THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THAILAND’S COUNTERINSURGENCY
by
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The Need for Intelligence Reform in Thailand’s Counterinsurgency

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

In Thailand, post January 2004, the Islamic insurgency in the south has surged constantly. During this time, the insurgency has not refrained from attacking and intimidating innocent people; government officials are also targeted especially the military, the police, and the local community leaders. The Thai government has developed its policies and ad hoc organization to confront this problem, and improved related laws in hopes of improving the situation, but so far, little the government has done has been successful.

This thesis examines the Thai government’s counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy post-2004 to cope with the Muslim insurgency in that country, and focuses on the ad-hoc organization of Thai officials charged with executing the COIN strategy, with emphasis placed on the intelligence system, in particular, in order to recommend the appropriate ways to reform the intelligence system.

The purpose of this case study is first to suggest improvements to the Thai Intelligence Community that will enable it to become more effective in fighting the insurgency. The second goal of this thesis is to suggest modifications to the Thai government’s strategy and its organization that could enable the government to pursue more effective counter-insurgency activities.

Thailand’s Intelligence, Network Organization.
ABSTRACT

In Thailand, post January 2004, the Islamic insurgency in the south has surged constantly. During this time, the insurgency has not refrained from attacking and intimidating innocent people; government officials are also targeted especially the military, the police, and the local community leaders.

The Thai government has developed its policies and ad hoc organization to confront this problem, and improved related laws in hopes of improving the situation, but so far, little the government has done has been successful. In particular, the intelligence has often lacked accuracy, in terms of the information received, lacked the opportunity for timely warnings, and lacked hard evidence with which to accuse the movement’s masterminds. In this regard, the intelligence operation has mainly relied on HUMINT derived from interviews, interrogations, and informants. Increasingly, it has become harder to receive information because informants frequently are intimidated and fearful of cooperating with authorities. Conversely, the authorities themselves can not provide enough security for their informants, so receiving accurate information has become increasingly difficult.

This thesis examines the Thai government’s counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy post-2004 to cope with the Muslim insurgency in that country, and focuses on the ad-hoc organization of Thai officials charged with executing the COIN strategy, with emphasis placed on the intelligence system, in particular, in order to recommend the appropriate ways to reform the intelligence system.
The purpose of this case study is first to suggest improvements to the Thai Intelligence Community that will enable it to become more effective in fighting the insurgency in those cases where the state either cannot receive, or only receives, limited support from the local population. The second goal of this thesis is to suggest modifications to the Thai government’s strategy and its organization that could enable the government to pursue more effective counter-insurgency activities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In Thailand, about 2.8 million people worship Islam, or 4.5% of the total population, which, otherwise, is predominantly Buddhist (Islam Religion, n.d.).

Figure 1. Demographic of Malay-Muslim in southern Thailand. From “Information about South Thailand Insurgency,” by ebamgoo.com, at http://www.ebamgoo.com/index.php?q=South_Thailand_insurgency.

Eighty percent of Thailand’s Muslims are concentrated in the Provinces of Satun, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala at the southern end of Thailand (Maisonti, 2004, p. 6). The populations of these southern provinces are different from the mainstream Thai population in terms of their ethnic background, religious practices and language. The majority of Thai Muslims in the southernmost region are ethnic Malay and actually call themselves “Thai Malays,” or “Pattani-
Thai, Chinese and Pakistani Muslims constitute the remainder of the southern inhabitants. The majority of the Muslims in Thailand are Sunnis, and the remainders are Shiite. Ethnic Malays, which are the second largest minority group in Thailand, have had the greatest influence of all Thai Muslims because geographic factors and cultural affinities toward Islam have promoted a strong Malay identification with neighboring Malaysia, and the Thai government has granted a number of cultural, linguistic, and religious concessions (Department of the Army, 1970, as cited in Maisonti, 2004). The people in these four provinces speak two languages: Thai and Jawi, or a Malay dialect. Roux (1998) mentions that Jawi is a Malay dialect which reflects the language of the sultanate of Pattani. The Pattani dialect is similar in vocabulary, morphology, and phonology to that of the bordering Malay state of Kelantan. Some Malays of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are not interested in the Thai language because they think that Thai is the language of Buddhism (as qtd. in Maisonti, 2004, p. 6).

Despite the difference of religious makeup, however, the Thai government treats all Thais equally, regardless of their background. As in many other countries, all citizens enjoy freedom of religion and the freedom to follow diverse cultural practices. For Islamic people in Thailand, the chief Muslim, called “Chularajamontri,” came to his official position after being selected by the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand with approval of the Central Islamic Committee of the province. The chief Muslim performs as the leader of all Islamic practices in Thailand (“Islamic Information,” n.d.). However, Thai Muslims in the southernmost region of Thailand do not regard the chief
Muslim as highly as Thai Muslims in other areas of the country because they perceive themselves as Thai Malays and consider the chief Muslim to be associated with the Thai government (Ampunan, 2005).

Thai Muslims fall under the Thai political system and the jurisdiction of the Thai government by virtue of their Thai citizenship. Within the hierarchy of the Thai political structure, authority originates with the Thai central government and passes through the province to the district, sub-district, and village. Officials working at the province and district levels are selected by the central government, but the heads of the sub-district and villages are selected by the villagers upon approval of the Thai district officers (Fraser, 1966 as cited in Maisonti, 2004, pp. 7-8). At the sub-district and village levels, in addition to the community leader, there is an Islamic religious leader in each community. Both the community leader and religious leader are Muslims and selected by the local population; however, most of local people in these communities look upon their community leaders as Thai officials. Therefore they give their respect to the religious leaders rather than to their community leaders (Ampunan, 2005).

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Pattani is on the Malaya Peninsula, formerly called “Lungasuka,” an area that in the past included both the Kedah state in Malaysia and the Pattani province of Thailand. It was a significant seaport for trade with foreigners from Southeast Asia, so it absorbed cultures from China, India, and several Arab countries. The local people worshiped Buddhism and Hinduism until the Malays immigrated
to the area and brought Islam. The gradual disappearance of the former regime caused Buddhism and Hinduism to become less popular and caused Islam to broaden rapidly in the area. This occurrence affected the social structures and cultures and caused them eventually to shift more towards Islam and Islamic traditions.

During the 13th - 14th centuries, the Sukhothai regime occupied the Malaya Peninsula as a colonial territory after the ruler of Pattani surrendered to the more vigorous Sukhothai. Pattani dedicated tributes to Sukhothai; however, Sukhothai never actually managed the administration of Pattani because of the long distances, preferring a distant administrative type of relationship.

Under the Ayudhaya regime, during the 14th - 18th centuries, the administration of Pattani remained the same; that is, Pattani was administered from afar without Ayudhaya intervention, but only with the provision that Pattani acknowledge its role as a territory of Ayudhaya. During Ayudhaya, there was initially trade with Portugal that allowed the Portuguese to establish a commerce station along the east coast. As a consequence, Pattani’s economy expanded rapidly, providing the ruler of Pattani a sense of independence. Thus, when Ayudhaya changed its own King, Pattani tried to announce its independence but was conquered by Ayudhaya. In the late 16th century (1767), Ayudhaya fought to defend itself from attacks by Burma until Ayudhaya collapsed, after which Pattani declared itself to be independent from Ayudhaya until to the end of the Thonburi regime in the 18th century (1777-1782).
In 1782, at the beginning of the Ratanakosin regime, relations with Pattani were strengthened by the ruler of Ratanakosin who directly appointed Malay to rule Pattani. It was the first time that Siam allowed the people of Pattani, who were loyal to Ratanakosin regime, to rule themselves; however, Pattani still attempted to declare independence. Siam had carefully improved its administration of Pattani by sending an authority from the central administration to be the governor of Pattani for the first time, and also by using assimilation to mitigate forthcoming problems. The governor of Siam relocated people from the vicinity into Pattani. But as problems frequently occurred, Siam had to improve its administration again. This time Pattani was divided into seven provinces in such a way that they were separated and ruled based upon the portion of Buddhism and Islam in each province, with the majority in each portion allowed to select its ruler. Inevitably there were some problems, but Siam applied a rigorous policy and authorized the former ruler to manage or participate in the administration of the newly formed province.

During the reign of King Rama V, he reformed the administration by creating a centralized administration to mainly stabilize the provinces while also enabling them to resist colonialism from westerners. This central administration reduced the authority of the rulers of the provinces, causing them to become very angry. The rulers of the provinces attempted to rebel but were unsuccessful until Siam yielded by giving some of Malaya to Britain, including a portion of Pattani, in exchange for the understanding that the remaining portions of Pattani and Siam were not to become a British colony. At that time, Siam gave the lands
of Klantun, Tranganu, Peruk, and Kedah to Britain in 1909. Since then, conflict associated with the administration of these lands had been reduced. During the King Rama VI reign, Siam decreased the rigorousness of its administration and allowed the Muslim people have more prominent roles in the administration of these lands, so eventually the situation became rather peaceful.

In 1932, Thailand itself transferred governmental power from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, after which the former Thai administration also changed to a regional administration divided into provinces, districts, and sub-districts. At this point, many conflicts arose from the central government’s strict policy against the Malays’ culture. This policy caused an uprising that required the Thai government to use strong military force to quell it, and led to the organization of separatist groups (Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army, n.d.).

In 1933, the first election since the transition of power, Thai Muslims in the three southern provinces expected to have Muslims as their governmental representatives. Unfortunately, no Thai Muslims were elected, instead Buddhist representatives were chosen. Four years later, though, Thai Muslims did have government representatives from the three provinces, they were on duty for only one year.

In 1938 Prime Minister Pibulsongkram assumed the leadership position of Thailand and declared the Thai nationalistic policy for nation building, which directly affected Thai Muslims in the south. From 1939-1944, the government applied a policy of assimilation with the aim of
reforming and reconstructing the social and cultural aspects of the entire country. Government officials issued regulations to be enforced upon Thai Muslims that, among other restrictions, forbid the observance of Friday as a holiday, and revoked the Islamic judges who had ruled upon family and property cases among Muslims in 1944. Since then, Thai Muslims from the three southern provinces have brought their cases to the Islamic courts in Malaysia. However, the Thai nationalistic policy was terminated in 1944 after Pibulsongkram lost his position. In 1945 Khuang Abhaiwongse, the subsequent Prime Minister, used a softer approach and tried to understand the Thai Muslims by increasingly listening to the local people and decreasing the strictness of the assimilation policy.

During the Khuang administration, he promulgated the Islamic Patronage Act to restore the damages caused by the Pibulsongkram administration: this restoration included bringing back some Islamic religious laws and, specifically, renewing the appointment of the chief of the Muslim “Chularajamontri,” a position which had been canceled after the Ayudhaya regime. However, the process for the appointment of this position was undertaken rapidly to relieve the problems at that time, and the individuals who previously had been Chularajamontri had never actually been Thai Muslims from the southern provinces. Therefore, the Thai Muslims in the southern provinces had never accepted the chief of the Muslims. Nevertheless, these approaches indicated a positive effort at communication between the Malay Muslims and the Thai government. Unfortunately, these approaches occurred just after World War II, during an economic decline, and, therefore, were ineffective, due to
the people’s greater concern for their own living conditions. However, discontent over the former policy remained in people’s minds because of the previous prejudicial treatment from Thai authorities.

During 1947, the Thamrongnavasawat administration attempted to draw Thai Muslim political leaders into political involvement, but Pibulsongkram, blackmailed by a coup group into posing as its official leader, assumed power on November 8, 1947. However, Pibulsongkram could not assume the position of Prime Minister because he was already on record as a war criminal as a result of his joining with the Japanese in World War II. Therefore, the coup group appointed Khuang Abhaiwongse to be the interim Prime Minister, but Abhaiwongse could not solve the problems and did not consider any requests which the former administration received from Malay Muslims. After the coup, Malay Muslims had no hope of negotiating with the government and, therefore, turned both to fighting and to incorporating religion into their political strategy. Eventually, Pibulsongkram assumed the Prime Minister’s position on April 8, 1948. In 1948, there were many violent incidents in the south which the government quelled, during the process of which many people were killed. Consequently, some Malay Muslims fled to Malaysia and some of them organized into a group to fight with the Thai government (Aphornsuvan, 2004).

The expansion of the Malay resistance in the 1950s was accelerated and consolidated by the formation in Malaya of the Gabungam Melayu Pattani Raya (GAMPAR, the Greater Pattani Malayu Association), an organization set up to incorporate Thailand's four majority Muslim provinces into
Malaya and the Pattani People's Movement (PPM), a Thailand-based organization which had the same goal. However, when the leaders of GAMPAR and PPM died in 1953 and 1954 respectively, the organizations disintegrated. Their scattered memberships were collected by Adun Na Saiburi or Tonku Abdul Jalun bin Tonku Abdul Mudtalib, the deputy leader of GAMPAR (Cheman, n.d.), when he established the Pattani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani, BNPP) in 1959, the first organized armed group to call for Pattani's independence (International Crisis Group, May 18, 2005, p. 6).

B. SEPARATIST GROUPS: ORGANIZING SEPARATIST GROUPS

1. National Pattani Liberation Front or Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP)

Founded by the former GAMPAR’s leader “Tonku Abdul Jalun Bin Tonku Abdul Muktarib,” BNPP was the first Pattani separatist group to have armed forces. The group’s goal was to be independent from Thailand (Cheman, n.d.). Its strategy was twofold: to create violent incidents that would indicate that the Thai government could not contain the situation, and to provoke the Thai authorities into aggressively quelling the situation. In doing so, the governments’ aggressive response would foster the conditions by which new recruits could be induced into joining the group and sympathetic Muslim countries could be prompted to pressure the Thai government (International Crisis Group, 2005).

By 1990, the name of the movement was changed to the BIPP to conform to the struggle launched by separatist
Muslims throughout the world. For reasons that are unclear, since 2002 the organization has ceased its activity in Thailand (Maisonti, 2004).

2. The National Revolutionary Front or Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)

This group broke apart from the BNPP because the BNPP’s primary members, who were the former rulers of Pattani, were conservative and trying to resurrect the sultanate. The BRN, which broke apart from the BNPP, initially called itself a “progressive group” before adopting the name BRN, and refusing to cooperate with the BNPP. In 1963 Karim Hussan, head of the progressive group, seceded from the BNPP and then organized the BRN. The goal of the BRN was to establish an Independent Pattani state. In the beginning, the BRN placed emphasis on forming a political body, rather than pursuing guerrilla warfare. The BRN used an Islamic religious school or “Pondok” as a foundation for the organization’s operations. Then in 1968, it formed its own armed forces (Cheman, n.d.). Karim Hussan, along with the young generation, dubbed their ideology “Islamic socialism.” With this ideology, they formed relations with the Communist party of Malaysia and the Communist party of Thailand. The three factions shared the same objective of destabilizing the area along the border of the two countries. Therefore, the BRN received support from conservative groups in Malaysia and the Middle East. However, the endeavor of the BRN to expand the ideology of Islamic socialism and nationalism generated conflict within the group. Karim Hussan differed with Haji M., and by 1980 they separated from each other. Karim Hussan turned to rigorous religious
activities instead of Islamic socialism. In 1984, there was a vote within Karim’s faction for leadership in which Karim Hussan lost to the young leader “Cheku Peng or Rosa Buraso or Abdul Razak Raman.” The new leader preferred to use armed forces to fight with Thai authorities and called his faction the “BRN Congress.”

As for Haji M., he wanted to use political means to fight for the long-term by using existing Islamic religious school as a base, coupled with sabotage actions in urban areas. He calls his faction the “BRN Coordinate.” Karim Hussan still claimed to be the leader of the BRN, but gathered his people to organize the BRN Ulama or Gerakan Ulama Pattani as the third faction of the BRN which focused on religious activities (International Crisis Group, 2005).

3. Pattani United Liberation Organisation or Pertubuhan Pembebasan Pattani Bersatu (PULO)

In 1968, PULO was founded by Bira Kotanila, or Kabir Abdul Rahman, who graduated with a degree in political science from India. This group received most of its support from students in Malaysia, Pakistan, and several Arab countries. The objective of this group was to separate the southern provinces from Thailand in order to establish an independent state.

In the early 1980s, PULO split into “PULO” and “New PULO.” The original PULO still had Bira Kotanila as a leader, while the new PULO had Abdul Raman Betong as a leader. In 1988, the New PULO split into PULO-88 with Arong Mooreng, who graduated with a Master’s degree in political Science from the University of Lund in Sweden, as its leader. In 1998, Abdul Raman Betong, the leader of New PULO,
was arrested, but the movement still pressed on without exposing the leader (Cheman, n.d.). However, the PULO and New PULO have since tried to patch up their differences and strengthen their mutual cooperation. At present, it is reported that the two factions have dispatched their armed units to carry out joint military and political operations in some areas of the three southern border provinces (Primer: Muslim Separatism in Southern Thailand, 2002, as cited in Maisonti, 2004).

In the political sense, PULO stands between the Islamic socialism of the BRN and the conservative BNPP, with the goal of establishing an independent state. Its ideology is nationalism which adheres to race, rather than to Islam and religion. Yet even if PULO is not adhering to religious principles, it cites the Koran as a justification for the right to create violence (International Crisis Group, 2005).

4. Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement or Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani

In the mid 1980s, Wahuddin Muhammud, the vice leader of the BIPP/BNPP, separated from his group and formed the Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani (GMP). At the end of the 1980s, Abdul raman Pute, or Sik Kumae Unta, declared a separation from the GMP and formed the Garakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), due to the original leader placing emphasis on political rather than military operations (Cheman, n.d.).

This group has as its goal the establishment of a Pattani state with ties to the growing international popularity of Islamic fundamentalism more so than the BRN and PULO. In the beginning, the GMIP joined in operations
with new PULO for a short time, but later the GMIP leadership had a conflict of interest with the leadership of New PULO (International Crisis Group, 2005).

Recently, the GMIP has become a group which embraces less ideology and is considered instead as more of a criminal gang (Ampunan, 2005).

5. The United Front for the Independence of Pattani or Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Pattani

In October 1991, the BIPP/BNPP, BRN, New PULO, and GMIP reached an agreement to form an umbrella organization named the Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Pattani (BERSATU) with Dr. Mahadi Da-Ud as its leader (Cheman, n.d.). The reason for gathering into one group was to unify all the movements and to carry the struggle in a unified direction in order to avoid confusion in soliciting and accepting financial donations from foreign countries (Maisonti, 2004). However, the BERSATU’s leadership can only give direction but can not command (Ampunan, 2005).

Subsequently, the BERSATU has manifested an intention to resist both the colonization efforts of the Thai government and the Thai government’s policies which seem intended to eradicate the way of life, beliefs, and culture of Malay Muslims. The emergence of BERSATU sparked a desire among the separatist groups to join in liberating Pattani so that it could be independent again (Cheman, n.d.).

Currently, the perpetrators can be categorized into four groups which have related activities, connections and status, as detailed in the following paragraphs.
Separatists: The main groups that are playing key roles in fostering a wave of violence are the BRN Co-ordinate, New PULO and the GMIP under the guidance of the BERSATU organization, using the elements of history, race (Pattani-Malay), religion and cultural schisms as the focal points for bitter campaigns. They have apparently been plotting attacks in the hopes of seeking assistance from Islamic countries and drawing international attention to the problems.

Religious Leaders: The groups of Thai Muslim leaders in the southern provinces and Muslim fundamentalists in the region, as well as Muslim separatists, can be divided along two tracks:

- Islamic Teachers such as the owners of Muslim religious schools, or pondoks, and Islamic clergy.
- Islamic Practitioners such as Provincial Islamic Committees and Mosque Committees.

Political Groups: These groups are local community leaders, canvassers and local politicians who stir up unrest for the benefit of their political advantage.

Illegal Businesses/Power Abusing Groups: The illegal trading groups have become acquainted with the politicians in order to cover up and facilitate their illegal business, as well as to share in the profits.

There is a suspicion that the Islamic separatist groups were behind most of the aggravation and the unrest in the south. However, there were also other groups (Ampunan, 2005).
C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In 1980, General Prem Tinsulanond’s administration launched a policy to deal with the situation in the southern provinces. The policy emphasized public participation, economic development, and a broad amnesty, under which many separatist fighters and communists gave themselves up to the government. He set up a new organization to integrate jobs among agencies as a result of the new policy. A Civil-Military-Police joint headquarters 43 (CPM43) was established to coordinate security operations; it was supervised strictly in its efforts to legally eliminate murder and disappearances. Additionally, the government also
launched the Policy of Attraction, aimed at eliminating sympathy for separatist groups by increasing political participation and promoting economic development projects in the region. Military and civil officials helped establish committees at the village level to promote economic development and security.

On the political front, the government set up the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) which was under control of the Forth Army Area in the beginning, then shifted to the Ministry of Interior. SBPAC had many boards which were comprised of local people. Moreover, it oriented non-Muslim officials toward understanding the Malay culture and dialect (Jawi). The two main objectives for the SBPAC administration were to foster coordination among state agencies, and to both eradicate corruption and improve prejudicial attitudes among officials. Importantly, SBPAC had the authority to reward, remove, and punish civil officials based on performance. This policy worked rather effectively, and both the number of violent incidents and the number of separatists decreased.

Yet even though the government projects improved economic welfare and drew Muslim people to participate in politics, two main problems still existed. The first was official corruption, especially within the police, and the second was the political integration of policies that still emphasized Thai-centric elements. Many officials continued to think that the Islamic cultural demands related to the political demands of Malay’s separatist groups, and their official response was still to attempt to convert that
Islamic identity. One important factor was the promotion of the Thai language throughout education and the media. Teachers in elementary schools and high schools taught pupils to identify themselves as Thai Muslim, not Malay Muslim. The Thai language was the only one that could be taught as a common language. Even though in the private religious schools (Pondok), students might choose to study English, French, German, or Arabic as a second language, Jawi was prohibited. This policy succeeded in the sense that most Malay Muslim children now speak Thai, but on the other hand, it fostered the sense that the Malay language and culture were being eliminated.

Even though many problems still remain, the two state agencies worked quite effectively and brought about a generally peaceful situation in the provinces. However, the Thai government did not have confidence in the situation with respect to the issue of external support, especially from the opposition party in Malaysia. Earlier in 1998, the Thai government collaborated with the Malaysian government to wipe out the membership of separatist groups in the two countries. Malaysia pursued and captured some of the separatist members who lived in Malaysia and some fled to other countries. The Thai government announced amnesty for separatists and conducted a diplomacy campaign towards those Middle Eastern countries with sympathies towards separatists in Thailand. Since these strategies first came about, the number of separatists has diminished because they no longer have sanctuary and they lack financial resources. In response, they have turned to illegal means to survive.
Nevertheless, the principal members of some groups have attempted still to fight. PULO has created its own website of propaganda. Meanwhile, the New PULO has used the remainder of its members to conduct small-scale operations. The BRN have been affected the least by the collaboration of Thai and Malaysia, because few of its members have surrendered to the Thai government. The BRN coordinated faction has adopted a strategy which formerly placed emphasis on the political, then shifted in 1992 to procure juveniles to join the group. At this time, the BRN coordinate has formed the BRN Youth (called “Permuda” in Malay language). Currently, the BRN coordinate would be the strongest and most systematic among the known separatist groups (International Crisis Group, 2005).

D. THE NEW ROUND OF COMBATING THE THAI GOVERNMENT

During 2002-2003, there were a few assaults on police checkpoints, and small teams of military also seized weapons. But also at this time there was a subtle change in tactics - the assaults occurred simultaneously in many places. This tactic indicated a high-level of proficiency which was more complex than the sporadic attacks of the past. Recently this tactic became the new pattern of operations: that is, coordinated attacks on police posts located within remote areas and raids by masked gunmen in order to capture weapons. Also during this time, the number of violent incidents per year increased from approximately 50, 75, 119, to more than 1,000 in the years from 2001-2004, respectively.
The most major of these violent incidents occurred on January 4, 2004, when insurgents raided the 4th Army Development Battalion in the Narathiwat province, getting away with assault rifles and machine guns. The raid was a carefully planned, well-coordinated series of attacks that began around 2:00 a.m., and resulted in the seizure of some 400 weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, pistols and rocket launchers. Afterwards, the Thai government declared martial law in the three southern provinces and sent reinforcing troops for the 4th Army Area.

Previously, the government had always insisted that violent incidents in the southern provinces, including earlier arms raids, were the work of vicious criminals and drug dealers. But the sophistication of the January 4, 2004 raid made the government admit that the attackers were professional and well-trained, which would indicate separatist training and capability. The two main reasons for the upsurge in violence during 2002-2004 are as follows:

1. The conflict between the military and police in the three southern provinces led to the canceling of both CPM43 and SBPAC in May 2002, which has contributed, in part, to a much worse situation. SBPAC had good relations with local community leaders and served as the channel by which community leaders could express problems. CPM43 provided security and intelligence by accessing the community and keeping the local people informed. The two major organizations contributed to remedying problems through synchronized and systematic efforts.

2. The local population experienced a loss of faith in the rule of law. Fear and resentment were created by arbitrary arrests, police brutality and the government’s failure to provide justice to victims. These problems stirred up the historical
grievances, which have led people to have sympathy and support for separatist groups (International Crisis Group, 2005).

In March 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin established the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) to drive and coordinate tasks of military, police and intelligence organizations. It also supervised the policy of improved economic, social, and educational conditions for the three provinces. Nevertheless, there were a few conflicts among officials, and, therefore, the SBPPC was reconstructed in October 2004 with the replacement of the commanding officer. However, the situation to date has not yet improved (Ampunan, 2005).
II. THE THAI INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

Since the Thaksin administration cancelled the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and Civil-Military-Police Joint Headquarters 43 (CPM43) on May 1, 2002, the government then assigned all the state agencies under the provinces’ administration the task of integrating the former functions of the SBPAC and CPM43 into the agencies’ existing responsibilities. Nevertheless, the violence still remained and tended to be more serious because there was no organization specifically dedicated to the problem of synchronizing all functions. Consequently, on June 27, 2003, the government approved the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Problem Solving and Southern Border Province Development, with the Minister of Interior as its chairman. This committee was established to integrate cooperation among state agencies; nevertheless, it could not implement the government strategy. Therefore, the government approved the establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) to improve the situation. Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc Committee on Problem Solving and Southern Border Province Development was not cancelled, but its role was changed to that of a coordinator between the 4th Army Area and SBPPC.

A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIRST SBPPC’S

The first SBPPC was established on March 24, 2004, with the aim of being the primary central coordinator among all state agencies. It was supervised by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) with the military acting as the
main body responsible for the performance of all state agencies in the ISOC. However, the same problem still remained: practically, the SBPPC could not integrate all of the various works, because it had not been assigned the authority to command all organizations and all projects of each state agency. Therefore, the budgets and projects of each agency at the province level came directly from their parent units without verification by the SBPPC.

According to this structure, there was an ISOC Intelligence element that was responsible for intelligence similar to the staff section at the policy level, where most of the authorities were military personnel. In the SBPPC structure, the government attempted to integrate all intelligence disciplines under a single manager by establishing the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center as the supervisory unit. Many officers from the Army and ISOC were sent there to increase efficiency and cooperation between the SBPPC and ISOC, but this effort at improvement did not work very well. This was because the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center was a new organization with an inexperienced staff who were unfamiliar with the specific situation and background of the area. Most of the actual intelligence work was done by the 4th Army Area. Nevertheless, the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center represented a good starting point for the integration of jobs and the creation of a conduit for future cooperation and sharing of information (Ampunan, 2005). However, once again violent incidents still remained, and the government then appointed the Armed Forces deputy commander to take
charge and readjust the SBPPC structure, beginning in November 2004. Figure 3 shows the organization chart for the ISOC (Thai Senate, 2004c).

Figure 3. Organization Chart for ISOC. From the Office of the Prime Minister, Order 154/2003, June 27, 2003.
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECOND SBPPC’S

The SBPPC during the second period was controlled by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Director General of the SBPPC, and gained more power to command and control subordinate units. Each framework and project was generated and approved by the SBPPC to de-conflict plans and increase cooperation among agencies. This absolute power allowed the SBPPC to more independently manage plans and projects; moreover, it was attached to more support units to sustain the various projects (Thai Senate, 2004b). At the NSC, there was only a small intelligence element at work which actually had very few roles in intelligence. This is because the government normally received a direct report from the SBPPC. The intelligence element at the NSC functioned as a coordinator which collected and summarized information from the SBPPC and other agencies. Meanwhile, the SBPPC had added more staff, including civilian, police, and military personnel to allow all sections to have sufficient expertise in order to operate effectively. At the SBPPC there was an Intelligence Element which performed as an intelligence staff, the chief of which was from the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The SBPPC Intelligence Element was responsible for directing, coordinating, and supervising all intelligence tasks to de-conflict and synchronize the tasks of each agency. For intelligence operations, there was the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center which performed like the central control for multi-disciplines of intelligence. Both intelligence sections worked systematically and with integrity.
Although the cooperation among agencies within the SBPPC increased, the overall operation was still not good enough. This was due to the fact that most staffs came from various organizations with different work cultures and had trouble becoming familiar with one another. As a result, the earlier cooperation was not firm, but there were good indications that cooperation would gradually be better in the future. Figure 4 shows the organization chart for the National Security Council (Thai Senate, 2004c).

Despite progress, the situation did not meet the satisfaction of policy makers. Therefore, the government agreed to readjust the SBPPC structure for the second time in May 2005. At this time the structure was adjusted only at the policy level, but not inside the SBPPC structure itself.

At the policy level, the government established two committees located in Bangkok: the Committee for Safety and Peace in the Southern Border Province is responsible for developing policy and strategy in order to solve problems in the southern provinces; and the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee is responsible for overseeing and following-up on SBPPC projects to insure such projects are in line with the strategy. Therefore, the administrative power of the SBPPC was reduced to a subordinate level under the control of these two committees Figure 5 shows the revised organization chart with these new committees (Thai Senate, 2004b).
Figure 5. Revised Organization Chart with New Committees. From the Office of the Prime Minister, Order 200/2005, May 31, 2005.

According to the new administration, there was no intelligence structure at the policy level because the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee oversaw only the operations of all agencies which worked in the southern
provinces, but was not responsible for intelligence. Instead, the government had assigned the National Intelligence Coordinating Center to the area to function at the same level as the SBPPC. Therefore, the government directly received intelligence reporting from both the SBPPC and National Intelligence Coordinating Center (Senior Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 20, 2007, personal interview with author). Since the SBPPC had to work under supervision of the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee, the former problems of the SBPPC returned. The SBPPC could not integrate plans and budgets by itself; meanwhile, the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee could not integrate all activities and projects by itself. This was because the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee only had the role of supervising follow-up work and coordination, and was not allowed to take action. Also, the administration of the entire bureaucratic structure at that time created complications in the chain of command (Thai Senate, 2004b).

The work-flow approval procedure at that time was somewhat awkward, because the SBPPC’s plans and projects had to be approved by the Policy and Strategy Administration Committee first. Meanwhile, intelligence tasks in the SBPPC remained under the same structure, where the SBPPC Intelligence Element worked as a staff section and the SBPPC Joint Intelligence Center worked as central control of the multi-disciplines of intelligence. Additionally, the National Intelligence Coordinating Center was assigned to perform intelligence tasks at the same level with the SBPPC. Meanwhile, the Police Operations Center was set up to supervise police performance in the area. As a result, the
integration of the SBPPC was undermined, causing an increase in the competition among agencies, all of them ignoring the administration from the SBPPC. Most staffs perceived themselves as aligned with their parent units and did not share a sense mutual responsibility. Therefore, their efforts and loyalties were directed toward their original affiliations, and not toward any strong commitment to a collective operation with the SBPPC (Ampunan, 2005).

C. THE INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER

After the military coup in September 2006, the new administration cancelled the SBPPC and resurrected the ISOC as the organization responsible for domestic security. This time the ISOC was the central organization in charge of managing and coordinating all performances in pursuit of the government’s domestic security policy, strategy, and critical projects in particular. Within the ISOC structure, the government also resurrected the Internal Security Operations Region (ISOR) under the command of the Army Area commander. For the 4th Internal Security Operations Region, the previous organizations which had the responsibility for the southern provinces were resurrected: CPM43 was responsible for counterinsurgency and strengthening the cooperation with the neighboring country to the south; the SBPAC was responsible for reinforcing the development of state welfare, building an understanding with the local people, and monitoring inappropriate behavior of civil officials. Figure 6 shows the revised September 2006 organization chart of the NSC.
Figure 6. NSC Organization Chart Revised September 2006. From the Office of the Prime Minister, Order 205/2006, October 30, 2006.
According to the ISOC structure, the ISOC intelligence element, which is controlled by the military alone, is the primary organization responsible for intelligence analysis. Other than that, there is the Situation Monitoring Division within the Internal Security Coordinating Center in the ISOC to monitor and follow-up on the situation. These two structures are duplicative and both their staffs are unclear as to their specific intelligence responsibilities because their missions are so much alike (General Kasem Yuktavira, June 18, 2007, personal interview with author). Furthermore, the NIA did not set up a National Intelligence Coordinating Center and did not assign any such Center to the ISOC to integrate the intelligence tasks at the policy level, so that there are no agencies from other intelligence organizations participating in intelligence performance at the national level. Likewise, the Intelligence Element of the 4th Internal Security Operations Region (ISOR) is subordinated to only the military to integrate the intelligence tasks. For intelligence operations, there is the 4th ISOR Intelligence Coordinating Center that is responsible for intelligence operation, but it is assigned under operational control of the CPM43 Joint Intelligence Center. The CPM43 is the subordinate unit of the 4th ISOR but it controls the operation of the 4th Intelligence Coordinating Center. The reason for this kind of command structure, assigned at the order of the office of Prime Minister, is to increase the effectiveness of intelligence cooperation and operation for CPM43 in rapidly pursuing the situation. Yet, this management structure creates an overlap in the chain of command and decreases the unity of the command.
Generally, the main concept of the recent structure is helpful for allocating responsibility to the respective military and civilian missions. But in practice, the military is still the main organization responsible for all operations, a factor which causes less integration and participation from various agencies. In fact, it is clear that the SBPPC structure in November 2004 provided the most effective integration of administrative functions. The SBPPC at that time received complete authority to make decisions and access all resources available to solve problems.

Nevertheless, the evolution of the structure could not increase the efficiency of intelligence operations. This is because the organizational nature of the administration adheres to military direction which demands that the staff section scrutinize each task before submitting it to the decision maker. Additionally, a military organization often works along a chain of command and its culture ties rank to position. This structure is then the reason for a reluctance on the part of various analysts to express opinions, thwarting their comments regarding the very intelligence analysis that requires consideration of diverse points of view.

The insurgency situation in southern Thailand is not a conventional war, but it is an irregular war that needs cooperation from all involved organizations, especially law enforcement. However, the military organization remains somewhat slow to adapt a realistic concept of operations, since it considers the situation to be like that of a conventional war. Particularly, the military intelligence operation considers the enemy to be an institution or unit,
rather than a network or clique. This approach affects the intelligence procedures, in that analysts have to dedicate time and effort to search for the insurgent leaders at each echelon of a hierarchical organization, when no hierarchy exists. This kind of situation requires rapid dissemination and the free sharing of information among agencies at low levels to rapidly pursue the situation and produce timely intelligence for tactical commanders.

Furthermore, intelligence organizations put emphasis on collection rather than analysis, so that most of the intelligence reporting is somewhat scattered and accumulated at the analysis section without sufficient integration to create an entire picture of what would be useful in eliminating the insurgent organizations.

In the case of the responsible government organization, it must re-adjust its structure and administration in order to improve and allow all agencies to access information both faster and simultaneously as a network—not a hierarchy—and facilitate access among all levels. This does not mean transforming the bureaucracy into a network, but it means applying the benefit of networks that are embedded in hierarchical organizations to increase the speed and efficiency for cooperation and the sharing of information (Senior Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 20, 2007, and Colonel Jaturong Juntaranont, June 21, 2007, personal interviews with author).
III. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

A. THE MALAYAN STATE OF EMERGENCY: EXAMINATION OF SUCCESS

1. Historical Background of the Malayan State of Emergency

The Malayan insurgency originated from an anti-colonial movement in the 1920s which utilized the Russian Revolution as an inspiration. The Chinese in Malaya were the initiators of the movement which gained less support from other races in the country. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and Malayan General Labor Union (MGLU) were formed in April 1930. Initially, they did not gain much support, but in 1933 they recovered and became popular among Chinese students in particular.

After 1937, the Japanese threat had increased; however, the MCP did not cooperate with the Western Colonial Administrators until the Japanese invaded Malaya. The Chinese community was permitted to form a military force and was armed by the British to fight the Japanese. However, the cooperation between the MCP and the British occurred for only two months because of the British Force surrender to the Japanese in Singapore on February 15, 1942, causing the Resistance Force to be terminated. After that time the MCP formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), a force which was finally accepted by the U.S. and British to be the frontal resistance organization operating behind the Japanese line. The organization received a lot of arms support from the British and kept some of the weapons for
postwar use. The British anticipated those arms would be used in the large-scale war with the Japanese, but the war ended unexpectedly after the atomic bombing of Japan.

On September 5, 1945, the British moved back to reestablish control over Malaya again, but this time they found that many areas were occupied by the MPAJA. However, the British agreed to acknowledge the MPAJA with an official military status under the control of the British military. Afterward, the British began negotiations to convince the MPAJA leaders to disband their organization. Meanwhile, the MPAJA leaders expected the British to accept their organization as a permanent military force that would augment or replace the Malaya Regiment. The MPAJA leaders realized that their hope of the MPAJA remaining a permanent military force was unrealistic but, nevertheless, they decided to disband the MPAJA, and replace it with a number of front organizations of a traditional Communist character within the MCP, which was later named the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA).

During 1945-1948 the MCP was recognized as a legitimate organization and admired for its role in the war. During the same time period, the MCP shifted its effort to labor agitation in an attempt to destabilize the government, and it also turned its operational attention to terror. As the situation deteriorated, the government declared a state of emergency on June 19, 1948. Nonetheless, the government could not contain the violence, due to the ongoing disorder from the previous wartime. The economy had not yet
recovered, the administrative structure was under-manned, the security forces were under-strength, and some areas were occupied by the MCP.

2. Insurgents’ Movements and Tactics

At the time of the declaration of a state of emergency in June 1948, the number violent incidents increased dramatically. The insurgents conducted intense operations against rubber and tin business groups in order to disrupt the principal economic industries in Malaya, while simultaneously disrupting the administrative system. Initially, the MCP had prepared for a mass uprising which did not occur. In the meantime, the government security force was more firmly reinforced and thus the situation remained calm for a short time. At that point, the insurgents readjusted their strategy and decided to use the Maoist pattern of insurrection. Their strategy was to attempt to control selected rural areas and declare those to be liberated areas where there was no local administration. After that, the people in those areas would be organized into guerrilla units and then moved out of the liberated areas to take over the entire country.

Although the British and the government of Malaya cooperated and struck back aggressively, containing the situation at hand, violent incidents occurred continuously until the assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in October 1951. In October, before the assassination, the MCP had directed the stoppage of indiscriminate terror threats against innocent people because of the concern that the MCP would lose popularity and much needed local support. Ultimately, the MCP realized
that the insurgency would never reach its objective and the MCP leader, Chin Peng, hinted at a desire for peace in late 1955. Simultaneously, the government of Malaya offered amnesty and continued to pressure the MCP which resulted in substantial surrenders from 1957-1958. Eventually, in 1960, the insurgent strength and activities diminished until the government of Malaya cancelled the state of emergency.

3. The U.K./Government of Malaya Policy and Strategy

Efforts at eliminating problems by the British and the government of Malaya improved gradually over time, even though the initial attempts at solving some of the problems were somewhat confusing and went slowly. Eventually, the process of trial and error enabled the British and the government of Malaya to separate the insurgents from the people. Such a response was conducted by restricting the insurgent boundaries and breaking the insurgents’ external support by the populace. The efforts of the British and the government of Malaya succeeded because they used multifaceted techniques utilizing all sources from the civilian to the military, and were flexible enough in their strategy to conform to the nature of the insurgent threat. They did not use military action as their main effort, but they still maintained a military capability in a limited role and employed police as a military element for aspects of security.

a. Balanced, Multifaceted Response

This multifaceted approach involved balancing responses from among the civil, police, and military elements. This technique was designed to capitalize on all
resources and capabilities which were available in local areas rather than requesting them from the outside. It also placed the main emphasis on civilian response over that of the military.

b. Territorial Framework

This approach involved assigning areas of operation based on the local administrative structure from the village to district, state, and federal levels respectively. This included military force which was assigned to the same pattern: a brigade for the state, a battalion for the district. All operations worked through the channels of the local administrative structure.

c. Unified Management

This aspect entailed working via a British-style committee system, which followed the local administrative structure on each level, from village to federal. Eventually the principle of civilian supremacy proved effective, and the policy was centralized, but the execution of the policy was decentralized from the state to the village level.

d. Reliance on Intelligence

Emphasizing intelligence effort was significant to the strategy’s success. The British and the government of Malaya did not build up a large military intelligence unit, but instead expanded and strengthened the police special branch, and exerted the intelligence effort by inducing insurgent defectors and applying other forms of psychological warfare.
e. **Separating the Insurgents from the People**

The insurgents in the jungle heavily relied on support from the civilian population; they could not survive if they were separated from the population. Therefore, the British and the government of Malaya launched a series of programs to separate the insurgents from the people; these ranged from registration, resettlement, and food control to denying access to the insurgents.

f. **Satisfying Popular Aspirations**

The British and the government of Malaya sought to temper the opposite impact of such tough control measures by using other parallel efforts to improve the economic situation and to raise social services in order to gain popular support from people. They initiated the development program in rural areas, and attempted to persuade the Malay-Chinese to participate in the Malaya political process to gain what they wanted as an alternative to starting a revolution. They also established the ultimate goal of a sanctioned independence for all Malayans in an effort to undermine the MCP movement.

Despite the British and the government of Malaya’s implementation of this strategy, it was inadequate. There were many other problems such as lack of unity of command, not enough intelligence, and poor coordination between the military and police.

Subsequently, the British and the government of Malaya agreed to have one individual assume responsibility for the integrity of command and control. The British government appointed LTG. Harold Briggs (retired) to be the
Director of Operations. He developed the “Briggs plan” as a framework for counterinsurgency operations, and his plan was the archetypal plan that underwent further modifications until the end of state of emergency. The plan defined a series of operations as follows:

- Separate the insurgents from the people: Briggs prioritized the resettling of Chinese squatters to the new villages where they got better protection and were closely monitored by authorities.

- Formalize and strengthen the counterinsurgency management system: Briggs gave formal interference to the top level administration by creating an informal committee at each level of the local administration structure.

- Strengthen intelligence as the key to the anti-guerrilla operations: Briggs placed this effort on the police special branch.

- Deploy security forces on a primarily territorial basis: Briggs assigned military troops at the brigade level to the state, the battalion level to the district, and the smaller unit down to the lower level along the local administrative structure instead of deploying large military elements throughout the area. He also organized the community volunteer guards, as well as the mine, plantation, and village guards.

This effort was the crucial turning point in the state of emergency situation; even though the result was not rapidly effective, it still alleviated the crisis. Nevertheless, the war was not at an end because the people in the rural areas were still suffering and the insurgents remained an influence. The assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in October 1951 encouraged the British and the government of Malaya to launch new endeavors.
During 1952-1954, the fallout from the assassination of the British High Commissioner made the British government send the new Minister of Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, to Malaya. He made six chief recommendations to remedy situation:

- Unify control of civil and military forces.
- Reorganize and training of police forces.
- Increase educational effort, especially in the primary schools.
- Improve protection of the resettlement areas.
- Enlarge the community guard volunteer, including the Chinese community.
- Review the civil service selective procedure to ensure getting the best people.

In 1952, the British and the government of Malaya started an offensive, and the insurgents fell short of food and had less control of the population. Also, in 1953, the government declared a “white area” policy to reinforce their strategy by canceling the state of emergency in those areas where there were no insurgents (R.W. Kommer, 1972).

B. EXPLAINING ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT OUTCOMES: STRATEGIC INTERACTION.

1. Strategic Interaction

In every fight, regardless which strategy is used, there is always a counterstrategy. Each actor can predict and verify the opponent’s attempts to seek a counterstrategy, as well as calculate how to reduce his own damages. In that regard there are two potentials of strategies and counterstrategy: direct and indirect.
a. Direct Strategic Approach

This is an approach in which both factions of attack and defense use conventional maneuvers. Targets of the campaign aim to destroy the opponent’s armed forces, fighting as soldier-to-soldier, and following the rules of engagement.

b. Indirect Strategic Approach

This is an approach that is free from a pattern, but both factions use all kinds of means to conquer their opponent, including murdering, torturing, or detaining noncombatants.

In each of the two strategic approaches, if the same approach or interactions were applied (that is, indirect vs. indirect or direct vs. direct), the strong actors are likely to win. In the case of applying contrasting approaches or interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), the weak actors are likely to win. The results of this are shown below in Figure 7. Due to the fact that the weak actors avoid colliding with strong actors, they try to extend the length of the actual conflict to gain an advantage (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 34).
2. Main Theory: Strategic Interaction and Conflict Outcomes

a. Strategy 1 — Direct Offense vs. Direct Defense

"When strong actors attack using a direct strategic approach, and weak actors defend using a direct strategic approach, all other things being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively" (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 38).
b. **Strategy 2 — Direct Offense vs. Indirect Defense**

“When strong actors attack with a direct strategic approach and weak actors defend using an indirect approach, all other things being equal, weak actors should win” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 39).

c. **Strategy 3 — Indirect Offense vs. Direct Defense**

“When a strong actor attacks with an indirect strategic approach against a weak actor defending with a direct strategic approach, all other things being equal, the strong actor should lose” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 41).

d. **Strategy 4 — Indirect Offense vs. Indirect Defense**

“When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with a GWS, all other things being equal, strong actors should win” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42).

These four strategic interaction outcomes in theory suggest that the interactions are either same-approach or opposite-approach strategic interactions. This can bring about a single theory:

e. **Strategy 5**

“Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42).
3. Alternative Theories

a. Strategy 6

“The better armed a weak actor is, the more likely it is that a strong actor will lose an asymmetric conflict” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42).

Additionally, the remarkable characteristic of actors leads to the alternative theories:

b. Strategy 7(a)

“Authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars more often than do democratic strong actors” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42).

c. Strategy 7(b)

“Authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars in which the weak actor uses an indirect strategy more often than do democratic strong actors” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005, p. 42).
Figure 8. Application of Strategy Interactions to inquire the Thai government’s strategy based upon model by Arreguin-Toft, 2005.

Since January 2004, the situation in the south of Thailand has remained violent. The insurgents can easily create violence daily by using camouflaged attacks, bombings, and arson. The local authorities and official locations are the insurgents’ main targets in order to continually create fear among the people who would like to assist the authorities. Even though, after the military coup in September 2006, the new administration was supposed to achieve peace by containing the situation through use of its absolutely power, in reality, the new administration could not because it was not an absolutely authoritarian strong actor, as suggested in Strategy 7(b), “Authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars in which the weak actor uses an indirect strategy more often than do democratic strong actors” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005).

The new administration did not enforce any temporary rules to facilitate the authorities’ control of the southern provinces; the administration still continued
to perform following the primary law of a democratic strong actor because the administration feared a negative popular reaction. Since violent incidents have occurred, the Thai government has been using the direct strategic approach in fighting the indirect strategic approach of insurgents by deploying conventional forces in the hopes that they would contain the situation.

Although the development of the government structure is comprised of civilian, police, and military agencies, the main campaign has been driven by the military. However, the military thinkers consider the problem to be similar to a conventional war in which the military achieves readiness with full troops and equipment, and then overcomes the resistance within a short time. The military has tried to calculate the insurgents forces by units following the conventional war concept in order to prepare military troops to fight. Almost four years have passed and the situation has proven that the Thai government cannot contain the violent incidents. Nevertheless, the Thai government still attempts to maintain a conventional strategy based on a preponderance of military troops with the belief that the stronger actor will win, but increasingly the troops themselves become the victims (General Kasem Yuktavira, June 18, 2007, personal interview with author, and NIA Insurgency Situation Report, 2006). Meanwhile, the insurgents know that the Thai government cannot use large bodies of troops to quell them because they are embedded in the population and gain their advantage from using the indirect strategic approach. The insurgents have never confronted the authorities because of their disadvantage of fewer weapons; instead they use hit-and-run tactic to compensate for their
inferiority. Currently the situation is a stalemate; the Thai government cannot eradicate the insurgent network and the insurgents also cannot attain their goal. However, this stalemate situation leaves the Thai government at a distinct disadvantage because it can not initiate action, but must play following the insurgents’ lead. It is obvious that the Thai government tries to conquer insurgents by using Strategy 2 (direct offense vs. indirect defense); meanwhile the insurgents try to achieve their goal by using the Strategy 3 (indirect offense vs. direct defense). The remaining violent incidents have shown that the direct strategic approach can not improve the situation. Therefore, the Thai government should shift their strategy to Strategy 4 (indirect offense vs. indirect defense) to seize the advantage.

C. MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL

The Mystic Diamond Model developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School is shown below in Figure 9.
1. Players

   a. Insurgency

   This element is comprised of a group of people who support an insurgency. The insurgency strives to discredit the government and to threaten the population into not cooperating with the authorities.

   b. Government

   The government is comprised of civilian, police, and military organizations which have the responsibility of the counterinsurgency.
c. Population

This group represents all the people who live in the area of conflict. This includes those people who may be members of an insurgency, who actively or passively sympathize with the insurgency, or who choose to stay on the side of the government.

d. International Community

This group constitutes a form of external support which may involve state or non-state actors.

2. Strategy

a. Control the Population

Both players try to win the support of the populace in order to gain the advantage. Controlling the population helps the government to gather information necessary to search for the mainstay of the insurgency, while the insurgency strives to controls the population in order to acquire infrastructure and embed itself into the population.

b. Breaking Relations from the Population

This involves breaking the opponent’s support from the population in order to predominate over the opponent. From the government’s perspective, separating the population from the insurgency and denying insurgents access to the infrastructure are essential.
c. **Strive**

This action involves using forces against the opponent to attack, destroy, disrupt, or capture the other.

d. **Interdict External Support**

This action involves using preventive measures to interdict the insurgency to obtain external resources including finances, training, and ideology. Both players need to achieve a status of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

e. **Restrict External Sponsors**

This involves using diplomacy as a way to create a relationship and understanding with the international community. From the government’s perspective, pursuing this strategy will restrict the insurgency from gaining support while also encouraging the government to assume a greater degree of righteousness.

3. **Execute Strategy**

This strategy must be performed sequentially beginning with Strategies 1-3 and proceeding dynamically to Strategies 4-5. Meanwhile, the government must achieve Strategy 1 then move to Strategy 2, and then Strategy 3, with the previous strategies still ongoing. Strategies 4-5 may be performed sequentially at the same time as Strategies 1-3, depending on the situation.
D. APPLYING THE MYSTIC DIAMOND MODEL OF DR. GORDON H. MCCORMICK

The Application of the Mystic Diamond Model (McCormick, 2006) can be applied, as a theory, in order to inquire as to what the Thai government’s actual strategy is. This model demonstrates how both the insurgents and the government succeed or fail.

Figure 10. An Application of the Mystic Diamond Model based upon model by Dr. Gordon H. McCormick, 2006.

1. The Players

a. Separatists

The separatists strive to discredit the government and to threaten the population into not cooperating with the
authorities. The aim of this group is to separate the three southern provinces from Thailand. The main groups playing key roles in a wave of violence are the BRN Co-ordinate, NEW PULO, and GMIP under the guidance of the BERSATU organization using the issues of history, race (Pattani-Malay), religion and cultural schisms as the focal points of bitter campaigns. They essentially want to create a separate Muslim state which unifies both faith and governance. Particularly, they seek to mobilize the young Muslims of the south into taking up arms and conducting an insurgency. The religious leaders constitute the key group of people influencing the young Muslims. There are two main groups of Thai Muslim leaders in the region. Muslim fundamentalists, as well as those who are separatists, can be divided into two tracks:

- Islamic teachers, such as the owners of Muslim religious schools, or pondoks, and Islamic clergy.
- Islamic practitioners, such as the Provincial Islamic Committee and Mosque Committee.

b. The Thai Government

The Thai government is comprised of civilian, police, and military organizations that, in this case, have the responsibility for the counterinsurgency in Thailand.

c. The Population

The population consists of all the people living in the southernmost area of Thailand, including Thai-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists. These people may be members of an insurgency, or they may actively or passively sympathize with the insurgency, or they may choose to stay on the side
of the government. They are the targets of separatists for recruitment, organizing, and supervision in order to support the insurgents’ needs for survival.

d. International Community

This is a form of external support which may involve state actors, particularly OIC (Organization of Islamic conference) and Muslim countries, and non-state actors which may be other terrorist groups or other organization that may support separatists unintentionally, such as Non-government Organizations (NGOs) and the media.

2. The Strategy

a. Control the Population

Both the Thai government and the separatists must win the support of the populace in order to gain an advantage. The Thai government expects to gain information to search for the mainstay of the insurgency, while the insurgency expects to acquire an infrastructure and embed itself into the population.

b. Breaking Relations from the Population

This involves breaking the opponent’s support from the population in order to predominate over the opponent. The Thai government tries to eliminate separatists from the population; meanwhile the separatists try to retain the population as a cover for its organization and activities.
c. **Strive**

Using forces against the opponent to attack, destroy, disrupt, or capture the other.

d. **Interdict External Support**

This strategy focuses on denying the separatists external support. Similar to Strategy 2, the Thai government has to disrupt the relationship between the separatists and the international community. Both sides require a perceived status of legitimacy in order to obtain international support.

e. **Restrict External Sponsors**

The Thai government has to maintain a good relationship with the international community, because such a relationship can affect both the strengths and weaknesses between the Thai government and the separatists. For example, the Thai government can gain a force advantage with troops and equipment, but it still requires the support of the international community to gain legitimacy. By comparison, the separatists may gain resources, training, and personnel from the international community, whether such support is from Muslim countries, other terrorism organizations, or other external organizations. The separatists can also use the international community to force further restrictions on the Thai government. For example, the separatists may manipulate Non-government Organizations (NGO’s) to force the Thai government to accept
international agreements concerning human rights; and meanwhile, the separatists are not forced to accept similar agreements.

3. **Execute Strategy**

This strategy requires the government to prioritize the internal security aspect by sequentially performing Strategies 1-3 and then proceeding dynamically to Strategies 4-5. This is because the external security aspect does not have much influence on the situation. Meanwhile, as the government achieves Strategies 1-3 and then moves to Strategies 4-5, the previous strategies must still be maintained.

E. **CONCLUSION**

For twelve years during the Malayan state of emergency, the British and the government of Malaya used the same strategy with the guerillas (indirect-indirect) as indicated by Strategy 5, “strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions” (Arreguin-Toft, 2005). They did not deploy large bodies of troops to engage the guerillas, but they assigned troops along side the local administrative structure, and they limited the military role to one of only support. The main responsibility was on the civilians and the police. The crucial solution to the Malayan state of emergency is, according to the Mystic Diamond Model, to prioritize the control of the population as the first step toward gaining cooperation and information, then move to break the support received by the guerillas from the population and deny the guerillas access to the
infrastructure, and then to attack once the guerillas can be identified and located. Since the resurrection of violence in the south of Thailand in January 2004, the insurgents have shifted their strategy by transitioning from a hierarchical to a decentralized organization and changing their areas of conflict from the jungle to the urban areas.

The previous strategy was similar to a direct-direct interaction that caused the insurgents to have a disadvantage in tactics and weapons. They restructured their organization to be less hierarchical by scattering into small cells throughout the area, avoiding engaging the authorities, and secretly making trouble in the urban areas. Meanwhile, the authorities remained focused on the previous strategy in the pattern of direct-indirect interaction, thus the government would not be able to seize the initiative. Although the insurgents cannot achieve their objective, they can easily make trouble and inflict trouble on the authorities that can destabilize the government. The Thai government currently utilizes only one strategy to improve the situation: reinforcing troops in the area even though they cannot see where the insurgents are.

The Thai government should convert their strategy by turning to indirect-indirect interaction and assigning the main authority and leadership in this strategy to the civilians and police. This is because the situation in the south of Thailand is actually an asymmetric conflict that requires various dimensions of solutions. In this case, the solution is not in fighting on the battlefield to occupy the opponent’s territory, but the solution is related to the realignment of several state agencies that need cooperation
among the civilian, police, military, and law enforcement agencies. Also, the Thai government should limit the role of the military to securing government offices and preparing for reinforcements as requested, and the main responsibility should be placed on a civil official who works in the local administration structure. And according to the Mystic Diamond Model, the sequence for conducting this strategy should change from mainly using force to suppress insurgents to one of separating the population from the insurgents in order to obtain and forward information to the appropriate forces in order to apprehend the right perpetrator. This strategy can be presented to the population as a way of letting them know that the government does not fight randomly.
IV. NETWORK ORGANIZATION MODEL

A. THE THAI GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION STYLE

The Thai government has reorganized the structure and administration of the organization responsible for southern Thailand four times, the most recent organization being called the ISOC (Internal Security Operation Command). Yet the violence in the south has remained, along with the possibility for it to become even worse. This situation indicates that the current strategy has failed, due to the fact that the problems cannot be solved through the utilization of the military organization alone; the solution requires the integration and cooperation of various agencies. Additionally, civilians should assume leadership for the solution, and the military should be placed in a supportive role. In the Thai bureaucratic culture, however, anything involving security issues is often assigned to the military without consideration for the other aspects of the problem, and that bureaucratic culture is too complicated to change. The specific situation in southern Thailand, however, requires the integration of various administrative, political, security, educational, social welfare, and development efforts in order to solve the problem (Thai Senate, 2004c). That integration also includes coordination among the government, civil and private sectors, and especially coordination of the private agencies responsible for the critical infrastructure service. This is because the government sector, specifically the military, does not know about infrastructure vulnerability and does not, by itself, have the capabilities to recover from damages caused to the
infrastructure by insurgent attacks, specifically to the railroads and powerhouses that are always targeted. The structure of the Thai governmental organization responsible for the situation in southern Thailand should incorporate specialists from all the Thai governmental agencies and private agencies and then apply their pooled competencies to solve the problems, and not just rely on the capability of the military alone (Senior Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 20, 2007, personal interview with author).

Additionally, the ISOC administration mostly adheres to conventional war measures that commit decisions to a chain of command by using a command and staff decision making process. This administrative structure mainly relies on the planning of staff officers who, after receiving approval from the higher command, disseminate to subordinate units a plan which directs them, in turn, to develop a subordinate plan based upon the directives of the higher command.

The problems with this structure are at least three fold: depending on the staff officers involved, the work flow process may go slowly; a lack of individual thinking and participation may occur, and all suggestions must be submitted for consideration by staff officers before being submitted to an actual decision maker. In the case where staff officers disagree with, dislike, or do not understand a suggestion, the suggestion will simply be discarded. In particular, problems that may not be related to the use of military force may lead to circumstances where the staffs’ consideration may be mistaken, or staff officers may not relay all the facts to the decision maker. Nonetheless, the military style does retain one good feature in that the
operation being considered will result in a rapid success if the plan is good. Unfortunately, the problems of southern Thailand do not only involve security, but they are related to political, administrative, judicial, and developmental issues. The developmental issue itself is significant in that it encompasses equity in treatment, understanding and acceptance of the differences in the Thai-Malay culture.

Recognizing the military’s administrative style when engaged in conventional war and its slow adaptation to the distinctive situation, the military cannot handle the problems that concern law enforcement and the population. The situation indicates that the former strategy is ineffective, and suggests a need to readjust both the structure of the security organization and the strategy to pursue the distinctive threat environment (Thai Senate, 2004c).

Unfortunately, reorganizing a regular bureaucratic organization is almost impossible. This is due to the fact that the responsibilities of a bureaucratic organization are constrained by many laws and regulations. A possible way to accomplish this restructuring, though, is by improving the authorization process in order to allow greater flexibility, participation, and coordination in the decision making process. Despite the fact that working in the ISOC demands one follow the regulations and chain of command, in reality most commanders and staffs frequently do not following the regulations; instead they either work across the lines of command, or they directly contact commanding officers by relying instead on familiar or personal relations. In that
regard, faxes, cell phones, and ordinary internet usage without security have all become very popular tools.

These informal connections from personal relationships provide for flexibility in accomplishing tasks, but these connections only occur as a result of individuals’ abilities, not as a product of the system. Those staff personnel who have widely established connections can accomplish their jobs quickly. The informal procedures reduce the time needed and allow for short cuts from the regular procedures, so that is the informal procedures are accepted implicitly. Intelligence tasks in particular require rapid reporting and coordination. Most intelligence staff members broadly use their informal connections. Even commanding officers in each command level frequently ignore standing operating procedures because an informal connection in the form of a network allows them to coordinate and make decisions faster, rather than waiting first for a formal report. Since the informal network already exists, it should easily facilitate the transition to the improved working procedures of a networked organization.

However, one limitation of the informal connection is that there is no information center where involved agencies can access shared information, but each agency must directly contact the people who possess the information, and those people may not always be available. Therefore, the establishment of an information center may alleviate this limitation through the use of information technology which would not only store and arrange the information, but determine who can access it (Senior Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, June 20, 2007, personal interview with author).
Besides being slow to adapt to and cope with an asymmetric conflict environment, the conventional military strategy of using troops may produce other negative consequences, among them the spreading of hate, the advancement of the insurgency’s credibility, and the perception that small scale incidents are far greater and more significant than they are in actuality (Yuktavira, 2005-2006).

In conclusion, the primary administration of the ISOC relies on a military style of decision-making that follows the chain of command, but in actuality, an informal network is frequently used to increase the speed of coordination. It is not necessary for The Thai government to restructure the bureaucracy of the entire organization, it is only necessary to improve the work process and decentralize the authority. Information technology will enhance the capability of the network by allowing all agencies to exchange and disseminate information in real time.

B. SEPARATISTS MOVEMENT

The separatists in southern Thailand have used Islamic doctrine to create credibility for their propaganda. They have committed violence in urban areas in order to stimulate the Thai authorities into using military and police forces to intensely suppress them. This strategy is very successful because the government suppression then encourages the local population to have sympathy and support for the separatists, and such suppression may also provide the insurgents with financial support from Muslims abroad.
Currently, separatism recruitment has targeted young Muslims to be converted and trained for the movement. Moreover, some separatist members who live in foreign countries have created a website for spreading news about the violations of human rights inflicted upon Malay Muslims in southern Thailand. Consequently the violent incidents caused by insurgents are now occurring within a greater area and threatening not only the Buddhist people, but also many Muslim people who may assist the government officials (Ampunan, 2005).

From captured documents and interrogation reports, intelligence analysts discovered that at least ten years ago the separatists had shifted their strategy of fighting from the jungles to the urban areas. The current strategy uses the affiliations between the Islamic religious teachers and young Muslims as the core basis for procuring fellowship in the local area. That procurement occurred silently during the time when there was no violence in southern Thailand. It is possible that now the separatists have formed a hard-core group among villages which is inducing and instilling the notion of denying the Thai authorities. The local leaders in those villages may be a hard-core group or supporter, whether voluntary or by coercion. The criteria of the selection process for joining the separatists focuses on young Muslim males who are physically fit, strictly religious, exhibit good behavior, and have a grievance with the Thai authorities. Inducements mainly rely on kinship and friendships that develop from socializing with neighbors, as well as affinities among those who attend mosques and Muslim religious schools.
Religious teachers have the greatest influence on young Muslims; likewise, the young Muslims earnestly believe and obey their religious teachers. Such obedience seems irrational, even though there is evidence that indicates that religious teachers break the law, but the obedience seldom deteriorates. This demeanor reflects what Sageman said about social affiliation, “discipleship is unique to the Southeast Asian cluster and accounts for about 8% of Mujahedin who joined the jihad. In Southeast Asia, teachers command strong personal loyalty from their students” (Sageman, 2005, pp. 113-114).

Once these young people have selected, they receive basic training about weapons and sabotage tactics. After that, they are brought to a swearing in ritual with the Koran to ensure that they will not divulge anything to outsiders. After that, they will be assigned simple jobs to reinforce self-confidence, such as arson on public utilities, destroying crops, or placing road spikes. Young people who can pass these procedures easily will be evaluated again to verify the potential that they can go forward to create more violent incidents. Those people who cannot pass this procedure will be assigned to support roles like monitoring the movements of authorities.

In operations, small teams of the separatists forces are scattered throughout the area, with four to five members in each team, in order to make trouble in many places at the same time. They usually have contact through a coordinator or by using prepaid cell phone SIM cards to cover the identities of the coordinators. The prepaid cell phone is very advantageous because it does not register an owner,
thus making it is easy for anyone to deny possession and throw away. Each member in a team may not know any of the members in the other teams except for the team leader. This arrangement allows the team leader and mastermind of the plan to easily escape without clues to his identity. Additionally, some religious teachers use occultism to arouse aggressive, daring behavior, such as using only a big knife or a sword in fighting the authorities without fear. Evidence indicates that the use of occultism combined with separatism is captured in a document found on the dead body of an insurgent in the Krue Sae Mosque incident on April 28, 2004. That document is called “Sacred War,” and it instructs that:

- Pattani territory was occupied by Siam, and the Pattani-Malay lineage must strive to get it back; people who do not want to fight are viewed as betrayers.
- Follow the leader and dare to kill the enemy.
- Sacrifice to die for the protection of religious beliefs without fear.
- Do not worry about killing apostates, and Muslims who disagree with this instruction are also deemed apostates.

Additionally, the captured document indicates that this instruction was promulgated by a religious leader and is becoming a compulsory doctrine. Muslim people who do not follow this doctrine are viewed as wicked. Conversely, Muslims people who behave according to this doctrine and die fighting are viewed as religious warriors who will go to heaven (Thai Senate, 2004a, and NIA Insurgency Situation Report, 2006).
In summary, each separatist team and its supporting members move as a compartment in order to prevent contamination should some members either be apprehended or desert. Most members who joined the cause of separatism exhibited good behavior, were strictly religious, believed in separatism, and frequently had feelings of grievance and indigency. Nevertheless, some of those who joined the group may have been criminals or drug dealers, but they were instructed that the only way to alleviate their guilt was by dying for their religion. Religious teachers are the primary inducers because most young Muslim people pay respect to them.

A characteristic of a separatist organization is that it is a kind of network where each small group clings together with loose control. Robustness of a group depends on trust and relationships more than common ideology, ethnicity, and religious beliefs. The movement’s administration has no clear chain of command inside the organization and is decentralized. The top leader determines goals and direction; the local leader can freely make decisions to fight according to the leader’s direction. The weaving of the networks is the strong point that allows the separatist organization to survive any attempt at leadership decapitation. The weakness of the organization, however, is that the top leader cannot rigorously command the sub-groups; therefore, the small team leader may not maintain the desired direction and, arbitrarily, may either take risks to fight or, instead, choose not to fight (NIA Insurgency Situation Report, 2006).
C. THE CONCEPT OF RESTRUCTURING FROM A HIERARCHY TO A NETWORK

Intelligence in counterinsurgency is different from intelligence in conventional war because the insurgent organization was formed by a small group of people who share a common goal. They do not have an explicit structure in the form of a unit, and they do not carry weapons openly in fighting with authorities. An insurgency is like an asymmetric conflict, in that the strategy becomes one attacking authorities from behind their backs and escaping like criminals. For that reason, conventional intelligence cannot pursue insurgents, cannot maintain an insurgent’s order of battle as a unit, and has difficulty estimating the insurgents’ course of action. The suitable concept for performing intelligence in a counterinsurgency should be the combining of military intelligence and police intelligence operations. Military intelligence collects information to predict future operations, and police intelligence collects evidence to prove and apprehend perpetrators. Kyle Teamey and Jonathan Sweet point to the six distinct factors of intelligence in a counterinsurgency that are different from other forms of warfare:

1. Intelligence in a counterinsurgency is about people. The military must understand the local population in the respect of perceptions, values, beliefs, and the conditions driving the insurgency. These things will be the basis for collection and analysis effort.

2. Counterinsurgency is an intelligence war. Both sides need effective intelligence capabilities to gain an advantage. Therefore, they attempt to create and maintain intelligence networks and fight continuously to neutralize each other’s intelligence capabilities.
3. A feedback relationship existing between operations and intelligence is more important. This feedback can be a mutual benefit for the two sections. Effective intelligence drives effective operations, producing more intelligence. Ineffective or inaccurate intelligence drives ineffective operations, reducing the availability of intelligence.

4. All operations have an intelligence component. All service members can be intelligence collectors when in contact with the people. Therefore, all operations should always include intelligence requirements.

5. Intelligence mostly flows from the bottom up in a counterinsurgency, and all echelons both produce and consume intelligence. That means intelligence analysis at all levels should be integrated to analyze and create the whole picture of the situation.

6. Units at all echelons will operate in a joint, combined environment. Therefore, commanders and staff personnel at all echelons must coordinate intelligence collection and analysis with all agencies involved, not just the military (Teamey and Sweet, 2006).

In the case of southern Thailand, the restructuring of the Thai bureaucracy will need to consider structure, tools, and personnel at the level of the fourth Internal Security Operation Region (4th ISOR) and below.

1. **Restructuring the Organization**

The requirement of restructuring and work flow is to enable all agencies in the region to coordinate and exchange information rapidly in order to track insurgents who may move across many units’ areas of responsibility. Normally, intelligence would be passed in a hierarchical manner but that process does not work well because it is often slow and
cumbersome. In some environments, the situation may require commanders and staff to work across the field and chains of command.

a. Organizing the Intelligence Division

The intelligence division at all levels should be a combined organization with all its representatives from both the government and the private sector. This combined organization may have different units and account for different proportions, but it is based on the local environment and number of agencies in the area. The basic component should have six elements at each unit level: a civil official, a police official, a military official, as well as representatives from state enterprises, the private sector, and volunteer groups. The responsibilities of each agency in the six elements should cover many fields of problems and follow the work processes similar to those in the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) model. As John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker describe,

The TEW follows a networked approach, integrating law enforcement, fire, health and emergency management agencies to address the intelligence needs for terrorism and critical infrastructure protection. The TEW model is based on the premise that intelligence is more than 'secret information' about an adversary. Intelligence to address contemporary threats must go beyond mere descriptions of the threat actors (opposing force, OPFOR); it must also provide a range of users (investigators, emergency responders, planners, etc.) with assessed and accurate information about the situation they are managing. The TEW model describes
this process as 'all source/all phase' fusion. For the TEW, intelligence is derived from all potential sources (classified, sensitive but unclassified, and open sources or OSINT) to provide information at all phases of a threat/response (pre-, trans- and post-incident). The TEW assumes that information germane to an event is available from local through global sources. The immediate precursor for an attack may be in the local area, across the nation, a foreign nation, in cyberspace, or in a combination of all (Bunker, 2005).

Additionally, the intelligence staff at all levels should, as a requirement, maintain a list of contacts for intelligence sections, units and people who possess information. This list would enable personnel to rapidly find the person with whom they need to share intelligence. Also, it should record all types of communications such as telephone, facsimile, and internet in order to assure that all sections can contact each other in the case where the primary communication channels cannot be used (Teamey & Sweet, 2006).

b. Organizing the Process and Analytical Section

This section of the intelligence division at all levels should be divided into two cells:

• Analysis of enemy actions: To monitor a situation, provide preliminary analysis, warning, and produce intelligence reports to continuously keep the commander and staff informed of the current situation, especially one that may not be terminated in a short time such as a demonstration, hostage being captured, and being besieged.
• Network analysis cell: To categorize and organize information to analyze the interrelationship of a network for targeting, evaluating insurgency capability, and future planning.

Commanders frequently tend to concentrate on current situations more than network analysis. This is because the immediate situation may require a quick decision, while network analysis would be analyzed and scrutinized by a staff analyst for a long-term plan. However, the two cells have to sustain a sharing of information continuously in order to ensure that they understand the same situation and operational environment. Additionally, the intelligence process sections at all levels have to create a joint database on the insurgency order of battle to ensure that they are looking at the same picture. This is because information about the insurgency is scattered in bits and pieces that require consolidation and analysis to form an overall picture. To avoid error and confusion, therefore, the information about the insurgency at all levels should be formatted according to the same criterion so that, for example, analysts will not double-count insurgents due to spelling errors. The insurgents in southern Thailand, specifically, are Muslims who use Islamic names in the Jawi language, but spelling those names in the Thai language. If the intelligence sections do not use the same criterion for spelling a name, double-counting or apprehending the wrong people may occur.

2. Structure and Functionality of the Network

In the case of the insurgency in southern Thailand, there is the consideration of creating a network
organization based on administrative boundaries and obligations to the law of involved state agencies. Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe four basic network organizational types:

- **Chain**: each node communicates through the intermediate node.
- **Star, hub, or wheel**: a group of nodes that are tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node, and must go through that central node to communicate and coordinate with each other.
- **All-channel or full-matrix**: every node can connect to other nodes directly.
- **Hybrid**: a combination of the three types, depending on task, organization or other type of relationship that may require continuous coordination such as investigation, explosive disposal, or infrastructure (Bunker, 2005, p. 185).

The type of network that may be suitable for southern Thailand would be a hybrid network which is a combination between the star and all-channel types. The network should be divided into three levels, yet not be hierarchical: the 4\(^{th}\) Internal Security Operation Region (4\(^{th}\) ISOR), Civil-Police-Military 43 (CPM43), and Internal Security Operation Command-province (ISOC-province; 3 provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat). The level refers to the area of responsibility and framework. Overall the networks are comprised of five sub-networks, where each sub-network is comprised of six elements which are involved with eliminating problems. The six elements are as follows:

- **Civil official**: all civilian agencies from all the ministries that are involved with problems, such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and Ministry of Justice.
• Police: all types of police such as the Provincial Police Region, Narcotics Suppression Bureau, Border Patrol Police, and Immigration Bureau.

• Military: the regular Army, Special Forces, Army Ranger volunteers, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and paramilitary.

• State enterprises: all state enterprise agencies that are responsible for infrastructure service such as energy, telecommunications, and transportation.

• Private sector: all private elements that can assist the government including contractors, and companies that receive concessions to do business such as mobile phone companies, internet providers, stone crushing mills that use explosives, banks, and financial businesses.

• Volunteer groups: various volunteer groups such as public disaster relief volunteers, public health volunteers, and fire and rescue volunteers.

All six elements are bound by the tasks for which they are responsible. In case more agencies join the network, elements may be added by groups of tasks. Figure 11 shows the structure of the 4th ISOR network.
Forming the 4th Internal Security Operations Region (4th ISOR) network is based on the previous hierarchical organization, but, in this model, the hierarchical structure will be pressed into the network. The five networks are divided by task responsibility, area of responsibility, and administration boundary. The 4th ISOR network would be organized to meet the local environment, and it is influenced by such factors as threat assessment, intelligence requirements, and the specific needs of participating agencies. However, the network will primarily consist of agencies that are located within the local area.
Basically, the concept of the network is an all-channel network where every node in the five networks can directly connect with the other four, including the nodes located within the other networks.

The 4th ISOR network is responsible for the entire southern area, so its network will include all involved agencies in that region. These agencies may be located outside the three southern provinces, or they may be from the central government. The 4th ISOR HQs are responsible for network administration.

The CPM43 network is responsible for the three southern provinces, so its network is primarily comprised of all agencies that work in the role of general support for the three provinces. The CPM43 HQs are responsible for network administration.

The ISOC-Province network (Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces) network is primarily comprised of all agencies at the province level. The agencies that work within those provinces will be included, and the ISOC-Province HQs are responsible for network administration.

The internal structure of these networks is a star type with a hub, but the function of the hub is not as the medium for communication. In this case, the hub function is an information center for all surrounding nodes in each network where they can access and share information. All the nodes in these networks can contact directly all other network nodes either internally or externally as an all-channel network. However, in order for the networks to run properly, each must have a network manager who should be the commanding officer of that specific network. The network
manager has to thoroughly understand the mission and responsibility capability, and the limitation of each agency in order to integrate all tasks effectively (Department of the Army, 2006).

Additionally, the network manager should develop an organization chart within the network to describe the functions of each node. This chart will help to ensure that coordination among agencies goes smoothly; also, it is very useful in case someone is replaced or rotates positions. Once the chart is complete, it should be disseminated to all agencies to ensure that all staffs are fully informed.

3. Tools

The internet is a necessary tool for a network organization. Even though the network can run with other types of communication tools like the telephone or facsimile, the progress of information technology allows people to send large amounts of information rapidly along the internet such as texts, pictures, and sound. Additionally, computers and software can manage, categorize, and search information within a short amount of time. For the military structure, Teamey and Sweet (2006) suggest that, “to support counterinsurgency, companies should have tactical internet capabilities so that company commanders can rapidly share information on enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures in their area of operations” (p. 28). This way of sharing information enables companies to exchange information rapidly, especially about the lessons learned, enemy tactics in other areas, and provide timely warnings to other units. For the other agencies besides the military, the tactical internet capabilities should extend down to a
level that is equal to the company level. Additionally, the 4th ISOR, as the top level organization in the area, should set up the security measurements and criterion for permitting people to have the right to access the tactical internet.

4. Personnel

Intelligence personnel should be added to the company level and above. Particularly, the company level should have intelligence personnel available to work for the company commander. As suggested by Teamey and Sweet (2006), intelligence often flows from the bottom up in a counterinsurgency. The requirement of collecting, processing and analyzing will overwhelm those at the regiment level and below. Pushing analysts down to the company level would place them closer to collectors, would improve the overall intelligence picture, and would help higher echelon staff get the right answers for their priority information requirements. It is obvious that the intelligence capability of the tactical level unit is very important to intelligence analysis in counterinsurgency. The higher echelon can analyze and estimate insurgencies more accurately if the tactical level units provide intelligence reports of good quality.

Interpreter personnel should be added to the battalion level. This is because the local people in southern Thailand mostly speak the Jawi dialect, so the first step to understanding the people is understanding their language. Specifically, units that are rotated from the outside southern provinces area should add more linguists. Even if additional collectors and analysts are added to tactical
units, a lack of linguists can limit their effectiveness. Linguists are required to interact effectively with locals, conduct interrogations, translate captured documents or material, and perform other tasks.

Intelligence training for a counterinsurgency includes skills that are different from conventional intelligence; social and culture awareness in local areas are necessary for analysts to ensure that they can use their knowledge to help the commander estimate the social structure and culture in their areas of operations (Teamey and Sweet, 2006).

Lastly, fostering an understanding among all who work in the network is the most important requirement for running a network effectively. This understanding will enhance cooperation among representatives from different agencies and decrease competition between organizations. It will also decrease resistance from people who are familiar with the hierarchy organization by showing them that the network does not threaten their leadership nor reduce the authority of the commander. The work flow in the network facilitates the sharing and exchanging of information which then goes to everybody at the same time.
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V. CONCLUSION

Since Jan 04, 2004, the violent incidents in southern Thailand have become increasingly severe, and at the present time there is no indication that either the number of attacks or the severity of the violence will be reduced. The situation may indicate that the Thai government should reconsider its policy, strategy, and authorization process. Despite the fact that the Thai government has dedicated a significant amount of resources to the southern provinces to accelerate solving the problems, it cannot contain the violence or gain an initiative with which to press the separatists. Meanwhile, the insurgents assail the authorities continuously and create violence in order to deter the local population from cooperating with the authorities. The governmental organizations, led by military, have so far employed the strategy of conventional war by reinforcing troops into the southern areas whenever more violence occurs, and in the process they have continued to lose soldiers, even while the military remains unable to find the separatists. In light of this failure, the Thai government should shift its strategy of coping with insurgency. They should reduce the deployments of large bodies of conventional troops charged with containing the situation, while attempting to destroy the enemy; that strategy wastes troops because the government cannot discriminate between the insurgents and the population. Furthermore, the troops themselves are being targeted by the insurgents’ camouflaged attacks and, even worse, they are helping to create fear among local population whenever any
authorities are killed. Nevertheless, the people are frustrated with the situation because they worry about insurgents; meanwhile, the people also fear that the authorities will fight even more aggressively and violently in attempting to conquer the insurgents. According to the current strategy, the Thai government has emphasized suppression which indirectly has allowed the insurgents expand their influence because whenever the insurgents or innocent people are killed or injured by authorities while conducting an operation, the insurgents use that incident to gain sympathetic support.

The Thai government’s strategy should emphasize population control in order to gain information and cooperation, while at the same time attempting to separate insurgents from population. By this strategy, the authorities also must convince the local populations that they can protect the lives and property of the local residents, while simultaneously increasing confidence in the law enforcement agencies and the judicial process in order to foster trust in the government. Additionally, intelligence efforts should be increased to search for insurgents and to dismantle the insurgents’ organization.

With respect to the administration, some components of the Thai bureaucratic structure and work authorization process should be readjusted to a form of network structure, thereby facilitating the coordination and rapid exchange information among all agencies in order to pursue the movements of insurgents. Moreover, the security internet should be set up to speed up the communication system and to facilitate maintaining a database and rapid search
capability for information. Lastly, building an understanding among the representatives from each agency participating in the network is important. This is because such an understanding can reduce the competition among the agencies and decrease resistance from those people who are familiar with working within the culture of a hierarchical organization. In particular, military organizations should understand that working within a network does not mean a reduction in authority or a loss of respect for the commander in the chain of command.
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