DISJOINTED COMBAT SUPPORT IN JOINT FORCE OPERATIONS

by

Michael E. Saunders, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Instructor: Dr. Bert L. Frandsen

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2005
**Title:** Disjointed Combat Support in Joint Force Operations

**Authors:**

**Performing Organization:** Air University Press (AUL/LP), 131 W Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, AL, 36112-6615

**Report Date:** APR 2005

**Dates Covered:** 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005

**Distribution/Availability Statement:** Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**Security Classification:**
- Report: Unclassified
- Abstract: Unclassified
- This Page: Unclassified

**Limitation of Abstract:**
- Same as Report (SAR)

**Number of Pages:** 30

**Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98):** Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
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Overview

Combat support operations at joint-use installations are disjointed. The current approach relies on the Services to provide combat support for their own forces on the installation despite similar and in many cases identical combat support requirements. Problems from lack of coordination, differing standards, and duplication of effort are prevalent throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). This paper will identify and discuss some of the problems with the current method of providing combat support at joint-use bases and will recommend the establishment of an installation Joint Task Force concept to improve the efficiency of combat support operations.

Discussion begins with an overview of the challenges that stem from providing combat support and combat service support at joint-use bases. This paper relates to most if not all facets of combat support and combat service support (i.e. engineering, force protection, communications, food services, finance, chapel service, contracting, etc.). However, for the purpose of this study, research was limited primarily to engineering related topics and joint-use installations that supported Air Force and Army operations.

The paper provides a review of current combat support doctrine and includes experience from recent operations during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The paper considers three alternative courses of action before ultimately recommending the establishment of an installation JTF. Finally, this report recommends steps necessary to ensure the successful implementation of the installation JTF concept.
Combat Support of Joint-use Installations:

The Soviet threat during the Cold War era led to a doctrine that focused on a known threat and relied heavily on pre-positioned forces staged at large garrison installations abroad. Permanent facilities existed in large numbers throughout the Pacific and Europe. The end of the Cold War witnessed a reduction in the garrison base concept and at the same time, a transition to numerous small scale contingencies around the world. Even in the case of a major theater war such as that seen in Operation DESERT STORM, political leaders and military planners still had the benefit of protracted political interaction and incremental force deployments over an extended period of time to alleviate most combat support concerns. The relatively short duration of these contingencies coupled with a still maturing joint force concept prevented significant concerns with respect to combat support operations from surfacing.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 changed all of that. Those events changed the US assessment of the international threat environment and our policy on how to deal with that threat. Less than a month after the attacks, America initiated Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.

The current Department of Defense (DoD) vision remains expeditionary and requires the ability to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. At the same time, garrison base closures and the expansive area of possible conflict in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have resulted in the prevalence of joint-use installations to project force during conflict. While the joint-use installation may have improved the ability to project truly joint forces, it has not had the same positive impact on combat support operations. Despite improvements in joint war fighting, combat support at joint-use installations remains disjointed and has resulted in much debate.
In general, the debate could be articulated in the following question: ‘Who should be responsible for base operating support (combat support and combat service support) at joint installations in an expeditionary environment?’

To answer that question, this paper will discuss and analyze three possible courses of action and then provide the recommended solution. It will also provide some additional recommendations to address the general topic of combat support at joint installations.

Significance of the Problem:

The importance of this issue and need for resolution have been evident for some time. Numerous experiences and lessons learned from deployments have been compiled by the Services and Joint Staff. Although the findings are varied, much dispute exists regarding combat support operations at joint-use installations.

For its part, the Air Force commissioned Task Force Enduring Look (TFEL) at the onset of OEF to capture lessons learned. According to its charter, the mission of TFEL is threefold:

- Provide superior support to the warfighter.
- Tell the Air Force story during these operations.
- Properly recognize lessons learned during and at the conclusion of these operations.\(^3\)

In March of 2002, TFEL published Quick Look #2, *Combat Support and Expeditionary Basing*. In the report, the Air Force acknowledged that “combat deployment and subsequent operations were fraught with many difficulties. Compressed, reactive planning, delayed coordination, and the absence of dedicated, tailored, contingency response planning and execution units contributed to those difficulties.”\(^4\) Additionally, the report stated that “U.S. forces faced higher operational risks and endured health-threatening conditions as a result of these BOS-related
problems…” At the time of this report, the details of the operational risks remain classified. However, additional issues and risks inherent in the current disjointed nature of combat support are well known.

Currently, combat support suffers from a lack of unity of effort. In many cases, the Services even referred to the same installation by different names. This disjointed approach means that individual Services accomplish master planning for upgrading their respective portions of a joint-use installation separately. This approach causes inefficiencies and contributes to disparate BOS standards for the assigned forces. More importantly, it can risk the health and well being of the assigned forces. On 24 December 2003, a soldier from the 173d Airborne Brigade based at FOB Bayonet (Kirkuk AB) died of injuries sustained while running a communication wire near a high voltage power line. Apparently he was unaware that the wires he was working near were energized. Unfortunately, the lack of coordination may have contributed to this death as Air Force engineers were aware of the electrical distribution system and could have isolated the line.

**What is Supposed to Happen:**

Doctrine is the cornerstone of how U.S. forces plan and execute joint military operations. The same should hold true for combat support operations. Therefore, to answer the question regarding who should provide support at joint installations, the first logical step is to conduct a review of current doctrine.

Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, defines logistics as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.” Civil Engineering is one of six functional areas within logistics and is defined as “those combat
support and combat service support activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and which operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other engineering functions in support of military operations.”

Engineer operations are a force multiplier for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and support operational movement, maneuver, and force projection through three primary functions (Combat engineering, General engineering, and Topographic engineering).

The organization of logistics functions including engineer functions is discussed in doctrine also. Unfortunately, none of the publications provide specific answers to the question regarding who should provide support at joint-use installations. JP 4-0 states that “each Service is responsible for the logistics support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing.” This guidance and responsibility is most probably derived from Title 10 of United States Code (USC) which provides the individual Services the responsibility and resources to organize, train, and equip their Services. Except in some limited cases regarding US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and functionally unique equipment, the legislation does not provide the Combatant Commander (COCOM) the responsibility or resources to equip their apportioned forces.

Joint Publication 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, follows the Service responsibility line of reasoning and proposes that a Service component command structure is best suited when engineer forces are in direct support of Service component missions.

However, doctrine also states that Combatant Commanders exercise “directive authority” for civil engineering and all logistics functions. Directive authority gives the combatant commander “the unique ability to shift logistic resources within the theater.” In an extension of
the idea of directive authority, JP 4-0 further explains that “in contingency operations, one Service or agent is normally assigned base operations support responsibility for all Services in a particular area or base; thus they are responsible for facility acquisition funding for all Services.”\textsuperscript{15}

The acknowledgement that one Service may provide base operations support for all forces at a joint-use installation is consistent with other portions of joint engineer doctrine which states that command and control of engineer operations should be organized to achieve unity of effort. Simplicity and clarity of command relationships for engineer forces are also paramount. JP 3-34 states that JFCs should establish command and control relationships that take advantage of engineer flexibility since engineer requirements will often exceed the limited engineer forces available - - especially in the early phases of a conflict.

To that end, JP 3-34 reports that a “Service component command may be delegated tactical control (TACON) of engineer forces of another Service in order to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. In addition, the JFC may establish support relationships between subordinate commanders to aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.”\textsuperscript{16}

In sum, joint logistics and engineer doctrine provide two possible methods for providing combat support at joint-use installations. In the first option, Services provide combat support of their own forces. This is based on authority and responsibility established in Title 10 USC. The second option designates responsibility for providing BOS for all Services at the joint-use installation to a single Service (usually the one with the preponderance of the forces). This option theoretically stems from the COCOM’s directive authority with respect to logistics.

\textbf{What’s Really Happening in the Field:}
This review of doctrine certainly hints at the complexity of the issue, but it does not provide a solution. Therefore, it is necessary to review what is really happening in the field. The CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) provides many opportunities for analysis.

During the first six months of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) the USAF operated from three main operating bases within Iraq (Tallil AB, Baghdad International Airport, and Kirkuk AB). Each of these installations had large numbers of joint/combined forces collocated with Air Force operations and personnel.

In the case of Kirkuk AB, the installation was home to the 506th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) with eight A-10 aircraft and 1,200 Airmen plus the Army’s 173d Airborne Brigade with approximately 3,000 soldiers and their assorted equipment. For its combat support piece, Kirkuk AB boasted at least three separate engineering organizations conducting similar BOS operations but receiving guidance and support from different commands.

By the fall of 2003, the 506th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES) had a diverse force of 180 personnel with design engineers, horizontal and vertical construction capability, utility specialists, NBC specialists, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and firefighters. Though charged by the original AEG/CC to support all base personnel equally, the unit was only sized to support the Air Force contingent. A later AEG/CC changed the focus to support the Air Force first and the Army when possible.17

The 173d Abn Bde had a brigade engineer with a small engineer company and periodic support from a rotational unit that moved throughout Iraq. Army engineer units at Kirkuk had limited engineer capability and spent considerable effort completing horizontal work both inside and outside of the base perimeter.18

Additionally, there was a growing Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
contract effort at Kirkuk AB. This Army contractor’s effort obviously was not controlled by the Air Force, and surprisingly it was not typically coordinated with the resident Army Brigade Engineer either. LOGCAP is centrally managed by the Army Material Command (AMC). By early March, 2004, LOGCAP had completed its first project - - a joint-use dining facility (DFAC). A modular container village for lodging Army personnel was scheduled to be completed by the end of March, 2004.\textsuperscript{19}

The bases at Tallil and Baghdad International Airport operated in a similar manner. In sum, joint-use installations in OIF favored the use of individual Services to provide combat support for their forces despite similar if not identical functions. The COCOM’s directive authority was not exercised at the tactical level and efforts to integrate combat support functions were largely dependent on ad hoc relationships that were built over time. Unfortunately, Air Force personnel turned over every 90-120 days so these relationships often had to be recreated again and again.

**COA Development, Analysis, Comparison, and Selection:**

Efforts to resolve the question of who should provide combat support at joint-use installations have been long overdue. In the development of this paper, three possible courses of action (COAs) were considered and used to ultimately provide a concept that Joint Force Commanders and planners can use to change the disjointed nature of combat support. The proposed COAs are:

1. Individual Services provide support for their own operations (Status Quo)
2. Airmen open, establish and sustain airfields
3. Establish a joint installation management CONOPS to serve joint-use installations
In the Joint Planning arena, COAs are developed and compared to various factors in a decision matrix to provide a recommended course of action. However, each course of action must first pass a validity test to ensure they are: Suitable, Feasible, Acceptable, Distinguishable, and Complete. COA 1 clearly is a valid COA since it is the status quo option that has been in effect for some time. COA 2 proposes to use Air Force personnel to open, establish, and sustain the airfield portion of the joint-use installation. COA 2 is also valid since senior USAF leaders have proposed this approach as the best way to accomplish the Air Force mission at joint-use installations. It meets the requirements of being suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. And finally, COA 3 is also considered valid and suitable since it has the potential to accomplish the mission. This option is primarily focused on command and control which means it has little impact on time and resources constraints. Therefore, it is feasible. Additionally, any implementation costs would be outweighed by the benefits this option produces ensuring it is acceptable. And finally, the basic approach to combat support presented in this option is clearly distinguishable from COA s 1 and 2.

The Case for COA 1:

COA 1 is the status quo option. It requires the Services to provide combat support functions for their own forces at joint-use installations. In this COA, individual Services are typically geographically separated within the base perimeter. Duplicative combat support functions occur independently with little or potentially no interaction. This arrangement, while certainly not the most efficient method, has been successful. In his book The Iraq War, Anthony H. Cordesman acknowledged that the USAF built and supported 5 bases in Iraq and
Expeditionary Combat Support “was critical to U.S. success.” Similarly, the Task Force Enduring Look reports some lessons learned but acknowledge that the U.S. military successfully brought forces and a support structure to far-off lands in minimal time, allowing combat air forces to deliver ordnance on enemy targets within three weeks.  

**Advantages:** Maintaining the status quo has several advantages. First, since it is the status quo, there are no implementation costs or significant changes that military planners need to adapt to. This option allows the Services to continue to concentrate on other operationally focused transformational concepts as we continue to adapt to a changing security environment.

This COA is also consistent with doctrine and maintains the Services’ Title 10 authorities and responsibilities. Although this option leaves the responsibility to provide combat support with the Services, along with that responsibility comes significant resources dedicated to that mission. Services can and often do exercise some flexibility in funding other priority requirements at the expense of combat support initiatives. In essence, maintaining the status quo means maintaining Service commander flexibility in determining and meeting the needs of the individual Service.

From an Air Force perspective, that may in fact still mean that combat support initiatives will enjoy a relatively strong level of support. By maintaining Service responsibility for combat support, the Air Force can ensure that it will provide a high level of base operating support for at least the Air Force personnel assigned to an installation.

**Disadvantages:** This COA is not without its disadvantages. Chief among these is the fact that it does not correct the basic premise that combat support operations are disjointed at joint-use installations. In fact, the current separate Service approach does more to actually cause the disjointed nature of CS than it does to solve it.
A Service providing their own combat support means these functions will continue to be duplicated by similar units with similar capabilities. In the case of civil engineering, this process leads to problems arising from a lack of unity of effort. COA 1 will maintain the status quo during which no one agency currently assumes master planning and base development responsibilities for the entire installation. In the past, this concern has only been mitigated through ad hoc relationships which provide no guarantee to efficient operations, especially since Air Force units rotate with each 120-day AEF cycle.

Additionally, the status quo may create additional concerns from the Army perspective. Large portions of Army combat support and combat service support functions typically reside in the Reserve component (68% and 54% respectively). These forces can not be employed in large numbers without mobilization of the Reserves. This dependency on the Reserve component combined with a saturated LOGCAP capability has resulted in the Air Force deploying combat service support functions solely for the purpose of supporting Army units in OIF. In July 2004, the USAF had roughly 2,000 CSS personnel supporting Army operations including about 800 engineering personnel.

The Case for COA 2:

The next option considered is COA 2 in which Airmen are designated to open, establish, and maintain airfields. This option is an Air Force proposal and has guided significant organizational and training advancements for the last several years. In fact, the unofficial revised first draft version of JP 3-34 includes language acknowledging that “Air Force engineers are the units of choice for assessing, establishing, maintaining, and operating airbases that support fixed wing aircraft. Only Air Force engineer units have the specialized capabilities required to support
all engineering aspects of airfield operations ranging from early entry operations to war damage repair.”

In this COA, Airmen assigned to contingency response wings are specially trained to open and establish airfield operations at austere locations as soon as an airfield is seized. These organizations prepare for follow-on Air Force forces that bring operational capabilities and maintain the airfield portion of the installation. In the case of joint-use installations, the remainder of the installation would be supported by CS and CSS operations from the Service with the preponderance of assigned forces (often the Army).

Advantages: One of the primary advantages of this COA is the ability to take advantage of Service expertise. The USAF prepares to support the COA through its Agile Combat Support (ACS) CONOPS. ACS is a concept of support for both in-garrison and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS), and it lays out the general concepts for delivering ACS to Combatant Commanders. This COA offers the potential to employ the following specialized USAF engineering capabilities:

- En route base opening and operational support for strategic airlift
- Installation, operation, and maintenance of deployable airfield lighting systems
- Installation, operation, and maintenance of mobile aircraft arresting systems
- Design and construction of runways, taxiways, and parking aprons, including associated facilities
- Automatic building machine (k-span), tension fabric structure, and inflatable building operations
- Specialized shelter support and power generation for deployable aerospace command, control, and communication systems

COA 2 also will ensure joint operations are not limited by the inability to perform some of these same specialized functions. After action reports from OEF report several cases where inability to maintain airfield lighting systems by deployed CS organizations resulted in reduced flying operations and related operational impacts.
From the USAF perspective, this COA also will reduce the manpower burden of deployments in support of major theater wars (MTW) since USAF CS units would be responsible for just the airfield portion of the installation. As previously mentioned, the service with the preponderance of the forces would provide BOS for the rest of the installation and in most forward deployed joint-use installations, this would be a Service other than the USAF.

**Disadvantages**: As with COA 1, this option has disadvantages. First and foremost, it still relies on at least two different services to perform the full spectrum of combat support functions without much coordination. Although USAF support operations will be focused on airfield pavements and associated aerospace facilities such as airfield lighting and aircraft arresting systems, airfield operations will still be dependent on and impacted by infrastructure located outside of the airfield complex. As with the status quo, this option does not provide a solution to the disjointed nature and therefore results in all of the same disadvantages as those discussed for COA 1 (lack of unity of effort and limited CS resources).

An additional disadvantage presented by COA 2 stems from the fact that the Service with the preponderance of forces will be responsible for providing BOS for the remainder of the installation and all assigned personnel. This arrangement revives historical concerns that BOS standards are not consistent among the Services. Task Force Enduring Look recognized this imbalance and recommended development of “a common Joint definition for base operating support.”

The Case for COA 3:

Whereas COA 1 and COA 2 focus on who should provide support at joint-use installations, COA 3 attempts to solve the research question by focusing on how combat support
should be provided. This option proposes the development of a joint installation management
CONOPS to manage combat support functions. The individual organizations that provide CS
capabilities could come from any of the Services represented at the installation but would be
subordinated to an installation management structure that has the authority to manage their
efforts in a coordinated approach.

This approach is a novel concept only in its application to expeditionary forces and
installations. Garrison installations have long operated in this manner. Take for example
Andrews AFB in Maryland. The base is home to the host unit, the 89th Airlift Wing, which
conducts Special Air Mission (SAM) flights operating various aircraft including Air Force One.
The base is also home to the 113 Wing (Air National Guard) operating F-16s, C-38s and C-40s
and the 459th Air Refueling Wing (USAF Reserve) operating KC-135s. Additionally, Andrews
AFB is home to the Naval Air Facility, Washington which employs over 2,000 active and
reserve Navy and Marine Corps personnel and operates a variety of aircraft including a Marine
squadron of F/A-18 Hornets and Navy C-130s. Coordination of support functions and
responsibility for master planning remains with the 89th Airlift Wing while the resources and
responsibility for routine operations and maintenance (O&M) remains with the
components/Services. The details of Service responsibilities are spelled out in inter-service
support agreements. For example, if the Navy requests construction of a new dormitory, the
location must first be approved by USAF master planners. Once that hurdle is approved,
responsibility for funding the project remains with the Navy.

**Advantages:** The coordinated approach to installation management offers many
advantages to joint-use installations in an expeditionary environment. Most importantly, it
provides a solution to the current disjointed nature of combat support despite the potential
employment of combat support organizations from more than one Service. A designated
installation management authority can ensure a coordinated approach to master planning as well
as solve the unity of effort concern.

This COA remains consistent with the portion of doctrine that defines combat support as
a Service responsibility. Yet, at the same time, it has no adverse impact on the COCOM's
directive authority for logistics. In essence, this COA provides a recommendation to the
COCOM on how best to organize his forces. A joint installation management CONOPS can be
used to employ specialized combat support functions that the different Services have such as the
ones discussed in COA 2 above.

Disadvantages: Despite its promise, COA 3 has disadvantages too. Implementation of
this COA could be difficult for the Services to accept since it relies on the subordination of
Service support functions and capabilities to a structure to that may not fully understand that
Service’s requirements or agree on their priority. Finding the correct command relationship
between the installation management agency, and the CS organizations is a challenging task.

Comparison of COAs:

A formal comparison of each of the COAs is necessary in order to recommend the best
possible solution to the joint-use installation issue. As in the Joint planning process, COAs are
not compared to each other but are individually evaluated against a set of established criteria.\textsuperscript{31}
Criteria can be selected from any source; however, the principles of war, facets of operational
art, applicable doctrine and/or other guiding documents such as the USAF ACS CONOPS are the
most common.

Criteria that are particularly applicable to the issue of combat support are: Unity of
Command, Agility, Reliability, Integration, and Responsiveness. Unity of command ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. The other criteria were selected from the basic principles of joint logistics and agile combat support. Comparing each COA against the established criteria leads to the following decision matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
<th>COA 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services provide their own support</td>
<td>Airmen open, establish, and sustain airfields</td>
<td>Establish a joint installation management CONOPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Command</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agility</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Criteria Met</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected, neither COA 1 nor COA 2 meets the unity of command criteria since combat support forces remain subordinate only to their respective Services. Additionally, neither of the first two courses of action addresses the issue of integration. According to the ACS CONOPS, “integration is the bringing together or incorporation of diverse parts into a whole. This is not just a combination of parts; integration creates a dynamic whereby the sum is much greater than its constituent parts.” The course of action to establish a joint installation management CONOPS is the only solution that meets all criterion. Therefore, COA 3 becomes the recommended solution. Implementing this recommendation will require joint Service support and a series of critical steps.

Implementation of Recommended Solution:
STEP 1. Designate USJFCOM as Lead. The first key step is to designate a lead agency for developing and implementing the joint installation management concept. US Joint Forces Command is DoD’s lead joint force integrator and trainer. Therefore, this functional command is ideally suited to become the lead agency for this CONOPS.

STEP 2. Adopt Applicable Garrison Concepts. Many valuable concepts already exist to assist USJFCOM in their development. As previously mentioned, garrison installations already facilitate multiple Services with little or no conflict. Applicable concepts from the garrison approach should be given significant consideration. However, implementation of a joint installation management CONOPS won’t be as easy as simply adopting the garrison base support agreement process in its entirety.

Expeditory installations are different from garrison installations. Expeditory installations generally require synchronization and execution of combat support requirements on a more accelerated timeline and often will more dire consequences. Additionally, transformation initiatives to reduce the deployed logistics footprint typically result in fewer forces to conduct support operations than are available in garrison. This can be especially challenging in austere environments that have little or no contracting opportunities. Another difference between garrison installations and expeditory installations is the relative Service representation. Most garrison installations that serve two or more military departments have a disproportionate representation by one Service (often >10:1) whereas joint Army/Air Force installations during OEF and OIF had a more balanced approach (~3:1).

Despite these contrasts, the similarities between garrison and expeditory installations outweigh their differences and should be exploited. Air Force organization and command and control structures in a garrison setting are based on the objective wing concept with subordinate
groups and squadrons. Deployed structures are very similar and consist of an Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) with subordinate expeditionary groups and squadrons. Combat support and installation management of Air Force garrison bases and expeditionary bases is also accomplished in much the same way – through the agile combat support (ACS) concept of operations. ACS is a USAF distinctive capability that is highly mobile, technologically superior, robust, responsive, flexible, and fully integrated with combat operations. Its goal is to provide the same level of support for both in-garrison as well as expeditionary commanders. Air Force civil engineers are a significant part of the ACS CONOPS and enjoy a reputation as the world’s premier installations engineer force. This success is due in large part to the fact that Air Force engineers are organized, trained, and equipped to perform the same basic functions whether in-garrison or deployed. When the Air Force’s military engineers deploy, civilian engineers remain behind to maintain the installation.

Army installation support is performed slightly differently. In an effort to improve quality of life and installation management at its garrison locations, the Army activated the Installation Management Agency in Oct 2002. This agency provides equitable, effective and efficient management of Army installations worldwide to support mission readiness and execution. The IMA structure enables the Army to establish standards, resource to those standards, and deliver equitable service from installation to installation. Unfortunately, the development of the IMA has removed the responsibility for managing installations from the Major Commands (MACOMs) and operational units which they are supposed to support. Instead, installation management is centralized with the IMA controlling area support groups and subordinate Base Support Battalions at the installation level. This works well during garrison operations since installation management in the Army is conducted via a Public Works concept.
primarily staffed with civilian personnel. However, the process does not necessarily facilitate
the training and experience necessary to become proficient installation managers in a deployed
setting.

As previously mentioned the majority of the Army’s military CS and CSS personnel
reside outside of the active component. That means the Army’s military engineers are likely to
find themselves doing prolonged installation management tasks for the time as an organization
during the deployment. What’s more, the Army installation managers (Base Support Battalion
Commanders) don’t typically deploy. Installation management in a deployed setting reverts to
the operational units and typically becomes a responsibility of the Headquarters Company.

STEP 3. Define Installation JTFs. This disparity between the Services in garrison and deployed
installation management approaches highlights the need for a standardized approach – at least in
the deployed environment. Rather than simply adopt one Service approach and discard another,
USJFCOM should propose and define a commonly accepted installation management structure.

USCENTCOM has made improvements toward that end by significantly revising
CENTCOM Regulation Number 415-1, *Construction and Base Camp Development in the
USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), “The Sand Book.”* This document, published
1 Dec 04, defines a Base Operating Support Integrator (BOS-I) to manage base master planning
efforts for all Services/forces.\(^{39}\) Additionally, in deference to Air Force concerns, it calls for the
establishment of a Senior Airfield Authority (SAA) to plan and/or program for military
construction, leasing, and engineering support for all Services.\(^{40}\) Unfortunately, CCR 415-1 does
not clearly define the source for this expertise. Nor does it clearly define the authority of these
roles beyond coordination. A recent Army/Air Force issues team reached the same conclusion.\(^{41}\)

The Joint Task Force (JTF) has historically proven to be a better structure for organizing
joint operations. Defining and implementing a functional JTF for installation management at joint-use installations should be pursued. Installation Management JTFs could leverage the resources that all Services bring to the fight and solve coordination issues that stem from the separate Service approaches considered in COAs 1 and 2 above. The ideal JTF staff would have representation from all supported Services and could take advantage of command and control structures that already exist within the individual Services.

For example, the Installation Management JTF/CC could be the deployed Air Force Expeditionary Mission Support Group Commander. The Deputy Commander might be a deployed Army Base Support Battalion Commander. The JTF may designate an Installation Engineer, Force Protection Officer, Communications Officer, etc. These positions would be staffed with Service representatives within those particular functional areas. In some cases, JTF command and control positions could be leveraged as necessary so the personnel were in essence dual-hatted to perform JTF coordination issues and Service functional support in their traditional capacity. A notional Installation JTF structure is suggested below:42

![Installation JTF Structure](image)
Although not considered in depth as part of this research, USJFCOM should also study the installation-level JTF for application beyond the combat support functional perspective. An installation JTF may be designated to combine all Service capabilities (operational and support) to provide joint operations to a particular area within the battlespace. This arrangement is particularly appealing during Phase 4 (Transition) operations when forces are less mobile and typically operate and re-supply from fixed locations.

STEP 4. Establish Joint Training. Once the installation JTF structure is determined, establishing joint training is the obvious next step. The Air Force currently operates two training sites that could be used by USJFCOM to facilitate joint combat support training.

The Air Force’s Silver Flag training sites provide provides combat support training to active-duty Air Force units, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command as well as Army, Marine Corps and allied nations’ forces. Additionally, the Air Force operates the Eagle Flag training site at the Air Mobility Warfare Center (AMWC), Ft Dix, NJ to exercise opening and establishing an airbase to initial operating capability and provide initial command and control. Additionally, AMWC has established courses designed to provide training for MSG commanders, potential expeditionary MSG commanders, and A-4s. USJFCOM should provide additional resources (personnel, equipment, and funding) to make these sites the primary joint training sites for combat support forces and installation management command and control personnel.

Additional Recommendations:

The steps discussed above are critical to the successful implementation of the preferred COA and therefore should be considered mandatory. However, there are some additional
developments that can also facilitate implementation.

Normalizing BOS standards among the Services has long been a point of contention. As discussed in the COA analysis, differing BOS standards exacerbates problems presented by multiple services providing the same basic function of combat support. Having an agreed upon BOS standard that is specific with respect to quality and timeliness will enhance the ability of the installation JTF to manage joint combat support operations at a particular joint-use installation.

Similarly, standardizing the support equipment among Services would also have a synergistic effect on the implementation of the installation management JTF concept. In a study commissioned by the J-4 staff, SAIC noted that joint engineers are called upon to develop significant infrastructure facilities in austere environments. A common equipment set would enable each service to draw from prepositioned equipment sets and facilitate modular expansion at individual installations in a more efficient manner.\textsuperscript{46}

Standardizing BOS standards and CS equipment are not the only improvements that could improve the efficiency of combat support. Several improvements with respect to command and control authorities should be considered. First, the use of a joint logistics contract augmentation program might improve the warfighters ability to call upon contract support. Currently, the Services each operate separate programs to provide contract support their forces. These programs are known as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) for the Army, the Air Force Contractor Augmentation Program (AFCAP) for the Air Force and the Construction Capabilities Contract (CONCAP) for the Navy. Each program is managed by the Services they support and not the COCOMs. The process has resulted in coordination problems. The GAO recently completed a study that recommended better coordination of contract activities between DOD components (COCOMs, deployed units, etc.) involved with using LOGCAP.\textsuperscript{47}
One potential solution is to establish a joint contract augmentation program for each COCOM. This proposal would ensure installation JTFs could call on support without having to work within separate contract programs. Additionally, separate programs for each COCOM would reduce the overall size of any current Service program and would ensure each COCOM contract augmentation program is developed and awarded to address theater specific logistical issues. More importantly, a 1999 study recognized that a “joint contract would provide unity of effort in meeting JTF commander logistic responsibilities with an end result of improved efficiency of operations” and planning activities as recommended by the GAO.48

Finally, consideration should be given to provide Title 10 authority the COCOMs. This proposal would be an extension of the authorities suggested with respect to establishing a joint contract augmentation program. Title 10 authority would provide the necessary authority and resources that COCOMs need to equip the forces they employ. While this proposal should not be taken to remove authority from the Services, it could provide COCOMs the necessary flexibility to improve prepositioned war reserve materials and supplies.

Conclusion:

US military forces will continue to operate in an expeditionary manner for the foreseeable future. That being said, the current disjointed nature of combat support operations at joint-use installations must be corrected. Many proposals have been considered but an evaluation of the most common shows that the true solution will be dependent on correcting the command and control structure for combat support operations.

Establishing a functional JTF at the installation is the best means to ensure command and control and efficient coordination of various Service expertise and capabilities. The installation
JTF may even soon apply to all operations (operational and support) at joint-use installations thereby creating a truly joint operational capability for the assigned area of responsibility.

While establishing an installation management JTF may be a new concept, it is grounded in historical processes that are found both in garrison and deployed. The key to implementing the concept is to designate a lead agency, develop the strategy by adopting applicable garrison concepts, and establish joint training opportunities.

Additionally, standardizing BOS standards and equipment among the Services would have a positive effect on the installation JTF concept. Significant consideration should be given to improving the COCOM’s roles and responsibilities in providing combat support for the forces they employ. Establishing a joint contract augmentation program for each COCOM and providing the authority and resources to equip employed forces is one such improvement.

Ultimately, the installation management JTF concept has the best chance to improve the current disjointed nature of combat support. This CONOPS will solve the unity of command issues and Service integration problems that all other proposals have yet to address.

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1 For the purpose of this report, the term combat support (CS) is synonymous with base operating support (BOS) and is intended to include those combat support and combat service support (CSS) functions that typically take place within the confines of the installation.
2 The 2004 National Military Strategy defines the attributes of the force and in doing so lists ‘Expeditionary’ as one of those attributes.
3 Task Force Enduring Look (TFEL), *Quick Look #1. Quick Look Reports: A Primer, March 2002.*, 1
4 Task Force Enduring Look (TFEL), *Quick Look #2. Combat Support and Expeditionary Basing (U), March 2002. (Secret)*, 1. Information extracted is unclassified.
5 Ibid, 4.
6 Based on the author’s experience at Kirkuk AB in northern Iraq. The Army’s 173d Airborne Brigade called the same installation FOB Bayonet.
8 Based on the author’s experience as Commander of the 506th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron during AEF Silver, Nov 2003 – Mar 2004.
11 JP 4-0, vi.
13 Joint Publication 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, 5 July 2000, vi.
14 JP 4-0, vi.
16 JP 3-34, II-2.
17 Based on the author’s experience as Commander of the 506th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron during AEF Silver, Nov 2003 – Mar 2004
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
22 TFEL, Quick Look #2. Combat Support and Expeditionary Basing (U), March 2002. (Secret), 1. Information extracted is unclassified.
25 Joint Publication (JP) 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, Unofficial Revised First Draft, 1 March 2005., B-C-4
27 JP 3-34, A-4
29 TFEL, Quick Look #2. Combat Support and Expeditionary Basing (U), March 2002. (Secret), 5. Information extracted is unclassified.
30 Andrews Air Force Base (AFB) website available at http://www.dcmilitary.com
31 JP 5-00.1, III-11
32 Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001, A-2
33 ACS CONOPS, 7.
34 Some smaller USAF installations may be commanded by an Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) vice AEW.
35 ACS CONOPS, 1.
40 Ibid. 19.
41 Major Susan Smith (AF/ILEX), email dated 15 April 2005 regarding the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and Air Force Lessons Learned (AF/XOL) site visit to examine Joint Airfield/Airbase Operations which concluded 8 April 2005.
42 Adapted from Joint Publication (JP) 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999, II-3
46 Engineer Capabilities Study: A Path to the Future, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Final Report, 30 September 2002, Appendix 6, 14

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