated by the global repositioning of forces to support the GWOT without degradation or risk to accomplishment of the missions in the KTO.

The latest evolution in the military component of the alliance between the ROK and U.S. exemplifies the application of Operational art. The operational level commander, GEN B.B. Bell, evaluated his theater mission (“ends”) and identified a mismatch in the “ways” and “means” to accomplish that mission with the forces available. He elevated that assessment to the strategic level where the mutual decision by the ROK and U.S. was made to transfer wartime OPCON of ROK military forces and to the ROK. Given the strategic level decisions, GEN Bell translated them into an operational level framework that is reflected in the complete redesign of the C2 structure of the KTO.

**DIME**

The elements of National Power described in U.S. Army Field FM 3-0 by the acronym “DIME” or “Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic” must be considered as critical enablers to the evolution of the C2 structure in the KTO. Perhaps more than anything, it is the balancing or synchronization of DIME not just internally within the ROK but in large measure a re-balancing of DIME in relation to the U.S. that contributed directly to the changes in the theater C2 design. What is certain, is that the extraordinary changes in
DIME in the ROK over the last half century has been nothing short of miraculous and should serve as an example of success to the world. Considering that at the end of the Korean War essentially all elements of ROK National Power were at the bottom of the scale. With the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty came the guarantee of security for the growth of a fledging democracy in the ROK that provided insurance for outside economic investments in the ROK that continues today.\textsuperscript{xx}

The ROK is now the eleventh largest economy in the World with a per capita household average income of just over $24K. By way of comparison, the U.S. per capita is approximately $44k and Japan is at $33K. This is an extraordinary growth rate given the fact that the ROK per capita income at the close of the Korean War was less than $2K. The ROK has an estimated $235B in foreign exchange currency and gold in reserves. The ROK enjoys a favorable trade environment with a surplus of nearly $45B resulting from exports totaling in excess of $345B and imports of approximately $300B. The ROK major trading partners include China at 21%/16% (exports/imports), U.S. at 13%/11%, and Japan at 8%/17%. Major exports include electronic products, machinery and equipment, automobiles and petrochemicals. Major imports are comprised of electronics and raw materials including crude oil, chemicals, metals that drive the economy but also include machinery and semiconductors as well. Clearly, the ROK enjoys a strong economic position in Asia in particular and continues to expand throughout the world.\textsuperscript{xxi}

The battle tested military leadership dominated the ROK diplomatic (political) element of National power from the end of the Korean War until the 1992 presidential election through a series of military authoritarian rulers. “Despite repressive rule South Korea's economy began to grow rapidly from the mid 1960s and by the 1990s the country had undergone an
economic miracle. It was transformed from a poor, relatively undeveloped country into a thriving and rich economy. The state played a large part in the transformation. In the 1960s General Park built roads and bridges and expanded education. A series of 5 year plans were drawn up and the government took a central role in running the economy. Industry became dominated by large corporations called Chaebol. With the democratic presidential election in 1992 came a true democratic society with the subordination of the military to civilian leadership. Similarly, this true democracy resulted in the gradual deregulation of industry and reduction of government direct involvement with business (and the Chaebol model) leading to a free market economic system enjoyed today. The ROK has successfully linked and pursued its economic interests through the establishment of diplomatic ties in over 170 different nations around the globe. A great example of the ROK emergence as a political and economic power in the Pacific Rim region is their contributions as a founding member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the recent Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.

As with the other elements of National Power, the Information element of national power has successfully evolved in the ROK reflecting the changes of a society from a third world nation into a modern information-age society. As with any successful democracy, freedom of the press across all media is a vital component of the information environment. Central to the freedom of press is the physical linkage (infrastructure) to the population through the media that spans the range of available technology. In the last twenty years, the ROK has emerged as one of the most technologically advanced and connected societies in the world. The entire range of information media exists from the internet, television, radio broadcast, digital cellular phones to all manner of written press and provides extraordinary levels of
information transfer within the population of Korea. When one considers the fact that the ROK enjoys one of the highest literacy rates in the world at 97.9%, the value of information as power is all the more relevant to the ROK society. The literacy rates reflect the direct investment of capital into one of the key national assets, its people, and guarantees the continued innovations in technology to expand the use of information as power for the foreseeable future.

The ROK military is comprised of approximately 687K active duty personnel, the 6th largest in the World. As expected, the ROK Army is the largest in size with 560K personnel with 4,975 Tanks/Armored Vehicles, 5,598 battlefield Artillery Systems (Includes Tracked, Wheeled and Towed Systems) and 13,000 Infantry Support Systems. The Air Force contributes another 65K and 180 aircraft while the Navy is comprised of 68K personnel (including 25K Marines) with 170 commissioned ships (total displacement of approx. 141,000 tons) including about 10 submarines, 75 patrol craft and 20 auxiliaries.

In 2005, the ROK released their Defense Reform Plan that calls for the reduction of force structure down to 500K total (with the majority of the reduction in the Army) while simultaneously increasing lethality through the application of improved technology and equipment by 2020. The plan identifies the need for the investment of over $640B over 15 years primarily in the procurement and/or development of technologically advanced warfighting equipment such as fighters, support aircraft, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, missile defense, submarines and UAV systems.

With the recent decision to transfer OPCON to the ROK, several new dynamics have been introduced into their transformation plan. First, the transfer OPCON has necessitated a change in their overall C2 structure that is currently integrated with the U.S. at echelon to a
JFC in order to properly synchronize with the U.S. and UN supporting structures. Secondly, the time factor has compressed the window in which the ROK military must procure adequate C4I systems to ensure they have the technology and enablers necessary to maintain C2 of (and share information with) forces on the peninsula.\textsuperscript{xxvii} Third, the ROK military must develop their independent war plans so that the supporting commanders (U.S./UN) can produce complimentary supporting plans. Lastly, the ROK military must exercise their new war plans and independent C2 to ensure successful transfer of the mission from CFC.

The simultaneous transformation of the ROK military and the transfer of OPCON of ROK forces is a challenge of the highest order. Fortunately, the ROK has the last 57 years of shared experience and knowledge with the U.S. upon which to develop their transformed Operational Theater. As the motto of the CFC says “We Go Together”, the ROK can and must rely on the strength of its alliance with the U.S. to see it through successfully.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

**Wartime OPCON Transfer**

What is the transfer of wartime OPCON of the ROK military and what are the ramifications of that decision to the theater C2 design? In the following figures General B. B. Bell, the current CFC commander, provides a graphical representation of the various lines of coordination and C2 from the strategic levels to higher order operational levels in the KTO as it exists today and is proposed for the future.
The strategic level processes in the forms of the Security and Military Consultative meetings remains essentially unchanged as an integral part maintaining the alliance established by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. However, at the operational level, there is a complete redesign of the C2 architecture in the KTO.

It is the disestablishment of the CFC and the resultant transfer of Theater C2 to a ROK JFC that signifies the radical departure from the past. This effectively places the ROK military in the lead role as the “supported command” in the defense of their Nation with the U.S. and UN in doctrinal “supporting commands.” This simplified “supporting to supported” command construct will significantly clarify the specific roles of the U.S. and UN with regard to their missions in the KTO as it relates to the MNF lead nation design.
In large measure, this also simplifies the theater C2 and significantly increases the ROK JFC commander’s ability to maintain and possibly increase freedom of action as a single authority line exists to the ROK NCA for the prosecution of the defense of their country. Perhaps as important is that the decision cycle would significant shorten as there would be no consultations off the peninsula. In contrast, under the current construct, the Commander of CFC (U.S. 4 star General) receives guidance from both the U.S. and ROK equally through the consultation processes as well as directly from the NCAs during wartime perhaps resulting in conflicting guidance given the different national interests and views regarding North Korea. It is certain that any amount of conflicting strategic guidance would unnecessarily cause time delays and possibly restrict the freedom of action of the CFC Commander.

In the new arrangement of C2, the ends, ways and means for defending the ROK are defined by the ROK. This enhances and strengthens unity of effort by allowing the Koreans to lead the planning and prosecution of the defense of their nation on their own terms while taking into account their cultural and national interests. The U.S. and UN in supporting roles provide specific capabilities and enablers upon which the ROK can rely.

It is important to understand that by doctrine and law, the U.S. and ROK (and most nations) military commanders never relinquish command authority over their forces but do provide forces in a Tactical Control (TACON) relationship as necessary in support of appropriate plans and orders. At no time would a U.S./UN commander allow his forces to be used contrary to doctrine or law. This should not be of any surprise given the fact that the U.S. and ROK militaries have successfully exercised these relationships routinely in annual Theater level Command Post Exercises for almost 30 years as the CFC.
It is the as yet to be defined changes to the theater C2 structure at the JFC and below that will be the most challenging and complex. The ROK and U.S. are currently jointly developing the way ahead for the design of the C2 structure at echelon, OPLAN development and the training and certification program necessary to meet the April 2012 transfer date. The current integrated structure (at echelon) does provide a glimpse of the characteristics that will be necessary in order to adequately design an operational C2 structure to ensure that every available capability is leveraged to full advantage. One key consideration is that while this transformation is a joint ROK-U.S. effort, in the end it is ROK taking on the lead role and therefore they should have the preponderance of the influence on the final C2 structure of the KTO. Fortunately, with the ROK and US sharing the same warfighting doctrine, the theater design for the components below the JFC will likely not come as any surprise nor deviate greatly from the existing construct.

The new ROK JFC will be responsible for C2 of all forces in the KTO during wartime and will be comprised of a standard Joint Task Force headquarters staff to synchronize the Component Commands and leverage their capabilities in the KTO. At this level it is anticipated that a robust coordination capability will be formed to ensure the JFC has direct coordination with a U.S. element for input into formulation of plans and the application of U.S. forces. Of critical importance will be the integration of intelligence to ensure a common operating picture across the theater that leverages the capabilities of both the U.S. and ROK intelligence apparatus. Central to the entire concept of coordination cells, centers and boards concept will be the requirement for a communications infrastructure and architecture that enables the rapid transfer of information throughout the KTO.
Below the JFC, one would expect to see the all the standard Component Commands including Ground, Air, Maritime, and Special Operations. As GEN Bell has articulated in his vision of the future alignment of forces, “With premier air- and naval-centric capabilities, the U.S. supporting effort compliments the predominant ROK ground forces in defending the South…” Clearly, the U.S. commitment of Air and Naval forces is of vital strategic importance to the KTO due to their rapid response capabilities and thus will continue to be significant force providers to the KTO. Therefore one should expect to see a U.S. led ACC and or MCC just as we fully expect to continue to have a ROK led GCC.

At the Component levels, both the U.S. and ROK militaries will have to establish liaison/coordination cells or centers to ensure a seamless integration of US forces and capabilities with ROK forces in both planning and execution. We have successful examples in operation throughout the KTO today with the Combat Support Coordination Teams embedded in the ROK Armies and the Korea Air Operations Center to name a few. As both the U.S. and ROK forces transform, so then will the coordination elements needed to ensure the success of the “supporting” to the “supported” relationships at echelon within the KTO.

Unlike immature Theaters, the KTO under the new JFC will benefit from the strength of the integrated planning efforts of the CFC over the last 29 years. While it is true that the JFC will have to promulgate new OPLANs, there will no doubt be a systematic and detailed battle handoff from CFC to the JFC. The current bilateral planning processes as defined by JP 3-0 as the “preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency.” In essence, the current integrated plans will be split into its component parts with the U.S. and UN preparing
appropriate complimentary supporting plans to the JFC OPLAN. Similarly, as with the CFC plans, the existing complimentary Component plans at echelon will have to be modified to account for the new C2 structures developed for the theater.

**Lessons Learned**

The transformation of the C2 structure in the KTO is of critical importance to the future of MNF operations doctrine. The KTO C2 design with different nations commanding the Components under a single “lead nation” will impact the future of U.S. and MNF operations when operating with capable MNF partners. Instead of defaulting to the U.S. in the lead roles, perhaps greater consideration will be given to allowing other nations to command Components or MNF Joint Task Forces.

The use of the “supporting to supported” command relationship greatly simplifies roles and responsibilities in MNF operations. The use of the “supporting to supported” command construct cuts across the Theater C2 from the JFC down through the Component Commands and provides clear unity of effort. The design and subsequent testing of the liaison and coordination cells and their required communications architectures will be of great importance to the next iteration of JP3-16 and will serve as a blueprint for the future of MNF operations.

The transfer of Wartime OPCON of Korean military forces and the associated redesign of the C2 architecture on the Korean peninsula best exemplifies the complexity of the “interconnected operational environment” as defined by JP 3-0 and depicted in the following illustration:
Figure 2 Interconnected Operational Environment (Reprinted from U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, (Washington DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006) IV-5.)

Note that JP 3-0 uses this concept as it relates to the operational environment with respect to an adversary, however, it is equally applicable to use it to analyze friendly forces. It is from this “system of systems” construct that we can best frame the lessons learned for the Joint and MNF warfighters of the future.

Fundamentally, it is democracy that successfully links all the systems together and maintains a precarious balancing act throughout the operational environment for both the U.S. and the ROK. So it should come as no surprise that in the political sphere our two governments willingly negotiated at the strategic level the decision to fundamentally change the military component system of the operational environment in the KTO. As the operational environment model suggests, this decision was not made in a vacuum but rather as a direct result of the simultaneous influences of the all systems within the environment. Moreover, it is the complex and ever changing linkages between the systems nodes that are the critical enablers to this initiative.
Security and stability is another critical overarching condition that permeates the operational environment in the ROK and is the foundation from which all other systems evolved since the end of the Korean War. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 establishing the alliance between the ROK and the U.S. has successfully provided for a secure and stable environment for the last 54 years. In that 54 years, the ROK has developed from a third world country devastated by war into a fully functional democratic information age society with a free market economy and a modern and capable military.

The interdependencies of the systems in the operational environment are of critical importance. The model demonstrates that there is no set linear development path in which to prioritize the systems of the operational environment in order to build a nation. One must work each component of the operational environment with simultaneity and unity of purpose over the long term to achieve any measure of success. The ROK stands out as a sterling example of this with their extraordinary successes in all components of the operational environment.

Finally, it is the maturation and strength of the other systems in the model that have enabled the military component to rise to the challenge of being the lead in the defense of the ROK with the U.S. and UN in a supporting role. It is a sterling example of where the combination of the entire system of systems of the operational environment far outweighs the sum of the individual systems strengths. In the U.S. and ROK alike, the military system derives its strength from the interconnected civilian political leadership, supported by an industrial infrastructure and capacity built from a strong economy and supported by a free, democratic, information age society. More than ever, the military component cannot act alone and the Joint and MNF warfighters of the future must understand this to succeed.
Notes


6 JP 3-16, II-6.

7 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 81-2.

8 Ibid., 84.


10 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 80.

11 Ibid., 83.

12 JP 3-0, IV-3.


14 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 81.


16 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 83.

17 JP 5-0, IV-1.

18 Gurney and Smotherman, “An Interview with B. B. Bell,” 78.

19 FM 3-0, 1-4.

20 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 80.


25 Ibid.

26 Bechtol, Bruce E., Red Rogue The Persistent Challenge of North Korea, 162.

27 Ibid., 163.

28 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 86.

29 JP 3-0, III-5.

30 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 84.

31 JP 3-0, III-3-5.

32 Bell and Finely, “South Korea Leads the Warfight,” 83.

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34 Ibid.

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