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Operational Command and Control:
Lessons for Today’s Joint Force from Grenada, Somalia, and Kosovo

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

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INTRODUCTION

*Americans had learned, and learned well. The tragedy of American arms, however, is that having an imperfect sense of history, Americans sometimes forget as quickly as they learn.* – T.R. Fehrenbach

It has been said that one who fails to study history is doomed to repeat it. The purpose of this paper is to examine three recent military operations in an effort to develop lessons learned that have relevance for today’s joint force. The three operations that will be examined are: Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, the deployment of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. In order to effectively link lessons learned from these disparate operations, this paper will focus its analysis on the joint function of command and control.

Within the area of command and control, this paper will examine two specific topics. The first to be considered will be the role of organizational structure on the planning and execution of these operations. The second topic to be covered will be the coordination and integration of joint, multinational, and inter-governmental organization (IGO) support during these conflicts. The paper will then close with recommendations for today’s joint force based on lessons learned from the analysis of these three operations.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

Organizational Structure

According to Joint Publication 3-0, command and control (C2) “encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.”

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provide for unity of effort through unity of command. Based on these concepts it is clear that the C2 structure for Grenada was flawed from the start.

In 1983, the Unified Command Plan assigned responsibility for “normal operations” in the Caribbean to the United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), commanded by Admiral McDonald. USLANTCOM was headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia and was focused heavily on conducting blue-water, naval operations. During the planning stages for Grenada, there was no existing joint task force (JTF) organization in the LANTCOM area of responsibility that could handle the crisis. Because of this, Admiral McDonald created JTF 120 to plan and conduct the operation.

Admiral McDonald’s choice for who should serve as the JTF headquarters would have far reaching implications. Although USLANTCOM contained the Headquarters, US Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB), which had a joint staff composed of officers from all the services, Admiral McDonald instead chose Vice Admiral Metcalf, Commander Second Fleet, to serve as CJTF 120. Admiral McDonald gave two reasons why he selected Second Fleet and his staff instead of USFORCARIB to serve as the headquarters for JTF 120. The first reason was based on location. Second Fleet headquarters was collocated with USLANTCOM in Norfolk, while USFORCARIB was located in Key West, Florida. Admiral McDonald was concerned about operational security and the limited amount of planning time available. Based on these considerations, the selection of Second Fleet over USFORCARIB because of its proximity to USLANTCOM made sense.

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5 Cole, 65.
6 Ibid.
The other reason Admiral McDonald chose Second Fleet was that it had operational forces assigned to it, while USFORCARIB was only a headquarters command. Based on the time constraints he was operating under, this again made ADM McDonald’s selection of Second Fleet seem logical. There was a significant liability associated with this selection, however.

Second Fleet headquarters was composed of naval officers who had very little experience in planning or commanding large ground operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and ADM McDonald were well aware of this shortcoming. In order to mitigate the risks associated with this lack of expertise, ADM McDonald added Army officers to the Second Fleet headquarters during the final two days of planning. The CJCS, GEN Vessey, also sent Major General Schwarzkopf to serve as a ground force advisor to Vice Admiral Metcalf. These attempts at mitigation were well-meaning, but proved to be too little, too late.

The original concept from the LANTCOM staff for ground operations proposed having Marines and Rangers operate as combined units for the landings at Point Salines and Pearls. GEN Vessey was opposed to this plan. He told ADM McDonald to keep the units separate and drew a boundary that divided Grenada in half. The northern sector would be the area of operations (AO) for the Marines and the southern sector would be the AO for the Army. What this did was effectively create two independent ground force commanders,

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7 Ibid., 66.
8 Ibid., 6.
9 Ibid., 66.
10 Ibid., 6.
11 Ibid., 30.
12 Ibid., 31.
resulting in minimal cooperation between the Army and Marines. This situation was ameliorated somewhat with the designation of MG Schwarzkopf as the deputy commander of the JTF (instead of merely serving as a ground advisor) on 26 October, one day after the start of the invasion. Ground forces were not the only area that suffered from a lack of efficiency due to poor unity of command.

The joint special operations task force (TF 123) was also trying to work for VADM Metcalf as well as the National Command Authority. In addition, there was no concept of a joint forces air component commander (JFACC). Naval aircraft belonged to the Independence battle group, which came under the command of VADM Metcalf. TF 126, composed of eight F-15’s and four E-3A’s, also came under the command of VADM Metcalf. TF 126 did not contain the rest of the Air Force aircraft in the AO, however. Lift assets from the Military Airlift Command as well as tanker and reconnaissance aircraft from the Strategic Air Command were to operate independently of TF 126. In the end, the command and control structure developed by Second Fleet suffered because of their lack of ground and air expertise, resulting in “uncoordinated ground operations by Rangers and Marines and the absence of unified air support” during the first few days of Urgent Fury.

Somalia also saw its share of issues related to organizational structure. Task Force Ranger (TFR) was deployed to Somalia on 25 August 1993 following a series of attacks by Mohammed Farah Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia on U.S. forces via

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14 Cole, 48.
15 Negrete, 13.
16 Cole, 30.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 66.
command detonated mines.\(^{19}\) These attacks killed four U.S. soldiers and wounded ten others.\(^{20}\) The mission of TFR was to capture Aideed under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 837.\(^{21}\) UNSCR 837 was passed in response to the ambush of U.N. forces by the SNA militia on 5 June 1993, which killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers and wounded fifty-seven Pakistani, one Italian, and three American soldiers.\(^{22}\) There had been reluctance on the part of both GEN Powell, the CJCS, and Gen Hoar, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), to deploy the special operations forces of TFR. Powell and Hoar both viewed the mission as high risk, giving it a less than 50% chance for success.\(^{23}\) The mounting casualties and brazen attacks by the SNA militia specifically targeting Americans finally convinced Powell of the need to send TFR to Somalia.\(^{24}\)

The president rapidly approved the deployment of TFR once Powell supported it. Political guidance on the deployment from Secretary of Defense Aspin was to reduce the visibility of the U.S. effort.\(^{25}\) This guidance was translated by the CJCS to both Gen Hoar and GEN Downing, Commander of Special Operations Command, as a mandate to keep the force level at a minimum.\(^{26}\) As a result, TFR was forced to deploy without an additional Ranger platoon that was normally used as a quick reaction force (QRF).\(^{27}\)

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 41-42.
24 Sangvic, 11-12.
25 Ibid., 12.
26 Warner, 28-29.
27 Ibid., 28. See also Sangvic, 32 and 37.
In order to make up for this force shortfall, MG Garrison, Commander of TFR, needed to rely on a QRF from the 10th Mountain Division that was under the command of MG Montgomery, Commander U.S. Forces Somalia and Deputy Force Commander of United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). This division of forces under two separate ground commanders would have dramatic implications during the 3-4 October TFR raid. These implications would begin to be felt approximately forty minutes after the start of the raid when the first MH-60, Super 61, was shot down by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG).

As a consequence of the decision to keep the QRF under a separate commander, the QRF was not collocated with TFR at the airport in Mogadishu. As a result, it took almost an hour for a QRF company from the 10th Mountain Division to travel from the university compound and link up with elements of TFR at the airport.28 During this time another MH-60, Super 64, was brought down by an RPG. An ad hoc ground reaction force (GRF) comprised of twenty-seven Rangers had already left the airport to secure the crash site of Super 64 before the QRF company arrived at the airport.29 Once the QRF company reached the TFR compound at the airport, it was briefed on the mission to secure the crash site of Super 64. The QRF company left the TFR compound approximately thirty-two minutes after the ad hoc GRF did to accomplish the same mission.30 These units were now operating independently to reach the same objective, but both were forced to return to the TFR compound prior to reaching the crash site of Super 64 due to intense enemy resistance and obstacles placed in their paths.31

28 Sangvic, 16.
29 Ibid., 18.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
Based on the failure of these units to reach the crash site for Super 64, a decision was made to organize a rescue convoy. This convoy would involve the entire battalion-size QRF, four Pakistani M-48 tanks, and twenty-eight Malaysian M-113 armored personnel carriers (APCs). Because of the multiple units involved, it took approximately four hours to assemble this force and another two and a half hours for the force to reach the crash site of Super 61 (by the time this convoy was being assembled the crash site of Super 64 had already been overrun by the Somalis). This means that the first units of the fully assembled rescue convoy did not reach the crash site of Super 61 until approximately nine and a half hours after it was shot down.

While much has been written regarding those responsible for the failures that resulted in the tragic losses that occurred during the TFR raid of 3-4 October, the blame at the operational level as it pertains to the C2 organization falls squarely on the shoulders of GEN Hoar. As the Commander of CENTCOM, he had the authority under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to ensure the unity of effort between MG Garrison and MG Montgomery. Once it was clear that TFR would be forced to deploy without its additional Ranger platoon to provide an organic QRF, Gen Hoar should have directed better integration of the 10th Mountain Division QRF into the TFR operation. This “failure to coordinate actions in Somalia between TFR and QRF and the failure to resource properly TFR and the QRF were critical mistakes that resulted in the overall failure of the 3 October TFR mission.”

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32 Poole, 57. See also Warner, 37 and Sangvic, 19.
33 Ibid.
34 Sangvic, 15 and Warner, 37.
35 Sangvic, 32.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 33.
were also force integration issues with respect to command and control during Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo.

The U.S. contribution to OAF was through JTF Noble Anvil. As had been the case during Operation Urgent Fury, there was no pre-existing theater staff to form JTF Noble Anvil around.38 In a move eerily reminiscent of Operation Urgent Fury, a decision was made to use the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) staff as the core cadre to form the JTF Noble Anvil staff.39 Whereas Operation Urgent Fury saw Second Fleet’s blue-water focused staff commanding a largely ground-based operation, CINCUSNAVEUR’s surface-centric staff was charged with commanding an almost exclusively air-centered operation. The use of CINCUSNAVEUR’s staff turned out to be much more effective than Second Fleet’s during Operation Urgent Fury, even if it was not optimal.40 The reason for this improved effectiveness was the appointment of Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short to serve as both the joint force air component commander (JFACC) as well as the combined forces air component commander (CFACC). This is not to say that there were not organizational issues within the JFACC, however.

The issues within the JFACC centered on the deployment of Army AH-64 Apaches. GEN Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), requested that the Army send Apaches shortly after OAF commenced.41 SACEUR wanted to use the Apaches to complement his fixed-wing assets. The Apaches had the ability to fly lower and operate in

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
weather conditions that canceled or delayed fixed wing sorties. SACEUR eventually received twenty-four AH-64s and their accompanying support forces in the form of Task Force Hawk (TFH). The first battalion of Apaches arrived in Albania on 21 April 1999. TFH assets were under the command of the Army’s V Corps commander, Lieutenant General John Hendrix, and were supposed to be a “supporting (as opposed to supported) combat element.”

Who would maintain control of the Apaches if they saw combat was an issue from the very beginning. Since the inception of armed helicopters during the Vietnam War, the Army has been hesitant to place their aviation assets “on the air tasking order (ATO) and transfer command of those assets to anyone other than an Army commander—Operation Allied Force was no different.” Lt Gen Short as the CFACC and in accordance with published joint doctrine at the time, JP 3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 14 Nov 1994 (now JP 3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 5 June 2003), was responsible for the prosecution of the air operation in Kosovo. Despite this fact, there was no formal command relationship between TFH and the CFACC. In an effort to explain his position, Lieutenant General Hendrix had the Apache unit’s air liaison officer (ALO) send a message to the Air Force. In this message the ALO “complained of Lieutenant General Hendrix’s unwillingness to place the Apaches on the ATO for fear of losing control of the assets and because the ATO ‘tied his hands.’” The overall tone of the message was that LTG Hendrix did not want his Apaches on the ATO based on his fundamental “mistrust

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42 Peter L. VanDeusen, Joint Doctrine and Task Force Hawk: Lessons for the New Millennium (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 2 June 2000), 49-50.
43 Ibid., 50.
44 Lambeth, 148.
45 Lambeth, 153.
46 VanDeusen, 54. See also Lambeth, 152 for a discussion of this issue.
47 VanDeusen, 54.
48 Ibid.
of the CFACC concept.”49 It is interesting to note that other senior ranking officers in the Army did not agree with LTG Hendrix’s position.

The Army’s incoming vice chief of staff, LTG Jack Keane made the following remarks at an industry symposium that seemed to validate the CFACC concept for control of Army helicopters: “It boggles my mind, but we still have senior leaders, people who wear stars…that don’t recognize that if you’re going to fly Apaches at a distance and range, it’s got to be on the [air tasking order].”50 LTG Keane also stated that it was in the Army’s “self-interest” for the Apaches to be under the operational control of the CFACC because the arrangement offered better targeting in view of the entire air campaign as well as re-tasking based on real-time intelligence in this particular situation.51

In the end, Army Apaches never flew a combat sortie during OAF. An agreement was eventually reached to include time-deconflicted windows in the ATO that would have protected Apaches from friendly bombs falling on them.52 “However, the agreement reached in the end was so vague that it allowed each service to claim that it maintained tactical control over the Apaches in the event they were ever committed to combat.”53 The agreement may have protected the Apaches from friendly fire, but it never really solved the command and control issues. Resolution of issues related to multinational support was another recurring problem during these three operations.

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49 Ibid.
50 Lambeth, 155.
51 Ibid.
52 Lambeth, 153.
53 Ibid.
Coordination of Joint, Multinational, and IGO Support Issues

When President Reagan formally approved the mission in Grenada, he gave primary responsibility for the operation to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). Reagan directed the SECDEF to work with the Secretary of State over the cooperation with the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), Jamaica, and Barbados. The goal of this coordination was “to convince Congress and the public that the operation was truly multilateral.”

In order to facilitate this coordination, GEN Vessey ordered Marine Major General George Crist to establish a Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). GEN Vessey directed that the CPF perform a visible, but relatively safe role during the operation. To ensure that there was no confusion over the role that multinational forces were to play in the operation, the JCS execute order for Operation Urgent Fury specifically directed “close coordination with the Caribbean community forces (Caribbean Peacekeeping Force-CPF) at the appropriate time.” GEN Vessey was also in constant contact with ADM McDonald during the planning stages of the operation. GEN Vessey would later insist that based on these conversations, ADM McDonald “knew from the beginning how important it was, politically and diplomatically, to involve CPF ‘early on’ in the operation.”

Despite the written guidance and the multiple conversations regarding the importance of integrating the CPF during Operation Urgent Fury, the LANTCOM concept of operations did not provide for their use. MGEN Crist did his best to correct this deficiency while in Barbados on 24 October during his meetings with the leaders of the Barbados and Jamaica

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54 Cole, 33.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 3
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 35.
59 Ibid., 36.
60 Ibid.
Defense Forces as well as the OECS Regional Security Unit. MGEN Crist recommended that the approximately 300 member CPF be used to take over responsibility for important Grenadian facilities such as the Government House and Richmond Hill Prison following their initial capture by U.S. forces.

GEN Vessey agreed with this recommendation and ordered ADM McDonald to amend the Urgent Fury mission statement to reflect it. The new mission statement directed that VADM Metcalf would act “in cooperation with other OECS/Friendly Government participants. . .” and “. . .assist in restoration of democratic government in Grenada, provide the logistical support necessary to the peacekeeping force, and duly record by video tape and motion picture all military activities conducted by U.S. and CPF military forces.”

This modified execute order did not reach VADM Metcalf until the afternoon before the operation was scheduled to begin. Not only was the new order poorly timed, it also lacked guidance on how VADM Metcalf was supposed to integrate CPF units into his force structure. ADM McDonald would later call GEN Vessey’s modified order “too little, too late.” According to ADM McDonald, the details of the multinational coordination should have been formalized days in advance of the initiation of hostilities. In ADM McDonald’s judgment, it was the failure to do this timely coordination that ultimately “thwarted effective CPF support of military operations during the first two days of Urgent Fury.”

Somalia also saw its share of issues regarding coordination of multinational support. These issues began with the failure of UNOSOM II to maintain control of Mogadishu in

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61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 37
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
May, which led to the eventual requirement to deploy TFR to Somalia in August. When the United States turned over operations in Somalia to UNOSOM II on 4 May, it was expected that U.N. forces would be up against bandits, not centrally controlled guerrillas.\(^{69}\) The CJCS gave MG Montgomery direction to neither “make UNOSOM II an American show nor allow it to fail.”\(^{70}\) Essentially MG Montgomery was told to ensure the success of UNOSOM II, without having U.S. forces play a leading role. This guidance would prove contradictory given the level of preparedness of UNOSOM II forces. U.N. forces were undermanned (several nations did not commit the level of troops they had promised in a timely manner); had not all worked together before, and were lacking critical equipment such as flak jackets.\(^{71}\) Gen Hoar captured the eventual outcome of this contradictory guidance in his testimony to Senator Warner: “Over the summer, it became apparent that the allies couldn’t be depended upon. As a result, over time we lost control of Mogadishu. Things certainly went down hill when the Pakistanis were ambushed.”\(^{72}\)

This ambush was the proximate cause for UNSCR 837. In effect, resolution 837 put the United States on one side in Somalia’s ongoing civil war. It was also a de facto declaration of war against Aideed, which eventually led to the deployment of TFR and the concomitant losses that occurred during the raid on 3-4 October. The difficulties with C2 and coordination with multinational and IGO support is best summarized by Senator Warner in his report to the Armed Services Committee:

The policies which drove the military operations, formulated in the Clinton Administration and U.N. headquarters, and conveyed through two chains of command – 1) a CINC, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and 2) a U.N. command under a U.N. General. In addition, one U.S. General in Somalia wore two

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\(^{69}\) Poole, 42.  
\(^{70}\) Ibid.  
\(^{71}\) Sangvic, 6 and Warner, 47.  
\(^{72}\) Warner, 19.
hats, one as the Deputy to the U.N. Commander and one as Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, subordinate to Commander, CENTCOM. This created difficult—if not unprecedented—command arrangements. There will, forever, remain legitimate questions regarding the adverse impact these command arrangements had on the eventual outcome in Somalia.73

Similarly, Operation Allied Force was also plagued by multinational and IGO coordination issues. During OAF, fourteen nations contributed aircraft to the effort.74 During the targeting process, it was necessary to obtain agreement from nineteen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members prior to conducting any strikes.75 The positive aspect of obtaining this agreement was pointed out by Secretary of Defense Cohen and the CJCS, GEN Shelton, when they said “building consensus generally leads to sounder decisions.”76 In contrast, Gen Klaus Naumann, the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, captured the lack of responsiveness that this level of bureaucracy creates when he remarked, “The slowest ship determines the speed of the convoy.”77

In addition to its negative impact on the timeliness of decisions, the level of multinational participation in OAF also created other inefficiencies. Because of concerns over security, OAF saw the “implementation of parallel NATO and US-only planning and ATO processes.” One reason for this duplication of effort was the inability of some NATO and U.S. systems to connect and share information.78 These connectivity issues were the result of a failure to develop a multi-level security (MLS) system which would have allowed information exchange at the technical level while providing clear guidance at the policy level for what information may be shared within the NATO alliance.79

73 Warner, 9.
74 Lamb, 8.
75 Ibid., 7.
76 Ibid., 8.
77 Ibid., 9.
78 Ibid., 26.
79 Ibid.
CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above discussion there are several important recommendations regarding C2 issues for today’s joint force. The first recommendation has to do with the selection and training of the personnel that will be used to form the staff for any Joint Task Force headquarters. In both Grenada and Kosovo, a JTF staff was created that consisted largely of surface naval officers that had little or no experience in planning or commanding a military operation in the operational environment (ground for Grenada and air for Kosovo) that was necessary to achieve the desired military end state. It is interesting to note that in the case of Grenada a truly joint headquarters staff did exist in the AOR, but a less capable staff was used instead.

The lessons to be derived from this are three-fold. First, it is advisable for all geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to have a standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) staff ready to assume duties quickly in a crisis action situation. This has already been established as policy by former SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld. The second lesson is that GCCs should actually use these SJFHQs when the need to do so arises. One can only speculate on how the planning and execution for Grenada might have proceeded if USFORCARIB had been used instead of Second Fleet to lead the JTF. Third, there is a requirement to train as many staff officers as possible in joint military operations. Despite the fact that all GCCs are required to have SJFHQs, there is always the possibility that another staff will get tasked to perform this function. It could be based on a need for more operational security (as in Grenada), or the SJFHQ for a particular theater may already be employed when another crisis flares up. Whatever the reason, staffs at the three-star level can not be content to be subject matter experts in their particular operating environment.
The second recommendation has to do with unity of command once a proper JTF has been established. This is an issue that is addressed in current joint publications within the JP-3 series. When Operation Urgent Fury was planned and conducted, there were no such publications. Given this doctrinal shortcoming, it is easier to forgive the assignment of MG Schwarzkopf as an “advisor” to VADM Metcalf instead of designating him as the joint forces land component commander (JFLCC) than what happened with the command arrangements in Somalia and Kosovo. Considering that TFR deployed to Somalia almost seven years after the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, it is more difficult to understand the failure of Gen Hoar to properly ensure the unity of effort between MG Garrison and MG Montgomery. The refusal of LTG Hendrix to place his Apaches under the control of the CFACC exemplifies the reluctance among certain officers to embrace fully integrated joint operations specified in the Goldwater-Nichols Acts.

The salient point here is that current joint publications effectively capture historical lessons learned with respect to effective organizational C2 structures. To truly create synergy within the joint force it is necessary for functional components to report to a single commander. This commander can synchronize and coordinate their efforts in order to optimize their employment to achieve the desired military end state. This is a fundamental point that all levels of leadership need to understand and embrace, especially those of flag rank.

The final recommendation is centered on multinational and IGO coordination issues. The operations discussed above have illustrated the importance of establishing clear command relationships between U.S. and multinational forces. Each of the three cases highlights a different aspect that is important for today’s joint force. Grenada demonstrates
the necessity of defining command relationships between U.S. and coalition partners well in advance of the initiation of hostilities. Waiting to specify how coalition forces will be integrated with U.S. forces until the afternoon before D-day is clearly a recipe for marginalization of coalition participation. The experience in Somalia should give the United States pause when it comes to U.N. leadership of peace enforcement operations. In the future, the United States should insist on a model more akin to that used during Desert Storm where there was a lead nation in charge of the operation.\textsuperscript{80} Finally, Operation Allied Force highlights the difficulties experienced with modern information systems during multinational operations. It will become increasingly important for these information systems to be compatible among partner nations. There is a need to establish a MLS system so that it is not simply “all or nothing” when it comes to information sharing among nations. Policy must go hand-in-hand with this MLS system, clearly delineating what information may be shared and with whom.

Much can be learned from the study of recent military operations. It is encouraging to note that many of the recommendations made above have already been captured in current joint publications or Department of Defense policy statements. The key for current and future leaders of the joint force is to prove T. R. Fehrenbach wrong. They must show that they can learn the proper lessons when studying history and then remember and apply those lessons the next time they face a similar situation.

\textsuperscript{80} Warner, 18.
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